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CODE OF GEORGIA-SUPPLEMENT
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
§ 4 (§ 4.) Construction of statutes.
See notes to section 3092.
Conistructiton of By-Law.—Pursuant to paragraph 1 of
this section it is held that the words "Nominations from
the floor shall always be in order," in a by-law are to be
given their ordinary signification; and the plain and ob-
vious meaning of the language employed is that nomina-
tions from the floor are always in order until an election
has in fact been held. Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555,
146 S. F. 173.
Not a Question for Jury.—It should not be left to the jury
to determine whether a party could or could not substan-
tially comply with the code or amendatory laws. Lim^-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103,
128 S. F- 226.
Reasonable Care Insufficient.—Where a substantial com-
pliance with a statute by a railway company would be suffi-
cient, the duty of compliance to that extent would be abso-
lute, and the company would not have discharged the duty
merely by the exercise of reasonable care to that end. Lime-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103,
128 S. E\ 226.
When Last Day Falls on Sunday—Bill of Exceptions.
—
When the last day numerically for presenting the bill of ex-
ceptions for certification falls on Sunday, the presentation of
the bill of exceptions to the trial judge for certification upon
the next day, Monday, is not too late. Maryland Casualty
Co. v. England, 34 Ga. App. 354, 129 S. F. 446.
Service of Process.—The giving of "five days notice of the
time and place of hearing," required by section 5154, of a
petition for discharge filed by a defendant in a suit in trover,
who is held in imprisonment in default of bail, is not com-
plied with by serving the plaintiff, on the first day of May,
with notice that the time of hearing the petition will be on
the fifth day of May following. From the first day of May
to the fifth day of May is only four days. Hardin v. Mutual
Clothing Co., 34 Ga. App. 466, 129 S. F- 907.
Cited in Columbus v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 165 Ga. 259,
140 S. F. 860; Citizens & Southern Bank v. Taggart, 164
Ga. 351, 354, 138 S. F- 898; Mobley v. Chamblee, 39 Ga.
App. 645, 148 S. F. 306; Export Ins. Co. v. Womack, — Ga.
— , 142 S. F- 851.
Applied in suits brought by administrators in Allen v.
Allen, 39 Ga. App. 624, 147 S. F- 798; Willcox v. Beech-
wood Band Mill Co., 166 Ga. 367, 370, 143 S. F. 405.
§ 10 (§ 10.) Waiver of law.
See notes to §§ 3154(19), 3154(55).
Failure to Object to Motion for New Trial.—Any point of
practice which, if sound, would be fatal to a motion for a
new trial should be presented to the trial court by a motion
to dismiss the application for a new trial, and, if not so pre-
sented, will be considered as having been waived. Walker
v. Neil, 117 Ga. 733, 45 S. F. 387; Hopkins v. Jackson, 147
Ga. 821, 822, 95 S. F- 675; Fairburn v. Brantley, 161 Ga. 199,
130 S. F. 67.
Waiving Process.—A person is entitled to legal service,
but may waive service of the original suit by appearing and
pleading to the merits. Failure to serve a motion for new
trial will afford ground upon which the motion must be dis-
missed, but the failure may be waived. Fairburn v. Brant-
ley, 161 Ga. 199, 130 S. F- 67.
§ 13 (§ 13.) Bonds taken by officers.
Failing as Statutory Bond—Good as Common Law Bond.—
Where a bond was made payable to the levying officer and
was conditioned to deliver the property at the time and place
of sale but no affidavit of illegality was ever filed or at-
tempted to be filed, the bond taken is a good and valid ob-
ligation as a common-law bond and recovery on it can be
had. Mullis v. Kennedy, 143 Ga. 618, 85 S. F. 845, cited and
approved. Garmany v. Loach, 34 Ga. App. 722, 724, 131 S.
F. 108.
Cited in Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Norwood, 38 Ga. App. 534,
540, 144 S. F. 387.
THE POLITICAL CODE
FIRST TITLE
Divisions; of the Boundary, Sovereignty and Ju-
risdiction of the State
CHAPTER 3
Jurisdiction Ceded to the United States Over Cer-
tain Land
§ 26(a). Park's Code.
See § 26(1).
§ 26(1). Land for other public buildings.—The
consent of the State of Georgia is hereby given in
accordance with the 17th clause, 8th section, and
of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States, to the acquisition by the United
States by purchase, condemnation, or other-
wise, any land in this State which has been
or may hereafter be acquired for custom-houses,
post offices, arsenals, other public buildings what-
[
ever, or for any other government purposes. Acts
1927, p. 352.
§§ 26(b), 26(e). Park's Code.
See § 26(2).
§ 26(2). Same
—
Jurisdiction; exemption from
taxation.—The exclusive jurisdiction in and over
any land so acquired by the United States shall
be and the same is hereby ceded to the United
States for all purposes, except that the state re-
tains the right to serve thereon all civil and crimi-
nal processes issued under authority of the state;
but the jurisdiction so ceded shall continue no
longer than the said United States shall own such
lands.
The jurisdiction hereby ceded shall not vest
until the United States shall have acquired the
title to the said lands by purchase, condemnation
or otherwise; and so long as the said lands shall
remain the property of the United States when
acquired as aforesaid, and no longer, the same
shall be and continue exempt and exonerated from
all state, county, and municipal taxation, assess-
1]
§ 34 PENALTY FOR MANAGERS' DEFAULT § 84
ineiit, or other charges which may be levied or
imposed under authority of the state.
SECOND TITLE
Elections by the People
CHAPTER 1
Qualification of Voters
§ 34 (§ 32.) Qualification of voters.
Failure to Make Return of Taxes.—The failure of a tax
payer to make a return of his taxes as required by law is
not, without more, a ground for disqualifying him" as a voter
for members of the General Assembly. As to taxes, it is
only non-payment which will disqualify the voter, and even
then the exception in paragraph 3 must be considered.
Daniel v. Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S. E. 411.
CHAPTER 2
Registration of Voters
ARTICLE 2 ,
Method of Registering on Voters' Book
§ 42 (§ 42.) Oath to be read or repeated at re-
quest of applicant.
Signature Required.—One can not lawfully register as a
voter without signing his name in the voters' book in person
or by making his mark as prescribed by this section. Turk
v. Royal, 34 Ga. App. 717, 131 S. E. 119.
ARTICLE 5
List of Registered Voters, Who Entitled to
Vote
§ 61. Additional registration list.
See § 1551(133).
ARTICLE 8
Ballots, by Whom and Where Cast
§ 71. Voter changing residence.
Must Apply to Registrars.—One who had moved from an-
other county to that wherein an election was held, and, by
application to the tax-collector of the latter county, had had
his name transferred and entered upon the voters' book of
that county, but at no time had made any application to the
registrars thereof for such transfer, and had offered no proof
before them as to his qualifications to vote, was not qualified
to vote in such bond election. Turk v. Royal, 34 Ga. App.
717, 131 S. E. 119.
CHAPTER 3
Elections for Members of the General Assembly
ARTICLE 1
Managers of Election; Qualifications and Oath
§ 76. Superintendent of elections for mem-
bers of the legislature.
See section 1551(133).
ARTICLE 2
Election Precincts
§ 79. Election Precincts.
See notes to section 1551(133).
ARTICLE 3
Elections; When and How Held
§ 80(b). In certain counties.—In all counties in
the State of Georgia, having, by the United States
census of 1920 or any future census, a population
of not less than 14,501 and not more than 14,505
inhabitants, all election precincts which are lo-
cated as a whole or in part in an incorporated
city or town having a population of 1,000 or more
according to the 1920 census of the United States,
shall remain open on all election days, whether
general, special, primary or otherwise, from 7:00
o'clock a. m. to 6:00 o'clock p. m. ; provided
however, that the provisions of this section shall
not apply to elections that are held by the mu-
nicipal authorities or the local board of education.
Acts 1927, p. 130.
§ 82 (§ 72.) Manner of conducting elections.
Superintendents Cannot Recount Ballots.—Under the provi-
sions of this paragraph, superintendents of election have
neither power nor authority to examine or recount ballots
cast in a county election for the purpose of correcting er-
rors, whether the same be due to mistake or fraud as pre-
scribed by this and the next paragraph of the section. Bacon
v. Black, 162 Ga. 222, 133 S. E. 251.
Paragraph 9—Certificate Necessary to Complete Consoli-
dation.—The formal and completed consolidation of the vote
consists in the ascertainment from the face of the returns
of the vote cast for the respective counties and a declara-
tion of the result, and after that the issuance of the cer-
tificate prescribed in paragraph 9 of this section. Beasley
v. Bacon, 164 Ga. 557, 558, 139 S. E. 55.
ARTICLE 4
Penalty for Managers' Default
§ 84 (§ 74.) In case superintendents make false
return, etc.
Superintendent also Liable under iPenal Code.—If the num-
[2]
§ 121 PRIMARY ELECTIONS § 138(g-l)
ber of votes is knowingly and falsely misstated by a super-
intendent of an election, he has failed to discharge a duty
imposed upon him by law, and he is liable to be prosecuted,
under section 658 of the Penal Code, for a misdemeanor al-
though this section also applies. Black v. State, 36 Ga. App.
286, 136 S. E- 334.
CHAPTER 7
Contested Elections
ARTICLE 1
In Cases Where Governor Commissions
§ 121. Proceedings in contested election.
Who May Contest.—Where it does not appear that the
petitioners were candidates for the offices to which the de-
fendants were elected are not in a position to contest the
election. Jones v. McElreath, 167 Ga. 833, 834, 146 S. E.
734.
ARTICLE 3
Other Contested Elections
§ 125 (§ 111.) Contests in other elections.
Jurisdiction of Ordinary—Mandamus to Compel Hearing.—
Where on the hearing of a contested election case before an
ordinary, the contestee filed a demurrer to the petition,
which demurrer was sustained and the ordinary dismissed
the contest proceedings, and the contestant filed a petition
against the ordinary for a writ of mandamus to compel the
ordinary to hear and determine such election contest, alleging
that the ordinary had failed and refused to perform his legal
duty in the premises; the court did not err, in granting an
order making the mandamus absolute, and requiring the
ordinary to hear and determine such contest. Morgan v.
Wason, 162 Ga. 360, 133 S. E- 921.
Does Apply to Elections in Disposition of Public Utility
Properties.—This section relates to contests of elections for
public officers of the several kinds especially enumerated,
and does not purport to authorize a contest before the
ordinary of an election of the character provided for in
§§ 904(1) -904(4). Byrd v. City of Alma, 166 Ga. 510, 143
S. E. 767. See notes to § 904(1).
The declaration by the city council of the result of an
election for mayor of the City of D, under its char-
ter, is not final and conclusive, and does not prevent
the defeated candidate from contesting the election of a
rival candidate under this section. Moore v. Dugas, 166
Ga. 493, 143 S. E. 591, citing I,ow v. Towns, 8 Ga. 360;
McCants v. Layfield, 149 Ga. 231, 99 S. E- 877; Bennett
v. Public Service Commission, 160 Ga. 189, 127 S. E. 612.
Cited in Avery v. Hale, 167 Ga. 252, 145 S. E. 76.
ARTICLE 4
Elections Not Set Aside for Formal Defects,
When
§ 126 (§ 112.) Election not void by reason of
formal defects.
Violation of Directory Provision Harmless.—An election
was not invalid because it did not appear that the mayor
and council had published the names of the election man-
agers in accordance with a certain provision of the city
charter, for this provision is directory. Edwards v. Clarkes-
ville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 133 S. E- 45.
Ballots Improperly Marked.—That the notice to the voters
provided that the ballots should have written or printed
thereon the words "for school bonds" or "against school
bonds," and that such ballots may have been used, did not
invalidate the election, notwithstanding the ordinance call-
ing the election prescribed that the ballots should bear the
words "for public school bonds for schoolhouse" or "against
public school bonds for schoolhouse." Edwards v. Clarkes-
ville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 133 S. E. 45. For similar holding as
to vote for local taxation in school district, see notes to §
1551(133) of the Georgia Code of 1926.
Specifying "Australian Ballot System."
—
Even in the ab-
sence of all provisions therefor, to say merely that the
election was to be held or was held under some system in-
definitely described as the "Australian ballot system" would
not affirmatively disclose that the election was void. Ed-
wards v. Clarkesville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 312, 133 S. E- 45.
ARTICLE 5
Primary Elections in Certain Counties
§ 126(1). Primary election contests in coun-
ties of 6,458 to 6,462 population.—The proce-
dure relative to contests as outlined in subsec-
tions or paragraphs numbers two, three, four,
five, and seven of section 121, also sections 122
and 123 of Park's Code of Georgia, shall be and
the same is hereby made the procedure to con-
test the nomination of any person nominated in
any primary election by the people for election
to any county office in such counties of this
State as have a population of not less than 6,458
and not more than 6,462, as determined by the
census of the United States of 1920. Acts 1929,
P- 226, § 1.
Oath of Candidate before De Facto Notary.—The fact
that the statement of one of the candidates was sworn to
before a de facto notary public, both the notary and the
candidate thinking- that tbe notary was a de jure officer
and both acting in good faith did not render invalid the
statement of such candidate. Adair v. McElreath, 167 Ga
294, 295, 145 S. E. 841.
§ 126(2). Candidate receiving highest vote is
deemed nominee.—The candidate receiving the
highest number of votes as shown by the con-
solidation of the returns of said primary elec-
tion shall be deemed the nominee for election
to the office as he may have been candidate
therefor, and it shall not be necessary for any
authority to so declare him as such, as a condi-
tion precedent to contesting his nomination for
election to such office. Acts 1929, p. 226, § 2.
§ 126(3). Judgment of superior court final.—
The judgment, order, or finding of the judge of
the superior court of such counties, declaring
the nominee in any such contests, shall be final.
Acts 1929, p. 227, § 3.
CHAPTER 8
Primary Elections
§ 13i8(g-l). Park's Code.
See § 138(754).
[3]
§ 138(7^) VOTING MACHINES IN COUNTIES § 138(25)
§ 138(7^). Nominations for General Assembly
members and Superior Court Judges in certain
counties; specification of incumbent opposed; plu-
rality.—Candidates for the General Assembly in
all counties having within its borders a city or a
part of a city of population of 200,000 or more and
candidates for Judges of the Superior Court in all
judicial circuits having a county or counties of
population of 200,000 or more, according to the
last or any future census of the United States,
shall, when qualifying for a primary, specify the
particular incumbent which said candidate de-
sires to oppose or succeed, and all ballots shall be
prepared accordingly. The candidate receiving a
plurality of the votes cast for candidates for such
office shall be declared the nominee therefor. Acts
1925, p. 205; 1927, p. 246.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 limited the provi-
sion as to candidates for the General Assembly, to counties
"having- within their borders a city or a part of a city."
§ 138(7^2a). Candidate required to specify in-
cumbent opposed, in counties of 25,397 to 25,-
700 population.—Candidates for the General As-
sembly in all counties having more than one
representative, and having a population of not
less than 25,393 and not more than 25,700 ac-
cording to the last census of the United States,
shall, when qualifying for a primary, specify
the particular incumbent which said candidate
desires to oppose or succeed, and all ballots
shall be prepared accordingly. The candidate
receiving a plurality of the votes cast for candi-
dates for such office shall be declared the nomi-
nee therefor. Acts 1929, p. 227, § 1.
CHAPTER 11
Voting Machines in Counties between 63,690
and 63,692 Population
§ 138(24). Definitions.—The list of candidates
used or to be used on the front of the voting
machine for an election district in which a vot-
ing machine is used pursuant to law shall be
deemed official ballots under this chapter. The
word "ballot" as used in this article (except
when reference is made to irregular ballots)
means that portion of the cardboard or paper or
other material within the ballot frames contain-
ing the name of the candidate and the designa-
tion of the party by which he was nominated,
or a statement of a proposed constitutional
amendment, or other question or proposition
with the word "yes" for voting for any question
or proposition, and the word "no" for voting
against any question. The term "question" shall
mean any constitutional amendment, proposition,
or other question submitted to the voters at any
election. The term "official ballot" shall mean
the printed strips of cardboard containing the
names of the candidates nominated and a state-
ment of the question submitted. The term "ir-
regular ballot" shall mean a vote cast, by or on
a special device, for a person whose name does
not appear on the ballots. The term "voting
machine custodian" shall mean the person who
shall have charge of preparing and arranging
the voting machine for elections. The term
"protective counter" shall mean a separate coun-
ter built into the voting machines which can-
not be reset, which records the total number of
movements of the operating lever. Acts 1929,
P- 337, § 1.
Editor's Note.—The title of this act [§§ 138(24) - 138(53) ]
reads: "An Act to authorize the county commissioners .>f
any county in the State of Georgia of a population of
not less than 63,690 or more than 63,692 according to the
State census of 1920, to adopt" voting machines, etc.,
but nowhere in the Act is the limitation as to population
mentioned.
§ 138(25). Requirements of voting machines.—
Any voting machines may be adopted, rented,
purchased or used which shall be so constructed
to fulfill the following requirements: It shall
secure to the voter secrecy in the act of voting;
it shall provide facilities for voting for or against
as many questions as may be submitted; it shall
permit the voter to vote for the candidates of
one or more parties; it shall permit, the voter to
vote for as many persons for a'n office as he is
lawfully entitled to vote for, but no more; it
shall prevent the voter from voting for the
same persons more than once for the same of-
fice; it shall permit the voter to vote for or
against any question he may have the right to
vote upon, but no other; if used in primary
elections, it shall be so equipped that the elec-
tion officials can lock out all rows except those
of the voter's party by a single adjustment on
the outside of the machine; it shall correctly
register or record and accurately count all votes
cast for any and all persons, and for or against
any and all questions; it shall be provided with
a "protective counter" or "protective device"
whereby any operation of the machine before
or after the election will be detected; it shall
be provided with a counter which shall show
at all times during an election how many per-
sons have voted; it shall be provided writh a
mechanical model, illustrating the manner of
voting on the machine, suitable for the instruc-
tion of voters; it may also be provided with one
device for each party, for voting for all the
presidential electors of that party by one opera-
tion; and a ballot therefor containing only the
words "Presidential Electors For" preceded by
the name of that party and followed by the
names of the candidates thereof for the offices
of president and vice-president, and a registering
device therefor which shall register the vote cast
for said electors when thus voted collectively,
provided, however, that means shall be furnished
whereby the voter can cast a vote in part for
the candidates for presidential electors of one
party, and in part for those of one or more
other parties or in part or in whole for persons
not nominated by any party. Every voting ma-
chine shall be furnished with a lantern, or a
proper substitute for one, which shall give suf-
ficient light to enable voters while voting to
read the ballots and suitable for use by the elec-
tion officers in examining the counccrs. All
voting machines used in any election shall be
provided with a screen, hood or curtain which
shall be so made and adjusted as to conceal the
voter and his action while voting. Acts 1929, p.
338, § 2.
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§ 138(26). Adoption of voting machine.—The
board of county commissioners of such counties
may adopt for use at elections any kind of vot-
ing machine that meets the requirements of this
Act, and thereupon such voting machine may
be used at any and all elections held in such
counties, or in any part thereof, for voting, regis-
tering, and counting votes cast at such elections.
Voting machines of different kinds may be
adopted for different districts in the same
county. Acts 1929, p. 339, § 3.
§ 138(27). Experimental use of voting ma-
chine.—The county commissioners of such coun-
ties, authorized by the last preceding section to
adopt a voting machine, may provide for the
experimental use, at an election in one or more
districts, of a machine or machines which they
might thereafter permanently adopt, and the
use of such machine or machines at such elec-
tion shall be as valid for all purposes as if it. or
they, had been permanently adopted. Acts 1929,
p. 339, § 4.
§ 138(28). Providing machines. — The authori-
ties adopting the use of voting machines shall,
as soon as practicable thereafter, provide for
each polling place one or more voting machines
in complete working order, and thereafter the
authorities in charge of elections shall preserve
and keep them in repair, and shall have custody
thereof when not in use at an election. If it
shall be impracticable to supply each and every
election district with a voting machine or vot-
ing machines at an election following such adop-
tion, as many may be supplied as it is practica-
ble to procure, and the same may be used in
such election district or districts within such
counties as the officers adopting the same may
direct. Acts 1929, p. 340, § 5.
§ 138(29). Payment for machines.—The boards
of county commissioners of such county on the
adoption and rental or purchase of voting ma-
chines may provide for the payment therefor in
such manner as they may deem for the best in-
terest of their respective localities. Acts 1929,
p. 340, § 6.
§ 138(30). Printing official ballots.—All ballots
shall be printed on paper of clear white mate-
rial, of such form and size as will fill the ballot
frames of the machines, in plain color type as
large as the space will reasonably permit. Party
nominations shall be arranged on each voting
machine, either in columns or horizontal rows;
the caption of the various ballots on said ma-
chines shall be so placed on said machines as
to indicate to the voter that push knob, key
lever, or other device is to be used or operated
in order to vote for the candidate or candidates
of his choice. The order of arrangement of
parties and of candidates shall be as now re-
quired by law. Acts 1929, p. 340, § 7.
§ 138(31). Mailing of sample ballots and fur-
nishing of instruction ballots.—The officer or
officers, whose duty it may be under this Act to
provide and furnish official ballots for any poll-
ing place where a voting machine is to be used,
shall also provide two sample ballots or instruc-
tion ballots which sample or instruction ballots
shall be arranged in the form of a diagram
showing such portion of the front of the voting
machine as it will appear after the official bal-
lets are arranged thereon or therein for voting
on election day. Such sample ballots shall be
open to the inspection of all voters on election
day, in all primaries and general elections where
voting machines are used.
There shall be furnished to the election offi-
cial, at each polling place, a sufficient number
of sample ballots (a facsimile of the face of the
machines) of a reduced size, so that one may
be given to each voter desiring the same. Acts
1929, p. 341, § 8.
§ 138(32). Number of official ballots to be fur-
nished.—Two sets of official ballots shall be pro-
vided each polling place for election district for
use in and upon the voting machine, one set
thereof shall be inserted or placed in or upon
the voting machine and the other shall be re-
tained in the custody and possession of the
Board of Elections, unless it shall become nec-
essary during the course of the election to make
use of the same upon or in the voting machine.
Acts 1929, p. 341, § 9.
§ 138(33). Duty of authorities of municipali-
ties.—It shall be the duty of the authorities in
charge of any election, where a voting machine
is to be used, to have the machine and all nec-
essary furniture and appliances at the proper
polling place or places before the time fixed for
opening of the polls, and the counters set at
zero (OOO), and otherwise in good and proper
order for use at such election; and for the pur-
pose of placing ballots in the ballot frames of
the machine, putting it in order, testing, and ad-
justing and delivering the machines, the au-
thorities in charge of elections may employ one
or more competent persons to be known as cus-
todian or custodians of voting machines, who
shall be fully competent, thoroughly instructed,
and sworn to perforin their duties honestly and
faithfully, and for such purpose shall be ap-
pointed and instructed at least thirty days be-
fore the election and shall be considered as
officers of election. Before preparing a voting
machine for any election, written notice shall be
mailed to the chairman of the local organization
of at least two of the principal parties, stating
the time and place where the machines will be
prepared, at which time one representative of
each of such political parties shall be afforded
an opportunity to see that the machines are in
proper condition for use in the election; such
representatives shall be sworn to faithfully per-
form their duties and shall be regarded as elec-
tion officials, but shall not interfere with the
custodians or assume any of their duties. When
a machine has been so examined by such repre-
sentatives it shall be sealed with a numbered
metal seal. Such representatives shall certify
tc the numbers of the machines, that all of the
counters are set at zero (000), and as to the
number registered on the protective counter, if
one is provided, and on the seal. After the prep-
aration of the machines an officer or officers, or
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some one duly authorized, other than the per-
son who has prepared them for election, shall
inspect each machine, and report in writing,
concerning the facts as to whether or not all of
the registering courts are set at zero (000), the
machine is arranged in all respects in good or-
der for the election and locked, and as to the
number registered on the protective counter, and
on the seal. When a voting machine has been
properly prepared for election it shall be locked
against voting and sealed; and the keys thereof
shall be delivered to the board of officials hav-
ing charge and control of elections, together
with a written report made by the custodian,
stating that it is in every way properly prepared
for the election. After the voting machines
shall be transferred to the polling places it shall
be the duty of the local authorities to provide
ample protection against molestation or injury
to the machine. The lantern or electric-light
fixture shall be prepared in good order for use
before the opening of the polls. Acts 1929, p.
341, § 10.
§ 138(34). Instruction to election officers.
—
Not less than ten nor more than twenty-one
days before each election the custodian or cus-
todians of the machine shall instruct the board
or elections that are to serve in an election dis-
trict in the use of the machine, and in their
duties in connection therewith; and he shall give
to each member of the board of elections who
has received such instruction and is fully quali-
fied to properly conduct the election with the
machine a certificate to that effect. For the
purpose of giving such instructions the cus-
todian shall call such meeting or meetings of
the board of elections as shall be necessary.
Such custodian shall, within five days, file a re-
port with the board or official in charge of elec-
tions, stating that he has instructed the election
officers, giving the names of such officers, and
the time and place where such instruction was
given. The board of elections of each election
district in which a voting machine is to be used
shall attend such meeting or meetings as shall
be called for the purpose of receiving such in-
struction concerning their duties as shall be
necessary for the proper conduct of the election
with the machine. No member of any board of
elections shall serve in any election at which a
voting machine is used, unless he shall have re-
ceived such instruction and is fully qualified to
perform the duties in connection with the ma-
chine, and has received a certificate to that
effect from the custodian of the machines; pro-
vided, however, that this shall not prevent the
appointment of a person as a member of the
board of elections to fill a vacancy in an emer-
gency. Acts 1929, p. 343, § 11.
§ 138(35). Instruction to voters before elec-
tions.—Where voting machines are to be used,
the authorities in charge of elections shall des-
ignate suitable and adequate times and places
where voting machines containing sample bal-
lots showing titles of offices to be filled, and, so
far as practicable, the names of candidates to be
voted for at the next election, shall be exhibited
for the purpose of giving instructions as to the
use of voting machines to all voters who apply
for the same. No voting machine which is to
be assigned for use in an election shall be used
for such instruction after having been prepared
and sealed for the elections. During public ex-
hibition of any voting machine for the instruc-
tion of voters previous to an election, the count-
ing mechanism thereof shall be concealed from
view and the doors may be temporarily opened
only when authorized by the board or official
having charge and control of the elections. Acts
1929, p. 343, § 12.
§ 133(36). Official ballots furnished,—Official
ballots of the form and description set forth in
this Act for use upon voting machines shall be
prepared and furnished in the same manner, at
the same time, and be delivered to the same of-
ficials as now provided by law. Acts 1929, p.
344, § 13.
§ 138(37). Number of voters in a district.—
Election districts in which voting machines are
to be used may be altered, divided, or com-
bined so as to provide' that each district in
which the machine is to be used shall contain,
as nearly as may be, seven hundred and fifty
voters, and that each district in which two ma-
chines are to be used shall contain, as nearly as
may be, one thousand voters, and that each dis-
trict in which three machines are to be used
shall contain, as nearly as may be, one thousand
five hundred voters, provided that nothing
herein shall prevent any election district from
containing a less number than above if neces-
sary for the convenience of the voters. When-
ever more than two machines are to be used in
a district, one additional member of the board
of elections shall be appointed for each addi-
tional machine. Acts 1929, p. 344, § 14.
§ 138(38). Furnishing ballots in lieu of ones
lost, stolen, etc.—If the official ballots for an
election district or precinct at which a voting
machine is to be used shall not be delivered in
time for use on election day, or after delivery
shall be lost, destroyed, or stolen, the clerk or
other official or officials, whose duty it now is
in such case to provide other ballots for use at
such elections in lieu of those lost, destroyed,
or stolen, shall cause other ballots to be pre-
pared, printed, or written as nearly as may be
of the form and description of the official bal-
lots, and the board of election shall cause the
ballots so substituted to be used at the election
in the same manner, as nearly as may be, as the
official ballots would have been. Acts 1929, p.
344, § 15.
§ 138(39). Voting machines out of order.—In
case any voting machine used in any election
district shall, during the time the polls are open,
become injured so as to render it inoperative in
whole or in part, it shall be the duty of the elec-
tion officers immediately to give notice thereof
to the body providing such machine, and it shall
be the duty of such body, if possible, to substi-
tute a perfect machine for the injured machine,
and at the close of the polls the records of both
machines shall be taken, and the votes shown
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on their counters shall be added together in as-
certaining and determining the results of the
election; but if no other machine cannot be re-
paired in time for use at such election, unofficial
ballots made as nearly as possible in the form
of the official ballots may be used, received by
the election officers and placed by them in a
receptacle in such case to be provided by the
election officers, and counted with the votes
registered on the voting machines; and the re-
sult shall be declared the same as though there
had been no accident to the voting machine; the
ballots thus voted shall be preserved and re-
turned as herein directed, with a certificate or
statement setting forth how and why the same
were voted. Acts 1929, p. 345, § 16.
§ 138(40). Opening of polls.—The board of
election of each district shall attend at the poll-
ing place, three quarters of an hour before the
time set for opening of the polls, at each elec-
tion, and shall proceed to arrange within the
guard rail the furniture, stationery, and voting
machine for the conduct of the election. The
boards of election shall then and there have the
voting machine, ballots and stationery required
to be delivered to them for such election. If
not previously done, they shall insert in their
proper place on the voting machine the ballots
containing the names of the offices to be filled
at such election, and the names of candidates
nominated therefor. The keys to the voting
machine shall be delivered to the election of-
ficers at least three quarters of an hour before
the time set for opening the polls, in a sealed
envelope on which shall be written or printed
the number and location of the voting machine,
the number of the seal, and the number regis-
tered on the protective counter or device, as re-
ported by the custodian. The envelope contain-
ing the keys shall not be opened until at least
one member of the board from each of two po-
litical parties shall be present at the polling
place, and shall have examined the envelope to
see that it has not been opened. Before opening
the envelope, all officers present shall examine
the number on the seal of the machine, also the
number registered on the protective counter, and
shall see if they are the same as the number
written on the envelope; and if they are not the
same, the machine must not be opened until the
custodian or other authorized person shall have
been notified and shall have presented himself
at the polling place for the purpose of re-ex-
amining such machine, and shall certif}' that it
is properly arranged. If the numbers of the
seal and protective counter are found to agree
with the numbers on the envelope, the election
officers shall proceed to open the doors conceal-
ing the counters, and each officer shall carefully
examine every counter and see that it registers
zero (000), and the same shall be subject to the
inspection of official watchers. The machine
shall remain locked against voting until the polls
are formally opened, and shall not be operated
except by voters in voting. If any counter is
found not to register zero (000) the board of
election shall immediately notify the custodian,
who shall if practicable adjust the counters at
zero (000), but if it shall be impracticable for
the custodian to arrive in time to so adjust such
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counters before the time set for opening the
polls, the election officers shall immediately
make a written statement of the designating
letter and number of such counter, together with
the number registered thereon, and shall sign
and post same upon the wall of the polling
room, where it shall remain throughout election
day, and in filling out the statement of canvass,
they shall subtract such number from the num-
ber then registered thereon. Acts 1929, p. 345,
§ 17.
§ 138(41). Irregular ballots. — Ballots voted
for any person whose name does not appear on
the machine as a qualified candidate for office,
are herein referred to as irregular ballots. In
voting for presidential electors, a voter may
vote an irregular ticket made up of the names
of persons in nomination by different parties, or
partially of names of persons so in nomination
and partially of names of persons not in nomi-
nation, or wholly of names of persons not in
nomination by any party. Such irregular bal-
lot shall be deposited, written or affixed in or
upon the receptacle or device provided on the
machine for that purpose. An irregular ballot
must be cast in its appropriate place on the ma-
chine, or it shall be void and not counted. Acts
1929, p. 347, § 18.
§ 138(42). Location of voting machines.— At
all elections where voting machines may be used,
the arrangement of the polling room shall be
the same as is now provided for by law; the ex-
terior of the voting machine and every part of
the polling room shall be in plain view of the
election officers; the voting machine shall be
placed at least three feet from every wall or par-
tition of the polling room and at least four feet
from any table whereat any of the election of-
ficers may be engaged or seated. The voting
machine shall be so placed that the ballots on
the face of the machine can be plainly seen by
the election officers and the party watchers
when not in use by voters. The election offi-
cers shall not themselves, be or permit any other
person to be in any position or near any posi-
tion that will permit one to see or ascertain how
a voter votes, or how he has voted. The elec-
tion officer attending the machine shall inspect
the face of the machine after each voter has cast
his vote, to see that the ballots on the face of
the machine are in their proper place and that
the machine has not been injured. During elec-
tions the door or other covering of the counter
compartment of the machine shall not be un-
locked or open, or the counters exposed ex-
cept for good and sufficient reasons, a state-
ment of which shall be made and signed by the
election officers and shall be sent with the re-
turns. No person shall be permitted in or
about the polling room except as now provided
by law in election where ballots and ballot-
boxes are used. Acts 1929, p. 347, § 19.
§ 138(43). Time allowed a voter.—Where a
voter presents himself for the purpose of vot-
ing, the election officers shall ascertain whether
his name is upon the register of voters, and if
his name appears thereon and no challenge be
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interposed, or, if interposed, be not sustained,
one of the election officers, to be stationed at
the entrance through the outer guard-rail, shall
announce the name of the voter and permit him
to pass through the entrance opening in the
outer guard-rail to the booth of the voting ma-
chine for the purpose of casting his vote; no
voter shall remain in the voting machine booth
longer than two minutes, unless for good and
sufficient reason he be granted a longer period
of time by the election officer in charge; and,
having cast his vote, the voter shall at once
emerge therefrom and leave the polling room
by- the exit opening in the outer guard-
rail; if he shall refuse to leave after the time of
two minutes he shall be removed by the elec-
tion officers; the election officers shall ascertain
the name and address of each voter in the man-
ner now provided by law, before he enters the
voting machine booth for the purpose of vot-
ing; no voter, after having entered and emerged
from the voting machine booth, shall be per-
mitted to re-enter the same on any pretext
whatever; only one voter at a time shall be per-
mitted to pass the outer guard-rail to vote.
Acts 1929, p. 348, § 20.
§ 138(44). Instruction to voters on election
day.—For the instruction of voters on any elec-
tion days there shall, so far as practicable, be
provided for each polling place a mechanically
operated model of a portion of the face of the
machine. Such model, if furnished, shall, dur-
ing the election, be located on the election of-
ficers table or in some other place which the
voters must pass to reach the machine, and
each voter shall, before entering the machine,
be instructed regarding its operation and such
instruction illustrated on the model, and the
voter given opportunity to personally operate
the model; the voter's attention shall also be
called to the diagram of the face of the ma-
chine, so that the voter can become familiar
with the location of the questions and the names
of the officers and candidates. In case any voter,
after entering the voting machine, shall ask for
further instructions concerning the manner ot
voting, two election officers of opposite political
parties, if present, and, if not, two election offi-
cers of the same party shall give such instruc-
tions to him, but no officer or person assisting
a voter shall in any manner request, suggest, or
seek to persuade or induce any such voter to
vote any particular ticket, or for or against any
particular ticket, or for or against any particu-
lar candidate, or for or against any particular
amendment, question, or proposition. After
giving such instructions and before such voter
shall have registered his vote, the officers or
persons assisting him shall retire, and such voter
shall then register his vote in secret as he may
desire. Acts 1929, p. 348, § 21.
§ 138(45). Blind or physically disabled voters.
—The provisions of the election law relating to
the assistance to be given to blind or physically
disabled voters shall apply also, where voting
machines are used, and the word "booth," when
used in such sections, shall be interpreted to in-
clude the voting machine inclosure or curtain.
Acts 1929, p. 349, § 22.
§ 138(46). Announcing the vote and locking
the machine against voting.—Immediately upon
the close of the polls the election officers shall
lock and seal the voting machine against fur-
ther voting and open the counter-compartment
in the presence of persons who may be lawfully
present at that time, giving full view of the
counters. The chairman of the board of elec-
tions, under the scrutiny of a member of the
board of a different political party, if such mem-
ber desires to be present, shall then in the or-
der of the officers as their titles are arranged
on the machine, read and announce in distinct
tones the result shown by the counters, and
shall then read the votes recorded for each of-
fice on the irregular ballots; he shall also, in
the same manner, read and announce the vote
on each constitutional amendment, proposition,
or other question. As each vote is read and an-
nounced, it shall be recorded on two statements
of canvass by two other members of the board
of election inspectors, and when completed shall
be compared with the numbers on the counters
of the machine. If found to be correct, the re-
sult shall be announced by the chairman of the
board and the statements of canvass, after be-
ing duly certified and sworn to, shall be filed
as now provided by law for filing election re-
turns. After the reading and announcing of the
vote, and before the doors of the counter-com-
partment of the voting machines shall be closed,
ample opportunity shall be given to any person
or persons lawfully present to compare the re-
sult so announced with the counters of the ma-
chine, and any necessary corrections shall then
and thereby be made by the board of election.
No tally sheets nor return blanks as required
by law for use in election districts where paper
ballots are used shall be furnished or used in
election districts where voting machines are
used, but in lieu thereof there shall be furnished
two copies of a statement of canvass to con-
form to the requirements of the voting machine
or machines being used. Acts 1929, p. 349, § 23.
§ 138(47). Locking the machine and returning
the irregular ballots.—The election officers shall,
as soon as the count is completed and fully ascer-
tained as by this Act required, lock the counter-
compartment, and it shall so remain for a period
of thirty days, except it be ordered opened by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Whenever ir-
regular ballots of whatever description have been
voted, the election officers shall return all such
ballots in a properly secured package endorsed
"irregular ballots," and return and file such
package with the original statement of the re-
sult of the election made by them. Said pack-
age shall be preserved for six months next suc-
ceeding such election, and it shall not be opened
or its contents examined during that time ex-
cept by order of a judge of a court lawfully em-
powered to direct the same to be opened and
examined. At the end of said six months, said
package may be opened and said ballots dis-
posed of at the discretion of the official or body
having charge thereof. Acts 1929, p. 350, § 24.
§ 138(48). Disposition of keys.—The keys of
the machine shall be inclosed in an envelope to
be supplied by the custodian on which shall be
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written the number of the machine a *ri the dis-
trict and ward where it has been used, which
envelope shall be securely sealed and endorsed
by the election officers, and shall be returned to
the officer from whom the keys were received.
The number on the seal and the number regis-
tered on the protective counter shall be written
on the envelope containing the keys. All keys
for voting machines shall be kept securely locked
by the officials having them in charge. It shall
be unlawful for any unauthorized person to
have in his possession any key or keys of any
voting machine, and all election officers or per-
sons intrusted with such keys for election pur-
poses, or in the preparation of the machine
therefor, shall not retain them longer than nec-
essary to use them for such legal purpose. All
machines shall be boxed and stored as soon
after the close of the election as possible, and
the machine and the boxes for the machines
shall at all times be stored in a suitable place.
Acts 1929, p. 351, § 25.
§ 138(49). Application of previous article and
penal law. — Any unauthorized person found in
possession of any such voting machine or keys
thereof sha'll be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and fined in a sum not less than twenty-five nor
more than five hundred dollars, and imprison-
ment in the county jail, not less than ten nor
more than thirty days; and any person wilfully
tampering or attempting to tamper with, disar-
range, deface, or impair in any manner whatso-
ever, or destroy any such voting machine while
the same is in use at any election, or who shall,
after such machine is locked in order to preserve
the registration or record of any election made
by the same, tamper or attempt to tamper with
any voting machine, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and on conviction thereof shall be im-
prisoned in the State Prison of this State at
hard labor for not less than three nor more than
ten years. Acts 1929, p. 351, § 26.
§ 138(50). Application. — All laws relating to
elections now in force in this State shall apply
to all elections under this Act so far as the same
may be applicable thereto; and so far as such
provisions are not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the Act pertaining to the use of the pa-
per ballots and ballot-boxes. Acts 1929, p. 452,
§ 27.
§ 138(51). Purpose and object.—The purpose
and object of this bill is to provide a proper
method of experimenting with and trying out
what is known as the mechanical balloting or
voting machine, and in every case in which the
governing authorities of such counties as is here-
inbefore described shall adopt and place in use
at any precinct or precincts of such counties, the
said county commissioners are hereby specifically
authorized and empowered to do anything neces-
sary, whether specifically covered by this Act or
not, which they shall deem to be requisites to
a fair, honest, and satisfactory trial and use of
such machine. Acts 1929, p. 352, § 29.
Nothing in this Act shall in any way change, al-
ter, repeal or modify any provision of the pres-
ent election laws of the State of Georgia, as the
same shall now apply to and be operative in any
election precinct in which such balloting machine
shall not be used. Acts 1929, p. 352, § 29.
§ 138(53). Effective immediately. — This Act
shall take effect immediately upon becoming a
law. Acts 1929, p. 352, § 30.
THIRD TITLE
§ 138(52). Present election laws not changed.-
CHAPTER 2
The Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller-
General, and Attorney-General
ARTICLE 2
Of the State Treasurer
SECTION 10
Bond Commissioner
§ 232. State treasurer ex-ofncio> Bond Commis-
sioner.—The State Treasurer shall be ex-officio
Bond Commissioner of this State, and as such
he shall receive a salary of $1,200.00 per annum;
and he is hereby authorized to appoint the chief
clerk in the treasury department, or some other
fit and competent person, to be Assistant Com-
missioner, and said assistant shall receive a salary
of $1,200.00 per annum; and said Bond Commis-
sioner shall be allowed such sum as may be nec-
essary, not to exceed the sum of $10,000.00 per
annum, for clerical assistance in performing the
duties of his office, which said sum, together with
the salaries of the Bond Commissioner and the
Assistant Bond Commissioner, shall be paid from
the State Treasury; it shall be the duty of the
Bond Commissioner and his assistant to receive,
file, record, care and provide for the deposit of
bonds or other securities offered for deposit as
the law may direct. Acts 1909, p. 145; 1923, p.
132; 1927, p. 131.
Editor's Note.—The amendment, of 1927 wrought many-
changes in the phraseology of this section. The substantial
innovations co">s : <:t of the provision for a $12,000 salary for
both the Bond Commissioner and the Assistant Bond Com-
missioner, and the provision for allowance of $10,000 for
clerical assistance, and the source of its payment.
§ 233. Fees of commissioner,—Each and every
depositing corporation or individual of whatever
name or class, which now has or may hereafter
have on deposit bonds or other securities, as the
law provides, is 'hereby required, within sixty days
from and after August 14th, 1909, and thereafter
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on or before January 15th of each year, to pay
the said bond commissioner the following sched-
ules of fees, namely: Bonds or other securities ag-
gregating not over $5,000.00, $2.00; not over
$10,000.00, $3.75; not over $25,000.00, $7.50; not
over $50,000.00, $12.50; not over $100,000.00,
$20.00; more than $100,000.00, $25.00; provided,
however, that the W. & A. R. R. lessees shall be
exempt from the operation of this section. All
fees collected as aforesaid shall be paid into the
general funds of the state treasury. In default of
the payment of the fees herein prescribed, the
bond commissioner shall refuse to accept the de-
posits required by law to be made, and shall not
certify their acceptance until the fee is fully paid
each year as herein provided, .but shall report
said default to the insurance commissioner, who
shall suspend or revoke the license of said) delin-
quent company or individual until the fee required
under this section is fully paid. Acts 1927, p. 131.
ARTICLE 4
Of the Attorney General
§ 256. Comptroller-general may require his
services.
Cited in Avery v. Hale, 167 Ga. 252, 256, 145 S. E- 76.
FOURTH TITLE
General Regulations as to All Officers and Offices
CHAPTER l
Of Eligibility, Qualification, and Commissions of
Officers, and Vacation of Offices
ARTICLE 1
Eligibility and Qualification
§ 258 (§ 223.) Persons ineligible; de facto offi-
cers.
Prior Removal for Misconduct.—The conviction of an offi-
cer for misbehavior and misconduct in office in the illegal
appropriation of public funds, and his removal from office,
are equivalent to an adjudication that he is ineligible to
hold said office for and during the remainder of the term
for which he was elected. McClellan v. Pearson, 163 Ga.
492, 136 S. E. 429.
A county school superintendent is a county officer within
the provisions of par. 7 of this section. Culbreth v. Can-
nady, 168 Ga. 444, 148 S. E. 102.
§ 261 (§ 226.) Officers of this State must re-
side therein, hold until successor is qualified, and
keep seal.
Liability on Bond Continues.—The effect of this section is
to extend the term of office under the original appointment
until a successor has been qualified, with the further effect
that liability on an official bond continues where an official
elected for a fixed period thereafter holds over, after its ex-
piration, until his successor is appointed. Elberton v. Jones,
35 Ga. App. 536, 133 S. E. 745.
Cited in Wiley v. Douglas, 168 Ga. 659, 664, 148 S. E.
735.
Applied in Bashlor v. Bacon, 168 Ga. 370, 372, 147 S. E.
762.
ARTICLE 2
How Commissioned
§ 263. What officers commissioned under ex-
ecutive seal.
See nlotes to § 1780.
An inspector of fertilizer is not such a civil officer' as
must be commissioned by the Governor under this section.
Talmadge v. Cordell, 167 Ga. 594, 146 S. E- 467.
ARTICLE 3
Vacancies
§ 264. Offices, how vacated.
A person holding the office of justice of the peace in
this State does not vacate the office by ceasing to be a
resident of the district for which he was elected, where he
continues to reside within the State, and where the fact
of his cessation of residence has not been judicially ascer-
tained. Dong v. Carter, 39 Ga. App. 508, 147 S. E. 401.
Cited in Wiley v. Douglas, 168 Ga. 659, 148 S. E. 735.
CHAPTER 2
Official Oaths
§ 272. Official oaths must be filed in exec-
utive office, when.
See notes to § 1782.
Cited in Decatur County v. O'Neal, 38 Ga. App. 158,
162, 142 S. E. 914; Talmadge v. Cordell, 167 Ga. 594, 146
S. E- 467.
CHAPTER 3
Official Bonds and Sureties Thereon
ARTICLE 5
Bonds; How Far and for What Binding
§ 291 (§ 256.) Official bonds obligatory.
Color of office is defined in Fidelity, etc., Company v.
Smith, 35 Ga. App. 744, 748, 134 S. E- 801, quoting Duther v.
Banks, 111 Ga. 374, 36 S. E- 626.
When Acts Colore Officii—Illustration.—An officer shoot-
ing at the occupants of an automobile who have fled from
an attempted arrest for a misdemeanor (illegal transporta
tion of liquor) commits a wrongful act under color of his of-
fice. Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817, 138 S. E- 267.
Acts Entirely Unauthorized Not Breach of Bond.—A tax-
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collector, having no authority of law whatever to make lev-
ies and sales under tax fi. fas., issued a fi. fa. purporting
to be for taxes due, and placed it in the hands of another
as his deputy, who, "armed" with the fi. fa. and acting un-
der the instructions of the tax-collector, seized property of
the alleged taxpayer and sold it, to the owner's damage. It
was held that such acts constituted no breach of the tax-
collector's bond and the surety on the bond was not liable
therefor. Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 744, 134
S. F. 801.
ARTICLE 10
Measure of Damages on Bonds
§ 299 (§ 264.) Measure of damages.
Meaning of "Smart-Money."—The term "smart-money,"
as employed in this section seems to be substantially sy-
nonymous with "punitive damages." Copeland v. Dunehoo,
36 Ga. App. 817, 821, 138 S. E- 267. Thus this section seems
to be an exception to section 4393. Id.
What Amounts to Bad Faith.—Any arbitrary omission by
the officer to do that which is required of him by law, or
any conscious disregard of the limitation upon his authority,
would amount to bad faith within the meaning of that term
as employed in this section. Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga.
App. 817, 824, 138 S. F- 267. See note of this case under sec.
2549.
Statement of Injury.—In an action for damages because of
the alleged breach of the official bond of a former clerk of a
city court, it not appearing from the petition that any ac-
tual injury was sustained by the plaintiff by reason of
the alleged breach, the petition did not set out a cause of
action. Donaldson v. Walker, 35 Ga. App. 224, 132 S. F. 649.
CHAPTER 4
Powers of Public Officers Limited
§ 303 (§ 268.) Powers of public officers.
As to liability on unauthorized acts of school trustees, see
note to sec. 1551(141).
When Public Is Estopped—Statements Without Authority.
—In Gill v. Cox. 163 Ga. 618, 137 S. E. 40, it was held that
the state is not estopped by statements made by the state
veterinarian, said statements not being made in the exercise
of any legal authority.
The public under this section is not estopped by the
unauthorized acts of its agents. County Com'rs v. O'Neal,
38 Ga. App. 158, 142 S. F. 914, 916.
CHAPTER G
Inventory Annually to Be Made
Cited in City of Dawson v. Terrell County, 38 Ga. App.
676, 783, 145 S. F. 465; Goodin v. McRae, 163 Ga. 293, 135
S. F. 911.
§ 314. "Proper authority."
Public property becomes "unserviceable * * * where such
property can not be beneficially or advantageously used
under all the circumstances." Dawson v. Terrell County,
38 Ga. App. 676, 678, 145 S. F- 465.
CHAPTER 7
Salaries and Fees of Officers
ARTICLE 5
Officers Connected with the Judicial Depart-
ment
§ 328. Fees of solicitor-general.
As to validity of act abolishing fee system in Chatta-
hoochee Circuit, see Harris v. Williams, 167 Ga. 45, 144
S. E. 756.
Cited in American Surety Co. v. Kea, 168 Ga. 228, 147
S. F. 386.
FIFTH TITLE
Legislative Department
CHAPTER 1
Of the General Assembly
ARTICLE 8
Pay of Members
§ 354 (§ 312.) Accounts of members and officers,
how audited.
In General.—By this section a method is provided for de-
termining what compensation, including per diem, is due to
the members of the General Assembly. This statute estab-
lishes a special tribunal for the determination of the mat-
ter in question. There certainly should be no judicial inter-
ference with this method and this tribunal, before any ac-
tion is taken by this special tribunal, by assuming that it
will certify per diem to which members are not entitled
under the constitution. Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 537, 136
S. F. 425.
SIXTH TITLE
County Organization
CHAPTER 2
Incorporation of Counties, County Contracts,
Property, and Claims
ARTICLE l
Counties Are Corporate Bodies
§ 383 (§ 340.) Each county a body corporate.
Construed with Section 384.—Sections 383 and 384 must be
construed together, and they must receive a reasonable con-
struction. Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga.
929, 931, 137 S. F- 247.
Extent of Power Conferred. — This section subjects the
counties of this State to suit, but not to suits upon all causes
of action. It does not make them generally liable to suits,
like individuals or as municipal corporations. Being politi-
cal subdivisions of the State, they can not be sued unless
made subject to suit expressly or by necessary implication.
Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga. 929, 931, 137 S.
F. 247.
A county can always be sued upon any liability against it
created by statute, or for breach of any valid contract which
it is authorized by law to make. Decatur County v. Praytor,
etc., Co., 163 Ga. 929, 935, 137 S. E- 247. See sec. 384 and the
notes thereto.
Cited in City of Dawson v. Terrell County, 38 Ga. App.
676, 783, 145 S. F- 465.
ARTICLE 2
Suits against Counties
§ 384 (§ 341.) County, when liable to suit.
Editor's Note.—This section was codified from the deci>
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sions of the court in the cases of Hammond v. Richmond, 72
Ga. 188, and Smith v. Wilkes & McDuffie Counties, 79 Ga.
125, 4 S. F- 20, and it must be construed in the light of these
decisions. See Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163
Ga. 929, 932, 137 S. F- 247.
Bread Terms.—Language could not be broader or more
comprehensive, or more free from doubt, than the words of
this section. When it says the county shall not be liable
for any cause of action, it expressly negatives the idea of
exceptions other than provided therein, to wit, "unless made
so by statute." Wood v. Floyd County, 161 Ga. 743, 745, 131
S. F. 882.
General Rule.—Whenever a county is by statute made
liable for a given demand, an action against it will lie there-
for, though the statute does not in express terms authorize
or provide for the bringing of such an action. Decatur County
v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga. 929, 933, 137 S. F- 247, citing nu-
merous cases.
Liability in Case of Bridges.—A county is liable to suit by
contractors for breach of a valid and binding contract for
the building of a bridge over a river in such county, upon
the assumption that the difference between the representa-
tions in the plans and specifications as to the facts and condi-
tions under the bed of the river, and the actual facts and
conditions thereof, amounted to a breach of the contract
by the county. Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 16?
Ga. 929, 137 S. F- 247.
When County Officials Exceed Powers.—"When public of-
ficers, in discharging duties imposed upon them by law, under-
take other duties not imposed by law, although intending
it to be a benefit to the public, the latter, as represented by
county governments, can not be made responsible for torts
or ultra vires contracts." Wood v. Floyd County, 161 Ga. 743,
748, 131 S. F. 882.
Petition Must Show Liability by Statute.—The petition
in a suit brought against a county must indicate that
the liability sought to be established comes within the
provisions of the rule of this section. Fulton, County v.
Gordon Water Co., 37 Ga. App. 290, 140 S. F- 45.
Cited in City of Dawson v. Terrell County, 38 Ga. App.
676, 783, 145 S. F. 465.
ARTICLE 3
Contracts, How Made by Counties, Competition
in Bidding
§ 388. Contracts with ordinary.
Sufficiency of Entry.—In King v. Casey, 164 Ga. 117,
121, 137 S. F. 776, it is said: "The present record shows
that the contract was entered upon the minutes of the
board of commissioners of roads and revenues, but that
certain specifications were omitted; it was legal for the
judge to order the entry of the contract on the minutes,
in which event the restraining order should be dissolved
and of no further effect."
Mandamus will lie to compel county authorities to en-
ter such contract on their minutes. King v. Casey, 164
Ga. 117, 121, 137 S. F. 776, citing Wagener v. Forsyth
County, 135 Ga. 162, 68 S. F. 1115.
§ 389. Contracts to give bonds; counties
with chaingangs.
Since the passage of the act of 1920 to amend this sec-
tion, counties having a chain-gang may purchase material
for and U5e the convicts in building or repairing any
public building, bridge, causeway, or other public works,
and may use the funds arising from taxes levied for such
purposes, in purchasing such material and in supporting
and maintaining the convicts while such work is being
done. Southern Ry. Co. v. Whitfiegd County, 38 Ga.
App. 703, 145 S. F- 668.
§ 389(c). Park's Code.
See § 389(1).
§ 389 (1). Contract for public work void with-
out bond.
What Constitutes "Doing Work."—An employee of the con-
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tractor is not doing work "under and for the purpose of" the
contract where he is engaged only in "winding up the af-
fairs" of his employer in the particular location, such as
collecting and looking after the machinery and "shipping it to
the next work they were going to do," all of this being done
after the work had been fully completed and after the mu-
nicipality has formally and finally accepted the same as a
compliance with the contract between it and the contractor.
Southern Surety Co. v. Williams, 36 Ga. App. 692, 137 S. F-
851.
Bond Protects Two Classes.—The bond required by this sec-
tion is for the use of two classes of persons: first, the muni-
cipality, and second, "all persons doing work or furnish-
ing skill, tools, machinery, or materials under or for the pur-
pose of such contract." Both classes of persons are entitled
to protection under the bond. Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes,
161 Ga. 207, 212, 130 S. F- 577.
Necessity of Stating "Use" in Bond.—In an action by the
trustees of a school district "for the use" of a material-
man, who furnished material used in the construction of a
school building, against a bonding company as surety upon
the bond given by the contractor, where the bond contained
no provision that it was given "for the use of the obligee and
of all persons doing work or furnishing skill, tools, machinery
or materials under or for the purpose of such contract," nor
any similar clause, but specifically provided that "no right
of action shall accrue for the use or benefit of any other than
the obligee," the trustees can have no recovery on the bond
merely "for the use" of the materialman. Massachusetts
Bonding, etc. Co. v. Hoffman, .34 Ga. App. 565, 130 S. F. 375.
A bond which does not use the words "for the use of," but
the expressed obligation is to both "the City of Thomas-
ville" and "all persons doing work or furnishing skilled labor,
tools, machinery, or materials under or for the contract," is
a sufficient statutory bond under the section, notwithstanding
it dees not expressly employ the words "for the use of" the
municipality or the members of the other class. Being such
statutory bond, a materialman, coming under the second class
of obligees can in his own name bring a suit on a certified
copy thereof, as is expressly provided in section 389 par. 4.
Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 211, 130 S. F. 577.
Bond Covering Two Principals.—Where a bond specifies
two corporations as principal and a surety company as se-
curity, and a suit is brought on the bond by a person of
the second class, who alleges in the petition that certain ma-
terials for which he seeks a recovery were furnished by him
to one of the corporations named as principal, and that only one
of such principals contracted with the municipality, such al-
legation would not alone operate to discharge the surety on
the bond. In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake induc-
ing the surety to excute the bond, he will be bound by his con-
tract as surety for both of the corporations named as prin-
cipals in the bond, and will not be relieved by mere allegation
in the petition that only one of the named principals to whom
the materials were alleged to have been furnished was a con-
tractor with the municipality. Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes,
161 Ga. 207, 213, 130 S. F- 577.
Liability of County for Failure to Take Bond.—A county
which has failed to take from the contractor the statutory
bond required under this act, is liable to any person furnish-
ing material to the contractor for the purpose of the con-
tract, for any loss resulting to such person from the
failure of the county to take the required bond. De-
catur County v. Southern Clay Mfg. Co., 34 Ga. App.
305, 129 S. F. 290; Ty Ty Consol. School Dist. v. Colquitt
Lumber Co., 153 Ga. 426, 112 S. F- 561, and Hannah v. Love-
lace-Young Lumber Co., 159 Ga. 856, 127 S. F. 225, were
cited in this case. Ed. Note.
Same—Necessity for Work to Be Completed.—It is not es-
sential to the county's liability under this act that the work
for which the county contracted shall have been completed.
Decatur County v. Southern Clay Mfg. Co., 34 Ga. App. 305,
129 S. F. 290.
Notice as Affecting Liability of Public Body.—A public body
can not, by notice to a materialman of its intention to pay
direct to the contractor all bills for material which may be
furnished to the contractor by the materialman for the pur-
pose of the contract, and that it will not be liable to the ma-
terialman for such material, relieve itself of the statutory li-
ability imposed upon it by this act, for loss to a materialman
resulting from the failure of the public body to take the
bond required. Nor will such notice to the materialman ope-
rate to estop him from asserting his right, under the statute,
to hold the public body liable. Board v. United States Sup-
ply Co., 34 Ga. App. 581, 131 S. F. 292.
Suit on Bond by Materialman, Workers, etc.—A material-
man furnishing material to the contractor in making the
improvements specified in the contract can in his own name,
where the city fails to sue in the time prescribed by the act,
maintain an action on the bond, although the bond does
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not expressly state that it is "for the use of" persons furnish-
ing material for construction of the improvement. Southern
Surety Co. v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 130 S. E- 577.
Substitutions of Parties Plaintiff.—Where a materialman
improperly brought suit in his own name against the surety,
and it appeared that under the terms of the bond no indemnity
was provided in behalf of the materialman, an amendment
was not allowable making the suit proceed in the name of
the county for the use and benefit of the materialman. Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Bibb, 162 Ga. 388, 134 S. E- 100.
§ 389(d). Park's Code.
See § 389(2).
§ 389 (2). Approval and filing of bond.
Trustees Not Surety Liable.—The liability of the trustees
under this section, if existing, would not be one in which the
surety on the bond actually taken would be concerned where
the bond contained no provision for the assumption of it.
In other words, if it could be said that the trustees had sub-
jected themselves to liability to the materialman in failing
to take a proper bond, the resulting damage to them would
flow from their own default, and not from the failure of the
contractor to perform his contract. The surety on the
bond which they actually obtained would not ordinarily
be liable for damage suffered by them because of their failure
to comply with the law and take a bond of different character.
Massachusetts Bonding, etc., Co. v. Hoffman, 34 Ga. App.
565, 568, 130 S. E- 375.
§ 389(f). Park's Code.
See § 389(4).
§ 389 (4). Action on bond.
In General.—This section specifies the order in which each
class may sue on the bond. The municipality primarily may
bring a suit on the bond, in which event the remedy of any
person in the second class is by intervention in such suit; but
if the municipality does not bring a suit within 90 days after
the completion of the contract and acceptance by the mu-
nicipality, any person of the second class may bring a suit
upon the bond for the enforcement of any right concerning
which the bond affords him protection. Southern Surety Co.
v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 212, 130 S. E- 577.
This section is express authority for a person of the sec-
ond class who has furnished material to a contractor for mak-
ing a public improvement, to bring an individual suit upon
the bond for his own benefit. Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes,
161 Ga. 207, 215, 130 S. E- 577.
Purpose of Provision for Certified Copy of Bond.—The pro-
vision for the obtainment of a certified copy of the bond and
the basing of a suit thereon is for convenience of persons en-
titled to sue on the bond, and is not to be construed as re-
quiring a suit to be based on such certified copy rather than
upon the original bond. To make such requirement would
place the certified copy above the original bond, with no
reason for making any such technical distinction. The cause
of action, if any, arises from the contract embodied in the
bond, not from the primary or secondary character of the
paper that might be set out in a petition suing on the bond.
Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 212, 130 S. E-
577.
ARTICLE 5
County Buildings, Care and Inspection Thereof;
Supplies for County Offices
§ 400. Public buildings and records.
The officers having jurisdiction of the county affairs
are not deprived of all discretion, by this section as t)o
the manner of providing a court-house or the character
of the building or its equipment. On that subject the
county authorities have a bread discretion, which should not
be disturbed by the courts except cautiously, nor unless it
is clear and manifest that the county authorities are abus-
ing the discretion vested in them by law. Manry v. Glea-
ton, 164 Ga. 402, 138 S. E- 777; Cowart v. Manry, 166 Ga.
612, 144 S. E- 21.
§ 401. Court-house rooms.
The expression "county officers," as used in this section,
refers to those officers who are such in the strict sense
of the term—that is, those who are constitutional county
officers; and they are such, under the provisions of the
constitution, as "shall be elected under section 6599 of
the Constitution. It does not apply to a city-court solic-
itor. Graham v. Merritt, 165 Ga. 489, 491, 141 S. E- 298.
ARTICLE 6
Claims against Counties
§ 411 (§ 362.) Claims to be presented, when.
See notes to § 910.
In General.—Under this section a cause of action against
a county such as can be recovered upon does not exist un-
less the claim has been presented within twelve months
after its accrual. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mitchell
County, 36 Ga. App. 47, 48, 135 S. E. 223.
Allegation of Time.—An action against a county, brought
in 1923, to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally levied
and collected in 1919, and alleging that a month before the
filing of the suit a demand that the taxes so collected be
refunded was made upon the county authorities and refused,
was barred, under this section. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Mitchell County, 36 Ga. App. 47, 135 S. E- 223.
County Warrants.—County warrants are not such claims
as are required by this section to be presented within
twelve months after they accrue for the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run against county warrants until
a demand for payment is repudiated or a fund out of which
they can be paid is provided. Central, etc., R. Co. v.
Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 132 S. E. 449.
Claim of Payee of Void Note.—A claim against a county
by a payee of a void note for money used by the county and
paid out on outstanding valid warrants, even if enforceable
against the county, was barred under this section, where
not presented within 12 months after accrual. Farmer's
Loan, etc. Co. v. Wilcox County, Ga., 2 Fed. (2d), 465.
Salary of Commissioner.—This section is not applicable to
allowances for salary of the road commissioner under a
local law as his salary is an allowance provided by law for
the benefit of the commissioner as a public officer, and has
no reference to contract or breach of duty. Sammons v,
Glascock County, 161 Ga. 893, 131 S. E- 881.
Applied in suit to recover money paid to county on
void tax titles. Newsome v. Treutlen County, 168 Ga.
764, 149 S. E. 44.
This section bars the claim where the injury for which
damages were sought (destruction of the value of land)
occurred in 1924 and the claim was not presented until
1927. Effingham County v. Zittrouer, 39 Ga. App. 115,
146 S. E. 351.
Cited in Habersham v. Cornwall, 38 Ga. App. 419, 144
S. E- 55; Baggett v. Barrow, 166 Ga. 700, 144 S. E. 251.
ARTICLE 8
County Auditors and Expert Accountants
§ 418(1). Auditors for counties of 25,860 to 25-
865 population.—In all counties of the State of
Georgia which have a board of commissioners of
roads and revenues and which counties also have
a population, according to the United States Cen-
sus of 1920, of not more than 25,865 and not less
than 25.S60, the board of commissioners, when
they deem it necessary, may appoint an auditor
for their respective counties. Acts 1929, p. 212,
§ 1.
§ 418(2). Duty of auditor.—It shall be the duty
of such county auditor, under the direction of
his respective board of commissioners and in ac-
cordance with such rules as may be prescribed
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by said board, to audit the orders drawn on the
county treasurer by the judge of the superior
court and the judge of the city cou'rt of the
county. Acts 1929, p. 212, § 2.
§ 418(3). Orders on treasurer not to be paid
unless approved by auditor.—Be it further en-
acted that no order drawn by the judge of any
court against the treasury of any county having
an auditor under the provisions of this act shall
be paid by the treasurer of such county unless
the same has been approved by the county audi-
tor. Acts 1929, p. ,212, § 3.
§ 418(4). Term of office.—Term of office of
such auditor shall be one year from the date of
his appointments, and the county commissioners
may discontinue the office of county auditor at
any time they may deem best. Acts 1929, p. 212,
§ 418(5). Auditor to be clerk of county com-
missioners.—The said county auditor shall be the
clerk of the county commissioners and shall re-
ceive no additional compensation for his services
as county auditor, other than his salary as said
clerk of the county commissioners. Acts 1929, p.
213, § 5.
ARTICLE 8a
Expenses of Office
§ 418(6). Office expenses of officers of counties
of 44,000 to 150,000! population.—In all counties
described in the second paragraph of this sec-
tion, the necessary office expenses of the of-
ficers herein named shall, when appioved by
the county board of commissioners or other
fiscal agent of said county, be paid out of
the treasury of such county monthly, and each
of said officers is required to furnish to the
county commissioners or other fiscal agent an
itemized statement of such necessary expenses
at the first regular meeting of such board or fis-
cal -agent in each month; provided the counties
aforesaid shall only be liable for the payment of
such items of expense as are approved by such
board of commissioners or other fiscal agent.
This section shall apply to all counties in the
State of Georgia having by the United States
census of 1920 a population of forty-four thou-
sand inhabitants and less than one hundred and
fifty thousand inhabitants and to all counties in
this State which may have by any future census
of the United States a population of forty-four
thousand inhabitants and less than one hundred
and fifty thousand inhabitants. Acts 1929, p. 303.
Editor's Note.—This act refers to "the officers herein
named" without naming any, however the title of the act
is "to provide for the payment of office expenses of the
clerk of the superior court (whether he be clerk of the
superior court only or ex-officio clerk of other courts),
the sheriff, the ordinary, the tax-collector and the tax-
receiver in certain counties in Georgia," etc.
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ARTICLE 11A
Co-operation of Counties with Municipalities for
Improvements
§ 431 (1). Co-Operation lawful.
Cited in Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Contracting
Co., 163 Ga. 929, 935, 137 S. E\ 247.
§ 431 (2). City improvements through county
funds.
Prior to the passage of this act there was no statute
which authorized a county and a city to jointly pave and
improve the street of a city. The municipalities referred
to in that act are authorized (without regard to the na-
ture of their charters at the time of the passage of the
act) to expend money jointly with the county, and "in
such cases" to assess part of the cost of paving or im-
proving against abutting property and the owners thereof.
Mayor v. Brown, 168 Ga. 1.
§ 431 (3). Contracts; assessments by munici-
pality.
This last clause of this section is not altogether clear
in expression, but properly construing the entire section
together, in view of the express purpose of the legisla-
tion, the endeavor to make express provisions for cases
where by previous dharater provisions, ordinances, or
laws of the State the particular municipality was not
theretofore authorized to assess was entirely needless and
useless in view of the previous provision which authorized
the co-operation of the county and city under the provi-
sions of the act and the prior authority already conferred
upon the municipality to exercise any power provided in
its charter or ordinances or any power arising under the
general law of the State. This provision included all mu-
nicipalities, whether they had charter provisions or ordi-
nances upon the subject of assessments or not. The ap-
parent ambiguity in the last clause of this section is
removed when • the language employed is construed in con-
nection with the caption and the clear provisions imme-
diately preceding it, which gave all municipalities of the
State the right, if they chose, of proceeding under the gen-
eral law. Mayor v. Brown, 168 Ga. 1.
It is specifically provided in the act of 1925 that what-
ever the county may pay upon the cost of the joint project is
not to be applied for any other purpose than the joint
construction of the highway. Such sum as represents the
county's share of the costs of construction is not to be
used as a contribution to abutting landowners as well as
other tax payers of the municipality, but it to be used
to increase the city's power to do its share of the im-
provement. Mayor v. Brown, 168 Ga. 1.
The declaration, in this section that in carrying out its
purposes the municipality shyall have and exercise any
power provided in its charter or ordinances or in the
general law of the State, is not a provision requiring that
there shall be in the charter any authority to assess, or
that there shall be existing ordinances authorizing the
municipality to assess. The power may arise from the
general law of the State. The act of 1925 is a general
law of the State; and if in a given instance a munici-
pality has no charter authority and no ordinance upon
the subject, it is expressly permitted to fall back and
rely upon any pertinent general law of the State upon
the subject. Mayor v. Brown, 168 Ga. 1.
ARTICLE HB
Residue of Bond Issue Used for Improvements
§ 431 (4). Use of balance of proceeds of bond
issue, to pay warrants in certain counties.—The
ordinaries or boards of county commissioners, or
other county authorities in this State where such
boards exist, and who have the management of
the revenues of the counties, in all the counties in
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this State having a population of not less than
11,170 nor more than 11,200 according to the 1920
census, are here'by authorized and empowered,
whenever the purposes of a county bond issue has
been accomplished, which fact is to be judged of
by said county authorities in their discretion, and
there remains a balance of the proceeds of said
bond issue on hand, to use said balance in the sat-
isfaction of outstanding warrants representing the
costs of permanent county improvements, or in
making permanent county improvements. Acts
1927, p. 215.
to redeem. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat. Bank,
163 Ga. 136, 138, 135 S. E- 720.
CHAPTER 3
County and Municipal Bonds and Debts—Sink-
ing Funds
ARTICLE 12
System of Drainage
§ 439 (ee). Park's Code.
See § 439(31).
§ 439(31). Assessments for cost of drainage.
Execution.—-Pursuant to this section it is held that "'an
execution could be issued by the tax- collector for the
collection of such assessment, directed to any lawful of-
ficer to execute and return, commanding such officer that
by levy and sale of the lands and tenements of a named
owner, 'known as tract No. 19 in Spalding County drain-
age district No. 1,' being the land upon which the assess-
ment was levied, 'he cause to be made' the amount of
such assessment." Pursley v. Manley, 166 Ga. 809, 144 S.
E- 242.
The assessment being against the designated tract of land,
and the execution issued by the tax-collector commanding
the levying officer to sell that tract, thus being an execution
in rem, the same could issue after the death of the owner
of the land so assessed; and such execution, the levy and
sale of said land thereunder, and the sheriff's deed made
in pursuance of such sale, are not null and void for the
reason that the owner of the land was dead at the time
of the issuing of such execution. Pursley v. Manley, 166
Ga. 809, 144 S. E. 242.
§ 439(h). Park's Code.
See § 439(34).
§ 439 (34). Bonds for drainage, how issued and
collected.
Sale of Bonds as Prerequisite to Validity of Contract.—
A contract is not in any wise invalid by reason of the fact
that there has been no actual sale of drainage bonds, assess-
ments for the improvements having been previously made
to an amount exceeding the total amount of the drainage
contract. Board v. Williams, 34 Ga. App. 731, 732, 131 S.
E- 911.
Effect of Collection upon Validity of Contract. — Where
the total liability under the drainage contract was within
the total amount of assessments, the contract was not
thereafter rendered invalid by reason of the fact that such
assessments were not collected or enforced, or by reason of
the fact that the full par value of all the drainage bonds
sold did not come into the district treasury, as this act
requires. Board v. Williams, 34 Ga. App. 731, 733, 131 S.
E. 911.
Redemption of Land Sold.—This law does not expressly
give the right to redeem where land is sold under execution
issued for an assessment to meet principal or interest, or
the cost of draining the land, in a drainage district. Sig-
mon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat. Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 135 S.
E- 720.
The only language of this section bearing upon exemp-
tions simply means that executions issued to collect an
assessment are collected in the same manner as tax execu-
tions are collected. The procedure for their collection is
the same as the procedure for the collection of tax execu-
tions. This is a different thing from giving to any lien-
holder, or person having an interest in the land, the right
ARTICLE 1
Election on Issue of Bonds or Incurring New
Debt
§ 440 (§ 377). Notice of election on issue of
bonds.
I. IN GENERAL.
Issue of Bonds in Installments.—Nothing in the constitu-
tion or this section is inconsistent with authorization of an
issue of bonds in installments and the levy of the tax for
the payment of each installment in the year of its issue.
Brady v. Atlanta, 17 Fed. (2d), 764.
Section Must Be Strictly Complied with.—Allen v. City
of Atlanta, 166 Ga. 28, 33, 142 S. E- 262.
Cited in Houston v. Thomas, 168 Ga. 67, 146 S. E- 908;
Gibbs v. Ty Ty Consol. School Dist., 168 Ga. 379, 147
S E. 764.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE.
Publication—For Thirty Days.—Where it appeared that an
election was held on Saturday, January 23, 1926, and that
notice thereof had been published in the proper newspaper
once a week for six weeks, beginning on Friday, December
18, 1925, and ending on Friday, January 22, 1926, since the
notice was inserted the first time at least 30 days before
the date of the election and as nearly that precise number
of days immediately preceding such date as was possible
under the circumstances, the fact that the publication be-
gan more than 30 days prior to such date was immaterial
and afforded taxpayers no cause for attacking the validity
of the notice. Clark v. Union School Dist., 36 Ga. App. 80,
135 S. E. 318.
Notice Affecting Custodian of Funds.—In Bank v. Hage-
dom Const. Co., 162 Ga. 488, 134 S. E- 310, it was held that
a bank as custodian of the proceeds of county bonds is
chargeable with the notice given under this section as to
the purpose of the bond issue and must not permit the
funds to be used for other purposes.
Ordinance Not Meeting Requirements of This Section
Void. — Allen v. City of Atlanta, 166 Ga. 28, 162 S.
E- 262.
§ 444(a). Park's Code.
See § 444(1).
§ 444 (1). Bonds of municipalities to be issued
without referendum.
By the act of 1921, p. 212, the certificate of the chief of
construction, that the petition was signed by the owners of
more than fifty per cent of the property abutting on the
street or portiorf of the street sought to be paved, is made
prima facie evidence of this fact. The act of 1919 makes
this prima facie / presumption conclusive, if the owners do
not file objections to the passage of the preliminary ordi-
nance providing for the payment. Montgomery v. Atlanta,
162 Ga. 534, 545, 134 S. E- 152.
ARTICLE 2
Bonds, How Validated
§ 445. Bonds of counties and municipalities,
how validated.—When any county, municipality,
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or division, desiring to incur any bonded debt, as
prescribed in paragraph 1 and 2, section 7, Arti-
cle 7 of the Constitution, shall hold an election in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion and in accordance with the laws of the State,
controlling and regulating such elections, and the
returns of said election shall show prima facie
that such election is in favor of the issuance of
said bonds, the officer or officers of such county,
municipality, or division, charged by law with
the duty of declaring the result of the election,
shall, within six months after so declaring the
result of said election, notify the solicitor-gen-
eral of the judicial circuit in which such county,
municipality, or division shall lie, in writing, of
the fact that an election for the issuance of bonds
was held in such county, municipality, or divi-
sion, and that the election was in favor of the
issuance of such bonds, and the service of said
notice shall be personal upon the solicitor-gen-
eral, and in the event he is absent from the cir-
cuit, then it shall be served in person upon the
attorney-general of the State. When any mu-
nicipality having a population of one hundred
and fifty thousand (150,000) or more, according
to the United States census next preceding the
date of issue of the bonds hereinafter referred
to, desiring to incur a bonded debt or debts for
street improvements and issue and sell street im-
provement bonds without the assent of two-
thirds of the qualified voters thereof, but upon
a two-thirds vote of the members of its govern-
ing bod}' as provided in Paragraph 1, Section 7,
Article 7, of the Constitution of this State as
amended by amendment approved August 17,
1920, and duly ratified and proclaimed adopted by
the Governor, November 17, 1920, shall, by vote
of its governing body in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the
State, direct the issue of such bonds, the Mayor
or Chief Executive official of such municipality,
shall, within six months after the adoption of the
ordinance evidencing the vote of the governing
body of such municipality, notify in writing the
Solicitor-General of the Judicial Circuit in which
such municipality shall lie, of the fact that an
ordinance providing for the issuance of such
was duly adopted by said governing body of such
municipality, and that the necessary two-thirds
vote of said governing body was in favor of the
issuance of such bonds, and the service of said
notice shall be in person upon the Solicitor-Gen-
eral, and in event he is absent from the Circuit,
then it shall be served in person upon the At-
torney-General of the State.
When any municipality in the State of Georgia,
which, pursuant to article 7, section 7, paragraph
1 of the Constitution of Georgia, as heretofore or
hereafter amended, is authorized to issue and sell
street-improvements bonds without the assent of
two-thirds of the qualified voters at an election
called thereon, but upon a majority vote of the
members of its governing body, desires to incur
a bonded debt or debts for street improvements
and so to issue and sell street-improvements
bonds, said municipality may, at its option, pro-
ceed to have such bonds validated as provided in
this Act and in the Code sections herein referred
to. When it is so desired to have such bonds
validated, the Mayor or governing body of said
municipality shall, within six months after the
final passage of an ordinance providing for the
issuance of such bonds, notify in writing the
Solicitor-General of the judicial circuit in which
such municipality is located, of the fact than an
ordinance for the issuance of such bonds was
duly adopted by a majority vote of the governing
body of said municipality, and the service of said
notice shall be upon such Solicitor-General in
person; and in the event that he is absent from
his circuit, then the notice shall be served in per-
son upon the Attorney-General of the State. Acts
1897, p. 82; 1920, p. 633, 192, p. 92; 1929, § 1.
Rights of Taxpayers Who Failed to Make Themselves
Parties.
—Where an election, held to determine whether
municipal bends should be issued, resulted in favor of
such issuance, and the bonds were duly validated in ac-
cordance with this and the following- sections of this ar-
ticle, citizens and taxpayers who could have made them-
selves parties to the proceedings to validate the bonds,
but failed to do so, were concluded by the judgment ren-
dered, and could not thereafter enjoin the collection of a
tax to pay the interest and part of the principal falling
due, on the ground that some of the bonds were for a
purpose not authorized by ' the constitution. Jenkins v.
Mayor & Aldermen, 165 Ga. 121, 139 S. E- 863.
§ 446. Duties of the attorney-general or solici-
tor-general.
Sufficiency of Petition.—It is necessary, of course, to state
the facts, and this should be done with sufficient partic-
ularity to meet the requirements of good pleading. A peti-
tion which fails to show, except by a bare conclusion, that
the election resulted prima facie in favor of the issuance of
the bonds is fatally defective . and subject to general de-
murrer. Edwards v. Clarkesville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 310, 133
S. E. 45.
Same—Unnecessary Allegations.—The law does not re-
quire an allegation as to publication of the notice to the
voters, or as to the furnishing of the list of the registered
voters (it being sufficient merely to show the number of
such voters), or as to the city's indebtedness not exceeding
the limit allowed by the constitution. Edwards v. Clarkes-
ville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 310, 133 S. E- 45.
§ 447. Trial of the case and bill of exceptions.
Court Can Determine Validity of Votes.—In a proceeding
to validate bonds, it is within the power and jurisdiction
of the superior court, upon proper pleadings and sufficient
evidence, to pass upon the validity of any votes cast in the
election, and to eliminate such votes as are shown by the
pleadings and the evidence to be illegal. Turk v. Royal, 34
Ga. App. 717, 131 S. E- 119.
Burden on State to Prove Material Facts.—See Clay v.
Austell School Dist., 35 Ga. App. 109, 132 S. E. 127, quoting
the paragraph set out under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Final Judgment Prerequisite to Bill of Exceptions.—Where
an answer filed by intervenors is dismissed as being insuffi-
cient to prevent validation, but the order of dismissal pro-
vides merely that the petitioners "may take an order con-
firming and validating," it does not constitute a final
judgment "confirming and validating the issuance of the
bonds" from which a bill of exceptions will lie, as provided
by this section. Veal v. Deepstep Consol. School Dist., 34
Ga. App. 67, 128 S. E. 223.
Applied in Gibbs v. Ty Ty Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 163 Ga. 379, 147 S. E- 764; Gibbs v. Ty Ty Consol.
School Dist., 168 Ga. 379, 147 S. E. 764.
§ 448. Judgment validating forever conclusive.
Cited in Towns v. Workmore Public School District, 166
Ga. 393, 394, 142 S. E- 877.
§ 461. Bonds for refunding or paying off prior
issue.—Any county or municipality, desiring to
.validate any issue of bonds proposed to be issued
tor the purpose of refunding or paying off and. dis-
charging a prior issue of bonds issued by such
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county or municipality, may have the same vali-
dated before issuing, in the manner hereinbefore
provided, by presenting a petition to the solicitor-
general of the circuit in which said county or
municipality is located, or to the attorney-general
of the State of Georgia when the solicitor-general
is absent from his circuit, setting forth a full de-
scription of the bonds to be issued, as well as the
bonds to be paid off by such refunding issue, with
a full copy of the resolution and all proceedings
authorizing the original issue of said bonds
sought to be paid off by the refunding issue, also
resolutions and proceedings authorizing the re-
funding issue of bonds. Such petition being pre-
sented to the solicitor-general, or the attorney-
general, as the case may be, it shall be the duty
of such officer to bring proceedings for the valida-
tion of such issue of refunding bonds in the mat-
ter hereinbefore provided, save and except that in
such cases the county or municipality seeking the
validation of such bonds shall pay all court costs,
and the fee of $25.00 to the solicitor-general. But
no bonds shall be allowed validated hereunder
that have been issued for a bonded debt created
since the Constitution of 1877. Acts 1927, p. 135.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927 only bonds
issued between the adoption of the Constitution of 1887 and
the passage of the Act of 1897 could be validated by the
operation of this section.
§ 462(1). Sections applicable to validation of
street improvement bonds.—.All the terms and
provisions contained in sections 445, 446, 447,
448, 449, 450, 451, and 455, as hereby amended, of
the Code of Georgia of 1910, providing for the
validation of the bonds of counties, municipali-
ties, and divisions generally, and the method of
procedure thereunder, are hereby made applic-
able in all proceedings to validate street-improve-
ment bonds which ma}' be issued by any mu-
nicipality which, pursuant to article 7, section 7.
paragraph 1, of the Constitution of Georgia, as
heretofore or hereafter amended, is authorized
to issue and sell street-improvements bonds with-
out the assent of two thirds of the qualified vot-
ers at an election called thereon, but upon a ma-
jority vote of the members of its governing body.
Acts 1929, p. 153, § 2.
. ARTICLE 3
Debts Other Than a Bonded Debt
§ 468. Number of votes; hew ascertained.
Cited ir dissenting- opinion in Tightower v. Keaton, 16/
Ga. 94, 96, 144 S. E. 759.
CHAPTER 4
Change of County Lines
§ 468. Change of county lines.
See notes to § 471(1).
§ 471(a). Park's Cede.
See § 471(1).
Ga.—
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§ 471(1). Election in town of 400 to 500 popu-
lation—Whenever the boundary lines of one or
more of the counties of this State shall lie within
the corporate lines of any town or city having a
population of not less than four hundred or more
than five hundred inhabitants, according to the
census of 1920 or any future census, and it is de-
sired to change the county lines and bring the
said town or city wholly within the limits of one
county only; the change of such county lines shall
be effected in the following manner:
Whenever a petition, signed by not less than
thirty qualified voters of said town or city shall
be addressed to the governing authorities of said
town or city asking that an election shall be held
as in this Act prescribed, provided that there shall
be not less than fifteen petitioners from each of
the counties whose boundary lines lie within the
corporate limits of said town or city, and said peti-
tion be approved by a majority of the members
of the governing board of said town or city, it
shall be the duty of said governing authorities to
submit the matter, as herein provided, to the law-
ful voters of said municipality at any general elec-
tion therein, or at any special election held for
that purpose, after advertising the same in either
case once a week for four weeks in the public
gazette in which sheriff's advertisements are pub-
lished in each of the counties whose boundary
lines lie within the limits of said municipality, and
also in the public gazette in said municipality if
there be one published therein. Said special elec-
tion shall not be held earlier than thirty days after
the publication of first notice, and shall be held
under the same rules and regulations as provided
for the election of members of the General As-
sembly. At any such general -or special election,
the question shall be submitted in such manner as
to enable each voter to say whether he desires a
change in existing boundary lines so as to bring
the municipality wholly writhin the line of one of
the adjacent counties, and which of the adjacent
counties he desires the municipality to be included
within. Whenever at such general or special elec-
tion, a majority of the votes cast shall be in favor
of changing the county lines so as to bring the
municipality wholly within the line of one of the
adjacent counties, and a majority of the votes
cast shall be in favor of one of said adjacent
counties, the mayor and clerk of said town or city
shall within thirty days certify and declare the re-
sult of said election to the ordinaries or board of
county commissioners or other officers having the
control of the count}^ business in each of the
county [counties] affected. The said municipal
and county authorities shall thereupon proceed to
readjust and change the lines of the counties af-
fected, in such manner as to include the said
municipality wholly within the limits of the par-
ticular county fixed upon by said election, and
shall cause a description and map of the new line
to be filed and recorded in the office of the clerks
of the Superior Courts of each county affected,
and shall cause an official notice of the change
and description to be published once a week for
four weeks in a public gazette in their respective
counties; and thereupon the new line or lines
shall be held to be established in lieu of the origi-
nal line or lines. The costs of said proceedings
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shall be paid by the said town or city desiring the
same. Acts 1927, p. 209.
Section Unconstitutional. — This section is unconstitu-
tional and void, because in conflict with a general law
found in §§ 468 et seq. The constitution forbids enactment
of any special law where provision has been made for the
same subject matter by general law. See § 6391. Mayor v.
Wilkinson County, 166 Ga. 460, 143 S. E- 769.
CHAPTER 6
Change of County- Sites; Courts, Where Held;
Offices, Where Kept.
§ 486. Application for change, how made.
General Assembly Not Bound by Findings of Secretary
of State. — The General Assembly, in determining the
facts and legislating upon the removal of county- sites un-
der this and the following section, is not bound by the find-
ings of the Secretary of State as to the result of the elec-
tion. Cowart v. Manry, 166 Ga. 612, 144 S.- E- 21; citing
Bachlott v. Buie, 158 Ga. 705 (2) 124 S. E. 339.
Failure of General Assembly to Legislate.—Where re-
moval election was held on May 5, 1927, and the General
Assembly of 1927 did not pass any legislation thereon, the
General Assembly of 1929 had the constitutional power
and authority to pass an act removing the county-site.
Cowart v. Manry, 166 Ga. 512, 144 S. E- 21.
CHAPTER 7
County Revenue
ARTICLE 1
From Taxation
SECTION 1
Special and Extra Tax
§ 504. (§ 395.) Extra tax, how levied.
Public Improvements.—The object stated in paragraph 2
of section 513, although for a county purpose, is held not
to be within the purview of section 508; consequently, a tax
"to build or repair courthouses or jails, bridges or ferries,
or other public improvements, according to contract" does
not require the recommendation of a grand jury. Seaboard
Air Line R. Co. v. Wright, 34 Ga. App. 88, 90, 128 S. E- 234.
See note of this case under § 507.
Cited in Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165
Ga. 631, 142 S. E- 292.
§ 505. On failure to levy an extra tax.
An amendment could not be considered either as re-
ducing the amount originally levied to pay the legal in-
debtedness nor as an admission by the county that the
lesser amount mentioned in the amendment was all that
was necessary to be levied for that purpose, and therefore
as establishing that the levy was exorbitant to the extent
of suoh attempted reduction. Seaboard Air-Eme Ry. Co.
v. Mcintosh County, 38 Ga. App. 43, 142 S. E- 699.
Where the taxpayers in general had paid their taxes
for the year and executions had been issued against those
who had been defaulted in the payment of the same, in-
cluding the plaintiff in error, and where, after a levy
upon its property, the plaintiff in error filed an affidavit
of illegality, it was not then lawful for the county au-
thorities to amend the tax levy by reducing the amount
levied to pay the legal indebtedness of the county, as in-
dicated above, and by adding the equivalent of such re-
duction to the amount levied for a separate and distinct
purpose; and the court, upon the trial of the issue formed
by the affidavit of illegality, properly disregarded such
attempted amendment of the tax levy. Ala. Great So. R.
Co. v. Wright, 34 Ga. App. 639, 130 S. E- 918; Seaboard
Air-Eine Ry. Co. v. Mcintosh County, 38 Ga. App. 43,
142 S. E. 699.
§ 507. (§ 398.) Tax not sufficient.
See notes to § 696.
Gives County Four Years.—This section clearly provide*
that the county under certain contingencies may have four
years in which to pay its accumulated debt. Central, etc.>
R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 153, 132 S. E- 449.
Nature of Tax.—See Seaboard Air-Eine R. Co. v. Wright,
34 Ga. App. 88, 89, 128 S. E- 234, which contains the same
holding set out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of
1926.
Same—Editor's Note.—The question as to the amount of the
tax which the county authorities can levy under this section
to pay current expenses seems to be at present somewhat in
doubt. By the holding in Southwestern R. Co. v. Wright,.
156 Ga. 1, 118 S. E- 552 and Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Wright,
156 Ga. 13, 118 S. E- 709 the authorities may legally levy a
tax not exceeding 100 per cent of the state tax to pay ac-
cumulated debts or current expenses or either. This is by
virtue of this section. However in Seaboard Air Eine v.
Wright, 161 Ga. 136, 129 S. E. 646, it was held that the levy
of a tax for the purposes specified in section 508 cannot ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the state tax and that this limit extends
to current expenses. This decision seems in direct conflict
with the holding in the two cases, supra, but the court did
not refer to them. The same question arose in Central, etc
R. Co. v. Wright, 36 Ga. App. 386, 137 S. E- 93 and the
Court of Appeals after considering both cases declined to
follow the Seaboard Case, supra, and upheld the power to
levy the 100 per cent tax.
In considering Central, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 36 Ga. App.
386, 137 S. E. 93, it should be noted that in this case certio-
rari was granted by the Supreme Court and also that there
is another case between the same parties and involving the
same point before that court at the present time.
"Current Expenses."—It may be said generally that "cur-
rent expenses" include the ordinary expenses of the county
arising during the year for which the tax is levied, and
"county purposes" include all purposes for which county
taxation may be levied; that is, the ordinary expenses of
the county and the unusual and extraordinary expenses as
well. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Wright, 34 Ga. App. 88,
90, 128 S. E. 234. This case also adopts the holding set out
in the first and second paragraphs under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
This section does not expressly or impliedly authorize
the levy of a tax for current expenses in any amount.
Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Eong County, 167 Ga. 210, 212,
144 S. E. 783.
The term "current expenses," as employed in this sec-
tion is necessarily included in the term "for county pur-
poses" as employed in § 508. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Eong
County, 167 Ga. 210, 212, 144 S. E- 783.
"Extra," extraordinary, or special taxes, no matter
which term is used to denominate the taxes not essen-
tially necessary for carrying on the ordinary functions of
government, are not to be computed in the consideration
of the question whether a tax levy is excessive when the
term "current expenses" as used in this section is in-
volved. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 1, 139
S. E- 890.
Tax laws passed since the adoption of the Code, to raise
revenues for specific purposes definitely stated therein, are
extra or special taxes, not coming within the provisions
of this and the following section. Central of Ga. Ry. Co.
v. Wright, 165 Ga. 1, 139 S. E. 890.
A county can not legally levy a tax of more than 150
per cent, of the State tax to pay current expenses and ac-
cumulated debts. Accordingly, where a county levied a
tax of SJ/i mills for the combined purpose of paying cur-
rent expenses and accumulated debts, the levy was exces-
sive to the extent of three fourths of one mill. Atlantic
Coast Eine Railroad Co. v. Eong County, 39 Ga. App.
303, 147 S. E. 158.
Recommendation of Grand Jury Not Necessary.—Under
this section, the proper county authorities may, with-
out a recommendation of the grand jury, levy a tax upon
the taxable property of the county, in an amount equal to
100 per cent, of the State tax for the current year. Wright
v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 36 Ga. App. 382, 137 S. E,
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93; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 631. It
follows therefore that a tax levy of $2.75 per thousand
made by the county authorities, without a recommenda-
tion of a grand jury, for the purpose of paying the ac-
cumulated indebtedness of the county, is legal, being with-
in 100 per cent, of the State tax for the current year,
which is $5 per thousand. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v.
Jones County, 37 Ga. App. 763, 142 S. E. 301.
A county may levy more than 100 per cent, of the
State tax, without the recommendation of a grand jury,
for the payment of accumulated debts, "when debts have
accumulated against the county, so that one hundred per
cent, on the State tax, or the amount specially allowed
by local law, .can not pay the current expenses of the
county and the debt in one year." This section of the
Civil Code is not to be construed to limit the power
thereby conferred so as to impose only an additional levy
of 50 per cent, of the State tax in case it should be neces-
sary to levy the 50 per cent, of the State tax under the
provisions of section 508 of the Code. Hill, J., concurs
specifically as to this note. Central of Ga. R. Co. v.
Wright, 165 Ga. 1, 139 S. E. 890.
If the levy of 50 per cent, of the State tax, as authorized
by section 508, is exhausted, and under the terms men-
tioned in section 507 the levy of an additional 100 per
cent, on the State tax is insufficient to pay the current
expenses for the year and the accumulated debts in one
year, then the county authorities without the recommen-
dation of a grand jury, for the purpose of paying the in-
debtedness of the county, may levy an additional assess-
ment for the purpose of paying its accumulated debts and
current expenses, unless the latter have been included in
the levy for county purposes or otherwise provided for.
This item of the levy must be sufficient to pay off the
accumulated debts of the county in four years. Unpaid
lawful current expenses incurred in one year, which were
not discharged by payment and for which county warrants
were legally issued, are accumulated debts of the county
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of section
513 of the Code. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165
Ga. 1, 139 S. E. 890.
The tax under section 508 of the Civil Code of 1910, not
to exceed fifty per cent, of the State tax, is one over and
above the extra or special taxes authorized by sections
504, 506, 507, and is in addition to such extra or special
taxes, and is leviable for county purposes, including pay-
ment of the legal indebtedness of the county due or to
become due during the year, or past due, the current ex-
penses of the county, and the other purposes stated in sec-
tion 513. When the tax levied under section 508, and
to the limit therein fixed, for the purposes of pay-
ing the legal indebtedness and current expenses of
the county, is insufficient for those purposes, then resort
can be had to the extra tax authorized under section 507,
to pay accumulated debts and current expenses, or either.
Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 631, 142 S. E 292.
Cited in Maddox v. Anchor Duck Mills, 167 Ga. 695, 700,
146 S. E. 551; Decatur Bank & Trust Co. v. Amer-
ican Sav. Bank, 166 Ga. 789, 144 S. E- 285; Blue Is-
land State Bank v. McRae, 165 Ga. 153, 140 S. E- 351;
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Effingham County, 37 Ga.
App. 766, 801, 142 S. E. 303; Southern Ry. Co. v. Wright.
36 Ga. App. 391, 137 S. E. 98.
SECTION 3
Purposes for Which County Tax May Be As-
sessed
§ 508 (§ 389). Tax for county purposes.
County Purposes.—See note "Current Expenses" under
section 507. See, also, note under section 504.
Same—Includes Current Expenses.—The levy of a tax for
the purposes specified in this section can not exceed fifty
per cent of the State tax. This limit extends to current
expenses. Seaboard Air-Dine R. Co. v. Wright, 161 Ga. 136,
129 S. E. 646.
Items Not Included.—In computing the fifty per cent
provided by section 508 of the Code, items of tax levy
which require no recommendation by the grand jury are
not to be considered in determining the 50 per cent refer-
red to in that section. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright,
165 Ga. 623, 142 S. E- 288.
Same—Tax to Pay Accumulated Debts.—While section
507 does not expressly authorize a levy of a tax for 100
per cent of the State tax to pay accumulated debts and
current expenses, it does by clear and necessary implica-
tion authorize such a tax. This section authorizes the
proper county authorities to levy a tax to pay current ex-
penses. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 631,
142 S. E. 292.
Counties are expressly authorized to levy a tax for the
payment of past-due or accumulated debts of the county;
and where a warrant was issued for a past-due or accumu-
lated debt, and in renewal of a former warrant which had
been issued in a previous year for a liability incurred dur-
ing that year, and payment of which had gone by default,
such renewal warrant was not void because it was given
in one year to be paid in the following year. Blue Island
State Bank v. McRae, 165 Ga. 153, 140 S. E- 351.
Applied in McGinnis v. McKinnon, 165 Ga. 713, 141 S. E-
910.
Cited in Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Effingham
County, 37 Ga. App. 766, 801, 142 S. E. 303; Central of
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jones County, 37 Ga. App. 763, 142 S.
E. 301; Atlantic Coast Dine R. Co. v. Dong County, 16/
Ga. 210, 144 S. E. 783; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Wright, 165 Ga. 1, 139 S. E- 890.
§ 509. (§ 400). Duty of ordinary.
Provisions Directory.—Failure to comply with the provi-
sions of this section of the Code, which require the ordina-
ries to have prepared and presented to the grand jury on
the first day of the court, for inspection by that body, a
statement of the financial condition of the county and the
amount of tax required to pay the county's liabilities, does
not affect the validity of the tax levy. Central of Ga. Ry.
Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 623, 142 S. E- 288, citing Atlanta
National Asso. v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80, 35 S. E. 73.
§ 513. (§ 404). Objects of county tax.—County
taxes shall be assessed for the following pur-
poses:
1. To pay the legal indebtedness of the county
due, or to become due during the year, or past
due.
2. To build or repair court-houses or jails,
bridges or ferries, or other public improvements
according to the contract; provided, that in coun-
ties having a population of not less than 11,813
and not more than 11,825 persons, according to
the 1920 Census of the United States, the com-
bined or total tax levy for all the purposes enu-
merated in this or subsection 2 shall not exceed
five (5) mills, unless the grand jury at the spring
term of the Superior Court for such county shall
recommend an increase for such year to meet
some emergency.
3. To pay sheriffs', jailors', or other officers'
fees that they may be legally entitled to, out of
the county.
4. To pay coroners all fees that may be due
them by the county for holding inquests.
5. To pay the expenses of the county, for bail-
iffs at courts, non-resident witnesses in criminal
cases, fuel, servant hire, stationery, and the like.
6. To pay jurors a per diem compensation.
7. To pay expenses incurred in supporting the
poor of the county, and as otherwise prescribed
by this Code.
8. To pay charges for educational purposes, to
be levied only in strict compliance with the law.
9. To pay any other lawful charge against the
county. Acts 1929, p. 154, § 1.
See notes to §§ 507, 508, 1551(130).
In General.—Under the provisions of this section, county
taxes shall be assessed to pay the legal indebtedness of the
county, due, or to become due during the year, or past
due; and when debts have accumulated against the county,
so that 100 per cent on the State tax, or the amount spe-
cially allowed by local law, can not pay the current ex-
penses of the county and the debt in one year, the proper
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county authorities may in their discretion levy such an
amount or per cent of tax upon the taxable property of
the county as will insure the payment of the debt or
debts of the county within at least tour years, and such a
per cent as will at the same time provide for the current
expenses and thereby prevent, if possible, an increase of
indebtedness or the creation of additional obligations. Cen-
tral of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 623, 142 S. E- 288.
Where an item of a tax levy under this section is in-
definite but not void, it may be clarified and made defi-
nite by an amendment which does not change the purpose
or the amount of the original levy; and this is true even
though the generality of taxpayers have paid their taxes
and the amendment is made after the property of a pro-
testing taxpayer has been levied on under a tax fi. fa.,
and an affidavit of illegality has been interposed to the
levy. Southern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield County, 38 Ga. App.
703, 145 S. E- 668.
It is sufficient if each item of a tax levy under section
513 of the Civil Code of 1910 gives the per cent of the tax
levied under that item, and it is not necessary that the
per cent levied for each separate purpose expressed in the
item be stated. Southern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield County,
38 Ga. App. 703, 145 S. E- 668.
This section names nine purposes for which taxes
may be levied, and when a tax is levied foi any one
of these nine purposes it includes all items named in that
purpose. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144,
132 S. E. 449.
Paragraph 1—Accumulated Indebtedness.—-Under the terms
"due" and "past due" is embraced, necessarily, the "ac-
cumulated indebtedness" of the county. Indebtedness of
the county "due" or "past due" may possibly be more
extensive, in the last analysis of those expressions, than
"accumulated indebtedness," but "accumulated indebtedness"
can not be more extensive than the aggregate of the indebt-
edness which is due and that which is past due. And conse-
quently a tax for the purpose of paying "accumulated indebt-
edness" is provided for exclusively under this section. Cen-
tral, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 153, 132 S. E.
449.
And it follows that a tax for the purpose of paying ac-
cumulated indebtedness, as allowed under section 507, can
not be lawfully levied under item 9 of section 513, which
authorizes a levy "to pay any other lawful charge against
the county." Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App.
144, 153, 132 S. E- 449.
Paragraph 2.—See notes to §§ 504, 507.
Cited in Maddox v. Anchor Duck Mills, 167 Ga. 695, 700,
146 S. E. 551; Blue Island State Bank v. McRae, 165 Ga.
153, 140 S. E. 351; McGinnis v. McKinnon, 165 Ga. 713, 141
S. E. 910; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga.
1, 139 S. E. 890; Mcintosh County v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co., 38 Ga. App. 611, 144 S. E- 687; Seaboard Air
I/ine Ry. Co. v. Liberty County, 39 Ga. App. 75, 146 S.
E. 771; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga.
631, 142 S. E. 292.
§§ 513(a)-513(c). Park's Code.
See P. C. §§ 1236(1) -1236(3).
SECTION 4
Assessment and Collection of Taxes
§ 514. (§ 405). Order must specify.
See notes to § 696.
Cited in Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Liberty County,
39 Ga. App. 75, 146 S. E- 771; Southern Ry. Co. v. Whit-
field County, 38 Ga. App. 703, 145 S. E. 668.
§ 521. (§ 412). Payment, how enforced,
Applied in Payne v. Royal Indemnity Co., 168 Ga. 77,
78, 147 S. E. 95.
the same individual. Martin v. Decatur County, 34 Ga.
App. 816, 131 S. E. 302.
Cited in Wilcox County v. American Surety Co., 164
Ga. 798, 139 S. E. 538; Payne v. Royal Indemnity Co., 16S
Ga. 77, 147 S. E- 95.
§ 526. (§ 417.) County tax may be remitted.
As to when claims against county are barred, see section
411 and note.
Cited in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mitchell County,
35 Ga. App. 47, 135 S. E- 223.
SECTION 4A
Fiscal Year in Certain Counties
§ 526(4). May change to calendar year.—Any
county or counties, the fiscal year of which has
been changed or shall be changed to cover a dif-
ferent period of time than the calendar year, shall
have full power and authority, by order of the
ordinary, board of commissioners or other au-
thority having charge of the fiscal and adminis-
trative affairs of any such county, which order
shall be entered upon their minutes at the time,
to change said fiscal year to the calendar year.
Acts 1929, p. 235, § 2.
Editor's Note.—The acts of 1922 and 1925, codified as
§§ 526(1) -526(3) of the code of 1926 were amended by
adding the provisions of this act, herein codified as §§
526(4)
-526(6).
§ 526(5). Power to levy tax. — Any county
changing its fiscal year to the calendar year shall
have full power and authority to levy a tax dur-
ing the calendar year in which such change is
made, covering the entire calendar year, notwith-
standing a tax may have previously been levied
and collected for a portion of such calendar year
and notwithstanding any statute of this State to
the contrary. Acts 1929, p. 235, § 3.
§ 526(6). Change to other than calendar year.
-—
-Any county within the terms of this Act shall
have full power and authority to change to a
fiscal year other than calendar year, and from
such fiscal year back to calendar year as a fiscal
year, without limit as to the number of changes.
Acts 1929, p. 236, § 4.
§ 523. (§ 414.) On failure to pay.
Execution against Sheriff.—An execution could not be
legally issued under this section against the sheriff of a
county on the bond given by the sheriff of a city court of
the county, although both offices may have been filled by
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SECTION 5
Proceedings against Defaulting Tax-Collectors
and Treasurers
§ 528. (§ 419.) Failure to account, malprac-
tice.
Applied in Pitts Banking Co. v. Sherman, 166 Ga. 495,
143 S. E. 581.
ARTICLE 2
From Other Sources
§ 530. (§ 421.) Licenses, exhibitions, etc.
Test for Local Ordinance.—In determining whether the
§ 554 COUNTY MANAGER FORM OF GOVERNMENT § 615(24)
occupation tax imposed by a local ordinance upon peddlers
is reasonable, the courts should take into consideration the
occupation taxes imposed by this section. Iyandham v. La-
Grange, 163 Ga. 570, 576, 136 S. E). 514.
ARTICLE 4
Paupers
§ 554. (§ 439.) Parents and children bound to
support each other.
When Mother Must Support Children.—On the death of a
father the duty of supporting the children devolves upon
the mother, where the mother has the ability, and the in-
fant child is without means, and is unable to earn a main-
tenance. Thompson v. Georgia R., etc., Co., 163 Ga. 598,
603, 136 S. E. 895.
§§ 563(1) -563(13). Park's Code.
See P. C. §§ 1519(44) -1519(55).
CHAPTER 9
County Officers
ARTICLE l
County Treasurer
SECTION 4
County Orders
§ 579. (§ 463). Order in which the county
debts are paid.
Cited in Maddox v. Anchor Duck Mills, 167 Ga. 695, 702,
146 S. E. 551.
SECTION 6
Final Settlements, Fees, Expenses and Salaries
§ 590(2). Salary in county of 63,690 to 63,695
population.—The salary of the county treasurers
of counties of this State, having a population ac-
cording to the Federal Census of 1920 of not
less than 63,690 and not more than 63,695, be
fixed at thirty-six hundred ($3,600.00) dollars per
annum, to be paid in monthly installments of
three hundred ($300.00) dollars each out of
county funds. Acts 1929, p. 223, § 1.
ARTICLE 2
County Surveyor and His Fees
SECTION 2
Duties and Fees of County Surveyor
§ 603. (§ 485). Where there is no surveyor.
See notes to § 3818.
§§ 615(a)-615(b). Park's Code.
See § 6017(1).
§§ 615(f)-615(j). Park's Code.
See §§ 6017(6) -6017(8).
§ 615 (m). Park's Code.
See § 6017(11).
CHAPTER 9A
County Manager Form of Government
§ 615 (24). Uniform county manager form of
government provided; operation of act.—This act
shall be a general law to provide a uniform county
commissioner's law for all such counties in this
State as may require a commission form of county
government composed of a board of county com-
missioners of roads and revenues for such county,
with a county manager as the chief executive of-
ficer thereof, to be known as the county-manager
form of government, and shall not prevent any
county in this State from having a county com-
missioner's form of county government by local
Act as now provided by law, provided such local
Act shall not provide a county-manager form of
government for such county; and this Act shall
not go into effect in any county of this State ex-
cept upon a majority vote of the qualified voters
of the county, and the operation of this Act in any
county adopting the same shall be suspended and
terminated in like manner upon a majority vote
of the qualified voters of the county; and upon
the suspension of the operation of this Act in any
county, the local Act of force in such county shall
automatically be revived and shall have full force
and effect in such county, as if its operation had
not been suspended in such county by the adop-
tion of this Act by such county; provided, how-
ever, that this provision shall not affect a county
in this State having a population of 44,051 by the
1920 census taken by the United States govern-
ment, and this Act shall go into force and effect
in a county of this State having a population of
44,051 by the 1920 census taken by the United
States government, and the operation of this Act
in' such county adopting the same shall be sus-
pended and terminated only upon an election
called for the purpose of submitting to the quali-
fied voters of the county the question whether
the county-manager form of county government
shall be established or abolished in such county
as provided in this Act. If a majority of the quali-
fied voters of such county, voting in such election,
shall vote in favor of establishing the county-man-
ager form of county government in and for such
county, this Act shall thereupon become of full
force and effect in such county; and if a majority
of the qualified voters of such county voting in
such election shall vote in favor of abolishing the
county-manager form of county government in
such county, such form of county government
shall thereupon be suspended and terminated in
such county; and upon the suspension of the opera-
tion of this Act in such county, the local Act of
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force in such county shall automatically be re-
vived and shall have full force and effect in surh
county as if its operation had not been suspended
in such county by the adoption of this Act by
such county; provided, however, that the mem-
bers of the board of commissioners of such
county, in office under the provisions of this Act
at the time of the suspension of the operation of
this Act in such county, shall hold office and act
as the commissioners of such county under the
provisions of such local Act of such county until
the expiration or their respective terms of office
under the provisions of this Act, and until their
successors shall be elected and qualified under the
provisions of such Act for such county; provided,
further, that the operation of this Act in any
county of this State shall not be suspended and
terminated by any election held within two full
years after this Act shall be put into effect in
such county. If the ordinary of the county shall
be in charge of the affairs of such county at the
time of the adoption of this Act in such county,
the ordinary shall take charge of the affairs of
such county upon the supervision of the operation
of this Act in such county, as now provided by
law for counties having no county commissioners.
Acts 1922, pp. 83, 93, 94; 1927, p. 211.
Editor's Note.—The first proviso and all the provisions
that follow it down to the second proviso, were inserted by
the amendment of 1927.
CHAPTER 11
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues
§ 626(2). Salaries of commissioners in coun-
ties of 200,000 population.—The compensation of
commissioners of roads and revenues in counties
in this State having a population of two hundred
thousand or more, according to the United States
census of 1920 or any future census, be and the
same is hereby fixed at the sum of three hundred
($300.00) dollars per month for each commis-
sioner, payable monthly on the first day of each
month, out of the county treasury. Acts 1929, p.
218, § 1.
CHAPTER 12
Roads, Bridges, Ferries, Turnpikes, Causeways,
Crossings, etc.
ARTICLE l
Public Roads
SECTION 1
Classification of Roads and Districts
§ 629(a). Park's Code.
See § 629(1).
§ 629 (1). Post roads deemed public roads;
maintenance.
Effect upon Classification of Roads.—This section does
not prohibit the county authorities from classifying the road
as a first, second, or third-class road as provided by law.
Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E. 626. See section
631.
§ 631. (§ 511). Roads may be classified.
The road commissioners mentioned in this section are pro-
vided for in section 724. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137
S. E- 626.
Effect of Section 694.—The provision of this section, with
regard to "concurrence of the majority of the road commis-
sioners" (such commissioners as are provided in section
724), is inconsistent with the exclusive power granted to
county commissioners of roads and revenues in section 694
et seq. This ruling is based upon the theory that the pro-
vision for "concurrence of the majority of road commission-
ers," found in section 631, also applies to the establishment
of third-class roads. In fact section 633, codified from Ga.
Laws 1894, p. 100, does not mention road "commissioners."
The act did authorize classification of third-class roads.
Buchanan v. James, 130 Ga. 546, at page 549. The act merely
amends the road laws so as to provide for third-class roads
and how such roads shall be worked. Section 724 provides
for district road commissioners, and their duties are speci-
fied in section 729. All of these duties, where the alterna-
tive road law is operative, are reposed solely in the county
board of roads and revenues. Browne v. Benson, 163, Ga. 707,
137 S. E- 626.
§ 633. (§ 513). Third-class roads.
See note under section 631.
§1 634:. (§ 514). Bridges and causeways.
This section imposes no legal duty upon a county to
maintain at a width of 16 feet a traveled way for vehicles
over a bridge which is 32 feet long, on a highway in this
State. Smith v. Colquitt County, 37 Ga. App. 222, 223,
139 S. E- 682. See note to § 748.
SECTION 3
Roads; How Laid Out, Altered, or Discontinued
§ 640. (§ 520). Public roads, how laid out or
altered.
See notes to §§ 686 and 5243.
Res Adjudicata.—Where, on a proceeding under this sec-
tion to open a road, a landowner who interposed his claim
for $2500 as damages was awarded but $250 by the jury,
and thereafter, instead of having that award reviewed by
certiorari, he brought a suit in the superior court to re-
cover of the county $3000 as damages for taking part of
his land and decreasing the market value of the part not
taken, a plea of res adjudicata in defense to that suit was
properly sustained. Love v. Murray County, 37 Ga. App.
604, 141 S. E. 85.
Method Not Exclusive as to Establishing.—It has several
times been ruled that sections 640 et seq., is a general law,
providing a method of establishing roads. It is not the only
method, but is cumulative, and it has also been held that
the establishment of a public road without compliance with
sections 640 et seq. is illegal. Shore v. Banks County, 162
Ga. 185, 132 S. 35- 753, citing numerous cases.
Does Not Apply to Question of Classification.—This sec-
tion applies to "any new road, or alteration in an old
road," but has no application to the question of whether
county commissioners alone have authority to classify pub-
lic roads into first, second, and third-class as provided in
section 631. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E. 626.
See note to sec. 621.
Adoption of Alternative Road Law.—When the alternative
road law is adopted by the recommendation of the grand
jury, road commissioners cease to exist in that county, and
an exercise of any judicial functions whatever by those per-
sons who may previously have been road commissioners be-
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•comes legally impossible. Varner v. Thompson, 3 Ga. App.
415, 60 S. E. 216. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E. 626.
State Highway Department Cannot Proceed Hereunder.—
This section provides a method applicable alone for the con-
demnation of rights of way for public roads to be laid out by
the proper county authorities and the state highway depart-
ment cannot proceed by virtue of this section to condemn
rights of way for State-aid roads. McCallum v. McCallum,
162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E- 755.
Who May Be Appointed Commissioners. — Anderson v.
Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E- 567, following Brown v.
Sams, 119 Ga. 22, 45 S. E- 719, as set out in first paragraph
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Same—Presumptions of Validity.—In the absence of any-
thing to the contrary, the presumption would be that the ap-
pointment was properly made. Anderson v. Howard, 34
Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E- 567.
Description of Road.—Where it was objected that the road
commissioners, or reviewers, did not physically "mark out"
the road as required by this section, and the evidence was
that they did not actually stake or mark out the road on
the ground, or designate its location in any other way ex-
cept on paper, but they did attach to and make a part of
their report a map or plat containing all the information and
data necessary for the definite location of the proposed road,
this was held a sufficient compliance. Anderson v. Howard,
34 Ga. App. 292, 297, 129 S. E- 567.
Cited in Parrish v. Glynn County, 167 Ga. 149, 144 S.
E 785.
§ 642. (§ 522). Persons in possession to be
notified.
Notice Signed by Majority Sufficient.—It is not necessary
that the notice served on the objectors should be signed by
all the commissioners. A majority is sufficient. Anderson v.
Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E. 567.
Clerical Error in Notice.—The words in a notice, "said
road to be fifty feet in length," clearly appeared to be a
clerical error, and, the length of the road otherwise appear-
ing therein, it was proper to overrule a motion to dismiss
the proceeding, based on the ground that the notice showed
that the road was to be only fifty feet long, and for that rea-
son could not be of public utility. Anderson v. Howard, 34
Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E. 567.
Failure to Serve All tParties.—Where the citation was pub-
lished as required by sec. 641, a plaintiff cannot object to the
proceedings on the ground that certain other persons, through
whose land the road would pass, had not been served with
written notice as required by this section. Anderson v. How-
ard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 296, 129 S. E. 567.
SECTION 9
Damages, How Assessed
§ 678. (§ 557). Landowners aggrievied, how
redressed.
Meaning of "Vicinage."—The word "vicinage," in this
section means the neighborhood, or surrounding or adjoin-
ing district; and its extent does not depend upon an arbi-
trary rule of distance or topography, but varies according
to the sparseness or density of settlement in county or city
districts. Graves v. Colquitt County, 34 Ga. App. 271, 129
S. E- 166.
See notes to § 640.
§ 686. (§ 565). Certiorari.
Review of Damage.—Certiorari proper to review judg-
ment based on award of damages under §§ 640 et seq. Love
v. Murray County, 37 Ga. App. 604, 605, 141 S. E. 85.
§ 688. (§ 567). Value of land, how ascer-
tained.
This section does not mean that in estimating the value
of the land so taken the jury could take into consideration
the losses arising from the operation of a ferry of the own-
ers, due to competition springing from the use of this
bridge by the traveling public. State Highway Board v.
Willcox, 168 Ga. 883, 893, 149 S. E- 182.
ARTICLE 2
Alternative Road Law
§ 694. (§ 573). County authorities to lay out
roads.
Does Not Include Roads Inside of Cities.—The word "road,"
wherever used in these sections, seems clearly to indicate
that roads lying outside the municipalities only are in-
cluded in the term itself. Especially is this true when sec-
tions 695 and 696 are considered; for the residents of cities
are not affected by the provisions of section 695, declaring
who shall be subject to road duty, nor are they subject to the
payment of the commutation tax provided for in section
696. Mitchell County v. Cochran, 162 Ga. 810, 817, 134 S.
E. 768.
Classification under Alternative Road Law.—The alterna-
tive road law having been adopted in Muscogee County, the
commissioners of roads and revenues of that county had the
exclusive right to classify the roads of that county at any
time, in their discretion. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137
S. E- 626. See in connection with classification of roads sec-
tion 631 and notes.
Only One Levy.—A county, after having adopted the al-
ternative road law as embodied in this article, and after
having levied the maximum rate of four dollars per thou-
sand for the maintenance of the public roads of the county,
can not levy an additional or special tax for that purpose.
Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Terrell County, 37 Ga.
App. 599, 141 S. E- 79.
§ 695(3). Tax in counties of population between
26,815 and 26,830.—In all counties of this State,
having a population of not less than 26,815 and
not more than 26,830 according to the census of
1920, the county commissioners of such counties
are hereby authorized and permitted to levy a road-
maintenance tax of not more than $4.00 per an-
num upon all persons subject to road duty of
commutation tax under Code section 695 of the
Code of 1910.
That such road-maintenance tax shall be in lieu
of the road duty or commutation tax defined in
section 695, supra. And said road-maintenance
tax shall be collected by the county tax-collector
as other taxes are collected, and the lien for such
taxes to be equal to other tax liens.
The justice of the peace in each militia district
in such county shall make and furnish to the
tax-receiver of the county a list of every person
residing in his militia district who is subject to
said tax. Said list to be furnished annually not
later than June 10th of each year. Said justice
of the peace to receive, as compensation for his
services, ten cents for each name furnished. Said
sum to be paid out of the county treasury.
It shall be the duty of the tax-receivers to re-
turn those subject to said tax to the tax-collector
of the county, whose duty it shall be to collect
said road-maintenance tax as other taxes are col-
lected. Acts of 1929, p. 155, § 1.
§ 696. County tax for roads.
In Addition to Levy under § 507.—The tax authorized
under this section may be levied over and above and in
addition to the tax levies authorized under sections 507,
508, and 510 and is not limited by the provisions cf these
latter sections. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga.
1, 139 S. E- 890; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones County, 37
Ga. App. 763, 142 S. E. 301.
Whether Tax Sufficiently Specific. — A tax levy by a
county of "$2.00 per thousand * * for county purposes, as
provided in this section" is, by reference to the code sec-
tion, sufficiently specific, even assuming that the provi-
sions of section 514 of the Political Code, which provides
for specificalness in county tax levies, applies to the levy
of the special tax provided for under section 696 of the
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Political Code of 1910. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones
County, 37 Ga. App. 763, 142 S. E. 301.
Cited in McGinnis v. McKannon, 165 Ga. 713, 141 S.
E- 910.
§ 704(2). General road law amended to except
counties of 11,755 population.—The Act of 1891,
known as the general road law, on pages 135, 136,
137, and 138 of the Acts of 1891, and the amend-
ments thereto, shall be amended by adding an-
other section thereto, as follows:
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to
counties having a population of 11,755, but that
in those counties the road tax shall be collected
by the tax-collector, as other State and County
taxes are collected. Acts 1929, p. 323, § 1.
ARTICLE 5
Road Duty and Commutation Tax in Certain
Counties
§ 723(1). Exemption from road duty in coun-
ties of 13,600 to 14,300 population.—In counties
of this State having a population of not less than
13,600 and not more than 14,300, according to the
official census of the United States for 1920 or
any future census, no citizen of any such county
shall be required or compelled to do or perform
any work, service, or duty upon the public roads
or bridges of any such county in building, repair-
ing, or maintaining the public roads or bridges of
•such county; nor shall any citizen of such county
be required or compelled to pay any sum what-
ever in commutation of any such work, service,
or duty. Acts 1929, p. 322, § 1.
ARTICLE 6
Commissioners of Public Roads
SECTION 1
Appointment and Obligation to Serve
§ 724. (§ 584) j Three commissioners for each
district, two may act.
See sec. 631 and notes thereto.
ARTICLE 8
Bridges, Ferries, Turnpikes and Causeways.
SECTION 3
Contractor's Liability and Bond
§ 748. (§ 603). Condition of contractor's bond.
Narrow Bridge.—Since, under this section, a county is
liable to travelers over bridges along the highways only for
injuries caused from defective bridges, the county is not
negligent, as respects a vehicular traveler over a bridge,
in maintaining the bridge so narrowly constructed that an
approaching vehicle will run into him while attempting to
pass him on the bridge. Smith v. Colquitt County, 37 Ga.
App. 222, 225, 139 S. E. 682. See note to § 634.
Since a county is not liable to a traveler on a highway
for injuries to him resulting from a defect in the roadway,
but is liable to him only for injuries resulting from de-
fects in bridges on the highway, as provided in this section,
the court, upon the trial of a suit, against the county to
recover damages because the automobile in which the plain-
tiff was traveling along the highway failed to take the
bridge as a result of the road being wider than the bridge,
and fell into the declivity on the side of the road at the
entrance to the bridge, properly directed a verdict for the
defendant. Knight v. Floyd County, 38 Ga. App. 515, 144 S.
E- 348.
SECTION 7
Right of Way; Grants, How Construed
§ 781. (§ 636). Value of land, how estimated.
This section is not applicable where the State is seeking
Co take land for a right of way and for a bridge, and its
prospective value as a bridge- site and its present value as
a ferry, if one was in use, should be taken into calculation.
This does not mean that the value of another ferry- site
and profits arising from the operation of such ferry should
be taken into consideration in determining the value of
the bridge-site which the State is seeking to condemn.
State Highway Board v. Willcox, 168 Ga. 883, 893, 149 S.
E- 182.
ARTICLE 12
Private Ways
§ 808- (§ 662). Not more than fifteen feet wide.
See notes under §§ 819, 825.
§ 819. (§ 673). Can not be closed after one
year without notice.
Way Need Not Be Established.—This section, properly
construed, means that notwithstanding a road may not be a
private way within the meaning of the law, yet if persons
have used it—traveled it—for as long as a year as though
it were such in fact, the owner can not obtruct or close it
without first giving the prescribed notice. It is not the
purpose of this section to enable the user of the road to
hold the owner at bay until the road may become a priv-
ate way by prescription, but its clear intent is that if the
owner sits by and for a year or more permits another to
travel a road over his land as though it were a private way,
such conduct on his part speaks of a necessity for the way
to the extent that the law will preserve the status for 30
days in order that the parties using the road may take steps
to have it made permanent by condemnation. Barnes v.
Holcomb, 35 Ga. App. 713, 716, 134 S. E- 628, citing Neal v.
Neal, 122 Ga. 804, 50 S. E- 929.
Prescriptive Use Unnecessary.—The provisions o* the pres-
ent section were in the earler codes, and, what L more, the
article in which they appeared in each of such earlier codes
was devoted exclusively to the acquisition of private ways
by express grant and by condemnation. It is thus seen that
the right definied in this section was not dependent upon
such use as could ultimately have resulted in prescription.
These facts regarding the history of this section apply
equally to the history of section 808. Barnes v. Holcomb, 35
Ga. App. 713, 719, 134 S. E- 628.
Necessary Allegations.—An application to prevent closing
a road until the thirty days notice is given will be suf-
ficient to show the jurisdiction of the ordinary where it de-
scribes the road with reasonable certainty, and alleges that
the road has been used by the applicant as a private way
for as much as a year, and that the owner of the land over
which it passes has obstructed or closed it without first
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giving the 30-days notice in writing. In such a case it is
not necessary to make the allegations required in an ap-
plication for the removal of obstructions from a private
way claimed by prescription under the provisions of section
824. Barnes v. Holcomb, 35 Ga. App. 713, 716, 134 S. £.
628.
See notes to § 825.
§825. (§ 679). Obstructions, how removed.
Where persons claiming a prescriptive right of way ap-
ply to the ordinary for the removal of obstructions from it,
under this section, they must show not only that there
has been an uninterrupted use of it for more than seven
years, but that it is not more than fifteen feet wide, and
that it has been kept open and in repair, and is the same
fifteen feet originally appropriated. Under the facts of
this case the ordinary erred in granting an order for the
removal of obstructions. Barnett v. Davis, 38 Ga. App.
494, 144 S. E. 330.
§§ 828(uu-2)-828(uu-ll) Park's Code.
See §§ 1770(50) -1770(56).
§§ 828(uu-16)-828(uu-49). Park's Code.
See §§ 1770 (60a)- 1770 (60cc).
§ 828(xx). Park's Code.
See '§ 828(1).
§ 828(ooo)-828(ppp). Park's Code.
See §§ 828(18) -828(19).
§ 828 (sss). Park's Code.
See § 828(22).
§§ 828(uuu)-828(wwww). Park's Code.
See §§ 828(27) -828(28).
§ 828 (zzz). Park's Code.
See § 828(31).
§ 828(bbbb). Park's Code.
See § 828(33).
ARTICLE 13
State Highway Department. Reorganization.
SECTION l
Reorganization, Assent to Federal Law and
Membership of Department
§ 828 (1). State Highway Department reor-
ganized.
As to construction through municipality without consent
of local authorities, see note to sec. 828(31).
§ 828 (4). Suits by or against department.
In Habersham County v. Cornwall, 38 Ga. App. 419, 422,
144 S. E. 55, it is said: "By the act of 1925 (Ga. I,. 1925, p.
208, 211) it is provided that the State Highway Department
may be sued. This provision may or may not be applicable
to the plaintiff's claim. Even if inapplicable, that, with-
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out more, would not entitle the plaintiff to proceed against
the county where the county is not otherwise liable."
SECTION 6
Powers and Duties of Highway Department
§ 828 (18). Control of road work, etc.
Effect of Section upon Rights to Condemn.—The provi-
sion that no road or portion thereof shall become a part of
the system of State-aid roads until so designated by the
State highway board does not prevent that board from
instituting condemnation proceeding to acquire right-of-
way. On the contrary, the law authorizes this proceeding.
Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 97, 132 S. E. 902.
§ 828(19). Appointment of board, etc.; limit
of total mileage; relocation, etc.—Provision 3.
Efforts shall be made to serve as large a ter-
ritory and as many market points as practi-
cable with the said system, due consideration be-
ing given topographic and construction difficul-
ties; provided that said State Highway Depart-
ment shall take over the State-aid roads as above
mentioned on o'r before January 1, 1922; and
provided further, when the various counties have
complied with the law with reference to right of
way; and provided further, that the State High-
way Department in taking over said roads is not
Dound to the right of way and road-bed as lo-
cated on January 1, 1922, but shall have the right
to resurvey and relocate in their entirety any one
or all of said roads, keeping in view only the con-
trol points, and it shall be the duty of the county
or counties when its resurveys and relocations
are made to furnish the right of way, or reloca-
tion and resurvey, free of charge to the said
Highway Department; provided, that in relocat-
ing any road or right of way the State Highway
Department shall confer with the ordinary or
county commissioners as the case may be, and
give due consideration to their wishes, but in
case of a disagreement the judgment of the State
Highway Board shall prevail. That, from and
after the passage of this Act, the State-aid roads
in the State of Georgia are such roads as are in-
dicated by the parallel white lines on the map of
the State of Georgia, hereto attached and made a
part of this bill, with the power and authority in
the State Highway Board of the State of Georgia,
from time to time, in its discretion, to designate
an additional five hundred (500) miles of State-
aid roads within the State of Georgia, between
any points in said State, which within its discre-
tion may require such State-aid roads, and such
roads as are indicated by the two parallel white
lines on the map of the State of Georgia, which
is hereto attached, and by this enactment made a
part of this bill, shall be the State-aid roads of
the State of Georgia, without regard to the num-
ber of miles in said State-aid roads, until other
State-aid mileage is added thereto by the State
Highway Board of the State of Georgia, in its
discretion, not to exceed five hundred (500)
miles. Acts of 1929, p. 264, § 1.
Editor's Note.—As only Provision 3 of this section was
amenled by the act of 1929 the other portions of the sec-
tion appearing in the Georgia Code of 1926 are not set
out.
Amendment of 1922 Constitutional.—The act of August
21, 1922 (Acts 1922, p. 176), which authorizes the State High-
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way Board to construct and maintain State-aid roads in
and through towns or cities of not more than twenty- five
hundred people, does not violate § 6391. Jackson v. State
Highway Department, 164 Ga. 434, 138 S. E. 847.
Discretion of Board.—A court of equity will not interfere
with the discretionary action of the State Highway Board
acting under this section in designating and locating a
State-aid road within the sphere of their legally delegated
powers, unless such action is arbitrary and amounts to an
abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State Highway Depart-
ment, 164 Ga. 434, 138 S. E- 847, and cit.; Town of
Camak v. State Highway Board, 166 Ga. 359, 143 S. E.
367; Appleby v. Holder, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S. E- 596.
Action for Unlawful Appropriation.—Without constitu-
tional or statutory authorization, no action lies directly and
primarily against the State Highway Board for unlawful
appropriation of private property for road-construction pur-
poses. Edmonds v. State Highway Board, 37 Ga. App.
812, 142 S. E. 214.
Limitation of 6300 Mites.—This limit of 6300 miles has not
been extended expressly or impliedly by any action of the
General Assembly. Amendment of 1922, authorizing the
State Highway Board to construct and maintain State-aid
roads through certain municipalities, in no manner affects
the said mileage limit. State Highway Department of
Ga. v. Marks, 167 Ga. 397, 145 S. E- 866.
Abandonment.—Refusal of an injunction against reloca-
tion of the road between Augusta and Waynesboro, and
thereby substituting the "Peach Orchard Route" for the
"McBean Route," was error; the evidence demanding a
finding that the State Highway Department proposed to
build a new interconnecting county-site road twenty-five or
thirty miles long, and to abandon the existing interconnect-
ing county-site road previously designated as such by the
department, the construction and maintenance of which
they had taken over for a number of years. Marks v.
Highway Department, 167 Ga. 792, 146 S. E- 838.
§ 828(19a). Gas tax.—The counties in which
lie such additional State-aid roads as are created
by the amendment of 1929 to the preceding sec-
tion shall not receive from the State of Georgia
a proportionate part of the tax generally called
the gas tax, for such additional mileage, until the
rights of way for such additional State-aid mile-
age has been provided by the counties in which
lie such additional mileage, and not until provi-
sion has been made by the State Highway Board
for the construction of such additional mileage;
and as each county furnishes the rights of way
for such additional mileage and after provision
for construction of such mileage has been made
by the State Highway Department, then such
county or counties shall be paid by the State of
Georgia the proportionate amount of the gas tax
for such additional mileage in said county or
counties complying with the provisions of this
Act. Acts of 1929, p. 265, § 2.
§ 828 (19b). Roads to become part of State-Aid
System.—Such roads as may have been con-
structed or upon which construction has or had
begun with State, County and/or Federal Aid
(whether included on said map or not), and also
all of that mileage designated and adopted into
the State-aid system by the State Highway
Board and also those roads which were prepared
and conditioned by the several county authori-
ties, under contract or agreements with the High-
way Board that said roads would be certified into
the State-Aid System of Highways so that those
roads prepared and conditioned for purpose of
becoming part of State-Aid System of Highways
shall rank equally with that mileage actually cer-
tified into the system under acts of General As-
sembly of 1925 (and as shown by the minutes of
said board) after passage of that certain Act of
the General Assembly of Georgia, approved Au-
ing over any additional mileage added by this
Act; and the counties in which said roads are
located shall be entitled to receive, from and after
passage of this Act, their pro rata part of the
one cent gasoline tax now allocated to the coun-
ties, as to such State-aid road mileage. It is not
the purpose of this Act, however, to require the
State Highway Board to abandon any of its pres-
ent construction and paving projects, but it shall
exercise its best judgment as to when and in
what manner the roads hereby specially desig-
nated shall be completed and paved; and for the
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of
this Act all necessary power and authority is
hereby vested in the State Highway Board.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to add
any additional maintenance cost for roads to the
Highway Departments until such roads shall
have been located and constructed as contem-
plated under this Act. Whenever, after the pas-
sage of this Act, the said State Highway Board
shall, pursuant to the power and authority vested
in it by that certain Act of the General Assembly
of Georgia approved August 21, 1922, authoriz-
ing said board to "construct and maintain State-
aid roads in and through towns or cities of not
more than twenty-five hundred people," con-
gust 21st, 1925, limiting the total mileage of State-
aid roads in said system to 6,300 miles as set
forth in the published volume of Georgia Laws
1925, pages 207 and 208, and prior to the 31st
day of December, 1928, shall immediately be-
come a part of the State Highway System and
shall be given preference in construction and pav-
struct any State-aid road or roads in and througn
towns or cities of not more than twenty-five hun-
dred people, all such State-aid mileage embraced
and included within the incorporate limits of such
towns or cities is hereby declared to be excluded
from the limitation on the amount of highway
mileage heretofore fixed at 6,300 miles by the Act
approved August 21, 1925, as set forth in the pub-
liislhed volumes of 'Georgia Laws for 1925, at
pages 207, 208, and is also hereby declared to be
excluded from any future limitation on the
amount of such highway mileage. Nothing con-
tained in this Act shall be construed to prevent
any county of this State, in which there is lo-
cated a town or city of not more than twenty-
five hundred people, to receive its pro rata of the
one cent gasoline tax now allocated to the coun-
ties, as to such State-aid road mileage in towns
or cities of not more than twenty-five hundred
people. Nor shall anything in this Act be con-
strued to invalidate any special act of the Gen-
eral Assembly which may have heretofore been
passed, or which may hereafter be adopted, in-
corporating into the State Highway System any
Highway mileage which may have been included
in or taken into the Federal-Aid System by the
Bureau of Public Roads of the United States.
Acts 1929, p. 266, § 3.
§ 828 (19c). Highway Department not liable
for damages on additional State-aid roads.—The
State Highway Department of the State of Geor-
gia shall not be liable under existing laws for
damages accruing on such additional State-aid
roads created by this Act, until the rights of way
have been provided by the counties and construc-
[26 1
§ 828 (19d) CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS BY COUNTY § 828(31)
tion hereon begun under the direction of the
State Highway Board and such additional State-
aid roads opened to traffic by the State Highway
Department. Acts 1929, p. 268, § 4.
§ 828 (19d). Contracts of Highway Department.
—Any contracts heretofore made by the State
Highway Department of Georgia with any of the
counties of Georgia for the construction of any
of the State-aid roads indicated upon the map
of the State of Georgia, heretofore attached and
made a part of this bill, shall be and remain of
force, and the State Highway Department is
hereby authorized to perform and execute said
contracts in their entirety as originally contem-
plated by the State Highway Department and
the various counties of the State of Georgia when
such contracts were executed. Acts 1929, p. 268,
§ 5.
§ 828 (22). Labor, contracts for construction,
etc.; condemnation of right of way.
As to liability of county where state condemns right-of-
way, see note to sec. 828(27).
As to necessity of designating road as part of system as
prerequisite to condemnation proceedings, see note to §
828(18).
Power of Condemnation Exercised by State.—This law
prescribes a full and complete State method of laying out,
constructing, and maintaining State-aid roads. The State
highway board is given full authority and power to con-
demn rights of way for these roads. This power was so
•exercised in the case at bar and it can not be said that the
proceeding was brought for and in behalf of the county
and not in behalf of the State. Cook v. State Highway
Board, 162 Ga. 84, 98, 132 S. E. 902.
§ 828 (27). Rights of way, counties to give.
Condemnation by State—Liability of County.—The fact
that the proper county authorities are required to furnish
rights of way, free to the State highway board, does not
prevent that board from condemning rights of way for
State-aid roads whenever the county authorities fail or re-
fuse to furnish said rights of way. This provision may
make the counties liable for expenditures incurred by the
State highway board in acquiring these rights of way; but
it does not bar this board from proceeding to condemn
rights of way. Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84,
97, 132 S. E. 902.
§ 828 (28). Construction funds, etc.
In General.—Under this section, a county is authorized
to appropriate and spend any funds properly applicable to
such work, in building and maintaining any State-aid
road; and where funds are raised from bonds which are
duly voted for the purpose of paving such road, they be-
come a trust fund, and can not be diverted from such
purpose upon the grounds, (a) that a new route, whicn
the State Highway Board has adopted in resurveying and
relocating the old route, is more feasible, (b) that said
board and the Federal Bureau of Roads refuse to furnish
any funds with which to pave the old route, and (c) that
there has been a violation of duty on the part of the State
Highway Board. Marks v. Richmond County, 165 Ga.
316, 140 S. E. 880.
§ 828(30a). Fund for Highway Board from
taxes on distributors of fuels.—Upon the written
request of the State Highway Board, the Gov-
ernor of the State is hereby authorized and fully
empowered to assign and set aside not exceeding
forty per cent of the revenue derived monthly,
during the period beginning September 1st, 1929,
and ending December 31st, 1930, from the taxes
upon distributors of fuels allocated to the State
Highway Department, as a special fund to be used
exclusively, for the purpose of paying warrants
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against the same, as hereinafter provided. Acts
1929, p. 269, § 1.
§ 828 (30b) Warrants on special fund.—In order
to enable the State Highway Department to meet
its obligations lawfully incurred, whether under
the laws of this State or of the United States, and
to which the State has by law given its assent,
and when revenue from other sources is, in the
opinion of the Governor and State Highwav
Board, not sufficient, the Governor of the State,
upon the written request of the State Highwav
Board, is hereby duly authorized and fully em-
powered from time to time to draw his warrant-
or warrants against the special fund in the treas-
ury, for such sum or sums as may be required to
meet the obligations of the State Highway De-
partment 'lawfully incurred, as provided in this
section; the Governor is further authorized and
empowered to discount and/or sell said warrants
so drawn against said special fund, and to place
the proceeds arising therefrom in the Treasury to
the credit of the State Highway Department for
the purpose of enabling the State Highway De-
partment to meet its obligations lawfully incurred,
as herein provided. Said warrants shall be duly
countersigned by the Comptroller-General. The
holders of said warrants shall have all the right?
and privileges accorded by law to the holders of
all other warrants drawn by the Governor and
countersigned by the Comptroller-General. Acts
1929, p. 269, § 2.
§ 828 (30c). Amount designated by Governor
presumed correct.—In carrying the provisions of
this Act into effect it shall be conclusively pre-
sumed, in every court of law or equity, that the
monthly amount designated and set apart by the
Governor by executive order in accordance with
section 1 hereof has been correctly determined
and set apart by the Governor pursuant to the
terms of this Act. Acts 1929, p. 270, § 3.
SECTION 7
Construction of Roads by County
§ 828 (31). Reimbursement of counties for ex-
penditures.
Construction by State Through Municipality—Liability
for Damages.—The decision in Lee County v. Smithville, 154
Ga. 550, 115 S. E- 107, to the effect that the State highway
department, in conjunction with the county authorities, may
construct a "State-aid road" through a municipality without
its consent and even against its will, can have no applica-
tion so as to preclude a liability against the municipality
for damage done to private property by a change in a
grade of one of its streets which the municipality knowingly
permitted to be made where such street is not part of the
highway being constructed or repaired but is entirely dis-
connected therefrom and is graded merely for the purpose
of obtaining dirt with which to widen another street or road
which is occupied as a part of the highway. Cleveland v.
Kimsey, 34 Ga. App. 480, 130 S. E. 159.
The municipal authorities in such a case having power
to prevent such change in the grade of the street may be
held liable for damages to private property resulting there-
from where they knowingly permit the work to be done.
Cleveland v. Kimsey, 34 Ga. App. 480, 130 S. E- 159.
Power of County to Construct Municipal Roads.—County
authorities are not authorized to expend the proceeds of
the sale of bonds issued by the county for the purpose of
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raising money with which to pave and grade the public
roads in that county, for the pavement or grading or im-
provement of streets in a municipaLity located in the
county; and the court did not err in granting an injunction
to restrain them from so doing. Mitchell County v. Coch-
ran, 162 Ga. 810, 134 S. E- 768.
§ 828 (33). Power to sue and to condemn
rights of way.
As to liability for payment, see note to § 828(27).
CHAPTER 13C
County Depositories
§ 848(7) County commissioners, authorized to
name depositories in certain counties. — The
boards of county commissioners, sometimes called
boards of roads and revenues, of any county in
this state having therein a city with a population
of not less than fifty-itwo thousand, nine hundred,
ninety-five, and not more than eighty thousand,
according to the United States Census of 1920, or
the ordinaries in such counties having no such
boards, be and they ate hereby authorized to
designate one or more banks located in such
county as a depositor}'- for public funds to which
the county is presently or ultimately entitled. Such
depository or depositories shall be designated for
a term to expire on December 31 next succeeding
the naming of such depository or depositories, or
until the prior order of the authority naming such
depository, entered for good cause, revokes such
designation. Any such depository or depositories
named shall, before entering upon its duties as
such depository, enter into bond with security ap-
proved by the authority naming such depository,
conditioned for the payment to such county of
any and all funds received by such depository
under such appointment. Any such bond shall
cover the fees which may be collected by the
sheriff, tax-collector, tax-receiver, clerk of the su-
perior court, ordinary, sheriff or other officer who
may be paid a salary in lieu of fees, the county
being entitled to fees accruing to the several of-
fices, or any other funds to which the county may
be presently or ultimately entitled. Acts of 1929,
p. 224, § 1.
§ 848(8). Term of Depository.—Any depository
so qualifying under the terms oif the preceding
section shall continue to act until the end of the
term herein specified, or prior order of the author-
ity designating it as depository, revoking its au-
thority so to act, or until ten days after written
notice by such depository to such appointing
power, asking to be relieved as such depository.
Acts 1929, p. 225, § 2.
§ 855 (1). Policemen of good character to be
appointed.
County Policeman Not an Employee under Compensation
Act.—See note under this catchline under section 3154(2)
subdivision (b).
The act of 1914 (this chapter of the Code) applies to all
counties of the State. Eison v. Shirley, 165 Ga. 374, 378,
141 S. E. 295.
§ 855 (2). Salaries and expenses; levy of tax.
Under this section, the ordinary is without authority to
appoint a policeman under an agreement by which he is
to be paid for work done in enforcing the prohibition law
by destroying stills, and for which he is to be paid so
much for each still destroyed, to be paid out oi the funds
derived by fines and forfeitures from the enforcement of
the prohibition law. If such work or service is rendered
under a contract which the ordinary is not authorized tc
make, no implied obligation arises on the part of the
county to pay for such services, even though the county
receives the benefit. Eison v. Shirley, 165 Ga. 374, 141 S.
E. 295.
§§ 855(35)-855(37). Park's Code.
See §§ 431(1)-431(3).
SEVENTH TITLE
Municipal Corporations
CHAPTER 2
Municipal Taxation
ARTICLE l
Assessors
§ 862. (§ 717.) Tax assessors for city.
Effect upon Existing Power.—As stated in the proviso of
the section, the charter powers conferred upon the mayor
and aldermen of Savannah as assessors were not taken away
by the subsequent enactment of this section. Tietjen v.
Mayor, 161 Ga. 125, 130, 129 S. E. 653.
CHAPTER 14
County Police, Election, and Maintenance
§§ 849-850. Park's Code.
See §§ 855(l)-855(2).
ARTICLE 3
Assessments for Street and Other Improvements
§ 869. (§ 723). Municipalities may issue exe-
cutions for paving, etc.
Similar to a Tax Fi. Fa.—A fi. fa. issued by a city under
this section is in the nature of a tax fi. fa. and governed
by the same procedure, and must be taken to be subject
to the same period of limitation. Lewis v. Moultrie Bank-
ing Co., 36 Ga. App. 347, 348, 136 S. E. 554. See Brunswick
v. Gordon Realty Co., 163 Ga. 636, 136 S. E- 898.
Cited in Montezuma v. Brown Bros., 168 Ga. 1, 147 S.
E- 80.
CHAPTER 3
Power of Municipality and Its Officers.
ARTICLE 1
Councilmen Incompetent to Hold Other Office.
§ 886. (§ 739). Councilman, when incompetent
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to hold other municipal office.—Councilmen and
aldermen of the towns and cities of this State
shall be incompetent to hold, except in towns of
less than two thousand inhabitants, any other
municipal office in said towns and cities during
the term of office for which they were chosen;
provided, nothing herein shall render them ineligi-
ble to be elected during said term, to serve in a
term immediately succeeding said term, but noth-
ing in this section shall apply to any municipal
office which is filled by appointment of the mayor.
Any councilman or alderman appointed during
his term to any other municipal office shall re-
sign before being eligible to enter upon the of-
fice to which he has been appointed. In cities
of more than eighty thousand inhabitants, coun-
cilmen and aldermen, during the term of office for
which they were chosen, are incompetent to hold
any office in said cities which is filled by appoint-
ment or election of the general council or govern-
ing board, but are competent to hold any other
office in said cities, having first resigned the of-
fice of councilman or alderman; provided, noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed as repeal-
ing any provisions to the contrary hereof in any
charter of any city or town in this State. In cities
of this State whose inhabitants, according to the
census of 1920, were between the number of 16,-
890 and 16,900, aldermen of said cities shall be
eligible for the election of mayor of said cities,
when the election for said mayor shall occur dur-
ing the term of office of said aldermen, and shall
be qualified to act as said mayor, if elected, upon
their resigning their said office of alderman." Acts
1899, p. 26; 1890-1, pp. 226; 1S95, p. 79; 1902, p.
40; 1929, p. 156, § 1.
ARTICLE 2
Cities as Trustees—Parks
§ 891(1). Purchases of realty by cities of 200,-
000 or more population.—Any city in the State of
Georgia having a population of 200,000 or more,
according to the last or any subsequent Federal
census, may through its governing body purchase
on time or partly for cash, with balance on time
or deferred payments, or otherwise acquire any
real property or interest in real property within
or without the limits of such city, securing the
note or notes, claim or claims, for deferred pay-
ments and interest thereon, with mortgages or
deed of trust on the land purchased, or with or by
means of an instrument in writing retaining title
thereto in the vendor, or enter into any other con-
tractual arrangement whereby provision is made
that such note or notes, claim or claims, or other
instruments for deferred payment and interest
thereon, and all lawful charges, shall not be a
charge or charges against the general credit of
the city, or be a general liability thereof, but that
the liability shall only extend to and be a charge
against the land so purchased or acquired. Such
method of acquisition provided for in this sec-
tion shall not be considered or deemed exclusive,
but cumulative and in addition to all other meth-
ods of acquisition of lands or interests therein for
public purposes heretofore, hereafter, or by other
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provisions in this Act provided. This section shall
apply to all cities of the State of Georgia, now or
hereafter having a population of 200,000 or more,
according to the last or any subsequent Federal
census. The term "such city" as used in this sec-
tion refers to and means all and only those cities
of the state of Georgia having a population of
200,000 or more, according to the last or any sub-
sequent Federal Census. The term "governing
body" as used in this Act means the mayor and
city council, the commissioner and commission-
ers, or either or both as the case may be, or the
"governing body" by whatever name called of
any city coming under the provisions of this
Act. Acts 1929, p. 304, §§ 1, 2.
ARTICLE 3
Limitation of Powers of City and Its Officers
§ 894. (§ 745). Obstructions in street.
Use of Streets Not Absolute.—The use of streets and high-
ways is not absolute and unrestricted, but is subject to
reasonable regulation. Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148,
129 S. E. 861.
Same—Restriction of Busses.—The use of streets by com-
mon carriers for the purpose of gain is extraordinary and
may be conditioned or prohibited as the legislature or mu-
nicipality deems proper. Hence, if the State or city deter-
mines that the use of streets by busses should be re-
stricted or prohibited there is nothing in the Constitution
of the United States or this State which prohibits such ac-
tion. Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 161, 129 S. E. 86L
citing numerous authorities.
§ 897. (§ 748).
for what.
Municipal corporations liable
Applied in Newton v.
148 S. E. 299.
City of Moultrie, 39 Ga. App. 702,
§ 898. (§ 748). Municipal corporations liable
for injuries, when.
General Rule.—Stated in Atlanta v. Robertson, 36 Ga.
App. 66, 135 S. E- 445, as set out under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
Proximate Cause.—Irrespective of whether a municipal
corporation is exercising a "governmental function" in al-
lowing a part of its sewerage system to become worn and in
a bad state of repair, where a traveler upon a public street
in a city is injured in consequence of a dangerous condi-
tion under the surface of a street, of which the city knew
or should have known in time to repair it or to give warn-
ing of its existence before the injury, the city can not escape
liability upon the ground that such condition of the streets
was due to its failure to repair its sewerage system. Atlanta
v. Robertson, 36 Ga. App. 66, 135 S. E. 445.
§ 899. (§ 750). Municipal property not sub-
ject to levy.
Property Cannot Be Encumbered.—A city board of educa-
tion has no authority to place an incumbrance upon articles
which it had unconditionally purchased on account several
months previously, and which it had installed as necessary
to the operation of the schools. Southern School Supply
Co. v. Abbeville, 34 Ga. App. 93, 101, 128 S. E. 231, and
cases cited.
§ 900. (§ 751). Voting when personally inter-
ested.
Effect on Contract.—A contract between the City of At-
lanta and a construction company, in which a member of
council is a large stockholder, is null and void, although
such member of council did not vote for the ordinance au-
thorizing such contract, and did not use his influence in
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procuring other members of council to approve and author-
ize the making of such contract, and although such contract
is fair and free from fraud. Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162
Ga. 534, 134 S. E- 152.
Where such an illegal contract has been made, it can-
not subsequently be ratified by the resignation of the
interested councilman and the confirmation of the contract
by the council. Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 547,
134 S. E. 152.
Councilman Employed as Attorney by Contractor.—
Abutting owners cannot complain after completion of
a municipal contract because of illegal participation
in execution of municipal contract by councilman who had
been employed as attorney by contractor. Cochran v.
Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 582, 146 S. E- 462.
ARTICLE 7
Disposition of Public Utility Properties; Sale
or Lease of Plant
§ 904(a). Park's Code.
See § 913(2).
§ 904(1). Park's Code.
See § 913(13).
§ 904(m). Park's Code.
See § 904(1).
§ 904(p). Park's Code.
See § 904(4).
§§ 904(t) -904(11). Park's Code.
See §§ 913(23) -913(38).
§ 904 (1). Sale, lease or other disposition by
municipality.
See notes to § 125.
Giving due effect to the proviso, of this section con-
strued, as it must be, in connection with the acts creat-
ing the charter of the City of Alma, that city has au-
thority to sell its electric-light plant without the neces-
sity of submitting the question of sale to the voters of
the city. Byrd v. City of Alma, 166 Ga. 510, 143 S. E.
767.
If a municipality owning an electric plant which it desires
to sell, and having an opportunity to make a sale thereof on
condition of complying with this section, has authority to
make the sale, and causes the required notice of sale to
be published, and, after filing of objections by protestants
against the sale, an election is held, and the returns of
the election show a sufficient number of affirmative votes
to authorize the sale, and the result is declared, and cer-
tain of the protestants file a petition with the ordinary to
contest the election, the effect of which is to delay or
prevent consummation of the sale of the property to the
contemplated purchaser, equity will entertain a petition
on the part of the city against the ordinary and the pro-
testants, to prevent further entertainment or prosecution
of the so-called contest of election before the ordinary.
Byrd v. City of Alma, 166 Ga. 510, 143 S. E. 767.
§ 904 (4). Election; majority vote.
This provision of this section does not by its own terms
expressly or impliedly provide for a contest of an elec-
tion held under the terms of the act, before the ordinary
of the county. Byrd v. City of Alma, 166 Ga. 510, 143
S E- 767. See notes to § 125.
CHAPTER 6
Demand Before Suit
§ 910. Demand prerequisite, etc.
Substantial Compliance Must Be Alleged.—In a claim
for money damages against a municipal corporation on ac-
count of injuries to person or property, the petition must
affirmatively allege a compliance with the provisions of
this section quoted above, and unless it does so, it should
be dismissed on demurrer. Newton v. City of Moultrie, 37
Ga. App. 631, 148 S. E. 299, citing Saunders v. City uf
Fitzgerald, 113 Ga. 619, 38 S. E- 978.
An allegation in the renewal petition to the effect that
prior to the institution of the former suit, which was
against a municipal corporation, the plaintiff had served
upon the defendant a written notice of claim, as provided!
by this section, in which the plaintiff claimed damages-
arising out of the same cause of action as that sued on in
the renewal petition, is not an allegation as to the cause
of action sued on in the former suit. Barber v. City of
Rome, 39 Ga. App. 225, 146 S. E- 856.
But in Habersham County v. Cornwall, 38 Ga. App. 419,
420, 144 S. E. 55, it is said: "If it was necessary at all
to allege a compliance with section 910 of the Civil Code,,
which requires a presentation in writing to the govern-
ing authorities of towns and cities of any claim for dam-
ages, before bringing suit thereon against any such mti-
nicipality (see Grooms v. Hawkinsville, 31 Ga. App. 424,.
120 S. E. 807; Civil Code (1910), § 411), the allegations-
upon that subject were not open to demurrer merely be-
cause no copy of such claim was attached to the petition."'
Leaving Notice with Clerk of City Commission.—The
filing of the required notice in writing in the office of, and
leaving of it with, the officer who is the secretary or the
clerk of the city commission, which is the governing au-
thority of the city, and is the officer who is the custodian
of the records of the city, is a presentation of the claim
to the governing authority of the city as required by this
section. Davis v. City of Rom?, 37 Ga. App. 762, 142 3.
E- 171.
CHAPTER 9
System of Supervised Recreation
§§ 813(rr-l)-913(rr-18). Park's Code.
See P. C. §§ 1519(56)-1519(73).
§ 813 (2). Application of act, etc.
This article as originally introduced, does not impinge
or offend the provisions of § 6391 of the constitution. Wil-
son v. City Council, 165 Ga. 520, 141 S. E- 412. But see
note to § 913(13).
§ 913 (13). Application of provisions of act.
In Wilson v. City Council, 165 Ga. 520, 141 S. E- 412, it
is said: "The controlling question in this case, therer
fore, is whether this section, which is clearly unconstitu-
tional, shall invalidate the entire enactment and thus de-
stroy the purpose of the General Assembly to further and
promote the creation of a system of playgrounds, or
whether it is the court's duty to preserve and enforce the
intention of the General Assembly by cutting away that
portion of the act which is obnoxious to § 6391, of the
constitution. Applying the second rule that, as much of
the act must be preserved as possible, and since upon
consideration the portion of the act not excised therefrom
is not in violation of the constitutional provision with
which it is alleged to be in conflict, the act of the Gen-
eral Assembly above referred to, except section 11a
thereof, must be held to be constitutional and enforceable."
CHAPTER 11
Repeal or Amendment of Municipal Charters
§ 913(ss). Park's Code.
See § 913(19).
§ 913(19). Referendum, when necessary.—No
locail law seeking a repeal of a municipal charter of
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cities of less than fifty thousand inhabitants, or
an amendment to any municipal charter of cities
of less than fifty thousand inhabitants, which
amendment materially changes the form of gov-
ernment of a municipality or seeks to substitute
other officers for municipal control other than
those in control under existing charter, shall be-
come effective until such repeal or amendment
shall be voted upon by the qualified voters of the
municipality to be affected as hereinafter provided.
Acts 1925, p. 136; 1927, p. 245.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927, this sec-
tion applied to repeal or amendment of charters of cities which
have a population of less than two hundred thousand. The
present section is limited to cities with a population of less
than fifty thousand.
CHAPTER 12
Street Improvements in Certain Cities
§ 913(23). Definitions.—In this Act the term
"municipality" means any city or town in the
State of Georgia now or hereafter incorporated,
having .a population of six hundred or more.
"Governing body" includes mayor and council,
board of aldermen, board of commissioners, or
other chief legislative body of a municipality.
The words "improve" and "improvement" in-
clude the grading, regrading, paving, repaving,
macadamizing, and remaeadamizing of streets,
alleys, sidewalks, or other public places or ways,
and the construction, reconstruction, and alter-
ing of cunbing, gutting, storm-sewers, turnouts,
water-mains, and water, gas, or sewer connections
therein.
The word "streets" include streets, .avenues,
alleys, sidewalks and other public places or ways.
The word "pave" shall include storm drainings,
paving, macadamizing, and grading.
"Frontage" means that side or limit of the lot
or parcel of land in question which abuts on the
improvement. Acts 1927, p. 322.
The act of the General Assembly, entitled an act to
provide a system under which certain classes of munici-
palities may grade, pave, etc., their streets and alleys,
approved August 25, 1927 (Ga. 1,. 1927, p. 321), is not un-
constitutional on the ground that it is in conflict with
§ 6391. Wheat v. Bainbridge, 168 Ga. 479, 148 S. E. 332.
The act under consideration is not unconstitutional on
the ground that "it is general in its nature but not uni-
form in its operation, because it is made an alternative
method of procedure, and its application is dependent up-
on its adoption by a favorable vote of the electors, where-
as the constitution does not contemplate the enactment
of a law general in its nature, the application of which
shall be optional with the municipality, either under a
prior local law or a local law enacted subsequent to such
general law." Wheat v. Bainbridge, 168 Ga. 479, 148 S.
E. 332.
§ 913(24). Referendum as to adoption of this
Act.—The governing body of any municipality
in the State of Georgia is hereby authorized and
empowered to hold an election (or elections), at
such time and under such conditions as may be
determined by said governing body, for the pur-
pose of adopting the provisions of this chapter;
and w'hen such election has been duly held and a
majority of the qualified electors voting therein
shall have voted in favor of such adoption, and
the election managers shall have duly certified
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the results of such election to the governing body,
and the same shall have been adopted and entered
on the minutes thereof, then the aforesaid govern-
ing body of such municipality shall be and is
hereby authorized and emtpawered to ijmprove
any street or streets in such municipality when-
ever in the judgment of its governing body the
public welfare or convenience may inquire such
improvement, subject only to the conditions and
limitations herein prescribed. Acts 1927, p. 322.
§ 913(25). Resolution declaring improvement
necessary; publication;, protest; contract assess-
ment; etc.—Whenever the said governing body
shall deem it necessary to improve .any street or
any part thereof either in length or width, within
the limits of said municipality, and said governing
'body shall by resolution declare such improve-
ment necessary to be done, and publish such reso-
lution once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in the newspaper in which the sheriff's ad-
vertisements of the county in which such munici-
pality is located are published, and if the owners
of a majority of the lineal feet of frontage of the
lands abutting on said improvement shall not in
fifteen days after the last day of publication of
such resolution file with the clerk of said city
their protest in writing against such improvement,
then said governing body shall have power to
cause said improvement to be made, and to con-
tract therefor, and to make assessments and fix
liens as provided for herein. Any number of
streets or any part or parts thereof to be so im-
proved may be included in one resolution, but
any protest or objection shall be made as to each
street separately; provided, however, that if the
owners of a majority of the lineal feet or frontage
of the land liable to assessment for such improve-
ment shall petition the governing body for such
improvement, citing this chapter and designating
by general description the improvement to be un-
dertaken and the street or streets or part thereof
to be improved, it shall thereupon be the duty of
said governing body to proceed, as hereinafter
provided, to cause said improvements to be made
in accordance with the prayers of said petition
and their own best judgment, and in such cases
the resolution hereinbefore mentioned shall not
be required. The petition shall be lodged with the
clerk of the municipality, who shall investigate
the sufficiency thereof, submit the petition to the
governing body, and certify the result of his in-
vestigation. Acts 1927, p. 323.
§ 913 (26). Assessment on basis of frontage;
intersecting streets.—Each lot or parcel of land
abutting upon said improvement shall be charged
on a basis of lineal-foot frontage at an equal
rate per foot of such frontage with its just pro
rata of the entire cost of said improvement, less
any amounts paid by street or steam railways or
others; provided, however, that the cost of the
sidewalks, curbs, and gutters shall be charged
entirely to the lots or parcels of land abutting on
that side of the street upon which the same are
constructed. The frontage of intersecting streets
shall be assessed as real estate abutting upon
the improvement, and the municipality, for all
purposes of this chapter, shall be deemed to the
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owner thereof, and the mayor or chairman of the
board of commissioners shall have authority to
sign the petition or file objections provided for
herein; and the governing body of the municipal-
ity '.shall pay from the city treasury, as other cur-
rent bills are paid, its just pro rata of the entire
cost of said improvement, unless the owners of a
majority of the aforesaid frontage in the petition
hereinbefore provided for shall agree to pay the
entire cost of said improvement, or unless in the
resolution hereinbefore provided for it shall be
stated that the entire cost of the improvement is
to be paid by the abutting property owners. Acts
1927, p. 324.
§ 913(27). Railroads.—Any railroad or street
railway having tracks located in a street at the
time of the proposed improvement as provided
herein shall be required by the governing body
to pave the width of its tracks and two feet on
each side thereof, and, except as hereinafter pro-
vided, with the same material and in the same
manner as the rest of the street is to be paved, and
such work shall be performed under the supervi-
sion and subject to the approval of the city's en-
gineer, and if such railway shall not, within a pe-
riod of thirty days after receipt by such railway of
the notice to do such work, agree in writing to
comply with such order, or if the work is not
completed to the satisfaction of the city's engineer
within such time as may t>e described by the gov-
erning body, said governing body may have such
work done and charge the cost and expense there-
of to such railway company located in the munici-
pality and said lien shall have the same rank and
priority and shall be enforced in the same manner
as the liens provide for in section 913(31). The
governing body may, however, require such pav-
ing to be of a different material and manner of
construction, when, in its judgment such is ren-
dered necessary by the railway uses of the street.
Acts 1927, p. 324.
§ 913(28). Powers as to ordinances.—When-
ever the petition provided for in section 913(25)
is presented, or when the said governing
body shall have determined to improve any street,
and shall have passed the resolution provided for
in said section 913(25), the said governing
body shall then have the power to enact all
ordinances and to establish all such rules and reg-
ulations as may be necessary to require the
owners of all the property abutting on the im-
provement and of any railway in said street to
pay the cost of such improvement, and to cause
to be put in and constructed all water, gas, or
sewer-pipe connections to connect with any exist-
ing water, gas, or sewer-pipes in and underneath
the streets where such improvement is to be
made, and all cost and expense of making such
connections shall be taxed solely against such
property, but shall be included and made a part
of the general assessment to cover the cost of
such improvement. Acts 1927, p. 325.
§ 913(29). Resolution as to kind and extent of
improvement; contracts; bonds; etc.—After the ex-
piration of the time for objection or protest on the
part of the property owners, if no sufficient pro-
test is filed, or on receipt of a petition for such im-
provement signed by the owners of a majority of
the frontage of the land to be assessed, if such pe-
tition be found to be in proper form and properly
executed, the governing body shall adopt a resolu-
tion reciting that no protest has been filed, or the
filing of such petition, as the case may be, and ex-
pressing the determination of said governing body
to proceed with the said improvement, stating the
kind of improvement and defining the extent and
character of the same, and other such matters as
may be necessary to instruct the engineer em-
ployed by said municipality in the performance of
his duties in preparing for such improvement the
necessary plans, plats, profiles, specifications, and
estimates. Said resolution shall set forth any and
all such reasonable terms and conditions as said
governing body 'shall deem proper to impose with
reference to the letting of the contract and the
provisions thereof; and said governing body -shall
by said resolution provide that the contractor shall
execute to the city a good and sufficient bond as
provided in the Act entitled "Contractors of Pub-
lic Work Bonded," approved August 19, 1916, and
may require a bond in an amount to be stated in
such resolution for the maintenance of good con-
dition of such improvements for a period of not
less than five (5) years from the time of its com-
pletion,, or both, in the discretion of said govern-
ing body. Said resolution shall also direct the
clerk of said municipality to advertise for sealed
proposals for furnishing the materials and per-
forming the work necessary in making such im-
provements. The notice of such proposals shall
be published in at least six consecutive issues of
a daily paper, or at least two of a weekly paper,
having a general circulation in said municipality,
and shall state the street or streets to be improved,
the kinds of improvements proposd, what, if any,
bond or bonds will be required to be executed by
the contractor aforesaid, and shall state the time
when and the place where such sealed proposals
shall be filed and when and where the same will
be considered by said governing body. At the
time and place specified in such notice the govern-
ing body shall examine all bids received, and with-
out unnecessary delay award the contract to the
lowest and best bidder, who will perform the work
and furnish the materials which may be selected
and perform all the conditions imposed by said
governing body as prescribed in such resolutions
and notice for proposals, and the said govern-
ing body shall have the right to reject any and all
bids and readvertise for other 'bids when the bids
submitted are not, in its judgment, satisfactory.
Acts 1927, p. 326.
§ 913(30). Appraisers to apportion cost to abut-
ting land.—After the said contract is let and the
cost for such improvement, which shall include
all other expenses incurred by the city incident
to said improvement in addition to the contract
price for the work and materials, is ascertained,
the said governing body shall by resolution ap-
point a board of appraisers consisting of three
members to appraise and apportion the cost and
expense of the same to the several tracts of land
abutting on said improvement as hereinbefore pro-
vided. Within thirty days from the date of the
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resolution appointing said board, it shall file with
the clerk of the municipality a written report of
the appraisal and the assessment and cost upon
the several lots and tracts of land abutting on said
street, or upon the property of any street or steam
railway whose tracks are located in such street
where such railway has failed or refused to do
the paving provided herein when and as required
iby the governing body. When said report shall
have been returned and filed, the said governing
body shall appoint a time for the holding of a ses-
sion, or shall designate a regular meeting of their
body for the hearing of any complaints or objec-
tions that may be made concerning the said ap-
praisement, apportionment, and assessment by
any person interested, and notice of such session
for the said hearing shall be published by the
clerk of the governing foody once a week for two
weeks in a newspaper having a general circula-
tion in said municipality, and said notice shall
provide for an inspection of such return by any
property owner or other party interested in such
return. The time fixed for said hearing shall not
be less than five nor more than ten days from the
date of the last publication. The said governing
body at said session shall have power, and it shall
be its duty, to review and correct said appraise-
ment, apportionment, and assessment, and to hear
objections to the same, and to confirm the same
either as made by said board or as corrected by
said governing body. The said governing body
shall by ordinance fix the assessments in accord-
ance with said appraisement and apportionment,
as so confirmed, against the several tracts of land
liable therefor; provided, however, that the rate
of interest to be taxed shall not exceed one per
cent per annum over and above the rate of in-
terest stipulated in the 'bonds herein provided for.
Assessment in conformity to said appraisement
and apportionment as confirmed by said munici-
pality shall be payable to the treasurer of such
municipality in cash, and, if paid within thirty
days from the date of the passage of said ordi-
nance, without interest; provided however, that in
the event the owner of the land or of any street
railway so assessed shall, within thirty days from
tne passage of the ordinance making the assess-
ment final, file with the clerk of the said munici-
pality his or its written request asking that the
assessments be payable in installments in accord-
ance with the previsions 'hereof, the same shall
thereupon foe and become payable in ten equal an-
nual installments and shall bear interest at the
rate of not exceeding seven per cent per annum
until paid, and each installment together with the
interest on the entire amount remaining unpaid
shall be payable each year at such time and place
as shall be provided by resolution of the govern-
ing body. Acts 1927, p. 327.
§ 913(31). Lien of assessment; date of lien.—
Such special assessment and each installment
thereof, and the interest thereon and the expense
of collection, are hereby declared to be a lien
against the lots and tracts of land so assessed
from the date of the ordinance levying the same,
coequal with the lien of other taxes and prior to
and superior to all other liens against such lots or
tracts, and such lien shall continue until such as-
Ga—
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sessment and interest thereon shall be fully paid,
and shall be enforced in the same manner as are
liens for city taxes. Acts 1927, p. 328.
§ 913(32). Bonds—The said governing body,
after the expiration of thirty days from the pas-
sage of said ordinance confirming and levying
said assessment, shall by resolution provide for
the issuance of bonds in the aggregate amount of
such assessments remaining unpaid, bearing date
not more than thirty days after the passage of the
ordinance fixing the said assessment and of such
denomination as the said governing foody shall
determine, which bond or foonds, unless authority
is hereafter granted and exercised for making the
same a direct obligation of the municipality, shall
in no event become a liability of the municipality
or of the governing body of the municipality is-
suing same. One tenth in amount of any such
series of bonds with interest upon the whole
series to date, shall foe payable on such day and
at such place as may foe determined by the govern-
ing body, and one tenth thereof with the yearly
interest upon the whole amount remaining un-
paid shall be payable on the same day in each
succeeding year until all shall be paid. Such
bonds shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding
six per cent per annum from their date until
maturity, payafole annually, and shall foe desig-
nated as "street-improvement bonds," and shall
on the face thereof recite the street or streets, part
of street or streets, or other public places for the
improvement of which they have issued, and,
unless authority is hereafter granted and ex-
ercised for making the same a direct obliga-
tion of the municipality, that they are payafole
solely from assessments which have been fixed
upon the lots or tracts of land benefited by said
improvement under authority of this chapter. Said
bonds shall be signed foy the mayor or chairman
of the board of commissioners, and attested by
the clerk of the governing body, and shall have
the impression of the corporate seal of such mu-
nicipality thereon, and shall have interest coupons
attached, and all bonds issued foy authority of this
chapter shall foe payable at such place either with-
in or without the State of Georgia as shall be des-
ignated foy said governing body. Said foonds shall
be sold by said governing body at not less than
par, and the proceeds thereof applied to the pay-
ment of the contract price and other expenses in-
curred pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,
or such bonds in the amount that shall be neces-
sary for that purpose may be turned over and
delivered to the contractor at par value in pay-
ment of the amount due him on his contract,
and the portion thereof which shall be necessary
to pay other expenses incident to and incurred
in providing for said improvements shall be sold
or otherwise disposed of as the said governing
body shall direct. Any proceeds from the sale
of said bonds remaining in the hands of the treas-
urer after the payment hereinbefore provided for
shall go into the treasury of the municipality as
compensation for the services to be rendered foy
it as contemplated herein. Acts 1927, p. 329.
§ 913 (33). Treasurer's duty as to collection;
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sales to pay assessment; affidavit of illegality.—
The assessment provided for and levied under the
provisions of this chapter shall be payable as the
several installments become due, tog-ether with
the interest thereon, to the treasurer of the mu-
nicipality, who shall keep an accurate account
of all such collections by him made, and such
collections shall be kept: in a special fund to 'be
used and applied for the payment of such bonds
and the interest thereon and expenses incurred
incident thereto, and for no other purpose, until
all said bonds are paid in full; and said treasurer
shall give bond in amount to be fixed by the
governing body, conditioned upon the faithful
performance by him of the duties imposed herein.
It shall be the duty of said treasurer, not less than
thirty days and not more than fifty days before
the maturity of any installment of such assess-
ments, to publish at least one time, in a newspaper
having a general circulation in said municipality
a notice advising the owner of the property af-
fected by such assessment of the date when such
installment and interest will be due, and desig-
nating the street or streets or other public places
for the improvement of which such assessments
have been levied, and that, unless the same shall
be promptly paid, proceedings will be taken to
collect said installment and interest, or in lieu
thereof to mail such notice within the time limits
aforesaid to the owners of record of the property
affected, at their last known address. And it shall
be the duty of said treasurer, promptly within
fifteen days after the date of the maturity of any
such installment or assessment or interest, to is-
sue an execution against the lot or tract of land
assessed for such improvement, or against the
party or person owning the same for the amount
of such assessment or interest, and shall turn
over the same to the marshal or chief of police
of the municipality or his deputy, who shall levy
the same upon the abutting real estate liable
for such assessment and previously assessed for
such improvements, and after advertisement and
other proceedings a,s in case of sales for city
taxes the same shall be sold at public outcry to
the highest bidder, and such sales shall vest an
absolute title in the purchaser, subject to the
lien of the remaining unpaid installments with
interest, and also subject to the right of redemp-
tion as provided in sections 880, 1169, 1170, 1171,
and 1172 of the Code of Georgia; provided that
the defendant shall have the right to file an affi-
davit denying that the whole or any part of the
amount for which said execution issued is due,
and stating what amount he admits to be due,
which amount so admitted to be due shall be paid
and collected before the affidavit is received, and
the affidavit received for the balance. All affi-
davits (and the foregoing and following provi-
sions shall apply to the railroads or street rail-
ways against whom execution shall be issued for
the cost and expense of paving) shall set out in
detail the reasons why the affidavit claims the
amount is not due, and, when received by the
city marshal or chief of police, shall be returned
to the superior court of the county wherein the
municipality is located, and there be tried and
the issue determined as in cases of illegality, sub-
ject to all the pains and penalties provided for
in other cases of illegality for delay under the
Code of Georgia. The failure of said treasurer or
clerk to publish or mail said notice of maturity
of any installment of said assessment and interest
shall in no wise effect the validity of the assess-
ment and interest and the execution issued there-
for. Acts 1927, p. 330.
§ 913(34). Suit to enjoin assessment, etc.; time
limit.—No suit shall be sustained to set aside any
such assessment, or to enjoin the said governing
body from making or fixing or collecting the same
or issuing or levying executions therefor or is-
suing such bonds or providing for their payment
as herein authorized, or contesting the validity
thereof on any grounds or for any reason other
than the failure of the governing body to adopt
and publish the preliminary resolution provided
for in section 913(25) in cases requiring such
resolution and its publication, or to give no-
tice of the hearing of the return of the ap-
praisers as herein provided for, unless such suit
shall be commenced within thirty days after the
passage of the ordinance making such assess-
ment final; provided, that in the event any special
assessment shall be found to be invalid or insuf-
ficient in whole or in part for any reason whatso-
ever, the said governing body may at any time,
in the manner provided for the making of an
original assessment, proceed to cause a new as-
sessment to be made and fixed, which shall have
like force and effect as an original assessment.
Acts 1927, p. 332.
§ 913(35) Assessment where county is land
owner.—Whenever the abutting-land owners of
any street of said municipality petition the gov-
erning body as herein set out, or said governing
body pass the resolution provided for in section
913(25) for the improvement of any street
where the county is owner of property on
said street, and the governing body of such
county has assented to the proposed improvement
and has provided funds to pay in cash its propor-
tionate part of the cost of said improvement, the
frontage so owned is to be counted as if owned
by an individual, for all the purposes of this chapter
and the chairman of the board of commissioners
of such county is authorized to sign the aforesaid
petition or file objections in behalf of the county.
Acts 1927, p. 332.
§ 913 (36) Special laws not repealed. — This
chapter shall not be construed to repeal any special
or local law, or affect any proceedings under such
for the making of improvements hereby author-
ized or for raising the funds therefor, but shall be
deemed to be additional and independent legisla-
tion for such purposes and to provide an alterna-
tive method of procedure for such purposes, and
to be a complete Act not subject to any limita-
tions or restrictions contained in any other pubk'c
or private law or laws except as herein otherwise
provided. Act 1927, p. 33i2.
This section is not violative of section 6341 of our State
constitution. Wheat v. Bainbridgt, 168 Ga. 479, 148 S.
E. 332.
§ 913(37) Payment of part by municipality.—
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Where the municipality desires to pay any por-
tion of the cost of the improvements contemplated
herein, in addition to the amounts hereinbefore
provided for, the balance may be assessed against
the abutting property or the owners thereof, or
the owners of any street or steam railway there-
in, as hereinbefore provided for. Acts 1927, p. 333.
§ 913(38) Proceeding to validate lien.—Any
time within sixty days after the assessments are
finally determined and fixed as hereinbefore pro-
vided for, it shall be lawful for the municipality
to file a petition in the superior court of the
county in which the said municipality is situated,
wherein shall be alleged the fact of the passage
and approval of the ordinance, and a copy there-
of, the street or part of a street affected thereby,
the character of paving or other improvement in-
tended, and the approximate estimate of the cost.
Said petition shall allege that the ordinance is
authorized by law, and that it will create a lien on
all real property abutting on such street or part
of a street, for the payment by the owner of each
lot or parcel of land so abutting, of the pro rata
share of expense assessed to each said lot or par-
cel of land, as well as on any street or other rail-
road therein, if any such there be, and shall pray
for a judgment iby the court declaring such ordi-
nance valid, legal, and binding, and that the liens
be set up as alleged. It shall not be necessary in
such petition to allege the names of the owners
of the abutting property of railroads to be af-
fected, but shall be sufficient to describe the street
or portion thereof to be improved, and to indi-
cate, as hereinbefore provided, that the property
on said street is to ibe charged with the expense.
At or hefore the filing of such petition, the same
shall be presented to the judge of said court, who
shall thereupon pass an order calling upon all
persons owning or interested in the real estate
abutting on said street, or on the designated part
thereof, to show cause, at a time and place to be
in said order named, why the prayer of the peti-
tion should not be granted and the ordinance
and assessments declared valid and the liens be
fixed as legal and binding, which time shall not
be less than thirty nor more than sixty days later
and either in term time or vacation, and either in
open court or at chambers. It shall thereupon he
the duty of the clerk to publish once a week
for four weeks in the official organ of the
county, a statement of the case and a copy of said
order. At the time and place named, or at such
other time and place as the hearing may be ad-
journed to, any person interested shall be heard
to show cause in writing, which writing shall be
filed with the clerk, why the prayer should not be
granted. The court shall hear all questions
of law or fact, and all competent evidence may
be offered as in other cases; and the court shall
thereupon pass an appropriate order finding and
adjudging that said ordinance is lawful and valid
and said liens legal and binding, or otherwise, as
the law and facts may warrant. The municipality
or any person appearing, and who may be dis-
satisfied with said judgment, may within ten days
file a bill of exceptions and carry the matter up
to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
as the case may be, for review as in cases of in-
terlocutory injunction. If the final judgment of
the superior court shall be in favor of the validity
of the ordinance and of the liens claimed, the
same shall forever be conclusive, and said mat-
ters so determined shall never be thereafter drawn
in question in any court. Bonds issued under the
provisions of this chapter after such judgment
shall have written or stamped thereon the words
"Validated and Confirmed by judgment of the
Superior Court," specifying also the date when
such judgment was rendered and the court where-
in it was rendered, which shall he signed by the
clerk of the said superior court, and said entry
shall be original prima facie evidence of the fact
of such judgment, and receivable as such in any
court of this State. In any case in which similar
bonds have been heretofore issued by any munic-
ipality under the authority of particular local
Acts, it shall be lawful to validate the same and
fix the assessments by final judgment of the su-
perior court under like proceedings and with like
effect; provided, however, that before the munic-
ipality shall institute such proceedings in such
cases, the holder or holders of such bonds or
any part thereof shall give to the municipality
good and sufficient bond and security to indem-
nify and hold harmless the municipality against
any court costs or other expenses incident to
such validating proceedings, the sufficiency of such
bond and the security to be approved by the
chief executive officer of the municipality. Acts
1927, p. 333.
EIGHTH TITLE
Public Revenue
CHAPTER l
Taxation
ARTICLE 1
Ad Valorem, Specific, and Occupation Taxes
§ 993(2). Park's Code.
See § 993(4).
§ 993 (4). Poll tax; exemptions; registered
female voters.
Registration as Prerequisite to Tax.—A female more than
21 years of age, by the provisions of the act of 1923, prop-
erly construed, is not required to pay poll-tax except for
those years in which she may be registered as a voter. Haw-
thorne v. Turkey Creek School Dist., 162 Ga. 462, 134 S. E.
103.
Poll Tax Prior to 1922.—Females in this State, who were
otherwise qualified to vote, might have voted at any time
between August 26, 1920, and December 20, 1922, without
paying poll-tax prior to such voting. Davis v. Warde, 155
Ga. 748, 118 S. E. 378. Thus there was no poll-tax required
of females prior to December of 1922. Hawthorne v. Turkey
Creek School Dist., 162 Ga. 462, 468, 134 S. E. 103.
§ 993 (24). Cars operated for hire.
Effect upon Municipal Taxation.—The imposition of a tax
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under this act and its payment by jitney owners does not
confer upon them the right to operate their jitneys on the
streets of a city so that the latter can not prohibit their
operation. Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 163, 129 S.
E. 861.
§ 993(26). Park's Code.
See § 993(24).
§§ 9-93 (47 -a), 993(47-e). Park's Code.
See § 993(149).
§ 993 (49). Coal, coke, wood and lumber.
Constitutionality.—This section as amended in 1924, is not
unconstitutional and void because it violates the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution, or the uniform-tax pro-
vision of the State Constitution. Georgia-Carolina I^umber
Co. v. Wright, 161 Ga. 281, 131 S. F- 173.
§ 993 (54). Foreign corporations.
Effect of Failure to Pay upon Contract.—The failure on
the part of the corporation to register with the comptroller -
general and pay the tax required by this act, does not
render the contracts of the corporation void and unenforce-
able, since the purpose of the general tax act, as denned by
its caption, is merely to raise revenue, and it can not be
taken to impliedly nullify contracts inade in the absence of
compliance with its provisions. Toole v. Wiregrass De-
velopment Co., 142 Ga. 57, 82 S. F- 514; Morris v. Moore,
143 Ga. 512, 85 S. F- 635; McFamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App.
210, 129 S. F. 570; Alston v. New York Contract Purchase
Corp., 36 Ga. App. 777, 138 S. F- 270.
§ 993(54). Park's Code.
See § 993(49).
§ 993(59). Park's Code.
See § 993(54).
§ 993 (65). Travelling horse traders or gyp-
sies.
Taxation under This Section and Section 993(80). — The
plaintiff, a Georgia corporation, having a fixed and perma-
nent place of business, and being a bona fide resident of
the State, and having paid the occupation tax imposed by
section 993(80), to the tax-collector (who issued his certifi-
cate showing the payment, etc.) was not subject to the tax
imposed under this section. Fulton Trading Co. v. Baggett,
161 Ga. 669, 131 S. F. 358.
§ 993 (69). Travelling, etc., agents of assess-
ment, etc., companies.
Industrial Life Insurance Agents.—Because of section
2507, this section is not applicable to industrial life in-
surance agents. Hoover v. Pate, 162 Ga. 206, 132 S. F- 763.
§ 993(70). Park's Code.
See § 993(65).
§ 993(74). Park's Code.
See § 993(69).
§ 993 (80). Live stock dealers.
As to payment under both this section and section 993(65),
see note to section 993(65).
§ 993(84). Park's Code.
See § 993(80).
§ 993 (149). Cigarette and cigar dealers; "whole-
sale" and "retail" dealer defined.
Number of Sales to Constitute One Dealer.—Where the
evidence shows only one sale and no attempt at others or
intent to engage in retail trade, it is not sufficient to clas-
sify the seller as a dealer under the definition of this sec-
tion. Lichtenstein v . State, 34 Ga. App. 138, 128 S. F- 704.
§ 993 (169). Specific and occupation taxes.—
In addition to the ad valorem tax on real estate
and personal property, as required by the Con-
stitution and now provided for 'by law, the fol-
lowing specific and occupation taxes shall be
levied and collected each year after the passage of
this Act, beginning in 1928. In all cases in this
Act where population controls the amounts of
tax or license fee to be paid, the last census re-
port of the Federal government shall govern.
Acts 1927, p. 57.
Editor's Note.—All sections under this article, unless
otherwise noted, were codified from the Acts of 1927.
§ 993 (170). Poll tax; exemptions.—Upon each
and every inhabitant of the State between the
ages of twenty-one and sixty years, on the day
fixed for the return of property for taxation a
poll tax of ($1.00) one dollar, which shall be for
educational purposes in instructing children in the
elementary branches of an English education only.
Provided, this shall not be demanded of blind
persons, nor crippled, maimed, or disabled Con-
federate veterans relieved of such taxes under
and by authority of section 766, volume 1, of the
Code of 1895, nor shall this tax be required or
demanded of female inhabitants of the state who
do not register for voting.
§ 993 (171). Ad valorem tax for sinking fund
for retirement of State Bonds.—The governor, by
and with the assistance of the Comptroller-Gen-
eral, is authorized and empowered annually to
levy and assess a tax on the ad valorem value
of the taxable property of this State, such rate as
may be sufficient to raise a net amount of $100,-
000.00 as a sinking-fund to pay off and retire
the valid outstanding bonds of the State as they
fall due, as required by article 7, section 14, par-
agraph 1, of the Constitution. The tax above
authorized shall be specially levied and collected,
and separate accounts of the same shall be kept
by the Treasurer, and the money arising there-
from shall be applied to paying off the valid bonds
of the State as they mature. The said amount
so received each year shall be applied to paying
off and retiring the valid bonds of the State,
maturing in their order continuously. All bonds
retired under the provisions of this Act shall be
cancelled and stamped with the words "sinking
funds," by the Treasurer, and filed in his office.
In addition to the foregoing levy, the Governor,
by and with the assistance of the Comptroller-
General, shall also levy and assess such addi-
tional rate of tax on the taxable property of this
'State as may be necessary to meet the appropria-
tions of the General Assembly of Georgia for each
succeeding year. The aggregate ad valorem tax
levy in any one year not to exceed the tax-rate
limit fixed by the Constitution of this State.
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§ 993 (172). Professional tax.—Upon each and
every practitioner of law, medicine, osteopathy,
chiropractic, chiropodist, dentistry, and upon each
and every veterinary surgeon, optician, optome-
trist, masseur, public accountant,' or embalmer,
and upon every civil, mechanical, hydraulic, or
electrical engineer, or architect, charging for their
services as such, $15.00, and the validity of their
licenses is made contingent upon the payment of
the tax herein provided. And no municipal cor-
poration or county authority shall levy or
collect an additional tax on the professions, busi-
nesses, or occupations enumerated above, which
shall be returned to the tax-receiver of the county
of his residence by any person engaged therein
on the first day of January, and entered by the
receiver on the digest of the county.
§ 993(173). Presidents and officials of corpora-
tions.—Upon the president of each express, tele-
graph, telephone, railroad, street-railroad, steam-
boat or navigation company, electric light, gas
company, water company, sleeping-car company,
palace car-company, ^building and loan association,
and investment and loan company, doing business
in this State, $25.00. Provided, said tax shall not
apply to local building and loan associations fos-
tered as a civic undertaking and not conducted
for financial gain or profit. In case the president
of any of the companies enumerated in the pre-
ceding paragraph does not reside in this State,
then in each case the general agent, superintend-
ent, or other person or official in charge of the
business of such companies, residing in this State,
shall be required to pay the tax of $25.00 hereby
imposed; and no -municipal corporation, or county
authorities shall levy or collect an additional tax
on the officials enumerated above, either as a li-
cense, tax, or fee. The president or other officials
herein named, of the companies enumerated
above are required to make a return as such to
the tax-receiver of the county of his residence as
of January 1st, which return shall be entered on
the digest by said receiver.
§ 983(174). Advertising agents.— Upon each
person, firm, or corporation conducting 'business
of an advertising agency using other means than
billboards, $50.00; upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration conducting the business of advertising
by signs painted, pasted, or printed on billboards
or other places where space is leased, rented, or
sold, in each county where located, one dollar
($1.00) for each location, and a location is defined
to be 75 lineal feet or fractional part thereof; and
provided further, that before painting or posting
such locations or fractional part thereof, it shall
be the duty of the person or persons so advertis-
ing to register with the ordinary and tax-col-
lector of said county as required by law, and in
case of any increase of advertising said ordinary
shall in each instance be notified as to the number
of locations.
§ 983(175). Agencies, collecting, commercial,
and mercantile.—Upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration engaged in business as a collecting, com-
mercial, mercantile, or any other agency of like
character, $200.00 in every county in the State
where they have an office or branch office. Pro-
vided that any attorney at law, or firm of law-
yers, opening a collection agency, and who shall
employ solicitors and collectors, or who shall ad-
vertise as collectors or as a collecting agency,
shall be liable for said tax regardless of having
paid their regular professional tax. Acts 1929, p.
58, § 2.
§ 993(176). Detective agencies. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating a detec-
tive agency or doing detective work for hire or
compensation, for each office established in this
State, in or near cities or towns of 25,000 or more
inhabitants, $200.00; in or near cities or towns
from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $50.00; and in
or near cities or towns of less than 10,000 inhabit-
ant, $25.00.
§ 993 (177). Amusement parks. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation running, leasing, or
operating an amusement park, other than base-
ball, football, or bicycle parks, hereinafter men-
tioned, where two or more amusement devices,
resorts, or attractions are operated, and an admis-
sion fee is charged for any one or more of the ex-
hibits, resorts, or attractions, $250.00. Provided,
this paragraph shall not be construed to exempt
or relieve any individual device, resort, amuse-
ment, or attraction located in said park from pay-
ing any specific or license tax herein imposed.
§ 993(178). Athletic clubs.—Upon every Ath-
letic Club, and upon every association or persons
giving boxing or sparring or wrestling exhibi-
tions. That the tax herein provided for shall be
paid to the tax-collector to the county before
opening the doors for any said exhibitions where
an admission of fifty cents to one dollar is
charged, $50.00 for each exhibition; where ad-
mission charged is $1.00 to $1.50, $100.00; and
where the admission charged is $1.50 and over,
$200.00 for each exhibition. Acts 1929, p. 58, § 1.
§ 993 (179). Auctioneers.—Upon each and ev-
ery auctioneer selling by auction in this State
jewelry, junk, furniture and household goods, live
stock, farm implements and produce, and real
estate, $100.00 in each county in which he con-
ducts said business. Provided that this section
shall not apply to sheriffs and the parties acting
as auctioneers for executors, administrators, guard-
ians, and commissioners conducting sales by vir-
tue of the order of any court of this State. Pro-
vided that the foregoing provision shall not apply
to auctioneers of tobacco or other farm prod-
ucts, nor to attorneys at law conducting sales un-
der power of sale, or other legal sale for their
clients.
§ 983 (180). Automobile and truck dealers.—
Upon every agent of, upon every dealer in, and
upon every person soliciting orders for retail sale
of automobiles or trucks, not including wholesale
dealers or distributors soliciting or canvassing for
local dealers, the sum set out below, viz. In each
county with a population of less than 20,000,
$25.00; in each county with a population of be-
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tween 20,000 and 30,000, $55.00; in each county
with a population of between 30,000 and 50,000,
$85.00; in each county with a population between
50,000 and 75,000, $110.00; in each county with a
population between 75,000 and 100,000, $165.00;
in each county with a population between 100,000
and 150,000, $220.00; in each county with a popula-
tion exceeding 150,000, $275.00. Provided, how-
ever, that nothing in this Act shall conflict with
the provisions fixing a license upon exclusive
dealers in used cars. Such dealer, agent, or so-
licitor selling or offering for sale automobiles or
trucks at retail shall be required to pay one license
fee only in each county, so as to provide that all
persons soliciting orders, or selling automobiles
or trucks at retail, shall pay a license to become
a dealer or agent, and such license shall entitle
such dealer to sell any makes of new or second-
hand automobiles or trucks; and shall entitle said
dealers to operate, in connection with said busi-
ness, a service-station in said county in which
said license is paid; any dealer having paid such
tax to be allowed any numiber of employees for
the purpose of selling cars within the county
wherein such tax has been paid. The service-
station under this paragraph includes work done
only on the makes of cars sold by the dealer un-
der this tax.
§ 993 (181). Dealers in used cars.—Upon every
person, firm, or corporation dealing exclusively
in used automobiles or trucks, or second-hand
automobiles or trucks, the following sums, viz:
In each county with a population of less than
20,000, $25.00; in each county with a population
of over 20,000 and not over 50,000, $50.00; in each
county with a population exceeding 50,000, $100.00.
§ 993 (182). Automobile tires or accessories;
(Wholesale).—Upon every wholesale dealer in au-
tomobile tires or automobile accessories of
any kind whatsoever, the sum of $100.00 for each
place of business.
§ 993 (183). Automobile tires or accessories (Re-
tail).—Upon every retail dealer in automobile
tires or automobile accessories of any kind what-
soever, the sum of $10.00 for each place of busi-
ness.
§ 993 (184). Automobile assembling; plants. —
Upon every agent or representative of any foreign
or non-resident corporation, said agent or repre-
sentative having an office in this State, operating
an automobile assembling-plant. $300.00 in each
county.
§ 993 (185). Automobile truck assembling-
plants.—Upon each person, firm, or corporation
operating an automobile truck assembling-plant,
$300.00 in each county.
§ 993 (186). Automobile garages.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation carrying on the busi-
ness of operating garages, either for storage or
repairing automobiles, in cities of more than
35,000 inhabitants, $75.00; in cities between 20,000
and 35,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in cities between
10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in cities
f 38
and towns of 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, $15.00;
in cities and towns of less than 1,000 inhabitants,
$5.00; and persons operating such garages within
one mile of the limits of all incorporated cities,
$5.00.
§ 993(187). Automobile parking-places.—Upon
each person, firm, or corporation operating
what is commonly known as automobile parking-
places, said parking-places being located on
vacant lots, in cities or towns with a population
of 50,000 or more inhabitants, $50.00; cities or
towns of 25,000 to 50,000, $25.00; in cities or
towns with a population of less than 25,000 in-
habitants, $15.00, for each location where cars
are parked for hire.
§ 993 (188). Awning and tent makers.—Upon
all awning and tent makers, $15.00 in each county.
§ 993(189). Bagatelle, billiard, jennylind, pool
or tivoli tables.—'Upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration operating for public use, and charging
for the use thereof, any billiard, bagatelle, jenny
lind, pool, or tivoli tables, the State and County
license fee on and after October 1st, 1929, shall
be at the rate of $100.00 for each place of business
operating not exceeding six tables, and addition
thereto, $50.00 for each table operated in excess
of six tables Said license fees shall be paid semi-
iannuailly, 'beginning' Pctober 1st, 1929, in ad-
vance before the beginning of operation. Acts
1929, p. 58, § 3.
§ 993 (190). Ball and racing parks.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation owning, leasing, or
operating any park or place where baseball, foot-
ball, or other similar game is played, or where
automobile, motorcycle, horse, or bicycle races
or contests are held, and where admission fees
are charged, in cities of more than 50,000 inhab-
itants, or within five miles thereof, $200.00; in
cities with 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, or within
live miles thereof, $100.00; in cities with 10,000
to 20,000 inhabitants, or within five miles thereof,
$50.00; in cities or towns of less than 10,000 in-
habitants, or within five miles thereof, $20.00.
Provided that this tax shall apply only to those
parks and places wherein professional games are
played or professional contests are held.
§ 993 (191). Barber-Shops.—Upon every barber-
shop the sum of $5.00 for each chair in use, ex-
cept that in cities or towns of less than 5,000 in-
habitants the amount shall be $2.50 for each chair
in use.
§ 993 (192). Barber supplies.—Upon all agents
for barber supplies, $50.00 for each place of busi-
ness.
§ 993(193). Beauty parlors.—Upon each beauty
parlor or shop or manicure shop, in each and
every town and city of this State, with a popula-
tion of fifty thousand (50,000) or more, the sum
of $25.00; and in each town or city of this State,
with a population of twenty-five thousand (25,000)
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to fifty thousand (50,000), the sum of $15.00; and
in each and every town and city of this State,
with a population of less than twenty-five thou-
sand (25,000), the sum of $10.00;—said tax to
apply to and to be collected from the owner or
operator of each and every such place of business.
Provided that this tax shall not apply to mani-
cure shops operated in connection with barber-
shops. Acts 1929, p. 63 § 10.
§ 993 (194). Bicycle dealers. — Upon every bi-
cycle dealer selling- or dealing in bicycles, either
at wholesale or retail, for themselves or upon
•commissions or consignments, $10.00 for each
place of ibusiness. All unsold bicycles belonging
to dealer shall be liable to seizure and sale for
payment of such tax.
§ 993 (195). Bill distributors. — Upon all bill
-distributors and parties engaged in the business
for profit in towns or cities, $25.00; provided, this
tax is limited to cities of 15,000 population or
more.
§ 993(196). Book agents.—Upon each agent or
canvasser for books, maps, or lithographic prints,
in each county in which he shall do business,
$5.00. Provided this shall not apply to bona fide
students earning their way through school or col-
lege, or to persons selling Bibles only.
§ 993(197). Bottlers (non-resident). — Upon
•each non-resident person, firm, or corporation
delivering for sale by truck or trucks any carbo-
nated beverages in this State, $150.00.
§ 993 (198). Brokers; stocks and bonds. —
Upon each person, firm, or corporation dealing in
bonds or stocks, either exclusively or in connec-
tion with other business, the sum of $100.00 for
each town or city in which -uch persons, firms,
or corporations maintain an office
§ 993(199). Brokers; real estate.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of buying or selling real estate on commis-
sion, or as agents renting real estate, in cities of
50,000 or more inhabitants, $50.00; in cities of
25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $30.00; in cities of
10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $20.00; in cities or
towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, $15.00.
And if such person shall engage in auctioneering
or selling property at public outcry or by auction
sales, he shall also be liable for and required to
pay the tax required of real estate auctioneers by
paragraph 10 of this section, to wit: $100.00 in
each county.
§ 993 (200). Burglar-Alarms. — Upon all bur-
glar alarm companies, or agents therefor, the
sum of $25.00 for each agency or place of
business in each county.
§ 993 (201). Cafes and restaurants. — Upon
every person, firm, or corporation, except hotels,
operating any cafe, restaurant, or lunch-room
with fifty or more tables, $100.00; twenty-five
to fifty tables, $50.00; ten to twenty-five tables,
$25.00; five to ten tables, $10.00; less than five
tables, $5.00. Provided, that four seats or stools
at tables or counters shall be construed on the
same basis as a table.
§ 993 (202). Carbonic acid gas.—Each per-
son, firm, or corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing or vending soft drinks
made of or containing carbonic acid gas or any
substitute therefor shall pay, as a privilege li-
cense to carry on such business, 4 cents on each
pound of carbonic acid gas, or any substitute
therefor so used. Provided, that bottled drinks
on which this license shall have paid may be re-
fold in original packages without the payment of
any further license, under this schedule. Each
person, firm, or corporation engaged in such busi-
ness shall keep accurate books and invoices
showing the quantity of carbonic acid gas or any
substitute therefor used in such business, and
such other information relating to the business as
may be reauired by the Comptroller-General, to
enable the State tax officials to check up the rt -
turns herein required. At the end of each calen-
dar quarterly period every person, firm, or corpo-
ration engaged in such business shall make a re-
port to the Comptroller-General on blanks to be
furnished by the Comptroller-General, showing
the amount of carbonic acid gas or other substi-
tute therefor consumed during the preceding
quarter, and such other information as the Comp-
troller-General may require, verified by affidavit,
and shall with the report remit the license herein
provided for each pound of carbonic acid gas or
other substitute therefor consumed, as shown by
the report, and such remittance shall be paid into
the State Treasury. If such report or remittance
is not made within fifteen days after the end of
the calendar quarter, there shall be added to the
sum due for such license for the preceding quar-
ter 10% additional license. The tax officials of
the State shall have authority to examine th^
books and papers of any one engaged in such
business, for the purpose of ascertaining the cor-
rectness of all reports and remittances. Any per-'
son wilfully failing or refusing to make the re-
ports and remittances herein required shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and any person wilfully
making a false affidavit as to any report herein
required shall be guilty of perjury.
§ 993(203). Cars operated for hire.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating or keeping
automobiles for hire, whether in connection with
a garage or not, a tax according to the follow-
ing scale, whether in or outside of the corporate
limits of any city or town, for each automobile
so operated, in or near cities or towns with less
ohan one thousand (1,000) inhabitants, $5.00; in
or near cities with one thousand to five thousand
inhabitants, $10.00; in or near cities or towns with
five thousand to fifteen thousand inhabitants, $15.-
00; in or near cities or towns with fifteen or thirty
thousand inhabitants, $20.00; in or near cities or
towns with thirty thousand to fifty thousand in-
habitants, $25.00; in or near cities or towns with
more than fifty thousand inhabitants, $40.00. Pro-
vided that the words "near," as used in this par-
agraph, is defined to mean within a distance of
three miles of the incorporate limits of any town
or city. Acts 1929, p. 63, § 11.
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§ 993 (204). Cafs operated for hire over fixed
routes.—Upon every person, firm, or corporation
operating automobiles for transportation of pas-
sengers upon a regular fixed route, commonly
known as jitneys, for a uniform fare, for each five
passenger car or less, $15.00; and for each car
carrying more than five passengers, $25.00.
§ 993 (205). Cars for hire; "Drive-It-Your-
self." — Upon each person, firm, or corporation
operating or keeping for hire automobiles, com-
monly known as "Drive-It-Yourself" business, or
automobiles without drivers for hire, $150.00 for
each place of business. Provided that the tax
fixed herein shall not exceed $10.00 for each car
operated.
§ 993(206). Coal and coke.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation dealing in either coal or coke,
whether for themselves or as agents or as brok-
ers, in cities of more than 1,000 inhabitants and
not more than 10,000, $10.00; in cities of more
than 10,000 and not more than 20,000 inhabitants,
$50.00; in cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants
in one county $100.00 for each place of business.
Provided that where this tax is paid by any per-
son, firm, or corporation, he or it shall be priv-
ileged to handle both commodities on the one
tax. Acts 1929, p. 60, § 4.
§ 993 (207). Cemetery companies. — Upon all
cemetery companies, agencies, offices, etc., $100.00
in each county.
§ 993 (208). Circuses.—Upon each circus com-
pany or other company or companies giving such
exhibition beneath or within a canvas enclosure,
advertised in print or parade in any manner what-
soever as a circus, menagerie, hippodrome, spec-
tacle, or show implying circus, the following tax
measured by the number of railroad-cars, auto-
mobiles, trucks, or wagons used in transporting
said circus—railroad cars, automobiles, trucks and
wagons hereinafter referred to as cars. A circus
requiring more than 80 cars, $1,000.00 per day;
40 to 80 cars, $500.00 per day; 20 to 40 cars,
$100.00 per day; 10 to 20 cars, $50.00 per day;
less than 10 cars, $25.00 per day, for each day it
may exhibit in the State of Georgia.
§ 993 (209). Circus side-shows. — Upon each
side-show accompanying a circus company in any
county having a town or city of 5,000 population
or more, $50.00 per day; and in all other coun-
tries, $25.00 per day.
§ 993(210). Concerts, shows, and exhibitions.
—
Upon all concerts, shows, and exhibitions, charg-
ing an admission, in or near cities of less than
five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, $25.00; in or
near cities of more than five thousand and not
more than twenty thousand inhabitants, $50.00;
in or near cities of twenty thousand population
and not more than fifty thousand, $75.00; in or
near cities of more than fifty thousand population
$100.00 for each day. Provided that this section
shall not apply to exhibitions given by local per-
formers, nor to exhibitions the entire proceeds
of which are for charitable, benevolent purposes,
nor to entertainments commonly known as chau-
tauquas. Provided further this section shall not
apply to histrionic, dramatic, and operatic per-
formances given in regular licensed theaters and
opera houses, but upon each such theater or
opera house, in towns of less than 2,000 inhabit-
ants, $2.50 per month; in cities from 2,000 to
5,000 inhabitants, $4.00 per month; in cities from
5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, $7.00 per month; in
cities from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $10.00
per month; in cities of over 25,000 inhabitants,
$12.50 per mouth. Provided that the word "near,""
as used in this section, shall be defined to mean
a distance of three miles from the incorporate
limits of any such town or city herein referred to.
Acts 1929, p. 64, § 12.
§ 993 (211). Commercial reporting agencies.—
-
Upon each person, firm, or corporation engaged
in the business of a commercial reporting agency,
in each county in the State where they have an
office or branch office, $125.00.
§ 993 (212). Street carnivals.—Upon every mid-
way combination of small shows, or street fair
or street carnival, the sum of $25.00 each week
or fractional part thereof, for each separate tent,,
enclosure, or place where an admission fee is
charged or collected, either directly or indirectly,
co witness or hear any performance, or where
anything may be exhibited for admission or
ticket; and upon every merry-go-round or flying
horse accompanying any midway combination,
street fair or street carnival, in each city or town
in this State in which it does business, or in each
county where they may operate outside of the
limits of any city or town in this State, $25.00.
Provided, that should the said midway combina-
tion, or any of them specified above, be held in
connection with county, district, or State agri-
cultural fairs of this State and under the direction
of, and within the grounds at the time of holding
said fairs, the whole amount of said tax for said
attraction when so held shall be $25.00 per week
or fractional part thereof.
§ 993(213). Corporations, domestic.—-All cor-
porations incorporated under the laws of Georgia,
and doing business therein, except those that are
not organized for pecuniary gain or profit and
those that neither charge nor contemplate charg-
ing the public for services rendered, in addition
to all other taxes now required by them by law,
are hereby required to pay each year an annual li-
cense or occupation tax as specified In the follow-
ing scale:
Corporations with issued capital stock not ex-
ceeding $10,000, $10.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$10,000, and not over $25,000, $30.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over $25,-
000, and not over $75,000, $75.00'.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$75,000, and not over $100,000, $100.00.
'Corporations with issued capital stock overf
$100,000, and not over $300,000, $200.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$300,000, and not over $500,000, $250.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$500,000 and not over $750,000, $300.00.
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over
Corporations with issued capital stock
$750,000, and not over $1,000,000, $500.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock
$1,000,000, and not over $2,000,000, $750.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over $2,-
000,000, and not over $4,000,000, $1,000.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over $4,-
000,000, and not over $6,000,000, $1,250.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$6,000,000, and not over $8,000,000, $1,500.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over $8,-
000,000, and not over $10,000,000, $1,750.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over $10,-
000,000, and not over $12,000,000, $2,000.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$12,000,000, and not over $14,000,000, $2,500.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$14,000,000, and not over $16,000,000, $3,000.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$16,000,000, and not over $18,000,000, $3,500.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$18,000,000, and not over $20,000,000, $4,000.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$20,000,000, and not over $22,000,000, $4,500.00.
Corporations with issued capital stock over
$22,000,000, $5,000.00.
For the purpose of ascertaining the tax hereby
imposed, capital stock having no nominal or par
value shall be deemed to have such value as is
fixed therefor by the Comptroller-General from
the information contained in the report to be filed
by said corporation, as hereinafter provided for,
and from any other information obtained by the
Comptroller-General; but in no event shall the
value of such stock as so fixed exceed the true
value thereof. Acts 1929, p. 85, § 1.
§ 993(214). Corporations, foreign.—All corpo-
rations incorporated or organized under the laws
of any other State, nation or territory, and doing
business in this State, except those companies
that are not organized for pecuniary gain or profit
and those that neither charge nor contemplate
charging the public for services rendered, in ad-
dition to all other taxes now required of them by
law, are hereby required to pay each year an an-
nual license of occupation tax for the privilege of
carrying on its business within this State, as spec-
ified in the following scale:
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State does not exceed $10,-
000, $10.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $10,000 and not
over $25,000, $30.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $25,000 and
not over $75,000, $75.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $75,000 and
not over $100,000, $100.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $100,000 and
not over $300,000, $200.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $300,000 and
not over $500,000, $250.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $500,000 and
not over $750,000, $300.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $750,000 and
not over $1,000,000, $500.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $1,000,000 and
not over $2,000,000, $750.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $2,000,000 and
not over $4,000,000, $1,000.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $4,000,000 and
not over $6,000,000, $1,250.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $6,000,000 and
not over $8,000,000, $1,500.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $8,000,000 and
not over $10,000,000, $1,750.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $10,000,000 and
not over $12,000,000, $2,000.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $12,000,000
and not over $14,000,000, $2,500.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $14,000,000 and
not over $16,000,000. $3,000.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $16,000,000
and not over $18,000,000, $3,500.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $18,000,000
and not over $20,000,000, $4,000.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $20,000,000
and not over $22,000,000, $4,500.00.
When the amount of the capital stock and sur-
plus employed in the State is over $22,000,000,
$5,000.00.
For the purpose of ascertaining the tax hereby
imposed, every corporation subject to said tax is
deemed to have employed in this State the pro-
portion of its entire outstanding issued capita!
stock and surplus that its property and assets
in this State bears to all its property and assets
wherever situated. Capital stock having no nomi-
nal or par value shall be deemed to have such
value as is fixed therefor by the Comptroller-Gen-
eral from the information contained in the report
to be filed by said corporations, as hereinafter
provided for, and from any other information ob-
tained by the Comptroller- General; but in no
event shall the value of such stock as so fixed
exceed the true value thereof. Acts 1929, p. 86, § 1.
§ 993 (214a). Payment to Comptroller-General.
—The tax required by the two preceding para-
graphs shall be paid to the Comptroller-General
of this State, and the payment of said tax shall
authorize said corporation to do business in any
county in this State, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law; and upon payment of said license
or occupation tax the Comptroller-General shall
furnish to said corporation a certificate or dupli-
cate receipt for each agent in the several coun-
ties of this State that the corporation tax herein
provided for has been paid. Acts 1929, p. 89, § 1.
§ 993 (214b). Payment not relieve from other
tax; sections not applied to insurance and cewing
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machine companies; returns.—The payment of
this tax shall not be constructed so as to relieve
the corporation or its agents of any other license
or occupation tax whatever. Provided that the
three preceding- sections shall not apply to in-
surance companies, or to sewing-machine com-
panies, which are separately taxed by other pro-
visions of this Act. Provided further that all re-
turns by corporations, resident or non-resident,
must be made under oath; and when any cor-
poration paying this license or occupation tax re-
quires or demands mo're than two duplicate certif-
icates for agents, then such corporation shall be
required to pay an additional fee of $1.00 for each
duplicate certificate or receipt over and above
the first two mentioned. Acts 1929, p. 89, § 2.
§ 993 (214c). Annual reports of domestic cor-
porations; form. — Each domestic corporation
shall on or before the first day of January in each
year make a report to the Comptroller-General,
upon forms furnished by him, showing:
(a) The name of the corporation.
(b) The location of its principal offices.
(c) The names of the president, secretary,
treasurer, and members of the board of direc-
tors, with post-office address of each.
(d) The date of annual election of officers.
(e) The amount of authorized capital stock
and the par value of each share.
(f) The amount of capital stock subscribed, the
amount of capital stock issued and outstanding,
the amount of capital stock paid up, and the
amount of surplus and undivided profits.
(g) The nature and kind of business in which
the corporation is engaged, and its place or places
of business.
(h) The change or changes, if any, in the
above particulars since the last annual report.
(i) A balance-sheet as of the last day of the
last fiscal or calendar year.
(j) Such report shall be signed and sworn to
before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
by the president, vice-president, secretary, treas-
urer, or general manager of the corporations, and
forwarded to the Comptroller-General. Acts
1929, p. 90, § 3.
§ 993(214d). Annual reports of foreign corpora-
tions; form. — Each foreign corporation doing
business in this State shall, on or before the first
day of January in each year, make a report to
the Comptroller-General, upon foirms furnished
by him, showing:
(a) The name of the corporation and under the
law of what State or country organized.
(b) The location of its principal office.
(c) The names of the president, secretary,
treasurer, and members of the board of directors,
with the post-office address of each.
(d) The date of the annual election of officers.
(e) The amount of authorized capital stock and
the par value of each share.
(f) The amount of capital stock, subscribed,
the amount of capital stock issued, and the amount
of paid up capital stock, surplus and undivided
profits.
(g) The nature and kind of business in which
the company is engaged and its place or places of
business, both within and without the State.
(h) The name and location of its office or of-
fices in this State, and the name and address of
the officers or agents of the corporation in
charge of its business in this State.
(i) The value of the property owned and used
by the company in this State, where situated, and
the value of the property owned and used outside
of this State and where situated. Provided that in
the case of a railroad company located partly in
this State and partly in other States, it shall only
be necessary for said railroad company to report
its total mileage in all States and its total mileage
including all side-track in this State, and the tax
assessable against; it under this Act shalll be
upon that proportion of its total capital as its
mileage including all side-track in this State
beats to its total mileage both within and with-
out this State.
(j) The volume of business done by the com-
pany in this State.
(k) The volume of business done by the com-
pany outside of the State, and where the said
business is done.
(1) The change or changes, if any, in the above
particulars, made since the last annual report.
(m) A balance-sheet as of the last day of the
fiscal or calendar year.
(n) Such report shall be signed and sworn to
before an officer authorized to administer oaths,
by the president, vice-president, secretary, treas-
urer, superintendent, or managing agent in the
State, and forwarded to the Comptroller-General.
Acts 1929, p. 90, § 4.
§ 993(214e). Failure to make report; penalty.—
In the event any corporation subject to the pro-
visions hereof shall fail to make the reports here-
in required, when required, said corporation shall
by that fact become liable to ten per cent, of the
face value of said tax as a penalty, to be collected
in the same manner as the tax itself is collected.
Provided, however, that the Comptroller-General
shall have authority to extend the time either for
making said report or paying the tax, for good
cause shown to him. Acts 1929, p. 92, § 5.
§ 993(215). Dance halls and dancing instructors.
—'Upon each person or persons operating dance
halls where dancing is permitted or taught for
hire, $100.00 for each place of business. Acts 1929,
p. 60, § 5.
§ 993(216). Devices, bowling and ten-pin alleys,
cane racks, shooting galleries^ etc.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating for gain a
bowling, box-ball, ten-pin alley or alley of like
character, shooting galleries, or booth where fire-
arms are used for firing at a target, and upon per-
sons operating for gain any table, stand, machine,
or place for performance of games not prohibited
by law, and any rack or booth or place for pitch-
ing or throwing rings at canes, knives, or other
things of value, or any table or stand for rolling
balls for play or for sale or disposition of prizes,
for each stand, table, alley, gallery, machine, rack,
booth, or other place put in use at each place of
business in this State, the sum of $50.00; provided
this paragraph shall include automatic baseball
games of all kinds.
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§ 993 (217). Directories. — Upon each person,
firm, or corporation compiling a city directory or
directories of any character, and selling or supply-
ing the same on subscription, the sum of $25.00 for
each county in which a directory is published.
The above tax shall not be construed to apply to
telephone companies issuing directories for use in
the telephone exchanges.
§ 993(218). Dry cleaning. — Upon all persons,
firms, or corporations, engaged in dry cleaning, in
all towns and cities of this State, of not more
than 3,500 inhabitants of $5.00 for each place
of business; and in all towns and cities of this
State having a population of more than 3,500 in-
habitants, the sum of $25.00 for each place of
business. Provided this paragraph shall not ap-
ply to laundries paying the tax imposed by para-
graph 62 of this Act, nor to pressing clubs, pay-
ing the tax imposed by paragraph 89 of said Act
Acts 1929, p. 65, § 13.
§ 993(219). Electrical contractors.—Upon all
electrical contractors, $25.00 for each county.
§ 993(220). Emigrant agents.—Upon each emi-
grant agent, and upon each employee of such
agents, doing business in this State, $1,000.00 for
each county in which such agents or employee
may do or offer to do business. Provided, that
no emigrant agent or employee shall take from
this State or attempt to take from this State any
person until after first giving a bond to be ac-
cepted and approved by the Commissioner of
Commerce and Labor, conditioned to pay any
valid debt owing by said person to any citizen of
this State.
§ 993(221). Employment agencies. — Upon all
employment agencies or bureaus doing business
in this State, $50.00 for each county.
§ 993(222). Fire-Engines and apparatus.—Upon
each dealer in fire-engines and apparatus or either
of them, $100.00 for each place of business.
§ 993(223). Fish dealers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation engaged in the business of
packing or shipping oysters, shrimp, or fish, $50.00
for each county.
§ 993(224). Hotels.—Upon every person, firm,
or corporation operating a hotel, in counties of
over 30,000 inhabitants, a tax of $1.00 for each
sleeping-room per annum, and in counties of less
than 30,000 inhabitants, 50 cents per annum for
each sleeping-room.
§ 993(225). Horse-Traders (traveling) or gyp-
sies.—Upon each company of traveling horse-
traders, or traveling gypsies, or traveling com-
panies or other transients, traveling persons or
firms, engaged in trading or selling merchandise
or live stock of any kind, or clairvoyant, or per-
sons engaged in fortune-telling, phrenology, or
palmistry, $250.00, to be collected by the tax-col-
lector in each county and distributed as follows:
To the county where collected $125.00; to the
State $125.00. This tax to be collected in each
county where they carry on either kind of busi-
ness herein mentioned. This tax shall apply to
any person, firm, or corporation, who themselves
or by their agents travel through the State carry-
ing live stock and carrying with them cooking
utensils, and live in tents or travel in covered
wagons and automobiles, and who may be a resi-
dent of this State, o'r who reside without the state,
and who are commonly called traveling horse-
traders and gypsies, and such persons or corpora-
tions shall 'be liable to pay this tax. Such tax shall
constitute a lien on any live stock owned by
such traveling persons or firms. Provided that
no Confederate soldier, indigent, or any other
person, or corporation shall be exempted from the
tax provided under this section. Provided that
nothing herein shall prevent any municipality, by
proper ordinance, from prohibiting the practice
of fortune-telling, phrenology, palmistry, or like
practices within its limits. Acts 1929, p. 60, § 6.
§ 993(226).. Ice cream dealers. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation manufacturing ice
cream or selling same at wholesale, in or near
cities of mo're than 50,000 inhabitants, $100.00;
in or near cities from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants,
$75.00; in or near cities from 10,000 to 20,000 in-
habitants, $50.00; and in or near cities of less
than 10,000 inhabitants, $10.00. Provided that
the word "near," as used in this section, is de-
fined to mean within a radius of three miles of
the incorporate limits of cities in this section re-
ferred to. Acts 1929, p. 65, § 14.
§ 993(227). Insurance agents.— (a) Upon each
and every local insurance agent, and upon each
and every solicitor or subagent, for any resident
or non-resident life, fire, marine, accident, casu-
alty, liability, indemnity, fidelity, bonding or surety
insurance company doing business in this State,
$10.00, payable to the Insurance Commissioner,
for each county in which said agent, solicitor, or
subagent shall transact or solicit business.
(b) Upon each and every local insurance agent,
and upon each and every solicitor or subagent,
for any resident or non-resident assessment life-
insurance company, or industrial life, accident, or
sick-benefit insurance company, live-stock insur-
ance company or fire and storm co-operative as-
sessment fire-insurance companies doing business
in this State, $10.00 payable to the Insurance Com-
missioner, for each county in which said agent,
solicitor, or subagent shall transact or solicit
business.
(c) Upon each and every general, special, travel-
ing, state, or district agent, or manager, or assist-
ant manager, by whatever name he may be
designated in his contract, of any resident or non-
resident life, fire, .marine, accident, casualty, lia-
bility, indemnity, fidelity, bonding or surety in-
surance company, doing business in this State,
$100.00 payable to the Insurance Commissioner,
whose receipt shall authorize the person named
therein to go into any county in the State without
the payment of an additional tax.
(d) Upon each and every general, special, travel-
ing, state, or district agent, manager, district man-
ager, assistant manager, superintendent, or assist-
ant superintendent, by whatever name he may be
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designated in his contract, of any resident or non-
resident assessment life-insurance company, or in-
dustrial life, accident, or sick-benefit insurance
company, or live-stock insurance company, doing
business in this State, $100.00 payable to the In-
surance Commissioner, whose receipt shall au-
thorize the person named therein to go into any
county in the State without the payment of an
additional tax.
(e) Upon all adjustment bureaus employing ad-
justers, a tax of $50.00 for each person who adjusts
any loss, said tax payable to the Insurance Com-
missioner, whose receipt shall authorize the per-
son named therein to go into any county in the
State.
(f) Upon each and every person not connected
with an adjustment bureau, who adjusts insurance
losses. $50.00 payable to the Insurance Commis
sioner, whose receipt shall authorize the person
named therein to go into any county in the State.
Provided, that this tax shall not apply to local in-
surance agents who adjust losses without re-
muneration.
(g) The occupation taxes imposed by this par-
agraph must be paid in advance by said agents to
the Insurance Commissioner, for the fiscal year
for which they are levied, before said agent shall
be authorized to act as agent for any insurance
company. Provided, that railroad-ticket agents
selling accident tickets shall not be deemed in-
surance agents in the sense of this paragraph.
§ 893(228). Junk-dealer. — Upon each person,
firm, or corporation engaged in the business of
dealing in junk in or near cities of over 50,000 in-
habitants $100.00; in or near cities of from 10,-
000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in or near cities
of from 3,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in
cities or towns under 3,000 or within ten miles
thereof, $3.00. Each junk dealer, his clerk, agent,
or employee, shall keep a book, open to inspec-
tion, in which he shall make entries of all rail-
road iron, brass, pieces of machinery, plumbing
materials, unused farm implements, automobile
parts, fixtures, or accessories purchased by him,
together with the name of the party from whom
purchased; and upon failure to keep such book or
record and produce it on demand, the said dealer
shall forfeit his license. Provided the words,
"near," as used in this section, is defined to mean
within a radius of the three miles of the incor-
porate limits of the cities and towns referred to
in this section. Acts 1929, p. 66, § 15.
§ 993 (229). Legerdemain and sleight of hand.—
Upon each exhibition of feats of legerdemain or
sleight of hand, or other exhibition and enter-
tainment of like kind, $25.00 in each county.
§ 993 (230). Legislative agents. — Upon each
person registered under the Act of the General
Assembly approved August 11, 1911 (see Acts
1911, page 151), the sum of $250.00 for every
person, firm, or corporation represented by said
agent.
§ 993 (231). Laundries. — Upon each person,
firm
}
or corporation operating a laundry or dye-
ing establishment, $100.00 if employing ten or
more persons; $50.00 if employing five and not
more than ten persons; $25.00, if not employing
more than five persons. Provided that where
any person, firm, or corporation owns or op-
erates more than one laundry, this tax shall be
paid for each such laundry, according to the
scale of tax herein provided, that is to say, the
tax shall be paid for each operation of each
such laundry or dyeing establishment. Acts
1929, § 16.
§ 993 (232). Lighting systems. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation selling, whether as
manufacturer, agent, or dealer in any lighting
system, whether gas, gasoline, or electrical, $25.00
in each county.
§ 993 (233). Lightning-rods. — Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation who may contract for
or engage in the business of fitting up or erecting
lightning-rods in this State, the sum of $10.00'
for each county in which he may contract for, or
erect, or put in place any lightning-rod or rods
upon any structure or building therein; and it
shall be the duty of the tax-collector to whom the
tax is paid to issue the person paying such tax a
license receipt showing such payment. When a
license for erecting a certain brand or make or
rod has been issued for a county, additional li-
censes for erecting the same brand or make shall,
be issued upon the payment of $5.00 each.
§ 893(234). Live stock dealers. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation dealing in live stock,
having a fixed place of business in or near cities
of more than 50,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in or
near cities of from 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants,
$15.00; in or near cities or towns of less than 10,-
000 inhabitants, $10.00 for each place of business.
Provided the word "near,'' as used in this sec-
tion, is defined to mean within a radius of three
miles of the incorporate limits of any town or
citv in said section mentioned. Acts 1929, p. 66,
§ 17.
§ 993(235). Lumber dealers.—Upon every per-
son, firm, or corporation engaged in the manu-
facure of lumber products of any character or
dealing in lumber or lumber products, whether
for themselves or as agents or brokers, in or near
cities of 1,000 inhabitants and not more than 10,-
000, $10,00; in or near cities of more than 10,000
and not more than 2,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in
or near cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants
$100.00 for each place of business. Provided the
word "near" as used in this section is defined to
mean within a radius of three miles of the incor-
porate limits of the cities and/or towns in this
paragraph referred to. Acts 1929, p. 67, § 18.
The use of the word "near" in making the classification
subjecting certain persons and corporations designated by
the act as "in or near cities," as contained in this sec-
tion, necessarily leaves to the tax officer the discretion of
determining in many instances that some may be liable
and others may not be liable, depending entirely upon the
circumstances of each particular case; and for this rea-
son the tax imposed by the section, is invalid and unen-
forceable in so far as the provisions of the paragraph re-
late to persons or corporations "near" cities, but out-
side the definite limit of one mile stated in the act. Case-
Fowler Lumber Co. v. Winslett, 168 Ga. 808, 149 S. E. 211.
§ 993 (236). Machines (Store cash registers).-
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Upon each manufacturer or wholesale dealer in, I its agents in this State, and all wholesale and re-
or agent for the sale of, any cash or account reg-
ister, $100.00 for each place of business in this
State.
§ 993 (237). Machines (Weighing or calculat-
ing). — Upon each manufacturer or wholesale or
retail dealer in, or agent for the manufacturer of,
any weighing scale or scales for calculating weight
or prices of commodities, $25.00 for each place of
business in this State.
§ 993 (238). Machines (Adding machines). —
Upon every manufacturer of, or wholesaler or re-
tail dealer in, or agent for the sale of any adding
or calculating machine, check-protector, and do-
mestic ice machines retailing for more than ten
dollars, $25.00 for each place of business in coun-
ties of 20,000 population or under; $50.00 in coun-
ties of a population of over 20,000 and under 50,-
€00; and $100.00 in counties of over 50,000, for
each place of business in this State.
§ 993 (239). Machines (Typewriters). — Upon
every manufacturer of, or wholesaler or retail
dealer in, or agent for the sale of any typewriter
or typewriting machine, $25.00 for each place of
business in counties of 20,000 population or un-
der; $50.00 in counties of over 20,000 population
and under 50,000; $100.00 in counties of over 50,-
000; this tax to be paid for each place of business
in the various counties of this State.
§ 993 (240). Machines (Slot). — Upon every
machine, punchboard, or other device, operated,
used, or kept in this State, wherein is kept any
article to be purchased by depositing therein or
paid therefor any coin or thing of value, and for
which may be had any article of merchandise
whatsoever, where there is no chance incurred by
reason thereof, and where the deposit of coin or
other thing of value does not exceed one cent
per operation, $2.00 for each machine, punchboard,
or other device for each county where kept, set
up, used, or operated.
(b). Upon each slot-machine wherein may be
seen any picture or music may be heard by de-
positing in said machine any coin or thing of
value, and each weighing machine or scale, and
every machine making stencils by use of contriv-
ances operated by slot, wherein coin or other
thing of value is to be deposited or used, the de-
posit of coin or other thing of value not exceed-
ing one cent per operation, $1.00 for each ma-
chine where kept, set up, used, or operated. On
all other machines described in this paragraph,
charging more than one cent per operation, $5.00
for each machine where kept, set up, used, or
operated. Provided further, that no machine
described in this paragraph shall be subject to
more than one tax.
§ 993 (241). Machinery and equipment.—Upon
every manufacturer of reaping, mowing, binding,
or thrashing machines, gas, electrical, or oil en-
gines, agricultural machinery propelled by gas,
and road-building machinery propelled by gas or
oil, culverts, road-machines and road-graders,
selling or dealing in such machinery by itself or
tail dealers in the above-mentioned machinery,
selling such machinery manufactured by compa-
nies that have not paid the tax thereon named,
shall pay $100.00 annually to the Comptroller-
General on the first of January of each year or at
the time of commencement of business, same to
be known as a license fee for the privilege of fin-
ing business in this State. All companies and
others paying this license fee shall, at the time of
payment, furnish the Comptroller-General with
a list of all agents authorized to sell the aforesaid
machinery of their manufacture, or under their
control, and shall pay to said Comptroller-Gen-
eral the sum of $10.00 for each of said agents, for
the fiscal year or fractional part thereof, for each
county in which the said agents may do business.
Upon the payment of $10.00 the Comptroller-
General shall issue to each of said agents a certifi-
cate of authority to transact business in this State.
Before commencing business in this State all such
agents shall be required to register their names
with the Ordinaries of those counties in which
they intend to do business, and shall exhibit to
said ordinaries their license from the Comptroller-
General; wholesale and retail dealers in the above-
mentioned machinery shall be required to pay tax
provided herein for manufacturers of the above
machines sold by them, unless said manufac-
turers, have paid the tax required by this Act. All
unsold machinery belonging to manufacturers,
dealers, or other agents, or in their possession or
the possession of others, shall be liable to seizure
and sale for the payment of such fees, license, or
tax. None of the provisions of this paragraph shall
apply to licensed auctioneers selling second-hand
machinery, or to officers of the law under legal
process, or to merchants buying or selling said
machinery on which a license tax has been paid as
herein provided, and who keep the same and sell
and deliver them from their place of business.
Any person who shall violate the provisions of
this paragraph shall be liable to prosecution for a
misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished
as prescribed in section 1065, volume 2 of the Code
of 1910.
§ 993(242). Merry-Go-Rounds. — Upon the
owner, manager, keeper, or lessee of any merry-
go-round or flying horses, or flying swings, or
human roulettes, or scenic devices run by machin-
ery, or of an elevated railway or scenic railway,
similar contrivance kept for gain, either directly
or indirectly, for each place of business in this
State, and for each place where operated, in coun-
ties in which there is a city of 50,000 or more in-
habitants, $50.00; in all counties in which there are
cities between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, $30.-
00; in counties having a city between 5,000 and
10,000 inhabitants, $20.00; in all other counties,
$10.00.
§ 993 (243). Monument dealers. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation selling monuments or
tombstones, $25.00 in each county in which they
shall have a place of business.
§ 993 (244). Motor-Buses.—Upon every person,
firm, or corporation, operating a motor-bus for the
transportation of passengers upon a regular or
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fixed route, $25.00 for each bus of a passenger
capacity of seven or less, and on each bus of more
than said capacity the sum of $50.00; provided
they shall be exempt from local municipal license
tax; provided further, that this section shall not
apply to passenger buses transporting school chil-
dren exclusively.
§ 993(245). Motor-Trucks and trailers.—Upon
every person, firm, or corporation engaged in
the operation of motor-trucks or trailers for the
transportation of freight for hire, $25.00 for each
truck or trailer. Provided this section shall not
apply to persons, firms, or corporations hauling
farm produce, live stock, and fertilizer exclusively.
Provided that the width of load of trucks and
trailers shall not be more than eight feet. Pro-
vided further that said Act shall not apply to
motor-trucks and trailers used exclusively in
hauling of lumber not in competition with com-
mon carriers. Provided nothing in this section
shall be construed to impose a tax upon trailers
used by any person, firm, or corporation engaged
in transportation of lumber, timber, piling, cross-
ties, or poles, not for hire, but used by such per-
son, firm, or corporation as an incident to their
business. Acts 1929, p. 73, § 29.
§ 993 (246). Motorcycle dealers.—Upon every
person, firm, or corporation selling or dealing in
motorcycles or motor attachments for bicycles,
whether in connection with the business of selling
bicycles or automobiles or otherwise $25.00 for
each place of business.
§ 993(247). Moving pictures.—Upon each and
every electric show or exhibition of moving pic-
tures, or illustrated songs, except where given
for educational purposes, for each place of busi-
ness in or near cities or towns of less than 2,000
inhabitants, $2.00 per month; in or near cities or
towns of from 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, $3.00
per month; in or near cities of from 5,000 to 10,-
000 inhabitants, $7.00 per month; in or near cities
of from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $10.00 per
month; in or near cities of from 25,000 to 50,-
000 inhabitants, $12.50 per month; in cities of 50,-
000 or more inhabitants, $25.00 per month, ex-
cept in suburbs of cities of more than 50,000 in-
habitants, where the tax shall be $12.50 per
month. Provided the word "near," as used in
this paragraph, is defined to mean within a radius
of three miles of the incorporate limits of any
such cities or towns referred to in this paragraph.
Acts 1929, p. 67, § 19.
§ 993 (248). Motion picture supply houses. —
Upon all motion-picture supply-houses, or film-
distributing agencies, $100.00 for each place of
business.
§ 993(249). Musical instruments. Graphophones,
organs, phonographs, pianos, and victrolas, radios
or radio supplies..—Upon each person, firm, or
corporation engaged in the business of selling
or renting, as agents or dealers, any of the above
similar instruments, in or near cities of more
than 50,000 inhabitants, $100.00; in or near cities
of from 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in
or near cities of from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants,
$25,00; in or near cities or towns of less than 10,-
000 inhabitants, $10.00 for each place of business.
Provided the word "near," as used in this sec-
tion, is defined to mean within a radius of three
miles of the incorporate limits of said city or
town referred to in this paragraph. Acts 1929,
p. 68, § 20.
§ 993 (250). News dealers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation carrying on the business of
selling books, magazines, papers, fruits, confec-
tions, or other merchandise on the railroad-trains
in this State, $500.00. No county or municipality
shall have authority to levy any additional tax for
the privilege of carrying on said business.
§ 993(251). Packing-houses, brokers, and butcher
plants. — Upon every packing-house, butcher
plant, broker, or brokers, and upon every person,
persons, firm, or corporation acting as agent for
any packing-house or corporation dealing in pack-
ing-house products or goods, doing business in
this State, for each place of business in each
county having a city situated therein with a popu-
lation of 30,000 or more, $300.00; for each place
of business in each county with a population of
from 15,000 to 30,000, $150.00; for each place of
business in each county with a population of
from 5,000 to 15,000, $50.00; for each place of
business in each county with a population of less
than 5,000, $25.00. Acts 1929, p. 61, § 7.
§ 993 (252). Patent rights.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation selling patent rights in
Georgia, the sum of $50.00 for each county in
which said business is carried on.
§ 993(253). Selling in baseball parks. — Upon
each person, firm, or corporation, in cities having
a population of 40,000 or more inhabitants, carry-
ing on the business of selling papers, fruits,
drinks, or other articles of merchandise in base-
ball-parks, $100.00.
§ 993 (254). Pawnbrokers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation carrying on the business of
pawnbrokers, for each place of business in this
State, $200.00. If any pawnbroker shall sell, or
offer for sale, or expose in his place of business
any pistol, pistol or rifle cartridges, dirk, bowie-
knife, or metal knucks, whether sold as unre-
deemed pledges or otherwise, he shall also be held
subject to and required to pay the license-tax re-
quired of the dealers in such articles by section
993 (257).
§ 993 (255). Peddlers.—Upon every peddler or
traveling vendor of any patent or proprietary
medicine or remedies, or appliances of any kind,
or special nostrum, or jewelry, or stationery, or
drugs, or soap, or of any kind of merchandise or
commodity whatsoever (whether herein enumer-
ated or not), peddling or selling any such goods or
articles or other merchandise, in each county
where the same or any of them are peddled, sold
or offered for sale, $50.00. Provided, that no
vendor or peddler of perishable farm products
including products of grove and orchard, shall
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be required under this paragraph or any other
of this act, to pay any license fee or tax, State,
County or municipal. And provided further,
that any person qualifying under this para-
graph and under sections 1886 et sequitur of
Civil Code of Georgia, 1910, to peddle, shall
be entitled to one helper only to assist him in
carrying on his business as a peddler.
(b) Upon every peddler of stoves or ranges for
cooking purposes or clocks or albums, or picture-
frames, for each county wherein he may sell or
offer for sale either of said articles, $25.00.
(c) Upon any traveling vendor of any patent
churn, or patented fence, or patented agricultural
implements, or tools, or other patented articles,
$25.00 for each county in which he may sell or
offer to sell either of the enumerated articles.
(d) Upon every traveling vendor using boats,
barges, or other water-craft for the purpose of
selling goods of any kind, not prohibited by law,
on the rivers or waters within the limits of this
State, for each county where he may sell such
wares, goods, or merchandise, $50.00. The tax
shall be a lien upon the boat, barge, or other water-
craft, and its contents, without regard to the
ownership thereof.
(e) The term "peddler" is hereby defined as
follows, to wit: Any person carrying goods, wares
or merchandise of any description with him, other
than farm, orchard or grove products, either in
a pack or vehicle of any character whatever,
and who makes delivery of goods ordered on
the day of taking orders, shall be held and
deemed a peddler, whether such sales are for
consumption or resale. Provided that the defi-
nition of the term peddler as herein used shall
not embrace servants, agents, and/or employees
of bona fide wholesalers or distributors of goods,
wares, produce, and merchandise to retailers
thereof, only.
§ 993(256). Pictures and picture-frames.—Upon
every person, firm, or corporaton who, in person
or through its agents, sells and delivers photo-
graphs or pictures of any character, or picture-
frames, whether they make charge for such
frames or not, $15.00 in each county in which this
business is done. Provided, this shall not apply
to regular merchants dealing in such goods at
their usual place of business.
§ 993(257). Pistols. — Upon each and every
dealer in pistols, or who deals in pistol cartridges,
or rifle cartridges, dirks, bowie-knives, or metal-
knucks, for each place of business in this State,
in or near towns or cities of 10,000 or less in-
habitants, $50.00; in or near cities of over 10,000
inhabitants, $100.00. Provided further that no
person shall be exempted from the payment of
this tax. Provided further the word "near," as
used in this section or paragraph, shall be and is
denned to mean within a radius of three miles
of the incorporate limits of said towns or cities
in this section referred to. All dealers in toy
pistols of every kind doing business in this State
shall pay a tax of five hundred dollars. Acts
1929, p. 68, § 21.
§ 993 (258). Playing-Cards.—Upon each dealer
in playing-cards, $10.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (259). Photographers. — Upon every
daguerrean, ambrotype, photographic, and simi-
lar artists carrying on the business of making
pictures, $10.00 in each county.
§ 993(260). Pressing-clubs and pressing and
cleaning business.—Upon each person, firm, or
corporation operating a pressing-club, and/or
upon each person, firm, or corporation engaging
in the business of pressing and cleaning clothes,
$5.00 for each place of business. Provided that
if each such person, firm, or corporation, shall
engage in any dry-cleaning business, he shall, in
addition, pay the sum provided for in paragraph
993(218) hereof. Acts 1929, p. 69, § 22.
§ 993 (261). Practioners (Itinerant). — Upon
every intinerant doctor, dentist, optician, optom-
etrist, veterinary surgeon, osteopath, chiropractor,
or specialist of any kind, doing business in this
State, $25.00 for each county in which they may
practice or do business. Provided, that if any
one of said itinerant specialists shall peddle or
sell any drug, medicine, remedy, appliance, spec-
tacles, glasses, or other goods in connection with
the practice of his profession, he or they shall be
subject to the tax required of peddlers, or travel-
ing vendors of patent or proprietary medicine,
nostrums, etc., by section 993(225), $50.00
in each county where they may offer to sell such
articles. Provided further, that the provisions ot
this paragraph shall not apply to persons whose
fixed place of business is in any county of this
State, and who have paid the professional tax re-
quired by section 993(172).
§ 993(262). Rinks (Skating). — Upon the
owner, manager, keeper, or lessee of any skating-
rink in this State, where any fee or charge is made
for admission, for the use of skates or skating, in
counties having a population of more than 100,-
000, the sum of $100.00; in counties having a pop-
ulation of 50,000 and not over 100,000, the sum of
$50.00; in counties having a population less than
50,000, the sum of $25.00 for each place of busi-
ness.
§ 993(263). Salary and wage buyers.—Upon
each person, firm, or corporation or partnership
buying salary or wage accounts and all negotiable
papers, $100.00 for each office or place of business
maintained.
§ 993(264). Safes and vaults.—Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation or agent thereof selling
safes or vaults, or vault doors or other vault fix-
tures, $100.00 for each place of business.
§ 993(265). Sanitariums.—Upon hospitals and
•sanitariums, or institutions of like character,
whether incorporated or not, 'conducted for gain,
in or near cities of more than 20,000 population,
$100.00. In or near cities or towns of less than
20,000 population, $15.00. Provided that the
above tax shall not apply to public hospitals
maintained by municipal corporations for charit-
able purposes only. Provided further the word
"near" as used in the above stated section, is
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defined to mean within a radius of five miles of
the incorporate limits of the towns or cities of
paragraph referred to. Acts 1929, p. 69, § 23.
§ 993(266). Shows (Dog and pony.)—.Upon
each dog, pony, or horse show, where the entire
show is exclusively an exhibition of trained dogs,
ponies, or horses and monkeys, or a combination
of any of them, beneath a tent, canvas, or enclos-
ure, where an admission fee of fifteen cents or
more is charged, the sum of $50.00 for each day it
may exhibit; and upon such shows with an admis-
sion fee of less than fifteen cents, the sum of
$30.00 for each clay it may exhibit in this State.
§ 993(267). Shows (vaudeville). — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating vaudeville
shows which are given under tents or places
other than regular licensed theatres, in or near
cities or towns of less than 1,000 inhabitants,
$2.50 per week; in or near cities or towns of 1,-
000 to 5,000 inhabitants, $5.00 per week; in or
near cities or towns of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants,
$7.50 per wreek; in or near cities or towns of 10,-
000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $10.00 per week; in
or near cities or towns of 25,000 to 50,000 in-
habitants, $20.00 per week; in or near cities or
towns of more than 50,000 inhabitants, $50.00 per
week. Provided the word "near" as used in the
foregoing section is defined to mean within a
radius of five miles of the incorporate limits of
the towns and cities therein referred to. Acts 1929
p. 70, § 24.
§ 9©8(268). Sprinklers (Automatic).—Upon all
automatic sprinkler companies, or agents there-
for, the sum of $25.00 for each agency or place of
business in each county.
§ 993 (269). Soda-Fountains.—Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation running or operating
soda-fountains in this State, having one draught
.arm or similar device used in drawing carbonated
water, $5.00; and for each additional arm or de-
vice, $5.00.
§ 993 (270). Soft-Drink syrups.—Upon all per-
sons and companies carrying on, in this State, the
business of manufacturing or selling, by wholesale
or retail, or distributing from any depot, car, or
warehouse or agency, any carbonated waters or
syrups or other articles to be used in carbonated
water, or intended to be fixed with or blended
with carbonated water to be sold as soft drinks
(not including imitations of beer, wine, whiskey,
or other intoxicating liquor), as an occupation
tax for the privilege of carrying on said (business,
an amount payable at the end of each quarter,
equal to one half one per cent (^2%) of the
gross receipts from said business for said
quarter in this State. Within three days from the
end of each quarter of the calendar year each per-
son or company engaged in said kind of business
shall make returns under oath to the Comptroller-
General of this State, showing the amount of said
gross receipts, with a detailed statement of the
parties from whom said receipts are received. In
case of a corporation, the return shall be made
under oath by the president, if a resident of this
State; and if the president is not such resident,
by the officer or person in charge of the business
of said corporation in this State. Upon failure of
any person required by this paragraph to make
such returns within ten days after the expiration of
such quarter, he shall be guilty of a misdemean-
or, and shall be liable to prosecution and be pun-
ished as now provided in cases of misdemeanor.
Upon the making of such returns, the person or
company liable to said tax shall pay the same to
the Comptroller-General, and upon failure to pay
the same the Comptroller-General shall issue an
execution for said tax against the property of the
person or company liable to said tax. If no re-
turns be made or if the Comptroller-General be-
lieves said returns .are false, the Comptroller-Gen-
eral shall ascertain the amount of said gross re-
ceipts from the best information in his power, and
assess the tax according, after giving the company
or person liable to said tax at least five day's no-
tice of the time of assessing said tax, and issue his
execution accordingly against the person or cor-
poration carrying on said business. Any person,
company, or agent carrying on any kind of busi-
ness specified in this paragraph, after failure to
pay the tax herein levied for any preceding quarter
during which he or it was liable to tax, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. It is hereby enacted that
all of said taxes received or collected under this
paragraph shall be paid into the State treasury. It
is also enacted that any person or company pay-
ing the tax herein levied s'hall be relieved of any
and all occupation tax or license fees to the State
under existing laws on or for the kind of business
specified in this paragraph. Provided, however,
that said tax shall be collected upon said syrup or
carbonated water only once, and shall be paid by
the wholesale dealer in said syrup if sold within
the confines of this State by such wholesale dealer;
and if said syrup or carbonated water shall be
purchased by the retail dealer without the limits
of this State and shall be shipped to a point with-
in the limits of this State, the same shall be taxed
in the hands of such retail dealer, and for the pur-
poses of this tax the price paid for such syrup
or carbonated water shall determine the receipts
for the same.
§ 993(271). Swimming-pools.—Upon each and
every person, firm, or corporation operating a
swimming-pool where admission fees are charged,
or upon persons, firms, or corporations keeping
and renting bathing-suits for hire, $20.00 in coun-
ties of over 50,000 population; and $10.00 >int
counties of under 50,000 population; upon per-
sons, firms or corporations conducting or operat-
ing a bathing resort in or near the ocean and
ocean and gulf front of this State, for hire, the
sum of $200.00 in each county where such bath-
ing resort is located. Provided the word "near"
as used in the above-stated section, is defined to
mean within two miles of the shore line of any
ocean and/or gulf referred to in said section. Acts
1929, p. 70, § 25.
§ 993 (272). Toll-Bridges and ferries.—Upon
all persons or corporations operating ferries,
$15.00. Upon all persons or corporations operat-
ing toll-bridges, $100.00, said tax to be paid to the
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tax-collector of the county in which the bridge is
located or situated. Provided, that this tax shall not
be required of any ferry or toll-bridge the receipts
from which do not amount to more than $500.00
per annum. And provided further, that the pro-
visions of this paragraph shall apply to line
bridges as well as bridges wholly within the con-
fines of this State.
§ 993 (273). Trucks (Gasoline or Oil).—Upon
each person, firm, or corporation selling oil or gas-
oline from a wagon or truck, $10.00 for each wag-
on or truck.
§ 993(274). Undertakers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation whose business is that of
burying the dead and charging for same, co.n-
monly known as undertakers in or within a radius
of fifteen miles of the corporate or town limits
of cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, $200.00;
in or near cities from 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants,
$100.00; in or near cities from 5,000 to 10,000 in
habitants, $50.00; in or near cities or towns of
from 2,500 to 5,000 inhabitants, $20.00; in or
near towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants, $10.00
for each place of business. Provided the word
"'near" as used in the above stated section, is de-
fined to mean within three miles of the incor-
porate limits of any town or city referred to in
said paragraph. Acts 1929, p. 71, § 26.
§ 993 (275). Warehouses (Cotton).—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating a ware-
house or yard for the storage and handling of cot-
ten for compensation, license-tax is as follows:
Where 500 to 5,000 bales are handled in one year,
$10.00; where 5,000 to 10,000 bales are handled in
one year, $25.00; where 10,000 to 20,000 bales are
handled in one year, $50.00; where 20,000 to 30,000
bales are handled in one year, $100.00; where more
than 30,000 bales are handled in one year, $200.00.
§ 993 (276). Warehouse (Merchandise, etc).—
Upon each person, firm, or corporation operating
a warehouse or yard for storage of goods, wares,
or merchandise and farm products other than cot-
ten, and charging for the same, $25.00. Provided,
that any warehouse that pays taxes as provided
in section 993 (275) shall not be subject to the
tax required bv this paragraph.
§ 993 (277). Wood dealers.—Any person, firm,
or corporation dealing in wood shall pay a tax of
$10.00 for each place of business.
§ 893 (278). Plumbing, heating, steam-fitting
and tinning contractors—Upon every plumbing,
heating, steam-fitting and tinning contractor, in
counties having a city with a population over
50,000 the sum of $25.00; in counties having a
city with a population less than 50,000 and over
15,000, the sum of $15.00; in counties having a
city or towns less than 15,000 the sum of $10.00.
§ 993(279). Malt extracts and malt products.—
Upon all persons and companies carrying on in
this State the business of manufacturing or sell-
ing, by wholesale or retail, any and all malt
syrups, as an occupation tax for the privilege of
carrying on said business an amount payable at
the end of each quarter, equal to one per cent, of
the gross receipts from said business in this
State. Within three days from the end of each
quarter of the calendar year each person or com-
pany engaged in said kind of business shall make
returns under oath to the Comptroller-General of
this State, showing the amount of said gross
receipts, with a detailed statement of the parties
from whom said receipts are received. Provided
further that this lax shall not apply to malt
syrups not flavored with hops and sold by the
manufacturers of said products to bakers in bake
shops for use in the manufacture of bread, nor
to malt syrup not flavored with hops and sold by
manufacturers of said products to the operators
of textile mills for use in the bleaching of cot-
ton cloth; and provided further that said malt
syrups shall not be additionally taxed under §
993(270). Acts 1929, p. 72, § 28.
§ 993(280). Chain Stores.—Under the police
powers of this State, the business of conducting
chain stores and/or a chain of stores, for the
selling of any kind of merchandise, hereby is
classified as a business tending to foster monop-
oly; and there is hereby levied upon each and
every such person, firm, or corporation, owning,
operating, maintaining, or controlling a chain of
stores, consisting of more than five stores, the
sum of $50.00 for each store. "Chain of Stores"
as used herein shall mean and include five or
more stores, owned, operated, maintained, or
controlled by the same firm, person, or corpora-
tion, in which goods, wares, or merchandise of
any kind are sold at retail in the State of Geor-
gia. Provided that the provisions of this para-
graph shall apply to wholesale chain stores, and/
or chains of stores as well as to retail chain
stores; and provided further that this tax shall
apply to each and every chain of stores as here-
in defined, and said tax shall be paid by each
store in any given chain, whether the same be
owned, operated, and controlled by any person,
firm, or corporation, or by any holding company
o'r trustee, who holds the title and/or beneficial
interest in the same, or in any units of any chain
of stores, to and for the use and benefit of the
owners of the entire chain of stores, or of any
unit or units of the same. Acts 1929, p. 71, § 27.
§ 933 (281). Fish and sea food peddlers; non-
resident.—Upon each non-resident firm or individ-
ual engaged in peddling fish, oysters, shrimp, or
other sea food, ten ($10.00) dollars for each vehi-
cle operated in each county in the State.
§ 993 (282). Dogs.—All dogs are hereby made
personal property, and shall be given in and taxed
as other property of this State is given in and
taxed, such tax to be enforced by levy and sale
as other taxes are collected, and not to interfere
with the imposition and collection of any munic-
ipal taxes on dogs, whether such dog or dogs be
owned by the taxpayer, his wife or minor chil-
dren.
§ 993 (283). Sewing-Machines. — Upon ever>
Ga—
4
[49]
§ 993(284) AD VALOREM, SPECIFIC, AND OCCUPATION TAXES § 993(286)
sewing-machine [company] selling or dealing in
sewing machines by itself or its agents in this
State, and all wholesale and retail dealers in sew-
ing-machines, selling machines manufactured by
companies that have not paid -the tax herein,
$400.00 for each fiscal year or fraction there-
of, to be paid to the Comptroller-General at
the time of commencement of business, and
said companies or dealers shall furnish the
Comptroller-General with a list of agents au-
thorized to sell machines of their manufac-
ture or under their control, and shall pay to
said Comptroller-General the sum of $10.00 fo;
each of said agents for the fiscal year or frac-
tional part thereof, for each county in which said
agents do business for said company. Upon the
payment of said additional sum the Comptroller-
General shall issue to each of said agents a
certificate of authority to transact business in
this State. Before doing business under this Act,
all sewing-machine agents shall be required to
register their names with the ordinaries of those
counties in which they intend to operate, and ex-
hibit to said ordinaries their license from the
Comptroller-General, and to keep such license
posted on their vehicles, or at their place of busi-
ness. Wholesale and retail dealers in sewing-
machines shall be required to pay the tax pro-
vided herein for each manufacturer of sewing-
machines sold by them, except where the tax
required by this Act has been paid by said manu-
facturer. All unsold sewing-machines belonging
to sewing-machine companies, dealers, or their
agents, in possession of said companies, dealers,
their agents or others, shall be liable to seizure
and sale for paj^ment of such fees, license, or tax.
Any person who shall violate the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and on conviction shall be punished as prescribed
in Section 1065, Volume 2, of the Code of 1910.
None of the provisions of this section shall apply
to licensed auctioneers selling second-hand sew-
ing-machines, or to officers of the law under legal
process, or to merchants buying and selling ma-
chines on which a license tax has been paid as
herein provided, and who keep the machines and
sell and deliver them at their place of business,
such sales not being on commission. Provided,
that if said merchant shall employ an agent or
agents to deliver or sell the machines, the provi-
sions of this Act shall apply to said agent or
agents.
§ 993 (284). Taxes, how returned.—-The tax
provided for in section 993 (291), requires return
made to the Comptroller-General in accordance
with the law of Georgia. The tax required by §§
993 (172), 993 (173) shall be returned to the re-
ceiver of tax returns in the county of the residence
of the person liable to such tax, and shall be
entered by the receiver upon the digest of taxable
property. In the case of the tax imposed upon
foreign corporations by § 993 (212), and the
tax imposed by § 993 (241) upon manufacturers
of machinery and implements, upon soft-drink
syrups by § 993 (270), and upon carbonic acid gas
by § 993 (200), the return is required to be made
and the tax paid to the Comptroller-General. The
tax imposed by § 993 (227) on Insurance Agents
is required to be paid to the Insurance Commis-
sioner. The tax imposed upon legislative agents
by § 993 (230) shall be paid to the Secretary of
State when each person registers, and he shall not
be allowed to register until such tax is paid. Alii
other taxes enumerated and set forth in § 993 (169)
to § 993 (281) shall be returned and paid to the tax
collector of the county where such vocations are
carried on. Provided, however, that nothing in
this section shall be construed as changing any
other provision in this Act as to whom any tax.
shall be paid.
Editor's Note.—Note that the Act of 1927 from which this
section is taken refers to paragraph 111 of section 2 of the
act. But paragraph 110, section 993(281) is the last para-
graph of said section.
§ 993 (285). Taxes, how paid.—Be it further
enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the taxes
provided for in this Act shall be paid in full for
the fiscal year for which they are levied; and
except where otherwise provided, said taxes shall
be paid to the tax-collectors of the counties where
such vocations are carried on, at the time of
commencing to do business. Before any person
shall be authorized to open up or carry on said
business, they shall go before the ordinary of
the county in which they propose to do business
and register their names, the business they pro-
pose to engage in, the place where it is to be con-
ducted; and they shall then proceed to pay the tax
to the collector, and it shall be the .duty of the
said ordinary to immediately notify the tax-col-
lector, of such registration, and at the end of each
quarter to furnish the Comptroller-General with
a report of such special tax registration in his-
office. Any person failing to register with the
ordinary or, having registered, failing to pay the
special tax as herein required, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined
not less than double the tax, or he imprisoned, as
prescribed by Section 1065 of Volume 2 of the
Code of 1910, or both in the discretion of the
court; one-half of said fine shall be applied to
the payment of the tax and the other to the
fund of fines and forfeitures for the use of the
officers of the court. Provided, however, that
in all counties of this State where the officers
of the Superior Court, or city court, are now or
may hereafter be upon the salary basis, the other
half of the fine shall be paid into the treasury of
such counties and shall become the property of
such counties.
§ 993 (286). Insurance companies.— (1) All for-
eign and domestic insurance companies doing
business in this State shall pay one and one-half
(l l/2 %) per cent, upon gross premiums received
bv them in this State for the year, with no de-
ductions for dividends, whether returned in cash
or allowed in payment or reduction of premiums,.
or for additional insurance; nor shall any deduc-
tion be allowed for premium abatements of any
kind or character, or for reinsurance, except com-
panies doing business in Georgia, or for cash
surrender values paid, or for losses or expenses of
any kind, said tax being imposed upon gross pre-
miums without any deductions whatever except
for premiums returned on change of rate and
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cancelled policies and on reinsurance as above
provided. Provided, that local organizations
known as Farmers' Mutual Insurance Companies,
operating in not more than four counties, shall
not be subject to this tax. Provided, further,
that mutual fire insurance companies chartered by
this State, which require their members to make
premium deposits to provide for losses and ex-
penses, and which premium deposits are used
wholly for the payment of losses and expenses
and returned to the policyholders or held to pay
losses and expenses and as reinsurance reserves,
shall not be subject to this tax.
(2) Every insurance company incorporated un-
der the laws of this State, and doing business on
the legal-reserve plan, shall be required to return
for taxation all of its real estate as other real
estate is returned, and all of the personal property
owned by it shall be ascertained in the following
manner: From the total value of the assets held
by the company, both real and personal, shall be
deducted the assessed value of all real estate ownea
by the company in this State, the non-taxable
funds deposited by the company with the State
Treasurer, and the amount of the reserve or net
value of the policies required by law to be held
by the company for its policyholders, and which
belong to such policyholders; the remainder shall
be the value of the personal property owned by
and taxable against such companies.
(3) That whenever any insurance company do-
ing business in this State shall make it appear by
proof to the Insurance Commissioner that one-
fourth of the total assets are invested in any or
all of the following securities or property, to wit:
Bonds of this State or of any county or munici-
pality of this State, property situated in this State
and taxable therein, loans secured by liens on real
estate situated in this State, or policy loans by
insurance policies issued by such company on
lives of persons resident of this State, then the
premium tax levied by the first paragraph of this
section shall be abated or reduced to one per
centum upon the gross receipts of such company;
and if the amounts so invested by any such com-
pany shall be as much as three fourths of the
total assets of such company, then said premium
tax shall be abated or reduced to three fourths
of one per centum upon such gross receipts of
such company.
§ 9£3 (287). Manufacturing companies—Be it
further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That
the president, superintendent, or agents of all
manufacturing and other companies, whether in-
corporated or not (other than railroad, telegraph,
telephone, express, sleeping and palace-car com-
panies, and such other companies as are required
to make return of the value of their franchise
to the Comptroller-General under the provisions
of the Act approved December 17th, 1902, en-
titled an Act to provide for and require the pay-
ment of taxes on franchises, and to provide the
method for the return and payment of said taxes),
and all persons and companies conducting busi-
ness enterprises of every nature whatsoever, shall
return for taxation at its true market value of all
their real estate to the tax-receiver of the county
wherein said real estate is located. Provided,
That if the real estate, upon which said manufac-
turing or other business enterprise of whatsoever
nature is carried on, lies on or across the county
line, or county lines, and in two or more counties,
said real estate shall be returned to the tax-re-
ceiver of the county wherein are located the main
buildings containing the machinery, or most of the
main buildings. Provided further, that all per-
sons, companies, and corporations not excepted
above, conducting any business enterprise upon
realty not taxable in the county in which such pei -
sons reside or the office of the company or corpo-
ration is located, shall return for taxation their
stock of merchandise, raw materials, machinery,
live stock, and all other personalty employed in the
operation of such business enterprises, together
with the manufactured goods and all other
property of such business enterprises and notes
and accounts made and the money used in
the prosecution of such business enterprises on
hand at the time for the estimation of property
for taxation, including all personalty of whatso-
ever kind connected with or used in such enter-
prises in any manner whatsoever, in the county
in which is taxable the realty wherein such busi-
ness enterprises are located or carried on. Pro-
vided further, that the agent in this State of any
person, firm, or corporation resident without this
State, who shall have on hand and for sale, stor-
age, or otherwise, as such agents, merchandise or
other property, including money, notes, accounts,
bonds, stocks, etc., shall return the same for tax-
ation to the tax-receiver of the county wherein
the same may be taxed for State and county pur-
poses as other property in this State is taxed. The
word "merchandise" shall be held to include
guano, commercial fertilizer, save and except that
all canal and slackwater navigation companies shall
make, through their respective executive, officers
or stockholders in possession of the same, returns
to the tax-receiver of each county in which the same
is located, or through which the same shall pass
in whole or in part, of the right-of-way, locks,
and dams, toll-houses, structures, and all other
real estate owned by or used by the company or
stockholders thereof. Provided, that this Act
shall not make subject to taxation any property
of canal or navigation companies which is not
subject to taxation by the laws of this State now
existing. The president of every manufacturing
company in this State, and agent, general man-
ager, or person in possession or charge of the busi-
ness and property in this State of any non-resi-
dent persons, firm, or corporation, shall be re-
quired to answer under oath, in addition to those
provided by law, the following questions:
1. What is the true market value of the real
estate of the company you represent, including
the buildings thereon?
2. What is the true market value of your ma-
chinery of every kind?
3. What is the true market value of real estate
not [now?] used in the conduct of the business of
your company?
4. What is the true market value of raw ma-
terials on hand on the day fixed for return of
property for taxation?
5. What is the true market value of manufac-
tured goods or articles on hand on the day for
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the return of property for taxation, whether at
your principal office or in the hands of agents,
commission merchants, or others?
6. How much money did your company have on
hand the ,day fixed for the return of property for
taxation, whether within or without the State?
7. State separately the true market value of the
notes, bonds, and other obligations for money or
property of every kind on hand on the day fixed
for the return of property for taxation. And such
company shall be taxed upon its entire property
so ascertained, and the Comptroller-General is
authorized to frame and have propounded any
other questions which in his judgment will pro-
duce a fuller return.
§ 993 (288). Railroads; return, to whom made.
—
(1). All railroad companies, street and suburban
railroads, or sleeping-car companies, or persons
or companies operating railroads or street-rail-
roads or suburban railroads or sleeping-cars in
this State, all express companies, including rail-
road companies doing express, telephone, or tel-
egraph business, and all telephone and telegraph
companies, person or persons doing an express,
telephone, or telegraph business; all gas, water,
electric light or power, hydro-electric power,
steam heat, refrigerated air, dockage or cranage,
canal, toll-road, toll-bridges, railroad equipment,
and navigation companies, person or persons do-
ing a gas, water, electric light or power, hydro-
electric power, steam heat, refrigerated air, dock-
age or cranage, canal, toll-road, toll-bridge, rail-
road equipment, or navigation business, through
their president, general manager, owner, or agent
having control of the company's offices in this
State, shall be required to make annual tax returns
of all property of said company located in this
State, to the Comptroller-General; and the laws
now in force providing for the taxation of rail-
roads in this State, shall be applicable to the
assessments of taxes from said businesses as
above stated. Provided, that small telephone com-
panies, or person or persons doing a telephone
business, whose capital stock or property is of
less value than ($5,000.00) five thousand dollars,
shall be required to make returns to the tax-re-
ceivers of the counties in which such property is
located, instead of making returns to the Comp-
troller-General.
(2). Sleeeping car companies. That each non-
resident person or company whose sleeping-cars
are run in this State shall be taxed as follows:
Ascertain the whole number of miles of railroads
over which sleeping cars are run, and ascertain the
entire value of .all sleeping cars of such person or
company, then tax such sleeping cars at the regular
tax rate imposed upon the property in this State
in the same proportion to the entire value of such
sleeping-cars that the length of lines in this State
over which such cars are run bear to the
length of lines of all railroads over which such
sleeping-cars are run. The returns shall be made
to the Comptroller-General by the president, gen-
eral agent, agent or person in control of such cars
in this State. The Comptroller-General shall
frame such questions as will elicit the informa-
tion sought, and answers thereto shall be made
under oath. If the officers above referred to in
control of said sleeping-cars shall fail or refuse
to answer, under oath, the questions propounded,
the Comptroller-General shall obtain the informa-
tion from such sources as he may, and he shall
assess a double tax on such sleeping-cars. If the
taxes herein provided for are not paid, the Comp-
troller-General shall issue executions against the
owners of such cars, which may be levied by the
sheriffs of any county in this State upon the
sleeping-car or cars of the owners, who have
failed to pay the taxes.
(3). Railroad equipment companies. Any per-
son or persons, copartnership, company, or corpo-
rations, wherever organized or incorporated, own-
ing or leasing or furnishing or operating any kind
of railroad cars except dining, buffet, chair, parlor,
palace, or sleeping-oars, which cars are operated,
or leased or hired to be operated, on any railroad
in this State, shall be deemed an equipment com-
pany. Every equipment company, as here-
in defined, shall be required to make re-
turns to the Comptroller-General, and shall be
taxed as follows: Ascertain the total number and
the value of all cars of such equipment company,
the total car-wheel mileage made by said
cars in the United States, and the total car-
wheel mileage in Georgia. Then tax such
cars at the regular rate imposed upon prop-
erty of this State in the same proportion to the
entire value of such cars that the car-wheel
mileage made in Georgia bears to the entire car-
wheel mileage of said cars in the United. States.
The returns shall be made to the Comptroller-
General by the president, general manager, agent,
or person in control of such cars; and the Comp-
troller-General shall frame questions as will elicit
the information and answers thereto shall be
made under oath. If the officers above referred
to in control of said cars shall fail or refuse to
answer under oath the questions propounded, the
'Comptroller-General shall obtain the information
from such sources as he may, and he shall assess
a double tax on such cars. If the taxes herein
provided are not paid, the Comptroller-General
shall issue executions against said equipment com-
pany, which may be levied by the sheriff of any
county in this State upon any car or cars owned,
leased, or operated by the company failing to pay
the tax.
§ 993 (289). Railroad returns and by whom made.
—The presidents of all railroad companies doing
business in this State shall make returns to the
Comptroller-General in the manner provided by law
for the taxation of the property or the gross receipts
or net income of such railroads, and shall pay
the Comptroller-General the tax to which such
property or gross receipts or net income may be
subject according to the provisions of this Act
and the laws now in force relating to the tax on
railroads; and on failure to make returns or re-
fusals to pay tax, said company shall be liable to
all the penalties now provided by law, and the
Comptroller-General is hereby required, upon fail-
ure of such companies to make returns, or if made
and not satisfactory to said officer, to proceed
against such companies as provided in Section 1050
of the Code of 1910, Volume 2.
§ 993 (290). Banks.—No tax shall be assessed
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upon the capital of banks or banking associations
organized under the authority of this State, or the
United States, located within this State, but the
shares of the stockholders of the banks or tank-
ing associations, whether resident or non-resident
owners, shall be taxed in the county where the
bank or banking association are located, and not
elsewhere, at their full market value, including
surplus and undivided profits, at the same rate
provided in this Act for the taxation of other
property in the hands of private individuals. Pro-
vided, that nothing in this section contained shall
be construed to relieve such banks or banking
associations from the tax on real estate held or
owned by them, but they shall return .said real
estate at its true market value in the county where
located. Provided further, that where real estate
is fully paid for, the value at which it is returned
for taxation may be deducted from the market
value of their shares; and if said real estate is not
fully paid for, only the value at which the equity
owned by them therein is returned for taxation
shall be deducted from the market value of their
shares. The bank or banking associations them-
selves shall make the returns of the property and
the shares therein mentioned and pay the taxes
herein provided. Branch banks shall be taxed on
the value of the capital employed in their opera-
tion, in the counties, municipalities, and districts
in which they are located, and the parent bank
shall be relieved of taxation to the extent of the
capital set aside for the exclusive use of such
branches. Provided further that banks and trust
companies doing a general banking business
shall not be required to pay any income tax.
Acts 1929, p. 75.
§ 993 (291). Building and loan associations.—
Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
that mutual builiding and loan associations operat-
ing only in the county of their charter, and limit-
ing their loans to members, shall not be assessed
on their capital loaned to stockholders or members
thereof. All other building and loan associations
or other association of like character shall be
required to return, to the tax-receiver of the
county where such associations are located, all
real and personal property of every kind and char-
acter belonging to such associations, except the
real property located in another county shall be
returned to the tax-receiver of that county.
§ 993 (292). Return by resident agents,—Be it
further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that
the president and principal agents of all incor-
porated companies herein mentioned, except such
as are required to make returns to tax-receivers
of the counties, shall make returns to the Comp-
troller-General under the rules and regulations
provided by law for such returns and subject to
the same penalties and modes of procedure for the
enforcement of taxes from companies or persons
required by law to make returns to the Comp-
troller^General.
§ 993 (293). Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
etc.—It shall be the duty of the sheriffs, their
deputies and constables of this State to look care-
fully after the collection of all taxes that may be
due the State of Georgia under this Act, or any
other special taxes due the State of Georgia. It
shall be the duty of all tax-collectors and sheriffs
and constables of this State to direct and see
that all persons, firms, or corporations violating
this Act or any of the tax Acts of this State shah
be prosecuted for all violations of the tax laws;
and every person convicted for a violation of this
Act or any of the special tax laws of Georgia,
upon the information of any citizen of this State,
one fourth of the fine imposed upon any person
for violation of the tax laws shall, by order of said
court, be paid to such informant or prosecutor.
§ 993 (294). "In towns and cities" defined.—
Whenever in any section or paragraph of this Act
the words "in towns or cities" occur, the same
shall be construed to mean "within one mile of
villages, towns, or cities," unless otherwise speci-
fied.
§ 993 (295). Fuel distributors; terms defined
The terms used in §§ 993 (295) to 993 (302) shall
be construed as follows: "Fuels" shall include
gasoline, benzol, naptha, amd other fuels used in
internal combustion engines, but shall not include
any such articles which, under a distillation test
conducted as prescribed by the bureau of mines
of the United States Government for gasoline,
will show distillation of the first drop at a temper-
ature of not less than 200 degrees Fahrenheit, and
shall not include kerosene oil, or the distillates
commonly known as crude fuel oils. "Kerosene"
as used in this Act shall include the ordinary
household petrolem oil used with wick burners
for illuminating, heating, and cooking purposes.
"Distributor" shall include any person, associ-
ation of persons, firm, corporation, and political
subdivision of this State, (a) That imports or
causes to be imported, and sells at wholesale or
retail or otherwise within this State, any of the
fuels or kerosene as specified above; or (b) That
imports or causes to be imported, and withdraws
for use within this State, by himself or others,
any of such fuels or kerosene from the tank-car
or other original container or package in which
imported into this State; or (c) That manufac-
turers, refines, produces, or compounds any of
such fuels or kerosene within this State, and sells
the same at wholesale or retail or otherwise with-
in this State for use or consumption within this
State.
The term "distributor" shall not include any
retail dealer in such fuels or kerosene, or opera-
tor or proprietor of a gasoline filling-station or
public garage or other place at which such fuels
are sold, where such dealer or other person pro-
cures his entire supply thereof from a "distributor"
as above defined, who has qualified, as such as
hereinafter provided. Act 1927, p. 104.
§ 993(296) Fuel distributors amount of tax.—
Each distributor of fuels who engages in such
business in this State shall pay an occupation
tax of six cents per gallon for each and every
gallon of such fuels (1) imported and sold with-
in this State, or (2) imported and withdrawn for
use within this State, or (3) manufactured, re-
fined, produced, or compounded within this
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State and sold for use and consumption within
this State, or used and consumed within this
State by the manufacturer, refiner, producer, or
compounder. Nothing in this Act contained
shall be so construed as to cause double taxation
on any of the products specified herein. Where
kerosene or fuels are manufactured or refined in
this State are shipped out of this State and
are brought back into this State and used
or consumed, the respective taxes herein fixed
shall be paid on such kerosene and fuels. Any
manufacturer or refiner in this State may sell to
any duly licensed distributor under the terms of
this act, and require the purchasing distributor
to pay the tax herein imposed; provided such
manufacturer or refiner shall report all such sales
to the Comptroller-General not later than the
next business day after the shipment was made,
giving full details of the sale, including quantity,
the car initials, and number, if a car-load ship-
ment, date of shipment, and name and address of
consignee. That the proceeds of said tax shall
be distributed as follows: four cents per gallon
shall be set aside to the State-highway fund, for
use in construction on the State-highway system
of roads, or State-aid System of roads; and one
cent per gallon to the several counties of this
State as now provided by law. The one cent of
gas tax not allocated under the terms of this
bill is hereby set aside to the public schools of
said State for an equalization school fund. That
said six cents tax shall become operative and in
effect on the first day of September, 1929. Pro-
vided, however, that should that portion of said
gas tax bill allocated or set apart to the counties
of this State not be available for any reason for
such allocation to the said counties, then and' in
such event such portion of said tax be and is
hereby allocated and set apart to the State-high-
way fund to be expended on the State-highway
System by the State Highway Board in addi-
tion to the said four cents tax already allocated
to said State-highway system; and provided fur-
ther that should that portion of said gas tax al-
located or set apart to the equalization fund for
the common-school system not be available for
any reason for such allocation to the said equali-
zation fund, then and in such event such portion
of said tax be and is hereby allocated and set
apart for educational purposes in instructing
children in the common schools of this State, in
addition to any other appropriation and alloca-
tions to the support of the common schools of
this State, and shall be paid into the treasury of
said State and there remain covered for such pur-
poses. Acts 1929, p. 101, § 2.
§ 993 (296a). Further definition of ''distribu-
tor."—."Distributor" as used in the 1929 amend-
ment shall also include any person, firm, corpo-
ration, association of persons, municipalities,
counties, or any subdivision thereof in the State
of Georgia, which shall import into this State
from any other State or foreign country, or shall
receive by any means into this State, and keep
in storage in this State for a period of twenty-
four hours or more after the same shall lose
the interstate character as a shipment in inter-
state commerce, any of the fuels or kerosene
as specified above. Acts 1929, p. 103, § 4.
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§ 993(297). Fuel distributors; tax on kerosene
distributors.—Each distributor of kerosene who
engages in such business in this State shall pay
an occupation tax of one (1) cent per gallon; the
proceeds of such tax to be covered into the gen-
eral treasury. All of the subsequent regulatory
provisions of this Act, except the rate of tax, shall
apply to distributors of kerosene. The (1) cent
of kerosene oil tax levied under this section is
hereby set aside to the public schools of said State
for an equalization school fund.
§ 993 (298). Fuel distributors; registration. —
Every such distributor shall register with the
Comptroller-General of this State on or before
September 1st, 1927, and on or before the same day
of the same month of each succeeding year, giving
his or its name, place of business, and post-office
address; and shall obtain from said Comptroller-
General a license to do business as a distributor
of motor-fuels and kerosene in this State. The
Comptroller-General shall keep a well-bound book
to be used for the purpose of registration as herein
described.
§ 993 (299). Fuel distributor; invoices and bills,
—Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
that such distributor shall keep and preserve all
invoices of bills of fuels and kerosene sold for the
period of one year, and submit the same to the
Comptroller-General of this State, whenever re-
quired by him.
§ 993 (300). Fuel distributors; monthly reports.
—All distributors of fuels and kerosene in this
State shall make a monthly report, to the Comp-
troller-General of this State, of all fuels and
kerosene sold or used by them. The first such
return or report shall be made on or before Octo-
ber 20, 1927, and shall embrace and include all
fuels and kerosene sold or used during the month
of September, 1927, and a similar return or report
shall be made on or before the 20th of each month
thereafter, and shall embrace and include all fuels
and kerosene sold or used during the immediately
preceding calendar month. Said report or return
shall show the number of gallons sold or used,
and shall be sworn to before an officer of this
State duly authorized to administer oaths.
§ 993(301). Payment to Comptroller-General.
—Each distributor of fuels and kerosene engaged
in such business in this State shall pay the oc-
cupation tax of six cents per gallon on fuels and
one cent per gallon on kerosene, as herein pro-
vided, to the Comptroller-General of this State.
The first such payment shall be made on or be-
fore October 20, 1927, and shall embrace and
include the tax for all fuels and kerosene sold or
used during the month of September, 1927; and on
or before the 20th of each month thereafter he
shall pay to the Comptroller-General said occupa-
tion tax on all fuels and kerosene sold or used
during the immediately preceding calendar month.
Acts 1929, § 3.
§ 993 (302). Fuel distributors; bond by distribu-
tor From and after the passage of this Act each
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distributor of motor fuels and kerosene engaged
in such business in this State shall give a good and
sufficient indemnifying bond, payable to the
State of Georgia, in a sum not less than $25,000.00.
Said bond shall be for tne payment of the occu-
pation tax, the making of the monthly report and
the annual registration as hereinbefore set forth,
and for the full, complete and faithful performance
of all the requirements of this Act. Said bond
shall be made by a surety company authorized to do
business in this State, and the cost of same shall
be paid by the distributor. Provided further,
that when a distributor collects less than $25,000.00
per month in taxes due the State, his bond shall
be fixed in the discretion of the Comptroller-
General of the State.
§ 993(303). Filling stations.—That each and
every person, firm, association or corporation
within the State retailing or wholesaling gaso-
line must pay a tax of $5.00 on each and every
pump or filler used or in connection with the
sale of gasoline. Each and every person, firm,
association, or corporation liable for the tax
herein imposed shall pay the same to the Comp-
troller-General of this State at the beginning of
each fiscal year, and upon said payment so
made the Comptroller-General of this State shall
issue or cause to be issued to the said person,
firm, association, or corporation paying said tax
a receipt for each pump or filler so taxed, which
said receipt shall be at all times displayed in the
filling-station or place of business of the person
or corporation paying said tax, showing the ex-
act numbers of pumps or fillers the said per-
son, firm, association, or corporation is entitled
to operate. Acts 1929, p. 73, § 30.
§ 993(304). Auto transportation companies. —
There shall be collected by the Comptroller-
General from every auto transportation com-
pany, association, or individual, as defined here-
inafter, to which has been granted a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, which it or
they are hereby required to obtain from the
Public Service Commission of this State, per-
mitting him, it, or them to engage in the trans-
portation of passengers or freight, or both, be-
tween fixed termini, an occupation lax on a
mileage basis of one quarter (%) cent per mile
on all busses with a capacity of 10 passengers
or less, and a mileage tax of one-half { l/2 ) cent
per mile on all busses with a capacity of not
more than 20 passengers nor less than 10 pas-
sengers, and a mileage tax of three quarters
(34) cent per mile on all busses with a capac-
ity of more than 20 passengers; and a mileage
tax of three quarters (24) cent per mile on all
trucks with a loaded capacity of less than
-5,500 pounds, and a tax of two (2) cents per
mile on all trucks with a loaded capacity of
5,000 pounds or more, coming within the terms
of this Act, for every mile traveled by the mo-
tor vehicles of such auto transportation com-
pany, association, or individual, over the public
highways of this state. This tax shall be paid
quarterly, beginning December 31, 1929. Pro-
vided that at the time of issuing of said certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity, and
at the beginning of each calendar quarter there-
after, the Comptroller-General shall collect from
each holder of such certificate the sum of seven-
ty-five ($75.00) dollars as an advance payment
upon the mileage tax herein levied for the en-
suing quarter, which said amount shall at the
end of the quarter be credited to said holder of
such certificate, and the difference between the
said amount and the correct amount of said tax
shall be adjusted by the Comptroller-General
with the said holder of such certificate. No oc-
cupation tax or business license may be laid by
any municipality upon any firm, person, or
corporation coming under the provisions of this
section. The provisions of this section shall
not apply to bus lines operating under franchise
of the United States Government and under the
regulation and supervision of said United States
Government and solely between any point or
points in this State and a military reservation
of said Government. Acts 1929, p. 74, § 31.
§ 993(305). Automobile financing.—Upon every
firm, person, or corporation engaged in the bus-
iness of automobile financing, handling notes or
any evidence of debt pertaining to the purchase
of automobiles, and the discounts of the pur-
chase-money notes thereof, a tax of one hun-
dred dollars ($100.00) for each place of business.
Acts 1929, p. 51, § 32.
§ 993(306). Collection of taxes.—Whenever the
State Tax Commissioner shall have reason to
believe that the taxpayers in any county are not
registering their businesses with the ordinary as
required by law and are failing to pay their spe-
cial taxes, he shall have authority, upon rec-
ommendation of the Governor, to employ a
competent person or persons to go in said
county, ascertain the facts, collect said tax, and
report his finding together with the amount of
money collected to the State Tax Commissioner.
The compensation for his services shall be a
percentum of the taxes collected by his efforts;
said commission to be fixed by the State Tax
Commissioner upon approval of the Governor.
Acts 1929, p. 76, § 34.
§ 993(307). Penalty for default.—Be it fur-
ther enacted by the authority aforesaid, that
should any of taxes herein imposed remain due
and unpaid for 30 days from due date thereof,
then such person, firm, or corporation shall be
subject to and shall pay a penalty of (50%)
fifty per cent of the tax imposed. Acts 1929, p.
76, § 35.
ARTICLE 1A
Cigar and Cigarette Tax
§ 993(308). License, application, for each place
of business; leaf tobacco not included. — Every
person, firm, or corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of purchasing, selling, or distributing with-
in this State cigars or cigarettes shall, within
thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act,
file with the Commissioner of Revenue an ap-
plication for a license permitting them to en-
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gage in such business. The application for li-
cense shall be filed on blanks to be furnished
by the Department of Revenue of said State
for that purpose, and shall contain a statement
including the name of the individual, the name
of the partnership and of each individual part-
ner, or corporation, the postoffice address, and
the nature of the business, whether wholesale
01 retail, in which engaged. In case any busi-
ness is conducted at two or more separate
places, license for each place of business shall
be required; provided, that any person, firm, or
corporation hereafter intending to engage in
the business of buying, selling, or distributing
cigars or cigarettes shall precedent to engaging
in such business, file an application for a license
in the manner and form hereinabove set forth
required. Upon receipt of an application for a
license to engage in the business above set forth,
the Commissioner of Revenue shall issue to such
applicant a license permitting the purchase, sale,
and distribution of the articles referred to in
this section. Such license shall be displayed at
all times in some conspicuous place at or in his
or its place of business easily seen by the public.
Nothing herein shall be construed as requiring
a license for the privilege of buying, selling, or
distributing leaf tobacco; Provided further that
every retail dealer, when filing application for
license, shall state the kind and nature of busi-
ness engaged in, whether drugs, grocery, hard-
ware, general merchandise, or other business.
No license provided by this Act shall be re-
quired prior to October 1, 1929, and said licenses
shall then terminate on December 31, 1930, after
which date annual licenses shall be required for
each calendar year commencing with January
1, 1931. Acts 1929, p. 78, § 4.
Editor's Note.—This act, codified as §§ 993(308) -993(315),
amended the act of 1923, codified as §§ 993(149) et seq. of
the Code of 1926. For penal provisions, see P. C. §§
464(4) et seq.
§ 993(309). Revocation of license. — In addi-
tion to the penalties imposed in this Act, and
after conviction by a court of competent juris-
diction for any violation of the provision of this
Act, [See P. C. §§ 464(4) et seq.] the Commis-
sioner of Revenue may revoke any license which
may have been issued to the party or parties
adjudged guilty by the court, and, upon good
cause shown by the party whose license has
been revoked, may issue a new license when, in
his discretion such applicant conforms to the
provisions of this Article. No license issued
permitting the sale and distribution of tobacco
products shall be transferable, and any license
issued to any individual, firm, or corporation
who shall afterwards retire from business, ex-
cept as hereinafter stated, shall be null and void:
Provided that any one may be allowed to operate
for ten (10) days after [purchase of stocks in
bulk, pending granting of license, upon applica-
tion made upon such purchase; and provided
further that heirs or legal representatives or
surviving partners of deceased persons, and re-
ceivers or trustees of insolvent corporations, may
conduct said business for the period of said li-
cense without taking out new license. Acts
1929, p. 79, § 5.
§ 993(310) Stamps, time of affixing.—The li-
cense taxes imposed by this section shall be paid
by retail dealers by affixing stamps in the man-
ner and at the time herein set forth. In the
case of cigars, the startups shall be affixed to> the
box or container in which or from which they
are normally sold at retail; and in the case of
cigarettes, the stamps shall be affixed to each
individual package: Provided that any retailer
shall have forty-eight (48) hours within which
to affix the stamps after such tobacco products
are received by him or them. Acts 1929, p. -79,
§ 7.
§ 993(311). Sellers of stamps, commission of.—
>
The Commissioner of Revenue is hereby au-
thorized to engage any person, firm, or corpo-
ration to sell tax stamps, and shall allow as
compensation, for receiving, selling, and account-
ing for such stamps, not exceeding one (1%)
per cent, of the amount sold, which said com-
mission for the sale of said stamps shall be paid
from the proceeds of the sale of said stamps.
That the Commissioner of Revenue may pro-
mulgate rules and regulations providing for the
refund to dealer of the cost of stamps affixed to
goods which by reason of damage become unfit
for sale and are destroyed by the dealer or re-
turned to the manufacturers. Acts 1929, p. 80,
§ 8.
§ 993(312). Condemnation, and sale of un-
stamped goods.—•Whenever any cigarettes, ci-
gars, stogies, or cheroots shall be found in the
establishment or establishments of any retailer,
if such goods shall have remained therein for a
greater length of time than forty eight (48)
hours after their receipt at or in the place of
business of such dealer, without bearing the
stamps required by the terms of this Article to
be affixed thereto, as herein prescribed, the
Revenue Commissioner of the State of Georgia,
or his agents or deputies, is hereby authorized,
and it shall be his duty, to seize such goods and
immediately institute condemnation proceedings
under the provisions of the law prescribed for
condemnation in the premises; and if upon the
hearing of such condemnation proceeding it shall
appear that said goods were not stamped in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this article, the
Revenue Commissioner, or his agents or depu-
ties, shall take possession of such goods, and ad-
vertise the same in the county where seized for
thirty days next preceding the day of sale, and
shall" sell said goods at and before the court-
house door of the county where said goods were
seized, to the highest bidder for cash at such
sale. In addition to the purchase-price of said
goods, the successful bidder shall be required to
purchase revenue stamps and affix same to the
goods so purchased; and it shall be the duty of
the said Commissioner of Revenue to cover into
the Treasury of the State of Georgia any and all
sums of money obtained by such sales, after de-
ducting therefrom all expenses incident to the
condemnation and advertising and sale of such
goods. Acts 1929, p. 81, § 10-A.
§ 993(313). Procedure in case of seizure.—In
si! cases of seizure of any cigarettes, cigars, sto-
gies, or cheroots as being subject to forfeiture
[56]
§ 993(313) AD VALOREM, SPECIFIC, AND OCCUPATION TAXES § 993(316)
under the provisions of this article, which, in the
opinion of the officer or person making the sei-
zure, are of the appraised value of $25.00 or
more, the said officer or person shall proceed
as follows:
First: He shall cause a list containing a par-
ticular description of the tobacco products here-
inbefore described and so seized to be prepared
in duplicate, and the appraisement thereof to be
made by three sworn appraisers to be selected
by said Commissioner of Revenue, or his agent,
who shall be respectable and disinterested citi-
zens of the State of Georgia, residing within the
county where the seizure was made. Said list
and appraisement shall be properly certified and
attested by said Commissioner of Revenue, or
his agent, and by said appraisers. For the serv-
ices of each of said appraisers there shall be al-
lowed the sum of $1.00 per day, not exceeding
two (2) days, to be paid by the commissioner of
Revenue out of any revenue received by hrni
from the sale, or the proceeds of the sale of the
confiscated goods of the individuals, companies,
or corporations which may be affected by said
seizure.
Second: If the said goods are believed by the
officer making the seizure to be of less value
than $25.00, no appraisement shall be made.
Third: Said officer or person making the seiz-
ure or agent of the Commissioner of Revenue
aforesaid, shall proceed to publish a notice, for
fifteen days, in writing at the court-house door
in the county where the seizure was made, de-
scribing the articles and stating the time and
place and cause of their seizure, and requiring
any person claiming them to appear and make
such claim in writing within thirty days from
the date of the seizure. A copy of said notice
shall be served upon the owner, or person in
charge of such articles when seized, if the owner
be known, within five days of the date of said
seizure; the notice herein provided for shall be
in the name of the Commissioner of Revenue,
and may be served by any officer now author-
ized by law to serve civil process, or any duly
authorized employee of the department of Rev-
enue.
Fourth: Any person claiming the said goods
so seized as contraband, within the time specified
by the notice, may file with the clerk of the su-
perior court of the county where the seizure is
made, a claim in writing, stating his interest in
the articles seized, under which said claim any
lawful defense may be asserted, may execute a
bond to the Commissioner of Revenue in the
penal sum equal to double the value of said
goods so seized, but in no case shall said bond be
less than the sum of $50.00, with surety to be ap-
proved by the clerk of the superior court in the
county in which the goods are seized, condi-
tioned that in the case of condemnation of the
articles so seized the obligors shall pay to the
Commissioner of Revenue the full value of the
goods so seized, and all costs and expenses of
the proceeding or proceedings to obtain said
condemnation. And upon the delivery of said
bond and a copy of the list of the articles so
seized as aforesaid, the Commissioner of Rev-
enue shall transmit the same, with the duplicate
list or description of the goods seized, to the
solicitor-general of the circuit in which said sei-
zure was made, or, in his discretion, to the so-
licitor of the city court of the county in which
said seizure was made, if there is a city court
in such county, and the solicitor-general afore-
said, or solicitor of the City Court aforesaid,
shall prosecute the case to secure the forfeiture
of said goods in the court having jurisdiction.
Upon the filing of the bond aforesaid, the said
property seized shall be delivered to the claim-
ant pending the outcome of said case, which
said claim shall be filed and disposed of as other
claim cases under the laws of this State. For
the services in such cases of forfeiture as herein
provided the solicitor-general or solicitor of
the city court, as the case may be, shall receive
$10.00 in each case; provided said sum does not
exceed one half of the amount involved, and
when the amount involved does not exceed $20.-
00 he shall receive one-half of the amount re-
covered.
Fifth: If no claim is interposed, and no bond
given within the time specified, or if claim is
made and not sustained, the said solicitor-gen-
eral or solicitor of the city court, as the case may
be, may apply to the judge of the superior court,
or judge of the city court, of the county where
said property has been seized, for an order or
a judgment, and for sale of said property at pub-
lic outcry at the court-'house door of said county
after three-days' advertisement by posting no-
tice of said sale at the court-house door of said
county. The proceeds of said sale when received
by the Commissioner of Revenue shall be turned
into the State Treasury as other revenues are
required by law to be turned in. Acts 1929, p.
81, § 10-B.
§ 993(314). Return of seized goods. — The
Commissioner of Revenue may, in his discretion,
return any goods seized under this Act, or any
part thereof, when it is shown that there was
no intention to violate the provisions of this Act,
upon payment to the Commissioner of Revenue,
or his deputy or agent, of the amount due and
required -by law for revenue stamps required un-
der this Act to be placed on and upon any such
property so returned. Acts 1929, p. 84, § 10-C.
§ 993(315). Constitutionality. — In the event
any section of this article shall be declared un-
constitutional by the courts, the remaining sec-
tions of this article shall not be affected thereby.
Acts 1929, § 84, § 11.
ARTICLE IB
Occupation Privilege—Sales Tax Act of 1929
§ 993(316). Definitions. — When used in this
Article, the term "person" or the term "com-
pan}V herein used interchangeably, includes any
individual, firm, copartnership, joint adventure,
association, corporation, trust, or any other
group or combination acting as a unit, and the
plural as well as the singular number, unless the
intention to give a more limited meaning is dis-
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closed by the context. The term "tax year" or
"taxable year" means either the calendar year,
or the taxpayer's fiscal year when permission is
obtained from the tax commission to use the
same as the tax period in lieu of the calendar
year. The term "sale" or "sales" includes the
exchange of properties as well as the sale there-
of for money, every closed transaction constitut-
ing a sale. The word "taxpayer" means any per-
son liable for any tax hereunder. The term
"gross receipts" means the value proceeding or
accruing from the sale of tangible property (real
or personal), or service, or both, and all receipts,
actual or accrued, by reason of the investment
of the capital of the business engaged in, includ-
ing interest, discount, rentals, royalties, fees, or
other emoluments, however designated, and
without any deduction on account of the cost of
property sold, the cost of materials used, labor
costs, interest or discount paid, or any other ex-
penses whatsoever, and without any deductions
on account of losses. The term "business" as
used in this Act shall include all activities en-
gaged in or caused to be engaged in with the ob-
ject of gain, benefit, or advantage, either direct
or indirect, and not excepting sub-activities, pro-
ducing marketable commodities used or con-
sumed in the main business activities, each of
which sub-activities shall be considered business
engaged in, taxable in the class in which it falls.
The term "gross proceeds of sales" means the
value proceeding or accruing from the sale of
tangible property, without any deduction on ac-
count of the cost of property sold, expense of
any kind, or losses. Act 1929, p. 103, § 1.
§ 993(317). Tax levy from October 1, 1929.—
From and after the first day of October, one
thousand nine hundred twenty-nine, there is
hereby levied and shall be collected annual priv-
ileges taxes against the persons, on account of
the business activities, and in the amounts to be
-determined by the application of rates against
values and/or gross receipts, as the case may be,
as follows: Acts 1929, p. 104, § 2.
§ 903(318). Manufacturers taxed on value of
products as shown by gross proceeds of sales,
half mill on dollar.—Upon every person engag-
ing or continuing within this State in the busi-
ness of manufacturing, compounding, or pre-
paring for sale, profit, or use any article, sub-
stance, or substances, commodity or commodi-
ties, the amount of such tax to be equal to the
value of the articles manufactured, compounded,
<or prepared for sale, as shown by the gross pro-
ceeds derived from the sale thereof by the man-
ufacturer or person compounding or preparing
the same (except as hereinafter provided), a tax
of one half of one mill on the dollar thereof. The
measure of this tax is the value of the entire
products manufactured, compounded, or pre-
pared for sale, profit, or use in this State, re-
gardless of the place of sale or the fact that de-
liveries may be made to points outside the State.
Provided that for the purposes of this Act per-
sons, firms, or corporations engaged in the busi-
ness of packing, canning, and preserving sea
foods shall be deemed manufacturers with re-
spect to said sea food so canned or preserved.
Provided that all persons, firms and corporations
engaged in the business of canning and preserv-
ing peaches or other fruits or vegetables shall be
deemed manufacturers under this Act. If any
person liable for any tax under section 3 shall
ship or transport his products or any part there-
of out of the State without making sale of such
products, the value of the products or articles in
the condition or form in which they existed when
transported out of the State shall be the basis for
the assessment of the tax imposed in said para-
graph; and the tax-commissioner shall prescribe
equitable and uniform rules for ascertaining such
values. In determining value, however, as re-
gards sales from one to another of affiliated com-
panies or persons, or under other circumstances
where the 'relation between buyer and seller is
such that the gross receipts from the sale are
not indicative of the true value of the subject-
m'atter of the sale, the tax-commissioner shall
prescribe uniform and equitable rules for deter-
mining the value upon which such privilege tax
shall be levied, corresponding as near as possible
to the gross proceeds from the sale of similar
products of like quality or character by the other
taxpayers where no common interest exists be-
tween the buyer and the seller, but otherwise
under similar circumstances and conditions. Acts
3 99, p. 105, § 3.
§ 993(319). Tax on business of selling.—Upon
every person engaging or continuing within this
State in the business of selling any tangible prop-
erty whatsoever, real or personal, there is like-
wise 'hereby levied, and shall be collected, a tax
equivalent to two mills on the dollar of the gross
receipts of the business; provided, however, that
in the case of a wholesaler, jobber, or broker,
the tax shall be equivalent to one mill on the
dollar of the gross receipts of the business. The
classification of wholesaler or jobber shall be
used by any person doing a regularly organized
jobbing business, known to the trade as such,
and having regularly in his exclusive employ-
ment one or more traveling salesmen, and who
does not sell direct to the consumer or final
user.
There shall be excepted from such gross re-
ceipts of any such persons or companies all gross
receipts derived from the sale of fertilizers, ferti-
lizer materials, or calcium arsenate. Acts 1929
p. 106, § 4.
§ 993(320). On gross receipts of railroads,
light, power, telegraph, telephone companies, etc.
—Upon every person engaging or continuing
within this State in the following business there
shall be levied and collected on account of each
of the business engaged in, taxes at the rate of
three mills on the dollar upon the gross receipts
of said business, to wit: steam railroads, street
railroads, electric-light and power companies,
telephone companies, telegraph companies, ex-
press companies, natural and artificial gas com-
panies. Acts 1929, p. 106, § 5.
§ 993(321). Gross receipts of shows. — Upon
every person engaging or continuing within this
State in the business of operating a theatre, opera
house, moving-picture show, vaudeville show,
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racetrack, or baseball park, the tax shall be three
mills on the dollar upon the gross receipts of any
such business. Acts 1929, p. 10G, § G.
§ 993(322). On other business—exception in
case of tax prohibited by U. S. Constitution. —
Upon every person engaged or continuing within
this State in any and every business not included
in the preceding sections there is levied and shall
be collected a tax equal to two mills on the dol-
lar of the gross receipts of any such business.
There shall be excepted from the receipts of
all persons and/or companies taxed under this
Act any amount that may be derived from the
business or income of any such persons or com-
panies as the State of Georgia is prohibited
from taxing under the constitution of the United
States of America. Acts 1929, p. 107, § 7.
§ 993(323). Exemption of $30,000 a year in
value prorated. — In computing the amount of
tax levied under the provisions of this Act for
any year there shall be deducted from the values
or from the gross receipts of the business, as
the case may be, an exemption of thirty thou-
sand ($30,000.00) dollars of the amount of such
value or gross receipts. Every person exercising
any privilege taxable hereunder for any frac-
tional part of a tax year shall be entitled to
an exemption of that part of the sum of thirty
thousand ($30,000.00) dollars which, bears the
same proportion of the total sum that the period
of time during which such person is engaged in
such business bears to a whole year. Acts 1929,
p. 107, § 8.
§ 993(324). License.—If any person after the
first day of October, one thousand nine hundred
and twenty-nine, shall engage or continue in any
business for which a privilege tax is imposed by
this Act, he shall be deemed to have applied for
and to have duly obtained from the State of
Georgia a license to engage in and to conduct
such business for the current tax year, upon the
condition that he shall pay the tax accruing to
the State of Georgia under the provisions of this
Act; and he shall hereby be duly licensed to do
such business. Acts 1929, p. 107, § 9.
§ 993(325). Exemption as to insurance com-
panies, banks, trust companies, mutual benefit
association, etc.—There are, however, exempted
from this Act: (a) insurance companies which
pay to the State of Georgia a tax upon premises,
banks and trust companies doing a banking
business, organized under the laws of this or
any other State or of the United States, dealers
in stocks and bonds or the discounting, buying
and selling of notes or other evidences of in-
debtedness; (b) mutual savings banks not having
a capital stock represented by shares and which
are operated exclusively for the benefit of de-
positors; and mutual fire-insurance companies not
having a capital stock represented by shares,
which are operated exclusively for the benefit of
their policy-holders; (c) labor, agricultural and
horticultural societies, and products of farm, in-
cluding live stock, grove or garden, when sold
directly by the producer or his authorized agent
and so long as said farm products are handled
and/or sold in their original packages, and/or
in general state or condition of or preparation for
sale; cemetery companies which are organized
and operated exclusively for the benefit of their
members; fraternal benefit societies, orders or as-
sociations operating under the lodge system and
providing for the payment of death, sick, acci-
dent or other benefits to members of such socie-
ties, orders or associations, and to their depend-
ents; mutual building and loan associations op-
erated exclusively for the benefit of their mem-
bers; corporations, associations or societies or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational; purposes;
business leagues, and organizations operated ex-
clusively for the benefit of the community and
for the promotion of social welfare, none of
which companies, organizations, corporations or
societies are organized for profit and no part of
the income of which inures to the benefit of any
private stockholder or individual. Acts 1929, p.
108, § 10.
§ 993(326). Exceptions as to sales of gasoline.
—The tax on retail sales of gasoline shall not be
included in nor affected by his Act, but the same
shall remain under and be controlled by the Act
of the General Assembly approved August 24th,
1927, and amendatory Acts thereto. Acts 1929,
p. 108, § 11.
§ 993(327). Payment in quarterly installments;
time of tax-returns; form of return; re-exami-
nation; extension of time for return or payment.
—The taxes hereby levied shall be payable in
quarterly installments, that is to say, all taxes
accruing in any quarter shall be payable within
thirty (30) days after the expiration of such
quarters. The taxpayer shall, within said period
of thirty (30) days, prepare and mail or other-
wise deliver to the State Tax Commissioner a
(tax-return under oath, together wiith a remit-
tance for the amount of the taxes due as shown
by said return. Said return shall be made upon
a form to be prescribed by the State tax Com-
missioner and furnished on application to the
taxpayer. All remittances in payment of taxes
hereby levied shall be made in cash, or by certi-
fied or cashier's check, postal money-order, or
certificates of deposit. Upon receipt of such re-
turn and remittance the State Tax Commissioner
shall issue to the taxpayer a receipt for such pay-
ment; but the acceptance of such return or re-
mittance, or the issuance of such receipt by the
State Tax Commissioner, shall not prevent a re-
examination of such return or remittance or a
reassessment of the tax as herein provided. All
monies received by the State Tax Commissioner
hereunder shall be paid into the State Treasury,
and shall be kept, accounted for, and disposed
of as provided by law. Said tax-return, if made
by an individual, shall be verified by the oath of
the taxpayer; or, if this be for any reason im-
practicable, then by the oath of a duly authorized
agent having knowledge of the facts; if said re-
turn be made by a corporation or other associa-
tion, it shall be verified by the oath of any au-
thorized agent having knowledge of the facts.
The State Tax Commissioner may, for good
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cause shown, extend the time for the making of
any such return or remittance; but in no case
shall such extension be for a period exceeding
ninety (90) days; and in every case where such
an extension is granted, six percentum (6%) per
annum interest shall be collected upon the
amount of such tax. Provided that when the
total annual gross receipts of any person liable
under this Act do not exceed twenty-five thou-
sand ($25,000.00) dollars, returns may be pay-
able at the end of the month next following the
close of the year, and annual returns and pay-
ments made monthly instead of quarterly. Acts
1929, p. 109, § 12.
§ 993(328). Correction of error in computing
tax.—If the taxpayer shall make any error in
computing the tax assessable against him, the
State Tax Commissioner shall correct such er-
ror or reassess the proper amount of taxes, and
notify the taxpayer of his action by mailing to
him promptly a copy of the corrected assessment,
and any additional tax for which such taxpayer
may be liable shall be paid within ten days after
the receipt of such statement. Acts 1929, p. 110,
§ 13.
§ 993(329). Authority to examine records, etc.
—When the State Tax Commissioner shall have
any reason to believe that any return or report
made under this Act is untrue or inaccurate, it
shall have the authority personally or through
designated agents to examine the records of any
person and to require, of such person, his offi-
cers, agents, or employees answers under oath,
at an examination conducted by any member of
the State Tax Commissioner or its designated
agents. Acts 1929, p. 110, § 14.
§ 993(330). Failure to make return.—If any
person fail or refuse to make a return, the State
Tax Commissioner shall proceed, in such man-
ner as may seem best, to obtain facts and in-
formation on which to base the assessment of
the tax herein prescribed; and to this end he
may by himself or his duly appointed agent,
make examination of the books, records, and pa-
pers of any such person, and may take evidence,
on oath, of any person who he may believe shall
be in possession of facts or information perti-
nent to the subject of inquiry, which oath he or
his agent as appointed by him may administer.
As soon as possible after procuring such infor-
mation as he may be able to obtain with respect
to any person failing or refusing to make a re-
turn, the State Tax Commissioner shall proceed
to assess the tax .against such person, and shall
notify him of the amount thereof, and his act
shall be final as to any person who refused to
make a return. Acts 1929, p. 110, § 15.
§ 993(331). Lien of tax as affecting purchaser
of business.—The tax imposed by this Act shall
be a lien upon the property of any person sub-
ject to the provisions hereof who shall sell out
his business or stock of goods, or shall quit
business, and such person shall be required to
make the return provided for under this Act
within thirty days after the date he sold out his
business or stock of goods, or quit business, and
his successor in business shall be required to
withhold sufficient of the purchase-money to
cover the amount of said taxes due and unpaid
until such time as the former owner shall pro-
duce a receipt from the Tax Commissioner show-
ing that the taxes have been paid. If the pur-
chaser of the business or stock of goods shall
fail to withhold purchase-money as above pro-
vided, and the taxes shall be due and unpaid af-
ter the thirty-day period allowed, he shall be per-
sonally liable for the payment of the taxes ac-
crued and unpaid on account of the operation
of the business by the former owner. Acts 1929,
p. Ill, § 16.
§ 993(332). State tax board; petition for cor-
rection of assessment; appeal injunctions.—There
shall be, and there is hereby created a State Tax
Board, which shall be composed of the Secretary
of State, the Attorney-General, and the State
Auditor of the State of Georgia. Such board
shall have powers and duties prescribed by this
Act. If any person having made the return and
paid the tax as provided by this Act shall feel
aggrieved by any assessment or reassessment
made against him by the State Tax Commis-
sioner, he may apply by petition to the State Tax
Board, at any time within thirty (30) days after
the notice is mailed to him by the State Tax
Commissioner as aforesaid, for a hearing upon
and a correction of the amount of said tax so as-
sessed or reassessed against him by the State
Tax Commissioner. Said petition shall be in
writing, and the same shall be filed in triplicate,
and the same shall set forth and show in short
and simple form the facts upon the basis of
which it is claimed the hearing and reduction
should be granted. The State Tax Board shall
promptly consider said petition and grant or
deny such hearing. If the petition be denied, the
petitioner shall be forthwith notified of the fact.
If the petition shall be granted, the petitioner
shall be notified of the time and place of such
hearing. After such hearing the State Tax Board
shall make such order in the premises as may
appear to it to 'be just and lawful, and shall fur-
nish a copy of such order to the petitioner. In
the event of a reduction of the tax, the excess
paid shall be refunded to the petitioner by the
State Tax Commission.
Any taxpayer who shall be dissatisfied with
any order of the State Tax Board may, within
thirty (30) days after the rendition of such or-
der, file his bill of complainant in the Superior
Court of the county in which the tax accrued,
setting forth his grounds of complaint, and such
Superior Court shall hear and determine such
matter as causes in chancery are heard and de-
termined. Appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court,
as in other causes. Any person improperly
charged with any tax and required to pay the
same may recover the amount paid, together with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum, in any
proper action or suit against the State Tax Com-
missioner, and the Superior Court of the county
in which the tax accrued shall have original ju-
risdiction of any action to recover any tax im-
properly collected. It shall not be necessary for
the taxpayer to protest against the payment of
[60
§ 903(333) AD VALOREM, SPECIFIC, AND OCCUPATION TAXES § 993(338)
the tax or to make any demand to have the same
refunded in order to maintain such suit. In any
suit to recover taxes or to collect taxes the court
shall adjudge costs to such extent and in such
manner as may be deemed equitable.
No injunction shall be awarded by any court
or judge to restrain the collection of any tax im-
posed by this Act, or any part thereof due from
any person, except upon the ground that the as-
sessment thereof was in violation of the constitu-
tion of the United States or of this State or that
the same was fraudulently assessed or that there
was an error made in the amount of the tax as-
sessed against such person. In the latter case
no injunction shall be granted unless application
shall have been first made to the State Tax Boa'rd
as herein provided for a correction of the al-
leged error, and unless said State Tax Board shall
have refused to correct the same, which facts
shall appear from the allegation of the bill of
complaint; and no injunction shall be granted to
restrain the collection of any tax levied hereun-
der unless and until the complainant shall give
bond as required by law in other suits for injunc-
tion on which a bond is required, which bond
shall be conditioned for the prompt and full pay-
ment of all taxes that may be determined to be
due from the complainant by the decree which
shall be entered in said cause, and in the event
the amount of said assessment as fixed by said
decree shall be in excess of the true amount as
claimed by the complainant, then also for the
prompt and full payment of all penalties that
may have accrued and the cost of said suit. Acts
1929 p. Ill, § 17.
§ 893(333). Suit to collects tax; penalty. —
A tax due and unpaid under this Act shall con-
stitute a debt due the State, and may be collected
by action in debt or assumpsit or other appro-
priate judicial proceeding, which remedy shall
be in addition to all other existing remedies; and
it shall 'constitute a lien upon all the property of
the taxpayer, and the same shall be collected to-
gether with an additional five per cent, of the
amount of the tax and the costs of collection, if
paid within thirty days after the date it was due,
and an additional two per cent, of the amount of
the tax for each succeeding thirty days elapsing
before the tax shall have been paid; provided,
however, that the additional two per cent, pen-
alty shall not be applied until a ten-day notice
of delinquency shall have been sent to the tax-
payer. Acts 1929, p. 113, § 18.
§ 993(334). Tax year. — The assessments of
taxes herein made and the returns required there-
for shall be for the year ending on the thirty-
first day of December; provided, however, that
if the taxpayer, in transacting his business, keeps
the books reflecting the same on a basis other
than the calendar year, he may, with the assent
of the tax commission, make his annual returns
and pay taxes for the year covering his account-
ing period, as shown by the method of keeping
the books of his business. Acts 1929, p. 113,
§ 19.
taxes; remittances, how made. — The tax im-
posed by this Act shall be in addition to all other
licenses and taxes levied by law as a condition
precedent to engaging in any business taxable
hereunder except as in this Act otherwise spe-
cifically provided.
All remittances of taxes imposed by this Act
shall be made to the State Tax Commissioner
by bankdraft, certified check, cashier's check, or
certificate of deposit, who shall issue receipts
therefor to the taxpayer and shall pay the money
into the State Treasury, to be kept and accounted
for as provided by law. Acts 1929, p. 114, § 20.
§ 993(336). Corporation not to receive certifi-
cate of dissolution or withdrawal, until tax paid.
—
-The Secretary of State shall withhold the is-
suance of any certificate of dissolution or with-
drawal in the case of any corporation organized
under the laws of this State or organized under
the laws of another State and admitted to do
business in this State until the receipt of a no-
tice from the State Tax Commissioner to the
effect that the tax levied under this Act against
any such corporation has been paid or provided
for, if any such corporation is a taxpayer under
the law, or until he shall be notified by the tax
commission that the applicant is not subject to
pay a tax hereunder. Acts 1929, p. 114, § 21.
§ 993(337). Penalties for violation of Act.—It
shall be unlawful for any person to refuse to
make this return provided to be made in this Act,
or to make any false or fraudulent return or false
statement in any return, with intent to defraud
the State or to evade the payment of the tax, o'r
any part thereof, imposed by this Act, or for any
person to aid or abet another in any attempt to
evade the payment of the tax or any part there-
of, imposed by this Act; or for the president,
vice-president, .secretary, o'r treasurer of any
company to make or permit to be made for any
company or association any false return, or any
false statement in any return required in this
Act, with the intent to evade the payment of any
tax hereunder. Any person violating any of the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
fined not more than one thousand dollars or im-
prisonment not exceeding one year in the county
jail, or punished by both fine and imprisonment,
at the discretion of the court, within the limita-
tions aforesaid. In addition to the foregoing
penalties, any person who shall knowingly swear
or verify any false or fraudulent return, or any
return containing any false or fraudulent state-
ment, with the intent aforesaid, shall be guilty
of the offense of false swearing, and on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished in the manner pro-
vided by law. Any company for which a false
return, or a return containing a false statement
as aforesaid, shall be made, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and may be punished by a fine of
not more than one thousand dollars. The crimi-
nal courts of the county in which the offender
resides, or, if a company, in which it carries on
business, shall have conculrrent jurisdiction :tio
enforce this section. Acts 1929, p. 114, § 22.
§ 993(335). Tax imposed in addition to other § 993(338). State Tax Commissioner's powers
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See §'§ 993 (169) -993 (302).
and duties; prosecuting attorney.—(The adminis-
tration of this Act is vested in and shall be exer-
cised by the State Tax Commissioner, who shall
prescribe the forms and reasonable rules of pro-
cedure in conformity with this Act foir making of
returns and for the ascertainment, assessment,
and collection of the taxes imposed hereunder;
and the enforcement of any of the provisions of
this Act in any of the courts of the State shall
be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax
Commissioner, who may require the assistance
of and act through the prosecuting attorney of
any county, and may employ special counsel in
any county to aid the prosecuting attorney, but
the prosecuting attorney, of any county shall re-
ceive no fees or compensation for services 'rendered
in enforcing this Act in addition to the salary paid
by the county to such officer. Acts 1929, p. 115,
§ 23.
§ 993(339). Expense of enforcing Act. — The
State Tax Commissioner is authorized to expend
from the funds collected hereunder such sums as
may be necessary in its judgment to effectively
carry out the provisions of this Act. Acts 1929,
p. 115, § 24.
§ 993(340). Act to expire Dec. 31, 1931.—This
Act shall continue in force until the 31st day of
December, one thousand nine hundred and thir-
ty-one, and shall expire upon said date; provided
that no person or company shall be 'relieved from
the taxes accruing under this Act for the tax
year or the taxable year one thousand nine hun-
dred and thirty-one, or any part thereof. Acts
1929, p. 116, § 26.
§ 993(341). Reduction of tax hereunder in
amount paid as net income tax.—The aggregate
of the tax payable hereunder by any taxpayer
during any tax 3'ear or fractional part thereof
shall be reduced in the amount of any tax im-
posed on the net income of such taxpayer and
paid by him to the State during the same pe-
riod; and if the amount of such tax on his net
income exceeds the tax payable hereunder, no
tax shall be collected under this Act. At the
time of making any quarterly payment of the
tax imposed hereby the taxpayer may take credit
for the amount of any such tax on his net income
paid by him during the three months immedi-
ateily preceding such payment, but subsequent
adjustments may be made so as to effect the re-
duction of the aggregate tax payable hereunder
for any tax year, or fractional part thereof, to
the full extent of any tax on his net income paid
by such taxpayer during such period. Provided,
however, that should it be held in any judicial
proceeding that the enforcement of this provi-
sion would render invalid, in whole or in part,
this law or the law providing for said income tax,
then this provision shall itself become null and
void, be ineffective and unenforceable, and this
law and said income-tax law shall stand as
though this provision had not been adopted. Pro-
vided, however, that no such credit or offset
shall be allowed against any tax payable under
the income-tax Act or this Act when such pay-
ment is due prior to January 1st, 1931. Acts 1929,
p. 116, § 27.
[
Code.
ARTICLE 3
Exemption of Property
§ 998, (§ 762). Property exempt from taxation.
Productive Property Taxable.—Under the constitution of
this state, productive property is taxable, even though the
income be used for charitable purposes. Atlanta Masonic
Temple Co. v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244, 133 S. E. 864.
Illustration—Masonic Lodge.—A masonic company fur-
nishing various city lodges with quarters, by renting and
maintaining a building, is not a purely charitable institu-
tion within the meaning of this section, although the lodges
occupying the building may be institutions of such character.
Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244, 133 S.
E. 864.
ARTICLE 4
Persons and Property Subject to Taxation.
§ 1003. Property, shall be returned at its value.
Power under City Charter.—The power to "lay" and "en-
force the payment" of "such taxes on the inhabitants" of,
and "those who hold taxable property" in, a city as the
"corporate authorities may deem expedient," conferred upon
the city by its charter, is not taken away by this section or
section 1004. Tietjen v. Mayor, 161 Ga. 125, 129 S. E. 653.
§ 1004. "Fair market value," meaning of.
See note under section 1003.
In General.—This section merely states a rule to be ap-
plied by municipalities in arriving at the value at which
taxable property shall be assessed for the purposes of taxa-
tion, and does not purport to limit investigations or the
manner or agencies by which the municipal authorities shall
inquire into such value of taxable property. Tietjen v.
Mayor. 161 Ga. 125, 131, 129 S. E. 653.
§ 1013. (§ 773). In what funds taxes are to
be paid.
Where a tax-collector, after accepting a taxpayer's check
on a Sparta bank and delivering to her a receipt for pay-
ment of State and county taxes, held the check for sis
days and then indorsed and deposited it in a Gibson bank,
which indorsed and sent it to an Atlanta bank, which In-
dorsed and sent it to the Sparta bank for collection, which
(on the ninth day after its date) charged the amount of
it to the drawer's account and later delivered it canceled
to her, having also mailed to the Atlanta bank a cash-
ier's or exchange check, which remained unpaid because
before its collection the Sparta bank failed and discon-
tinued business, the taxpayer was not subject to execu-
tion issued by the tax-collector for the amount of the tax
so paid. Palmer v. Harrison, 165 Ga. 842, 142 S. E. 276.
§ 1018.. (§ 778). Taxes charged against whom.
Origin of Provision as to Life-Tenants.—The latter part
of this section, referring to life-tenants and others, who
may own and enjoy property, was taken from the decision
oi this court in National Bank of Athens v. Danforth, 80
Ga. 55, 7 S. E. 546, written by Mr. Chief Justice Bleck-
ley. Pursley v. Manley, 166 Ga. 809, 816, 144 S. E. 242.
Not Applicable to Land-Drainage Taxes.—This section
does not apply to assessments for land-drainage taxes.
Pursley v. Manley, 166 Ga. 809, 811, 816, 144 S. E. 242.
See note to § 4391.
Applied in Durden v. Phillips, 166 Ga. 689, 694, 144
S. E. 313; Planters Warehouse Co. v. Simpson, 164 Ga.
190, 198, 138 S. E. 55.
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ARTICLE 7
County Taxation of Railroads
§ 1041. Affidavit of illegality.—If any railroad
company shall dispute the liability to such county
tax, it may be done by an affidavit of illegality,
to be made by the president of said railroad, or
other officer thereof having knowledge of the
facts, in the same manner as other affidavits
of illegality are made, and shall be returned for
trial to the superior court of the county where
such tax is claimed to be owing and where it is
sought to be collected, where such cases shall be
given precedence for trial over all other cases, ex-
cept tax cases in which the State shall be a party.
Acts 1889, p. 29; 1916, p. 34; 1927, p. 137.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 other officers
than the President having knowledge of the facts, may make
the affidavit prescribed by this section.
ARTICLE 8
Estate and Inheritance Taxes
§ 1041(1). Federal Estate Tax return; duplicate
to be filed with State Tax Commissioner.—It shall
be the duty of the legal representative of the es-
tate of any person who may hereafter die a resident
of this State, and whose estate is subject to the
payment of a Federal Estate Tax, to file a dupli-
cate of the return which he is required to make
to the Federal authorities, for the purpose of
having the estate taxes determined, with the State
Tax Commissioner. When such duplicate is filed
with the said official, he shall compute the amount
that would be due upon said return as Federal
Estate Taxes under the Act of Congress relating
to the levy and collection of Federal Estate Taxes
upon the property of -said estate taxable in Geor-
gia, and assess against said estate as State inherit-
ance taxes eighty per centum of the amount
found to be due for Federal Estate Taxes. Pro-
vided, that if after the filing of a duplicate return
and the assessment of the State inheritance taxes
the Federal authorities shall increase or decrease
the amount of the Federal Estate tax, an amended
return shall be filed with the State Tax Commis-
sioner, showing all changes made in the original
return and the amount of increase or decrease in
the Federal Estate tax and such official shall
assess against said estate 80 per cent of the addi-
tional amount found to be due for Federal Estate
tax. In the event of a decrease in the Federal
Estate tax, the State shall refund to said estate
its proportion of said decrease. Acts 1925, p.
63; Ex. Sess. 1926, p. 15, 16; 1927, p. 103.
Editor's Note.—Supplemental to the Editor's Note under
this section in the Code of 1926, the court pointed out in
McAlpin v. Davant, 163 Ga. 309, 136 S. E. 83, that the
act of 1925 does not specifically mention the act of 1913 as
amended, and does not expressly repeal that law.
The act of 1925 operates only in the future, and does not
conflict with the pre-existing act of 1913 as amended, in so
far as that law imposed an inheritance tax upon estates
left by decedents who died prior to passage of the act.
Consequently the act of 1925 does not authorize the assess-
ment and collection of the inheritance tax therein provided
for from estates that were left by decedents who died prior
to the passage of the act. McAlpin v. Davant, 163 Ga. 309,.
136 S. E. 83.
The amendment of 1926 inserted the word "hereafter" near
the beginning of the section, and raised the percentage of the
state inheritance taxes from 25% to 80% of the amount of
the Federal Estate Taxes. Subsequently, the amendment of
1927 added the proviso, with all that follows it, to the end of
the section.
Assessment of Estates Left Prior to 1925.—Where there
was no assessment or collection of any inheritance tax upon
such estate prior to the passage of the act of 1925, the es-
tate was subject to have an inheritance tax assessed and
collected therefrom under the act of 1913 as amended, un-
affected by the passage of the act of 1925, and was not sub-
ject to a tax under the act of 1925. McAlpin v. Davant, 163
Ga. 309, 136 S. E- 83.
§ 1041(2). Duties of County Ordinaries.—When
the amount of the of the inheritance taxes to be
paid by any estate has been determined, as pro-
vided for in § 1041(1), it shall be the duty of said
State official to certify the same to the Ordinary
of the county where said estate is being adminis-
tered, who shall enter the same upon the minutes
of his Court, and notify the executor or adminis-
trator of the amount found to be due, which shall
be a charge against the estate and not the several
distributive shares. The ordinary shall receive for
his services the sum of $3.00 to be taxed as a
part of the cost of administration. The tax as-
sessed under the terms of this Act shall be paid
direct to the Comptroller-General. Acts 1925, p.
63; 1927, p. 104.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927, the provision's
to the compensation for the services of the ordinary was in-
serted; and the tax assessed was made payable to the comp-
troller general instead of to the county tax collector.
Note that while the act of 1927 purports to amend section
2 and 4 of the act of 1926 it is obvious that 1925 was inserted
—
Query as to constitutionality.
§ 1041(4). Failure to pay; executions.—When-
ever the legal representative of any estate taxable
under this Act fails to pay the amount assessed
against said estate, within six months after notice
from proper authority as to the amount, to be
paid it shall be the duty of the Comptroller-
General to issue execution for the amount of such
tax, against said estate, which execution shall be
enforced by levy and sale. Acts 1925, p. 63; 192/,
p. 104.
Editor's Note.—The provision as to the enforcement of the
execution was added, a id the duty formally resting upon the
county collector was imposed upon the comptroller general*
by the amendment of 1927. See Editor's Note to § 1041(2).
§ 1041(e). Park's Code.
See § 1041(8).
§§ 1041 (1-1) -1041 (1-2). Park's Code.
See §§ 1041(1)-1041(2).
§ 1041 (m). Park's Code.
See § 1041(17).
§ 1041 (8). Tax, how levied on estates less
than fee.
Applied in I^ockhart v. State, 164 Ga. 14, 137 S. E. 549.
§ 1041 (r). Park's Code.
See § 1041(17).
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§ 1041(17). Tax on transfer of property of non-
resident decedent.—A tax of two per centum of
its actual value is hereby imposed upon the trans-
fer of the following property of a non-resident
decedent:
a. Real or personal property or any interest
therein within this State.
b. Shares of stock or registered or coupon bonds
or certificates of interest of corporations organ-
ized under the laws of this State, or of national
banking associations located in this State, or joint
stock companies or associations organized under
laws of this State.
c. Such tax shall not apply to bonds of this
State or any of its subdivisions, or on money de-
posited in a bank, trust company or other simi-
lar institution in this State, if such deposit is
owned by a non-resident decedent. Acts 1927, p.
101.
§ 1041(18). Valuation, how made. —The value
of any property taxable under the provisions of
this Act and the amount of tax imposed thereon
shall be determined by the State Tax Commis-
sioner, who shall give notice and an opportunity
to be heard to the transferor, administrator, trus-
tee, or other person liable for the payment there-
of. The tax shall foe imposed upon the transfer
of the property situated within this State, and not
upon the persons to whom the property is trans-
ferred. No deduction shall be allowed from the
value of any property taxable under this Act,
except an incumbrance upon real property in this
State or personal property held within this State
as collateral or security for a loan.
§ 1041(19). Time for payments; discount inter-
est.—All taxes imposed by this Act shall be
due and payable at the time of the transfer, and
shall be paid to the Comptroller-General of the
State. If such tax is paid within six months of
the death of the decedent a discount of five per
centum shall be allowed and deducted therefrom. If
such tax is not paid within eighteen months fro.n
date of death, interest shall be charged and col-
lected at the rate of ten per centum from the date
of death. The tax herein imposed shall be and
remain a lien upon the property transferred until
paid, and the transferor, executor, administrator,
or trustee of the estate shall be personally liable
for such tax.
§ 1041(20). Authority to prescribe rules and
forms.—The State Tax Commissioner, with the
approval of the Comptroller-General, shall have
the power to prescribe such rules and regulations
and forms not inconsistent with the terms of this
Act as may be necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this Act.
§ 1041 (u). Park's Code.
See § 1041(21).
§ 1041(21). Exemption.—The tax imposed by
this Act on personal property (except tangible
personal property having an actual situs in this
State) shall not be payable if the laws of the State
of residence of the decedent at the time of his
death exempted residents of this State from trans-
fer taxes or death taxes on such property.
ARTICLE 9
Income Taxes
§ 1041(22). Corporation net-income tax; ex-
ception. U. S. laws followed.—On the net in-
come of every person, firm, or corporation resid-
ing or doing business in this State, except insur-
ance companies which pay to the State a tax
upon premium income, after making such deduc-
tions as are allowed by the laws of the United
States in the system by them adopted for de-
termining net incomes and such increases and
deductions as are hereinafter provided for in
determining a proper taxable income, there shall
be levied and collected by the State of Georgia
an income tax similar to that of the United
States, but at the rate and according to the scale
hereinafter set forth; the same to be returned,
calculated, ascertained, and paid according to the
system and rules hereinafter set forth. Acts
1929, p. 93, § 1.
V
§ 1041(23). Computation of tax. — Whenever
any such person, firm, or corporation residing or
doing business in this State makes an income-
tax return to the United States, or is legally
bound so to do, such person being hereinafter
briefly referred to, for convenience, as a taxpayer,
it shall be his duty to make at the same time a
like return to the State of Georgia and file the
same with the State Tax Commissioner for the
purpose of a State tax on income. Such dupli-
cate return shall furnish the same information as
is contained in his return to the United States,
shall be made on a blank form to be furnished
by the Tax Commissioner, and shall ascertain
the taxable net income in the same way as in
the return to the United States; but before as-
certaining the net income taxable by the State,
the following changes shall be made:
1. To the amount ascertained under the laws
of the United States as the net income taxable
by the United States, there shall be added in
said return the gross amount of any salary re-
ceived by the taxpayer during the tax year, or
accrued to him during said period as a public
official or employee of the State, or of any
count}^, municipal corporation, or other political
division thereof, and the net amount of any fees,
perquisites, or other emolument from said sources
or any of them, paid to him during the same
period for official compensation, except in the
cases of the Governor of the State and of the
several Judges of the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, and the Superior Court, who shall
not be required to include their salaries paid or
accruing for any term existing at the time of
the passage of this Act.
2. From the amount so ascertained as the
taxable net income shall be deducted any salary
paid to the taxpayer by the United States or
accrued to him from the same source as an offi-
cial salary for any service rendered by him to
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the United States, and any and all interest paid
to him on any bond or bonds or other obligation
of the United States.
If neither of the changes indicated by sub-
paragraph 1 and 2 above is made, the net income
taxable by the State of Georgia shall be the same
as that taxable by the United States, and the tax
payable thereon to the State of Georgia shall be
one third of that payable to the United States.
But in case the next taxable income be changed
as the result of complying with subparagraphs
1 or 2 above, the tax payable to the State shall
be increased or reduced so as to be one third of
what would have been payable to the United
States under their laws upon such increased or
reduced taxable net income. Act 1929, p. 93, § 2.
§ 1041(24). Return by public officer or em-
ployee; non-resident corporation.—Any person,
ffirm, or corporation who makes no income-tax
return to the United States because of having no
sufficient income taxable by the United States
to call for such return under the laws of the
United States, but who would have such suffi-
cient income if his salary, fees or perquisites from
the State or subdivision thereof were taxable by
the United States, shall be liable and is hereby
required to make to the State of Georgia an
original return on the same or similar form as
would be used in making a duplicate return as
required in the present section indicating in some
appropriate way whether the same is an original
return. In such case the tax liability to the State
shall be one third of what it would be to the
United States if said income were by them tax-
able.
In any case where a non-resident corporation
having an office and doing business in this State
makes its income-tax return in some other State,
such corporation shall make an original return
to the Tax Commissioner of Georgia, confined
to its business done in this State, upon like
principles as are in this section above provided.
Acts 1929, p. 94, § 3.
§ 1041(25). Claim of exemption, to be made
with return; deductions.—It shall be the right
of any taxpayer making return of income for
taxation by the State, to attach or add to such
return any claim such taxpayer may choose to
make as to any item or items included in his
return to the United States which he conceives
to be exempt from taxation by the State of
Georgia. In such case it shall be the duty of
the taxpayer so making return to make a clear
and distinct statement of all relevant facts con-
nected with such claim, and to make a clear
statement of the reasons why he conceives such
item to be not taxable by the State. And there
shall be deducted any amount that may be de-
rived from incomes of any such persons or com-
panies as the State of Georgia is prohibited from
taxing under the Constitution of the United
States. Acts 1929, p. 95, § 4.
§ 1041(26). Payment in installments, time of.—
When such return is made and filed with the tax
commissioner as hereinbefore required, the tax-
payer shall, on or before the last day for making
return, pay to the Tax Commissioner for the
State of Georgia at least one third of the State
income tax as fixed by the provisions herein-
before made, the balance being due and payable
at intervals of three and six months thereafter.
Acts 1929, p. 95, § 5.
§ 1041(27). Claim not relieve from immediate
payment; refund.—The right granted the tax-
payer in section 1041(25) to file a claim of ex-
emption or denial of liability for tax, as to any
item included in the return, shall not be con-
strued to relieve the taxpayer from liability to
make immediate payment of the tax, nor shall
there be any judicial interference with tne pay-
ment or collection of the tax upon any other
ground, but all persons making return as herein
provided for, or required so to do, shall pay as
hereinbefore provided and make his complaint
for or seek a refund as hereinafter provided for
Acts 1929, p. 95, § 6.
§ 1041(28). Board of Income-Tax Review;
hearing of claim.—A tribunal is hereby created,
consisting of the Comptroller-General, the At-
torney-General, and the Secretary of State, which
shall be known as the Board of Income Tax
Review. Whenever any taxpayer shall make a
claim for exemption as to any item or items in
his return as provided in section 1041(25) and
shall be dissatisfied with the findings of the State
Tax Commissioner as to such claim for exemp-
tion, the claim shall be by the Tax Commissioner
referred to said board. In all returns the tax-
payer shall be required to give and shall give his
post-office address. Upon receiving such refer-
ence the board shall, by letter duly stamped and
deposited in the mails, give notice to the tax-
payer of the time and place where such claim
will be heard and passed on. Said board may
in its discretion also cause said notice to be
served on the taxpayer by any sheriff or deputy
sheriff of this State. If the board has any reason
to apprehend that the notice was not received,
it shall cause the same to be so served before
proceeding. The matter shall be heard at the
time and place stated in the notice, unless con-
tinued by the board to another time or place, or
unless the number of such instances to be heard,
or other good cause, makes it necessary to con-
tinue from day to day. At the hearing the board
(shall summarily consider and pass on the claimed
exemption, and either allow it or disallow it ac-
cording as in their judgment the same is or is
not so required by the Constitution or laws of
this State or of the United States. Acts 1929,
p. 96, § 7.
§ 1041(29). Appeal.—The taxpayer for himself,
or the Tax Commissioner for the State, shall, if
dissatisfied with the finding, have the right to
demand an appeal to the Superior Court of Ful-
ton County. Said demand shall be in writing
and shall be made within ten days, but no bond
shall be required as a condition thereon. No
notice shall be necessary on the part of the ap-
pellant, but in either event the appellee shall take
notice of the appeal at his own peril. Acts 1929,
p. 96, § 8.
§ 1041(30). Summary hearing in superior court;
Ga.—
5
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writ of error.—In the Superior Court the cause
resulting from such appeal shall be summarily
heard in preference to all other matters and with-
out regard to terms of court. From the judg-
ment of the Superior Court a writ of error shall
lie as in all other civil cases. Acts 1929, p. 97, § 9.
§ 1041(31). Protest by taxpayer; refund, with
interest.—Any taxpayer making return and mak-
ing payment, either in whole or in part, shall
have the right, at the time of said payment, to
file, with the person to whom payment is made,
a protest in writing; and if thereafter there be
a judicial finding in his favor exempting him in
whole or in part from liability, it shall be the
duty of the Treasurer of this State to repay to
such taxpayer, with interest at seven per cent,
per annum, any sum improperly required of him,
which payment shall be made out of the fund
now to be provided for. Acts 192-9, p. 97, § 10.
§ 1041(32). Special fund for reimbursements
of claimants. — As said income taxes are paid
into the treasury, such percentage thereof, not
exceeding ten per cent., as shall be deemed pru-
dent and necessary by the Board of Income Tax
Review shall be set aside by the treasurer as a
special fund for the reimbursement of taxpayers
improperly required to pay, and said treasurer
shall have authority, whenever a liability is es-
tablished for repayment in favor of a taxpayer,
so to repay out of said fund without other ap-
propriation thereof to that purpose than as
contained herein. Acts 1929, p. 97, § 11.
§ 1041(33). Time of return.—The first return
for taxes under this article shall be made each
year on or before the 15th day of March for the
preceding calendar year, but the liability of tax-
payers thereunder for the year 1929 shall only be
assessed pro rata for one fourth of the year.
Acts 1929, p. 97, § 12.
§ 1041(34). Blanks.—The Tax Commissioner
shall have authority and it shall be his duty to
provide all necessary blanks for carrying out the
provisions of this article, which blanks shall be
distributed throughout the State in such way as
the Tax Commissioner may deem proper. Acts
1929, p. 97, § 13.
§ 1041(35). Summary hearing in Superior
Court; writ of error. — The Tax Commissioner
shall have power and authority to make all nec-
essary regulations for carrying out the provisions
of this article, provided the same are not in con-
flict with the provisions of this article and do not
affect any substantive legal right of the taxpayer
resulting therefrom. Acts 1929, p. 98, § 14.
§ 1041(36). Default of taxpayer: penalty, no-
tice to taxpayer before assessment, execution.
—
Any person, firm, or corporation who shall fail or
refuse to make such return as herein required shall
be liable to a penalty of twenty-five per cent, of
the liability of such taxpayer as fixed by the re-
turn and other proceedings, and, in addition
thereto, interest at the rate of one per cent, for
every calendar month from and after the failure
to make return. If such taxpayer, after having
so failed or neglected to make return, shall be
notified by the Tax Commissioner so to do, and
shall thereupon continue so to fail and refuse, the
Tax Commissioner shall give to such taxpayer
notice that on a day to be named he will assess
the tax from the best information obtainable and
after giving the taxpayer opportunity to be
heard. In such case the penalty shall be fixed at
fifty per cent, upon the amount ascertained and
assessed, and may be included as part of tax, and
a writ of fieri 'facias shall be issued for the whole
by the Tax Commissioner, bearing teste in the
name of the Governor, and directed to all and
singular the sheriffs of this State, commanding
them to levy on the goods and chattels, lands,
tenements, and hereditaments of said taxpayer,
which writ it shall be the duty of any sheriff to
execute as in case of writs of execution from the
Superior Court. Acts 1929, p. 98, § 15.
§ 1041 (37). Fraud by taxpayer; punishment—
Should any taxpayer, fraudulently and with a
purpose to conceal his liability under this Act, so
fail or refuse to make return, or make any false
and fraudulent return with a purpose to escape
liability, such taxpayer shall, in addition to lia-
bility for the penalties herein provided, be liable
to prosecution in any court having jurisdiction,,
and upon conviction shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and punished accordingly. Acts
1929, p. 98, § 16.
§ 1041(38). Affidavit of illegality.—Whenever
any writ of fieri facias has issued under section
1041(36) or 1041 (37) and the taxpayer shall con-
ceive the same to be illegal, he may tender to the
levying officer his affidavit of illegality thereto,
and upon his payment of the assessed tax with-
out the penalty the officer shall return the same
to the Superior Court of Fulton County, where
the same shall be summarily heard as provided
in section 1041(28) for appeals, and the judgment
thereon shall be final so far as concerns the ju-
diciary of the State. Acts 1929, p. 99, § 17.
§ 1041(39). Reduction of ad valorem tax rate
because of revenue from income tax.—That the
Governor and Comptroller-General are instructed
and directed, in fixing the ad valorem tax rate
for State purposes in the year 1931, to make a
careful estimate of the amount of revenue that
will be derived from the provisions of this article
and from other sources of revenue, and, after
providing for any deficit that may exist and the
payment of current expenses of the State over a
two-year period, to reduce the ad valorem tax
rate for said year 1931 in proportion to the excess
revenue that will be realized under the provisions
of this article. Act 1929, p. 99, § 18.
CHAPTER 2
Taxes, How Returned and Collected
ARTICLE 2
Returns to Receiver of Tax Returns
SECTION 2
Wild Lands, and Notice to Non-Residents
§ 1070. (§ 821). Wild lands returned how,
and subject to double tax, when.
Assessment Prerequisite to Sale. — Under this section a
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tax-collector car. not issue an execution for taxes against
wild lands not given in for taxes by the owner in the
county in which they are located, in the absence of an as-
sessment of said land for taxes in some of the modes pro-
vided by law. A sale of such lands under a tax execution
not based on such assessment was void, and the purchaser
at such sale acquired no title. Cook v. Turner, 167 Ga.
671, 146 S. E- 314.
§ 1071. (§ 822). Owners to be notified of re-
turns received.
Cited in Dunaway v.
213.
Gore, 164 Ga. 219, 226, 138 S. E.
SECTION 9
Double Tax, When Collected
§ 1105. (§ 847). Defaulters to be doubly taxed.
Land Assessed for Owner.—Where the owner of land fails
to return it for taxation, under the authority of this sec-
tion it may be assessed for him. Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga.
381, 382, 136 S. E- 151.
§ 1106. (§ 848). Property not returned to be
doubly taxed.
Assessed as Unreturned Property.—If the owner of land
fails to return it for taxation, and if the owner is unknown,
under the authority of this section it is to be assessed as
unreturned property. Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 382, 136
S. E- 151.
ARTICLE 2B
Tax Equalization
§ 1116(i). Park's Code.
See § 1116(9).
§ 1116 (9). Qualifications; compensation;
moval from office.
re-
This section is not violative of that part of the constitu-
tion of this State which provides that no law shall pass
which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains
matter different from what is expressed in the title there-
of. Parks v. Ash, 168 Ga. 868, 149 S. E- 207.
Nor is the section unconstitutional because it adds other
grounds of disqualification to hold the office, which it was
not competent for the legislature to make, for the reason
that the constitution itself fixes the disqualifications, and
the legislature could not add to those. Parks v. Ash, 163
Ga. 868, 149 S. E. 207.
§§ 1116(k)-1116(l). Park's Code.
See § 1116(11).
§ 1116(11). Meeting of board; duties.
Effect of Failure to Give Notice.—It is proper to direct a
verdict for the plaintiffs in an action to enjoin the collection
of taxes where the returns of the plaintiffs were raised
without giving the required notice, the plaintiff tendering
the amount admitted due. Smith v. Shackelford, 163 Ga.
835, 137 S. E. 255.
Abandonment of Demand for Arbitration.—Where the
contestant and his arbitrator fail to appear at the place and
time fixed for the arbitration the demand for arbitration
will be considered as abandoned. Rogers v. Hamby, 163
Ga. 771, 137 S. E- 231.
Who May Be Arbitrators.—As to the effect of not object-
ing to a third arbitrator known by the contestant to be re-
lated to the tax collector, see Rogers v. Hamby, 163 Ga.
771, 137 S. E. 231.
ARTICLE 3
List of Insolvents and Defaulters
SECTION 1
Insolvent Lists
§ 1118. (§ 860). Insolvent list, by whom al-
lowed.
It was admitted that the tax fi. fas. allowed by the com-
missioners in McDuffie v. Wilcox County, 165 Ga. 164, 140
S. E. 379, did not show a return of "nulla bona" or "no
property."
ARTICLE 5
Tax Fi Fas. and Sales
SECTION 1
Lien of Tax Fi. Fas.
§ 1140. (§ 883). Taxes to be first paid.
When Lein Takes Effect.—Property returned or held at
the time of giving in is subject to the lien of the State, and
can not be divested by sale. Bibb National Bank v. Colson,
162 Ga. 471, 473, 134 S. E- 85.
Applies to All Property. — This section applies to all
property returned or held by a taxpayer that is subject
to taxation under the constitution of this State. Phoenix
Mutual Eife Ins. Co. v. Appling County, 164 Ga. 861, 139
S. E- 674.
Quoted in Jordan v. Baggett, 37 Ga. App. 537, 140 S.
E. 902; Planters Warehouse Co. v. Simpson, 164 Ga. 190,
195, 138 S. E. 55.
§ 1141. (§ 884). Lien of tax not divested by
judicial sale.
A sale of property under execution issued from a court
of competent jurisdiction does not divest the liens of the
State or county for taxes. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Appling County, 164 Ga. 861, 139 S. E- 674.
So a sale of land by the sheriff under a general fi. fa.
did not divest the lien of the State and county for the
year's taxes of the defendant in such process. Planters
Warehouse Co. v. Simpson, 164 Ga. 190, 195, 138 S. E- 55.
AppUed in Durden v. Phillips, 166 Ga. 689, 694, 144 S.
E. 313; Miller v. Jennings, 168 Ga. 101, 102, 147 S. E. 32
SECTION 3
Transfer of Tax Fi. Fas.
§ 1145. (§ 888). Transfer of tax fi. fas.
Recordation—As to Defendant.—The ground that the
transfer of a tax fi. fa. to its present owner was not entered
of record as provided for by this section is without merit,
since such recording is not necessary to make it binding on
the property of the taxpayer; nor is such recording neces-
sary to preserve its priority, except as to subsequent bona
fide purchasers for value. Eewis v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36
Ga. App. 347, 136 S. E- 554.
Transfer by Constable.—In Thomas v. Eester, 166 Ga.
274, 142 S. E- 870, after quoting this section it is said: "It
follows that the transfer by the constable of the tax fi. fa.
in this case, which exceeded in amount one hundred dol-
lars, was void, and the same could not be enforced by the
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transferee by levy and sale of the property of the defend
ant in the tax fi. fa.," citing Johnson v. Christie, 64
Ga. 117; Hill v. Georgia State B. & E- Association, 120
Ga. 472, 47 S. E- 897; Thompson v. Adams, 157 Ga. 42,
120 S. E- 529; Cook v. Powell, 160 Ga. 831(12), 129 S. E- 546.
Applied in Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Applying
County, 164 Ga. 861, 139 S. E. 674.
Cited in Jordan v. Baggett, 37 Ga. App. 537, 140 S. E.
902.
SECTION 4
Dormancy of Tax Fi Fas
§ 1147. (§ 890). Tax fi. fa. dormant, when.
No Contractual Lien to Prevent Bar.—In cases of tax fi.
fas. there is no contractual lien, fixing a period of limitation
different from that provided by the statute, to fall back on,
so as to prevent the bar of the dormant-judgment act.
Lewis v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36 Ga. App. 347, 350, 136 S. E.
554.
When Plaintiff Subrogated to Rights of State.—An ac-
tion brought to enforce the hen of the State and County
for taxes, to which the plaintiff became subrogated was
not barred by this section, as the lien can be enforced
within seven years from its accrual, although it would be
barred as an action for money had and received by the de-
fendant in the tax fi. fa. from the plaintiff. Thomas v.
Lester, 166 Ga. 274, 142 S. E. 870.
SECTION 10
Claims, How Interposed
§ 1159. (§ 899). Claim may be interposed
when tax fi. fa. is levied.
Property Subject to Fi. Fa.—The remedy of claim as
provided by this section is not available where the prop-
erty is subject to the fi. fa. levied thereon. Jordan v.
Baggett, 37 Ga. App. 537, 140 S. E- 902.
SECTION 13
Levy and Sale under Tax Fi. Fas.
§ 1164. (§ 904). Purchase by one bound to
pay.
This section is not applicable where the purchaser at the
tax sale is not the person bound to pay the tax, but an-
other, who is in no way bound for its payment, and who
purchases it upon his own account; nor is such principle
applicable where such purchaser at the tax sale conveys
the property to another, although the latter buys the
property for the use of the taxpayer, to whom she agrees
to convey it upon the payment to her by the taxpayer of
the amount which she is out upon the purchase, when
such amount has not been paid. Miller v. Jennings, 168
Ga. 101, 147 S. E. 32.
§ 1165. (§ 905).
under.
See note to § 1145.
By whom levied, and sales
SECTION 15
Redemption of Property Sold for Taxes
§ 1169. Land sold may be redeemed.
The Premium.—This section and section 1173 show that
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the legislature had in mind a difference between interest
at a stated rate per annum and a premium in the form of
a lump sum to be paid within the time in which the differ-
ent classes of property could be redeemed, and that it so
declared. Reynolds v. Bickers-Goodwin Co., 161 Ga. 378,
379, 131 S. E- 55. Section 1173 specifically states that the
interest shall be at a stated rate per annum, the absence
of such a provision in this section negatives the assumption
that payment should be in the same manner. Id.
Same—Time of Payment.—The premium provided for
means payment of ten per cent in addition to the amount
of purchase-money, without regard to the time elapsing
between the sale and the redemption. Reynolds v. Bickers-
Goodwin Co., 161 Ga. 378, 131 S. E. 55.
Execution to Meet Interest, (Principal, or Cost of Drain-
ing.—The right of redemption is not given where land is
sold under execution issued for an assessment to meet in-
terest or principal, or the cost of draining the land in a
drainage district. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat.
Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 137, 135 S. E. 720.
§ 1170. Effect of redemption.
Redemption of land sold for taxes, and taking quitclaim
deed from purchaser, does not vest title in holder of security
deed to the land who redeemed it, though period for re-
demption had passed. Lien acquired thereby. Johnson v.
King Lumber Co., 39 Ga. App. 280(4), 147 S. E. 142.
§ 1172. Quitclaim deed by purchaser.
Execution to Pay Interest, Principal, or Costs of Drain-
ing.—Where land is sold under execution issued for an as-
sessment to meet interest, principal, or costs of draining
the land in a drainage district, the vendee will not be re-
quired to execute and deliver a quitclaim deed, as provided
in this section. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat.
Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 135 S. E- 720.
§ 1173. (§ 910). How redeemed.
See notes to section 1169.
CHAPTER 3
Delinquent Tax Receivers and Collectors
ARTICLE 2
Execution Against Defaulting Receiver or Collec-
tor or Sureties
§ 1187. (§ 924.) Comptroller to issue executions
vs. collector and sureties on default.
Quoted and applied in State v. Bank, 162 Ga. 292, 133 S.
E. 248.
Cited in American Surety Co. v. Kea, 168 Ga. 228, 147
S. E. 386.
§ 1190. (§ 927). Lien on property of principals
and sureties, bound.
Superiority of State's Lien.—The State's lien is superior
to a security deed for money borrowed by the collector to
pay a prior shortage. State v. Bank, 162 Ga. 292, 133 S. E«
248.
Subrogation of Securities. — A bank, lending money to a
collector to cover a shortage, is not entitled to a superior
lien on account of subrogation to the rights of the State.
State v. Bank, 162 N. C. 292, 133 S. E- 248.
§ 1207 COLLECTOR, WHEN EX OFFICIO SHERIFF § 1227(4)
ARTICLE 5
Tax Collectors
SECTION 2
Tax- Collectors' Bonds
§ 1207. (§ 945). Amount of bonds and their
conditions.
The requirement of this section that the tax-collector
shall give bond "payable to the ordinary," should not be
construed so as to require that such bond be made pay-
able to the ordinary as such, but rather to the officer
having charge of the financial affairs of the county and
jurisdiction of county matters; and thus construed, oar
ruling does not give effect to a local law on a subject for
which provision has been made by an existing general
law, as forbidden by § 6464. Payne v. Royal Indemnity
Co., 168 Ga. 77, 79, 147 S. E. 95.
SECTION 7
Collector, When Ex Officio Sheriff
§ 1225. Collector ex-officio sheriff in some
counties. — The tax-collectors of counties which
contain a population of one hundred and fifty
thousand or more shall be ex-ofhcio sheriffs in
so far as to enable them to collect the taxes due
the State and county, by levy and sale under tax
executions; and said tax-collectors shall not turn
over any tax executions to the sheriffs, or to any
other levying officials of the said State, except
when it may become necessary, for the purpose
of enforcing the same, to send said executions to
any other county or counties than that in which
issued; but said tax-collectors, by virtue of their
office, shall have full power and authority to levy
all tax executions heretofore or hereafter to be
issued by them in their respective counties; and
the compensation of said tax-collectors shall not
exceed fifty cents for issuing each fi. fa., and for
levying and selling the same fees as are now al-
lowed by law to sheriffs of said State; and said
tax-collectors shall have full power to bring prop-
erty to sale, and sales made by them shall be
valid, and shall convey the title to property thus
sold as fully and completely as if made by the
sheriffs of said counties. Acts 1929, p. 157, § 2.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927, the tax
collectors of only the counties which contain a population of
one hundred and twenty five thousand or more, fell within
the scope of this section.
Note that this section is twice amended by the Acts of
1927
—the latter amendment taking no account of the former.
Judicial Notice of Population.—The courts will take judi-
cial cognizance of the population of counties for the purpose
of determining whether this section is applicable therein.
Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 744, 746, 134 S. E.
801, citing the following authorities: I,eadbetter v. Price,
102 Ore. 159 (199 Pac. 633, 17 A. I,. R. 218); Standard Oil
Co. v. Kearney, 106 Neb. 558 (18 A. L. R. 95, 184 N. W.
109); 15 R. C. L. 1129.
§§ 1225 (a) -1225(b). Park's Code.
See §§ 1227(1) -1227(6).
§ 1227(1). Counties with populations of 7,320.
—All tax-collectors of such counties of the State
of Georgia as have a population of not less than
7,320, nor more than 7,330, according to the cen
sus of the United States for the year 1924, shall
be ex-officio sheriffs of their respective counties,
in so far only as to give them full power and
authority to collect all taxes due the State of
Georgia in their respective counties, and all other
taxes required to be collected by them, by levy
and sale under tax executions, and that said tax-
collectors be vested with full power and authority
to levy any and all fi. fas. issued by them, whether
prior to or subsequent to the passage of this Act,
and that the compensation to be received by said
tax-collectors for rendering services as such ex-
officio sheriffs shall be the same as that now
allowed by law to sheriffs for the same or like"
services; that said tax-collectors shall have the
powers of sheriffs to bring all property to sale
that is subject to said fi. fas., and shall have full
authority to execute any and all necessary con-
veyances or bills of sale or other instruments re-
quired by law of sheriffs to be given to the pur-
chasers at public sales, and shall have authority to
do and perform all other Acts and to exercise all
other powers vested in sheriffs with respect to the
levy of said fi. fas., the sale of property thereun-
der, and the execution of conveyances therefor,
or with respect to any other feature connected
with the collection of said fi. fas. by levy and
sale, and all sales made by them as ex-officio shall
pass title and be as valid in all respects as if made
by the sheriffs of the respective counties. Acts
1927, p. 335.
§ 1227(2). Same—Advertisements of sales.—In
the levy of said fi. fas., and in the making of the
sales thereunder, in the advertisement of said
sales, said tax-collectors shall in all respects con-
form to the provision of the law governing such
sales by the sheriffs of this State, and all advei
-
tisements of sales required to be inserted in a
newspaper shall be published in the newspaper in
which the sheriff's advertisements for said county
are published, and shall be published for the same
period of time.
§ 1227(3). Same—Deputies.— Said tax-collec-
tors shall have powers to appoint one or more
deputies under the provision of this Act, and all
deputies thus appointed shall be vested with all
of the powers herein granted unto the tax-collec-
tors, and said tax-collectors shall be responsible
for the Acts of their said deputies as sheriffs are
liable for the Acts of their deputies, and the com-
pensation of such deputies shall be paid by said
tax-collector.
§ 1227(4). Counties with population of 15,160.
—All tax-collectors of such counties of the State
of Georgia as have a population of not less than
15,150 and not more than 15,160, according to the
census of the United States for the year 1920,
shall be ex-officio sheriffs of their respective coun-
ties in so far only as to give them full power and
authority to collect all taxes due the State of
Georgia in their respective counties, and all other
taxes required to be collected by them, by levy
and sale under tax executions, and that said tax-
collectors be vested with full power and authority
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to levy any and all fi. fas. issued by them, whether
prior to or subsequent to the passage of this Act,
and that the compensation to be received by said
tax-collectors for rendering services as such ex-
officio sheriffs shall be the same as that now al-
lowed by law to sheriffs for the same or like serv-
ices; that said tax-collectors shall have the powers
of sheriffs to bring all property to sale that is sub-
ject to said fi. fas., and shall have full authority
to execute any and all necessary conveyances or
bills of sale or other instruments required by law
of sheriffs to be given to the purchasers at pub-
lie sales, and shall have authority to do and per-
form all other Acts and to exercise all other
powers vested in sheriffs with respect to the levy
of said fi. fas., the sale of property thereunder,
and the execution of conveyances therefor, or
with respect to any other feature connected with
the collection of said fi. fas., by levy and sale, and
all sales made by them as ex-officio sheriffs shall
pass title and be as valid in all respects as if made
by the sheriffs of the respective counties. Acts
1927, p. 337.
§ 1227(5). Advertisements of sales.—In the
levy of said fi. fas., and in the making of the sales
thereunder, in the advertisement of said sales, said
tax-collectors shall in all respects conform to the
provisions of the law governing such sales by the
sheriffs of this State, and all advertisements of
sales required to be inserted in a newspaper shall
be published in the newspaper in which the sher-
iff's advertisements for said county are published,
and shall be published for the same period of
time.
§ 1227(6). Same—Deputies. — Said tax-collec-
tors shall have power to appoint one or more
deputies under the provision of this Act, and all
deputies thus appointed shall be vested with all of
the powers herein granted unto the tax-collec-
tors, and said tax-collectors shall be responsible
for the Acts of their said deputies as sheriffs are
liable for the Acts of their deputies, and the com-
pensation of such deputies shall be paid by the
said tax-collectors.
§ 1227(7). In counties of 15,275 to 15,300 popu-
lation.—All tax-collectors of such counties of the
State of Georgia as have a population of not less
than 15,275 and not more than 15,300, according
to the census of the United States for the year
1920, shall be ex-officio sheriffs of their respective
counties in so far only as to give them full power
and authority to collect all taxes due the State of
Georgia in their respective counties, and all other
taxes required to be collected by them, by levy
and sale under tax-executions, and that said tax-
collectors be vested with full power and author-
ity to levy any and all fi. fas. issued by them*
whether prior to or subsequent to the passage of
this Act, and that the compensation to be re-
ceived by them for rendering services as such ex-
officio sheriffs shall be the same as that now al-
lowed by law to sheriffs for the same or like
services; that said tax-collectors shall have the
powers of sheriffs to bring all property to sale
that is subject to said fi. fas., and shall have full
authority to execute any and all necessary con-
veyances or bills of sale or other instruments re-
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quired by law of sheriffs to be given to the pur-
chasers at public sales, and shall have authority
to do and perform all other acts and to exercise
all other powers vested in sheriffs with respect to
the levy of said fi. fas., the sale of property there-
under, and the execution of conveyances there-
for, or with respect to any other feature con-
nected with the collection of said fi. fas. by levy
and sale, and all sales made by them as ex-officio
sheriffs shall pass title and be as valid in all re-
spects as if made by the sheriffs of the respective
counties. Act 1929, p. 326, § 1.
§ 1227(8). Same—Advertisement.—In the levy
of said fi. fas., and in the making of sales there-
under, in the advertisement of said sales, said
tax-collectors shall in all respects conform to the
provisions of the law governing such sales by
the sheriffs of this State, and all advertisements
of such sales required to be inserted in a news-
paper shall be published in the newspaper in
which the sheriff's advertisements for said county
are published and shall be published for the same
period of time. Act 1929, p. 327, § 2.
§ 1277(9). Same
—
Deputies.—Said tax-collectors
shall have power to appoint one or more deputies
under the provisions of this Act, and all deputies
thus appointed shall be vested with all the pow-
ers herein granted unto the tax-collectors, and
said tax-collectors shall be responsible for the
acts of their said deputies as sheriffs are liable
for the acts of their deputies, and the compensa-
tion of such deputies shall be paid by said tax-
collectors. Act 1929, p. 327, § 3.
§ 1227(10). Counties of 10,590 to 10,600 popu-
lation. — All tax-collectors of such counties of
the State of Georgia as have a population of not
less than 10,590 nor more than 10,600, according
to the census of the United States for the year
1920, shall be ex-olficio sheriffs of their respective
counties, in so far only as to give them full
power and authority to collect all taxes due the
State of Georgia in their respective counties, and
all other taxes required to be collected by them
by levy and sale under tax-executions, and that
said tax-collectors be vested with full power and
authority to levy any and all fi. fas. issued by
them, whether prior to or subsequent to the
passage of this Act, and that the compensation
to be received by said tax-collectors for rendering
services as such ex-officio sheriffs shall be the
same as that now allowed by law to sheriffs for
the same or like services; that said tax-collectors
shall have the powers of sheriffs to bring all
property to sale that is subject to said fi. fas., and
shall have full authority to execute any and all
necessary conveyances or bills of sale or other
instruments required by law of sheriff's to be
given to the purchasers at public sales, and shall
have authority to do and perform all other acts
and to exercise all other powers vested in sheriffs
with respect to the levy of said fi. fas., the sale of
property thereunder, and the execution of con-
veyances therefor, or with respect to any other
feature connected with the collection of said fi.
fas. by levy and sale, and all sales made by them
as ex-officio shall pass title and be as valid in all
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respects as if made by the sheriffs of the respec-
tive counties. Act 1929, p. 328, § 1.
§ 1227(11). Same—Advertisement.—In the levy
of said fi. fas., and in making of the sales there-
under, in the advertisements of said sales, said
tax-collectors shall in all respects conform to the
provision of the law governing such sales by the
sheriffs of this State, and all advertisements of
sales required to be inserted in a newspaper shall
be published in the newspaper in which the sher-
iff's advertisements for said county are published,
and shall be published for the same period of
time. Act 1929, p. 328, § 2.
§ 1227(12). Same—Deputies,—Said tax-collec-
tors shall have power to appoint one or more
deputies under the provision of this Act, and all
deputies thus appointed shall be vested with all of
the powers herein granted unto the tax-collectors,
and said tax-collectors shall be responsible for
the Acts of their said deputies as sheriffs are
liable for the Acts of their deputies, and the com-
pensation of such deputies shall be paid by the
said tax-collectors. Act 1929, p. 329, § 3.
§ 1227(13). In counties of 6,458 to 6,462 popu-
lation.—All tax-collectors of such counties of this
State as have a population of not less than
6,458 and not more than 6,462 according to the
census of the United States of 1920, shall be ex-
officio sheriffs of their respective counties in so
far only as to give them full power and authority
to collect all taxes due the State of Georgia in
their respective counties, and all other taxes re-
quired to be collected by them, by levy and sale
under tax-executions, and that said tax-collectors
be vested with full power and authority to levy
any and all fi. fas. issued by them, whether prior
to or subsequent to the passage of this act, and
that the compensation to be received by such tax-
collectors for rendering services as such ex-officio
sheriffs shall be the same as that now allowed by
law to sheriffs of such counties for the same or like
services; that said tax-collectors shall have pow-
ers of sheriffs to bring all property to sale that is
subject to said fi. fas., and shall have full author-
ity to execute any and all conveyances or bills of
sale or other instruments required of such sher-
iffs to be given to the purchasers at public sales,
and shall have authority to do and perform all
other acts and to exercise all other powers vested
in sheriffs of such counties with respect to any
other feature connected with the collection of
said tax fi. fas. by levy and sale, and all sales
made by them as ex-ofncio sheriffs of such coun-
ties shall pass title and be valid in all respects as
if made by the sheriffs of such respective counties.
Acts 1929, p. 330, § 1.
§ 1227(14). Same—Advertisement.—In the levy
of said fi. fas. and in the making of the sales
thereunder, in the advertisement of said sales,
said tax-collectors shall in all respects conform to
the provisions of the law governing such sales by
the sheriffs of this State, and all advertisements
of sales required to be inserted in a newspaper
shall be published in the newspaper in which the
sheriffs of such counties advertise their sales, and
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shall be published for the same period of time.
Acts 1929, p. 330, § 2.
§ 1227(15). Same—Deputies.—Such tax-collect-
ors shall have power to appoint one or more depu-
ties under the provisions of this Act, and all
deputies thus appointed shall be vested with all
the powers herein granted unto the tax-collectors,
and shall be removable at any time by said tax-
collector, for or without cause, and said tax-col-
lectors shall be responsible for the acts and con-
duct of said appointed deputies as sheriffs are lia-
ble for the acts of their deputies, and may, if they
see \fit, require bond of such deputies, and the
compensation of such deputies shall be paid by
such tax-collectors. Acts 1929, p. 331, § 3.
§ 1227(16). In county of 14,493 to 14,495 popu-
lation.—In all counties of this State having a pop-
ulation of not less than 14,493 nor more than
14,495, according to the United States census of
1920, where such county shall have availed itself
of the rights conferred under paragraph 1, section
3, article 11, of the Constitution of this State by
merging or consolidating the offices of tax-receiver
and tax-collector and creating the office of county
tax-commissioner, said county tax-commissioners
in such counties shall be ex-officio sheriffs of said
counties in so far as to give them power to collect
the taxes due the State of Georgia and their respec-
tive counties by levy and sale of property under
tax-executions; and said county tax-commission-
ers shall not turn over the tax fi. fas. issued by
them to the sheriffs of their respective counties,
or to any levying officer of said State, except
when it may be necessary to enforce the collec-
tion of any fi. fa. to forward the same to some
other county or counties than the county in which
same is issued, but said tax-commissioners by
virtue of their office shall have power and author-
ity to levy all tax-executions heretofore or here-
after issued by them in their respective counties;
and the compensation of said county tax-commis-
sioners of said counties for their services as ex-
officio sheriffs shall be the same as that now al-
lowed the sheriffs or constables for similar serv-
ices; and said county tax-commissioners shall
have power and authority to bring any and all
property to sale, and all sales made by them, in-
cluding the executions of deeds and conveyances
of both real and personal property, shall be valid
and as binding as if the sale were made by the
sheriffs of said counties, and shall pass the title
to all property sold as fully as titles are now
passed by sheriffs of this State under sales made
by them. Provided further, that in all counties
where such county tax-commissioners shall re-
ceive regular salary, all fees assessed and col-
lected by them in connection with such services
shall be paid into the county treasury. Acts 1929,
p. 331.
CHAPTER 4A
Payment of Revenue into Treasury
§§ 1248 (a) -1248(g). Park's Code.
See §§ 1248(1)-1248(7).
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§ 1248(1) STATE DEPOSITORIES § 1249
§ 1248(1). Money collected by departments,
etc., for maintenance, to be paid into State treas-
ury.—It shall be the duty of every department,
commission, bureau, and other branch or agency
of the government of this State, and of every offi-
cial head of every department, commission, bu-
reau, and other branch or agency of the govern-
ment of this State created by special Act, the
support and maintenance of which has been pro-
vided by special Act and not by direct appropri-
ations of the General Assembly, to collect and
forthwith to pay into the State treasury all
moneys, fees, commissions, penalties, or other
charges which they are authorized by law to col-
lect for the support and maintenance of such de-
partment, commission, bureau, or other branch
or agency of the State Government. Acts 1927,
p. 311.
§ 1248(2). Expenses of maintenance to be paid
from treasury.—The costs and expenses of the
maintenance and support of every department,
commission, bureau, and other branch or agency
of the State government shall be paid out of funds
in the State treasury by warrant of the Governor
drawn on appropriations duly made by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
§ 1248(3). Exceptions.—The provisions of this
Act shall not apply to boards and fees col-
lected by the educational institutions of this State;
and such funds as may be derived from sale of
farm products, nor funds collected from sale of
farm produce equipment or other material de-
rived from the expenditure of Federal research
funds, nor to funds received by the Health De-
partment for sale of medical supplies, nor fees
received by health institutions, nor to gifts, dona-
tions and internal income received by said educa-
tional institutions; nor shall the provisions of
this Act apply to the Court of Appeals or Su-
preme Court.
§ 1248(4). Exception of funds collected to
match Federal aid funds.—Wherever by Act of
Congress conditions have been or may be pre-
scribed for matching Federal aid by State funds,
and such conditions are in conflict with the pro-
visions of this Act, then the department or bu-
reau or agency of this State having to do with
such Federal aid and collecting funds with which
to match such Federal aid may and it is hereby
authorized to withhold from depositing in the
Treasury an amount sufficient for matching
such Federal aid; but all other funds belonging
to the State collected by such department, bureau,
or agency of the State shall be paid into the State
Treasury, as hereinbefore provided.
§ 1248(5). Time of payment to treasury.— It
shall be and it is hereby made the duty of each
and everv official head described in section
1248(1) to pay over and to deposit in the State
Treasury, on or before January 1, 1928, all sums
remaining in their hands, collected before said
date, and remaining undisbursed under existing
laws.
shall be construed to affect the appropriation or
allocation of the motor-vehicle fees and licenses
and pro rata of gasoline taxes to the State High-
way Department; nor shall it be construed to
affect the appropriation or allocation of the pro
rata of gasoline taxes to the counties of this
State; nor shall it be construed to affect the ap-
propriation or allocation of the proceeds of the
cigar and cigarette taxes to the payment of pen-
sions. Nor shall this Act be construed to affect
either the appropriation and allocation of the pro-
ceeds of the tax on lumber dealer or dealers in other
forest products to the State forestry fund, or the
allocation of the proceeds of fees and penalties to
State game and fish protection fund; and pro-
vided further, that as to those departments,
branches, agencies, commissions, and bureaus of
State government who under the law can only
assess a sufficient amount of fees, licenses, penal-
ties, etc., to support such department, commission,
board, bureau, agency, or branch of government,
all assessments levied for such support shall be
the maintenance appropriation of such depart-
ment, board, bureau, agency, or branch for each
year. None of the provisions of this section shall
be construed to exempt or except any of the
funds, taxes, monies, fees, commissions, penalties,
or other charges received, collected, or paid into
any of the agencies named in this section from
the requirement of section 1248(1) that they
shall all be paid into the State Treasury.
§ 1248(7). Penalty for violation of Act.—
Should the official head of any department, com-
mission, bureau, or other branch or agency of the
State government violate any of the provisions
hereof, he or she shall, upon conviction, be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as
provided therefor, and in addition thereto shall be
thereafter ineligible to hold such office.
§ 1248(6). Appropriation or allocation of cer-
tain funds not affected.—Nothing in this Act
CHAPTER 5
State Depositories
§ 1249. (§ 982). State depositories provided for in
various cities.—The Governor shall name and ap-
point a solvent chartered bank of good standing and
credit in each of the following cities and towns,
to wit: In Atlanta (nine depositories), Athens,
Augusta, Columbus, Macon (four depositories),
Savannah, Rome, Americus, Albany, Hawkins-
ville, Gainesville, Griffin, LaGrange, Thomasville,
Newnan, Cartersville, Dalton, Valdosta, Milledge-
ville, Darien, Dawson, Cordele, Marietta, Rich-
land, Millen, Warrenton, Carrollton, Elberton,
Monticello, Fort Gaines, Cedartown, Jackson,
Harmony Grove, Thomaston, Covington, Black-
shear, Waycross, Brunswick, Forsyth, Jefferson,
Washington, Quitman, Greenville, Eastman,
Moultrie, Toccoa (two depositories) 3, Statesboro,
Tifton, Lawrenceville, Douglas, Dublin, Madison,
Tennille, Sylvania, McRae, Cornelia, Fitzgerald,
Bainbridge, Blue Ridge, Mt. Vernon, Barnesville,
Baxley, Hartwell, LaFayette, Louisville, Mont-
ezuma, Pelham, Sandersville, Swainsboro, Thom-
son, Winder, Calhoun, Jesup, Lavonia, Donald-
sonville, Claxton, Ashburn, Nashville, Blakely,
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Dallas, Perry, Fort Valley, Sparta, Reidsville,
Comer, Fayetteville, Ludowici, Senoia, Cochran,
Conyers, Hazelhurst, Lyons, Ocilla, Talbotton,
Bremen, Butler, Cairo, Franklin, Tallapoosa,
Georgetown, Gibson, Jonesboro, Jeffersonville,
McDonough, Ringgold, Rochelle, Pembroke,
Chipley, Colquitt, Guyton, Homerville, Jasper,
Summervil'le, Douglasville, Canton, Edison, Gor-
don, Alpharetta, Decatur, Eatonton, Fairburn,
Lumpkin, Reynolds, Rockmart, Shellman, Uvalda,
Lincolnton, Sylvester, Temple, Boston, Blairs-
ville, Buford, Camilla, Dahlonega, Ellaville, Ir-
winville, Kingsland, Manchester, Springfield,
Woodbury, Wrightsville, Metter, Rebecca, Vi-
dalia, Cummings, Vienna, Adel, Soperton, Glen-
wood, Greensboro, Morgan, Pearson, Willa-
coochee, Alma, Alston, Arlington, Ellijay, Mon-
roe, Crawford, Collins, Waynesboro, Folkston,
Alamo, Lakeland, Buchanan, and Dexter, which
shall be known and designated as State Deposi-
tories; provided that in each of said cities having
a population of not less than six thousand (6,000)
and not more than fifteen thousand (15,000), ac-
cording to the United States Census of 1920; and
provided further, that in each of said cities hav-
ing a population of less than six thousand (6,000)
but located in counties having a population of
more than thirty thousand (30,000), according to
the United States Census of 1920, the Governor
may name and appoint not more than two char-
tered banks of good standing and credit, which
shall be known and designated as State Deposi-
tories. Provided further, that in each of said
cities in the State of Georgia having a population
of fifteen thousand (15,000) and over, according
to the United States Census of 1920, the Governor
may name and appoint not more than three solv-
ent chartered banks of good standing and credit,
which shall be known and designated as State
Depositories. Provided, that in each city in Geor-
gia having a population of not less than 6,180 and
not more than 6,200, and also in each city in
Georgia having a population of not less than
11,554 and not more than 11,560, the Governor
may name and appoint one additional depository
to those now provided by law and under the
terms of the general law governing bank deposi-
tories. Acts 1929, p. 159, § 1; p. 161, § 1; p.
162, § 1.
§ 1259. (§ 992). Funds subject to check, etc.
As to county depositories, see § 855(2).
ELEVENTH TITLE
Education
CHAPTER l
The University of Georgia and Its Organization
Georgia State Teacher's College by the acts of 1927, p. 171.
A college of agricultural and mechanical arts, to be known
as the Middle Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical Junior
College was added as a branch by the acts of 1927, p. 161.
The name of the Georgia Normal School was changed to
South Georgia Teachers' College by the acts of 1929, p.
186. And by acts 1929, p. 195, the name of the South
Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical College was changed
to Georgia State College for Men.
ARTICLE 2
Branches of the University
§ 1397 (§ 1300). Branches of the University.
The name of the State Normal School was changed to The
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CHAPTER 4
Public School System
§ 1437(a). Park's Code.
See § 1551(81).
§ 1437 (b-1). Park's Code.
See § 1551(84^).
§§ 1437 (i) -1437 (j). Park's Code.
See §>§ 1551(89)-1551(90).
§ 1437 (o). Park's Code.
See § 1551(96).
§§ 1437 (p), 1437 (q). Park's Code.
See §§ 1551(98) -1551(99).
§ 1437 (r). Park's Code.
See § 1551(97).
§ 1437 (s). Park's Code.
See § 1551(100).
§ 1437 (w). Park's Code.
See § 1551(104).
§ 1437 (jj). Park's Code.
See § 1551(118).
§ 1438(a). Park's Code.
See § 1551(125).
§ 1438(h). Park's Code.
See § 1551(133).
§ 1438(m). Park's Code.
See § 1551(141).
§ 1438 (y). Park's Code.
See § 1551(153).
§ 1438(aa). Park's Code.
See § 1551(130).
§§ 1438 (bb), 1438 (cc). Park's Code.
See § 1551(136).
§ 1438(mm). Park's Code.
See § 1551(154a).
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§ 1438 (nn). Park's Code.
See § 1551(154b).
§ 1438(oo). Park's Code.
See § 1551(154c).
§ 1439(a). Park's Code.
See § 1551(155).
§ 1439(c). Park's Code.
See § 1551(157).
§ 1444(d). Park's Code.
See § 1551(195).
SECTION l
Taxation and School Funds
§ 1551 (6a). $20,000 a month from commission-
ers of roads and revenue payable in counties of
200,000 population.—The board of commissioners
of road and revenues of each county in the State
of Georgia, having a population of not less than
200,000, is hereby authorized to pay over to the
county board of education of such county any
sums not to exceed $20,000 each month out of
any funds in the treasury of the said county,
which shall have been derived from any source
other than from taxation. Such funds when paid
to the county board of education shall become a
part of the county school fund, and may be used
by the board of education for paying teachers'
salaries buying or renting lots and buildings for
school purposes, purchasing or building school
buildings maintaining school property, or for any
other education purpose not inconsistent with the
laws of this State. Acts 1929, p. 225.
ARTICLE 4
State School Superintendent, His Powers and
Duties
§ 1551 (72). School year coincident with cal-
ender year; annual statement.
The scholastic year being coincident with the calendar
year (Ga. I,. 1919, pp. 288, 316, Michie's Code 1926, § 1551-
<72) ), an election held on November 10, 1927, authorizing
the levy of a tax for a local school district, did not au-
thorize the assessment and levy of a school tax in the
year 1927 and the issuance of an execution therefor, and
the court below did not err in enjoining the levy of such
execution. Woods v. Miller, 168 Ga. 259, 147 S. E. 74.
ARTICLE 5
County Boards of Education
§ 1551 (81). School districts.
See sec. 1551(141).
§ 1551 (84i^). Compensation of members in
certain counties.—Members of the county boards
of education, in counties having above 200,000
population according to the last or any future
United States census, may be paid a salary of fifty
dollars ($50.00) per month each; and their ac-
counts for service shall be submitted for approval
each month to the county superintendent of
schools, and they shall not receive any other com-
pensation for said service. Acts 1927, p. 156.
§ 1551 (89). School terms; schools property;
separation of races.
Editor's Note.—The Supreme Court in Dominy v. Stan-
ley, 162 Ga. 211, 216, 133 S. E- 245. in construing section
1484 of the Civil Code, which forms that part of this section
beginning "The said boards are invested with the title"
etc., and ending with the words "according to the order cf
the board," used the following language: "This section,
however, confers no authority upon the board of education
of the county to control or to sell and dispose of the land
in question, which was given by private parties for a spe-
cific purpose [i e., a charitable trust]. Moreover, we do
not think that the doctrine of cy pres can be so extended
as to allow the trustees, who have no title to this property,
to sell the same or cut down the timber on the same for
the purpose of building up an entirely different institution
in an entirely different neighborhood."
It will be noticed that in this case the court was constru-
ing a section of the old law contained in sections 1532-1551
of the Civil Code, which sections are superseded by sec-
tion 1551(1) et seq. For a full treatment concerning the
confusion arising out of construction of the former law
see Editor's Note under sections 1432-1551, Georgia Code of
1926.
Length of Terms.—The county board has power, after hav-
ing specified the duration of a particular term, to pass a
resolution, after expiration of six months of such term,
closing the term prior to the time originally provided for
expiration of the term. Board v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58,
132 S. E- 427.
Same—Effect of Promise to Commissioners.—The board of
commissioners of a county has no power to contract with
the county board of education as to bind the board of edu-
cation to operate the schools for any particular time, and the
board of education will not be bound by any promise to the
board of county commissioners in regard to the length of
time it will operate the public schools at any term. Board
v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S. E. 427.
Same—Closing Early to Apply Fund to Prior Indebtedness.
—On the facts of this case, the board of education did not
abuse its discretion in closing a term earlier than originally
planned, and in applying the funds derived from local taxa-
tion to payment of the debts accumulated during previous
years for money borrowed to pay teachers and operate the
schools. Board v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S. F. 427.
§ 1551 (90). Powers of county boards as
school court.
Constitutionality. — This section is not void on the
ground that it is in violation of the constitution of Geor-
gia, §§ 6379, 6497, or the due process clause. Lott v.
Board of Education, 164 Ga. 863, 139 S. E. 722.
§ 1551 (96). Consolidation.
Name of New District.—Where two or more local school
districts are consolidated, it is not necessary that the word
"consolidated" appear as a part of the name selected for
the consolidated district; and it is proper for a proceeding
to validate bonds to be conducted in the name of the dis-
trict as fixed by the proper school authorities. Hawthorne
v. Turkey Creek School Dist., 162 Ga. 462, 134 S. E. 103.
§ 1551 (97). Appropriation for consolidated
schools.—Beginning with the year 1927 the State
Superintendent of Schools shall set aside $350,-
000 or so much thereof as may be necessary, and
for 1928 and the years to follow the State Su-
perintendent of Schools shall set aside $400,000 or
so much thereof as may be necessary, from funds
[74]
§ 1551(98) COUNTY BOARDS OF EDUCATION § 1551(118)
derived from the poll-tax collected and paid into
the treasury, to aid in the establishment and
maintenance of consolidated school in this State.
When the county board of education shall com-
bine smaller schools into a standard or approved
consolidated school with at least four teachers,
and evidence of this fact is furnished by the
County School Superintendent and Board of Edu-
cation to the State Superintendent of Schools,
and when it is made to appear to the State Super-
intendent of Schools that aid is needed to support
such consolidated school, the State Superinten-
dent of Schools shall be authorized to transmit
$500.00 annually to the support of such school.
If in addition the local school authorities pro-
vide for an approved or standard four-year high
school, and evidence of this fact is made to ap-
pear to the State Superintendent of Schools, that
aid is needed to support said four-year high
school, the State Superintendent of Schools shall
be authorized to transmit $1,000.00 annually to
the support of said school; such funds in both
cases shall be used by local authorities in the pay-
ment of salaries of principal and teachers.
When two or more schools in any county qual-
ify under this Act, either for the $500.00 aid or
for the $1,000.00 aid, the State Superintendent of
Schools shall determine to which one of such
schools said sums shall be paid; the State Super-
intendent of Schools shall be governed in his de-
cision by the extent to which the consolidated
district has utilized its local ability in building,
equipping, and supporting its school, and the
number of children to be reached by the consoli-
dation, the number of teachers, the qualifications
of the teachers employed, and the character of
the work being done by the school. No county
now receiving, or that may hereafter receive, aid
for both the consolidated ($500.00) and the high-
school ($1,000.00) aid shall be eligible to further
apply for such aid until every county in the State
has had an opportunity to apply. If those coun-
ties not receiving both aids fail to qualify, then
the State Superintendent of Schools is authorized
to extend further aid to those counties receiving
either or both aids as provided in this bill, and on
same conditions as set forth above. Acts 1925, p.
147; 1927, p. 158.
Editor's Note. — The amendment of 1927 increased the
amounts to be set aside by the superintendent of schools.
About the middle of the third paragraph, the phrase "the
qualification of the teachers employed" was inserted by the
same amendment.
§ 1551 (98). Division of school districts.
Effect of Previous Election When District Divided. —
Where the county board of education has duly divided one
school district into two school districts, under the provi-
sions of the act, act of 1911, (similar to this section) one of
the districts so created may have an election for local school
taxation under the statute, although an election for such
purpose has been held during the same year and failed to
carry in the old district as constituted before the division.
Tyson v. Board, 150 Ga. 247, 103 S. E. 158; Dutton v. Rahn,
162 Ga. 189, 190, 132 S. E- 756.
§ 1551 (99). Rearrangement of districts.
Constitutionality.—This section is not in violation of
section 6358 of the constitution. Lott v. Board of Educa-
tion, 164 Ga. 863, 139 S. E. 722.
General Consideration.—The consolidation of school dis-
tricts is a part of the political power of the State, which
the legislature has seen fit to confer upon the county
board of education, with a referendum to the voters of
[7
the consolidated districts to approve or disapprove the
consolidation, under the provisions of this section above
referred to; and without some provision made by statute
for a review in equity of the decision of the county
board of education, the remedy by popular vote is the
only one open to patrons of one or more of the schools
so consolidated, who are dissatisfied with the consolida-
tion. Board of Education v. Hudson, 164 Ga. 401, 138 S.
E. 792, citing Skrine v. Jackson, 73 Ga. 377; Caldwell v.
Barrett, Id. 604, 607; Ivey v. City of Rome, 129 Ga. 286,
58 S. E- 858; Clark v. Board of Education, 162 Ga. 439,
134 S. E. 74; Heath v. Bellamy, 15 Ga. App. 89, 82 S.
E- 665.
Election in District Affected.—Where two consolidated
school districts are formed by a resolution of the count/
board of education, and it is provided in such resolution
that a named district shall be divided and a designated
portion added to one of the districts thus formed and a
designated portion added to the other such district, and
legal objections are made protesting against the forma-
tion of onry one of such consolidated districts, the county
superintendent should call and hold the subsequent elec-
tion provided by law only in the district or districts al
fected by the consolidation to which the objections relate.
In such election all the qualified voters of the entire
school district proposed to be divided are entitled to
vote. Cummings v. Drake, 164 Ga. 251, 138 S. E. 15b.
Restoration in Spite of Ratification.—County board can
divide a consolidated district and restore districts or parts
as before, though consolidation was ratified at popular
election. Strickland v. Benton, 166 Ga. 168, 171, 142 S.
E- 671.
It was not error to refuse a mandamus requiring the
county superintendent of schools to call an election for
trustees in the consolidated district after it had been so
divided by the board. Strickland v. Benton, 166 Ga. 168,
142 S. E. 671.
Effect of Consolidation.—Provision is made in this sec-
tion for the addition of any part of one district to any
other district. But when two districts are joined to-
gether, it is a consolidation of the districts; and where
there is consolidation of two districts, the districts as
they existed before cease. Perry v. Baggett, 164 Ga. 143,
146, 137 S. E. 766.
Prerequisites to Calling Election.—Walker v. Hall, 161 Ga.
460, 131 S. E. 160, approving and following Shields v. Field,
151 Ga. 465, 107 S. E- 44.
Interference by Equity to Enjoin Proceeding.—A court of
equity will not enjoin a consolidation of districts by a county
board which has held an election and declared the result
to be in favor of the consolidation, because, even if the act
can be construed to give the right to contest the election
(there being no express provisions to that effect), it must be
done before the result is declared. Clark v. Board, 162 Ga.
439, 134 S. E- 74.
§ 1551 (100). Transportation of pupils.—When-
ever the county board of education or local dis-
trict trustees deem it for the best interest of the
school, they shall have the right to provide
means for the transportation of the pupils and
teachers to and from said school. Acts 1919, pp.
288, 327; 1927, p. 174.
Editor's Note.—The local district trustees were brought
within the scope of this section by the amendment of 1927.
Discretion of County Board.—Under the provisions of
this section the transportation of pupils and teachers to
the public schools is a matter addressed entirely to the
discretion of the several county boards of education of
this State, having due regard to the facts and circum-
stances and the special needs and financial ability of the
respective county boards of education. Douglas v. Boaid
of Education, 164 Ga. 271, 138 S. E. 226.
§ 1551 (104). Term of loan.
Repayment from Local Tax.—A Board of Education hav-
ing lawfully incurred debts for money loaned to pay teachers
and operate the public schools of the county, and such debts
having accumulated from year to year, it was in the power
of that board to repay such debts from any funds that could
lawfully be applied to such purpose, including funds derived
from the levy of a local tax in the fall of the school year in
which the debts are paid for operating the schools. Board
v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S. E- 427.
§ 1551(118). Free tuition, etc.
See § 6576.
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ARTICLE 6.
Local Taxation for Schools.
§ 1551 (125).
Under previous rulings applied to the facts of the case,
owners of land in a school district wherein was held an
election resulting- favorably to an issue of bonds for
building a schoolhouse, which bonds were duly validated
and sold, were not entitled to an injunction to prevent
enforcement of executions to collect taxes duly levied for
interest and sinking-fund of the bonds. Brakefield v.
Jarrell, 168 Ga. 502, 148 S. E. 273.
Cited in Parker v. Williams, 168 Ga. 301, 147 S. E. 571.
§ 1551 (130). Power to collect taxes.
See notes to § 6579.
Where a local tax for educational purposes was im-
posed by the county authorities of the county of Mcin-
tosh upon the taxable property in the county, there be-
ing no independent local school systems in the county,
at the rate of 5 mills, under the authority of section 153-1
of the Civil Code of 1910, and at the rate of 5 mills un-
der the authority of this section, thus aggiegating 10
mills, the tax was, by 5 mills, in excess of that which
the county authorities could legally impose. Mcintosh
County v. Seaboard Air-L,ine Ry. Co., 38 Ga. App. 611,
144 S. E. 687.
Governed by Constitution.—Any local tax for educational
purposes imposed by county authorities, outside of any
independent local school systems in the county, is gov-
erned by the constitution section 6579 as amended, and shad
not exceed in the aggregate 5 mills, as provided therein,
whether the tax is imposed under any one or all of the
following legislative enactments: Civil Code of 1910, sec-
tion 513; section 1534, providing for the imposition of the
tax when authorized by a popular vote, and this section
shall determine. Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 173, 132 S.
E- 896. See also, in this connection, McMillan v. Tucker,
154 Ga. 154(6), 113 S. E. 391; Almand v. Board of Edu-
cation, 161 Ga. 911, 131 S. E- 879; Central of Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 1, 9, 10, 139 S. E. 890; Mc-
intosh County v. Seaboard Air-Eine Ry. Co., 38 Ga.
App. 611, 144 S. E. 687.
Restrictions upon Construction. — This statute, dealing
with the subject of taxation, is to be interpreted in the
light of the fundamental restriction upon taxation imposed
by the constitution of this State, and will not be given • a
construction which violates such constitutional provision.
Penick v. Foster, 129 Ga. 217, 58 S. E- 773, 12 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346; Almand v. Board, 161 Ga. 911,
131 S. E. 897.
Levy of Tax upon City.—This statute does not authorize
county authorities to levy a tax upon taxable property with-
in an independent school district existing in a city, for the
support of the public schools of the county under the con-
trol of the county board of education. Almand v. Board,
161 Ga. 911, 131 S. E. 897, overruling Hanks v. D'Arcy, 156
Ga. 55, 118 S. E- 656.
Applied in Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga.
1, 139 S. E. 890.
§ 1551 (133). Election for school district.
Due process not denied by this section, as amended by
Ga. I,. 1921, p. 223. Houston v. Thomas, 168 Ga. 67, 74,
146 S. E- 908.
In General.—This section must be considered also in
connection with section 141 of the Code of School Eaws
(Ga. E- 1919, pp. 288, 345; 8 Park's Code Supp. 1922,
§ 1438(y); Michie's Code 1926, § 1551(153), and § 61 oi
Civil Code. Houston v. Thomas, 163 Ga. 67, 69, 146 S. E.
908.
Place of Election.—In prescribing the place of election
under this section the ordinary can designate a place
other than a regular polling precinct established under
section 79 of the Civil Code. Freeman v. Caiktway, 165
Ga. 498, 141 S. E- 312.
Validity of Election When District Abolished and Sub-
stantially Recreated.—In Dutton v. Rain, 162 Ga. 189, 191,
132 S. E- 756, it was said: "On authority of Stephens v.
School District, 154 Ga. 275(6), 277 (114 S. E- 197), we hold
that the action of the county board of education in rescind-
ing their former action creating the consolidated school dis-
trict, and at the same meeting creating substantially the
came district, can not be held by this court, as a matter of
law, to be a fraud, and that it did not render such election
void." The court here has reference to an election for a
school district tax, and was considering the following pro-
vision taken from § 1535, Civil Code of 1910. "An election
for the same purpose shall not be held oftener than
every twelve months." It will be noticed that this section
contains the same provision. Ed. Note.
Substantial Compliance with Ballot Sufficient.
—See § 126
and the note thereto.
§ 1551 (136). Election for additional levy tax.
Constitutionality.—This section is not violative of the
constitution section, 6579. Bacon v. Board of Public Ed-
ucation, 165 Ga. 526, 141 S. E. 811.
Last Sentence Not Repealed.—The last sentence of this
section was not repealed expressly or by necessary im-
plication by section 1551(141). Stapleton v. Martin, 164
Ga. 336, 138 S. E. 767.
Effect of Failure to Specify Amount.—Where a call for
an election under this section fails to specify the amount
of the tax intended to be levied, the election is void, and
consequently is no authority for the levy of the tax.
Stapleton v. Martin, 164 Ga. 336, 138 S. E. 767.
Prior to the act of 1922 (Ga. E. 1922, p. 153), there
was authority, under the act of 1919 (Ga. E- 1919,.
p. 288), for any school district to supplement the
funds received from the State public- school funds, by
levying a tax for educational purposes, upon an election
being had for such purpose, not to exceed five mills on
the dollar. This provision of law did not require, as does
the subsequent act of 1922, that in the call for such elec-
tion the additional tax proposed to be levied should be
specified. See Stapleton v. Martin, 164 Ga. 336, 347 (6),
138 S. E. 767. The passage of the act of 1922 did not
render invalid any election already held under the act of
1919. Accordingly, where an affidavit of illegality is filed
to a tax-execution, issued on account of failure to pay
such a local school tax, based upon the ground that the
order calling the election did not specify the amount or
rate of taxation to be authorized, and where in the rec-
ord there is nothing that shows whether the election to
determine whether the district should have local tax was
held before or after the passage of the act of 1922, it wiil
not be presumed that the levy was invalid because +he
order calling the election failed to specify the amount of
the additional tax proposed to be levied, but, the burden
of proof being upon the affiant attacking the execution,
it will be assumed, nothing being shown to the contrary*
that the election was legally had prior to the passage oi
the act of 1922 requiring such specification. Seaboard
Air-Eine Ry. Co. v. Dorchester Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 39 Ga. App. 185, 146 S. E. 510.
§ 1551 (141). Trustees and secretary; powers
and duties.
Powers of Trustees—To Borrow Money.—The trustees of
a local school district are not empowered or authorized by
law to borrow money. Consequently, where such trustees
borrowed $2200 from a bank upon the draft of the secretary
of said board of trustees upon the tax-collector, which was
accepted by the latter, no liability attached to the local
school district or to the trustees who succeeded the original
borrowers. Powell v. Bainbridge State Bank, 161 Ga. 855,
132 S. E- 60.
See note to § 1551(136).
This section does not authorize trustees to charge ma-
triculation fees for resident students attending any school
receiving State aid; nor does the power conferred upon
the- county boards of education to define and regulate the
public-school terms of the respective counties, under sec-
tion 1551(89), and the fixing of such terms for shorter
periods than the schools are actually operated, authorise
such trustees to charge matriculation fees. Brinson v.
Jackson, 168 Ga. 353, 148 S. E- 96.
§ 1551 (153). Elections, how governed.
See § 1551(133).
No person is lawfully entitled to vote in a school-
district bond election held under this section, whose name
does not appear on any list of the county registrars filed
with the clerk of the superior court of the county, show-
ing the names of the registered voters of the county en-
titled to vote. Chapman v. Summer Consolidated School
District, 152 Ga. 450(2), 453, 109 S. E- 129; Trustees of
St. Clair School District v. Broxton, 38 Ga. App. 65.
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ARTICLE 6A.
Payment of Teachers.
§ 1551 (154a). Governor's authority to make
debt to pay teachers. — Pursuant to the amend-
ment to Article 7, Section 3, Paragraph 1 of the
Constitution of this State, authorizing the con-
traction by or on behalf of the State of a debt in
an amount of $3,500,000.00 for the purpose of
paying the public-school teachers of the State,
the Governor is hereby authorized and empowered
to execute a note or notes for such amount and
for such time of payment as the condition of the
treasury may demand, at any time in his discre-
tion, for the purpose of paying the public-school
teachers of the State. The aggregate of said note
or notes shall not at any time exceed the afore-
said constitutional limit, and said note or notes
shall not mature later than February of the year
succeeding the time of the execution thereof, and
the principal amount so borrowed shall be repaid
each year out of the common-school appropria-
tion, and the interest thereon shall be paid each
year out of the general funds of the State, ac-
crued during the year of issue of said notes.
Said notes shall be signed by the Governor and
countersigned by the Comptroller-General and
Secretary of State. Acts 1927, p. 168.
§ 1551 (154b). Authority to use funds allocated
for other purposes.—The Governor is further au-
thorized and empowered, at any time in his dis-
cretion, to impress, use, and employ for the pay-
ment of public-school teachers of the State, and
without payment of interest thereon, any funds in
the Treasury which may have been allocated for
any special fund or purpose, so as to obviate the
necessity of increasing the public debt of the
State and the payment of interest. Provided,
however, that it shall be the duty of the Gov
ernor, when any fund shall be so used to replace
said fund or funds by borrowing the same, if nec-
essary, at such time as will not interfere with the
expenditure for the purpose appropriated of any
special or allocated fund or funds so drawn upon
by the Governor by virtue of the authority
granted in this Act.
§ 1551 (154c). Limit of authority.—The Govern-
or shall not during any calendar year impress, use,
or employ any funds in the Treasury allocated or
belonging to any special fund or purpose in ex-
cess of the borrowing power of the Governor un-
der this Act.
of the collector. Hawthorne v. Turkey Creek School Dist.,
162 Ga. 462, 467, 134 S. E. 103.
When Sections 440 et seq. Followed. — This statute re-
quires that the trustees "shall" follow the law as required
of county authorities in section 440 et seq. in the issue of such
bonds. Veal v. Deepstep Consolidated School District, 34 Ga.
App. 67, 128 S. K. 223.
Notice of Election.—"As a condition precedent to the hold-
ing of an election for school bonds a notice of such election must
be published for thirty days next preceding the day of the
election, in the newspaper in which the sheriff's advertise-
ments for the county are published." Burnam v. Rhine Con-
solidated School District, 35 Ga. App. 110, 132 S. E. 137, fol-
lowing Scott School Dist. v. Carter, 28 Ga. App. 412, 111 S.
E. 216.
Under § 6563 of the constitution of this State, a con-
solidated school district can not create a bonded debt
"without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters
thereof voting at an election for that purpose, to be he'd
as prescribed by law;" and such two thirds must consti
tute "a majority of the registered voters." Buchanan v.
Woodland Consolidated School District, 168 Ga. 626, 148
S. E- 663.
Applied in Fairburn School District v. McLarin, 166
Ga. 867, 144 S. E- 765.
§ 1551 (157). Bond election; tax to provide
sinking fund for retirement of bonds.
Constitutionality.—The last sentence of the last para-
graph of this section makes the section confoim to Art.
7. § 7, par. 2 of the Constitution. Seaboard Air-Line Ry.
Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 367, 140 S. E- 863.
The levy of a tax of twelve mills on the dollar, if that
amount of tax is necessary to provide a sinking-fund for
the retirement of bonds issued to build a schoolhouse in
a local school district, and to pay the interest thereon,
is not violative of the provisions of article 8, section 4,
paragraph 1, of the constitution, for the reason that that
paragraph of the constitution deals only with the support
of public schools, and has no reference to the erection of
school buildings or the payment of the debts created by
the erection of school buildings. Seaboard Air-Line Ry.
Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 367, 140 S. E. 863.
Where Record Does Not Show Tax Excessive.—In the
case sub judice the county authorities, in addition to the
tax of five mills for the support of the school, levied
twelve mills for the retirement of schoolhouse bonds. In-
asmuch as it does not appear from the record that the
levy of twelve mills is excessive for the reason that the
amount of tax levied is unnecessary to retire the bondi
and for paying the interest thereon, the trial judge did
not err in refusing to enjoin the process of the levy, and
in dismissing the illegality. Seaboard Air-Line Railway
Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 367, 140 S. E. 863.
ARTICLE 7.
Building School Houses in Local Tax Districts
§ 1551 (155). Election for bonds to build and
equip school houses.
What Amounts to Selection of Registered Voters.—Where
the tax-collector took the list furnished to him by the
trustees, went over it, and struck from it such names as
he thought did not belong there, the voters entitled to reg-
istration were selected by him, and not by the trustees of
the school district, the managers of the election, or the
attorney for the trustees who copied the list at the request
ARTICLE 9A
Instruction in Animal, Bird and Fish Life
§ 1551 (184a). Training for conservation of
useful wild life.—'For the purposes of lessening
crime and raising the standard of good citizen-
shio and inculcating in the minds of the children
of this State a spirit of thrift, economy, and kind-
ness therefor, by including in the curriculum of
all public schools in the State of Georgia a
course of training to teach, promote, and en-
courage the conservation and protection of birds,
animals, fish, forest, and any and all other forms
of useful wild life. Acts 1929, p. 188, § 1.
§ 1551 (184b). Periods of instruction.—In every
public school of this State a period of not less
than twenty-five minutes of each week during
the entire school term shall be devoted to teach-
ing the pupils thereof the practical value of con-
serving and protecting birds, animals, fish, forest,
and other forms of wild life; also the humane
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treatment and protection of our domestic birds and
animals, as well as the part they fulfill in the econ-
omy of nature. It may be optional with the teacher
whether this period shall be a consecutive
twenty-five minutes or be divided into shorter
periods during the week; and it shall also be
within the discretion of the teacher as to the
method of instruction to be employed. The in-
struction herein prescribed shall constitute a
definite purpose of the curriculum of study in
all the public schools of this State. Acts 1929,
p. 188, § 2.
§ 1551 (184c). Reports of teachers.—Each and
every teacher in the schools of this State shall
certify in his or her reports that the instruction
provided for has been in accordance with the
provisions of this article. Acts 1929, p. 189, § 3.
ARTICLE 10B
Compulsory School Attendance
§ 1551 (195). Attendance officer.
As to order of the attendance officer denying admission
to school of children not vaccinated, see Sherman v.
Board of Education, 165 Ga. 889, 142 S. E. 152.
TWELFTH TITLE
Police and Sanitary Regulations
CHAPTER 1
Georgia State Sanitarium
ARTICLE l
The Trustees
§ 1571. Managed by ten trustees.
Editor's Note.—Acts 1929, p. 324, changed the name of
the Georgia State Sanitarium to Milledgeville State
Hospital.
CHAPTER 7.
County Sanitary Regulations, Boards of Health,
Sanitary Districts, Cemeteries, Hospitals, etc.,
Contracts for Sanitation.
§§ 1676(1)-1676(24). Park's Code.
See §§ 1681 (27) -1681 (46).
§ 1676(14). Cemeteries, hospitals, ieta, out-
aide municipalities.
Necessity of Assignment to Users of Permit. — Where a
proposed corporation on being organized after the issuance
of a permit to a private person, acquired the property named
for the purpose, it was not essential to its use and enjoy-
ment of the permission to establish such cemetery that the
person by whom such permission was obtained should make
an assignment of the same to the corporation. Fairview
Cemetery Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 138 S. E. 88.
Revocation after Expenditures Made.—Where the person
to whom the permission was granted or one succeeding
thereto had, on the faith thereof, expended large sums of
money in the expectation of using and enjoying the per-
mission so granted, a resolution thereafter adopted by the
county authorities, for the purpose of rescinding their pre-
vious action in making the grant, was void and of no effect,
where its adoption was without a hearing and without any
sort of notice to the person to be adversely affected, where
also there was nothing to show any of the conditions of
such permission had been violated. Fairview Cemetery Co.
v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 138 S. E- 88.
§§ 1676(25), 1676(26). Park's Code.
See P. C. §§ 503(10)-503(11).
§§ 1676(mm-l)-1676(mm-17). Park's Code.
See §§ 2177(1) -2177(20).
§ 1676(nn). Park's Code.
See § 1676(14).
CHAPTER 8A.
Registration of Births and Deaths.
§§ 1681(1) to 1681(26). Superseded by the Acts
of 1927 p. 353, herein codified as §§ 1681(27) et seq.
§ 1681 (27). Registration of births and deaths.
—The State board of health shall have charge of
the registration of births and deaths in this State;
shall prepare the necessary instructions, forms,
and blanks for obtaining and preserving such
records, and shall procure the faithful registra-
tion of same in each primary registration district
as constituted in section 16<81(29), and in the
central bureau of vital statistics at the Capitol of
the State. The said board shall be charged with
the uniform and thorough enforcement of this
law throughout the State, and shall from time to
time recommend any additional legislation that
may be necessary for this purpose. Acts 1927, p.
354.
The proper person to issue a burial permit is the registrar
of the city or militia district, as the case may be, in which
the person died or the body was found. Fairview Cemetery
Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 719, 138 S. E- 88.
§ 1681 (28). Bureau of vital statistics; State
registrar; appointment, qualifications.—The sec-
retary of the State Board of Health shall have
general supervision over the central bureau of
vital statistics, which is hereby authorized to be
established by said board, and which shall be un-
der the immediate direction of the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics, whom the State Board of
Health shall appoint, and who shall be a medical
practitioner of not less than five years practice in
his profession, and a competent vital statistician.
The term of office of the State Registrar of Vital
Statistics shall be four years, and he shall con-
tinue in office until his successor has qualified. A
successor shall be appointed for the ensuing term
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at least ten days before the expiration of each
term. Any vacancy occuring in such office dur-
ing a term shall be filled by appointment for the
unexpired part of the term. The State Board of
Health shall provide for such clerical and other
assistant as may be necessary for the purposes of
this Act, who shall serve during the pleasure of
the board. The compensation of the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics and the compensation of
said assistants shall be paid by the said board out
of the funds appropriated by the General As-
sembly for the maintenance of the State Board
of Health. The custodian of the capitol shall
provide for the Bureau of Vital Statistics, at the
State Capitol, suitable offices, which shall be
properly equipped with fireproof vaults and filing
cases for the permanent and safe preservation of
all official records provided for by this Act.
§ 1681 (29) Districts for registration.—For the
purpose of this Act the State shall be divided in-
to registration districts as follows: Each city,
each incorporated town, and each militia district
or part thereof outside of a city or incorporated
town shall constitute a primary registration dis-
trict. The State Board of Health may combine
two or more primary registration districts as one
district, or may establish additional districts by
dividing a primary registration district into two
or more districts, when necessary to facilitate
registration.
§ 1681 (30). Local registrars.—In each city of
this State the city clerk, and in each incorporated
town the town clerk, and in each militia district
or part thereof outside of a city or of an incorpo-
rated town the justice of the peace therefor, or,
if there be no justice of the peace, the notary
public and ex-officio justice of the peace there-
of, shall be the local registrar of vital statis-
tics, except where another person has been ap-
pointed as such registrar by the State board of
Health, the said board being hereby authorized
to appoint the local registrars in any and all reg-
istration districts, in their discretion. Each local
registrar shall appoint a deputy registrar, who
shall serve as registrar when the local registrar,
is not immediately accessible for the purpose
of registration or the issuance of certificates or
permits as required by this Act; and should the
local registrar and his deputy both be absent
from their registration district, the duties of the
local registrar of that district may be performed
by the local registrar of any adjoining district in
the same county; and in such cases the registrar
acting in the absence of the local registrar shall
note on each certificate issued by him the date of
^filing, and shall forward the certificate in ten
davs, and in all cases before the third day of the
following month, to the local registrar in whose
place he has acted. Any local registrar or deputy
registrar who, in the judgment of the State Board
of Health, fails to make a proper and complete
return of births and deaths, or to discharge any
of his other duties as prescribed by this Act, may
be summarily removed by said board, and he
shall be subject to such penalties as are provided
for such officers under section 503(10) Penal
Code.
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§ 1681 (31). Burial or removal permit. — The
body of any person whose death occurs in this
State, or which shall be found dead therein, shall
not be interred, deposited in a vault or tomb, cre-
mated, or otherwise disposed of or removed from
or into any registration district, or be temporarily
held pending further disposition more than sev-
enty-two hours after death, unless a permit for
burial, removal, or other disposition thereof shall
have been properly issued by the local registrar
of the registration district in which the death oc-
curred or the body was found. And no such
burial or removal permit shall be issued by the
registrar until, where practicable, a complete and
satisfactory certificate of death has been filed
with him as hereinafter provided; provided, that
when a dead body is transported from outside of
the state into this State or from one registration
district into another registration district within
this State, for burial, the transit or removal per-
mit issued in accordance with the law and health
regulations of the place where the death occurred
shall be accepted by the sexton or person in
charge of the cemetery in lieu of a burial permit
at the place of burial.
§ 1681 (32). Stillborn child to be registered
twice.—A stillborn child shall be registered as a
birth and also a death, and separate certificates
of both the birth and the death shall be filed with
the local registrar, in the usual form and manner,
the certificate to contain, in the place of the name
of the child, the word "stillbirth," provided that
a certificate of birth and a certificate of death
shall not be required for a child that has not ad-
vanced to the fifth month of uterogestation. The
medical certificate of the cause of death shall be
signed by the attending physician, if any, and
shall state the cause of death as "stillborn,"
with the cause of stillbirth, if known, whether a
premature birth, and if born prematurely, the pe-
riod of uterogestation, in months, if known; and
the burial or removal permit of the prescribed
form shall be required. Midwives shall not sign
certificates of death for stillborn children; but
such cases, and stillbirths occuring without at-
tendance of either physician or mid-wife, shall be
treated as deaths without medical attendance, as
provided for in section 1681(34).
§1681(33). Death certificate; contents.— The
certificate of death shall contain the following
items, and such other items as are deemed neces-
sary for legal, social, and sanitary purposes sub-
served by registration records: (1) Place of
death, including State, county, incorporated town,
village, or city. If in a city, the ward, street, and
house number: if in a hospital or other institu-
tion, the name of the same to be given instead of
the street and house number. If in an industrial
camp, the name of the camp to be given. (2) Full
name of decedent. If an unnamed child, the sur-
name preceded by "Unnamed." (3) Sex. (4)
Color or race; as white, black, mulatto (or other
Negro descent), Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or
other. (5) Conjugal relation; as single, married,
widowed, or divorced. (6) Date of birth, includ-
ing year, month, and day. (7) Age, in years,
months, and days. If less than one day, the
]
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hours or minutes. (8) Occupation. The occupa-
tion to be reported of any person male or female,
who had any remunerative employment, with the
statement of (a) trade, profession, or particular
kind of work; (b) general nature of industry,
business, or establishment in which employed (or
employer). (9) Birthplace, at least State or for-
eign country, if known. (10) Name of father. (11)
Birthplace of father, at least State or foreign
country, if known. (12) Maiden name of mother.
(13) Birthplace of mother, at least State or for-
eign country, if known. (14) Signature and ad-
dress of informant. (15) Official signature of reg-
istrar, with the date when the certificate was filed
and registered number. (16) Date of death, year,
month, and day. (17) Certification as to medical
attendance on decedent, fact and time of death,
time last seen alive, and cause of death, with con-
tributory (secondary) cause of complication, if
any, and duration of each, and whether attributed
to dangerous or insanitary conditions or employ-
ment; signature and address of physician or offi-
cial making the medical certificate. (18) Length
of residence (for inmates of hospitals or other in-
stitutions, transients or recent residents) at place
of death and in the State, together with the place
where the disease was contracted, if not at place
of death, and former or usual residence. (19)
Place of burial or removal, date of burial. (20)
Signature of undertaker or person acting as such,
and post-office address. The personal and sta-
tistical particulars (items 1 to 13) shall be au-
thenticated by the signature of the informant,
who may be any competent person acquainted
with the facts. The statement of facts relating
to the disposition of the body shall be signed by
the undertaker or the person acting as such. The
medical certificate shall be made and signed by
the physician, if there was any, last in attendance
on the deceased, who shall specify the lime
in attendance, the time he last saw the deceased
alive, and the hour of the day at which the death
occurred. And he shall further state the cause of
the death, so as to show the course of the disease
or sequence of causes resulting in the death, giv-
ing first the name of the disease causing death
(primary cause) and the contributory (secondary)
cause, if any, and the duration of each. Indefi-
nite and unsatisfactory terms, denoting only
symptoms of disease or conditions resulting from
disease, will not be held sufficient for the issuance
of a burial or removal permit, and any certificate
containing only such terms, as defined by the
State Registrar, shall be returned to the physi-
cian or person making the medical certificate, for
correction and more definite statement. Causes
of deaths which may be the result of either disease
or violence shall be carefully defined; and if vio-
lence, the means of injury shall be stated, and
whether (probably) accidental, suicidal, homi-
cidal. And for the deaths in hospitals or insti-
tutions, or of non-residents, the physician shall
supply the information required, under this head
(item 18), if he is able to do so, and may state
where, in his opinion, the disease was contracted.
§ 1681(34). Death without medical attention.—
In case of any death occurring without medical
attention, it shall be the duty of the undertaker
to notify the local registrar of the death, and
when so notified the registrar shall, prior to the
issuance of the permit, inform the local health
officer, if there be such officer in the district
where the death occurred, and refer the case to
him for immediate investigation and certification;
provided, that when the local health officer is not
a physician, and in such cases only, the registrar
is authorized to make the certificate and return
from the statement of relatives or other person
having adequate knowledge of the facts; provided,
further, that if the registrar has reason to believe
that the death may have been due to unlawful act
or neglect, he shall then refer the case to the cor-
oner or other proper official for his investigation
and certification. And the coroner or other proper
official whose duty it is to hold an inquest on the
body of any deceased person, and to make the cer-
tificate of death required for a burial permit, shall
state in his certificate the name of the disease
causing the death, or, if from external causes,
(1) the means of death, and (2) whether (prob-
ably) accidental, suicidal, or homicidal, and shall
in any case furnish such information as may be
required by the State Registrar in order to clas-
sify the death properly.
§ 1681(35). Procedure, in obtaining burial per-
mit.—The undertaker, or the person acting as
undertaker, shall file the certificate of death with
the local registrar of the district in which trie
death occurred, and obtain a burial or removal
permit prior to any disposition of the body. He
shall obtain the required personal and statistical
particulars from the person best qualified to sup-
ply them, over the signature and address of his
informant. He shall then present the certificate
to the attending physician, if there was any, or to
the health officer, or coroner, as directed by the
local registrar, for the medical certificate of the
cause of death and other particulars necessary to
complete the record as specified in sections 1681-
(33), 1681(34) and he shall then state the facts re-
quired relative to- the date and place of burial or
removal, over his signature and with his address,
and present the complete certificate to the local
registrar in order to obtain a permit for burial, re-
moval, or other disposition of the body. The un-
dertaker shall deliver the burial or removal permit
to the person in charge of the place of burial, be-
fore interring or otherwise disposing of the body,
or shall attach the transit permit to the box con-
taining the corpse when shipped by any trans-
portation company; said permit to accompany
the corpse to its destination where, if within the
State of Georgia, it shall be delivered to the per-
son in charge of the place of burial. Every per-
son, firm, or corporation selling a coffin or burial
casket shall keep a record showing the name of
the purchaser, and the purchaser's post-office ad-
dress, and the name of the deceased, which rec-
ord shall be open to inspection of the State Reg-
istrar at all times. On the first day of each month
the person, firm, or corporation selling coffins or
burial caskets in this State shall report to the
State Registrar each sale for the preceding
month, on a blank provided for that purpose;
provided, however, that no person, firm, or cor-
poration selling coffins or burial caskets to deal-
ers or undertakers only shall be required to keep
such record, nor shall such report be required
from the undertakers when they have direct
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charge of the disposition of the dead body.
Every person, firm, or corporation selling cof-
fins or burial caskets at retail, and not having
charge of the body, shall inclose within the casket
or coffin a notice furnished by the State registrar,
calling attention to the requirements of the law,
a blank certificate of death, and the rules and reg-
ulations of the State Board of Health concerning
the burial or other disposition of a dead body.
§ 1681(36). Contents of burial permit.—If the
interment or other disposition of the body is to
be made within the State, the wording of the bur-
ial or removal permit may be limited to a state-
ment by the registrar, and over his signature, that,
a satisfactory certificate of death having been filed
with him as required by law, permission is granted
to inter, remove, or dispose otherwise of the body,
stating the name, age, sex, cause of death, and
other necessary details upon the form prescribed
by the State Registrar.
§ 1681(37). Burial without permit prohib-
ited; indorsement and return of permit.—No
person in charge of any premises on which in-
terments are made shall inter or permit the in-
terment or other disposition of any body unless
it is accompanied bv a burial, removal, or transit
permit as herein provided, and every such person
shall indorse upon the permit the date of the in-
terment, over his signature, and shall return all
permits so indorsed to the local registrar of his
district within ten days from the date of inter-
ment, or within the time fixed by the local board
of health. He shall keep a record of all bodies
interred or otherwise disposed of on the premises
under his charge, in each case stating the name
of each deceased person, place of death, date of
burial or disposal, and name and address of the
undertaker, which record shall at all times be
open to official inspection; provided, that the un-
dertaker or person acting as such, when burying
a body in a cemetery or burial ground having no
person in charge, shall sign the burial or removal
or transit permit giving the date of burial, and
shall write across the face of the permit the words
:
'No person in charge," and file the burial or re-
moval or transit permit within ten days with the
registrar of the district in which the cemetery is
located.
§ 1681(38). Birth registration.—The birth of
each and every child born in this State shall be
registered as hereinafter provided.
§ 1681(39). Certificate of birth to be filed.—
Within ten days after the date of each birth, there
shall be filed with the local registrar of the dis-
trict in which the birth occurred a certificate of
such birth, which certificate shall be upon the form
adopted by the State Registrar, upon advice and
consent of the State Board of Health, with a view
of procuring a full and accurate report with re-
spect to each item of information enumerated in
section 1681(40). In each case where a phy-
sician, or midwife, or person acting as a midwife
was in attendance upon the birth, it shall be the
duty of such person to file in accordance here-
with the certificate herein contemplated. In each
case where there was no physician, or midwife,
or person acting as midwife, in attendance upon
the birth, it shall be the duty of the father or
mother of the child, or the householder or the
owner of the premises where the birth occurred,
having knowledge of such birth, or the manager
or superintendent of the public or private insti-
tution where the birth occurred, each in the order
named, within ten days after the date of such
birth, to report to the local registrar the fact of
such birth. In such case, and in case the physi-
cian, or midwife, or person acting as midwife, in
attendance upon the birth, is unable, by diligent
inquiry, to obtain any item or items of informa-
tion contemplated in section 1681(40), it shall
be the duty of the local registrar to secure
from the person so reporting, or from any other
person having the required knowledge, such in-
formation as will enable him to prepare the cer-
tificate of birth herein contemplated, and it shall
be the duty of the person reporting the birth, or
who may be interrogated in relation thereto, to
answer correctly and to the best of his knowl-
edge all questions put to him by the local regis-
trar which may be calculated to elicit any in-
formation needed to make a complete record of
the birth as contemplated by section 1681(40) and it
shall be the duty of the informant, in any state-
ment made in accordance herewith, to verify such
statement by his signature, when requested so to
do by the local registrar.
§ 1681(40). Contents of birth certificate.—The
certificate of birth shall contain the following
items, and such other items as are deemed nec-
essary for the legal, social, and sanitary purposes
subserved by registration records: (1) Place o*
birth, including State, county, incorporated town,
village, or city; if in a city, the ward, street, and
house number; if in a hospital or other institu-
tion, the name of the same to be given instead
of the street and house number. (2) Full name
of child. If the child dies without a name, be-
fore the certificate is filed, enter the words "died
unnamed." If the living child has not yet been
named at the date of filing certificate of birth,
the space for full name of child is to be left
blank, to be filed out subsequently by a supple-
mental report, as hereinafter provided. (3) Sex
of child. (4) Whether a twin, triplet, or other
plural birth. A separate certificate shall be re-
quired for each child in case of plural births.
(5) For plural births, number of each child in
order of birth. (6) Whether legitimate or ille-
gitimate. (7) Date of birth, including year,
month, and day. (8) Full name of father; pro-
vided that if the child is illegitimate, the name
of the putative father shall not be entered with-
out his consent, but the other particulars relat-
ing to the putative father (items 9 to 13) may
be entered if known, otherwise as "unknown."
(9) Residence of father. (10) Color or race of
father. (11) Age of father at last birthday, in
years. (12) Birthplace of father, at least State
or foreign country if known. (13) Occupation
of father, occupation to be reported if engaged
in any remunerative employment, with the state-
ment of (a) trade, profession, or particular kind
of work: (b) general nature of industry, busi-
ness, or establishment in which employed (or
employer). (14) Maiden name of mother. (15)
Residence of mother. (16) Color or race of
Ga.—
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mother. (17) Age of mother at last birthday,
in years. (18) Birthplace of mother, at least
State or foreign country, if known. (19) Oc-
cupation of mother. The occupation to be re-
ported if engaged in any remunerative employ-
ment, with the statement of (a) trade,
profession, or particular kind of work, (b) Gen-
eral nature of industry, business, or establish-
ment in which employed (or employer). (20)
Number of children born to this mother, in-
cluding present birth. (21) Number of children
of this mother, living. (22) The certification
of the attending physician or midwife as to the
attendance at birth, including statement of year,
month, day (as given in item 7), and hour of
birth, and whether child was born alive or still-
born. This certification shall be signed by the
attending physician or midwife, with the date of
signature and address; if there is no physician
or midwife in attendance, then by the father or
mother of the child, householder, owner of the
premises, or manager or superintendent of pub-
lic or private institution where the birth occurred,
or other competent person, whose duty it shall
be to notify the local registrar of such birth, as
required by section 1681(39). (23) Exact date
of filing in office of local registrar, attested
by his official signature, and registered number
of birth, as hereinafter provided.
§ 1681(41). Supplemental report.—When any
certificate of birth of a living child is presented
without the statement of the given name, then
the local registrar shall make out and deliver to
the parents of the child a special blank for the
supplemental report of the given name of the
child, which shall be filled out as directed, and
returned to the local registrar as soon as the child
shall have been named.
§ 1681(42). Registration of midwives.—Every
midwife shall register his or her name, address,
and occupation with the local registrar of the
district in which he or she resides, or may here-
after establish a residence, such registration to be
made on or before the first day of February in
each year, or, if such residence is established
after that date, then within thirty days after the
same is established; and shall thereupon be sup-
plied by the local registrar with a copy of this
Act, together with such rules and regulations
as may be prepared by the State registrar rela-
tive to its enforcement. Within sixty days after
the close of each calendar year each local regis-
trar shall make a return to the State Registrar
of all midwives who have registered in his dis-
trict. No fee or other compensation shall be
charged by local registrars to midwives for reg-
istering their names under this section or mak-
ing returns thereof to the State Registrar.
§ 1681(43). Blanks supplied by State regis-
trar.—The State Registrar shall prepare, print,
and supply all registrars all blanks and forms
used in registering, recording, and preserving
the returns, or in otherwise carrying out the pur-
poses of this Act, and shall prepare and issue
such detailed instructions as may be required to
procure the uniform observance of its provisions
and the maintenance of a perfect system of reg-
istration; and no other blanks shall be used than
those supplied by the State Registrar, except
that in the transportation of dead bodies the
standard form of permit adopted by the State
Board of Embalmers may be used. He shall
carefully examine the certificates received
monthly from the local registrars; and if any
such are incomplete or unsatisfactory, he shall
require such further information to be supplied
as may be necessary to make the records com-
plete and satisfactory. And all physicians,
midwives, informants, or undertakers, and all
other persons having knowledge of the facts, are
hereby required to supply, upon a form provided
by the State Registrar or upon the original cer-
tificate, such information as they may possess
regarding any birth or death, upon demand of
the State registrar, in person, by mail, or through
the local registrar. No certificate of birth or
death, after its acceptance for registration by the
local registrar, and no record made in pursuance
of this Act shall be altered or changed in any re-
spect otherwise than by amendments properly
dated, signed and witnessed. The State Regis-
trar shall further arrange, bind, and permanently
preserve the certificates in a systematic manner,
and shall prepare and maintain a comprehensive
index of all births and deaths registered, said in-
dex to be arranged alphabetically, in case of
deaths, by name of decedents, and in case of
births, by the names of the fathers, or the
mothers in the event the name of the father is not
known. He shall inform all registrars what dis-
eases are to be considered infectious, or commu-
nicable, and dangerous to the public health, as de-
cided by the State Board of Health, in order
that when deaths occur from such diseases proper
precautions may be taken to prevent their spread.
If any cemetery company or association, any
church or historical society or association, or any
other company, society, or association, or any in-
dividual is in possession of any record of births
and deaths which may be of value in establishing
the genealogy of any resident of this State, such
company, society, association, or individual may
file such record, or a duly authenticated transcript
thereof, with the State registrar, and it shall be
the duty of the State Registrar to preserve such
record or transcript, and to make a record and in-
dex thereof in such forms as to facilitate the find-
ing of any information contained therein. Such
record and index shall be open to inspection by
the public, subject to such reasonable conditions
as the State Registrar may prescribe. If any per-
son desires a transcript of any record filed in ac-
cordance herewith, the State Registrar shall fur-
nish the same upon application, together with a
certificate that it is a true ropy of such record as
filed in his office.
§ 1681(44). Local registrar's duties; unsatis-
factory certificate of death.—Each local regis-
trar shall supply blank forms of certificates to
such persons as require them. Each local regis-
trar shall carefully examine each certificate of
birth or death when presented for record, in or-
der to ascertain whether or not it has been made
out in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and the instructions of the State Registrar. And
if any certificate of death is incomplete or unsat-
isfactory, it shall be his duty to call attention to
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the defects in the returns, and to withhold the
burial or removal permit until such defects are
corrected. All certificates either of birth or
death shall be written legibly in durable black
ink, and no certificate shall be held to be complete
and correct that does not supply all the items of
information called for therein, or satisfactorily
account for their omission. If the certificate of
death is properly executed and complete, he shall
then issue a burial or removal or transit permit
to the undertaker; provided, that in case the
death occurred from some disease which is held
by the State Board of Health to be infectious,
contagious, or communicable or dangerous to the
public health, no permit for the removal or other
disposition of the body shall be issued by the reg-
istrar, except under such conditions as may be
prescribed by the State Board of Health. If a
certificate of birth is incomplete, the local regis-
trar shall immediately notify the informant, and
require him to supply the missing items of in-
formation if they can be obtained. He shall num-
ber consecutively the certificates of birth and
death, in two separate series, beginning with
number one for the first birth, and the first death
of each calendar year, and sign his name as regis-
trar in attest of the date of filing in his office.
He shall also make a complete and accurate copy
of each birth and each death certificate on the
form provided by the State registrar for that pur-
pose, and he shall, on or before the tenth day of
each month, transmit to the State Registrar all
original certificates registered by him for the pre-
ceding month, and shall forward to the ordinary
of the county in which his district is located his
copy of the same, or, if there be a full-time city
health officer or a full-time county health officer
located in his county, he shall forward his copy
to said health officer instead of to the ordinary.
And if no birth or no death occurs in any month,
he shall on the tenth day of the following month
report that fact to the State Registrar on a card
provided for that purpose. And all birth and
death certificates filed with a local registrar when
the birth or death occurred outside his district
must be forwarded by him, within ten days, to
the local registrar of the district in which the
birth or death occurred. The ordinary or health
officer, as the case may be, shall file and pre-
serve in his office all copies of certificates re-
ceived by him.
properly registered, with the names of the local
registrars and the amounts due each at date of
said certificate; provided that before such fees are
paid by the county treasurer, the State Regis-
trar's certificate as to the amount due for such
fees shall be verified by a certificate of the ordi-
nary of the county, or city or county health offi-
cer, as the case may be, to whom copies of the
original certificates have been furnished by the
local registrar as provided in section 1681(44).
The ordinary or the county or city health
officer, as the case may be, shall be paid a fee of
ten cents for each copy of birth and each copy of
death certificate properly filed by him under sec-
tion 1681(44), said fee to be paid from county
funds by the county treasurer.
§ 1681(46). Certified copies.—The State regis-
trar or ordinary or the county or city health offi-
cer shall, upon request, supply to any applicant, a
certified copy of the record of any birth or death
registered under the provisions of this Act, and
any such copy of the record of a birth or death,
when properly certified by the State registrar or
ordinary or city or county health officer, as the
case may be, shall be prima facie evidence in all
courts and places of the facts therein stated, for
which said applicant shall pay a fee of fifty cents.
The United States Census Bureau may obtain,
without expense to the State, transcripts -or cer-
tified copies of births and deaths.
CHAPTER 9
Practice of Medicine; How Regulated.
§ 1681(45). Fees.—Each local registrar shall
be paid a fee of fifty cents for each birth
certificate and for each death certificate prop-
erly made out and registered with him, and
correctly recorded and promptly returned by
him to the State Registrar as required by this
Act. And in case no birth or no death certificate
was registered during a month, the local regis-
trar shall be paid a fee of twenty-five cents for
each report made by him to that effect, if such re-
port be made promptly as required by this Act.
All amounts payable to a local registrar under
the provisions of this section shall be paid from
county funds by the treasurer of the county in
which the registration district is located, and the
State Registrar shall annually, or, in the discretion
of the State Board of Health, from time to time
during the year, certify to the treasurers of the
several counties the number of births and deaths
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ARTICLE 1
Practitioners
§ 1684. (§ 1479). Practitioners must register.
Section Repealed.—See notes to § 1697(6).
ARTICLE 2
State Board of Medical Examiners
§ 1697(e) 4 Park's Code.
See § 1697(5).
§ 1697(5). License required before practice;
how obtained.
Constitutionality.—The right to practice medicine is, like
the right to practice any other profession, a valuable right,
which is entitled to be protected under the constitution
and laws of the State. But the State in the exercise of the
inherent police power of the sovereign may place such re-
strictions on a licensee as may be necessary for the wtlare
and safety of society. A statute which regulates the right
to practice medicine, but leaves the field open to all who
possess the prescribed qualifications, does not abridge be
privilege or immunities of citizens. Hughes v. State Board,
162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
§ 1697(f) PROFESSIONAL NURSING § 1711(8)
This law is not unjustly discriminatory so as to render it
void. Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
A license to practice medicine is not a contract, and gives
the licensee no right to continue in the practice in the future
unrestricted, and such license may be revoked for good cause,
and such revocation alone is not a taking of property with-
out due process of law. Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246,
134 S. E- 42.
§ 1697(f). Park's Code.
See § 1697(6).
§ 1697(6). Recording of certificate; fee; report.
Editor's Note.—Section 3 of the act of 1881, embodied in
section 1684 of the Code, was repealed by implication by the
act of December 12, 1894 (Ga. E- 1894, p. 85). The act of
1894 was in turn repealed, either expressly or by implication,
by the act of 1913 (now this section), and after August 18,
1913, a physician licensed under the act of 1894 was not re-
quired to register in accordance with the provisions of the
act of 1881, and a physician licensed under the act of 1894,
who had caused his certificate to be recorded as required by
that act, could recover for services rendered after August
18, 1913, although the record of his certificate had been made
prior to August 18, 1913. Friedman v. Mizell, 164 Ga. 1, 137
S. E. 400; Friedman v. Mizell, 36 Ga. App. 615, 137 S. E.
864.
§ 1697(m). Park's Code.
See § 1697(13).
§ 1697(13). Refusal and revocation of licenses.
Editor's Note—Constitutionality.—This section is not vio-
lative of the constitution, section 6545, which provides that
"The right of trial by jury, except where it is otherwise pro-
vided in this constitution, shall remain inviolate," etc.
Eewis v. State Board, 162 Ga. 263, 133 S. E. 469.
Nor is it violative of the due-process clauses of the State
and Federal constitutions. The section provides for notice
ot the time and place of hearing, for service of the notice,
for the production of the defendant's evidence, and for mak-
ing his defense, and also for an appeal from the State Board
of Medical Examiners to a jury in the superior court; and
this provides due process of law. Hughes v. State Board,
162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
The language of this section which declares that a licen-
tiate's name may be removed from the records in the office
of any clerk of court in this State, and his license revoked
upon the ground of "conviction of crime involving moral
turpitude," is not so vague, uncertain, and indefinite as to
render the same void. The words "moral turpitude" are
capable of accurate definition. The legislature may enact
that one who has been convicted of crime "involving
moral turpitude" shall no longer practice medicine. Hughes
v. State Board. 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
Nor is the provision that "said appeal to be had as in
other cases now provided by law," void for uncertainty.
Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
Retroactive Effect.—This section is not retroactive as ap-
plied to the facts of the case at bar. Hughes v. State
Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
/Prohibiting Advertisements.—Under the police power of
the State the legislature may prohibit advertisements by
licensed physicians with reference to "any disease of the
sexual organs 1;" and provide for a revocation of the license
of such practicing physician upon a majority vote of the
State Board of Medical Examiners, for a violation of the
above provision of the act. Hughes v. State Board, 162
Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
Notice—Specifying Law Alleged to Be Violated.—In pre-
ferring charges against a practicing physician in order to re-
voke his license under the act of 1913, as amended by the
act of 1918, it is not necessary to specify the law under
which the charges are preferred. Hughes v. State Board,
162 Ga. 246. 134 S. E- 42.
CHAPTER 10
Professional Nursing-
ARTICLE 1
Board of Examiners
§§ 1698 to 1711(1).—Repealed by the Acts of
1927, p. 247, herein codified as §§ 1711(7) et seq.
ARTICLE 3
Profession Regulated
§§ 1711(2)-1711(20). Park's Code.
See i§§ 1711 (7) -1711 (22).
§ 1711(7). Board of Examiners of nurses cre-
ated; members.—The Board of Examiners of
Nurses for Georgia is hereby created. It shall be
composed of five persons to be elected and ap-
pointed in the following manner: The Georgia
State Nurses' Association will, within thirty (30)
days after this Act takes effect, nominate to the
Governor of this State ten (10) of its members,
none of whom is in any way connected with any
training-school for nurses. The said nurses
must have had at least three (3) yearr- of practice
in their profession immediately preceding their
appointment. From this number the Governor
shall, within thirty (30) days thereafter, appoint
for places on the said board one nurse who shall
hold office for one (1) year from date of appoint-
ment; and two (2) shall hold office for two (2)
years from said date, and two (2) shall hold office
for three (3) years from said date. All of the said
appointments shall have the same date; provided
no two of the nurses so appointed shall have
graduated from the same training-school. Upon
the expiration of the term of office of any member
of said board the Governor of this State shall ap-
point a successor to fill the said term of office, who
shall hold office for three (3) years from the date
of the expiration of, the said term of office. The
said appointment shall be made from a list of five
(5) members of the said association, to be fur-
nished to him by the said association. All vacan-
cies occurring on this board shall be filled by the
Governor for the unexpired term from like nom-
inations furnished to him by the said association
within thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs;
provided, that if the said association fails to make
the nominations herein required within the time
here specified, the Governor shall make such ap-
pointments by nominating such members of the
nursing profession hereto as may seem to him to
be proper. Acts 1927, p. 247.
§ 1711(8). Officers. — The members of this
State Board of Examiners shall, within thirty
(30) days after appointment, organize by the elec-
tion of one of its members to be the president of
the said board, and another to be the secretary
and treasurer, who shall hold office for a period of
one year and until their respective successors are
elected and have qualified; said officers shall be
elected by the board annually, and in case of a
vacancy in either of said offices the board shall,
within forty (40) days after the vacancy occurs,
elect one of its number to fill the said office; and
in the event there is no such election within the
time named, the Governor shall appoint a mem-
ber of said board to fill the vacancy. The secre-
tary is required to certify to the Governor the
names of the officers so elected; and in the case
of a vacancy, this shall likewise be certified by the
secretary to him; and in the event of a vacancy
in the office of the secretary, the president of the
board shall certify the same to him, and shall
^rtify the name of the person chosen to fill the
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vacancy in the event the vacancy is filled by the
board.
§ 1711(9). Quorum; records; seal; certifi-
cates.—Three (3) members of said Board of Ex-
aminers shall constitute a quorum, but no action
of said board shall be valid unless authorized by
the affirmative vote ojf three (3) memlbers
thereof. The secretary of the board is directed to
keep a record of the minutes of the meetings of
said board, and a record of the names of all per-
sons applying for registration hereunder, and of
the action of the board thereon, and a register of
all nurses who have complied with the require-
ments of this Act, all of which said records shall,
at all reasonable times, be open to public inspec-
tion. Said board is authorized to have and use
an official seal which shall bear the words:
"State Board of Examiners of Nurses for Geor-
gia." The certificate of the secretary of said
board under the seal thereof as to the action or
non-action of the board shall be accepted in evi-
dence in the courts of this State as the best evi-
dence of the minutes of the said board; and like-
wise the certificate of the secretary under the said
seal, as to the registration or non-registration of
any person, shall be accepted as the best evidence
as to the registration or non-registration of the
said person under the requirements of this Act.
The secretary shall issue to all nurses admitted to
registration hereunder a certificate under the seal
of the said board, showing that fact.
§ 1711(10). Examinations; Notice.—It shall be
the duty of said board to meet for the purpose of
examining applicants for registration, at least
once in each year, and oftener should it be
deemed necessary by said board. Notice of said
meetings shall be given of the time and place of
said meetings by written notice posted, postage
prepaid, to the last known address of each appli-
cant, at least ten (10) days before the time of
said meeting, and by publication in a daily paper
of general circulation in Atlanta, and in a
nurses' journal, if there be one published in Geor-
gia. The said notice shall be published at the
same rates charged for sheriffs' advertisements.
Said notice shall be inserted at least once, and
the first insertion shall be made at least two
weeks prior to said meeting. Provided, the sec-
retary of said board shall issue a temporary per-
mit to each application for registration, which
permit will authorize said applicant to do nursing
as a registered nurse until the next meeting of the
board.
§ 1711(11). Deposit fee by applicant; dental
nurses.—All graduate nurses making application
for registration as graduate nurses under this Act
shall deposit with the Secretary of the said board,
at the time of making such application, the sum of
ten ($10.00) dollars as an examination or regis-
tration fee. Provided, that no person shall en-
gage in practice as a dental hygienist or dental
nurse without first obtaining a certificate therefor
to be issued by the Board of Dental Examiners
of Georgia, which certificate shall be issued by
said Board of Dental Examiners upon written ex-
amination conducted by and satisfactory to said
board, which shall include the subjects of Dental
Anatomy, Physiology, Bacteriology, Dental
Pathology, Sterilization, Office Routine, and Oral
Hygiene and Prophylaxis. Provided further, that
applicants for certificates as dental hygienists or
dental nurses shall be of good moral character,
shall be at least 19 years of age, shall Have had
such preliminary education and training as may
be prescribed by said Board of Dental Examiners,
and shall pay to said Board of Dental Examin
ers a fee of ten dollars for such examination.
Provided further, that no person to whom such
certificate is issued shall engage in practice as a
dental hygienist or dental nurse except under the
supervision of a licensed denist, and no such per-
son shall practice dentistry, or do any kind of
dental work other than to remove calcareous de-
posits, secretions, and stains from the normally
exposed surfaces of the teeth, and to apply ordi-
nary wash or washes of a soothing character, and
to do sterilization and office routine.
§ 1711(12). Qualifications.—Each applicant for
registration as a graduate nurse must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age, of good moral
character, a graduate of a regular chartered
training-school for nurses, connected with a gen-
eral hospital or sanatorium (in which medical,
surgical, obstetrical, and pediatric cases, and
where men, women, and children, are treated)
where three (3) years of training with a system-
atic course of instruction on the above-mentioned
classes of cases is given in the hospital or other
educational institution, or must have graduated
from a training-school connected with a hospitr: 1
of good standing, supplying a three (3) years'
training corresponding to the above standard,
which training may be obtained in two or more
hospitals. All qualifications of the applicant shaii
be determined by the State Board of Examiners
of Nurses for Georgia, which is empowered to
prescribe such examinations for the applicants as
will best test their fitness and ability to give effi-
cient care to the sick. All applicants at the same
examination shall be subject to the same kind of
examination; provided that the said board shall
have the power to grant advanced credit, not in
any case of excess of twelve (12) months, for
didactic and laboratory work done in an accred-
ited college, or for credits either time or scholas-
tic, earned in an institution other than the one
from which graduated.
§ 1711(13). Registration without examination.
—All nurses graduating on or before June 1, 1909,
from such training-schools as are referred to in
the preceding sections shall be, by that fact, en-
titled to registration without examination, upon
paying the application fee of ten ($10.00) dollars,
as provided in this Act, and submitting sufficient
evidence of good moral character. Nurses who
shall show to the satisfaction of the said board
that they are graduates of training-schools con-
nected with a hospital or sanitorium, giving two
years' systematic course of instruction, or if they
graduated before or during the year 1897 from
such a school giving one year's training, and who
are in good moral and professional standing,
and are engaged in the practice of the profession
of nursing at the passage of this Act, also nurses
in training at the time of the passage of this Act
and shall graduate hereafter and possess the quaH-
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ifications herein specified, shall, upon the pay-
ment, of the application fee, be entitled to regis-
tration without examination, provided application
is made for registration on or before February 1,
1928, There may be an appeal from the judg-
ment of the said board by the party who is re-
fused a license by the board, or whose license is
revoked, as the case may be, if dissatisfied with
the judgment, to a jury of the Superior Court of
the count} 1- of the residence of such dissatisfied
party; said appeal to be had as in other cases now
provided by law.
§ 1711(14). Nursing without certificate from
board; penalty.—After the expiration of six months
from the passage of this Act it shall be unlawful
for any person or persons to practice professional
'nursing as a graduate nurse or registered nurse
in this State without a certificate from said board;
and any person violating any of the provisions of
this Act shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished in accordance
with section 1065 of the Penal Code of the State
of Georgia. Each graduate nurse who registers
in accordance with the provisions hereof shall be
styled and known as a registered nurse, and no
other nurse shall assume or use such title, or use
the abbreviation "R. N.," or any other letters,
words, or figures to indicate that he or she is a
graduate or registered nurse; and a violation
hereof shall be deemed a misdemeanor, and shall
upon conviction be punished accordingly. Annu-
ally during the months of January or February
every registered nurse of Georgia shall be re-
quired to have her certificate validated by the is-
suance of a card attesting to her right to practice
as a registered nurse for the current year. This
request for validation shall be accompanied by a
fee of one ($1.00) dollar, and sent to the secre-
tary of the State Board of Examiners of Nurses
for Georgia. On March 1 of each year the roster
of nurses who have validated their certificates
shall be taken; and the same shall be printed
within sixty days thereafter in such form and
manner as may be determined by the board.
Any certificates not validated may be revoked.
§ 1711(15). Licenses to undergraduate nurses.
—The Board of Examiners of Nurses shall issue
a license to engage in the care of the sick to un-
dergraduate nurses. Each applicant must be at
least nineteen (19) years of age, of good moral
character, must present to the Board of Examin-
ers a certificate showing that he or she has had
at least twelve (12) months training in a regular
chartered training-school for nurses connected
with a general hospital or sanitorium, in which
medical, surgical, obstetrical, and pediatric cases,
and where men, women and children are treated.
§ 1711(16). Fee from undergraduate nurse.—It
shall be the duty of said board of Examiners to
determine all the qualifications of applicants, and
provide for examination for license for undergrad-
uate nurse. Upon filing application for examina-
tion and registration as a licensed undergraduate
nurse, each applicant shall pay a fee of five ($5.00)
dollars, and annually during the months of Jan-
uary or February every licensed undergraduate
nurse shall be required to have her certificate val-
[
idated by the issuance of a card attesting to her
right to practice as a licensed undergraduate nurse
for the current year. This request for validation
shall be accompanied by a fee of fifty (50) cents.
Any certificate not validated may be revoked.
This shall not apply to attendants or orderlies
employed in hospitals. All undergraduate nurses,
practicing at the passage of this Act, and possess-
ing the qualifications herein specified, shall, upon
the payment of the application fee, be entitled to
registration without examination, provided appli-
cation is made for registration on or before Feb-
ruary 1, 1928. After the expiration of six months
after the passage of this Act, it shall be unlawful
for any person or persons to practice as* under-
graduate nurse in this State without a certificate
from said Board of Examiners, except in hos-
pitals; and any person violating any of the pro-
visions of this Act shall be guilty of misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished in
accordance with section 1065 of the Penal Code
of the State of Georgia. Each licensed under-
graduate who registers in accordance with the
provisions hereof shall be styled and known as a
licensed undergraduate nurse, and no other per-
sons shall assume or use such title, or use the
abbreviation "L. U. N.," or other letters, words,
or figures for the purpose of representing that
he or she is a licensed undergraduate nurse within
the meaning of this Act.
§ 1711(17). Emergency nursing.—-This Act
shall not be construed to affect or apply to gra-
tuitous nursing of the sick by friends of the fam-
ily, or as an emergency aid. And this shall not be
construed to affect a situation in the event of pub-
lic emergency pronounced by the State Board of
Health to exist in the State at large, or any part
thereof, or in the event of an emergency declared
by national health authorities, requiring nursing
service within or without the State, in which case
unlicensed persons may be permitted to nurse or
care for the sick for hire during the continuance
thereof.
§ 1711(18). Revocation of certificate; notice to
holder.—The said board may revoke any certifi-
cate issued by it, for sufficient cause to be ad-
judged by it; but no such certificate shall be re-
voked without a hearing, notice of the time and
place of which shall be given to the holder of the
certificate by the secretary at least (30) days be-
fore the day set for said hearing, which notice
shall plainly set forth the charges against the
holder of said certificate, and the trial shall be
only upon the grounds specified. Said notice
shall be mailed to the said person so accused, at
his or her last known address, postage prepaid;
or the same shall be delivered personally to the
person so accused. The presiding officer of the
said board is authorized and empowered to ad-
minister oaths to all witnesses giving evidence at
such hearing, and no evidence shall be received
at such hearing if the same is not under oath.
§ 1711(19). Salary of secretary.—Out of the
funds of the said board, accruing from the appli-
cation fees herein provided, the secretary of said
board shall be paid a salary and all necessary ex-
penses, the salary to be determined by the said
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Board of Examiners. The members of the board
shall be entitled out of the funds to receive not
less than six ($6.00) dollars per day for each day
actually engaged in the service of the board, and
all necessary expenses. All payments out of said
funds, or any funds of the board, shall first be
approved by the presiding officer of said board.
Be it further enacted, that one or more persons
be emploj^ed by the board, to work under the di-
rection of the secretary, and to be paid out of
funds accruing from application fees, to assist in
carrying out the rules and regulations adopted
by the said board, and for giving advice and en-
couragement to nurse-training schools in prepar-
ing applicants for registration. Duties and sala-
ries shall be determined by the board, and shall
be paid as other expenses are paid.
§ 1711(20). Certificates of registration without
examination.—The Board of Examiners shall
have authority to issue certificates of registra-
tion without examination to graduate nurses of
a State other than Georgia, or of a foreign coun-
try, who hold bona fide certificates of registra-
tion issued under the laws of such a State or
foreign country; provided, the standards of reg-
istration are equivalent to those provided in this
Act, and the individual qualifications of the nurse
meet the requirements of this Act. The regis-
tration fee of ten ($10.00) dollars for graduate
nurses herein provided shall accompany each ap-
plication for a certificate. Be it further enacted,
that the Board of Examiners shall have authority
to issue a certificate of registration or license
without examination to undergraduate nurses
registered in a State other than Georgia, or of a
foreign country, whose qualifications meet the
requirements of this Act. The registration fee
of five ($5.00) dollars, as herein provided for un-
dergraduate nurses, shall accompany each appli-
cation for certificate.
§ 1711(21). Continuation of members of ex-
isting board; its books, etc., to be property of
new board.—The membership of the present
Board of Examiners of Nurses for Georgia shall
continue for the terms for which each member
was chosen or appointed; and that the books, rec-
ords, files, furniture, and property of the present
board shall be the property of the board herein
created. The board herein created shall be the
successor or continuation of the board now in
existence, and the acts of the present board here-
tofore done shall continue to be in all respects
valid and lawful, and all registrations heretofore
made or authorized by the said present board
shall continue of full force and effect.
§ 1711(22). Nurses not affected by this Act.—
The provisions of this Act shall not affect nurses
known as practical nurses, not holding themselves
out to be either graduate or undergraduate nurses
within the meaning of this Act.
CHAPTER 11
State Board of Embalming
§ 1717(4). Disinterred bodies.
As to permit where family consents to disinterment, see
note to P. C. 408.
CHAPTER 12
State Board of Pharmacy
§§ 1722 to 1731.—Repealed by the Act of 1927,
pp. 291 et seq., herein codified as §§ 1731(1) et
seq.
§§ 1731(a)-1731(y). Park's Code.
See §§ 1731(1) -1731 (24).
§ 1731(1). Georgia Board of Pharmacy cre-
ated.—There is hereby created and established a
board to be known as the Georgia Board of
Pharmacy, with the duties and powers as are
hereinafter in this Act provided. Acts 1927, p.
291.
§ 1731(2). Members of existing board to be
on new board.—Said board shall consist of five
(5) members, and the members of the now ex-
isting Georgia State Board of Pharmacy shall
continue in office and act as members of the said
Georgia Board of Pharmacy hereby created, with
all the duties and powers as herein provided, un-
til their respective terms of office expire, the va-
cancies as they may occur to be filed in keeping
with the requirements of this Act.
§ 1731(3). Governor to commission members;
term 5 years.—Members of said Georgia Board
of Pharmacy shall be commissioned by the Gov-
ernor, and shall serve for a term of five (5) years,
or until their successors are duly appointed and
qualified. No person shall be eligible for appoint-
ment to membership on said board who is not a
licentiate of the Board of Pharmacy of the State
of Georgia, and who has not been actually en-
gaged for a period of five (5) years or more in
the retail drug business. If any member of said
board after his appointment and qualification shall
cease to be actually engaged in the retail drug
business, his membership on said board shall at
once become vacant; nor shall any person be
eligible to appointment on said board who has
any official connection with any school or col-
lege of pharmacy, and if any member of said
board shall, after his appointment and qualifi-
cation, become connected with any school or col-
lege of pharmacy, his membership on said board
shall immediately become vacant. No member
of the board who has served one full term shall
be eligible to reappointment until there has in-
tervened a period of one (l) full term from the
date of the expiration of his membership to the
date of his reappointment.
§ 1731(4). Annual election of member for
next vacancy.—The Georgia Pharmaceutical As-
sociation shall from its membership annually elect
one member for the next occurring vacancy on
said board, who shall meet the qualifications as
required by this Act. When regularly submitted
to him by the secretary of the said association,
the Governor shall make the appointment for the
vacancy occurring in said board.
§ 1731(5). Unexpired term.—Vacancies occur-
ring other than by expiration of the term of a
member shall be filled for the unexpired term
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only by the member receiving next highest num-
ber of votes at last annual convention of the
Georgia Pharmaceutical Association.
§ 1731(6). Oath of appointee.—The appointee
to said board shall immediately after his appoint-
ment take and subscribe to an oath or affirma-
tion, before a qualified officer, that he will faith-
fully and impartially perform the duties of the
office, which oath shall be filed with the Secretary
of State; whereupon the Secretary of State shall
issue to said appointee a certificate of appoint-
ment.
§ 1731(7). Pay of members.—The members
of said board shall receive as their compensation
the sum of fifteen dollars ($15.00) per day while
in the actual performance of their duties as mem-
bers of said board, and in addition shall receive
their actual traveling expenses while in the per-
formance of their duties on said board, such com-
pensation to be paid out of the funds received by
said board under the provisions of this Act.
§ 1731(8). Organization of board.— The said
board shall, as soon as practicable after this Act
becomes effective, meet and organize and from
their members elect a president, a vice-president,
and a secretary.
§ 1731(9). Secretary's salary.— The said sec-
retary shall be paid a salary for his services, the
amount of the same to be fixed by said board,
and paid out of said funds.
§ 1731(10). Examinations by board, time of.
—The said board shall meet for examination of
applicants for licenses at such place or places,
and at such times, as the board may decide. In
no case shall the board hold more than three
meetings annually.
§ 1731(11). Drugs to be compounded only by
or under supervision of registered pharmacist.—
It shall be unlawful for any proprietor, owner, or
manager of any drug-store or pharmacy to al-
low any person in his employ except a registered
pharmacist to compound or mix any drugs, med-
icines, or poisons for sale, except an employee un-
der the immediate supervision of a registered
pharmacist.
§ 1731(12). Qualifications of Applicants. —
Applicants for registered pharmacists must be not
less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and shall
have at least a high school education with a mini-
mum of sixteen (16) units as are designated by
the Association of Accredited Schools, and not
less than thirty-six (36) months experience in
a drug store or place where poisons are dis-
pensed by a licensed vendor registered under
the laws of the State of his abode, or in lieu of
the foregoing a graduate of a recognized school
of pharmacy; provided, this Act shall not be
construed to affect a person who has had three
(3) years practical experience under the direct
supervision of a registered pharmacist at the
time of the passage of this Act.
§ 1731(13). Examination fee.—Applicants for
examination as registered pharmacists under this
Act shall pay to said board an examination fee
of fifteen dollars ($15.00). All fees shall be
paid to the secretary of said board at the time
of the filing of the application for examination.
Any applicant failing to make the required mark
is entitled to another examination without any
additional charge, provided he takes the second
examination within one (1) year from the first.
§ 1731(14). License to one registered in
another State.—The said board may in its dis-
cretion grant licenses as pharmacists to persons
who furnish proof that they have been regis-
tered as such in some other state, and that they
are of good moral character; provided that such
other State in its examination requires the same
general degree of fitness as is required by the
examination in this State.
§ 1731(15). Election of representative to meet-
ing, of association of other States.—The said
board, in order to determine and be informed
of the status of the boards of other States de-
siring reciprocal registration, and in order to be
advised also regarding the progress of phar-
macy throughout the country, may annually
elect one of their members to meet with like
representatives from other State Boards of
Pharmacy, the expenses of such member in at-
tending such meeting to be paid out of the
funds received by the said board under the pro-
visions of this Act. The said board through its
representatives may, with like representatives
from other State Boards of Pharmacy, join in
creating and maintaining an Association of
members of the several States, to be engaged in
the general advancement of pharmacy and the
keeping of records of reciprocal registration.
§ 1731(16). Refusal or revocation of license.
—Said board may refuse to grant a license to
any person found guilty of a felony, or gross
immorality, or who is addicted to the use of al-
coholic liquors or narcotic drugs to such an
extent as to render him or her unfit for the
practice of pharmacy, and may after due hear-
ing revoke a license for such cause, or revoke
any license which has been procured by fraud.
§ 1731(17). Who may compound or sell
drugs, etc.—No person shall engage in the
compounding or vending of medicines, drugs,
or poisons within the State without full com-
pliance with this Act, except: (1) such drug-
gists as are exempted from the operation of the
present law by the statute of the State of Geor-
gia, and such druggists as have heretofore ob-
tained a license and are legally authorized by
existing laws to compound and vend drugs,
poisons, and chemicals; (2) physicians putting
up their own prescriptions and dispensing med-
icines from their own offices. (3) This item
shall be construed in the interest of the pub-
lic health, and shall not be construed to pro-
hibit the sale by merchants of home remedies,
not poisons, or the sale by merchants of prep-
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arations commonly known as patent or pro-
prietary preparations when sold only in the
original and unbroken packages, Paris green,
arsenate of copper, arsenate of lead, or prep-
arations containing any of these articles used
for killing Lincoln-bugs, cabbage-worms, cater-
pillars, all and similar insects, provided the la-
bels, cartons, and packages containing such
preparations have the word "Poison" printed
across the face, and conform to the United
States Pure Food and Drug Act, and general
merchants other than druggists shall not be re-
quired to register under the provisions of this
Act.
§ 1731(18). Duty of board as to examina-
tion, license, prosecution.—It shall be the duty
of said board to examine all applicants for li-
censes under the provisions of this Act sub-
mitted in proper form, and to grant certificates
of licenses to such persons as may be entitled
to the same. It shall further be the duty of
said board to cause the prosecution of all per-
sons violating the provisions of this Act, and
in all such prosecutions the burden shall be
upon the defendant to show his authority.
§ 1731(19). Fees to go to fund in State
Treasury for pay and expenses of board.—
All monies paid to the secretary in fees or from
other sources shall be paid by him into the
Treasury of the State of Georgia and there
held by the State Treasurer for the payment of
the compensation and expenses by said board
and secretary; the funds arising under the pro-
visions of this Act being hereby especially al-
located under the authority of the General As-
sembly of Georgia for this purpose. After the
compensation of said board, the salary of the
secretary, and expenses of said board and sec-
retary have been paid, the board shall have the
right to establish a reserve or emergency fund
not in excess of $1,000.00, and all surplus over
and above the above-mentioned expenses and
the above-mentioned surplus shall, on the first
day of January of each year, revert to the
Treasury of Georgia, to be placed in the gen-
eral fund of the State.
§ 1731(20). Meaning of "drug-store," "phar-
macy," "apothecary."—The term "drug-store,"
"pharmacy," or "apothecary," wherever used in
this Act, shall be construed to mean a place
where drugs, medicines, or poisons are dis-
pensed, compounded, or sold at retail under the
direction and direct supervision of a person who
is duly licensed and registered by the Georgia
Board of Pharmacy to practice in Georgia.
§ 1731(21). Unlawful use of title "drug-store,"
etc.—It shall be unlawful for any person in con-
nection with any place of business or in any
manner to take, use, or exhibit the title "drug-
store," "pharmacy," "apothecary," or any com-
bination of such titles or any title or description
of like import or any synonym or other term
designated to take the place of such title, unless
such place of business is in fact and in truth a
drug-store or pharmacy as defined in this Act.
§ 1731 (22). Annual registration. — All per-
sons now lawfully engaged in compounding and
vending medicines, drugs, and poisons in this
State, shall, on or before the first day of Janu-
ary following the passage of this Act, and every
person who shall be hereafter duly licensed un-
der the provisions of this Act shall, before
engaging in any business under said license, reg-
ister in the office of the Secretary of the Geor-
gia Board of Pharmacy annually; said registra-
tion shall be entered in a book to be kept for
that purpose by said secretary, his name, na-
tionality, and credentials and date thereof under
which he is entitled to engaged in such voca-
tion at the time of filing such registration, and
a certificate of such registration, stating the
terms of the same, shall be given him by said
secretary.
§ 1731(23). Power to make rules.—The said
Georgia Board of Pharmacy herein provided
shall have the power and authority to make
rules and regulations governing the action of
the board, and to make such other rules and
regulations as they deem necessary to carry out
the intent and provisions of this Act.
§ 1731(24). Violation a misdemeanor.—Any
violation of any provision of this Act shall be
a misdemeanor, and the person so offending
shall be punished as prescribed in section 1065
of the Penal Code.
CHAPTER 15C
Regulation of Billiard Rooms
§ 1762 (20). Billiards defined.
Exercise of Police Power.—The operation of a pool or
billiard room for public entertainment is a business which,
from its very nature, comes within the police power of
the State. Such power may be exercised directly by the
State or indirectly through the medium of the subordi-
nate public corporations of the State. Shaver v. Mar-
tin, 166 Ga. 424, 143 S. E. 402.
CHAPTER 17
Motor Vehicle Laws
ARTICLE 2
Acts 1915, Ex. Sess., and Amendatory Acts
§ 1770(a). Park's Code.
See § 1770(61).
§ 1770(yy). Park's Code.
See § 1762(20).
§ 1770(fff). Park's Code.
See § 1770(26).
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§ 1770(hhh). Park's Code.
See § 1770(28).
§§ 1770(ffff)-1770(gggg). Park's Code.
See § 1896(5).
§§ 1770(pppp)-1770(qqqq). Park's Code.
See §l§ 1896(13) -1896(14).
§ 1770(xxxx-l). Park's Code.
See § 1896(5).
§ 1770(xxxx-2). Park's Code.
See § 1896(13).
§ 1770(26). Schedule of annual fees for ve-
hicles; registry and license of manufacturers
and dealers; number plates; tags for pur-
chasers
;
penalty.
Constitutionality.—The act is not unconstitutional because
it undertakes to tax automobiles, for the construction of pub-
lic roads, and that there is no authority in the General As-
sembly of Georgia to tax personal property in order to raise
a fund for the construction of public roads, §§ 6358 and 6359,
or the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. Lee v. State, 163 Ga. 239, 135 S. E- 912.
The act is not unconstitutional upon the ground that it
violates the constitution, § 6554, which provides that all tax-
ation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects and
ad valorem on all property taxed. Eee v. State, 163 Ga. 239,
135 S. E. 912.
The tax is not a property tax. Eee v. State, 163 Ga. 239,
135 S. E. 912.
§ 1770(28). Display of number-plate.
Constitutionality.—This section is not open to attack on
the ground that it was not one of the subjects included in the
Governor's proclamation convening the legislature in ex-
traordinary session. Eee v. State, 163 Ga. 239, 135 S. E.
912.
ARTICLE 3
Acts 1921, pp. 255 et seq.
§ 1770(50). Equipments.
Purpose of Regulation.—The purpose of these several
regulations of motor-vehicles is the protection of the lives
and limbs of all persons upon or using such streets and
"highways, not only those who may be met, overtaken, or
passed by the driver, but as well for the protection of those
who may accompany him. Black v. State, 34 Ga. App. 449,
451, 130 S. E. 591.
Presumption as to Compliance. — With nothing appearing
to the contrary, it will be assumed that the automobile was
duly equipped with "front lamps" and that they were
"throwing strong white lights to a reasonable distance in
the direction in which such vehicle is proceeding," in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the section. Macon v.
Jones, 36 Ga. App. 799, 803, 138 S. E. 283.
Insufficient Brakes as Negligence Per Se.—The operation
of a truck along .the public streets not equipped with effi-
cient and serviceable brakes, constituted negligence per se.
Orange Crush Bottling Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132
S. E. 259.
This section is not unconstitutional and void because it
amends, without proper reference thereto, the act of 191 !J,
which regulates the use of motor-vehicles, and makes
penal the operation of such vehicles on a public highway
while the operator is drunk. Durham v. State, 166 Ga.
.561, 144 S. E. 109.
§ 1770(51). Speed limit; intersections, etc.;
pedestrians, horses, etc.; passing stationary
street cars, etc.
Insufficient Brakes Negligence Per Se.—The trial court
did not err in instructing the jury that the law requires
motor-vehicles while in use upon the public streets to be
equipped with efficient and serviceable brakes, and that
the operation of the truck along the public streets not so
equipped constituted negligence per se. Orange Crush Bot-
tling Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S. E- 259.
Section Applied.—A charge to the effect that whenever
the operator of any vehicle along a public highway shall
meet a vehicle approaching from an opposite direction, the
operator of the first vehicle shall turn to the right, was
held applicable to the conduct of the plaintiff. Hornbrook
v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 425, 133 S. E- 264.
Not Applicable to Intersecting City Streets.—The second
paragraph of this section does not apply to "intersecting
streets of a city." Shannon v. Martin, 164 Ga. 872, 139
S. E- 671. The court said: "In view of this decision, and
and upon request of counsel for the plaintiff in error, the
case of Faggart v. Rowe, 33 Ga. App. 423, 126 S. E. 731,
is reviewed, and any contrary ruling therein is hereby
overruled." Shannon v. Martin, 37 Ga. App. 343, 140 S.
E- 425.
Railroad Crossing in Cities.—The provisions of this sec-
tion apply to railroad crossings in a city. Atlanta, etc.,
R. Co. v. West, 38 Ga. App. 300, 302, 143 S. E- 785.
Defendant Owner in Car.—The exact question here in-
volved seems not to have been decided by this court.
But in other jurisdictions it has been decided. In Com-
monwealth v. Sherman, 191 Mass. 439, 78 N. E- 98, the
fourth headnote is as follows: "In a prosecution for ope-
rating an automobile at an excessive rate of speed, proof
that the machine, which was registered with the Mass-
achusetts Highway Commission by defendant in his own
name, was being run by the operator at an illegal speed
while defendant was in the tonneau, established prima
facie that defendant, having power to control the ma-
chine, either knew, or allowed it to be illegally run, and
was therefore guilty." Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467,
470, 139 S. E. 77.
No Exception in Favor of Police Officers.—This section
limiting the speed of motor vehicles approaching a sharp
curve contains no exception in favor of police officers.
Hudson v. Carton, 37 Ga. App. 634, 141 S. E. 222.
§ 1770(52). Passing moving vehicles.
Constitutionality.—So much of the section as undertakes
to make penal the failure of the operator of a motor-vehicle,
when meeting a vehicle approaching in the opposite direc-
tion, to "turn his vehicle to the right so as to give one
half of the traveled roadway, if practicable, and a fair op-
portunity to the other to pass by without unnecessary inter-
ference" is too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be
capable of enforcement. Heath v. State, 36 Ga. App. 206,
136 S. E- 284. See also Hale v. State, 21 Ga. App. 658, 94
S. E- 823, holding the corresponding section of the Act of
1915 [§ 1770(34)] unconstitutional.
What Constitutes Meeting.—Where a motor-car travel-
ing along a public highway has been brought to a stop in
the highway, and another car is approaching it from the
front, both cars, notwithstanding one is stationary, are
meeting each other in the sense of the section. Roberts v.
Phillips, 35 Ga. App. 743, 134 S. E- 837.
Passage on Narrow Bridge. — Charges in an indictment
that the defendant failed and refused to give the deceased a
fair opportunity to pass by without unnecessary interference
it being practical to give one-half of the travelled roadway,
were not sustained by the proof, where the evidence showed
that the cars collided on a temporary bridge which was
less than twelve feet wide and too narrow to permit two au-
tomobiles to pass each other thereon. Shupe v. State, 36
Ga. App. 286, 287, 136 S. E- 331.
Bridges—Sufficiency of Guard-Rails. — There is no legal
duty on a railroad company to construct the guard-rails of
a bridge sufficiently strong to withstand the impact of an
automobile going at the rate of twenty to twenty-five miles
per hour. Corley v. Cobb County, 21 Ga. App. 219, 93 S. E.
1015; Eberhart v. Seaboard Air-Eine R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 49,
55, 129 S. E. 2.
Applied in Kamper Grocery Co. v. Sauls, 38 Ga. App.
487, 144 S. E. 403.
§ 1770(53). Warning.
Sounding Horn at Intersections. -There is no statute
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this State requiring the operator of a motor-vehicle to sound
a horn or give any other warning on approaching the inter-
section of public streets or highways, unless such intersec-
tion is a "dangerous place upon such street or highway."
O'Donnelly v. Stapler, 34 Ga. App. 637, 131 S. E. 91.
An allegation that defendant failed to give any warning
whatever on approaching an intersection did not amount to
a charge of negligent violation of a statute, although it
sufficiently specified, in connection with other parts of the
petition, that the defendant was negligent in the violation
of his duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to the
plaintiff's automobile at such intersection. O'Donnelly v.
Stapler, 34 Ga. App. 637, 131 S. E- 91.
§ 1770 (54). Accidents.
Petition Held Subject to Special Demurrer.—The peti-
tion in this case, by which the plaintiff sought to recover
for injuries inflicted by an automobile when he was walk-
ing on a public highway, and which alleged, as specific
acts of negligence contributing to the injuries, the fail-
ure of the defendants to stop after the infliction of the
injuries, and their failure to give the name and address
of the operator and the name and address of the owner
of the automobile as required by this section was sub-
ject to the special demurrer as to these and other allega-
tions in regard to the conduct of the defendant after the
injuries had been inflicted. Springer v. Adams, 37 Ga.
App. 344, 140 S. K. 390.
§ 1770(55). Chauffeur's license.
Roads to Which Applicable.—While it is unlawful for a
minor under sixteen years of age to operate a motor vehicle
upon the public highways, the rule is not applicable to roads
which are not public streets or highways. W. & A. R. R.
v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 544, 134 S. E. 134.
Effect of Presence of Owner—Experience. — It is unlawful
for a minor under sixteen years of age to operate a motor-
vehicle upon the highways of this State, whether he is ac-
companied by the owner of the machine or not, and regard-
less of experience. Western, etc., Railroad v. Reed, 35 Ga.
App. 538, 544, 134 S. E. 134.
§ 1770 (56). Qualification of chauffeur.
The evidence authorized a conviction of a violation of
that part of the motor-vehicle law which provides that
no person shall take, use, or operate any motor-vehicle
upon the public streets and highways without the per-
mission of the owner. Carter v. State, 38 Ga. App. 182,
143 S. E. 441.
ARTICLE 3A.
Acts of 1927 pp. 226 et seq.
§ 1770(60a). Secretary of state, ex-officio com-
missioner of vehicles.—After the passage of this
Act the Secretary of State shall be ex-officio Com-
missioner of vehicles of this State, and shall be
charged with the execution of the Act hereafter
enacted. Acts 1927 p. 227.
§ 1770 (60b). Definitions.—For the purpose of
this Act the following definitions shall apply:
"Vehicle"—Any contrivance used for trans-
portation of persons or property on public high-
ways.
"Motor-vehicle"—Any vehicle, except tractors,
propelled by power other than muscular power,
not operated exclusively upon tracks.
"Motorcycle" — Any motor-vehicle having but
two main wheels in contact with the ground, up-
on which the operator sits astride. A motorcycle
may carry a one wheel attachment generally known
as a side-car.
"Tractor" — Any self-propelled vehicle designed
for use as a traveling power-plant or for drawing
other vehicles, but having no provision for carry-
ing loads independently.
"Trailer"—Any vehicle without motive powei,
designed for carrying persons or property either
partially or wholly on its own structure and for
being drawn by a self-propelled vehicle, except
those running exclusively on tracks.
"Pneumatic tires"—Tires of rubber and fabric
inflated with air.
"Solid tires"—Tires of rubber or similarly elas-
tic material that do not depend on confined air for
the support of the load.
"Metallic tires"—Tires of any metal or other
hard material.
"Manufacturer," "dealer"—Any person, firm, or
corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, pur-
chase or leasing1 of motor vehicles or tractors.
"Owner"—Any person, firm, corporation or as-
sociation holding title to a vehicle or having ex-
clusive right to the use thereof for a period of more
than thirty days.
"Operator"—Any person who drives or operates
a motor-vehicle or tractor.
"Chauffeur"—An operator for hire.
"Local authorities"—All officers and public offi-
cials of the State, municipalities, and counties of
the State.
"Trucks".—"A motor-vehicle for the transpor-
tation of property or non-passenger carrying
motor-vehicles/'
For the puroose of this Act
—
A vehicle is considered equipped with pneu-
matic tires when pneumatic tires are used on all
wheels.
A vehicle is considered equipped with solid
tires when solid tires are used on two or more
wheels.
A vehicle is considered equipped with metallic
tires when metallic tires are used on two or more
wheels.
The National Automobile Chamber o f Com-
merce horse-power rating formula is hereby
adopted as the standard for determining the
horse-power of passenger-carrying vehicles.
§ 1770(60c). Registration. — That every owner
of a motor-vehicle, trailer, tractor (except tractors
used only for agricultural purposes) or motor-
cycle shall, on or before the first day of February
in each year, before he shall operate such motor-
vehicle, tractor, trailer or motorcycle, register
such vehicle in the office of the Commissioner of
Vehicles, and obtain a license to operate the same
for the ensuing year; and every chauffeur em-
ployed to operate motor-vehicles shall likewise
register and obtain a license as hereinafter pro-
vided.
That application for the registration of a motor-
vehicle, trailer, tractor or motorcycle shall be
made to the Commissioner of Vehicles, upon
blanks prepared by him for such purposes, by the
owner. Such application shall contain a state-
ment of the name, place of residence, and address
of the applicant, together with a brief description
of the vehicle to be registered, its name, model,
the name of the manufacturer, its motor number,
its shipping weight, carrying capacity, and such
other information as the Commissioner of Ve-
hicles may require.
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Provided, that nothing in this Act shall be
construed as repealing the Act approved August
22, 1925, requiring proof of ownership, certifi-
cate of registration and money-order receipt, fif-
teen-day permit, and penalty for violation of said
Act. pages 315 to 317 inclusive of Georgia Laws
of 1925.
That application for a chauffeur's license shall
be made to the Commissioner of Vehicles upon
blanks prepared for such purpose by him, and
shall be signed and verified by oath or affirma-
tion. Such application shall be made annually on
or before the first day of February, and shall
contain a statement of the name and address of
the chauffeur, and such other information as the
Commissioner of Vehicles may require, and shall
be signed and endorsed by at least three respon-
sible owners of motor-vehicles and employers of
chauffeurs; provided that no such license shall be
issued to any person under sixteen years of age.
A fee of $2.00 shall accompany the application.
Upon receipt of such application and the payment
of the required fee, the Commissioner of Vehicles
shall file the application, register the same, assign
to the applicant a distinctive number, and make
the same a matter of record in his office. He
shall likewise furnish such chauffeur a badge,
which badge shall be evidence of his right to act
as chauffeur until the first day of February of the
next year following. Such badge shall be of
aluminum or some other suitable metal, oval in
form, the greater diameter not to exceed two
inches and there shall be stamped thereon the
words "Registered Chauffeur No. (Here insert
the registration number designated) State of
Georgia." The badges shall be of uniform size,
numbered consecutively, beginning with the fig-
ure 1, and shall be issued in consecutive order and
of different design each year. The chauffeur
shall at all times, while operating a motor-vehicle
upon public streets and highways, wear his badge
pinned to his clothing in a conspicuous place. No
registered chauffeur shall voluntarily or other-
wise permit any other person to wear his badge,
nor shall any person wear a chauffeur's badge be-
longing to any other person, or a fictitious badge,
while operating a motor-vehicle upon the public
streets and highways.
Exception that the court erred in changing the exact lan-
guage of this section, because the accusation made no
reference to the "owner" and did not warrant the charge,
is not meritorious. Cumbie v. State, 38 Ga. App. 744, 145
S. E. 667.
§ 1770(60d). Registration, licensing, and per-
mit fees.—The annual fees for licensing of the
operation of vehicles shall be as follows for each
vehicle registered:
A.
B.
C.
For
For
Motorcycle $ 5.00
Motorcycle side-car 3.00
Passenger-carrying motor-vehicles fifty
(50) cents per one hundred (100)
pounds (or major fraction thereof)
gross weight of vehicle; minimum fee. 11.25
each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of one ton capacity or
less 15.00
each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of more than one and
not exceeding one and one half tons
capacity 22.50
For each non-passenger carrying i -votor-
vehicle or truck of one and on. half
tons and not exceeding two tons capa-
city 30.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of more than two tons
and not exceeding two and one half
tons capacitv 37.50
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of more than two and
one half tons capacity and not exceed-
ing three tons capacity 45.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than three tons
capacity and not exceeding three and
one half tons capacity 52.50
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than three and
one half tons capacity and not exceed-
ing four tons capacity 75.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than four tons ca-
pacity and not exceeding five tons ca-
pacity 150.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than five tons
capacity and not exceeding six tons ca-
pacity 375.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than six tons ca-
pacity and not exceeding seven tons ca-
pacity 750.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than seven tons
capacity 1,125.00
H. Trailers (or semi-trailers), when equip-
ped with pneumatic tires, one dollar
($1.00) per one hundred (100) pounds
(or major fraction thereof) gross
weight of vehicle.
K. Trailers (or semi-trailers), when equip-
ped with solid tires, one dollar and fifty
cents ($1.50) per one hundred (100)
pounds (or major fraction thereof)
gross weight of vehicle.
L. Trailers (or semi-trailers), when equip-
ped with metallic tires, two dollars
($2.00) per one hundred (100) pounds
(or major fraction thereof) gross weight
of vehicle.
T. Tractors when equipped with pneumatic
tires 15.00
V. Tractors equipped with solid or metallic
tires or treads 30.00
Provided, that tractors used exclusively for
agricultural purposes shall not be required to
register or to pay any fees.
Provided, that hearses and ambulances shall
pay the rates prescribed for passenger-carrying
motor-vehicles in paragraph C.
§ 1770 (60e). Half-Rate fees between Aug. 1
and Jan. 1.—Where application is made for the
registration of any vehicle or tractor between the
dates of August 1st and January 1st of any year,
the fee charged for such registration shall be one
half the amount set forth in section 1770 (60d).
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§ 1770 (60f). Receipt for post-office order as
permit.—When application is made for the regis-
tration of any vehicle or tractor and a United
States post-office money-order is purchased for
the correct fee and forwarded with said applica-
tion, the receipt for said money-order, when
dated by the proper authority, shall serve as a fif-
teen-day permit to operate the vehicle or tractor
on the highways of the State.
§ 1770(60g). Registration of makers and deal-
ers.—Manufacturers and dealers engaged in the
manufacture, sale, or leasing of motor-vehicles or
tractors shall register with the Commissioner of
Vehicles, making application for a distinguishing
dealer's number, specifying the name and make
of motor-vehicle manufactured, sold, or leased by
them, upon blanks prepared by the Commis
sioner of Vehicles for such purposes, and pay
therefor a fee of twenty-five ($25.00) dollars,
which fee shall accompany such application, and
for which said fee the Commissioner of Vehicles
shall furnish to said dealers two number-plates to
be known as a dealer's number and to be dis-
tinguished from the number-plates herein pro-
vided for by a different and distinguishing color
to be determined by the Commissioner of Ve-
hicles, with the word "Dealer" on same; dealers
number to be for the purpose of demonstrating
or transporting dealer's vehicles for sale or lease.
No dealer or manufacturer may use or permit to
be used a dealer's number for private use or on
cars for hire, or other manner not provided for in
this section. In case dealers or manufacturers
desire more than two tags, they shall so state on
the application, and, in addition to the fee of
twenty-five (25.00) dollars hereinabove provided,
shall pay ten ($10.00) for each and every addi-
tional number-plate furnished.
§ 1770 (60h). Number-Plates—description, and
how attached.—Upon receipt of the application
and the payment of the required fee, the Commis-
sioner of Vehicles shall file the application,
register the vehicle, assign to it a distinctive serial
number, and make the same a matter of record.
He shall furnish also without cost two metal num-
ber-plates showing thereon the serial number
designated to such vehicle. Number-plates shall
be of metal at least seven (?) inches wide and
not less than sixteen (16) inches in length, an^l
shall show in bold characters the year of registra-
tion, serial number, and abbreviation of the name
of the State, and such other distinctive markings
as in his judgment the Commissioner of Vehicles
may deem advisable, so as to indicate the class of
weight of the vehicle for which the number-plates
were issued. Duplicate number-plates, when one
of the originals have been lost, defaced, or de-
stroyed, may be obtained from the Commissioner
of Vehicles upon filing affidavit setting forth the
facts of such loss or destruction, and the payment
of a fee of one dollar. A number, when issued,
shall not be transferred from one vehicle to an-
other, and shall not be used by any person or up-
or any motor-vehicle [other than the motor-
vehicle] to which it is assigned, and any use
of said number by any person or persons in
any manner not provided for in this Act shall
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be a violation of said Act; provided, however, thac
where a motor-vehicle has been duly registered in
the office of the Commissioner of Vehicles, and
the number assigned to said vehicle for the year,
the owner of said motor-vehicle to which said
number has been assigned may, upon sale or ex-
change of said motor-vehicle, transfer and assign
the number assigned to said motor-vehicle to the
purchaser of said machine, by registering such
transfer in the office of the Commissioner of
Vehicles and the payment of fifty cents, which
shall accompany said transfer or registration, and
upon said transfer the assignee of said number
shall stand in the position of the original personal
in whose name such number is recorded.
Every motor-vehicle, tractor, trailer, or motor-
cycle, which is in use upon the highways of the
State, shall at all times display the number-
plates assigned to it, and the same shall be
fastened to both the front and rear of the ma-
chine in a position so as not to swing, and shall
be at all times plainly visible. It shall be the
duty of the operator of any motor-vehicle to keep
both number-plates legible at all times.
Exception that the law on which count of the accusa-
tion was based and had been repealed by the act of 1927,
is not meritorious, that count being grounded squarely
upon this section. Cumbie v. State, 38 Ga. App. 747, 145
S. E. 667.
§ 1770(60i). Lights and brakes.—Every motor-
vehicle, tractor, and motorcycle, while in use or
operation upon the streets or highways of this
State, shall at all times be provided and equipped
with efficient and serviceable brakes and signal-
ling device, consisting of a horn, bell, or other
suitable device for producing an abrupt warning
signal. Every motor-vehicle using the highways
of this State at night shall be equipped with a
lamp or lamps clearly visible for a distance of not
less than one hundred feet from front and rear.
"Front Lamp"—Every motor-vehicle and trac-
tor shall be provided with at least two lamps of
approximately equal candle-power, mounted on
the right and left sides thereof, and every
motorcycle shall have mounted on the front
thereof at least one lamp. The front lamps shall
throw light to a reasonable distance in the direc-
cion in which such vehicle is proceeding. Front
lamps shall be provided with a suitable device for
dimming or changing focus, so as to prevent
dangerously glaring or dazzling rays from the
lamps in the eyes of approaching drivers.
"Rear Lamps" — Every motor-vehicle, tractor,
and trailer shall have on the rear thereof, and to
the left of the axis thereof, one lamp capable of
displaying a red light visible for a distance of at
least one hundred feet behind such vehicle; pro-
vided that when a vehicle is used in conjunction
with another vehicle or vehicles, only the last of
such vehicles shall be required to carry such
lamp. Every motor-vehicle, tractor, trailer, or
motorcycle, when on highways of this State at
night, shall carry a lamp illuminating with white
lights the rear registration plate of such vehicle,
so that the characters thereon shall be visible for
a distance of at least fifty feet.
Provided, that the provisions of this section as
to lights, horns, bells, and or other signalling de-
vices shall not apply to tractors used exclusively
]
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for agricultural purposes when and while being
operated upon public roads between daylight and
dark only; and such lights, horns or other, signal-
ling devices shall not be required for such agricul-
tural tractors not using the public roads.
Provided, that the provisions of this Act requir-
ing front and rear lights on vehicles shall not
apply to horse or mule drawn vehicles or other
vehicles drawn by muscular power.
§ 1770(60j). Non-Residents License.—Motor
vehicles owned by non-residents of the State may
be used and operated on the public streets and
highways for a period of thirty days without hav-
ing to register and obtain a license to do so or a
chauffeur's license; provided, that the owner or
owners thereof shall have fully complied with the
laws requiring the registration of motor-vehicles
in the State or Territory of their residence, and
that the registration number and initial letter of
such State or Territory shall be displayed and
plainly visible on such vehicle or vehicles. In other
respects, however, motor-vehicles owned by non-
residents of the State and in use temporarily with-
in the State shall be subject to the provisions of
this Act; provided, no resident of this State shal 1
be allowed to operate a motor-vehicle within this
State under a license issued by another State.
§ I770(60k). Restrictions as to speed. — No
persons shall operate a motor-vehicle upon any
public street or highway at a speed greater than
is reasonable and safe, having due regard for the
width, grade, character, traffic, and common use
of street or highway, or so as to endanger life or
limb or property in any respect whatsoever; but
said speed shall not exceed those tabulated be-
low:
Total gross combined
weight of motor ve- Speed in miles per hour
hide and load in Kind of Tires
pounds. Metallic Solid Pneumatic
Less than 10,000 10 25 40
10,000 to 16,000 8 20 25
Over 16,000 5 18 20
§ 1770(601). Restrictions as to traffic.—Every
person operating a vehicle upon the highways ot
this State shall observe the following traffic rules
and regulations:
a. All vehicles not in motion shall be placed with
their right sides as near the right side of the high-
way as practicable, except on city streets where
traffic is obliged to move in one direction only.
b. Slow-moving vehicles shall at all times be
operated as close to the right-hand side of the
highway as practicable.
c. An operator meeting another vehicle coming
from the opposite direction on the same highway
shall turn to the right of the center on the high-
way, so as to pass without interference.
d. An operator of a vehicle overtaking another
vehicle going in the same direction, and desiring
to pass the same, shall pass to the left of the ve-
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hide overtaken, provided that the way ahead is
clear of approaching traffic, but if the way is not
clear he shall not pass unless the width of the
roadway is sufficient to allow his vehicle to pass
to the right of the center thereof in the direction
in which his vehicle is moving; provided further,
that no operator shall pass a vehicle from the rear
at the top of a hill or on a curve where the view
ahead is in any way obscured or while the vehicle
is crossing an intersecting highway. An operator
overtaking and desiring to pass a vehicle shall
blow his horn, and the operator of the vehicle so-
overtaken shall promptly, upon such signal, turn
his vehicle as far as reasonably possible to the
right in order to allow free passage on the left of
his vehicle.
e. An operator in rounding curves shall reduce
speed and shall keep his vehicle as far to the right
on the highway as reasonably possible.
f. An operator intending to start, to stop, or to
turn his vehicle to the left or right shall extend
the hand and arm horizontally from and beyond
the left side of the vehicle.
g. An operator of a vehicle shall have the right
of way over the operator of another vehicle who
is approaching from the left in an intersecting
highway, but shall give the right of way to an
operator of a vehicle approaching from the right
on an intersecting highway.
h. An operator of a vehicle shall bring the same
to a full stop not less than five feet from the rear
of any street-car or passenger-carrying bus headed
in the same direction, which has stopped for the
purpose of taking on or discharging passengers,
and shall remain standing until such car has taken
on or discharged said passengers; provided, how-
ever, that said operator may pass such street car
where a safety zone is established by proper au-
thorities, or where said operator may pass such
car at a distance of at least eight feet therefrom,
and provided further that he shall have slowed
down and proceeded cautiously.
i. An operator shall reduce speed at crossing
or intersection of highways, on bridges, or sharp
curves and steep descents, and when passing any
animal being led on the highway.
j. An operator shall not use the cut-out of a
motor-vehicle while on the highways of this State.
k. An operator of a motor-vehicle or tractor
shall sound his horn or other signalling device
when approaching points on the highways where
the view ahead is not clear or where the view of
the side of an intersecting highway is obstructed;
provided that in no such case shall such horn or
signalling device be used for the purpose of mak-
ing unnecessary noise.
I. All vehicles carrying poles or other objects
which project more than five feet from the rear
shall, during the period of from one half hour
after sunset to one half hour before sunrise, carry
a red light at or near the rear end of the pole or
other object so projecting. During the period of
from one half hour before sunrise to one half
hour after sunset vehicles shall carry a danger-
signal at or near the rear end of pole or other
object so projecting.
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§ 1770(60m). Restriction as to operators. —
No person shall operate a motor-vehicle or
motorcycle upon any public street or highway,
whether as owner or operator of such vehicle, if
under sixteen years of age, or while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquors or drugs; and no
person shall take, use, or operate any motor-ve-
hicle or motorcycle upon the public streets and
highwa}'S without the permission of the owner
thereof.
§ 1770 (60n). In case of accident.—In case of
accident to any person or damage to any prop-
erty upon the public street or highway, due to the
operation of a motor-vehicle, tractor, or trailer
thereon, the operator of such machine shall im-,
mediately stop, and, upon request of the person
iniured or sustaining damage thereby, or of any
other person present, give such person his name
and address, and if he is not the owner of such
vehicle, then in addition the name and address of
the owner thereof, and further he shall render
such assistance as may be reasonable or neces-
sary.
The last clause of section 14 if the motor-vehicle law
of 1927 (Ga. L. 1927, p. 239), to wit, "he shall render such
assistance as may be reasonable or necessary," is too
vague, indefinite, and uncertain to be capable of en-
forcement, and therefore can not properly form the bas's
of a criminal prosecution. For this reason the court erred
in overruling the demurrer to the accusation. Hurst v.
The State, 39 Ga. App. 522, 147 S. E. 782.
§ 1770 (60o). Restriction as to size. — No ve-
hicle shall be operated on the highways of this
State whose width, including load, is greater than
ninety-six (96) inches (except traction engines,
whose width shall not exceed one hundred and
eight (108) inches, a greater height than twelve
(12) feet, six (6) inches, or a greater length than
thirty (30) feet; and no combination of vehicles
coupled together shall be so operated whose total
length, including load, shall be greater than
eighty five (85) feet; provided, that in special
cases vehicles whose dimensions exceed the fore-
going may be operated under permits granted as
hereinafter provided.
§ 1770 (60p). Restriction as to weight. — No
vehicle of four wheels or less, whose gross
weight, including load, is more than 22,000
pounds, no vehicle having a greater weight than
17,600 pounds on one axle, and no vehicle having
a load of over eight hundred (800) pounds per
inch width of tire upon any wheel concentrated
upon the surface of the highways (said width in
the case of rubber tires to be measured between
the flanges of the rim) shall be operated on the
highways of this State; provided, that in special
cases vehicles whose weight, including loads, ex-
ceed those herein prescribed may be operated
under special permits granted as hereinafter pro-
vided. Provided further, that the State High-
way Commission may designate certain roads or
sections of roads on the State-Aid Highway Sys-
tem on which the traffic requirements do not
justify heavy type of pavement at the present
time, and the said State Highway Commission
may prescribe the maximum gross weight of ve-
hicle, including load, which may be operated over
the sections thus designated.
§ 1770 (60q). Restriction on wheels.—No load
or vehicle any portion of which drags or slides on
the surface of the roadways shall be used or
transported on the highways of this State; no
v-ehicle shall be used or transported on the high-
ways of this State the wheels of which while be-
ing used or transported, either from construction
or otherwise, cause pounding on the road surface.
No vehicle equipped with solid rubber tires shall
be used or transported on the highways of this
State, unless every solid rubber tire on such ve-
hicle shall have rubber on its entire traction sur-
face at least one inch thick above the edge of the
flange on the entire periphery. No vehicle shall
be used or transported on the highways of this
State the wheels of which have on the surface any
wooden or metal cleets, spikes, corrugations, or
other irregularities which tend to damage the
surface of the road; provided that this section
shall not be taken to prohibit the use of tire
chains.
§ 1770 (60r). Permits for extra size or weight.
— The special permit required by sections
1770(60p), 177O(60q) and 1770(60r) of this ar-
ticle, for the operation of a vehicle whose size or
weight with load exceeds the limits prescribed by
this Act, shall be in writing and be issued at the
discretion of the State Highway Engineer of this
State, or of those officials of the State's political
subdivisions who have charge of the highways
and bridges over which vehicle is to operate.
Such permit may be issued for a single trip or
for a definite period not beyond the expiration of
the vehicle registration, and may designate the
highways and bridges to be used.-
§ 1770 (60s). Municipal regulations of autos.—
That nothing contained in this Act shall be con-
strued as changing or interfering with any regu
lation or ordinance which has heretofore or may
hereafter be adopted by any municipality of this
State, regulating the running or operation of
motor-vehicles described in this Act; and pro-
vided further, that nothing in this Act shall pre-
vent cities and towns from regulating, by reason-
able ordinance, the rate of speed except as pro-
vided hereinafter, noisy cut-outs, and glaring
headlights within said cities and towns; provided,
further that nothing herein shall prevent incor-
porated cities and towns from requiring by ordi-
nance the owners of motor-vehicles residing
within the incorporated limits of said cities or
towns to register the number of State license
with the clerk of council or other officer to be
designated by such city or town, together with a
brief description of such motor-vehicle, and said
incorporated cities or towns shall have the power
to provide a penalty for the violation of such or-
dinance; provided, no additional license fee shall
be charged by any municipality.
§ 1770 (60t). Expense of operation.—That the
necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of
this law shall be defrayed out of the sums col-
lected thereunder, and the amount thereof shall
be fixed annually in advance upon an itemized
budget-sheet submitted by the Commissioner of
Vehicles, thirty days prior to the meeting of the
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General Assembly, accompanied by an itemized
report of the expenditures made for the preced-
ing year, when approved by the Governor of this
State. Said expense fund, or so much thereof as
shall be needed, shall be drawn upon the war-
rants of the Governor, supported by bills of par-
ticulars and vouchers submitted by the Commis-
sioner of Vehicles; provided said expense fund
as shown by said approved budget-sheets shall
be set aside out of the first collection made here-
under in any fiscal year, and provided the sums
used to defray said expenses shall not exceed 5
per cent, of the total revenue derived under this
Act.
§ 1770 (60u). Disbursement of fees.—That the
full amount of the fees collected under this Act
shall be turned over to the State Treasury by the
Commissioner of Vehicles within thirty days
after collection, in such manner as the State
Treasurer may prescribe, and that it shall be the
duty of the State Treasurer to set aside from said
fees the sum authorized by the budget-sheet as
prescribed under section 21 thereof.
§ 1770(60v). Salary Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles.— The Secretary of State is hereby au-
thorized to employ a clerk whose duty it shall be
to keep a full record of all motor-vehicle owners
in a book to be kept for that purpose. He shail
file registration alphabetically by counties, and
shall furnish each year to the county commissioner
or ordinaries, and also the tax-receivers of the
several counties, a list of all owners of motor-
vehicles of their respective counties who have
registered in this office. He shall perform any
and every duty pertinent to his office under the
direction of the Secretary of State. The salary of
said clerk shall be two hundred dollars per month,
payable out of the fees received for the registra-
tion of motor-vehicles; and the salary of the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall be one hun-
dred and fifty dollars per month, payable out of
the fees received for the registration of motor
vehicles.
§ 1770(60w). Throwing things on highways.™
That every owner or operator of a machine shall
have equal rights upon the highways of this State
with all other users of such highways; and no per-
son or peisons shall throw glass, nails, tacks, or
other obstructions upon the public highways used
and traversed by automobiles, or unreasonably ob-
struct or impede the right of travel of such owner
or operator while operating, propelling, or driving
such machine; and no person or persons shall give
any signal or signs of distress or danger or call
for assistance upon a person lawfully operating
any such machine on any of the public highways
of this State, maliciously and without reasonable
cause for so doing.
§ 1770(60x). Sheriff's duties defined—inspector.
—That the Commissioner of Vehicles shall at least
twice in each year call the attention of the sheriff's
constables, and marshals in this State, to the pro-
visions of this Act, and furnish once each quarter
to the sheriffs and clerks of the county commis-
sioners of each county, for file in his office, a list
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of such vehicles as are registered from the county
in which said sheriff and clerk hold office; and it
shall be the duty of all local authorities in every
county to make investigation as to the violation of
the provisions of this Act, and said local authorities
shall have authority, and it is hereby made their
duty, to swear out warrant and prosecute any and
all owners of motor vehicles who violate any of
the provisions of this Act. The cost of the
sheriffs, constables, and marshals shall be paid in
the same manner as other criminal costs are paid
under the law.
§ 1770(60y). Deputies from highway depart-
ment, to enforce law.—It shall be the duty of the
Commissioner of Vehicles to deputize such em-
ployees of the State Highway Department as may
be requested by the State Highway Board, for
the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this
Act. The State Highway Board is hereby au-
thorized to select from its employees men to be
deputized by the Commissioner of Vehicles, and
such deputies are hereby given the necessary
police powers for the purpose of enforcing this
Act. There shall be a motor-vehicle license in-
spector to be appointed by the Secretary of State,
who shall have authority to swear out warrants
for violations of the motor-vehicle law, and to
oerform any other duty required by the Secretary
of State.
§ 1770(60z). Penalty for violation of this Act.—
Any person violating the provisions of this Act
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and up-
on conviction thereof shall be punished as for a
misdemeanor. It is the duty of every arresting
officer both county, municipal and State, to en-
force the provisions of this Act.
§ 1770(60aa). Civil action not abridged. — No-
thing in this Act shall be construed to curtail or
abridge the right of any person to prosecute a
civil action for damages sustained by reason ol
injury to a person or property, resulting from the
negligent use of the public streets or highways by
a motor-vehicle or motorcycle, or by its owner, his
employee, or by any other operator thereof.
§ 1770 (60bb). Constitutionality of Act.—That
should any of the provisions of this Act be held
illegal or unconstitutional, the same shall not
vitiate the remaining provisions of said Act, but
all such provisions not held illegal or unconstitu-
tional shall remain of full force and effect.
§ 1770(60cc). When effective.—This Act shall
not take effect until February 1st, 1928; provided,
however, that section 1770(60h) shall take
effect on such date subsequent to February 1st,
1928, as the Commissioner of Vehicles in his di-
rection finds practicable.
ARTICLE 3B
Automobile Dealers' Monthly Reports
§ 1770(60dd). Monthly reports to Secretary of
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State; penalty.—Every person, firm, or corpora-
tion engaged in the business of selling automo-
biles shall be required to report in writing
monthly to the Secretary of State, either by de-
positing said report in the United States mails
or by sending the same by hand, a description of
all cars sold by such dealer during that month,
including the make of the machine sold, the
number of the (machine sold, and the name and
address of the purchaser to whom sold, the said
report to be sent in not later than the tenth of
each month. Any person engaged in the busi-
ness of selling automobiles who shall violate the
provisions of this section, by failing to send in
the report herein required, 'shall be punished as
for a misdemeanor. Acts 1929, p. 213, § 1.
ARTICLE 3C
Motor Vehicle Carriers of 1929
§ 1770(60ee). Title of Act.—This act may be
cited as "Motor-Carriers Act of 1929." Acts
1929, p. 294, § 1.
§ 1770(60ff). Definitions.—When used in this
Act, unless expressly stated otherwise,
—
(a) The term "person" shall include an indi-
vidual, a firm, copartnership, corporation, an as-
sociation or a joint stock association.
Ob) The term "commission" means the Geor-
gia Public Service Commission.
(c) The term "motor carrier" means every
corporation or person owning, controlling, oper-
ating, or managing any motor-propelled vehicle
(and the lessees, or receivers, or trustees
thereof, appointed by any court whatsoever)
used in the business of transporting persons or
property for hire over any public highway in this
State and not operated exclusively within the in-
corporated limits of any city or town; provided,
that the term "motor carrier" as used in this Act
shall not include, and this Act shall not apply to:
(1) Motor-vehicles engaged solely in trans-
porting school children and teachers;
(2) Or operated exclusively in transporting
agricultural, horticultural, or dairy, or other farm
products from the point of production to market,
when such motor-vehicle is owned or operated
by the manufacturer or producer of such
products;
(3) Motor-vehicles operated exclusively with-
in the incorporated limits of cities or towns;
(4) Taxicabs, or trucks of baggage-transfer
companies, which are operated principally within
the incorporated limits of cities or towns, but
which may in the prosecution of their regular
business occasionally go beyond the limits of
the city or town in which they operate, and
which do not operate between such city or town
and fixed termini outside of such city or town
limits;
(5) Hotdl passenger or baggage motor-ve-
hicles when used exclusively for its patrons and
employees.
(d) The term "public highway" means every
public street, road, highway, or thoroughfare of
any kind in this State used by the public.
(e) The term "certificate" means a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, issued un-
der this Act. Acts 1929, p. 294, § 2.
§ 1770(60gg). Commission's power to regulate.
—The commission is hereby vested with power
to regulate the business of any person engaged in
the transportation of persons or property, either
or both, for hire, by motor-vehicle on any public
highway in this State. Acts 1929, p. 296, § 3.
§ 1770 (60hh). Motor carrier required to ob-
tain certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity.— (a) No motor carrier shall, after this Act
goes into effect, operate without first obtaining
from the commission, after hearing under the
provisions of this Act, a certificate of public con-
veyance and necessity, pursuant to findings to
the effect that the public interest requires such
operation. A certificate shall be granted as a
matter of right when it appears to the satisfac-
tion of the commission that such motor carrier
was actually operating on or before July 1, 1929,
and continually since "said date over the route for
which such certificate is sought, in good faith,
and adequately as to services, rates, and the pro-
tection of the public; and as to other applicants,
preference shall be given to those operating in
good faith at the time of the passage of this Act,
over those commencing operation after the pas-
sage of same, provided the applicant shall com-
ply with the provisions of this Act.
(b) The commission may issue the certificate
prayed for, or issue it for the partial exercise only
of the privilege sought; and may attach to the
exercise of the rights granted by such certificate
such terms and conditions as in its judgment the
public interest may require.
(c) The commission may at any time, after
notice and an opportunity to be heard, suspend,
revoke, alter, or amend any certificate issued un-
der this Act, if it shall be made to appear that
the holder of the certificate has wilfully violated
or refused to observe any of the orders, rules, or
regulations prescribed by the commission or any
provision of this Act, or if, in the opinion of the
commission, the holder of such certificate was
not furnishing adequate service, or it is no longer
compatible with the public interest to continue
said certificate in force.
(d) Any such certificate may be transferred
upon application to and approval by the commis-
sion, and not otherwise. Acts 1929, p. 296, § 4.
§ 1770(60iA) Bond for protection of public;
limit of bond.—No certificate shall be issued or
continued in operation unless the holder thereof
shall give bond, with adequate security, for the
protection, in case of passenger vehicles, of the
passengers and baggage carried and of the pub-
lic, against injury proximately caused by the neg-
ligence of such motor carriers, its servants or
agents, and, in cases of vehicles transporting
freight, to secure the owner or person entitled
to recover therefor against loss or damage to
such freight for which the motor carrier may be
legally liable, and for the protection of the pub-
lic against injuries proximately caused by the
negligence of such motor carrier, its servants or
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agents. The commission shall approve, de-
termine, and fix the amount for such bonds, in a
sum of not more than $10,000.00 for any
one accident, casualty, or mishap, and not
more than $5,000.00 for anyone injured or
damaged party or claimant, and shall pre-
scribe the provisions and limitations thereof,
and such bonds shall be for the benefit of and
subject to suit or action thereon by any person
who shall sustain actionable injury or loss pro-
tected thereby. The commission may, in its
discretion, allow the holder of such certificate to
file in lieu of such bond a policy of indemnity
insurances in some indemnity insurance company
authorized to do business in the State of Georgia,
which policy must substantially conform to all
of the provisions hereof relating to bonds, and
must likewise be approved by the commission.
The commission shall have power to permit self-
insurance in lieu of a bond or policy of indemnity
insurance, whenever, in its opinion, the financial
ability of the motor carrier warrants. Acts 1929,
p. 297, § 5.
§ 1770 (60jj). Commission to prescribe rates,
etc.*—The commission shall prescribe just and
reasonable rates, fares, and charges for transpor-
tation by motor carriers of passengers, baggage,
and property and for all services rendered by
motor carriers in connection therewith, and the
tariffs therefor shall be in such form, and shall
be filed and published in such manner and on
such notice, as the commission may prescribe,
and shall be subject to change on such notice
and in such manner as the commission may pre-
scribe. Acts 1929, p. 298, § 6.
§ 1770(60kk) Motor carrier must not charge
discriminatory or reduced rates.—No motor car-
rier shall charge, demand, collect, or receive a
greater or less or different compensation for the
transportation of passengers and property or for
any service rendered in connection therewith
than the rates, fares, and charges prescribed or
approved by order of the commission; nor shall
any motor carrier unjustly discriminate against
any person in its rates, fares, charges, or service;
but the commission may prescribe by general or-
der to what persons motor carriers may issue
passes or free transportation, and may prescribe
reduced rates for special occasions. Acts 1929,
p. 298, § 7.
§ 1770(6011). Chartered motor-vehicles. — No
chartered motor-vehicles (which shall mean and
include a motor-vehicle carrying for compensa-
tion more than six persons, hired for a specific
trip or trips, and which is subject to the direc-
tion of the person hiring the same) may be op-
erated except a motor carrier holding a certifi-
cate under this Act. Acts 1929, p. 298, § 8.
§ 1770(G0mm). Mails, parcels, packages, may be
carried; when.—'Motor carriers may, as an inci-
dent to their business, carry mail, parcels and
packages, under such rules and (regulations as
may be prescribed by the commission. Act 1929,
p. 298, § 9.
§ 1770(60nn). White and colored passengers;
separation of.—Motor carriers may confine them-
selves to carrying either white or colored pas-
sengers, or they may provide different motor-ve-
hicles for carrying white and colored passengers;
and they may carry white and colored passengers
in the same vehicle, but only under such condi-
tions of separation of the races as the commis-
sion may prescribe. Acts 1929, p. 298, § 10.
§ 1770(60oo). Baggage; limitation of lia-
bility for baggage.—Motor carriers shall not be
compelled to carry baggage of passengers, ex-
cept hand baggage; the character, amount, and
size of which the motor carrier may limit by its
rules or regulations, subject to the approval of
the commission, and the commission may by
rule or regulation limit the amount of the liabil-
ity of the motor carrier therefor. If a motor car-
rier shall elect to carry the personal baggage of
passengers (other than hand baggage), the com-
mission shall prescribe just and reasonable rates
therefor, and such other rules and regulations
with respect thereto as may be reasonable and
just, and may by rule or regulation limit the
amount of the liability of the motor carrier there-
for. Acts 1929, p. 299, § 11.
§ 1770(60pp). Schedules. — The commission
shall have the power to fix and prescribe sched-
ules, and the commission may withhold or with-
draw its certificate, if, in its opinion, the service
of the motor carrier is not adequate in all re-
spects. Acts 1929, p. 299, § 12.
§ 177O(60qq). Discontinuance of service; no-
tice of.—A motor carrier shall have the right to
discontinue its whole service on any route upon
30 days published notice, and thereupon its cer-
tificate therefor shall be cancelled. A motor car-
rier shall have the right to discontinue any part
of its service on any 'route upon 30 days pub-
lished notice, subject, however, to the right of
the commission to withdraw its certificate for
such route, if in the opinion of the commission
such diminished service is not adequate or any
longer compatible with the public interest. Acts
1929, p. 299, § 13.
§ 1770(60rr). Railroad companies authorized to
operate motor-vehicles for hire or to buy stock
of motor carrier; when.—Railroad companies op-
erating in this State are hereby authorized to op-
erate motor-vehicles for hire upon the public
highways, provided they obtain from the com-
mission a certificate under this Act, and provided
further that they shall be as to said motor-ve-
hicles motor carriers under this Act, and subject
to all the provisions of this Act; and railroad
companies operating in this State are also au-
thorized to own the whole or any pa'rt of the
capital stock of a corporation or corporations or-
ganized or operating as a motor carrier. Acts
1929, p. 299, § 14.
§ 177O(60ss). Review of orders of commission.
—In all respects in which the commission has
power and authority under this Act, proceedings
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may be instituted, complaints made |and filed
with it, process issued, hearings held, opinions,
orders, and decisions made and filed, and any-
final order may be reviewed in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction of this State, under the condi-
tions and subject to the limitations as now pre-
scribed by law as relates to the Georgia Public
Service Commission. Acts 1929, p. 300, § 15.
§ 1770(60tt). Fees for issuance and transfer of
certificates of convenience.—A fee of thirty-five
($35.00) dollars shall be charged for the issue of
every certifrciate of convenience and necessity,
and a fee of seven and 50/100 ($7.50) dollars for
the transfer of a certificate, which shall be paid
to the Comptroller-General when the commis-
sion has approved the application for the certifi-
cate, of which approval the commission has ap-
proved the application for the certificate shall
notify the Comptroller-General; and no certifi-
cate shall issue until the said fee of $35.00 has
been paid. Acts 1929, p. 300, § 16.
§ 1770(60uu). Application for registration and
license; fee $25.—'Every motor carrier shall, as
soon as a certificate is issued and annually on or
before each succeeding January 1st as long as
such certificate remains in force, make applica-
tion to the commission for registration and li-
cense of all motor-vehicles to be operated under
said certificate, and, upon payment of a fee of
$25.00 dollars for each vehicle to the Comptrol-
ler-General, shall be entitled to register the same
and receive a license therefor. The sum or sums
derived herein from the issuance and transfer of
certificates of convenience and necessity by the
Comptroller-General shall be paid to the State
Treasurer, who shall keep such sums thus paid
to him in a separate fund and to be known
as the motor-vehicle fund. From such funds
thus derived the State Treasurer shall, upon
proper warrant from the Governor, pay all the
expenses and salary of every character as due
and provided herein. Such sum or sums as may
be left after such salaries and supervisory ex-
penses have been paid, as may remain unex-
pended on the first day of January each year,
shall be paid to the State Highway Department
for use in maintenance and repair of the high-
ways, as in the discretion of the Highway Board
may be directed. Acts 1929, p. 300, § 17.
§ 1770(60vv). Daily records of motor carriers.
— (a) Motor carriers shall keep daily records up-
on forms prescribed by the commission of all
motor-vehicles and trailers used during the cur-
rent month. On or before the tenth of the month
following, they shall file under oath with the
commission, upon forms prescribed by the com-
mission, summaries of their daily records, which
will show the capacity of their motor-vehicles
and trailers and the miles operated by each
motor-vehicle and trailer during the preced-
ing month, together with such other informa-
tion as the commission may require. Such daily
records shall be filed and preserved by the com-
mission for a period of at least two years. Acts
1929, p. 301, § 18.
§ 1770(60ww). Licensed motor carrier not to
be taxed by county or municipality.—No county,
municipal, or other political subdivision of this
State shall impose any registration, license, o'r-
operating fee or tax of any kind on any motor
carrier licensed under this Act; and this shall
be the only license or operating tax imposed
upon any motor carrier by this State. Acts 1929,
p. 301, § 19.
§ 1770(60xx). Violation of act, a misdemeanor.
Rebates and free transportation; penalty. — (a)
Every officer, agent, or employee of any cor-
poration and every other person who violates or
fails to comply with the provisions of this Act
(except the provisions relating to the payment
of fees or taxes), or any order, rule, or regula-
tion of the commission, or who procures, aids,
or abets therein, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction shall be punished as for a mis-
demeanor.
(b) Every officer, agent, or employee of any cor-
poration and every other person who knowingly
accepts or receives any rebate or drawback from
the rates, fares, or charges established or ap-
proved by the commission for motor-carriers, or
who procures, aids, or abets therein, or who uses
or accepts from a motor carrier any free pass or
free transportation not authorized or permitted
by law or by the orders, rules, or regulations of
the Commission, or who procures, aids, or abets
therein, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction shall be punished as for a mis-
demeanor. Acts 1929, p. 301, § 20.
§ 177O(60yy). Authority to employ and fix sal-
aries.—The commission is hereby authorized to
employ such persons as may be necessary, in the
discretion of the commission, for the proper en-
forcement of the provisions of this Act, the sal-
aries for such employees to be fixed by the
commission. The traveling expenses of the com-
mission and its employees incurred in the
performance of this Act shall be paid as similar
expenses of the commission. Acts 1929, p. 302,
§ 21.
§ 1770(60zz). Act cumulative of other laws.—
This Act shall be cumulative to other laws regu-
lating the use of motor-vehicles on the highways.
Acts 1929, p. 302, § 22.
§ 1770(60aaa). Act effective October 1, 1929.—
This Act shall become operative and effective on
October 1st, 1929. Acts 1929, p. 302, § 24.
ARTICLE 4
Title Registration Act
§ 1770(60^a). Machines operated for hire. —
Every owner of a motor-vehicle who operates
the same for hire, either for hauling passengers
or freight, whether a resident or non-resident of
this State, shall register the same with the com-
missioner of motor-vehicles of Georgia and ob-
tain a license therefor, and shall pay any and all
fees and taxes as may be required by law. Pro-
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vided, however, this Act shall not apply to such
motor-vehicles from States other than Georgia,
where such other States do not require the pur-
chase of such licenses and license-tags by such
motor-vehicles owned and operated under Geor-
gia licenses in such other States.
Any person or persons violating the provisions
of this Act shall he punished as for a misde-
meanor, as provided in section 1065 of Park's
Penal Code of Georgia, Volume 6. Acts 1929, p.
A293, § 1.
CHAPTER 18
Business of Making Loans
§ 1770(61). Interest rate.
Construed With §§ 2279, 2280.—The superintendent of
banks is authorized to issue the license provided by the
terms of this section, and to perform all other acts
previously devolving' upon the State bank examiner un-
der the provisions of sections 2279 and 2280. Although the
licensing official in the terms of the act of 1920 was
designated as the State bank examiner when in fact no
such official existed at the time of the passage of the
act, it is manifest that the General Assembly intended
to place the class of lenders authorized by the enactment
under the supervision of the State banking department
as created by the act of 1919, and in giving effect to the
legislative intention it follows that the duty of issuing
the license provided for must be construed to refer to
the superintendent of banks. Mathis v. Fulton Indus-
trial Corp., 168 Ga. 719, 149 S. E. 35.
Rate of Interest.—Although the bill of sale may have
been executed as security for a loan of $300 with interest
at i ne rate of 3 I/i% per month, authorized under the
'
"small- loan act" approved August 17, 1920, p. 215; and
even though it be assumed that loans of money made pur-
suant to the provisions of that act can not be secured by
a bill of sale passing title to personalty, and which,
therefore, is not a mortgage, the borrower, in setting up
exemption of the property from levy by virtue of the
homestead and exemption laws, does not attack the valid-
ity of the lender's security, but sets up an exemption
which he claims supersedes the lender's security, upon
the ground that, as contended by the borrower, the in-
strument securing the lender was a mortgage and not a
bill of sale passing title to the property to the lender as
security for the debt. Tarver v. Beneficial Loan Society
ot Macon, 39 Ga. App. 646, 148 S. E. 288.
Applied in City Purchasing Co. v. Clough, 38 Ga. App.
53, 54, 142 S. E. 469.
Persons to Whom Applicable. — Even the criminal pro-
cedure provided in this act refers only to those who may
obtain license and qualify under the provisions of the act.
Bennett v. Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 949, 132 S. E- 528. From
dissenting opinion.
Penalty for Violation of Section.—This act makes no pro-
vision for any penalty for a violation ol this section. Wil-
liams v. Yarbrough, 34 Ga. App. 500, 130 S. E- 361.
Equitable Relief.—There is no provision in this act giving
the superintendent of banks the power necessary to the
maintenance of a suit seeking relief in equity. The case is
controlled by the holding in Bentley v. Board, 162 Ga. 836;
Bennett v. Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 938, 132 S. E- 528.
The borrower could set up in defense of the action of
trover by the lender the grounds of equitable relief that in
making the loan the lender did not comply with this act,
and that the loan contract was void because the lender
collected a greater sum as interest than the statute author-
ized. Calhoun v. Davis, 163 Ga. 760, 137 S. E- 236.
§ 1770(73). Amount of loans; interest.
An agreement in the contract to pay compound interest,
or to pay, in addition to the interest contracted for at
3 l/i% per month, the costs of collecting, securing, or at-
tempting to collect or secure the indebtedness evidenced
by the contract, in addition to a sum for attorney's fees,
is expressly prohibited, and the presence in the contract
of an agreement to pay either, by the express provisions
ot the act renders the contract void and unenforceable,
and the principal and interest and all charges uncollecti-
ble. Fishburne v. Hartsfield Loan, etc., Co., 38 Ga. App.
784, 145 S. E- 495.
§ 1770(76). Salary assignments.
Transactions to Which Applicable.—This act nullifies and
precludes enforcement of certain loans and salary assign-
ments given to secure the same when made in contraven-
tion of its provisions as to special licensing by the State
bank examiner and as to rates of interest or discount. Mc-
Lamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 210, 213, 129 S. E- 570.
Same— Absolute Unconditional Sale of Salary. — This act
does not cover a bona fide assignment or sale of wages or
salary. McLamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 210, 213, 129 S.
E. 570. Citing Tollison v. George, 153 Ga. 612 (1), 614, 112
S. E. 896; Atlanta Joint Terminals v. Walton Discount Co.,
29 Ga. App. 225, 227, 114 S. E- 908.
Same—Effect upon Sections 3446-3465. — Nothing in this
act or in other legislation has apparently either expressly
or by implication repealed the law of 1904, §§ 3446-3465, so
far as it relates to a business of actual and bona fide buying
of wages or salaries. That original act, to this extent, there-
fore, remains in full force. McLamb v. Phillies, 34 Ga.
App. 210, 213, 129 S. E- 570.
TWELVE a TITLE
Armistice Day Holiday
§ 1770(81). Holiday, November 11.—From and
after the passage of this Act the 11th day of
November of each year, commonly known as
Armistice Day, is hereby declared a public and
legal holiday in the State of Georgia. Acts 1929,
p. 211, § 1.
THIRTEENTH TITLE
Regulations for Particular Branches of Trade
Agriculture
CHAPTER 1
Inspection
ARTICLE 1
Inspection, Analysis, and Sale of Fertilizers.
SECTION 1
Analysis
§ 1773. (§ 1553). Copy as evidence.
Section held not applicable in Southern Cotton Oil Co.
v. Raines, 167 Ga. 880, 147 S. E- 77.
§ 1777. Grade not to be lowered; brand name
or trade-mark.
Registration Not Required for Each Fiscal Year.—The
provisions of the statute embodied in this section and
§ 1771, do not require the annual registration, for each
fiscal year, of each brand of fertilizer sold. Logan v.
Tennessee Chemical Co., 166 Ga. 680, 144 S. E. 269.
[100]
§ 1778(a) SUPPLEMENTAL ACT § 1790(5)
§§ 1778(a), 1778(b). Park's Code.
See § 1778(1) -1778(2).
§ 1778 (1). Fertilizers must be tagged show-
ing sources and ingredients.
Constitutionality.—"This section is not unconstitutional
for any reason assigned. The penalty provided under the
police power of the State applies alike to all persons of
the same class. Moreover, it is not shown how or in
what manner any constitutional guaranty is denied."
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Raines, 167 Ga. S80, 147 S.
E. 77.
§ 1778 (2). Vendor liable in damages, when.
Effect of Agreement to Evade Statute.—The penalties
under this section can not be avoided by showing an
agreement between the parties to evade the statute.
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Raines, 167 Ga. 880, 147 S.
E. 77.
SECTION 3
Inspectors, Their Duties and Compensation.
§ 1782. Oath of inspectors.
A State inspector of fertilizers, being appointed by the
Ccmmissioner of Agriculture, and being required before
entering upon the discharge of his duties to take a spe-
cial oath to faithfully discharge all duties required of
him (this section), such oath is not one required by § 272
to be filed in the Executive office. The oaths required to
be so filed are the official oaths referred to in § 269. Un-
der proper construction of § 1780 it impliedly provides for
the filing of the oaths of fertilizer inspectors with the
Commissioner of Agriculture. Talmadge v. Cordell, 16"
Ga. 594, 146 S. E- 467.
SECTION 4
Samples
§ 1785. Purchaser may require samples to be
taken.
Applied in Southern Cotton Oil Co.
880, 147 S. E. 77.
v. Raines, 167 Ga.
§ 1790. Legal effect of chemist's statement.
Admissibility of Private Analysis.—Where a recovery
of damages and penalty for the sale of fertilizer is sougnt
on the ground that the fertilizer bought was inferior to
the representations and brand as registered, and no of-
ficial analysis is introduced in evidence, or the purported
official analysis is not shown to be based upon samples
obtained and furnished as provided by law, an analysis
made by a private chemist would be admissible if offered
by either party. A private analysis would not be ad-
missible where there is in evidence an official analysis
as provided in this section. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Raines, 167 Ga. 880, 147 S. E. 77.
"The plaintiff in error cites, as authority for the ad-
missibility generally of a private analysis, Patterson v.
Ramspeck, 81 Ga. 808, 10 S. E. 390, and cit. Those
cases were decided prior to the passage of the act of
December 27, 1890 (Ga. E. 1890-91, vol. 1, p. 142, sec. VI.
Civil Code 1910, § 1790); and since the passage of that
act those cases are not authority. Compare Jones v. Cor-
dele Guano Co., 94 Ga. 14, 20 S. E. 295; Southern Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. Raines, 167 Ga. 880, 147 S. E. 77.
SECTION 7A
Supplemental Act
§ 1799(1). Supplemental act.—The following
sections are in addition to and supplemental to
all the present laws governing the sale, manu-
facture and distribution of fertilizer and fertilizer
materials in the State of Georgia: Acts 1929, p.
228, § 1.
§ 1799(2). Registration of brands; analysis;
fee.
—Every manufacturer and mixe'r selling or
offering for sale within the State any fertilizer
or fertilizer material shall first file annually with
the Commissioner of agriculture, upon forms
supplied by the commissioner for that purpose,
a registration of each brand of fertilizer or ferti-
lizer material to be offered for sale, giving the
name and address of the manufacturer or mixer,
together with the name of each place at which
they may desire to do business in this State, the
guaranteed analysis thereof, stating the sources
from which the phosphoric acid, nitrogen and
potash are derived and giving the percentage of
organic nitrogen, the percentage of inorganic
nitrogen and the percentage of the total amount
of nitrogen, and stating what proportion of the
potash is sulphate, if any, and that for the pur-
pose of this Act, organic nitrogen shall be that
derived from animal or vegetable matter, and all
other nitrogen shall be classed as inorganic. Such
application to be accompanied by a fee of five
dollars for each brand of fertilizer or fertilizer
material which they may desire to sell. Acts
1929, p. 228, § 1.
§ 1799(3). License for sales, etc., fee $1. —
Every person, before offering any fertilizer or
fertilizer material for sale or exchange in the
State of Georgia, shall first procure a license
from the Commissioner of Agriculture authoriz-
ing such person to sell or exchange or deal there-
in. Such license shall be issued by said Commis-
sioner of Agriculture on payment of fee of $1.00,
and shall expire on the 31st day of December of
each year. Acts 1929, p. 229, § 2.
§ 1799(4). Filler.—It shall be unlawful for any
manufacturer or mixer of commercial fertilizer
to use any material as a filler or make-weight
which does not comply with the requirements
of this law as hereinafter set out as a fertilizer
material. Acts 1929, p. 229, § 3.
§ 1799(5). Tag. — Every bag or package of
commercial fertilizer sold within the State shall
have printed on bag or package, or affixed there-
to, a tag containing a legible and plainly printed
statement in the English language, the following:
1. Net weight of each bag or package, in
pounds.
2. Brand name or trade mark.
3. (a) Guaranteed analysis, giving the mini-
mum percentage of available phosphoric
;
acid,
and the sources, and within ten per cent, of the
amount of each source of available phosphoric
acid.
(b) The minimum percentage of total nitrogen
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and 'ho names of the sources, and within ten
per cent, of the total amount of the source in the
form of organic materials, and the names of
sources, and within ten per cent, of the total
amount of the source in the form of organic ma-
terials.
(c) The minimum percentage of potash and
the sources, and within ten per cent, of the
amount of each source of potash.
(d) The sources, and pounds of filler.
(e) Total pounds of available plant food.
(f) Name and address of manufacturer, mixer,
or importer.
(g) Whenever any fertilizer material is re-
duced from its original plant-food content, the
amount of the filler and sources used must
also be shown as provided for above.
(h) It shall further be unlawful for any ferti-
lizer manufacturer or mixer to use any foreign
or artificial coloring in the manufacture, mixture,
or manipulation of any fertilizer or fertilizer ma-
terial, or to use any substance for supplying an
odor not natural to and a part of the material
used. Acts 1929, p. 229, § 4.
§ 1799(6). Tankage.-nlt shall be unlawful to
sell or offer for sale any fertilizer material as
•tankage which shall contain more than two per
cent, of inorganic nitrogen, and it shall be un-
lawful to designate as tankage any material used
in a mixed goods which contain more than two
per cent, of inorganic nitrogen. It shall also be
unlawful to designate as tankage any material
which contains hair, hoof, horn or other animal
matter in which the nitrogen shows available of
less than eighty-five per cent, when determined
by the neutral permangate method without a
clear statement on the outside of each package
of the fact that such material is used. Acts 1929,
p. 230, § 5.
§ 1799(7). Penalty for variation from legal
percentage of water soluble nitrogen. — Where
the present law states the percentage of water
soluble nitrogen shall be declared, same shall be
in terms of water soluble nitrogen, and a varia-
tion of ten per cent, shall be construed as false
branding and be subject to a penalty of ten per
cent, of purchase^price. Acts 1929, p. 230, § 6.
§ 1799(8). Inspection; Samples. — The Com-
missioner of Agriculture is authorized to use the
inspectors' provided for by law in inspecting all
factories, wareihotfees, railroad cars and places
of business of all manufacturers and mixers of
commercial fertilizer, and is authorized to open
any and all packages, cars or parcels of fertilizer
or fertilizer material or materials which may be
found in and about such places which are unlaw-
ful to be used in fertilizer, and to secure samples
of the same to be analyzed by the State Chemist
as now provided by law. Acts 1929, p. 230, § 7.
§ 1799(9). Inspection before delivery to con-
sumer.—All inspections of commercial ferilizer
and fertilizer materials as now provided by law
shall be in so far as practicable made before de-
livery into the possession of the consumer. How-
ever, the Commissioner of Agriculture is au-
thorized in his discretion to have samples drawn
at any time or place of any ferilizer or fertilizer
material found within the limits of this State.
Acts 1929, p. 231, § 8.
§ 1799(10). Penalties for shortage in plant food
or commercial value.—Any fertilizer or fertilizer
material sold in this State without compliance
with the requirements of the law, any fertilizer
which upon analysis by the State Chemist shows
a shortage in any one plant food of ten per cent,
or more, and any fertilizer which upon analysis
under direction of the State Chemist shows a
shortage in commercial value below the guaran-
tee of five per cent, or more shall be subject to a
penalty of twenty-five per cent, of the purchase-
price plus the actual shortage in commercial
value. These penalties shall be in lieu of all
other penalties now provided by law and shall
not be cumulative. Acts 1929, p. 231, § 9.
§ 1790(11). Attachment, etc, to collect pen-
alty; payment of costs.—Whenever any fertilizer
or fertilizer material upon analysis by the State
Chemist is found subject to a penalty under the
provisions of this law, the Commissioner of Ag-
riculture is empowered and it is hereby made
mandatory upon him, to proceed by attachment
or other legal means to collect such penalty from
the party or parties subject thereto and to pay the
same to the person or persons entitled to receive
it. Provided that such adjustment is not made
after sixty days from notice of deficiency from
Commissioner of Agriculture; and provided fur-
ther that the matter is not being contested in the
court or courts, in which event the powers of
the commissioner shall be suspended until final
determination of the matter by the courts. Any
cost accruing under the enforcement of these
provisions may be paid by the Commissioner of
Agriculture out of the funds derived from their
fertilizer-inspection fees. In any suit filed by
the commissioner under this Act legal service
may be had on any agent or representative in this
State of any non-resident manufacturer or mixer.
Acts 1929, p. 231, § 10.
§ 1799(12). Cancellation of registration, etc. —
If any manufacturer or mixer shall be subject to
a penalty under the terms of this law and shall
fail or refuse to pay the same upon demand as
provided in the preceding section, the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture is authorized to cancel the
registration or registrations of such manufac-
turer or mixer and to forbid the sale b}r such man-
ufacturer or mixer of any fertilizer or fertilizer
materials in this State until such penalty or pen-
alties have been paid, or final judgment has been
obtained. Acts 1929, p. 232, § 11.
§ 1799(13). Violation of law, a misdemeanor.—
Every manufacturer, mixer, jobber, or dealer
violating any of the provisions of this Act or the
fertilizer laws of this State shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and punished as provided by sec-
tion 1065 of the Penal Code of 1910. Acts 1929,
p. 232, § 12.
§ 1799(14). Laws not repealed by this Act.—
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None of the present laws regulating the sale, dis-
tribution and inspection of fertilizers in this
State are repealed except such as are in conflict
with the laws of this Act, but that this Act is in-
tended to be an enlargement upon and in addi-
tion thereto, and is to become effective January
1st, 19'30. Acts 1929, p. 232, § 1.
§ 1799(15). Fees covered into State Treasury.
—All fees received by the Commissioner of Ag-
riculture under the terms of this Act shall be
covered into the State Treasury. Acts 1929, p.
232, § 14.
ARTICLE 2
Inspection of Oils
§§ 1800 to 1814. Repealed by the Acts of 1927
pp. 279, herein codified as §§ 1814(4) et seq.
§§ 1814(d)-1814(aa). Park's Code.
See §§ 1814(4) -1814(26).
§ 1814(4). "Gasolinje," "kerosene," defined. —
The word "gasoline" used in this Act shall em-
brace and include gasoline, naptha, benzol, and
other products of petroleum under whatever name
designated, used for heating or power purposes.
The word "kerosene" shall embrace and include
kerosene and other products of petroleum undei
whatever name designated, used for illuminating,
heating, or cooking purposes. Acts 1927, p. 279.
§ 1814(5). Inspection of gasoline and kerosene.
—For the purpose of the Act all gasoline and kero-
sene sold, offered or exposed for sale in this State,
shall be subject to inspection and analysis as here-
inafter provided. All manufacturers, refiners,
wholesalers, and jobbers, before selling or offer-
ing for sale in this State any gasoline or kerosene,
or the like products, under whatever name desig-
nated, for power, illuminating, heating, or cooking
purposes, shall file with the Comptroller-General a
declaration or statement that they desire to sell
such products in this State, and shall furnish the
name, brand, or trademark of the products which
they desire to sell, together with the name and
address of the manufacturer thereof, and that all
such products are in conformity with the distilla-
tion test hereinafter provided.
§ 1814(6). Approval by State Oil Chemist and
Comptroller-General. — All materials, fluids, or
substances offered or exposed for sale, purporting
to be substitutes for, or motor-fuel improvers, or
other motor fuels to be used for power, cooking, or
heating purposes, shall, before being sold, ex-
posed, or offered for sale in this State, be sub-
mitted to the Comptroller-General for examina-
tion and inspection, and shall receive the approval
of the state Oil Chemist hereinafter provided for,
and the Comptroller-General, and then shall be
sold or offered for sale only when properly labeled
with a label, the form and contents of which has
been approved by the State Oil Chemist and
Comptroller-General.
§ 1814(7). Illegal sale; confiscation.—The sale
or offering for sale of all such gasoline and kero-
sene as hereinbefore enumerated and designated,
used or intended to be used for power, illuminat-
ing, cooking, or heating purposes, when sold un-
der whatever name, which shall fall below the
standard hereinafter provided, is hereby declared
to be illegal, and same shall be subject to confisca-
tion and destruction by order of the Comptroller-
General.
§ 1814(8). Containers and labels.—Every per-
son, firm, corporation, or association of persons,
delivering at wholesale or retail any gasoline in
this State, shall deliver the same to the purchaser
only in tanks, barrels, casks, cans, or other con-
tainers having the word "gasoline," plainly
stenciled or labeled in vermilion red, in English.
Such dealers shall not deliver "kerosene oil" in
any barrel, cask, can, or other container which
has been stenciled or labeled, that has ever con-
tained gasoline, unless such barrel, cask, can, or
other container shall have been thoroughly cleaned
and all traces of gasoline removed. Every pur-
chaser of gasoline for use or sale shall procure
and keep the same only in tanks, barrels, casks,
cans, or other containers stenciled or labeled as
heretofore provided; every person delivering at
wholesale or retail any "kerosene" in this State
shall deliver same to the purchaser only in tanks,
barrels, casks, cans, or other containers having the
word "kerosene" in English, plainly stenciled or
labeled in vermilion red, and every person pur-
chasing for use or sale shall procure and keep the
same only in tanks, barrels, casks, cans, or other
containers stenciled or labeled as heretofore pro-
vided. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the
delivery of gasoline by hose or pipe from a tank
directly into the tank of any automobile or other
motor. In cases where gasoline or kerosene is
sold in bottles, cans, or other containers of not
more than one gallon, for cleaning and other
similar purposes, such bottles, cans, or other
containers shall bear label with the words, "un-
safe when exDosed to heat or fire."
§ 1814 (9). Notice as to shipments; samples.—
When gasoline or kerosene is shipped into the
State of Georgia in any manner whatever, the
manufacturer, refiner, or jobber shall promptly
give notice to the Comptroller-General of the date
of shipment, and shall furnish a sample of not less
than eight ounces of the gasoline or kerosene
shipped and labeled, giving the tank-car number,
truck number or other container number, with the
name and address of the person, company, firm,
or corporation and to whom it is sent, and the
number of gallons contained in the shipment made.
In each instance where gasoline or kerosene is
shipped in tank-cars, the record of the tank-car
furnished by the railroad companies as to the
capacity of each tank-car will be accepted.
§ 1814(10). Test or analysis for buyer.—Any
person purchasing any gasoline, illuminating, or
heating oils, from any manufacturer, refiner, job-
[103]
§ 1814(11) INSPECTION OF OILS § 1814(15)
ber, or vendor in this State, for his own use, may
submit fair samples of said gasoline, illuminating,
or heating oils to the Comptroller-General to be
tested, or analyzed by the State Oil Chemist. In
order to protect the manufacturer or vendor from
the submission of spurious samples, the person
selecting the same shall do so in the presence of
two or more disinterested persons, which samples
shall not be less than one pint in quantity, and
bottled, corked, and sealed in the presence of
said witnesses, and sample shall be placed in the
hands of a disinterested person, who shall for-
ward the same at the expense of the purchaser to
the Comptroller-General; and upon the receipt by
him of any such sample he is hereby required to
have the State Oil Chemist to promptly test and
analyze the same, and he shall return to such pui-
chaser or purchasers a certificate of analysis,
which, when verified by the affidavit of the State
Oil Chemist, shall be competent evidence in any
court of law or equity in this State.
§ 1814(11). Sale without test; misdemeanor.—
It shall be a misdemeanor for any manufacturer,
refiner, vendor, jobber, or wholesaler to sell, ex-
pose, or offer for sale any gasoline for heating or
power purposes in this State, which does not
comply with the following distillation test:
1. Corrosion test. A clean copper strip shall not
be discolored when submerged in the gasoline for
3 hours at 122° F.
2. Distillation range. When the first drop falls
from end of the condenser, the thermometer shall
not read more than 55° C. (131° F.)
When 20 per cent, has been recovered in the
receiver, the thermometer shall not read more
than 10i5° C. (221° F.)
When 50 per cent, has been recovered in the re-
ceiver, the thermometer shall not read more than
140° C. (284° F.)
When 90 per cent, has been recovered in the re-
ceiver, the thermometer shall not read more than
200° C. (392° F.)
The end point shall not be higher than 225° C.
(437° F.)
At least 95 per cent, shall be recovered as distil-
late in the receiver from the distillation.
3. Sulphur. Sulphur shall not be over 0.10 per
cent.
All the foregoing tests shall be made in accord-
ance with the methods for testing gasoline con-
tained in Technical Paper 323A, United States
Government Bureau of Mines, Department of the
Interior.
It shall also be a misdemeanor for any manu-
facturer, jobber, wholesaler, or vendor to sell, of-
fer, or expose for sale any kerosene oil for use or
intended to be used for heating, cooking, or power
purposes, which does not comply fully with the
following distillation test:
1. Color. The color shall not be darker than No.
16 Saybolt.
2. Flash point. The flash point shall not be
lower than 100° F.
3. Sulphur. The sulphur shall not be more than
0.125%.
4. Flock. The flock test shall be negative.
5. Distillation. The end point shall not be
higher than 625° F.
6. Cloud point. The oil shall not show a cloud
at 5° F.
7. Burning test. The oil shall burn freely and
steadily for 16 hours, in a lamp fitted with a No,
2 hinge burner.
All of the foregoing tests for kerosene shall be
made according to the methods for testing kero-
sene contained in Technical Paper 323A, United
States Government Bureau of Mines, Depart-
ment of the Interior.
Provided, that the Comptroller-General may
from time to time change these specifications to
agree with those adopted and promulgated by the
United States Government Bureau of Mines;
provided further, that sixty days' notice shall be
given all manufacturers, refiners, and jobbers do-
ing business in this State, before any such
changes shall become effective.
§ 1814(12). State Oil Chemist;, appointment,
duties, salary.—The Comptroller-General is here-
by required to appoint a chemist who shall be an
expert oil analyst, and to be designated as the
State Oil Chemist, whose duty it shall be to ana-
lyze all samples of gasoline and kerosene, and all
fluids purporting to be substitutes for, or motor-
fuel improvers, or other like products of petro-
leum, under whatever name is designated, and
used for illuminating, heating, cooking, or power
purposes, submitted by the Comptroller-General
or any duly authorized inspector or inspectors.
Said chemist shall hold office for a period of four
years, unless sooner removed for cause, as here-
inafter provided; and he shall receive a salary of
$3,000.00 per annum, payable monthly.
§ 1814(13). Oil inspectors; number, appoint-
ment, term, salary, expenses.—The offices of
general oil inspectors, State oil inspectors, and of
all local oil inspectors are hereby abolished, and
it shall be the duty of the Comptroller-General
to appoint six oil inspectors, each of whom
shall receive a salary of $2,400.00 per annum,
and shall be allowed an expense account not to
exceed the sum of $2,400.00 each per annum,
payable monthly. The inspectors herein provided
for shall hold office for four years, unless sooner
removed for cause, as hereinafter provided.
§ 1814(14). Unlawful interest in sale, etc.—
Any chemist or inspector who, while in office,
shall be interested directly or indirectly in the
manufacture or vending of any gasoline shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 1814(15). Inspectorsf automobiles ; daily re-
ports.—All inspectors are hereby required to
provide themselves, at their own expense, with
automobiles equipped with accurate speedome-
ters, and to make daily reports to the Comptrol-
ler-General, covering all work performed, and
monthly reports shall also be made, showing the
following information:
1. Name and number of towns visited.
2. Number of inspections in each town.
3. Number of miles traveled by rail.
4. Number of miles traveled by automobile.
5. Expenses incurred, with vouchers showing
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the amount spent for hotel bills, gasoline, oil,
railroad fares, and incidentals necessary in the
performance of their duties.
6. Number of samples drawn, each kind.
7. Number pumps inspected, and the numbers
of the pumps.
8 Number pumps condemned.
9. Number of pumps in territory.
§ 1814(16). Duty to collect and test samples.—
The Comptroller-General is hereby empowered
and it is made his duty to collect, or cause to be
collected by his duly authorized inspectors,
samples of gasoline, kerosene, or other illuminat-
ing cooking, or heating oils sold, offered, or ex-
posed for sale in this State, and to cause samples
to 'be tested or analyzed by the State Oil Chemist
hereinbefore provided for, for this purpose.
And said State Oil Chemist is hereby required to
report his finding to the Comptroller-General,
together with a certificate of analysis of such
gasoline, kerosene, or other like products of
petroleum, under whatever name designated, and
used for illuminating, heating, cooking, or power
purposes. Such certificate of analysis, when
properly verified by an affidavit of said State
Oil Chemist, shall be competent evidence in any
court of law or equity in this State.
§ 1814(17). Registration of gasoline dealers.
—
Each and every dealer in gasoline, before selling,
exposing, or offering for sale any gasoline in this
State, and annually thereafter, shall be required
to register and shall make known his desire to
sell gasoline to the Comptroller-General, giving
the name and manner and kind of pump or pumps
he will use, and location of same, and keep said
certificate or certificates of registration posted
in a prominent and accessible place in his place of
business where such gasoline is sold. The form
of such certificate shall be designated and issued
by the Comptroller-General.
§ 1814(18). Inspector's duty as to pumps.— It
shall be the duty of the inspectors herein provided
for to familiarize themselves with the accuracy
and adjusting devices on the various makes of
self-measuring pumps in use in this State; they
shall carefully inspect all of such pumps located
in the territory assigned to them, at least once
every ninety days; all such pumps found to be
giving accurate measure with a variation of not
exceeding four ounces from the actual measures
on a measure of five gallons, he shall place a lead
and wire seal, to be provided by the Comptroller-
General, on the adjusting device or devices in
such way that the adjustment cannot be altered
without breaking the seal. Any pump that is
found to be giving inaccurate measure in excess
of four ounces, the inspector shall then and there
notify the operator of the pump, whether owner
or lesisee, to make the necessary adjustments, the
inspector to lend his assistance with the standard
measure provided for testing such pumps; after
the adjustments have been made, the adjusting
devices are to be sealed in the same manner as
provided for those pumps found originally ac-
curate. On all pumps that have apparently been
altered for the purpose of giving short measure
in excess of eight ounces on a measure of five
gallons, or that cannot be adjusted within a
range of eight ounces, either over or under, on a
measure of five gallons, the inspector shall no-
tify the operator of such pump, whether he be
owner or lessee, that it must be immediately ad-
justed, the inspector to lend his assistance with
the standard measure for testing such pumps.
Should the operator fail or refuse to then and
there make such adjustments as are necessary to
bring the measure within the allowed variation,
the same shall be condemned and dismantled im-
mediately by the inspector examining the same
and such pump shall not again be allowed oper-
ated in this State without the written consent of
the Comptroller-General. Inspectors shall be re-
quired to report to the Comptroller-General im-
mediately the name and number of all pumps con-
demned and dismantled. Any person, company,
firm, or corporation who shall reinstall and oper-
ate any pump, without the written consent of
the Comptroller-General, which has been con-
demned by a duly authorized inspector herein
provided, because of giving short measure in ex-
cess of eight ounces to a measurement of five
gallons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction be punished as prescribed
by section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia of
of 1910. When any pump is condemned under
the provisions of this Act by any inspector, it
shall be the duty of the inspector to immediately
make affidavit, before the ordinary of the county
in which the pump is located, that the said pump
is being operated by the person who shall be
named in the affidavit, contrary to law; and
thereupon the ordinary shall issue an order to
the person named in the affidavit to show cause
before him on the day named in the order
not more than ten days nor less than three
days from the issuance of the order, why the said
pump should not be confiscated and dismantled.
On the day named in the order, it shall be the
duty of the said ordinary to hear the respective
parties and to determine whether or not the pump
has been operated contrary to the provisions of
this Act; and if the said ordinary shall find that
the said pump has been so operated, then he
shall forthwith issue an order adjudging the pump
to be forfeited and confiscated to the State of
Georgia, and direct the sheriff of the county to
dismantle the said pump and take same into his
possession, and, after ten days' notice by post-
ing or publication, as the court may direct, to
sell the pump to the highest bidder for cash; the
proceeds to said sale, or as much therefor as is
necessary, shall be used by the sheriff, first, to
pay the cost, which shall be the same as in cases
of attachment, and thereupon pay over and de-
liver the residue, if any there be, to the person
from whose possession the pump shall have been
taken. On and after the passage of this Act, it
shall be unlawful for any self-measuring pump,
which can be secretly manipulated in such man-
ner as to give short measure, to be installed or
operated in this State. Any person, company.
firm, or corporation who shall install or operate
a self-measuring pump in this State which has a
device or other mechanical means used for the
purpose of giving short measure, shall, upon con-
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viction thereof, be punished as provided in section
1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia of 1910, and
such inaccurate self-measuring pump shall be
condemned as heretofore provided in this section,
and thereafter it shall be unlawful for am>- person
to sell any kerosene, or gasoline from such pump
until such pump shall have been made or altered
so as to comply with the provisions of this Act,
and shall have been inspected and approved for
service by an inspector. After the passage of
this Act it shall be unlawful for any one to break
a seal applied by an inspector to a pump, with-
out first securing consent of the Comptroller-
General, which consent may be given through
one of the duly authorized inspectors.
§ 1814(19). Access for inspection.—In the per-
formance of their duties, the Comptroller-Gen-
eral, or any of his duly authorized agents, shall
have free access at all reasonable hours to any
store, warehouse, factory, storage house, or rail-
way depot, where oils are kept or otherwise
stored, for the purpose of examination or inspec-
ti(on and drawing samples. If such access be
refused by the owner, agent of such premises or
other persons occupying and using the same, the
Comptroller-General, or his duly authorized in-
spectors or agents, may apply for a search war-
rant, which shall be obtained in the same manner
as provided for obtaining search warrants in
other cases. Their refusal to admit an inspector
to any of the above-mentioned premises during
reasonable hours shall be construed as prima
facie evidence of a violation of this Act.
§ 1814(20). Violation of Act or of rule; pen-
alty. — Any person, or association of persons,
firm, or corporation, who shall violate any of the
provisions of this Act, or any rule or regulation
promulgated by the Comptroller-General for the
enforcement of this Act, shall upon conviction
thereof be ounished as for a misdemeanor, as pre-
scribed in section 1065, of Penal Code of Georgia
of 1910.
§ 1814 (21). Removal of chemist or inspector;
charges in writing.—The State Oil Chemist, or
oil inspectors provided for herein, may be re-
moved or discharged for misfeasance or malfeas-
ance in office, incompetency, or other good cause,
by a majority vote of the Governor of the State
the Attorney-General, and Comptroller-General,
after the preferment of charges in writing served
on any one of said officials not less than ten days
prior to the date which may be set by said Comp-
troller-General, Governor, and Attorney-General,
or a majority of them. Charges may be prefer-
red by any one of the three last-named officials,
or any citizen of the State, and from the decision
of said officials or majority of them, there shall
be no appeal.
§ 1814 (22). Expense of equipment, supplies,
clerical help, etc., allowance for; limits.—In ad-
dition to the salary and expenses of inspectors as
provided in section 1814(13) there shall be
allowed such further sums for the purchase of
equipment, supplies, and clerical help, and to pay
any other of the expenses incident to and neces-
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sary for the enforcement of this Act, as may
hereafter be appropriated; but the total of such
expenses shall not exceed the sum of $20,000.00
annually; so that including all salaries as herein
provided, and for the enforcement of said Act,
the total appropriation shall not exceed the sum
of $51,800.00. The Comptroller-General is here-
by constituted as chief Oil Inspector of this State,
for the purpose of the enforcement of this Act,
and his salary therefor is hereby fixed at the sum
of twelve hundred dollars ($1,200.00) per annum,
to be paid out of the aforesaid total sum of $51,-
800.00.
§ 1814(23). Salaries and expense accounts;
how paid.—The salaries of the State Oil Chemist
and of the inspectors and all of the expenses
herein provided for shall be paid out of the treas-
ury on warrants signed by the Governor, by req-
uisition of the Comptroller-General, accompanied
by itemized statements and vouchers for said
salaries and expenses. The expense accounts of
said oil inspectors shall be verified under oath and
furnished by said Comptroller-General along with
the requisitions.
§ 1814 (24). Entire time of chemist and inspec-
tors to be given to duties; bonds.—The State Oil
Chemist and the six oil inspectors herein provided
for shall devote their entire time to the duties of
their respective offices; and each shall give bond,
with some good and solvent surety company and
in such sum as may be approved by the Comp-
troller-General, for the faithful discharge of the
duties of their respective offices; the premiums on
which shall be paid out of the expense fund of
$20,000.00 in this Act provided for.
§ 1814 (25). No inspection fees. — No inspec-
tion fees of any kind or character shall hereafter
be paid for the inspection of gasoline or kerosene.
§ 1814 (26). Vacancies in offices.—The Comp-
troller-General shall be and is hereby authorized
to fill any vacancies which may occur in the
offices of State Oil Chemist and Oil Inspector, on
account of death, resignation, or other cause.
CHAPTER 3
Regulations of Agriculture, etc.
ARTICLE 1
Cotton, Rice, etc.
§ 1844. (§ 1601). Scalesmen, weigher's of cot-
ton, and others to be sworn.
Admissibility of Testimony of Unsworn Scalesman.—The
testimony of a scalesman as to the weight of a commodity
sold by him is not rendered inadmissible because he has not
subscribed to the oath required of him as a scalesman of
such a commodity under this section. Buckeye Cotton-Oil
Co. v. Murphy & Sons, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S. E. 553.
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§ 1851. (§ 1608.) Produce not taxable by cities
or towns.
Mineral water is not a farm product within the meaning
of this section. Pratt v. Macon, 35 Ga. App. 583, 134 S. E- 191.
§§ 1885(c)-1885(h). Park's Code.
See §§ 2119(9)-2119(15).
CHAPTER 5
Peddling
§ 1888. (§ 1642.) Disabled soldiers to peddle
without a license.
Editor's Note.—Acts 1929, p. 323, amended the caption of
the act of 1919, p. 90, amending this section, by inserting
after the words "indigent soldiers," the words "Spanish-
American War."
Exemption Not Based on Certificate.—The right of a dis-
abled or indigent soldier of the late European war to con-
duct business in a town or city without paying license for
the privilege of so doing is based upon the fact that the
owner of the business is such soldier, and not on the cer-
tificate of the ordinary, which is intended to furnish suffi-
cient proof of said fact, and not as a condition precedent
to the exercise of the right. Coxwell v. Goddard, 119 Ga.
369, 46 S. E. 412; Fairburn v. Edmondson, 162 Ga. 386, 134
S. E. 51; Jones v. Macon, 36 Ga. App. 97, 98, 135 S. E- 517.
Indigency of Disability — When Cause of Exemption
Ceases.—There is nothing in this section which provides for
exemption after the indigency or cause of exemption ceases
to exist. The act provides that the said certificate, stating
the fact of his being [not having been in the past] such
indigent soldier shall constitute sufficient proof. Jones v.
Macon, 36 Ga. App. 97, 98, 135 S. E- 517.
Cannot Certify to Permanent Indigency.—While the or-
dinary might be able to certify to a patent, permanent phy-
sical disability, he necessarily could not certify that a per-
son would always be indigent. Jones v. Macon, 36 Ga. App.
97, 98, 135 S. E. 517.
When Tax Is Due Prior to Issuance of Certificate.—The fact
that the license tax had become due before the certificate
had been issued does not render such soldier liable there-
for, if in fact he was a disabled or indigent soldier of said
war and a resident of this state at the time the license tax
was imposed, especially where he had applied for such
certificate before the license tax had become due. Fair-
burn v. Edmundson, 162 Ga. 386, 134 S. E- 51.
Soldier's License Used to Avoid Tax. — Where it was
found that the defendant was running a business himself,
deriving the profits from it, and was merely attempting
to use a soldier's license, granted to a Confederate soldier,
as a shield to protect him from paying a license tax to the
City of Atlanta and the State, the action of the judge of the
superior court in refusing to sanction a certiorari was sus-
tained. Lacy v. Atlanta, 34 Ga. App. 453, 454, 130 S. E. 74.
Applies to Indigent Sailors.—In view of the purposes of
the amendment of this section, the provision for the ex-
emption of "soldiers" should be so construed as to include
a disabled or indigent sailor serving as a gunner in the
navy of the United States during the late European War.
City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 145 S. E. 57.
Does Not Affect Tobacco Tax.—The exemption of war
veterans in this section does not include exemption from
the State tax on cigars and cigarettes, imposed by § 993-
(149) (Ga. L. 1923, pp. 39, 40). McMath v. State, 39 Ga.
App. 541, 147 S. E. 899.
Carrying on Business before Issue of Certificate.
—
The exemption from taxation provided this by section
as amended, existed from the time of the passage of
the statute, and the certificate of the ordinary is the
evidence thereof. And the fact that the defendant in er-
ror was carrying on the business before the certificate
was issued did not interfere with his right to the exemp-
tion. City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 145 S. E- 57.
CHAPTER 5B
Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen
§ 1896(5). "Real estate broker" and "real es-
tate salesman" defined; provisions, where inap-
plicable.—Whenever used in this article, "real es-
tate broker" means any person, firm or corpora-
tion, who, for another and for a fee, commission
or other valuable consideration, sells, exchanges,
buys, rents, or offers or attempts to negotiate a
sale, exchange, purchase, or rental, of any estate
or interest in real estate, or collects, or offers or
attempts to collect rent for the use of real estate.
The term shall include any person, firm, or cor-
poration advertising through signs, newspapers or
otherwise, as conducting a real estate office or
real estate business. Provided, however, this pro-
vision shall not be construed to include the sale or
subdivision into lots by the bona fide fee-simple
holder of any tract or parcel of land.
A "real estate salesman" means a person em-
ployed by a licensed real estate broker to sell or
offer for sale, to buy or offer to buy, to negotiate
the purchase, sale or exchange of real estate, or
to lease, rent, or offer to lease, rent or place for
rent any real estate for or on behalf of such real
estate broker. The term shall include any other
than bookkeepers and stenographers employed by
any real estate broker, as real estate broker is
defined in the preceding paragraph of this section.
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to
any person, firm or corporation, who, as owner or
lessor, shall perform any of the acts aforesaid
with reference to property owned by them. Nor
shall the provisions of this Act apply to persons,
firms, or corporations, not real estate brokers or
real estate salesmen, holding a duly executed
power of attorney from the owner for the sale,
leasing or exchanging of real estate; nor shall
said provisions be held to apply to a receiver or
trustee in bankruptcy, an administrator, or exec-
utor, or trustee, or any person selling real estate
under order of court, or pursuant to the terms of
a will, mortgage, or deed of trust, or deed to secure
a debt. Acts 1925, pp. 325, 326; 1927, p. 307.
Editor's Note.—The last two sentences of the first para-
graph and the last sentence of the second paragraph of this
section, were added by the amendment of 1927.
The 1927 Act is cumulative to the former law and repeals
it only when expressly stated. See § 25 of the Act.
§ 1896(13). Fees for licenses.—The fees for li-
censes shall be as follows: For a broker's license,
the annual fee shall be $25.00. If the licensee be a
corporation, the license issued to it shall entitle
one official or representative thereof to engage in
the business of a real estate broker within the
meaning of this act. For all other officers or rep-
resentatives of a licensed corporation who shall
engage in the business of a real estate broker with-
in the meaning of this, the annual fee shall be
$10.00. If the licensee be a co-partnership, the
license issued to it shall entitle one member of
said co-partnership to engage in the business of
a real estate broker within the meaning of this
Act. For every other member of such co-part-
nership, the annual fee shall be Ten Dollars.
For a salesman's license, the annual fee shall
be Five Dollars. All applications for license shall
be accompanied by the license fee as herein pro-
vided, and all licenses shall expire upon the 31st
day of December of each year. All applications
made during the year to expire December 31st of
said year. The fees required of brokers and sales-
men under this act shall be the full annual fee for
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all licenses applied for by or before June 30th of
any calendar year; and one-half the annual fee
for all licenses applied for between July 1st and
December 31st of any calendar year. Provided
that this section shall not be construed to prevent
municipalities from assessing license fees. Acts
1925, pp 325, 332; 1927, p. 308.
Editor's Note.—The annual fee for salesman's license was
reduced from ten to five dollars, by the amendment of 1927.
The original last sentence which provided that the fee charged
shall be prorated on monthly basis, was stricken, and the
present last sentence was added, by the same amendment.
§ 1896(14). Investigations; revocations; dis-
honest dealing.—The commission may, upon its
own motion, and shall, upon the verified com-
plaint in writing of any person, investigate the
actions of any 'real estate broker or real estate
salesman, who shall assume to act in either such
capacity within this state, and shall have power
to suspend, for a period less than the unexpired
portion of the license, or to revoke any license
issued under the provisions of this Act at any
time, where the licensee in performing or attempt-
ing to perform any of the acts mentioned herein
be deemed to be guilty of:
(a) Making any substantial misrepresentations.
(b) Making any false promises of a character
likely to influence, persuade, or induce, or
(c) Pursuing a continued and flagrant course
of misrepresentation or the making of false prom-
ises through agents or salesmen or advertising or
otherwise, or
(d) Acting for more than one party in a trans-
action without the knowledge of all parties there-
to, or
(e) Representing, or attempting to represent, a
real estate broker other than the employer, with-
out the express knowledge and consent of the
employer, or
(f) Failure to account for or to remit for any
moneys coming into his possession which be-
longs to others.
(g) Paying a commission, or sharing or partic-
ipating in a commission for valuable considera-
tion to or with any person operating in any
county within the State of Georgia under the ju-
risdiction of the Georgia Real-Estate Commis-
sion, not licensed under the provisions of the
Act as amended.
(h) Has demonstrated unworthiness or incom-
petency to act as real estate broker or salesman
in such manner as to safeguard the interest of the
public.
(i) Any other conduct whether of the same or
a different character than heretofore specified,
which constitutes dishonest dealing.
This act shall not be construed to relieve any
person from civil liability o'r criminal prosecu-
tion under the general laws of this state. Acts
1925, pp. 325, 332. Acts 1929, p. 319, § 32.
§ 1896(22). Amendments to Acts as to real-
estate brokers.—Sections 1896(4) to 1896(21) of
the Code of 1926, defining, regulating, and licens-
ing real estate brokers and real estate salesmen
in counties having a population of 44,195 or
more, as amended by Act of 1927 is amended by
adding thereto this and the following sections.
Acts 1929, p. 318, § 28.
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§1896(23). Definition of "real-estate broker"
enlarged.—The term "real-estate broker," in ad-
dition to the persons set forth in section 1896(5)
shall include the following: Any person, firm,
or corporation subdividing a tract of land into
twenty (20) or more lots, or offering for sale a
tract of land already subdivided into twenty (20)
or more lots, where such persons, firm, or cor-
porations sells or offers any of said lots for sale
through salesmen, whether such salesmen be
regularly or occasionally employed, and whether
they be paid salaries or commissions. Acts 1929,
p. 318, § 29.
§ 1896(24). Claims not enforceable by unli-
censed broker.-—No person, firm, or corporation
shall have the right to enfo'rce in any court of
this State any claim fo'r commissions, profits, op-
tion profits, or fees for any business done as real-
estate broker or salesman, without having pre-
viously obtained the license required under the
terms of this Act as amended. Acts 1929, p.
319, § 30.
§ 1896(25). Real-Estate Commission's power
to make rules.—The Georgia Real-Estate Com-
mission shall have full power to make all rules
and regulations necessary, in its discretion, to>
carry out the provisions of this Act as amended.
Acts 1929, p. 319, § 31.
§ 1896(26). Appeals from decision of Real-Es-
tate Commission.—Be it further enacted by the
authority aforesaid, that an appeal from the de-
cision of the Real-Estate Commission, as provided
in section 1896(17), shall first be filed with the
Real-Estate Commission and then entered to the
superior court of the county of the residence of
the person, firm, or corporation entering the ap-
peal, within thirty days from the date of the de-
cision of the Real-Estate Commission. The orig-
inal papers in a case thus appealed shall be trans-
mitted to the clerk of the superior court by the
secretanr of the Real-Estate Commission. The
appeal shall be tried by a jury in the superior
court under the same 'rules and laws as appeals
from inferior courts to superior courts are now
tried, and in every respect shall be de novo. The
decision of the Real-Estate Commission shall be-
come effective immediately on its rendition, unless
an appeal is filed and a stay of execution granted
by the superior court. Acts 1929, p. 317, § 33.
§ 1896(27). Hearing before Real-Estate Com-
mission.—In the preparation and conduct of hear-
ings before the Georgia Real-Estate Commission,
any member of the commission may sign sub-
poenas, administer oaths and affirmations, ex-
amine witnesses, and receive evidence. Any
party to any hearing before the commission shall
have a right to the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf at such hearing upon making a request
thereof to the commission and designating the
person or persons sought to be subpoenaed. In
case of disobedience to a subpoena, any member
of the commission may invoke the aid of the
superior court of competent jurisdiction in re-
quiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of papers; and such court may
issue an order requiring the persons to appear be-
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fore the commission and give evidence or to pro-
duce papers as the case may be; and any failure
to obey such order of the court may 'be punished
by the court as a contempt thereof. Testimony
may be taken as in civil cases, and any person
may be compelled to appear and depose on the
same manner as witnesses may be compelled to
appear and testify as hereinbefore provided. Any
person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and
testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or to pro-
duce documentary evidence if in his power to do
so, in obedience to a subpoena or lawful require-
ment by such commission o'r member thereof,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be punished as prescribed by
section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia of
1910. Acts 1929, p. 320, § 34.
§ 1896(28). Act cumulative.—This amendment
is to be construed as cumulative of said original
Act as amended, and does not repeal any of the
provisions of said original Act as amended, ex-
cept as herein specifically stated. Acts 1929, p.
320, § 35.
§ 1896(29). Failure to obtain license, or viola-
tion of other provisions of Act, a misdemeanor.—
Section 18 of said Original Act shall be applicable
to this amendment, and all persons who consti-
tute real-estate brokers, or real-estate salesmen
as defined by this and former amendment, and
who fail to obtain the license required, and all
persons who violate any other provisions of this
amendment, or the original Act as amended, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished
as provided in section 18 of the original Act.
Acts 1929, p. 321, § 36.
CHAPTER 9
State Geologist
§ 1963. (§ 1712.) State geologist.
Cited in annotations to Myers v. U. S., 272 U. S. 52, 1249.
CHAPTER 12
Protection of Trademarks, and Names of Benevo-
lent Organizations
§ 1993. Name and style of benevolent and other
associations.
Presumption as to Fraud.—If the association or corpora-
tion first appropriating and using the name has a clear right
to its use, its subsequent use by another corporation know-
ing of the right is presumed to be fraudulent. Graves v.
District Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga. 110, 129 S. E. 783.
Sufficiency of Proof.—In a case where it is charged that
one beneficial incorporated association is using a name
which by prior use appertains to another fraternal organi-
zation, mere nroof by the plaintiff that the defendant was
using the. name which it had adopted to distinguish it from
similar organizations would not entitle the plaintiff to re-
lief. Graves v. District Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga. 110,
129 S. E. 783.
§ 1994. Injunction against infringement.
Enjoined In Toto.—When it is made to appear that the
name in question is being used, or indeed if it is shown that
it can be used, to mislead the public and induce the belief
that the association which is using the name which another
is justly entitled to use, the defendant should be enjoined
from the use of this name in toto, and not merely partially
enjoined. Graves v. District Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga.
110, 129 S. E. 783. The addition of the suffix "incorporated"
is not sufficient relief. Id.
Same—Ritual, Passwords, etc. — In Graves v. District
Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga. 110, 129 S. E. 783, it was
further stated that, "It was further error to omit or re-
fuse to enjoin the use by the defendant of the ritual, pass-
words, signs, tokens, etc., of the national order."
FOURTEENTH TITLE
Inclosures and Stock
CHAPTER 3
Inclosures and Fences
ARTICLE 5
Impounding Animals
§ 2034. (§ 1775.) Impounding animals, how dis-
posed of; and damages, how assessed.
Construed with Section 2082(11)
—
Quarantining and Dip-
ping.—In Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 624, 137 S. E. 40, Mr.
Justice Hines speaking for the court, said: "Section [2082-
(11)] and [this section] when construed together, furnish
the owner of animals impounded under that section an ade-
quate remedy for contesting the amount of expense claimed
by the local inspector for quarantining and dipping such
animals.
It was the intention of the legislature to make this rem-
edy applicable to an inspector who impounds cattle under
section 2082(11). So. if such inspector and the cattle-
owner can not agree upon the amount of expense in-
curred by the inspector in having the animals of the de-
faulting owner quarantined and dipped, then the inspector
must resort to the remedy provided in this section for the
recovery of such expense. He can not advertise and sell
them without such proceedings. If the cattle-owner wishes
to replevy his animals so impounded, and thus lessen the
expense of keeping them thereafter impounded, he can give
the bond provided for in said section. Gill v. Cox, 163
Ga. 618, 625, 137 S. E. 40.
ARTICLE 6
Election for No Fences
§ 2042(2) Exemption of mountain districts from
no-fence or stock law; election as to.—In those
several counties of the mountain region of Georgia
wherein the consent of the State of Georgia has
been given to the United States for the acquisi-
tion of land for the establishment of National
Forest Reserves, where any area composed of
three or more militia districts, in which the United
States has acquired a majority of the forest lands,
which area is isolated from other stock law or
no-fence territory by reason of natural barriers
such as mountain ranges, or which is adjacent to
non-stock law or fence-law territory, and located
in counties which heretofore or may hereafter vote
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in favor of county-wide stock law or no-fence law,
may be exempted from the operation of the stock
law or no-fence law when a majority of the law-
ful voters of said area vote in favor of the same.
Acts 1927, p. 217.
§ 2042(3) Petition of freeholders.— It shall be
the duty of the ordinary of the county wherein
such area is located, when a petition is filed with
him, signed by ten or more of the freeholders of
the several militia districts located in said area, to
hear and determine said petition; and if he is
satisfied that the area described in said petition
is so isolated from other stock-law territory or
adjacent to non-stock-law territory, then it shall
be his duty to call an election, giving notice of
the same for twenty days in each of the districts
named in said petition, by posting notices at three
or more public places, and submit the question
of "Fence" or "No fence" for said area to the
qualified voters of the area described in said pe-
tition, which election shall be held in each district
embraced in the area, under the same rules and
regulations governing the holding of elections for
members of the General Assembly. If a ma-
jority of the votes polled in said area at said elec-
tion are for "Fence," then the same shall become
operative and effective in said area ninety days
from the date of said election, and said area shall
then be exempt from the operation of county-wide
stock law. Acts 1927, p. 218.
ARTICLE 7
Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 2043. (§ 1781).
around.
Militia districts, fences
Stock law not applied to district adjoining another
State, when. Donaldson v. Gilliam, 39 Ga. App. 504, 147
S. E. 423. Proclamation not conclusive, but prima facie
evidence, as to fencing; rebuttal of inference. Id.
§§ 2043(a), 2043(b). Park's Code.
See §!§ 2043(2) -2042(3).
§ 2044. Stock-law fences legalized.
Resolution by Commissioner Not Conclusive.—If there has
been no honest effort made by the citizens of the district
to build good fences and gates on or about the district line,
and said fences and gates have not in fact been erected, a
resolution of the count}' commissioners declaring that they
have inspected the fences and gates so erected, and recogniz-
ing and establishing such fences and gates as the boundary
fence between the district and adjoining districts and as
a legal fence within the purview of this section, is not con-
clusive that such fence and gates have been erected; and
it would be competent for the plaintiff, in a possessory-war-
rant proceeding brought to recover some of his hogs which
had been impounded by a resident of a district under the
claim that the district was a no-fence or stock-law district,
to show that no fence and gates had been erected on or
about the district line. Parish v. Hendricks, 163 Ga. 385,
136 S. IJ. 135. Such a resolution is, however, prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. Id.
§ 2047. (§ 1784.) Gates to be erected.
Proper Gates Are Condition Precedent.—In no event shall
the provisions of the stock law go into effect as the results
of a militia district election, unless proper gates are so es-
tablished in public and private roads. Parish v. Hendricks,
163 Ga. 385, 136 S. D. 135. See notes of this case under §
2044.
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ARTICLE 10
Tuberculosis in Domestic Animals
§ 2064(1). State Veterinarian's duty as to eradi-
cation of tuberculosis in animals.—It shall be the
duty of the State Veterinarian to eradicate tuber-
culosis of domestic animals within the State. To
enable the State Veterinarian to eradicate bovine
tuberculosis effectively, and to aid him in estab-
lishing within the State a modified accredited
tuberculosis-free area, in conformity with rules
and regulations promulgated by the United States
Livestock Sanitary Association and adopted by
the Bureau of Animal Industry, United States De-
partment of Agriculture, the county commission-
ers of any county in which the State and Federal
Governments jointly engage in a tuberculosis eradi-
cation campaign may appropriate for aiding in
said work such sums as the county commissioners
or board of roads and revenues may deem adequate
and necessary. The State Veterinarian shall have
full and complete authority and responsibility in
all livestock sanitary control work. The State
Veterinarian, or his duly authorized agent, is here-
by empowered to enter upon any premises, barn,
lot, or any other place where cattle are kept, for
the purpose of applying test with tuberculin to
ascertain whether or not the animals so tested are
affected with tuberculosis. The owners, or
keeper of such cattle shall render such reasonable
assistance as may be required to enable the State
Veterinarian or his agent to apply the test with
accuracy and dispatch. Acts 1927, p. 349.
§ 2064(2). Notice to owner of animal.—Should
the State Veterinarian receive information or have
reason to believe that tuberculosis exists in any
animal or herds of animals, he shall promptly
notify the owner or owners and shall arrange to
have such animal or animals tested by a qualified
veterinarian. That all cattle which shall here-
after react to a tuberculin test shall immediately
after such reaction be branded on the left jaw
with the letter "T," said letter to be not less than
two inches in length, and in addition said reactors
shall be tagged in the left ear with a special tag
to be adopted by the State veterinarian. All cat-
tle so identified shall be slaughtered within a pe-
riod of fourteen days immediately following such
reaction, such slaughter to be under the direction
of the State Veterinarian in an abattoir where
Federal or competent local meat inspection is
maintained. The owners of such reactors to the
tuberculin test shall be indemnified for such ani-
mals, as hereinafter provided.
§ 2064(3). Notice agreement on value.—Before
having such reacting animal or animals slaugh-
tered, it shall be the duty of the State Veterinarian
to notify the owner of his findings as to the con-
dition of said animal or animals; and if such ani-
mal shall have been purchased by the owner not
less than six months, prior to the examination by
said veterinarian, then the owner and said veterina-
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rian shall, if possible, agree on the value of such
animal or animals so condemned. If said State
Veterinarian or his agent and the owner of said
animal or animals cannot agree as to the value of
said animal or animals, then each will select a
citizen from the county in which said animal or
animals are located, to act in their place. These
two arbitrators shall fix the value of such animal
or animals, and in the event said two citizens can-
not agree, then the United States Veterinary In-
spector in charge of co-operative tuberculosis era-
dication in Georgia shall act as umpire. In no
case shall the value fixed by said owner and State
Veterinarian, or by the arbitrators, exceed the
amount at which said animal or animals were re-
turned by the owner for taxation to State and
County authorities, nor shall the value fixed in
the case of a pure-bred cow or bull exceed $150.00,
nor in case of a grade cow or bull the sum of $90.-
00. Upon the value being fixed by agreement as
hereinbefore provided, said owner shall be paid,
within the limitations hereinbefore p/ovided,
jointly by the county commissioners out of county
appropriations and by the United States Bureau
of Animal Industry out of special Federal gov-
ernment tuberculosis eradication funds now avail-
able.
§ 2064(4). Restriction of use or sale of tuber-
culin.—No person, firm, or corporation shall ad-
minister veterinary tuberculin, except qualified
veterinarians. No person, firm or corporation
shall sell, offer for sale or distribution, or keep on
hand any veterinary tuberculin, except qualified
veterinarians, licensed druggists or others law-
fully engaged in the sale of veterinary biological
products. "Qualified veterinarians" within the
meaning of this Act shall be veterinarians ap-
proved by the State Veterinarian and the chief of
the United States Bureau of Animal Industry for
tuberculin testing cattle intended for interstate
shipment.
§ 2064(5). Annual Appropriation.—To enforce
the provisions of this Act and to enable the State
Veterinarian to eradicate bovine tuberculosis, to
establish and maintain a modified accredited tu-
berculosis-free area, and to develop the livestock
industry within the State, the sum of twelve thou-
sand, five hundred ($12,500) dollars annually, or
as much thereof as may be necessary, be and the
same is hereby appropriated.
§ 2064(6). Penalty.—Any violation of any pro-
visions of this Act is hereby made a misdemeanor,
and shall be punishable by a fine of not less than
twenty-five ($25.00) dollars for each offense.
FIFTEENTH TITLE
Department of Agriculture.
CHAPTER 1.
Commissioner of Agriculture.
§ 2066(a). Park's Code.
See § 2066(1).
§ 2066(1) Terms of commissioner.—Beginning
January 1, 1929, the term of office of the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture shall be for a period of
two years, or until his successor is elected and
qualified. Acts 1927, p. 207.
Editor's Note.—The act of 1927 provides that the term of
office of the commissioner shall expire December 31, 1928.
§ 2066(b). Park's Code.
See § 2067(1).
§ 2067(1) Bond of Commissioner.—The Com-
missioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia
is hereby required to give a bond of fifty thou-
sand ($50,000) dollars as a guaranty of the faith-
ful performance of the duties of his office, and for
the proper accounting for all monies, fees, etc.,
received by the office, said bond to be furnished
by a surety company authorized to do business in
Georgia by the laws of this State, provided said
premium on said bond, shall be paid by the State
of Georgia. Acts 1927, p. 206.
§ 2079. Cattle-ticks—suppression of diseases.
Quoted in Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 622, 137 S. E. 40.
§ 2082(b). Park's Code.
See § 2081(2).
§ 2081(2). Duties.
Acceptance of Federal Regulation. — The act from which
this section was taken and § 2082(11) amounts to an accept-
ance of the regulations and methods of the Commissioners
of Agriculture of United States under Act Cong. May 29,
1884, section 3 (Comp. St. section 8691). Thornton v. United
States, 2 Fed. (2d), 561.
Cited in Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 622, 137 S. E. 40.
§ 2081(3). Salary of State Veterinarian. — The
salary of said State Veterinarian shall be four
thousand two hundred ($4,200.00) dollars per an-
num, and he shall in addition be reimbursed his
actual traveling expenses, incurred while travel-
ing in the service of the State in the regular dis-
charge of his duties, not to exceed two thousand
($2,000.00) dollars, and that he is to receive no
other salary or remuneration from any other
source. Acts 1929, p. 336, § 3.
§ 2082(9). Dipping-vats and chemicals; man-
damus.
Applied in Colquitt County v. Bahnsen, 162 Ga. 340, 346,
133 S. E. 871.
§ 2082(10). Inspectors.
Constitutionality—Remedy of Inspector for Expenses. —
This section when construed in connection r>wrFh 'flection
2034, furnishes the only remedy by which th€ local inspector'
can prosecute his claim for expenses incurred by dipping/and
caring for such animals, and in defensdrof such proceeding
by the local inspector the owner had/an ample remedy for
contesting the amount of expense claimed by the local in-
spector. This being so, this section ' is not unconstitutional
upon the ground that it denies to /the owner of animals so;
impounded due process of law. Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137
S. E. 40.
The enforcement of this section is.;*iot unreasonable so as
to be unconstitutional upon the groun"d that it is a depriva-
tion of due process of law. Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137 S.
E. 40.
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§ 2082(11). Quarantine and dipping; notice;
lien for expenses.
As to this section being an acceptance of the Federal regu-
lations, see note to § 2081(2).
Constitutionality.—Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 626, 137 S. F.
•40, conforms to the holding set out under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Failure of Owner to Pay Expenses after Three Days No-
tice.—That part of the section which provides that "should
the owner fail or refuse to pay said expenses after three
days notice," does not authorize the inspector to sell the
animals after advertising them for three days. The purpose
of the notice is to afford the owner an opportunity to pay
the expense, and avoid the cost of litigation provided in the
above section of the Code. If, after the expiration of such
three days notice, the owner does not pay this expense,
the inspector must proceed as provided in this section. Gill
v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 625, 137 S. W. 40. See notes of this
case under § 2034.
§ 2082(k). Park's Code.
See § 2082(13).
§ 2082(13). Quafantine along border of Florida
and Alabama.
Cited in Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137 S. E. 40.
§ 2082(1). Park's Code.
See § 2082(14).
§ 2082(14). When reinfestation eradicated with-
out expense to county.
Entire Expense upon State.—In Colquitt County v. Bahn-
sen, 162 Ga. 340, 348, 133 S. E\ 871, Mr. Justice Hines speak-
ing for the court said: "We think the true meaning of sec-
tion 2 of the act of 1924 [this section] is to place upon the
State the entire expense of eradicating any subsequent rein-
festation of a tick-free county." In support of this holding
the court refers to the caption of the Act of 1924, from
which this section was taken, and to the fact that an appro-
priation for the purpose had been made by the Legislature.
Upon a failure of the state veterinarian to perform this
duty it will be enforced by mandamus.
The State veterinarian is required to eradicate ticks in
reinfested counties without the previous determination of
the commissioner of agriculture that such eradication is
wise and best. Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137 S. F- 40.
§§ 2084(e) -2084(g). Park's Code.
See §§ 2082(9) -2082(11).
§§ 2084(j)-2084(n). Park's Code.
See §)§ 2064(1) -2064(6).
CHAPTER 3.
Foods, Drugs and Liquors, Adulteration
Misbranding Prohibited
or
ARTICLE 3
Adulteration or Misbranding Prohibited
§ 2101. Adulteration or misbranding prohibited.
and adulterated foods. Baltimore Butterine Co. v. Tal-
madge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904.
Use Not Prohibited.—This section does not prohibit the
use of adulterated or misbranded foods. Baltimore Butter-
ine Co. v. Talmadge, (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d). 904.
When Sale of Substitutes Net Prohibited.—The law does
not prohibit the sale of substitutes for creamery butter,
provided the substitute is not sold so misbranded as to
deceive or so adulterated as to injure. Baltimore Butter-
ine Co. v. Talmadge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904, 909.
ARTICLE 4
When an Article Is Adulterated or Misbranded.
§ 2103. Adulterated, when an article is.
The provision of par. 5 of this section is not applica-
ble, where the contention is not that the defendant had
adulterated the product by adding some deleterious for-
eign substance to the normal constituency of the product
for the purpose of selling it as a part of the product it-
self, but where the charge is confined to the negligence
of the defendant in allowing the normal ingredients of
the product to become putrid and unwholesome. Armour
& Co. v. Miller, 39 Ga. App. 228, 147 S. F- 184.
§ 2104. Misbranded.
Use of Distinctive Name of Another Article.—Par. 1,
subsec. 1, provides that an article of food shall be deemed
misbranded, "if it be an imitation of, or offered for sale
under the distinctive name of, another article." This pro-
vision does not require that the name, either in its
primary or secondary signification, must describe the
contents of the article. Baltimore Butterine Co. v. Tal-
madge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904.
The word "imitation" as used in this section indicates
something intentional rather than incidental, and imports
more than mere resemblance or similitude. Baltimore
Butterine Co. v. Talmadge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904.
Articles Sold in Commerce. — This section deals with
articles sold in commerce. Baltimore Butterine Co. v.
Talmadge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904.
That a product is sometimes used as a substitute for
creamery butter without being declared to be such would
not justify its being banned under this chapter. Baltimore
Butterine Co. v. Talmadge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904.
"Southern Nut Product" held a "distinctive" name, not
an imitation of creamery butter and not adulterated.
Baltimore Butterine Co. v. Talmadge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d)
904.
ARTICLE 7
Standards of Purity to Be Fixed
§ 2115. Commissioner to fix standards.
See note to § 2117.
Products made wholly from vegetable oils, water, salt,
and harmless coloring matter are not prohibited from be-
ing sold by this section. Baltimore Butterine Co. v.
Talmadge, (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904.
ARTICLE 8
When Dealer Is Protected
§ 2117. Prosecutions.
The purpose of the law against adulteration or mis-
branding is to protect consumers from deception or in-
jury, and it is to be conclusively presumed that it was
adopted to prevent injury to the public health by the sale
and transportation in intrastate commerce of misbranded | for relief by injunction held too broad
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As to jurisdiction of Federal Court to enjoin wrongful
confiscation of food products and prosecutions for violating
Food and Drugs Act of Georgia, see Baltimore Butterine
Co. v. Talmadge (Ga.), 32 Fed. (2d) 904, wherein prayer
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ARTICLE 9.
Sanitation of Food Places.
§§ 21 19(c) -21 19(d). Park's Code.
See § 2119(3).
§ 2119(3). Supervision of state veterinarian over
slaughter house, dairies, etc.; report and statistical
bulletin.
Slaughter houses are subjects to sanitary regulations.
Schoen Bros. v. Pylant, 162 Ga. 565, 571, 134 S. E. 304.
ARTICLE 10.
Apples and Peaches; Grades and Marks.
§ 2119(9). Commissioner of Agriculture to es-
tablish grades and marking rules.—The Commis-
sioner of Agriculture is hereby directed to estab-
lish and promulgate from time to time official
standard grades for all closed packages of peaches
and apples, by which the quantity, quality, and
size may be determined, and prescribe and pro-
mulgate rules and regulations governing the
marking which shall be required upon packages
of peaches and apples for the purpose of show-
ing the name and address of the producer or
packer, the variety, quantity, quality, and size of
the product, or any of them; provided that the
Commissioner of Agriculture shall establish a
grade for immature apples, and an unclassified or
similar marking for all peaches and apples not in-
cluded in the other grades established. Acts 1927,
p. 191.
§ 2119(10). Packages to be marked; stamps. —
Whenever such standard for the grade or other
classifications of peaches or apples under this Act
becomes effective, every closed package contain-
ing peaches or apples grown and packed for sale
or transported for sale by any person, firm, com-
pany, or organization shall bea'r conspicuously
upon the outside thereof, in plain words and fig-
ures, such marking as are prescribed by the Com-
missioner of Agriculture under the provisions of
this Act.
Every crate or package of peaches or apples
shipped by mail or express from any point within
this State shall bear an adhesive stamp the price
of which shall be one-half of one cent each, show-
ing that they are classified under the provisions
of this Act.
Each bill of lading issued for a car of peaches
loaded in bushel baskets, shipped from any point
within this State, shall bear an adhesive stamp,
the price of which shall be $2.00, showing that
the contents of said car is classified under the
provisions of this Act.
Each bill of lading for a car of peaches loaded
in crates, shipped from any point within this
State, shall bear an adhesive stamp, the price of
which shall be $2.50 showing that the contents
of said said car is classified under the provisions
of this Act.
Each bill of lading issued for a car of peaches,
loaded in half bushel baskets or in containers of
smaller volume, shipped from any point within
this State, shall contain an adhesive stamp, the
price of which shall be $3.00, showing that the
contents of said car is classified under the pro-
visions of this Act.
Each bill of lading issued for a carload of ap-
ples loaded in bushel baskets or boxes, shipped
from any point within this State, shall contain an
adhesive stamp, the price of which shall be $3.00,
showing that the contents of said car is classified
under the provisions of this Act.
Each bill of lading issued for a carload of ap-
ples, shipped from any point within this State,
loaded in smaller containers than one bushel, shall
bear an adhesive stamp, the price of which shall
be $3.50, showing that the contents of said car is
classified under the provisions of this Act. Said
stamps shall be sold by the Commissioner of Ag-
riculture to the applicant, and shall be placed on
said packages by the shipper, and on the bills of
lading by the shipper at the time of the issuance
of the same. Acts 1929, p. 306, § 1.
§ 2119(11). Inspection; appointment of inspec-
tors.—The Commissioner of Agriculture of the
State of Georgia shall be charged with the en-
forcement of the provisions of this article, and
for that purpose shall have the power: (a) to en-
ter and to inspect personally, or through any au-
thorized agent, every place within the State of
Georgia where peaches and apples are produced,
packed, or stored for sale, shipped, delivered for
shipment, offered for sale, or sold, and to inspect
such places and all peaches and apples and con-
tainers and equipment found in any such place,
(b) to appoint, superintend, control, and discharge
such inspectors and subordinate inspectors as in
his discretion may be deemed necessary, for the
special purpose of enforcing the terms of this
Article, to prescribe their duties and fix their
compensation, (c) Personally, or through any au-
thorized agent or any such inspector, to forbid the
movement of any closed package or packages of
peaches or apples found to be in violation of any
of the provisions of this Article, which have not
been actually accepted by a common carrier for
shipment in interstate traffic, and to require the
same to be repacked or remarked. A carload of
peaches or apples shall not be considered as ac-
tually accepted by a common carrier for shipment
until the loading is finished, the car sealed, and
the bill of lading issued, (d) To cause prosecu-
tion to be instituted for violations of this Article.
§ 2119(12). Delivery prima facie evidence of offer
to sell.—When peaches or apples in closed pack-
ages are delivered to railroad station or a common
carrier for shipment, or delivered to a storage
house for storage, such delivery shall be prima
facie evidence that the peaches or apples are of-
fered or exposed for sale.
§ 2119(13). Penalty.—Any person, firm, com-
pany, organization, or corporation, who shall vio-
late any of the provisions of this Article, shall be
punishable by a fine of not more than five hun-
dred dollars ($500.00), or imprisonment for a
period not to exceed 90 days, either or both, for
each offense.
Ga.—
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§ 2119(14). Dealers protected by inspection, etc.
—No person, firm, or corporation shall be prose-
cuted under the provisions of this Article, when
he or it can be established that the peaches or
apples offered for sale have passed inspection by
an authorized inspector of the State of Georgia,
and bear the official Georgia State inspection
stamp, or by an inspector of the United States
Department of Agriculture, and found to be
packed and marked in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Commissioner of Agriculture
of Georgia.
§ 2119(15). Unfit fruit not to be shipped.—
No person in the State of Georgia shall ship any
peaches which are immature, or peaches or ap-
ples unfit for human consumption; and no apples
or peaches shall be offered for sale within the
State of Georgia which do not bear on the pack-
ages the marks and grades prescribed in section
2119(10).
ARTICLE 10A.
Milk and Cheese Dairy Inspection.
§ 2119(16). Duties of State Veterinarian or his
representative as to dairy inspection, etc. — It
shall be the duty of the State Veterinarian or au-
thorized representative: (1) to inspect or cause to
be inspected as often as may be deemed practicable
all creameries, public dairies, condenseries, butter,
cheese and ice-cream factories, or any other place
where dairy products are produced, manufactured,
kept, handled, stored, or sold within the State. (2)
To prohibit the production and sale of unclean or
unwholesome milk, cream, butter, cheese, ice cream,
or other dairy products. (3) To condemn for food
purposes all unclean or unwholesome dairy prod-
ucts, wherever he may find them. (4) To take
samples anywhere of any dairy product or imita-
tion thereof, and cause the same to be analyzed
or satisfactorily tested according to the method of
the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists
in force at the time. (5) To assist the State
Veterinarian in compiling and publishing an-
nually statistics and information concerning all
phases of the dairy industry in this State; and
the manufacturers of dairy products, upon his re-
quest, shall furnish the State Veterinarian such
data and statistics as he may require, and these
shall be used for the purpose of compiling statis-
tical reports of the general dairy interests. Acts
1929, p. 280, § 1.
§ 2119(17). Definitions of terms used in act.
—
For the purpose of this Act (1) the term "dairy
manufacturing plants" shall be construed to em-
brace creameries, condenseries, public dairies,
butter, cheese, ice cream, and other dairy fac-
tories, and the term shall be considered also to
mean such concerns as manufacture for sale
dairy products, either at wholesale or retail. (2)
The term "public dairies" shall also be con-
sidered to mean any place where milk and cream
are purchased from producers and sold or kept
for sale, either at wholesale or retail. (3) The
term "milk or cream station" shall be considered
to mean any place where milk or cream may be
received or purchased and held for shipment or
delivery to a dairy manufacturing plant. (4)
The term "milk or cream brokerage" shall be
considered to mean any business that is con-
ducted for the purpose of purchasing milk,,
cream, or butter fat with the intent of resale
without being converted into a finished product.
(5) The term "field superintendent" shall be
considered to mean any qualified person who is
the duly authorized representative of any per-
son, firm, company, or corporation engaged in
buying, selling, or manufacturing dairy products,
and who has supervision over buying stations
and operators. (6) The term "cream tester" shall
be considered to mean any person who performs
the act of sampling or testing milk, cream, or
other dairy products, the test of which is to be
used as a basis of making payment for said
products. Acts 1929, p. 281, § 2.
§ 2119(18). Test of milk, cream, etc.—In de-
termining the value of milk, cream, or other
dairy products by the use of the Babcock test,
it shall be unlawful to give any false reading or
in any way manipulate the test so as to give a
higher or lower per cent of butter fat than the
milk, cream, or other dairy products actually
contain, or to cause any inaccuracy in reading
the per cent of butter fat by securing from any
quantity of milk, cream, or other dairy products
to be tested an inaccurate sample for the test.
None other than the Babcock method, or such
method of testings as may be approved by the
State Veterinarian, may be employed when test-
ing milk or cream, the test of which is to be
used as a basis for making payment for the milk
or cream thus tested. None other than the
Torsion balance scales, or such scales as may be
approved by the State Veterinarian, may be
used when weighing cream for testing, when
such tests are to be used as basis for making
payment for such cream. It shall be unlawful
to use adjustable scale weights in determining
the weight of cream used in the Babcock test.
Only such centrifuge shall be used as shall meet
the approval of the State Veterinarian. Specifi-
cations for apparatus and chemicals and direc-
tions for testing milk and cream must conform
to those adopted by the American Dairy Science
Association, with such additions as are deemed
advisable by the State Veterinarian, to make
them applicable to the provisions of this Act.
All test tubes, bottles, pipettes, burrettes or in-
struments used in connection with testing or
determining the value of milk, cream, or other
dairy products by the use of the Babcock test,
must be United States Government standard and
shall be approved by the State Veterinarian. All
milk and cream tests shall be maintained at a
temperature of 135 to 140 degrees F. for at least
3 minutes before the reading of the per cent of
butter fat is made and recorded. In reading
cream tests glymol, or its equivalent, must be
used, and the samples under test must be held
for 3 minutes in a water bath extending up as
high on the graduated neck as the sample itself
does. Acts 1929, p. 281, § 3.
§ 2119(19). Licensing of cream testers. — It
shall be the duty of the State Veterinarian to*
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establish a license department for the licensing
of a "licensed cream tester," and of testing ap-
paratus for milk and cream. Cream tester's
license shall be issued for a period of one year
from date of issue, unless previously revoked
for cause. Upon expiration of the date of the
license all licensed cream testers must again ap-
ply for new license, which shall be granted the
applicant upon paying the required fee, provided
the applicant has not been found guilty of mak-
ing fraudulent tests, or otherwise violating any
of the provisions of this Act, or has permitted
his license to lapse for a period of 12 months.
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or
corporation to employ as tester any person who
does not have a license to operate testing ap-
paratus for milk and cream. It shall be unlaw-
ful for any person operating testing apparatus
for milk and cream to fail to have said license
posted in a conspicuous place in plain view to
all persons entering the room in which all test-
ing is done. The fee for issuing said license
shall be five dollars, payable upon presentation
of license. The same fee of five dollars shall
accompany application for the renewal of license.
Acts 1929, p. 282, § 4.
§ 2119(20). State Veterinarian's duty as to
weighing and testing.—It shall be the duty of
the State Veterinarian and his deputies, and
they are hereby authorized, to weigh and test
milk, cream, and other dairy products for the
purpose of ascertaining the percentage and
weight of butter fat or other ingredients con-
tained therein; and if said State Veterinarian or
any of his deputies shall find, upon test, that
there is a variance of one per cent, or more of
butter fat between his test and that made by any
person engaged in testing, buying, or selling
cream, or .2 of 1% in buying or selling milk,
said Veterinarian or Deputy Veterinarian shall
cause his test to be verified and substantiated by
the chemist of the Georgia State Department of
Agriculture, and if such chemist shall find that
the test made by such State Veterinarian or
Deputy Veterinarian is correct, the test thus
made and verified shall, in all prosecutions for
violations of the provisions of this Act be prima
facie evidence that the test made by the person
engaged in testing, buying, or selling such milk,
cream or other dairy products was falsely and
fraudulently made, and the State Veterinarian
is hereby authorized to recall and cancel the
tester's license or permit of such person thus
making fraudulent tests, or to bring criminal
action against such persons, or both. Acts 1929,
p. 283, § 5.
§ 2119(21). Bottles and pipettes, how marked;
bond of manufacturer.—All bottles and pipettes
used in measuring milk or milk products for
making determination of the per cent of fat in
said milk or milk products shall have clearly
blown or otherwise permanently marked in the
side of the bottle or pipette the word "sealed,"
and in the side of the pipette or the side or
bottom of the bottle of the same, initials or
trademark of the manufacturer and his designat-
ing number, which designating number shall be
furnished by the State Veterinarian upon ap-
plication by the manufacturer and upon the filing
by the manufacturer of a bond in the sum of
$1,000.00 with sureties to be approved by said
State Veterinarian, conditioned upon conform-
ance with the requirements of this section. A
record of the bonds furnished, the designating
numbers, and to whom furnished, shall be kept
in the office of the Department of Agriculture.
Any manufacturer who sells Babcock, or other
milk, cream, or butter test bottles or milk
pipettes, to be used in this State, that does not
comply with the provisions of this section shall
suffer a penalty of $500.00, to be recovered by
the Attorney-General of the State in action in
the name of the State, under the bond of such
manufacturer; and any dealer who uses, for the
purpose of determining the per cent, of milk fat
in milk or milk products any bottles or pipettes,
purchased after six months from the date of this
Act shall take effect, that do not comply with the
provision of this section relating thereto, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
shall be punished as provided in section 18 of
this Act. Acts 1929, p. 284, § 6.
§ 2119(22). Unlawful acts and omissions in
handling and sale of milk, cream, ice-cream, etc.
—It shall be unlawful: (1) To handle milk,
cream, butter, ice-cream or other dairy products
in unclean or unsanitary places, or in an unsani-
tary manner, or to keep, store or prepare for
market any milk, cream or other dairy products
in the same building or enclosure with any hide
or fur house, or any cow, horse, or hog barns or
s'heds, or other places where live stock is kept.
Cream or milk receiving and buying stations
must have outside doors or adjustable outside
windows; and if cream stations have connecting
doors with any other part of the building in
which said station may be located, there must
be installed at the connecting door a vestibule
having solid doors provided with stone springs
to keep them closed, and such vestibule must
meet the approval of the State Veterinarian.
The cream room must be used exclusively for
the handling of dairy products. It shall have
concrete floor, with proper drainage and sewer-
age for the disposition of all waste water. It
shall be equipped with running water, steam, and
other equipment necessary for the thorough
washing and sterilization of all cans, pails, sepa-
rator parts, and anything that may come in di-
rect contact with the milk or cream. The State
Veterinarian and his deputies shall have the
power, and they are hereby authorized, to forbid
the handling of cream, milk, butter, ice-cream or
other dairy products in any such place or places
which in their judgment are unsanitary and will
affect the purity of the milk, cream, butter, ice-
cream, or other dairy products handled therein,
or that will in any way injure the flavor or mar-
ket value thereof. (2) To handle or ship milk,
cream, or ice-cream, or other dairy products, in
unclean or unsanitary vessels, or to expose milk,
cream, or ice-cream, or other dairy products to
flies or other contaminating influence likely to
convey pathogenic or other injurious bacteria to
such milk, cream, ice-cream or other daii^
products. (3) For any common carrier to neg-
lect or fail to remove or ship from its depot, on
the day of its arrival there for shipment, any
milk, cream, or other dairy products left at such
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depot for transportation. Railway and express
companies must not allow merchandise of a con-
taminating nature to be .stored on or with dairy
products. (4) To allow milk or cream cans or
ice-cream cans or ice-cream packers to remain at
a railroad depot longer than one day from the
date of their arrivad. (5) To use any branded or
registered cream can or milk can or ice-cream
packer or container for any other purpose than
the handling, storing, or shipping, of milk, cream,
or ice-cream. It shall be unlawful for any person
other than the rightful owner thereof to use any
can, bottle, or other receptacle if such receptacle
is marked with the brand or trade mark of the
owner. (6) For any person, firm, or corporation,
purchasing ice-cream in cans, shipping bags and
tubs which are to be returned to the manufac-
turer to not cause such cans to be washed and
cleaned as soon as emptied and with the bags
and tubs stored in a dry place. (7) To sell or
offer for sale milk, cream, butter, cheese, ice-
cream, or other dairy products that are not pure
and fres'h and handled with clean utensils. In all
cases it shall be unlawful to sell or offer for sale
milk or cream from diseased or unhealthy ani-
mals or handled by any person suffering from or
coming in contact with persons afflicted with any
contagious disease, and it shall be unlawful to
sell or offer for sale any milk or cream exposed
to contamination or into which have fallen any
unsanitary articles or any foreign substance
which would render the milk or cream of the
product manufactured therefrom unlit for human
consumption. It shall be unlawful for any per-
son, firm, or corporation to sell or expose for
sale anywhere in this State milk, cream, butter,
cheese, ice-cream, or other dairy products con-
taining any preservatives of any kind whatsoever,
except common salt or sugar, or that shall not
comply with the standards promulgated by the
State Veterinarian and approved by the Com-
missioner of Agriculture. Acts 1929, p. 285, § 7.
§ 2119(23). Pasteurization. — Pasteurization,
for the purpose of this Act, is defined to mean
the heating of milk, cream, or milk products to
a temperature of at least 145 degrees F. and held
at such temperature for not less than thirty
minutes. All pasteurizing vats used for pasteur-
izing shall be equipped with a recording ther-
mometer, and for each vat of product pasteurized
a separate record chart shall be used, said charts
being dated and kept on file until called for by
the State Veterinarian or deputy. It shall be
unlawful to use any pasteurized milk, cream, or
ice-cream mix without having on tile, subject to
the demand of the State Veterinarian, a true rec-
ord of pasteurization of said product. The fa-
cilities for holding said product at a low tempera-
ture until frozen must have the approval of the
State Veterinarian. Samples of ice-cream taken
for an official test shall be taken with a butter
trier from a full or nearly full can of ice-cream in
solid condition or directly from the ice-cream
freezer. In all fruit creams an allowance of 2%
reduction in fat content shall be allowed. Acts
1929, p. 286, § 8.
§ 2119(24). Quarterly reports to State Veteri-
liarian.-^—-Each individual, firm, or corporation
[1
manufacturing ice-cream, butter, cheese, con-
densed milk, powdered milk, evaporated milk or
pasteurizing milk in this State shall make a
quarterly report to the State Veterinarian, on
blanks furnished by the State Veterinarian, set-
ting forth the amount of their production during
the quarter. In the report on ice-Cream the aver-
age fat and serum solids content shall be given.
Each individual, firm, or corporation manufactur-
ing the dairy products set forth herein shall also
furnish the State Veterinarian, on blanks fur-
nished by the Veterinarian, the number of pounds
of milk, cream, sweet or salt butter, evaporated
milk, condensed milk, sweetened condensed milk
or powdered milk, he or they have used during the
quarterly period under report. The average fat
content of the milk and cream used shall be re-
ported. Acts 1929, p. 287, § 9.
§ 2119(25). Condensed or evaporated milk, etc.,
unlawful additions to.—It shall be unlawful to sell
keep for sale, or offer for sale any condensed or
evaporated milk, concentrated milk, sweetened
condensed milk, sweetened evaporated milk,
sweetened concentrated milk, sweetened evapo-
rated skimmed milk, or any of the fluid derivatives
of any of them, to which has been added any fat
or oil other than milk fat, either under the name
of said products or articles or the derivatives
thereof, or under any fictitious or trade name
whatsoever. Acts 1929, p. 287, § 10.
§ 2119(26). Ice-cream, when deemed adulter-
ated.—Ice-cream shall be deemed adulterated:
(1) If it contains saccharin or any preservative,
mineral, or other substance or compound delete-
rious to health; provided that this clause shall not
be construed to prohibit the use of harmless color-
ing matter when not used for fraudulent purposes.
(2) If it contains any fats other than milk fat or
any oils or paraffin added to, blended with or com-
pounded with it; provided, that chocolate ice-
cream and the coating of coated ice-cream may
contain cocoa butter. (3) If it is made in whole
or in part from, or contains, any milk product
which is unfit for food. It shall be deemed un-
lawful for any person, firm or corporation, his
or its servant or agent to manufacture, sell or
offer or expose for sale or have in possession with
intent to sell or offer or expose for sale under the
name of "Ice-Cream" any substance not conform-
ing with the provisions of the three preceding sec-
tions; or to sell ice-cream from a container or a
compartment of a cabinet or fountain, which con-
tains any article of food other than ice-cream or
dairy products. Acts 1929, p. 288, § 11.
§ 2119(27). License, quarterly payments by but-
ter manufacturers.—It shall be unlawful for
wholsesale or 'retail milk plant or plants built to
manufacture butter, ice-cream, cheese, condensed
milk or milk powder in the State of Georgia with-
out first having applied for and obtained a license,
signed by the State Veterinarian, bearing the seal
of his office. Such license shall be conspicuously
displayed in the applicants place of business; and
the payment of the quarterly butter-fat tax in ac-
cordance with the following schedule:
Creameries: That each person, firm, partner-
ship, company, or corporation engaged in the
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manufacture of butter shall pay, through the of-
fice of the State Veterinarian, not later than the
fifteenth day of January, April, July and October,
five cents (5c) for each one thousand pounds of
butter fat purchased from producers during the
three preceding calendar months.
Ice-Cream Factories: That each person, firm,
partnership, company or corporation engaged in
the manufacture of ice-cream shall pay, through
the office of the State Veterinarian, not later than
the fifteenth day of January, April, July and Oc-
tober, fifty cents (50c) for each one thousand gal-
lons of ice-cream manufactured during the three
preceding calendar months.
Cheese Factories: That each person, firm, part-
nership, company or corporation engaged in the
manufacture of cheese shall pay, through the of-
fice of the State Veterinarian, not later than the
fifteenth day of January of each year, five cents
(5c) for each thousand pounds or fraction thereof
of butter fat purchased during the preceding year.
Condenseries and Milk Powder Plants: That
each person, firm, partnership, company or cor-
poration engaged in the manufacture of condensed
milk, condensed skimmed milk, powdered milk or
powdered skimmed milk, shall pay, through the
office of the State Veterinarian, not later than the
fifteenth day of January, April, July and October,
five cents (5c) fo'r each one thousand pounds of
butter fat purchased during the three preceding
calendar months.
Milk Plants: That each person, firm, partner-
ship, company or corporation engaged in the pas-
teurization of milk or the bottling of raw or pas-
teurized milk or the handling of whole milk for
the purpose of wholesale or retail sale, shall pay,
through the office of the State Veterinarian, not
later than the fifteenth day of January, April, July
and October, five cents (5c) for each thousand
gallons of milk purchased during the three preced-
ing calendar months.
Nothing in this Act pertaining to the manufac-
ture of butter shall apply to farmers or producers
of milk and cream when churning milk or cream
produced on their own farm, into what shall be
known as dairy, country, or farm butter, or to
prohibit such producers from making cheese out
of milk and cream produced on their own farm,
or prevent them from selling their milk or cream
to individuals, hotels, restaurants or boarding
houses. Aots 1929, p. 288, § 12.
§ 2119(28). Cream tester's license; field superin-
tendent's license; annual fee $5.—It shall be un-
lawful to establish cream or milk buying station
and install any person or persons as station op-
erators without first having obtained a cream
tester's license from the State Veterinarian. (2)
Field superintendent's license may be obtained by
making application to the State Veterinarian,
passing the examination given under his direction,
and paying the annual fee of five ($5.00) dollars,
such licenses being renewable each year on the
payment of the annual fee unless cancelled be-
cause the holder thereof has been found guilty of
violating the dairy law or the rules and regula-
tions based thereon. Acts 1929, p. 290, § 13.
§ 2119(29). Station license; annual fee $2; revo-
cation.—It shall be unlawful to establish any milk
or cream buying stations without first having ob-
tained a station license from the State Veterina-
rian. Such license may be obtained by making ap-
plication accompanied by the annual fee of two
($2.00) dollars, such license to be in force for one
year, subject to revocation by the State Veterina-
rian at any time the station shall be found to be
constructed or operated in violation of the provi-
sions of this Act. Acts 1929, p. 290, § 14.
§ 2119(30). Milk and cream brokerage; license;
annual fee $10; quarterly reports.—It shall be un-:
lawful to engage in the milk or cream brokerage
business without first having obtained a license
from the State Veterinarian to operate and con-
duct such business. Milk and cream brokerage as
those of the dairy manufacturing plant being sub-
ject to the annual license fee of ten dollars ($10.-
00). The State Veterinarian may require quar-
terly reports from such ibrokerage firms, showing
the quantity of dairy products they are selling in
the State. Acts 1929, p. 290, § 15.
§ 2119(31). Annual reports to State Veterina-
rian, as to purchase of milk and cream, amount of
fat, price. — Creameries, ice-cream plants, milk
plants (and cream and milk stations when buying
cream or milk for plants operating outside the
State) shall leport annually on or before the 1st
day of January of each year the amount of milk
or cream or both purchased during the last year,
with the amount of fat in the milk or cream, and
price paid for same. Any other data or statistics
desired by the State Veterinarian shall be reported
to him by said parties, firms or corporations ac-
cording to and on blanks furnished by said Veter-
inarian. The above concerns shall keep complete
and accurate records of their business, and the
State Veterinarian shall have free access to all such
records.
Said dairy manufacturing plants whose plants
are located outside the State and are buying their
milk and creani in the State of Georgia shall be
subject to all regulations specified within this Act,
being subject to the payment of all taxes, licenses
and butter-fat tax on volume of the raw material
purchased within the State of Georgia. Acts 1929,
p. 290, § 16.
§ 2119(32). Money received by State Veterina-
rian, how handled.—All monies paid to or received
by the State Veterinarian under the provisions of
this Act shall be handled through the funds of the
State Department of Agriculture and be paid into
the State Treasury, quarterly, by the Commis-
sioner of said department, there to be placed in a
separate fund, which, is hereby appropriated to the
State Department of Agriculture for administer-
ing the provisions of this Act. Any unexpended
balance now in funds available for the Dairy Di-
vision are hereby reappropriated and made a part
of the above-named fund, and any unexpended
balance in said fund at the close of any fiscal
year is hereby reappropriated to the State De-
partment of Agriculture for the ensuing year.
The State Auditor is hereby authorized to draw
warrants against this separate fund, upon pre-
sentation of properly itemized and fully verified
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vouchers, approved by Commissioner of Agri-
culture. Acts 1929, § 17.
§ 2119(33). Violation of Act, a misdemeanor;
penalty.—Any person, firm or corporation, and
any officer, agent, representative, servant or em-
ployee of such person, firm o'r corporation who
violates any of the provisions of this Act shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and his or their per-
mit or license shall be subject to suspension or
cancellation by the State Veterinarian. Upon
conviction the offender shall be punished by a
fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00)
nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) for
each offense. Acts 1929, p. 291, § 18.
§ 2119(34). Enforcement of Act.—The State
Veterinarian, by himself or his deputies, shall be
charged with the enforcement of this Act. Acts
1929, p. 292, § 19.
§ 2119(35). Shipments from foreign state. —
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to pro-
hibit the shipments into this State from a foreign
State and the first sale thereof in this State, in
the original package intact and unbroken, of any
of the products or articles, the manufacture, sale
or exchange of which, or possession of which
with intent to sell or exchange, is prohibited
thereby. Acts 1929, p. 292, § 20.
SIXTEENTH TITLE
State Board of Game and Fish.
CHAPTER 1
Creation of Board.
§ 2158 (j- 14). Park's Code.
See § 2158 (4^).
§ 2158(4i/Q. Powers of board over fishing dur-
ing spawning seasons; recommendations by
grand jury.—.Upon the recommendation of the
grand jury of any county, except counties having
a population of not less than 13,600 and not more
than 14,300 according to the official census of
the United States for 1920 or any future census,
the said Board of Game and Fish shall have
the power to regulate or prohibit the taking of
fish from any streams or other waters of this
State during any month or months in which said
fish in said waters commonly spawn. That when
such recommendation has been made by any
grand jury and a certified copy thereof prepared
by the clerk of the superior court of the county
in which such action is had, and transmitted to
the Board of Game and Fish, it shall be the duty
of said board to and it shall be 'required to im-
mediately pass an order carrying out the recom-
mendation of said grand jury and advertise said
order in the county affected in a newspaper of
general circulation therein once a week for four
weeks; and such o'rder shall not be effective until
tihus advertised. That the recommendation of
the grand jury as aforesaid shall specify the
period of time during which said fishing shall be
regulated or prohibited. Acts 1925, pp. 302,
308; 1929, p. 238, § 1.
Editor's Note.—The Act of 1929, excepted the counties
stated from the operation of this section, and by section 2
declared null and void any recommendation by any grand
jury heretofore made, in any excepted county pursuant to
this code section, as well as any and all orders passed by
the Board of Game and Fish, pursuant to any such rec-
ommendation.
CHAPTER 2
State Commissioner of Game and Fish. Tide-
water Commissioners, Wardens, In-
spectors and Patrolmen.
§ 2158 (14). Tidewater commissioner's office.
This section does not mean that an office temporarily
located within such territory shall be permanently es-
tablished in one fixed place. But such board can, in the
'exercise of its sound discretion, remove and locate th^
office of the tidewater commissioner to some convenient
place in "tidewater Georgia" that is best suited for its
purposes. City of Darien v. Clancy, 167 Ga. 848, 146 S.
E. 767.
Where a city located within the territory described in
the act of 1924 offered, as an inducement to the State
Board of game and fish, a certain dock and lights and
water free if the office of the tidewater commissioner
was located in that city, and the board did accept such
inducements by locating the office of the commissioner
temporarily within such city, and used such offered in-
ducement, this would not create such "vested rights" ui
behalf of the city, under the written instrument as set
out in the petition, as that the board could not subse-
quently, in the exercise of a sound discretion, remove -
such office to another city located within the tidewater
territory, which was more "convenient" for the purposes
of the board. City of Darien v. Clancy, 167 Ga. 848, 146
S. E. 767.
CHAPTER 3.
Oysters and Oyster Beds.
§ 2158(24). Owners of private oyster beds may
come under Act.
Cited in Camp v. State, 34 Ga. App. 591, 130 S. E- 606.
CHAPTER 4
Licenses
§§ 2158(j-21)-2158(j-22). Park's Code.
See § 2158(302^).
§ 2158(30^4). Trapper's license fee. — One
who traps fur-bearing animals for the purpose of
selling animals o'r their hides, skins, or pelts
shall be required to provide himself with a trap-
per's license to be issued by the Commissioner
of Game and Fish, on written application, upon
the same conditions as are prescribed for the is-
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suance of hunting license: Provided, however, $25.00. All trapper's licenses shall authorize the
that nothing in this section shall apply to the holder to engage in trapping anywhere in the
purchase of a license for the trapping of fur-
j
State of Georgia. Acts. 1925, pp. 302, 305, §§
bearing animals for the purpose of selling their 12, 13; 1929, p. 333, § 1.
hides, skins, or pelts in Counties of this State Editor's Note.—This section as originally appearing was
having a population of not more than 8,406 or codified from §§ 12 and 13 of the Act of 1925, § 12 includ-
-i ,i ^ Jnn j' ,i rc_ • i tt -j. j inff the first sentence of the code section and the penal
less than 8,400 according to the official United provision codified as P . c . § 594(13). Acts of 1929, p. 333,
States census of 1920. A trapper's license shall amended § 12 of the Act of 1925, by adding the proviso
ht issued to a resident of the State of Georgia excepting the counties stated from the operation of the
,, , r r r <*„ ,.„ , , law. But the Act of 1929, p. 334, subsequently approved,
upon the payment of a fee of $3.00, and to a repealed said ,§ 12 without making any re ference to the
non-resident upon the payment of a fee of Act of 1925, p. 333.
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FIRST TITLE
Of Persons.
CHAPTER l.
Different Kinds of Persons, Their Rights and Du-
ties.
ARTICLE 1.
Of Citizens.
§ 2159. (§ 1802.) Natural and artificial persons.
Creation of Corporation Legislative Function.—A corpora-
tion can be brought into existence only as the result of ex-
press legislation. The conference of power upon persons to
organize a corporation is legislative in character, and must
be done by direct legislation, or be founded upon legislative
nr constitutional provisions. Free Gift Society v. Edwards,
163 Ga. 857, 865, 137 S. E. 382.
§ 2167. (§ 1810). Females.
Cited in Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 786, 142 S.
F. 111.
ARTICLE 3.
Of Persons of Color.
§ 2177. (§ 1820.) Who afe persons of Color.—
All negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, and their de-
scendants, having any ascertainable trace of either
negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian
blood in their veins, and all descendants of any
person having either negro or African, West In-
dian, or Asiatic Indian blood in his or her veins,
shall be known in this State as persons of color.
Acts 1865-6, p. 239; 1927, p. 272.
Editor's Note.—This section prior to its amendment was
much less broad. It merely included negroes, mutators,
mestizos, and their descendants, having one-eighth negro
or African blood in their veins.
§ 2177(1). Registration as to race.—The State
Registrar of Vital Statistics, under the supervision
of the State Board of Health, shall prepare a
form for the registration of individuals, whereon
shall be given the racial composition of such in-
dividual, as Caucasian, Negro, Mongolian, West
Indian, Asiatic Indian, Malay, or any mixture
thereof, or any other non-Caucasic strains, and if
there be any mixture, then the racial composition
of the parents and other ancestors in so far as
ascertainable, so as to show in what generation
such mixture occurred. Said form shall also give
the date and place of birth of the registrant,
name, race, and color of the parents of registrant,
together with their place of birth if known, name
of husband or wife of registrant, with his or her
place of birth, names of children of registrant with
their ages and place of residence, place of resi-
dence of registrant for the five years immediately
preceding registration, and such other information
as may be prescribed for identification by the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. Acts 1927,
p. 272.
§ 2177(2). Supply of forms.—The State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics shall supply to each local
registrar a sufficient number of such forms to
carry out the provisions of this Act.
§ 2177(3). Local registrar must cause each per-
son in district to execute form., etc.—Each local
registrar shall personally or by deputy, upon re-
ceipt of said forms, cause each person in his dis-
trict or jurisdiction to execute said form in dupli-
cate, furnishing all available information required
upon said form, the original of which form shall
be forwarded by the local registrar to the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics, and a duplicate de-
livered to the ordinary of the county. Said form
shall be signed by the registrant, or, in case of
children under fourteen years of age, by a parent,
guardian, or other person standing in loco pa-
rentis. The execution of such registration certifi-
cate shall be certified to by the local registrar.
§ 2177(4). Untrue statement.-—If the local regis-
trar have reason to believe that any statement
made by any registrant is not true, he shall so
write upon such certificate before forwarding the
same to the State registrar or ordinary, giving his
reason therefor.
§ 2177(5). Penalty for refusal to execute regis-
tration certificate, etc. — It shall be unlawful for
any person to refuse to execute said registration
certificate as provided in this Act, or to refuse to
give the information required in the execution of
the same; and any person who shall refuse to exe-
cute such certificate, or who shall refuse to give
the information required in the execution of the
same, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall
be punished as prescribed in section 1065 of the
Penal Code of Georgia of 1910. Each such re-
fusal shall constitute a separate offense.
§ 2177(6). Fee for registration 30 cents; how
divided.—The local registrar shall collect from
each registrant a registration fee of thirty cents,
fifteen cents of which shall go to the local regis-
trar and fifteen cents of which shall go to the
State Board of Health, to be used in defraying ex-
penses of the State Bureau of Vital Statistics. If
any registrant shall make affidavit that through
poverty he is unable to pay said registration fee of
thirty cents, the local registrar shall receive a reg-
istration fee of only ten cents for such registra-
tion, which sum shall be paid out of the funds of
the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, and the State
Bureau of Vital Statistics shall receive no fee for
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such registration. This section shall not apply to
the registration of births or deaths, the registration
of which is otherwise provided for.
§ 2177(7). False registration, felony; punish-
ment.—It shall be a felony for any person to wil-
fully or knowingly make or cause to be made a
registration certificate false as to color or race,
and upon conviction thereof such person shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
not less than one year and not more than two
years. In such case the State registrar is author-
ized to change the registration certificate so that
it will conform to the truth.
§ 2177(8). Form of application for marriage li-
cense.—The State Registrar of Vital Statistics
shall prepare a form for application for marriage
license, which form shall require the following in-
formation to be given over the signature of the
prospective bride and groom; name and address;
race and color; place of birth; age; name and ad-
dress of each parent; race and color of each
parent; and whether the applicant is registered
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of this or any
other State, and, if registered, the county in which
such registration was made. The State Registrar
of Vital Statistics shall at all times keep the ordi-
naries of each county in this State supplied with
a sufficient number of said form of application for
marriage license to care for all applications for
marriage license. Each prospective bride and
each prospective groom applying for marriage li-
cense shall fill out and execute said application in
duplicate.
§ 2177(9). Filing application for marriage li-
cense.—Upon such applications for marriage li-
cense being filed with the ordinary by the prospec-
tive bride and prospective groom, the ordinary
shall forward the original of such application to
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics, and retain
the duplicate of such application in his files.
§ 2177(10). Report by State Registrar of Vital
Statistics after examination as to registration of
applicant.—The ordinary shall withhold the issu-
ing of any marriage license until a report upon
such application has been received from the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics. Said report from the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall be for-
warded to the ordinary by the next return mail,
and shall state whether or not each applicant is
registered in the Bureau of Vital Statistics; if
registered, the report shall state whether the
statements made by each applicant as to race and
color are correct according to such registration
certificate. If the registration certificate in the
office of the Bureau of Vital Statistics show that
the statement of either applicant as to race or
color are untrue, the report of the State Registrar
of Vital Statistics shall so state, and in such case
it shall be illegal for the ordinary to issue a mar-
riage license to the applicants, until the truth of
such statements of the applicants shall have been
determined in a legal proceeding brought against
the ordinary to compel the issuing of such li-
cense. If the report from the State Registrar of
Vital Statistics shows that the applicants are not
registered, and if the State Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics has no information as to the race or color
of said applicants, then the ordinary shall issue the
marriage license if he has no evidence or knowl-
edge that such marriage would be illegal. If one
of the applicants is registered with the State Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics and the other applicant is
not so registered, if the records of the Bureau of
Vital Statistics contain no information to dis-
prove the statements of either applicant as to
color or race, then the ordinary shall issue the
marriage license, if he has no evidence or knowl-
edge that such marriage would be illegal. Pro-
vided, that where each party is registered and such
registration certificate is on file in the office of
the ordinary of the county where application for
marriage license is made, it shall not be necessary
for the ordinary to obtain any information from
the State Bureau of Vital Statistics; and provided
further, that when any person who has previously
registered as required herein moves to another
county, he may file with the ordinary of the
county of his new residence a certified copy of his
registration certificate, which shall have the same
effect as if such registration had been made origi-
nally in said county.
§ 2177(11). Application for marriage license by
one not born in this State.—Where any application
for marriage license shows that such applicant
was not born in this State and is not registered
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of this State,
the ordinary shall forward a copy of such appli-
cation to the State Registrar of Vital Statistics
of this State, and shall also forward a copy of
the application to the clerk of the superior or cir-
cuit court, as the case may be, of the county of
the applicant's birth, and another copy to the Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics, at the capitol of the State,
of the applicant's birth, with the request that the
statements therein contained be verified. If no
answer be received from such clerk or Bureau of
Vital Statistics within ten days, the ordinary shall
issue the license if he have no evidence or knowl-
edge that such marriage would be illegal. If an
answer be received within ten days, showing the
statement of such applicant to be untrue, the ordi-
nary shall withhold the issuing of the license until
the truth of such statements of the applicant shall
have been determined in a legal proceeding brought
against the ordinary to compel the issuing of such
license. In all cases where answers are received
from such clerk or Bureau of Vital Statistics, a
copy of the answer shall be forwarded to the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics of this State.
§ 2177(12). Return of license after marriage.—
When a marriage license is issued by the ordinary,
it shall be returned to the ordinary by the officer
or minister solemnizing the marriage, and for-
warded by the ordinary to the State Registrar of
Vital Statistics, to be permanently retained by said
registrar.
§ 2177(13). "White person" defined.—The term
"white person" shall include only persons of the
white or Caucasian race, who have no ascertainable
trace of either Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic
Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in
their veins. No person shall be deemed to be a
white person any one of whose ancestors has been
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duly registered with the State Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics as a colored person or person of color.
§ 2177(14). Unlawful for whites to marry other
than white; penalty.—It shall be unlawful for a
white person to marry any save a white person.
Any person, white or otherwise, who shall
marry or go through a marriage ceremony in
violation of this provision shall be guilty of a
felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for not less than one nor
more than two years, and such marriage shall
be utterly void.
§ 2177(15). False statement in application; pen-
alty.—Any person who shall make or cause to be
made a false statement as to race or color of him-
self or parents, in any application for marriage li-
cense, shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not
less than two nor more than five years.
§ 2177(16). Ordinary's noncompliance with law.-
—
Any ordinary who shall issue a marriage license
without complying with each and every provision
of this Act shall be guilty of and punished as for
a misdemeanor.
§ 2177(17). Performing marriage ceremony in
violation of law.—If any civil officer, minister,
or official of any church, sect, or religion, au-
thorized to perform a marriage ceremony, shall
wilfully or knowingly perform any marriage
ceremony in violation of the terms of this Act,
he shall be guilty of and punished as tor a mis-
demeanor.
§ 2177(18). Report of violation of law.—If any
case of a marriage in violation of the provisions
of this Act is reported to the State Registrar of
Vital Statistics, he shall investigate such report,
and shall turn over to the Attorney-General of the
State the information obtained through such in-
vestigation.
§ 2177(19). Birth of legitimate child of white
parent, and colored parent, report of, and prosecu-
tion.—When any birth certificate is forwarded to
the Bureau of Vital Statistics, showing the birth
of a legitimate child to parents one of whom is
white and one of whom is colored, it shall be the
duty of the State Registrar of Vital Statistics to
report the same to the Attorney-General of the
State, with full information concerning the same.
Thereupon it shall be the duty of the Attorney-
General to institute criminal proceedings against
the parents of such child, for any violation of the
provisions of this Act which may have been com-
mitted.
§ 2177(20). Duty of Attorney-General and solic-
itor-General as to' prosecution—It shall be the
duty of the Attorney-General of the State, as
well as the duty of the Solicitor-General of the
Superior Court where such violation occurs, to
prosecute each violation of any of the provisions
of this Act, when the same is reported to him by
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. If the At-
torney-General fails or refuses to prosecute any
such violation so reported to him by the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics, the same shall be
grounds for impeachment of the Attorney-Gen-
eral, and it shall be the duty of the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics to institute impeachment
proceedings against the Attorney-General in such
case.
CHAPTER 2
Of Domicile, and Manner of Changing the Same
§ 2181. (§ 1824.) Domicile.
Meaning of "Permanently" as Used in Section.—The word
"permanently" is used in this section in contradistinction
from the word "temporarily." Alvaton Mercantile Co. v.
Caldwell, 34 Ga. App. 151, 128 S. E\ 781.
Residence and Domicile Distinguished.—The removal to an-
other county and there renting a house, did not constitute a
change of domicile, where the removal was for the purpose
of educating children, the former home was maintained,
the incidents of citizenship there discharged, and there was
at no time an intention to provide a fixed place of abode in
the place of removal, or to there establish permanent resi-
dence. Alvaton Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga. App.
151, 128 S. E\ 781. See § 2186 and notes thereto.
§ 2186. (§ 1829.) Change of domicile.
Involves Exercise of Volition and Choice.—As to a per-
son sui juris, the matter of making a change in domicile is
one involving the exercise of volition and choice. Stanfield
v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. E. 826. See notes to §
2181.
§ 2187. (§ 1830.) Of persons not sui juris.
Presumption and Proof of Change. — Where a resident of
this state was adjudged insane by the courts of this state in
1910, he was at least prima facie incapable thereafter of
making a change of his domicile. Proof that, after such ad-
judication, he "went over to stay with his people in North
Carolina," and was placed in a public institution of that
state for insane persons, is insufficient to show that such
person ceased to be a resident of the state of Georgia, or
that his removal from this state was such as to suspend
the operation of the statute of limitations as to a debt
against him. Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394. Compare
Jackson v. Southern Flour, etc., Co., 146 Ga. 453, 91 S. E\
481.
Cannot Change of Own Volition.—A person who has
been adjudged insane can not, by his own act or volition, ef-
fect a change in his domicile. Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga.
App. 394, 395, 136 S. E. 826.
SECOND TITLE
Corporations.
CHAPTER J
Corporations, Their Creation, Powers, and Lia-
bilities
ARTICLE 2
Their Creation
§ 2192(1). Application for charter, etc.; un-
lawful use of name; notice.
By Transferee of Purchaser of Business.—Having the
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right to use the name, which is included in the good-wdl
•expressly sold under a contract, the purchaser could trans-
fer and assign this right, and the transferee of this right
would have the authority to procure a charter tor the pur-
pose of carrying on the business under the same name or
substantially the same name as original vendor corpora-
tion. Morgan v. Frank E- Block Co., 167 Ga. 463, 146 S.
E. 19.
ARTICLE 4
Corporation Commissioner
§ 2209. Returns of corporations.
Editor's Note.—The section does not in any manner pur-
port by its terms to prohibit a corporation from doing busi-
ness in this State until it shall have filed the report. Ac-
cordingly, a corporation doing business in this State prior to
making the report does not thereby violate the terms of
the section, the terms of the statute which in such a case it
does violate being merely the requirement to file the
report, and pay the fee provided for in section 2210, which
breach renders the corporation subject, within the discretion
of the secretary of state, to the penalty imposed thereby.
See Alston v. New York Contract Purchase Corp., 36 Ga
App. 777, 138 S. E. 270.
§ 2210. Fees.
See Editor's Note under section 2209.
§ 2211. Penalty for non-compliance.
Effect of Non-Conformance upon Contracts.—The penalty
prescribed being all inclusive, and the corporation not being
prohibited by such breach of duty from doing business within
the State, its contracts are not rendered void by a failure to
comply with the requirements mentioned. Alston v. New
York Contract Purchase Corp., 36 Ga. App. 777, 138 S. E.
270. See Editor's Note under section 2209.
. ARTICLE 5
Powers and Liabilities of Corporations
§ 2216. (§ 1852). Common powers.
By-Laws Must Not Be Inconsistent with Charter.—By-
laws adopted under authority of this section must, of
course, not be inconsistent with the charter of the cor-
poration and the purposes for which the corporation was
cieated, must not infringe the common or statute law of
the State, must be reasonable, must not defeat or impair
any vested right of its stockholders or members, and
must not be contrary to public policy. Hornady v.
Goodman, 167 Ga. 555, 572, 146 S. E. 173.
Cited in McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond, etc., Co., 168
Ga. 145, 148, 147 S. E. 102.
§ 2219. (§ 1855). Transfer of shares, when
complete.
Applied in Mack v. Pardee, 39 Ga. App. 310, 318, 147
S. E. 147.
§ 2220. (§ 1856). Organization before capital
subscribed for.
In General.—While individuals can not bind a corporation
without express or implied authority from the stock-
holders or the board of directors, they can bind them-
selves by organizing and transacting business of the cor-
poration before the minimum capital stock has been sub-
scribed, under this section. Grandall v. Shepard, 166 Ga.
396, 143 S. E. 587.
This section is not a legislative enactment, but a codi-
fication of the principle announced in Burns v. Beck &
Gregg Hdwe. Co., 83 Ga. 471 (6), 10 S. E- 121. See Ham
v. Robinson Co., 146 Ga. 422, 445, 91 S. E. 483; Howard
v. Long, 142 Ga. 789, 791, 83 S. E- 852; Mobley v. Sasser,
38 Ga. App. 382, 383, 144 S. E. 151.
This section has not been repealed, amended, or modi-
fied by direct legislation. Mobley v. Sasser, 38 Ga. App.
382, 384, 144 S. E- 151.
Neither under the provisions of § 2220 of the Civil Code
of 1910, nor under the provisions of the general banking
act, did the superintendent of banks have any authority
for bringing these suits. See § 2366(52). Mobiey v. Sas-
ser, 38 Ga. App. 382, 144 S. E. 151.
Set-Off.—Against an action at law, brought by one of
the organizers and participants referred to in this sec-
tion, on a note given by one of the creditors in renewal
of an accommodation note given to the corporation so or-
ganized without its minimum capital stock subscribed,
the maker can set off in equity the liability of the holder
of the renewal note under that statute. Grandall v.
Shepard, 166 Ga. 396, 143 S. E. 587.
§ 2224. (§ 1860). Proceedings
stockholders, when allowed.
by minority
Applied in Peoples Bank v. So. Investment Co., 164 Ga.
31, 137 S. E. 547.
§ 2225. (§ 1861). Responsibility for acts of
officers.
Where By-Law Not Known to Plaintiff.—In a suit up-
on a note executed in behalf of a corporation by one as
manager, the corporation having authority under its char-
ter to issue negotiable paper in the due and ordinary
course of its business (Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Southern
Banking, etc., Co., 97 Ga. 573, 25 S. E. 171), it is no de-
fense that by reason of a by-law, not known to the plain-
tiff, only the president could execute notes in behalf of
the corporation. LaGrange Lumber & Supply Co. v.
Farmers & Traders Bank, 37 Ga. App. 409, 140 S. E. 765.
M. having apparent authority as assistant manager to
execute indorsements, even the corporation represented
by him could not defeat such indorsements meiely by al-
leging that in truth and in fact he had no such authority
and that his act in indorsing the paper had not been rati-
fied. Much less could the indorsement be defeated by a
third person (as in this case the defendant acceptor) by
allegations which altogether fail to charge the plaintiff
with notice of such lack of authority in the agent. Mas-
sell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 601, 604, 144 S.
E. 806.
§ 2226. (§ 1862.) No collateral attack as to cor-
porate existence.
Editor's Note.—This section is merely a codification of the
universally accepted doctrine. Since the Dartmouth College
Case the principle then announced that a charter to a pri-
vate corporation constitutes a contract between the State
and the incorporators have been controlling, and this alone
is sufficient reason why persons not parties to the contract
should not be allowed to attack its validity. That right be-
longs to the State. The State having bestowed life upon the
corporation and dictated what it can and can not do, also
has the right to waive violations of the contract on the part
of the incorporators. However, this doctrine should never
be applied in favor of the said incorporators themselves, to
the prejudice of a person who has not dealt with them as a
corporation. Hence, any person whose property is sought to
be taken under the right of eminent domain may challenge
the legality of the corporation's charter, such person not
having recognized or dealt with the corporation as such.
Rogers v. Taccoa Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131 S. E. 517. See
also Academy of Music v. Flanders Bros., 75 Ga. 14; 20
Harvard Law Review 472.
ARTICLE 7
Liability of Stockholders
§ 2247. (§ 1888). Liability of stockholder after
transfer of stock.
See § 2366(71).
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It is not essential to the Lability of a stockholder in an
insolvent banking corporation, for the assessment of his
capital stock in the corporation for the benefit of the cred-
itors of the corporation that the stock stand on the books
of the corporation in the name of the stockholder assessed,
but such assessment may be made against the leal owner,
although the stock stands on the books of the corporation
in the name of another who has no interest therein. Do:>-
tev v. MoJbley, 38 Ga. App. 508, 144 S. E. 385.
ARTICLE 9
Corporations, How Served
§ 2258. (§ 1899.) Service of process, how per-
fected.
II. SERVICE UPON AGENT.
What Constitutes an Agent within Meaning of Section.—
Where the person upon whom a rule nisi was served exer-
cised large discretionary and supervisory powers he was held
to be an agent of the defendant company, within the mean-
ing of the section. Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Fowler, 35 Ga.
App. 372, 133 S. E. 479.
Same—Ticket Agent of Railroad Selling for Pullman Com-
pany.—Where the ticket agents of a railroad company sold
tickets furnished to them by the Pullman Company and ac-
counted therefor directly to that company from which they
received instructions under an agreement without compen-
sation, they were agents of the Pullman Company who rep-
resented it in its business and on whom service of process
might legally be made in a suit against it, under this sec-
tion. Huckabee v. Pullman Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
Same—Agents Other Than One Designated for Service.—
That a foreign corporation has designated certain persons
as its agents for service in the state does not render invalid
service of process against it on others, who are in fact its
agents for that purpose under the provisions of the state
statute. Huckabee v. Pullman Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
III. LEAVING COPY AT PLACE OF BUSINESS.
The essentials for a suit against a foreign corporation are
that it shall be engaged in business in the state, and under
this section, that service be made upon an agent who rep-
resents the corporation in its business or by leaving the
process at the place of transacting the usual and ordinary
public business of such corporation. Huckabee v. Pullman
Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
IV. APPLIED TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
As to who is agent, see II. Service upon Agent; as to place
of service, see III. Leaving Copy at Place of Business; as
to sufficiency of return, see V. The Return.
V. THE RETURN.
What Return Should Show.—A return of service of proc-
ess on a foreign corporation, by leaving a copy of the writ
"at the office and place of doing business of said corpora-
tion," but which failed to state that it was "the place of
transacting the usual and ordinary public business of such
corporation," is insufficient under this section. Huckabee
v. Pullman Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
§ 2259. (§ 1900). Where suits may be brought
on contracts or for tort.
This history of the legislation upon the subject of the
venue of suits against corporations discloses that, with the
possible exceptions of insurance and telegraph companies,
suits against domestic corporations may, and in the case of
railroads shall, be brought in the county where the torts
are commited, or where contracts are made or to be per-
formed. Acts permitting corporations to be sued in coun-
ties other than those of their domicile should, because of
the above constitutional principle and the policy embraced
therein, be construed strictly, and not extended beyond the
requirements of their terms. Citizens & Southern Bank v.
Taggart, 164 Ga. 351, 358, 138 S. E- 989, citing Etowah Mill-
ing Co. v. Crenshaw, 116 Ga. 406, 42 S. E- 709.
This section does not repeal, but ils cumulative only of
the general provisions of law that suits against domestic
corporations, including suits ex contractu, may be brought
within the county where, by the charter of the corporation,
its principal office is located. See, in this connection. South-
ern Lumber Co. v. Ramsey-Wheeler Co., 38 Ga. App.
481, 144 S. E. 349.
CHAPTER 2
Private Corporations
ARTICLE l
Banks
SECTION 3
Preliminary Provisions
§§ 2262(a), 2262(c), 2262(f). Park's Code.
See §§ 2366(1), 2366(3), 2366(6), respectively.
§ 2263 (j). Park's Code.
See § 2366(16).
§ 2267(e). Park's Code.
See § 2366(49).
§§ 2268(e) -2268(g). Park's Code.
See § 2366(56) -2366(58).
§§ 2268(g-l), 2268(i), 2268(j), 2268(1). Park's
Code.
See §§ 2366(52), 2366(60), 2366(61), 2366(63), respectively.
§§ 2268(n), 2268(p), 2268(s), 2268(t) 2268(x).
Park's Code.
See §§ 2366(66), 2366(67), 2366(70), 2366(71), 2366(75),
respectively.
§§ 2269(a), 2269(g). Park's Code.
See §,§ 2366(80), 2366(86), respectively.
§§ 2279 (a) -2279(d), 2279(g). Park's Code.
See §§ 2366 (139) -2366) 142), 2366(145).
§§ 2280(b), 2280(e), 2280(k), 2280(m). Park's
Code.
See §§ 2366(148), 2366(151), 2366(157), 2366(159), respec-
tively.
§§ 2280(n), 2280(r), 2280(w), 2280(hh). Park's
Code.
See §§ 2366(160), 2366(164), 2366(169), 2366(180), respectively.
§§ 2280(mm), 2280(pp), 2280(rr), 2280(tt).
Park's Code.
See §§ 2366(185), 2366(188), 2366(190), 2366(192), respectively.
§§ 2280(vv), 2280(vv-l), 2280(vv-2). Park's
Code.
See •§§ 2366(194), 2366(195a), 2366(195b).
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§§ 2282(b), 2282(c). Park's Code.
See §§ 2366(196a), 2366(196b).
§ 23616(1). Bank, definition of.
Constitutionality.—The banking act is not unconstitutional
because in conflict with the constitution, section 6437, which
provides that "No law or ordinance shall pass which refers
to more than one subject-matter." Felton v. Bennett, 16J
Ga. 849, 137 S. F. 264.
Nor is the act violative of the foregoing constitutional pro-
visions for the reason that there is contained in the body of
the act "matter different from what is expressed in the title
thereof." Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. F. 264.
Nor does it violate the constitution, section 6379. It is
within the power of the General Assembly, without violating
the constitution to impose upon a designated official the
exercise of duties essentially ministerial, though quasi-ju-
dicial, by the creation of administrative departments sub-
ject to the Governor as the head of the executive depart-
ment, and thus to create new departments which in no wise
affect the distinctness and independence of either the legis-
lative, judicial, or executive departments provided for by the
constitution. Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. F. 264.
§ 2366 (2). Depositors.
See notes to § 2366(139).
A "deposit" is or is not, according to agreement, subject
to check on the bank with which it was actually placed, and
may or may not bear interest, and may be or may not be
payable on demand. The issuance of a passbook is not con-
clusive evidence, but is material en the question whether
the transaction is simply that of borrower and lender in
the ordinary sense or that of a deposit. Citizens Bank v.
Mobley, 166 Ga. 543, 549, 144 S. F. 119.
It is useless to endeavor to frame a rule by which a
"deposit" may be differentiated in every case from a mere
"loan" as applied to banking transactions, and it is wholly
unnecessary in deciding the present case. Citizens Bank v.
Mobley, 166 Ga. 543, 548, 144 S. F. 119.
§ 2366(3) Branch banks.—Branch banks, al-
ready established under the law of this State, shall
be operated as branches, and under the name of
the parent bank, and under the control and di-
rection of the board of directors and executive
officers of said parent bank. The board of di-
rectors of the parent bank shall elect a cashier,
and such other officers that may be required to
properly conduct the business of said branch; and
a board of directors, or loan committee, shall be
responsible for the conduct and management of
said branch, but not of the parent bank or of any
other branch save that of which they are officers,
directors, or committee. By January tenth of
each tax year the board of directors of the par-
ent shall set aside for the exclusive use of said
branch such proportion of its entire capital that
the total deposits of such branch bank on January
first of each tax year bears to the grand total of
all the deposits on January first of each tax year
in all branches of such bank, or banking associa-
tion, including the parent bank, in this State.
Branch banks shall be taxed on the capital set
aside, as herein provided, to their exclusive use
in the counties, municipalities, and districts in
which they are located, and the parent banks shall
be relieved of taxation to the extent of capital so
set aside for the exclusive use of such branch;
provided, that the real estate owned or held by
branch banks shall be taxed in the county, munici-
pality, and district where located, as other real
estate situated in such county, municipality, and
district, the same to be deducted from either the
value of the capital of the parent bank or the
respective branch bank. It shall be the duty of
the board of directors of the parent bank to fur-
nish a sworn statement to the taxing authorities
of the county, municipality, and district in which
the branch bank is located, of the total amount
of deposits on January first of each tax year in
each of the branch banks, including the parent
bank, and such sworn statement shall be filed
with such taxing authorities not later than March
first of each tax year, and shall, at the same time,
furnish to such taxing authorities a sworn state-
ment of the proportionate part of the capital of
such bank, or banking association, so set aside, as
herein provided, for such county municipality, and
district for taxing purposes for that year. If the
taxing authorities in any county, municipality,
and district are not satisfied with the amount of
capital set aside for such county, municipality,
and district for taxation, such taxing authorities
shall have the right to file with the Superintendent
of Banks of this State objections to the amount
of capital so set aside, and, upon ten days written
notice to the directors of the parent bank and to
such authorities, such superintendent shall hear
evidence, at a time and place to be fixed by him
in such notice, and determine, what amount should
have been set aside to such branch bank for taxa-
tion in the county, municipality, and district in
which it is situated, as herein provided, and his de-
cision on the question shall be final, and the amount
of capital so set apart by him shall be subject to
taxation in such county, municipality, and dis-
trict in which such branch bank is situated. Cap-
ital, as used in this section, shall include surplus and
undivided profits, except real estate owned or held
by the bank. After this section takes effect, no
new or additional branch banks shall be estab-
lished. Acts 1919, pp. 135, 136; 1920, pp. 102, 108;
1927, p. 195.
Editor's Note. — This section was so enlarged by the
amendment of 1927 that few of its provisions were found i.i
the original section, while other provisions were left out
from its scope. The changes effected are too multifarious
for specific description, and may only be determined by close
comparison of the old and the new section.
§ 2366 (3a). Branch banks in cities of 80,000 to
125,000 population.—Banks chartered under the
laws of this State, and having their principal of-
fice in a city now or hereafter having a popula-
tion of not less than eighty thousand or more
than one hundred and twenty-five thousand,
ma}' establish branch banks in the city in which
its principal office is located. Acts 1929, p. 214,
§ 1.
§ 2366(3b). Branch banks in cities of 200,000
population.—Banks chartered under the laws of
this State, and having their principal office in a
municipality now or hereafter having a popula-
tion of not less than 200,000 according to the
last census of the United States of any future
census of the United States, may establish
branch banks in the municipality in which its
principal office is located. Acts 1929, p. 215, § 1.
§ 2366 (6). Surplus and undivided profits de-
fined.
The capital stock of a bank is not a liability that should
be taken into account in determining the question of sol-
vency or insolvency of a bank. Manley v. State, 166 Ga.
563, 566, 144 S. E- 170.
The liability of a bank to its stockholders is not an as-
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set that the jury should take into consideration in de-
termining whether the bank is insolvent or not. Manley
v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 566, 144 S. E- 170.
SECTION 2
Department of Banking
§ 2366 (16). Assistant superintendent, exam-
iners and clerks.
See notes to § 2366(71).
SECTION 6
Impairment of Capital
§ 236649). Assessment, how enforced.
This section substantially reenacts Code, § 3391, reducing
the time within which the impairment shall be made good
from ninety to sixty days. Smith v. Mobley, 166 Ga. 195,
199, 143 S. E. 116.
It is not a condition precedent to the right of the su-
perintendent of banks to maintain a common-law suit to
recover an assessment of a stockholder in an insolvent bank
that the stockholder be given notice of the assessment as
required in this section, which provides for the collection
of the assessment by a summary execution. Doster v. Mob-
ley, 38 Ga. App. 508, 144 S. F. 385.
The method of collecting an assessment against a stock-
holder of an insolvent banking corporation by a summary
execution issued by the superintendent of banks against the
stockholder, as provided in this section, is not exclusive
but is cumulative only. An assessment so made may be
collected by a common-law suit instituted by the super-
intendent of banks, suing as provided in the sections cited
in paragraph 1 above. Doster v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 508,
144 S. E- 385.
SECTION 7
Taking Possession of Bank by Superintendent
§ 2366 (52). Suits, conveyance, purchase of
property, extension and renewal.
Constitutionality.—This section dees not violate article 3
of the constitution (Code, § 6437). Shannon v. Mobley, 166
Ga. 430, 143 S. F- 582, citing Fite v. Henson, 157 Ga. 579,
122 S. E- 412; Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E-
264.
This section does not give to the superintendent of banks
any authority to prosecute any cause of action which is
vested by law in the bank or in its stockholders or the
creditors thereof. That section is "in terms confined to
such matters as relate to the assets of the bank as such,
debts and liabilities due to the bank in its corporate ca-
pacity." Hines v. Wilson, 164 Ga. 888 (2), 139 S. F- 802.
The liability sought to be enforced by these suits is neither
an asset of the bank nor a liability due the bank in its
corporate capacity. So we find no authority whatever for
the superintendent of banks to bring these suits. Mobley
v. Sasser, 38 Ga. App. 382, 384, 144 S. F. 151.
Former Law Not Repealed.—This section supra, did not
expressly or impliedly repeal any authority conferred by
the act of 1919 upon the superintendent of banks touching
the question here involved. Shannon v. Mobley, 166 Ga.
430, 143 S. E. 582.
Causes of Action in Which Bank Has No Interest. — In
Hinton v. Mobley, 167 Ga. 60, 62, 144 S. F- 738, it is said:
"It is upon this principle that we decided the case of Hines
v. Wilson, 164 Ga. 888, 139 S. F- 802, where we held that
the use of the word "may" as employed in section 7a of
the act of 1922, supra, (p. 65), authorized the superintendent
of banks to sue for all debts due the bank, but did not in-
[1
elude causes of action in which the bank had no interest,
and where the recovery of damages for deceit would not
inure to the benefit of the bank but accrue only to the
individual who might have been defrauded and injured by the
acts of an individual who happened to be an official of the
bank, but was acting at the time he inflicted the injury
wrongfully and fraudulently and without the scope of his
duties."
Action against Directors Causing Insolvency.—Action lies
by State superintendent, not by stockholders, against di-
rectors who caused insolvency of bank. Hinton v. Mobley,
167 Ga. 60, 144 S. E. 738.
In Whose Name Suit Brought.—A suit instituted by the
superintendent of banks, under authority of this section,
may be instituted bjr him for the bank in his own name as
superintendent of banks. Doster v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App.
508, 144 S. E. 385.
Amendment to Proceed in Name of Bank.—The superin-
tendent of banks is authorized to bring the present suit
either in his own name in his official capacity, or in the
name of the bank. Such a suit brought by the superintend-
ent of banks in his own name is amendable so as to make
the case proceed in the name of the bank. Shannon v«
Mobley, 166 Ga. 430, 143 S. F. 582, citing Anderson v. Ben-
nett, 160 Ga. 517, 128 S. F. 660.
Sale by Superintendent as Divesting Tax Lien.—The
principles that liens for taxes are superior to all other
liens; and that an execution sale does not divest such
lien apply where a bank owning realty becomes insol-
vent and is placed in the hands of the superintendent of
banks under § 2366(51), and the superintendent, in pur-
suance of an order granted by the judge of the superior
court, makes sale of the realty and conveys the same to
a purchaser while the lien of the taxes of the bank for
the year in which the sale was made remains outstand-
ing. In such case a purchaser from the superintendent of
banks will take the property subject to be levied upon
and sold for collection of taxes. Sections 2366(54) and
3366(56) do not prohibit the levy of lawful executions for
taxes. Stephens v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Ga. 380, 143 S.
F. 386.
§ 2366 (54). Effect of notice or possession.
See note to § 2366(52).
§ 2366(56). Notice of taking possession. — On
taking possession of the assets and business of
any bank, as in this Act authorized, the Superin-
tendent of Banks shall forthwith give notice of
such action to all banks and other persons or cor-
porations holding or in possession of any assets
of such bank. No bank or other person or cor-
poration shall have a lien or charge for any pay-
ment, advance, or clearance thereafter made, or
liability thereafter incurred, against any of the
assets of the bank, of whose assets and business
the Superintendent shall have taken possession as
aforesaid.
The superintendent shall also file and have
recorded in the office of the clerk of the Superior
court of the county in which the bank is located,
and if the bank has a branch or branches in an-
other or other counties, in such county or coun-
ties also, a certificate under his hand and the seal
of the Department of Banking, wherein he shall
set forth that the assets and business of the bank
have been taken charge of by him for the purpose
of liquidation, giving the date on which he took
charge. A certified copy of said certificate shall
be admissible in evidence without proof, as a
duly recorded deed is admitted. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 155; 1927 pp. 195, 197.
See notes to § 2366(52).
Editor's Note.—The last paragraph, of this section was
added by the amendment of 1927-
§ 2366(57). Business resumed, how.—After the
Superintendent of Banks has so taken possession
of any bank, the Superintendent may permit such
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bank to resume business upon such conditions as
may be approved by him. When necessary, in
order to make good an impairment of capital, the
stockholders, with the approval of the superin-
tendent, may levy a voluntary assessment on the
stockholders as provided in section 7 of this
article, the amount of the assessments be fixed by
the superintendent. Acts 1919, pp. 135, 156; 1927,
pp. 195, 198.
Editor's Note.—The last sentence of this section is new
with the amendment of 1927.
§ 2366(58). Collections and sales, how made.
Confirmation of Sales.—Whether sales made under an or-
der of the superior court at the instance of the superin-
tendent of banks under this section should be confirmed is a
matter within the sound legal discretion of the court. Such
sales are never consummated until confirmed. Wingfield v.
Bennett, 36 Ga. App. 27, 134 S. E- 840.
Status of the Court in Authorizing Sale. — The judge of
the superior court, when passing upon an application of
the superintendent of banks and in passing an order author-
izing a sale of the assets of the bank by the superintendent
as provided in this section is not administering the assets
of the bank, and passes upon and adjudicates no rights of
parties but is merely, under statutory authority, directing
a State officer who is not an officer or receiver of the
court, in the discharge of a statutory duty. This is true
notwithstanding that the statute requires that before the
passage of such order the bank be made a party to the
proceedings, by proper notice issued by the court.
Such an order of sale is not judicial, but is purely ad-
ministrative or ministerial, and is therefore not a judgment
of a court which can be reviewed by a writ of error. Cochran
v. Bennett, 37 Ga. App. 202, 139 S. E. 428, and cases cited
In re Union Bank, 176 App. Div. 477.
"Assets" would ordinarily mean the property owned by
the bank as a corporate entity, and would not include the
statutory liability of stockholders, and while the word ap-
pears to have been used with this meaning in several places
in the banking act, it is nevertheless given a larger signifi-
cation in this section, for it is there provided that the individ-
ual liability of stockholders shall be an asset of the bank to
be enforced by and through the superintendent. Deariso
v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313, 324, 143 S. E. 915.
It could hardly be doubted by any one that the "getting
in" of the assets, including the making of collections on
any liability, would be a matter which the superintendent
could entrust to an agent. In fact, when we consider what
may be the multitude of his duties, the necessity of acting
through others in such matters would appear to be abso-
lute. Deariso v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313, 325, 143 S. E.
915.
Superintendent may appoint§ 2366 (60).
agent.
Where an agent has been authorized by the superintend-
ent to issue such executions, it is proper for him, in doing
so, to sign them in the name of the superintendent by him-
self as agent. Under the agreed statement of facts, the
trial court properly rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in fi. fa. on each ground of the affidavit of ille-
gality. Deariso v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313, 143 S. E. 915.
Under section 9 of article 7 of the banking act (Ga. L.
1919, p. 157) the superintendent may, under his hand and
official seal, appoint an agent to assist him in liquidating
and
^
distributing the assets of any bank whose assets and
affairs are subject to liquidation by him and may author-
ize such agent to perform any act connected with such liqui-
dation and distribution that the superintendent himself could
perform; and to that end may empower an agent to issue
executions for the enforcement of the liability of the stock-
holders where they have failed to pay the same after due
assessment and notice. Deariso v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313,
143 S. E 915. Compare Mobley v. Marlin, 166 Ga. 820.
§ 2366 (61). Attorneys, accountants, and as-
sistants.
An averment in such an affidavit of illegality, that the
execution "was not made on a legal assessment made by
the superintendent of banks, as required by law," can be
construed only as a charge that the assessment made by
the superintendent was in some way illegal, and is too
general and uncertain to be basis for a verdict in favor of
the defendant in fi. fa. Mobley v. Goodwyn, 39 Ga. App. 64.
§ 2366 (63). Inventory to be filed.
Cited in Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 588, 144 S. E. 17).
§ 2366 (64). Notice to creditors and proof of
claims.
Where in response to the notice required by this section,,
certain Florida banks filed with the superintendent of
banks verified claims against the bank in the hands of the
superintendent for liquidation, certified copies of such
claims are admissible in evidence in any court of this State,
when relevant, and such certified copies are primary evi-
dence. Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. E. 170.
§ 2366(66). Superintendent may reject claims
or change rank.—If the Superintendent doubts
the justice and validity of any claim or deposit or
the priority therefor as claimed in the proof filed,
he may either reject the same or change the rank
or order of paying the same and serve notice of
such rejection or change upon the claimant or
depositor, either personally or by registered mail,
and an affidavit of the service of such notice,
which shall be prima facie evidence thereof, shall
be filed in the office of the Superintendent. Any
action or suit upon such claim so rejected or
changed as to rank, whether for the purpose of
having said claim allowed or of establishing the
rank or order of payment thereof must be brought
by the claimant against the bank in the proper
court of the county in which the bank is located,
within ninety (90) days after such service, or the
same shall be barred. Notice of the filing of such
suit with a copy of the petition shall be given by
the claimant to the Superintendent of Banks by
registered mail at least ten days (10) before the
suit shall be in order for trial. The Superintend-
ent, if he so desires, may defend the suit in the
name of the bank. Suits brought under this sec-
tion shall be tried at the first term of the court.
Acts 1919, pp. 135, 158; 1927, pp. 196, 198.
Editor's Note.—The provision in case the superintendent
doubts the priority of the claim is new with 1927 amend-
ment. By the amendment the superintendent may change
the rank or order of paying the claim, and the rest of the
section is so amended as to conform it to the last referred
^hange. The last three sentences are also new with the
amendment.
§ 2366(67) Objections to claims. — Objections
to any claim or deposit not rejected or changed
as to rank or order of payment by the Superin-
tendent may be made by the party interested, by
filing a copy of such objections with the Super-
intendent; and the Superintendent, after investi-
gation, shall either allow such objections and re-
ject the claims or deposit, or change the rank or
order of payment thereof, and present such ob-
jections to the Superior Court of the county in
which the bank is located, which court shall cause
an issue to be made up and tried at the first term
thereafter, as to whether or not such claim or
deposit should be allowed and as to the proper
rank or order of payment thereof. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 159; 1927, pp. 195, 199.
Editor's Note.—The reference to the charge of the rank
or order or claims throughout this section is new with the
amendment of 1927.
§ 2366(70). Order of paying debts.—After the
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payment of the expenses of liquidation, including
compensation of agents and attorneys, and after
the payment of unremitted collections, the order
of paying off debts due by insolvent banks shall
be as follows:
(1) Debts due depositors.
(2) Debts due for taxes, State and Federal.
(3) Judgments.
(4) Contractual obligations.
(5) Unliquidated claims for damages and the
like.
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall
affect the validity of any security or lien held by
any person or corporation. Acts 1919, pp. 134,
159; 1925, pp. 119, 129; 1927, pp. 195, 199.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 the payment of
unremitted collections are also made prior to the payment
of other classes of claims enumerated. The amendment also
changed the order of payment, and the number of the
classes of claims enumerated. The proviso is new with the
amendment.
Lean to Cashier.—The money loaned to the cashier is
not a debt entitled to priority under class 5 [now 1] of this
section, as a debt due by the bank as trustee or other fidu-
ciary, or as a claim of like character. Campbell v. Morgan
County Bank, 35 Ga. App. 222, 132 S. E. 648.
Where a trustee deposits funds of his cestui que trust in
a bank and takes therefor a time certificate, bearing in-
terest from the date to maturity, and the bank becomes in-
solvent, the holder of such certificate is not entitled to pre-
ferred payment thereof under the 3rd provision of this sec-
tion. The bank does not become a fiduciary of like char-
acter as an executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee,
by receiving such deposit from the trustee or another for
the trustee, and issuing to the trustee a time certificate
therefor. Such certificate of deposit creates the relation of
debtor and creditor between the bank and the trustee; the
title to the money so deposited immediately passes to the
bank, and the credit of the bank is substituted for the
money. Cato v. Mixon, 165 Ga. 345, 140 S. E. 376.
Under the facts appearing from the agreement creating
the trust, and from the certificate of deposit, and the other
aliunde allegations in the petition, the bank did not become
either an express or implied trustee of the fund for which
the certificate was issued for the beneficiary under this trust
agreement. Deposits made by trustees, executors, adminis-
trators, assignees, auditors, public officers, and others serv-
ing as fiduciaries, are considered simply as general depos-
its; and if the bank in which they are placed fails to pay
them, the beneficiaries have no peculiar claim or preference
over other creditors. Cato v. Mixon, 165 Ga. 245, 140 S. E-
376.
This case is controlled by the ruling made by the Su-
preme Court in Williams v. Bennett, 158 Ga. 488, 123 S. E-
683. Here, as in the Williams case, the money sued for was
not a general deposit, but was held by the bank under fi-
duciary relations between the parties, constituting it a
trust fund to be applied to "a designated or specific pur-
pose." As such, under paragraph 5 of section 19 of article
7 of the banking act (Ga. L. 1919, p. 159), as it then ex-
isted, it is entitled to priority of payment over general de-
posits which fall under paragraph 7 of that section and ar-
ticle, and the judgment setting up the claim should have
established such priority. Buckeye Oil Co. v. Citizens
Bank, 37 Ga. App. 421, 422, 140 S. E. 399.
Between Debts Due County and Stats.—Clearly, under the
provisions of the act of 1919, which provided the order of the
payment of debts at the time this bank was taken posses-
sion of by the superintendent, and by that act as amended
by the act of 1925, debts due any county rank second, and
are inferior in priority only to debts due the State of
Georgia. Bennett v. Wilkes County, 164 Ga. 790, 139 S. E.
566.
§ 2366(71) Assessment of stockholders.
See notes to § 2366(180).
Section 20 of article 7 of the banking act approved Au-
gust 16, 1919 (Ga. E. 1919, pp. 135, 160), which provides
that after a stockholder in a bank which has been taken
over for liquidation by the superintendent of banks has
been given notice by mail of an assessment made against
the stockholder, if the stockholder "so notified shall re-
fuse or neglect to pay any such assessment within thirty
days after the levy of such assessment and notice there-
of, the superintendent of banks shall issue an execution
against such stockholder for the amount of such assess-
1 ment," implies that the stockholder against whom the
assessment has been made, and to whom the notice has
been given by mail as required, shall be entitled to
thirty days, exclusive of the date upon which the notice
of assessment was given, within which to pay the assess-
ment before an execution by the superintendent of banks
can be legally issued against the stockholder. It follows,
that, where an assessment against a stockholder was
made by the superintendent of banks and the required
notice was given on the 19th day of October, 1926, an
execution for the enforcement of the assessment which
was issued on November 18, 1926, was issued within the
period of thirty days after the levy of the assessment
and the giving of the notice, and therefore the issuance
of the execution was premature, and therefore illegal.
The judge of the superior court therefore properly sus-
tained the stockholder's affidavit of illegality interposed
to the levy made under the execution. Civil Code (1910),
§ 4, par. 8; Knoxville City Mills v. Eovinger, 83 Ga. 563,
10 S. E. 230; Rusk v. Hill, 117 Ga. 722, 45 S. E- 42; Holt
v. Richardson, 134 Ga. 287, 67 S. E- 798; Grooms v.
Hawkinsville, 31 Ga. App. 424, 120 S. E. 807; Mobley v.
Goodwyn, 39 Ga. App. 64, 146 S. E- 78. Judgment af-
firmed. Jenkins, P. J., and Bell, J., concur. Mobley v.
Chamblee, 39 Ga. App. 645, 148 S. E. 306.
Constitutionality.—A consideration and determination of
the question whether the provision of this section is viola-
tive of the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution of the United States being for decision by
a full bench of six Justices, who are equally divided in opin-
ion, the judgment of the lower court upon this point is af-
firmed by operation of law. Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849,
137 S. E. 264.
This section as amended does not violate paragraph 23
of section 1 of article 1 of the constitution of this State.
Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 164 Ga. 350, 138 S. E. 670.
In Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29, 48 S.
Ct. 422, it was held that this section did not deny due
process of law.
Delegation of Authority.—Authority of the superintendent
of banks to determine the stockholder's liability to deposit-
ors and collection thereof under this section as amended in
1925, cannot be delegated to agent by power of attorney au-
thorized by sections 2366(60), (61), notwithstanding section
2366(74) and section 2366(16). In re Giles, 21 Fed. (2d), 536.
Option of Stockholder.—Under a proper construction to-
gether of articles 6 and 7 of the banking laws, stockhold-
ers of a banking company have the privilege of declining
to levy assessments under article 6 to make good the im-
pairment of the capital stock thereof after notice by the
superintendent of banks, and of electing instead to allow
the bank to be liquidated and to submit to an assessment
made by the superintendent under article 7 of said banking
laws. Smith v. Mobley, 166 Ga. 195, 143 S. E. 116.
Summary Executions.—Under this section, the notice of
assessment is a demand on the stockholder for payment
thereof in proportion to the amount of stock held by him,
which he may satisfy at any time within thirty days, with-
out any proceeding to enforce its payment. If he fails to
make such payment within that period, it is the duty of
the superintendent of banks to proceed to enforce payment
by summarily issuing execution against the stockholder.
The mailing of the notice of assessment is not the begin-
ning of litigation, within the meaning of that word as used
in the phrase, "with a view to pending litigation," in the
Civil Code, § 5768. Bennett v. Cox, 167 Ga. 843, 146 S. E.
835.
Same—Signing Execution.—The signing of an execution
under this section, is a clerical or ministerial act which can
be delegated by the superintendent of banks. Properly
construed, the act is broad enough in its terms to author-
ize the superintendent of banks to appoint an assistant su-
perintendent of banks, or agent, to perform such duties as
shall be assigned him by the superintendent. The superin-
tendent can delegate to such assistant, or agent, the duty
**f issuing and signing executions in pursuance of assess-
ments made by the superintendent. This authority may be
exercised by signing such executions in his own official
capacity, or by the agent affixing to them the official sig-
nature of the superintendent of banks and adding the
word "by," and then adding his own official signature. Mc-
Caskill v. Chattahoochee Fertilizer Co., 167 Ga. 802, 146
S. E. 830.
Where Liability Fixed by Charter.—Section 8 of the act
of December 22, 1888, creating a special legislative charter
for the Washington Exchange Bank, which section fixes the
liability of stockholders of said bank, has not been re-
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pealed or modified by subsequent legislation contained ei-
ther in § 2270, or in §§ 2366(1) et seq. Latimer v. Bennett,
167 Ga. 811, 146 S. F. 762.
A stockholder in said bank, who had sold her stock prior
to the failure of the bank and to its being taken over for
liquidation by the superintendent of banks, but who had not
had the transfer of the stock entered upon the books of the
bank, as provided in section 6 of the act incorporating the
bank, is liable to an assessment, under this section of the
Code. Latimer v. Bennett, 167 Ga. 811, 146 S. F- 762; Lati-
mer v. Bennett, 37 Ga. App. 246, 139 S. F- 570.
Remedy of Stockholder.—A stockholder in this bank, who
is assessed on his stock by the superintendent of banks to
pay its indebtedness, can by affidavit of illegality contest
his or her liability for the assessment, the correctness of
the estimate made by the superintendent of banks, or the
amount of the assessment; and the ruling of the Court of
Appeals to the contrary was erroneous. Latimer v. Ben-
nett, 167 Ga. 811, 146 S. F- 762; Latimer v. Bennett, 37 Ga.
App. 246, 139 S. F. 570; Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 164
Ga. 350, 138 S. F- 670.
Where an execution was issued by authority of the superin-
tendent of banks, to enforce the statutory liability of a
stockholder, and where, upon a levy of the execution, the
stockholder interposed an affidavit of illegality, allegations
therein which in effect charged only that the estimate of
the value of the assets as made by the superintendent un-
der section 20 of article 7 of the banking act (Ga. L. 1919,
p. 135) were not carefully made, or that such estimate and
the assessment upon the stockholders were not made within
the time specified in the act, were insufficient to present
any defense against the execution.
There is no law requiring that executions to enforce the
statutory liability of stockholders shall be issued within
thirty days from the levy of the assessment and notice
thereof. Mobley v. Goodwyn, 39 Ga. App. 64.
§ 2366(75). Unclaimed deposits and dividends.
—Where deposits or other claims against the
bank are not filed within twelve months after the
expiration of the date fixed by the superintendent
for the presentation of claims against the bank,
no dividend shall be paid thereon but dividends
accruing on said claims shall be distributed as other
assets of the bank, and where dividends are not
accepted and collected within six months after
they are declared, they shall become a part of
the general fund of the bank and be distributed
as other assets. In case of banks that were
closed and being liquidated by the Superinten-
dent before August 25, 1925, claims which were
not filed within sixty days from the date of the
approval of this act shall be forever barred, and
all funds deposited or held to meet such claims,
and any dividends which may have been de-
clared but are not collected within such period
of sixty days, shall become part of the general
funds of the bank, and shall be distributed as
other assets. Acts 1925, pp. 119, 132; 1927, 195,
200.
Editor's Note.—The provision as to the bar of claims not
presented in time in case of banks closed and in liquidation
before August 25, 1925, is new with the amendment of 1927.
SECTION 8
Incorporation of Banks
§ 2366(80). Application for charter. — Any
number of persons not less than five (5) may
form a corporation for the purpose of carrying
on the business of banking, by filing in the office
of the Secretary of State an application in writ-
ing signed by each of them, in which they shall
state.
(3) The amount of its capital stock which
shall not be less than twenty-five thousand
Ga.—
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($2i5,000) dollars where located in a town or city
whose population does not exceed three thou-
sand according to the last preceding census of
the United States, and not less than fifty thou-
sand ($50,000) dollars where located in a city or
town whose population exceeds three thousand
according to said census. Provided, however,
this section shall not apply to banks whose
capital stock is now fixed, so they shall not be
required to increase the same. Acts 1927, 195,
200.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 changed the re-
quirement as to the minimum amounts of the capital stock,
and the population of places of establishment, which appear
in the third clause of this section.
Illustration.—In Mobley v. Hagedorn Construction Co.,
168 Ga. 385, 391, 147 S. F- 890, it is said: "We are of the
opinion that under the act of 1919 (Ga. I,. 1919, pp. 164 et
seq., Park's Code Supp. 1922, §§ 2269(a) et seq.; Michie's
Code 1926, § 2366(80) ) the Georgia State Bank, under the
contract under review, assumed all the liabilities of the
Bank of Chatsworth. It will be observed that by this
contract the Bank of Chatsworth stripped itself of its as-
sets, and it received no consideration therefor except the
obligation of the Georgia State Bank to assume its liabil-
ities."
§ 2366(86). Payment of capital.
Prior Law Construed.—In Pearce v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App.
415, 133 S. F- 278, construing Civil Code of 1910, section
2268, which permitted the board of directors to prescribe how
any unpaid part of the capital stock should be paid in, it
was held that where a subscriber for stock in such a bank
had paid his pro rata of the minimum amount required to
be paid in before the filing of the application for charter
and the subscription contract did not provide otherwise, the
remainder of his subscription was not due until the direc-
tors called for its payment, and the statute of limitations
did not begin to run in his favor as to the unpaid install-
ment until such condition was complied with. It will be
noted that section 2268 of the Civil Code of 1910, which Bell,
J., referred to in this case was repealed by Acts 1919, p.
135. See Editor's Note under section 2366(1) of the Code
of 1926. Of course banks incorporated under the said sec-
tion are still governed by that law instead of sections
2366(1)
-(196) unless the right to change was reserved to
the State in the charters of the individual Banks. Dart-
mouth College case. To ascertain whether such reservation
was made in a given case recourse to the charter of the
given bank must be had. Ed. Note.
SECTION 18
Liability of Stockholders
§ 2366 (139). Stockholders' liability, extent of.
See note to § 2366(2).
Citizens Bank transmitted $5000 to Bankers Trust Com-
pany, its financial agent, to be placed "on call" with an-
other bank or banks. The Trust Company, was also finan-
cial agent for a large number of banks, among which was
Plains Bank. The Trust Company deposited the $5000 in
Fulton National Bank of Atlanta and to the credit of
Plains Bank and advised Citizens Bank, "covering call
funds," that "we deposit $5000 with Plains [Bank], Ga."
Bankers Trust Company also advised Plains Bank, "Cov-
ering call funds," that "we deposit $5000 with Fulton Nat.
Bank. From—Deposited $5000 by Citizens Bank, Waynes-
boro, Ga." Held: Under the facts of the case, the trans-
action was not a "deposit" with Plains Bank, as contem-
plated by the General Assembly in providing that share-
holders in banks may be assessed for the payment of de-
positors. Citizens Bank v. Mobley, 166 Ga. 543, 144 S. F- 119.
"The stockholders of this bank are not individually li-
able to its depositors under the act of 1893 (Civil Code of
1910, § 2270), as this bank did not exercise the privilege
granted by this act of amending its charter so as to em-
brace therein this provision; nor are they thus liable un-
der §§ 2366(139) et seq., as that act imposes this liability
only upon stockholders of banks chartered thereunder.
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"This liability of the stockholders is one in favor of all
the creditors of the bank, and not in favor of depositors
alone. Bennett v. Wilkes County, 164 Ga. 790, 139 S. E.
566.
Cited in Mobley v. Robinson (Ga.), 30 Fed. (2d) 339.
§ 2366(140). Exception for trustees and other
fiduciaries.
Applicability to Parent of Minor.—One who buys stock in
a bank, and has it entered on the books of the bank in his
own name as guardian for his minor child, is himself, as
between him and the bank, the owner of the stock, and the
provisions of this section are not applicable. Where the
bank has been taken over by the superintendent of banks
under the authority of the banking laws, such person is in-
dividually liable for an assessment made against him as
stockholder by the superintendent of banks. Rosenberg v
Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. E. 119.
Applied in Longino v. Bennett, 39 Ga. App. 89, 90, 146
S. E. 324.
§ 2366(141). Liability of stockholder after trans-
fer of stock.
See note to § 2366(142).
Failure to Enter Transfer on Banks.—Where a stock-
holder in a bank, individually liable under the charter,
transfers his stock, but fails to have the transfer entered
upon the books of the bank, and fails to give to the bank
written notice thereof, as provided by the banking act, he
is not exempt from liability. Candler v. Mobley, 37 Ga.
App. 259, 139 S. F. 732.
Section 8 of the act of 1888 (Ga. L. 1888, p. 73), which
fixes the liability of stockholders of the Washington Ex-
change Bank, has not been repealed or modified by sub-
sequent legislation contained either in the act of 1893
(Civil Code of 1910, § 2270) or in the banking act of 1919
(Ga. J^. 1919, p. 135), or otherwise. Latimer v. Bennett, 37
Ga. App. 246, 139 S. F. 570. See note to § 2366(71).
Applied in Longino v. Bennett, 39 Ga. App. 89, 90, 146
S. F- 324.
§ 2366(142). Liability when bank fails.
Effect of Liability of Former Stockholder.—The present
owner of stock, against whom such an assessment is made,
can not defeat liability therefor upon the ground that under
the provisions of this and section 2366(141), a former stock-
holder from whom he purchased the stock within six months
prior to the date of the failure of the bank may be liable
for an assessment thereon. The right to enforce the assess-
ment against the former stockholder is in the superintendent
of banks, and not in the present stockholder. Rosenberg
v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. F- 119.
Effect of Defective Title of Former Stockholder. — A
present stockholder against whom an assessment has been
made under the authority of this law, can not defend against
such assessment upon the ground that the former stock-
holder from whom he purchased the stock had no title.
Rosenberg v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. F- 119.
SECTION 19
Regulation of the Business of Banking
§ 2366(148). Qualification of directors.—Every
director must, during his whole term of service, be
a citizen of his [this] State or reside within 25
miles of the city or town in which the bank is lo-
cated, and at least three fourths of the directors
must be residents of the city or town in which the
bank is located or within twenty-five miles there-
of, and must continue so to reside during their
continuance in office. Every director must own in
his own right and unpledged at least ten shares of
the capital stock of the bank of which he is a di-
rector, upon which,all installments which are due
shall have been paid in full, unless the capital of
the bank shall not exceed twenty-five thousand
dollars, in which case he must own at least five
shares of such stock. Any director who ceases to
be the owner of the number of shares herein re-
quired, or who pledges the same, or fails to pay
any installment thereon when the same becomes
due or who becomes in any other manner dis-
qualified, shall vacate his place as a member of
the board. Provided, that this section shall not
apply to directors in office at the date this act
takes effect, and said directors shall be qualified
to succeed themselves as often as they may be re-
elected without reference to the provisions of this
section. Acts 1919, pp. 135, 197; 1927, pp. 195, 201.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927 directors
of banks with a capital stock of between $15,000 and $50,000
and directors of banks with a capital stock of over $50,000
were required to own two and five shares of the capital
stock, respectively. All the other provisions of the section,
except the provision as to vacating the office of directors
which remains the same, are new with the amendment.
§ 2366(151). Semi-annual examinations by di-
rectors.— It shall be the duty of the board of
directors of every bank, at least onct in each
six (6) months, to count the cash and examine
fully into the books, papers, and affairs of the
bank of which they are directors, and partic-
ularly into the loans and discounts thereof,
with the special view of ascertaining the value
and security thereof, and the collateral security,
if any, given in connection therewith, and into
such other matters as the Superintendent of
Banks may require. Such directors shall con-
duct such count and examination by a com-
mittee of at least three (3) of its members;
and shall have the power to employ certified
public accountants, or other expert assistance in
making such examinations, if they deem the
same necessary. Within ten (10) days after
the completion of each of such examinations,
a report in writing thereof, sworn to by the di-
rectors making the same, shall be made to the
board of directors, which report shall be spread
upon the minutes of said board; and the orig-
inal thereof shall be placed on file in said bank,
and a duplicate thereof filed with the Superin-
tendent of Banks. Provided, however, that in
lieu of the semi-annual examination of the di-
rectors, such semi-annual examination may be
made by accountants, approved by the Super-
intendent of Banks; and provided, that any
bank which fails to transmit to the Superin-
tendent of Banks, within ten (10) days after the
completion of the same, a copy of the report
made by such board of directors or such ac-
countants shall be subject to the same penalty
as is provided by § 2366(44) for failure to make
and transmit its report in response to call of
the Superintendent of Banks. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 193; 1922, p. 67; 1927, pp. 195, 198.
Editor's Note.—The provision at the beginning of the sec-
ond sentence as to conducting the counts by a commitee,
which formerly was merely permissive, was made manda-
tory by the use of word "shall" in place of "may," by the
Act of 1927.
§ 2366 (157). Borrowing for personal use by
officers and employees prohibited except by per-
mission of directors.
A settlement of the indebtedness represented by the notes,
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by an acceptance of property by the bank from the mak-
ers in payment of the indebtedness, amounts to a settle-
ment and discharge of the indebtedness, and to a release
of the obligors under the contract of indemnity. This is
true notwithstanding some of the obligors may have been
members of the board of directors, or consented to the set-
tlement provided, in so doing they committed no fraud on
the bank. If the settlement was made bona fide and the
bank received full value in payment of the indebtedness,
there was no fraud as against the bank upon the part of
the directors consenting thereto, who were parties to the
contract of indemnity, and they therefore, under such cir-
cumstances, would not be estopped from setting up the set-
tlement as a release of their liability under the contract of
indemnity. Ruffner v. Sophie Mae Candy Corporation, 35
Ga. App. 114 (4), 132 S. E- 396. Walton County Bank v.
Staunton, 38 Ga. App. 591, 144 S. E. 815.
If, the property received by the bank in settlement of
the indebtedness represented by the notes was not reason-
ably worth the amount of the indebtedness, its acceptance
by the officers of the bank in full settlement of the indebt-
edness, if not done bona fide and in the interest of the
bank, amounted to a fraud upon the bank; and the guar-
antors upon the contract of indemnity, who were di-
rectors of the bank, unless they were not responsible for
the contract of settlement, would be estopped from setting
up the settlement in discharge of their obligations on the
contract of indemnity. Walton County Bank v. Stanton,
38 Ga. App. 591, 144 S. E- 815.
Applied in McClure v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 39
Ga. App. 753, 758, 148 S. E- 341.
§ 2366(159). Loans by bank, limit of.—No
bank shall be allowed to lend to any one per-
son, firm, or corporation more than twenty (20)
per cent of its capital, and unimpaired surplus.
And no loan shall be made in excess of ten (10)
per cent of the capital and surplus, except upon
good collateral or other ample security and
with the approval of a majority of the directors,
or of a committee of the board of directors, au-
thorized to act, which approval shall be evi-
denced by the written signature of said direc-
tors or the members of said committee. In
estimating loans to any person, all amounts
loaned to firms and partnerships of which he
is a member shall be included: Provided, how-
ever, that a bank may buy from or discount
for any person, firm, or corporation, bills of
exchange drawn in good faith against actually
existing values, or commercial or business pa-
per actually owned by the person negotiating
the same, in addition to loans directly made to
the person, firm, or corporation selling the
same, such purchase or discount not to ex-
ceed (20) per cent of the capital and surplus,
to be approved in writing by a majority of the
directors, or by a committee of such board au-
thorized to act; and provided, that the limit
of loans herein fixed shall not apply to bona
fide loans made upon the security of agricul-
tural, manufactured, industrial products or live
stock having a market value and for which
there is ready sale in the open market, title to
which by appropriate transfer shall be taken in
the name of the bank, and which shall be se-
cured by insurance against loss by fire, with
policies made payable to the bank, where no
more than eighty (80) per cent of the market
value of such products shall be loaned or ad-
vanced thereon. In all such cases a margin of
twenty (20) per cent between the amount of
the loan and the market value of the products
shall at all times be maintained (except where
products are intended for immediate ship-
ment)
; and the bank shall have the right to
tl
call for additional collateral when the differ-
ence between the market value and the amount
loaned shall be less than twenty (20) per cent,
and in the event of the failure to comply with
such demand, to immediately sell all or any
part of such products in the open market and
pay the amount of the loan and the expenses
of sale, and the balance to the borrower; and
provided, that the limit herein fixed shall not
apply to loans fully secured by bonds or cer-
tificates of indebtedness of the United States or
of this State, or of the several counties, dis-
tricts, or municipalities thereof which have been
duly and regularly validated as provided by
law. Liabilities arising to the makers and in-
dorsers of checks, drafts, bill of exchange, re-
ceived by the bank on deposit, cashed, or pur-
chased by it, shall not in any way be considered
as borrowed money or loans. It shall be the
duty of the Superintendent of Banks to order
any loans in excess charged to profit and loss,
provided in his opinion such excess is not well
secured; and if such reduction shall not be
made within thirty (30) days after such notifi-
cation, to proceed as in other cases provided
for violation of the orders of the Superintend-
ent. Acts 1919, pp. 105, 197; 1922, pp. 88, 70;
1927, p. 201.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 the phrase "not
to exceed twenty (20) per cent of the capital and surplus"
with regard to purchases referred to in the first part of the
proviso, was substituted for the phrase "if in excess of ten
(10) per cent of the capital and surplus."
Cited in Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 583, 144 S. E. 170.
§ 2366 (160). Liability of directors for allow-
ing loans exceeding limit.
The defendant in execution having failed to establish by
proof the allegation in his affidavit of illegality, that the
assistant superintendent of banks had no authority to is-
sue the execution, which was signed "T. R. Bennett, Su-
perintendent of Banks, by E. A. Thompson, Asst. Super-
intendent of Banks of the State of Georgia," and this being
the only ground of illegality urged, the trial judge erred
in directing a verdict for the defendant in execution. Han-
sard v. Pool, 39 Ga. App. 109, 147 S. E- 153.
§ 2366 (164). Certificates of deposit.
The purpose and effect of this section is to prevent a
bank from pledging its credit and increasing its liability
to depositors by trading its certificates of deposit for any
instrument not the equivalent of cash. But it will not be
taken that a bank has violated the section upon its merely
being made to appear that a certificate of deposit has been
issued to a customer in an amount representing the net
proceeds of a note discounted for the depositor upon the
same date, since the presumption would be that the dis-
count of the note was bona fide and independent of any
condition or understanding that its purchase price wouid
be discharged by the customer's acceptance of a time cer-
tificate of deposit. White County Bank v. Clermont State
Bank, 37 Ga. App. 268, 140 S. E- 676.
§ 2386(169). Purchase of stocks and invest-
ment securities.—No bank shall subscribe for,
purchase, or hold stock in any other bank, ex-
cept stocks in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, necessary to qualify for membership
therein, nor in any other corporation unless
the same shall have been transferred to it in
satisfaction of a debt previously contracted, or
shall have been purchased at a sale under a
power contained in a note or other instrument
by which it was pledged to the bank or under
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a judgment or degree in its favor, and all such
stock shall be disposed of by the bank within
six months, unless the Superintendent of Banks
shall extend the time for good cause shown.
Nor shall a bank purchase or hold any bonds
•or debentures except such as are classed as in-
vestment securities, and the buying and selling
of such securities shall be limited to buying
and selling without recourse marketable obli-
gations upon which there has never been a de-
fault, evidencing indebtedness of any person,
copartnership, association, or corporation in the
form of bonds, notes and/or debentures, com-
monly known as investment securities, under
such regulations as may be prescribed by the
Superintendent of Banks. The total amount
•of such investment securities shall at no time
^exceed 25 per cent, of the capital and unim-
paired surplus of such bank; but this limitation
as to the amount shall not apply to obligations
of the United States, of this State, or of the
several counties, districts, or municipalities
thereof which have been validated as provided
by law. Nothing in this section is to be con-
strued as applying to savings banks doing a
savings business only. Provided that this section
shall not apply to securities actually owned at
the date Act of 1919 became effective. Pro-
vided, further, that any bank may subscribe
for, or purchase, stock in an agricultural credit
corporation duly organized under the laws of
this State having authority to make loans to
the farmers of this State for agricultural pur-
poses and to re-discount the same with the In-
termediate Credit Bank of Columbia, but no
bank shall subscribe for or purchase stock in
more than one such corporation, nor invest
therein more than ten per centum of its cap-
ital, and no such subscription or purchase shall
be made until first approved by the Superin-
tendent of Banks. Acts 1924, p. 76; 1919, pp.
135, 201; 1927, pp. 195, 203.
Editor's Note.—Save the last proviso, all of the provisions
of the section were changed by the amendment of 1927. The
changes effected are so versatile as to render it impossible
to point them out by specific description, and calls for a
comparison of the two sections.
§ 2366 (180). Lien on bank's assets when
checks are not remitted.
K filed his claim against the Trust Company, based on
the checks which the Trust Company had given to him, and
claiming a lien on the Trust Company's assets under this
section. Shortly thereafer he transferred this claim to the
Fulton National Bank. The State superintendent of banks
rejected to claim; and K, for the use of the bank, brought
this suit to establish the claim under section 2366(71), and
at the same time to enjoin the superintendent from paying
out the funds of the Trust Company until the question
could be determined. Held, that the court erred in refus-
ing an injunction, inasmuch as the petitioner was entitled
under the facts, to assert the lien claimed. Kuniansky v.
Mobley, 167 Ga. 852, 146 S. E. 898.
§ 2366 (185). Payment of deposit in two
names.
Effect upon Title to Deposit.—This section has reference
to the liability of the bank as to a joint deposit, making it
lawful for the bank to pay either party under such cir-
cumstances. It does not affect the right of the property
as between the parties; that is, between the depositor and
the third person claiming the deposit. It has no applicability
to the title to the money as between the depositor and the
third party. Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 546, 136 S. E- 444.
§ 2366 (188). Deposit by agent, trustee or
other fiduciary.
See § 2366(70).
§ 2366(190). Forged or raised checks.
Applicability to Signing by Unauthorized Agent.—The ex-
pression "forged check," as used in this section applies
only to a check created as a result of a criminal act of for-
gery, and does not apply to a check to which one's name as
maker or drawer is signed by another, who purports to act
as the agent for the maker or drawer, although no such
authority exists. Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga.
App. 248, 129 S. E- 170.
Under the undisputed facts the plaintiff is not, as a mat-
ter of law, estopped, irrespective of the provisions of this
section, from repudiating the act of the alleged agent in
signing the plaintiff's name to the checks without authority.
Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga. App. 248, 129 S. E.
170.
Excuse for Failure to Give Notice.—The effect of the rul-
ing in Citizens, etc., Bank v. Ponsell, 33 Ga. App. 193, 125
S. E. 775, was that the trial court would not have been au-
thorized to hold the reasons assigned by the plaintiff in
exculpation of her failure to notify the defendant bank of
the forgeries, within 60 days, as required by this section
were not inadequate as a matter of law. That ruling did
not go to the extent of holding that the circumstances
pleaded in extenuation of such failure on the part of the
plaintiff were necessarily such as would relieve her from
the penalty prescribed. While it is true that the statute
charges the depositor with a duty of notifying, it does not
undertake to say what facts or circumstances, if any, would
be sufficient to obviate the penalty of such dereliction. S.
C, 35 Ga. App. 460, 133 S. E. 351.
It is for the jury to say whether the facts pleaded and
proved by the plaintiff, in exculpation of her dereliction,
were such as would absolve her from the penalty prescribed.
Consequently, the overruling of the demurrer to the peti-
tion does not mean that the plaintiff is absolutely entitled
to recover if she proves her case as laid; for a general de-
murrer should be overruled in an action based on facts and
circumstances justifying the plaintiff's admitted negligence
when the jury, from the facts alleged, would be authorized
to infer a justification for negligence, though they would not
be bound to do so. See McDuffie v. Ocean Steamship Co.,
5 Ga. App. 125, 129, 62 S. E- 1008. Ponsell v. Citizens, etc.,
Bank, 35 Ga. App. 460, 133 S. E. 351.
§ 2366 (192), Transfer after or in contempla-
tion of insolvency.
Under this section of the banking act the payment by
the bank of money which is on general deposit to the
depositor is the payment of assets of the bank to a creditor;
and when made after the insolvency of the bank, and with
a view by the bank of preventing the application of the as-
sets in the manner prescribed by the banking act, or with
a view by the bank of preferring the depositor over other
creditors, the payment is, under the terms of the act, "null
and void," if the payment is made within three months
prior to the failure of the bank. It is not essential to the
invalidity of the payment that at the time of payment the
depositor to whom the money is paid shall have knowledge
that the bank is insolvent. Twiggs County Bank v. McCal-
lum, 39 Ga. App. 306, 147 S. E. 129.
§ 2366(194). Payment of deposit of deceased
depositor.—Upon the death of any person in-
testate, having a deposit in a bank of not more
than three hundred no/100 ($300.00) dollars,
such bank shall be authorized to pay over such
deposit: (a) to the husband or wife of the de-
positor; (b) if no husband or wife, to the chil-
dren; (c) if no children, to the father if living;
if not, to the mother of the depositor; (d) if
no children or parent, then to the brothers and
sisters of the depositor. The receipt of such
person or persons shall be a full and final ac-
quittance to the bank and relieve it of all lia-
bility to the estate of said deceased depositor or
the representative thereof should one be ap-
pointed. Such deposit shall be exempt from
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the process of garnishment. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 210; 1927, pp. 195, 204.
Editor's Note.—Prior to its amendment in 1927, this sec-
tion applied to deposits not exceeding one hundred dollars.
The amendment extended its application to deposits of three
hundred dollars and less. The provision as to the exemp-
tion of the deposit from process of garnishment is new with
the amendment.
§ 2366 (195A). Stale checks.—Where a check
or other instrument payable on demand at any
bank or trust company doing business in this
State is not presented for payment within six
months from the date thereof, the same shall be
regarded as a stale check, and the bank or trust
company upon which the same is drawn may re-
fuse payment thereof unless expressly instructed
by the drawer or maker to pay the same, and no
liability shall be incurred to the drawer or maker
for dishonoring the check or other instrument
by such non-payment. Acts 1927, pp. 195, 204.
§ 2366 (195B). Stop-payment orders to be re-
newed.—No revocation, countermand, or stop-
payment order, relating to the payment of any
check or draft against an account of a depositor
in any bank or trust company doing business in
this State, shall remain in effect for more than
ninety (90) days after the service thereof on the
bank, unless the same be renewed, which re-
newals shall be in writing and shall be in effect
for not more than ninety (90) days from the
date of the service thereof on the bank or trust
company, but such renewals may be themselves
renewed from time to time. All notices affect-
ing checks or drafts of any bank or trust com-
pany, upon which revocation, countermand, or
stop-payment orders have heretofore been made,
shall not be deemed to continue in effect for
more than ninety (90) days from the date of the
approval of this Act, unless renewed in writing,
which renewal shall not continue in effect for
more than ninety (90) days from the date of the
service thereof on the bank or trust company.
Acts 1927, pp. 195, 205.
SECTION 20
Operation and Effect of Act
§ 2366(196A). Short title.—The Act approved
August 16, 1919, entitled "An Act to regulate
banking in the State of Georgia; to create the
Department of Banking of the State of Georgia,
to provide for the incorporation of banks, and
the amendment, renewal, and surrender of char-
ters; to provide penalties for the violation of
laws with reference to banking and the banking
business; and for other purposes," and the sev-
eral Acts amendatory thereof, shall be referred
to collectively as "The Banking Law." Acts
1927, pp. 195, 205.
§ 2366 (196B). Venue of suits; service.—All
suits against the Superintendent of Banks, aris-
ing out of the liquidation of insolvent banks,
shall be brought in the county in which such
bank had its principal place of business, and
service may be had on the Superintendent by
serving such suit and process on the liquidation
agent in charge of the affairs of the said bank,
or, if there be none, on any former officer of said
bank; provided, however, that in all such suits a
second original shall be served on the Superin-
tendent of Banks. Acts 1927, pp. 195, 206.
ARTICLE 4
Insurance Companies
SECTION 1
Incorporation of Insurance Companies
§ 2409(a). Park's Code.
See § 2409(1).
§ 2409(1). Superseded by §§ 2:409(2)-2409(6).
§ 2409(2). Authorized investments of insurance
companies.
—Every insurance company organized
and doing business by virtue of the laws of this
State shall have authority to invest its money
and assets in the following securities, to wit:
(a) Any and all bonds or securities issued by
the United States of America, the District of
Columbia, of any State of the United States, or
any county or city therein; bonds of any town-
ship or school district therein; bonds issued by
the Federal Land Banks under provisions of the
Act of Congress of the United States of
America of July 17, 1916, its amendments and
supplements.
(b) Loans secured by any of the class of se-
curities specified in (a) hereof.
(c) Loans secured by first liens on improved
real estate in any of the States of the United
States of America, not exceeding fifty (50%) per
cent, of the value of said property.
(d) Loans on policies issued by the insurance
company, not exceeding the reserve on such
policies.
(e) A building for home-office purposes; pro-
vided that no company shall hereafter invest in
such building unless its assets exceed $100,000.00,
and that such company shall not invest more
than twenty-five (25%) per cent, of its assets in
such a building; and provided further, that any
such investment in a building for home-office
use shall first be approved by the Insurance
Commissioner.
(f) Evidence of indebtedness which may be
purchased or discounted by Federal Reserve
Banks.
(g) Investment securities, that is, marketable
bonds, notes, and/or debentures, evidencing in-
debtedness of solvent persons or corporations,
which, under the regulations of the Comptroller
of the Currency of the United States, national
banks may buy and deal in.
(h) Bonds and debentures of any solvent rail-
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road, street-railway, or other public-utility corpo-
ration, or industrial corporation, on which no de-
fault of interest has occurred, when and if secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust covering physi-
cal assets or securities of ample value to exceed
the indebtedness secured.
(i) Preferred stocks of solvent corporations,
where at the time of acquisition the equity of all
preferred stock outstanding in the assets of the
issuing corporation including the issue in which
the investment is made is more than twice the
amount of such preferred stock, and the earnings
applicable to dividends on such preferred stock
have, for two consecutive years prior to the date
of acquisition, exceeded twice the dividend re-
quirements.
(j) Common stocks of solvent 'railroads, street-
railways, and other utility corporations and indus-
trial corporations which are listed on an estab-
lished exchange, where, prior to the date of ac-
quisition of the stock, the company issuing such
stock had maintained and paid dividends thereon
for three consecutive years, and the current earn-
ings of such company issuing such stock have
been sufficient in each of such three consecutive
years to fully pay the dividends.
(k) Promissory notes amply secured by
pledges of securities in which the company is au-
thorized to invest its funds. Acts 1929, p. 274,
§ I-
§ 2409(3). Approval by Insurance Commis-
sioner.—Investments in the classes of securities
defined in the preceding section, except as to a
building for home-office purposes, may be made
by insurance companies without the approval or
the Insurance Commissioner of Georgia, and that
all other investments of funds by insurance com-
panies in other classes of securities than those
specified in section 1 of this Act shall only be
made when the approval of the Insurance Com-
missioner of Georgia is first obtained. Acts 1929,
p. 275, § 2.
§ 2409(4). Investment in more than 10% of se-
curities of a single company or individual not al-
lowed.—'No insurance company organized and
doing business by virtue of the laws of this State
shall acquire or hold more than ten (10%) per
cent of the securities of any single corporation;
nor shall more than ten (10%) per cent of the
assets of any insurance company be invested in
the securities of any single company or in se-
curities issued by any single individual. Acts
1929, p. 276, § 3.
§ 2409(5). Required investments.—Every insur-
ance company organized and doing business by
virtue of the laws of this State shall, to the ex-
tent of the paid-in outstanding capital stock of
such insurance company, if it be a stock corpora-
tion, keep its funds and assets invested in the
classes of securities defined and described in
subparagraph (a), (ib), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h)
of section 2409(2). Acts 1929, p. 276, § 4.
§ 2409(6). Authority to sell and buy.—Such in-
surance companies organized and doing business
by virtue of the laws of this State may also sell,
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assign, transfer, and convey, either with or with-
out warranty, or either with or without recourse
upon it, as it may prefer, any real estate, personal
property, bond, note, mortgage, deed of trust,
deed to secure debt, or other form of property or
securities in which it may have invested its mon-
eys or its assets, or made loans as allowed by law,
and may also buy and sell any realty that may
be necessary for the protection of any loan such
insurance company may lawfully make. Acts
1929, p. 276, § 5.
SECTION 2
Insurance Companies, How Authorized to Do
Business
§ 2415. License, how obtained.—.Before said
commissioner shall issue such license, >such in-
surance company must fully comply with all of
the provisions of this article, and file with said
insurance commissioner a statement under oath
of its president and secretary, specifying
—
First. The name and locality of the company.
Second. The condition of such company on
the thirty-first day of December then next pre-
ceding, if such company was engaged in business
on said date; and if not so engaged on said date,
then on the date when said company began to do
business, exhibiting the following facts and items
in the following form, namely:
1. The amount of the capital stock of the com-
pany, and what part of the same has been paid in
cash, and what part is in notes of the stockhold-
ers, and how such notes are secured.
2. The property or assets held by the company,
specifying
—
(1) The value, as near as may be, of the real
estate held by such company; if encumbered, to
what amount.
(2) The amount of cash on hand and depos-
ited in banks to the credit of the company.
(3) The amount of cash in the hands of agents
and in the course of transmission.
(4) The amount of loans secured by bonds and
mortgages on real estate.
(5) The amount of other loans, and how se-
cured.
(6) The amount of bonds of this State, of
other States in United States, and of any stocks
owned by the company, specifying the amount,
number of shares, and par and market value of
each kind of stock.
(7) The amount of interest actually due and
unpaid.
(8) The amount of premium notes on hand up-
on which policies have been issued.
(9) The amount of all other assets, real and
personal, not included hereinbefore.
Third. The liabilities of the company, speci-
fying
—
1. The amount of losses due and yet unpaid.
2. The amount of claims for losses resisted by
the company.
3. The amount of losses not yet due, including
those reported to the company on which no ac-
tion has yet been taken.
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4. The amount of dividends declared and due
and remaining unpaid.
5. The amount of dividends declared but not
yet due.
6. The amount of money borrowed.
7. The amount of all other claims against the
company.
8. The amount of reserve for reinsurance.
Fourth. The income of the company during
the preceding year specifying
—
1. The amount of the cash premiums received.
2. The amount of notes received for premiums.
3. The amount of interest money received.
4. The amount of income received from other
sources.
Fifth. The expenditures during the preceding
year, specifying
—
1. The amount of losses paid during the year.
2. The amount of dividends paid during the
year.
3. The amount of expense paid during the
year, including fees and commissions to agents
and officers of the company.
4. The amount paid in taxes.
5. The amount of all other payments and ex-
penditures.
Sixth. The greatest amount insured in any one
risk, and the total amount of insurance outstand-
ing.
Seventh. A certified copy of the Act incorpo-
rating the company. Acts 1929, p. 163, § 1.
SECTION 6
Agents of Insurance Company
§ 2446. (§ 2057). Service on non-resident com-
panies.
See note to § 2563.
Applied in Export Ins. Co. v. Womack, 165 Ga. 815, 142
S. E- 851; Export Ins. Co. v. Womack, 38 Ga. App. 75, 143
S. E. 151.
SECTION 10
Fire Insurance Contracts
§ 2470. (§ 2089.) Contract of fire-insurance.
Entire Contract to Be Written.—This section requires
the entire contract to be in writing, and a memorandum
sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds will not always
do. Coffin v. London, etc., Ins. Co. (Ga.), 27 Fed. (2d),
616, 617.
Delivery.—The rule of this section is stated in Home Ins.
Co. v. Head, 35 Ga. App. 143, 132 S. E- 238.
Where an insurance company has accepted an application
for insurance and has issued the policy, actual delivery is
not essential to the consummation of a contract of insurance,
unless expressly provided for in the application or the pol-
icy. See New York Eife Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 104 Ga. 67,
30 S. E. 273, 42 L. R. A. 88, 69 Am. St. R. 134. Where both
the application and the policy are silent as respects actual
•delivery of the policy being essential to a consummation of
the contract, the contract becomes consummated upon the
retention by the company of the notes and the issuance of
the policy and mailing it to its local agent for delivery to
the applicant. Tarver v. Swann, 36 Ga. App. 461, 137 S. E-
126.
Same—Parol Agreement with Agent.—Where an applica-
tion for insurance, which, upon the consummation of the
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contract of insurance, became a part of the contract, pro-
vided that the company should "not be bound by any act
done or statement made by or to any agent, or other per-
son, which is not contained in this application," an agree-
ment not contained in the application or the policy, made
between the applicant and the local agent, when the appli-
cation and notes were signed, to the effect that the contract
of insurance would not be consummated until actual delivery
of the policy to the applicant, and that upon failure to make
such actual delivery the applicant would not be bound upon
the notes, did not become part of the contract. Tarver v.
Swann, 36 Ga. App. 461, 137 S. E- 126.
§ 2471. Policies must contain the entire con-
tract.
Necessity of Attaching Copy of Application.—See Couch v.
National Life, etc., Ins. Co., 34 Ga. App. 543, 130 S. E. 596;
Interstate Eife, etc., Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App. 723, 134 S. E.
804, citing and following the paragraph set out under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Effect of Attaching Copy of Application.—Where, in con-
formity with the requirements of this section the appli-
cation is attached to the policy and by the terms of the
contract is made a part thereof, and where the authority
of the medical examiner is limited, as in the contract before
us, the beneficiary, in suing upon the policy, can not im-
peach the application as thus integrated therein. If the ap-
plication falls, so does the policy, and in founding her ac-
tion upon the policy she is committed to the proposition
that the answers were made by the insured as set forth in
the application. This rule is not changed by the fact that
the plaintiff fails to include the application in the copy of
the policy attached as an exhibit to the suit. Metropolitan
Eife Ins. Co. v. James, 37 Ga. App. 678, 682, 141 S.
E. 500.
§ 2472, (§ 2090.) Interest of assured.
Test of Insurable Interest.—While, under the section, an
insurable interest is defined as "some interest in the prop-
erty or event insured," and a "slight or contingent inter-
est is sufficient, whether legal or equitable" such an in-
surable interest is not to be taken as synonymous with the
sole and unconditional ownership required by the terms of
the policy in the instant case. Nor does the rule as to an
insurable interest dispense with the contractual requirement
as to liens upon the property constituting the subject matter
of the risk. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga. App.
497, 499, 137 S. E- 277.
§ 2475. (§ 2093.) Construction.
Usages and Customs.—See Macon County Ass'n v. Slap-
pey, 35 Ga. App. 737, 741, 134 S. E- 834, following the para-
graph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
General Rules of Construction.—The rights of the parties
are to be determined by the terms of the policy, so* far as
they are lawful. The language of the contract should be
construed as a whole, and should receive a reasonable con-
struction, and not be extended beyond what is fairly within
the terms of the policy. Where the language is unam-
biguous and but one reasonable construction of the contract
is possible, the court must expound it as made. Cato v.
Aetna Eife Insurance Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398, 138 S. E. 787,
citing Yancey v. Aetna Eife Insurance Co., 108 Ga. 349, 33
S. E. 979; Wheeler v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 129 Ga. 237, 58 S.
E. 709.
§ 2479. Application, good faith.
Representations as to previous health of the insured ire
in general material, when not only life, but future health,
are to be insured. Even though a misrepresentation re-
lates to a time several years prior to the application, it
is material, unless it is very clear that the ill health was
due to a transient cause, and left no bad effects. Mental
derangement, because of its obscurity, especially might
well be traced back indefinitely. Pacific, etc., Ins. Co.
v Manley (Ga.), 27 Fed. (2d), 915.
Statements as to consultations with and treatment by
physicians are always considered material, because the
means are thereby furnished for the company' to check the
information and good faith of the applicant as to the na-
ture and extent of his ailments. So it is ground for can-
celling a life insurance policy that insured in his applica-
tion stated that he had not been treated by physicians
for an ailment, where it appeared that six years before
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he had had a condition of acute mania, had been con-
fined in hospitals and been treated for recurrent severe
headaches. Pacific, etc., Ins. Co. v. Manley (Ga.), 27 Fed.
(2d), 915.
Good Faith No Defense to Actual Falsity.—Under tins
section and §§ 2480 and 2499 the actual falsity of repre-
sentations materially affecting the nature and character
of risk void a policy of life insurance, independently of
intentional deceit. Good faith is not a reply to actual
falsity, unless the representation is made on information
from others, and the insurer is so informed at the time,
the assured propos-es to contract on a basis of fact pre-
sented by him to the insurer. If that basis is incorrect
in a material respect, there is no binding contract. The
case is not unlike that of a sale on representations,
v/hich, if materially untrue, though made in good faith,
avoid the sale under § 4113. Pacific, etc., Ins. Co. v.
Manley (Ga.), 27 Fed. (2d), 915, 916.
§ 2480. (§ 2098.) Effect of misrepresentation.
See notes to i§ 2479.
Where Capable of Two Constructions.—See Macon County
Ass'n v. Slappey, 35 Ga. App. 737, 741, 134 S. F- 834; John-
son v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 154 Ga. 653, 115 S. F- 14, follow-
ing paragraph under this catchline in Georgia Code of 1926.
Misrepresentation in Application Not in Writing Attached
to Policy.—In Interstate Life, etc., Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App.
723, 726, 134 S. F. 804, it was said by Bell, J., "Since the
application was not in writing and attached to the policy,
the insurer could not defend upon the ground of material
misrepresentations not amounting to actual fraud. The fail-
ure to make the application a part of the contract differen-
tiates the case from such cases as Supreme Conclave Knights
v. Wood, 120 Ga. 328, 47 S. F- 940, where it was held that
a material misrepresentation will avoid the policy, whether
the statement was made in good faith or wilfully or fraud-
ulently."
Knowledge of Agent as Waiver.—In Interstate Fife, etc.,
Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App. 723, 726, 134 S. F- 804, it was said
by Bell, J., "In a case like the present, if the agent had
actual knowledge of the facts which by a stipulation in
the contract would render it void, the insurer could not set
up such facts as a defense. But before the knowledge of
the agent could work a waiver on the part of his principal,
the knowledge must have been actual. Constructive knowl-
edge would not be sufficient for that purpose."
Section Given in Charge.—It would seem that it would
not be harmful to the insurer to give in charge a part
or all of the above Code section where the sole defense is
actual fraud. Interstate Fife, etc., Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga.
App. 723, 134 S. F. 804.
§ 2482. (§ 2100.) Increasing risk.
Provisions of Section Impliedly Written into Policy. —
It would seem that the provisions of this section should
be considered as impliedly written into the policy, and
that if they are violated the company will not be liable. It
therefore becomes necessary to determine from all the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances what character of use is
contemplated by a policy. Macon County Ass'n v. Slappey,
35 Ga. App. 737, 741, 134 S. F- 834.
§ 2480. (§ 2107). Second insurance.
Applied in Hall v. Continental Ins. Co., 38 Ga. App. 814,
145 S. F. 891.
§ 2490 (§ 2108.) Prescribing regulations.
Section cited in Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 G<
App. 497, 137 S. F. 277.
SECTION 12
Life Insurance
§ 2498. (§ 2116). To whom to be paid.
Applied in American National Ins. Co. v. Brantley,
Ga. App. 505, 144 S. F- 332.
§ 2499. (§ 2117.) Law of fire-insurance appli-
cable.
Cited in McGlathin v. United States Nat. Fife, etc., Co.,
36 Ga. App. 325, 136 S. F. 535; Pacific, etc., Ins. Co. v.
Manley (Ga.), 27 Fed. (2d) 915.
§ 2499(a). Park's Code.
See § 2501(1).
§ 2501(1). Medical examinations.—All persons
applying for life-insurance in a life-insurance
company writing life insurance in this State shall
submit to such reasonable rules and regulations
as may be prescribed by such insurance com-
panies; and after a policy is issued on the life of
such person, the beneficiary of such policy shall
be entitled to collect the amount of such policy
under the terms of the contract when it matures,
unless the applicant or beneficiary has been
guilty of actual fraud or has made material mis-
representations in procuring such policy, which
representations change the character and nature
of the risk as contemplated in the policy so is-
sued by the company. All statements, covenants,
and representations contained in applications for
insurance shall never be held or construed to be
warranties, but shall be held to be representa-
tions only. Acts 1912, pp. 119, 130, 1927, p. 223.
Editor's Note.—Prior to its amendment by Acts 1927, this
section at its beginning had contained a provision requiring
all insurance companies, with certain exceptions, to make
a strict medical examination of persons applying for in-
surance. The provision and the phrase "for the purpose
of making such examinations" which appeared after the
phrase "such insurance companies," were stricken by the
amendment.
SECTION 13
Industrial Life, etc., Insurance
§ 2507. When laws apply.
License Fees of Agent?.—Because of this section, section
993(69), relating to taxation of insurance agents, is not ap-
plicable to industrial life insurance agents. Hoover v. Pate,
162 Ga. 206, 132 S. F- 763.
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SECTION 17
Amount of Recovery and Damages
§ 2545. Valued policy.
Limitation of Recovery Void.—Under this section a limi-
tation of the insurance recoverable to three- fourths of
the loss is void. Coffin v. London, etc., Ins. Co. (Ga.) r
27 Fed. (2d), 616, 617.
Contract Made in Another State.—This section does not
apply to a fire insurance contract made in another state
covering property located in Georgia. Coffin v. London,,
etc., Ins. Co. (Ga.), 27 Fed. (2d), 616.
§ 2549. (§ 2140.) Insurance companies shall
pay damages, when.
In General.—The evidence did not show bad faith on the
part of the company in refusing to pay the loss, and the
legal questions involved were sufficiently doubtful and im-
portant to justify the insurer in litigating the matter.
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 38 Ga. App. 99, 102,
142 S. F. 90.
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Recovery of such damages not prevented by failure to re-
cover full amount of claim. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Laney, 38 Ga. App. 1, 3, 142 S. F- 571.
Under the foregoing rulings, the plaintiff, as the ac-
knowledged assignee under a valid assignment of the
policy, was entitled to recover the full value thereof, and
demand made by him at the time of filing proof of loss
was sufficient to give rise to an action for the penalty pro-
vided by section 2549 of the Civil Code upon the refusal of
the company to pay the loss within sixty days from the
date of such demand. Whatever might have been the
purpose and intent of the company in seeking to protect
and adjudicate the rights of other parties owning an in-
terest in the proceeds of the policy, it can not be said as
a matter of law that the company was not guilty of bad
faith, in a legal sense, in refusing to pay the policy within
the time prescribed by the statute. American National
Ins. Co. v. Brantley, 38 Ga. App. 505, 144 S. F- 332.
Demand and Refusal.—See Globe, etc., Ins. Co. v. Jewell
-
Ivoudermilk Co., 36 Ga. App. 538, 137 S. F- 286, stating and
applying the principle as set out under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
In a suit upon an insurance policy, where the only alle-
gation as to a demand upon the insurance company for
payment of the loss was contained in the allegation as to
the filing of the proof of loss, which was filed prior to De-
cember 7, 1925, on which date the insurance company
acknowledged receipt of proof of loss and denied liability
and refused payment of loss, and where the suit was filed
on January 12, 1926, the petition did not allege a failure of
the insurance company to pay the loss within sixty days
after demand. Continental L,ife Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 36 Ga.
App. 540, 137 S. F. 403.
Same—When Insufficient to Support Verdict for Damages.
—In the instant case such a demand as required by the sec-
tion in order for the insured to recover damages in addi-
tion to the loss not being shown by the evidence, the ver-
dict for damages given by the section was unauthorized.
The judgment overruling the defendant's motion for a new
trial was affirmed on condition that such damages be writ-
ten off. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga. App. 497,
137 S. F- 277.
Bad Faith.—The "bad faith" referred to in section 299
may be of a different character from that which under cer-
tain conditions will authorize a recovery under this section.
Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817, 823, 138 S. F. 267.
An Exception to Section 4393.—In Copeland v. Dunehoo,
36 Ga. App. 817,_ 821, 138 S. F- 267, Bell, J., intimates
that this section is an exception to the provision in section
4393, which provides that "exemplary damages can never
be allowed in cases arising on contracts."
Contract Made in Another State.—This section does not
apply to contract made in another state under the laws
of that state covering property located in Georgia where
insured resides. Coffin v. L,ondon, etc., Ins. Co., (Ga.\
27 Fed. (2d), 616.
SECTION 18
Fidelity Insurance
§ 21559. Proceedings when loss occurs.
Cited in American Surety Co. v. Kea, 168 Ga. 228, 147
S. F. 386.
SECTION 19
Suits against Insurance Companies
Suits against insurance§ 2563. (§ 2145.)
companies.
Agents in County When Policy Issued. — A petition
against an insurance company, wherein it is alleged that at
the time of the issuance of the policy sued on the defendant
was represented by named agents in the county in which
the suit was filed, alleges jurisdiction in that county, as
provided in the section. Process issued thereon is valid.
Hagler v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 530, 137 S. F.
293.
When Service Made upon Former Agent.—The fact that
no legal service could be perfected upon the defendant in-
surance company in the instant case, because at the time
of filing the petition there was no agent of the defendant
in the county upon whom service could be legally perfected,
does not affect the validity of the process, but affects only
the validity of the service perfected by serving the former
agent in the county, who, at the time of service, was not
an agent of the company and upon whom legal service could
not be perfected. The process, therefore, being valid, was
subject to amendment. This case is distinguishable from
that of Union Marine Fire Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 31 Ga.
App. 676, 121 S. F- 849. Hagler v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 36
Ga. App. 530, 137 S. F. 293.
Not Applicable to Suit under Section, 2445.—This section
does not apply to a suit against insurer doing business
under 2446. Fxport Insurance Co. v. Womack, 165 Ga.
815, 816, 142 S. F. 851.
§ 2564. (§ 2146.) Service on non-resident, as-
sessment, etc., insurance companies.
Process under Section 2563 Perfected under This Section.
—Service upon the defendant company under process issued
in accordance with section 2563 can be perfected, under
this section by leaving a copy of the petition with the com-
pany's agent in the county, if there be one. Hagler v. Pa-
cific Fire Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 530, 137 S. F. 293.
ARTICLE 6
Railroads
SECTION 1
Incorporation and Powers
DIVISION 3
Corporate Powers of Railroads
§ 2585. (§ 2167.) Powers of such roads.
Use of Street.—As a general rule, a railroad company
must obtain the written consent of the municipal authori-
ties before it can lay a track on any street of a city in this
State. Tift v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 161 Ga. 432, 443, 131
S. F. 46.
§ 2585(1). Authority to build, relocate, etc.
Approval of Railroad Commission Required.—The right of
condemnation given by this and the following section can
not be exercised until the railroad commission of this State
shall first approve the taking of the property or right of
way designated for the public use or uses desired. Tift v.
Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 161 Ga. 432, 440, 131 S. F. 46.
§ 2589. (§ 2171). Change of general direction
and route.
Municipal Authority.—The provisions of ordinances were
held sufficient to express municipal authority to change
the location of track and employ the same in the
operation of the railroad, in 1,. & N. R. Co. v. Merchants
and Farmers Bank, 166 Ga. 310, 142 S. F. 506.
§ 2599(a). Park's Code.
See § 2585(1).
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DIVISION 4
Street Railroads
§ 2611. (§ 2181). Electric railroad companies
may sell light and power.
Applied in Southern Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 39 Ga. App.
588, 147 S. E. 800.
§ 2612. (§ 2182). May acquire property for
the purpose.
Applied in Southern Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 39 Ga. App.
588, 147 S. F- 800.
SECTION 2
Georgia Public Service Commission
§ 2618. (§ 2185.) Suspension of commissioner
from office.
Cited in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52.
§ 2630. (§ 2189). Duty of commissioners.
In General.—Under this section and § 2670(1) et seq., the
commission has the power to determine what are just and
reasonable rates and charges for transportation of pas-
sengers on each of the railroads doing business in this
State. Ga. Pub. Serv. Com. v. A. & W. P. R. Co.. 164
Ga. 822, 139 S. F- 725.
§ 2631. (§ 2190). To make rates.
Maximum intrastate passenger rates were fixed by the
Railroad Commission of Georgia, effective since Septem-
ber 1, 1920, at 3.6 cents per mile on railroads doing busi-
ness in this State. This rate is prima facie reasonable
and just. Ga. Pub. Serv. Com. v. A. & W. P. R. C. 164
Ga. 822, 139 S. F. 725.
Commutation Passenger Fares.—For .case holding that the
rates established deprived the carrier of due process of law
and the equal protection of the laws, see Ga. Pub. Serv.
Com. v. A. & W. P. R. Co., 164 Ga. 822, 139 S. F- 725,
§ 2663. Jurisdiction of the commission.
Regulating Baggage.—This section confers the power upon
the Public Service Commission to issue an order requiring
a terminal company to receive and check to its destination
•certain properly identified baggage. Atlanta Terminal Co.
v. Georgia Pub. Service Comm., 163 Ga. 897, 137 S. F. 556.
Confined to Particular Companies.—The Georgia Public
Service Commission has not jurisdiction under the provi-
sions of this and the following section to regulate and con-
trol the business of common carriers other than classes of
common carrier corporations specifically mentioned in
those sections; and the powers so conferred do not extend
to regulation of persons operating motor-buses on the high-
ways of the State. Fstes v. Perrv, 167 Ga. 902, 147 S. F-
370.
§ 2670(a). Park's Code.
See § 2670(1).
§ 2670(1). Name changed to public service
commission, authority, rights, etc.
Cited and applied in Atlanta Terminal Co. v. Georgii
Pub. Service Comm., 163 Ga. 897, 137 S. F. 556, holding that
the commission has power to issue order respecting re-
ceiving and checking baggage.
SECTION 3
Operation of Railroads
§ 2674. (§ 2221.) Extent of such crossings.
-Railroad Owes No Duly to Maintain Highway.—A rail-
road company is under no duty to maintain a public high-
way, which traverses its right of way, in a condition safe
for travel at a point where the highway is not crossed by
the company's tracks or at a point not so close to such
crossing as to render the repair of the highway at this
point "necessary for a traveler to get off, and on the
crossing safely and conveniently." Hall v. Georgia South-
ern, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 786, 131 S. F- 187.
§ 2677(b). Park's Code.
See § 2677(2).
§ 2677(2). Blow-post; signal of crossing; look-
out and exercise of care.
Failure to Comply with Section as Negligence.—If the
failure to comply with the section is not the proximate
cause of the injury, for example where no post is erected
but the engineer nevertheless blew the whistle in accord-
ance with the legal requirements, the presumption of neg-
ligence is conclusively rebutted. Stanford v. Southern R.
Co., 36 Ga. App. 319, 136 S. F. 804.
Purpose.—The act of 1918 (this and the following sections)
which supersedes §§ 2675-2677 of the Civil Code, relied on
by counsel, in so far as it limits the speed of trains, ap-
plies only when they are approaching crossings, is de-
signed to protect people from injury to person and prop-
erty only when using the crossings. Harrison v. Central
of Georgia Railway Co., 39 Ga. App. 366, 367, 147 S. F- 177.
§ 2677(16). Elimination of grade crossings.—
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assem-
bly of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby en-
acted by authority of the same, that from and
after the passage of this Act, when in the judg-
ment of the State Highway Department of Geor-
gia it is practicable and, in the interest of public
safety, reasonably necessary, the State Highway
Department may authorize and direct the elimi-
nation of grade-crossings on the State road sys-
tem; and that when in the judgment of the
board of commissioners of roads and revenues of
any county in the State of Georgia, or of any
other authority having jurisdiction over and con-
trol of the public roads of that county, it is prac-
ticable and, in the interest of public safety, rea-
sonably necessary, such board of commissioners
of roads and revenues, or such other authority
having jurisdiction over and control of the pub-
lic roads of the county, may authorize and direct
the elimination of grade-crossings on the public
roads of said county; provided, that any such
elimination of a grade crossing shall be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Act, and
that no elimination of a crossing at grade of a
public county road (as distinguished from a road
which constitutes a part of the State highway
system) shall be eliminated under the provisions
of this Act, upon direction or order of any such
county authority, until and unless the State
Highway Department of Georgia shall approve
any such order of any such county authority, and
shall concur therein. Acts 1927, p. 299.
§ 2677(17). Same—Definitions.—For the pur-
poses of this Act, the following definitions shall
apply:
"Grade crossing." A crossing at grade of a
public road intersecting a track or tracks of a
railroad or railroads.
"Department." The State Highway Depart-
ment of Georgia as constituted under the laws
of this State.
"Boards." The boards of commissioners of
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roads and revenues of the several counties of the
State, or any other duly constituted authority
having jurisdiction over and control of the pub-
lic roads in the counties, in and for the control of
which such board or other authority is consti-
tuted under the laws of the State of Georgia.
'
"Railroads." All steam-railroads and interurban
electric or gasoline railways of more than twenty
miles in length, which are operated as common
carriers, but shall not include street-railways op-
erated in whole or in part within the corporate
limits of a city or town, nor logging railroads not
operated as common carriers.
"Overpass." A bridge and approaches thereto
for carrying highway traffic over a railroad.
"Underpass." A bridge .and approaches there-
to for carrying a railroad over a highway or
other public road which is within the purview of
this Act.
This Act may be cited as the "Grade-crossing
Elimination Act."
§ 2677(18). Same—Notice to railroad com-
pany; adoption of layout.—Whenever the de-
partment, with reference to State roads, or a
board, with reference to county public roads,
shall direct the elimination of any grade-cross-
ing by means of an underpass, overpass, or by re-
location, or shall direct the guarding of a grade-
crossing by an automatic signaling device,
prompt notice of the order in such regard shall
be given to the railroad company or companies
involved; and within ten (10) days thereafter
the representative of the department or board
and of the railroad or railroads involved shall
meet, and thereafter, within a reasonable time,
adopt a layout mutually satisfactory for the con-
struction of a grade separation structure or au-
tomatic signalling device. Any such layout so
adopted by or through the representatives of a
board and of a railroad shall be submitted to the
department for its approval, and no work looking
to the elimination of the grade-crossing pursuant
to the plans so adopted shall be begun until and
unless the department concur therein and ap-
prove the same, or unless the railroad or rail-
roads involved may agree that its or their por-
tion of the expense involved in the elimination of
such grade-crossing shall not be charged against
the maximum sum which any one railroad may
be required to expend in any one calendar year
under any or all of the provisions of this Act, as
hereinafter provided. Failing to agree within a
reasonable time, then the department or (as the
case may be) a board may order the railroad or
railroads involved to proceed with the construc-
tion of such grade separation structure as it may
be required, and as indicated in the plans and
specifications accompanying its order; provided,
however, that no order of a board entered in
such regard shall be binding until and unless the
same be concurred in and approved by the de-
partment. It shall be the duty of said railroad or
railroads to begin work on any such grade sepa-
ration structure within sixty (60) days after the
receipt of a binding order to that effect, and to
complete the structure within a reasonable time;
provided, however, that in no event shall the
railroad or railroads be required, without its con-
[13
sent, to do the actual physical work in providing
approaches by fill to an overhead structure or the
excavating beneath the supporting structure of
an underpass or the approaches thereto, but the
cost of such work shall be considered a part of
the cost of the grade elimination, whether ac-
tually performed by the railroad or the depart-
ment or board, and such cost shall be appor-
tioned as hereinafter provided.
§ 2677(19). Same—Agreement to apportion
work.—The department or board may, by agree-
ment with any railroad company, apportion the
work to be done in the construction of any grade
separation structure, between the railroad com-
pany or companies and contractors acting under
the control and supervision of the department or
of the board; provided, that whenever the de-
partment or a board, or any of its or their em-
ployees or contra [contractors] acting under the
orders of the department or board;, or of its or
their contractors, shall go upon or be upon the
right-of-way of the railroad company, they shall
be subject to any reasonable rules and regula-
tions of such railroad made for the protection of
its traffic, employees, and passengers.
§ 2677(20). Same—Space for additional track.—
When either an overpass or an underpass is con-
structed under the provisions of this Act, the
same shall be so designed and constructed as to
be sufficient to accommodate at least one rail-
road-track in addition to those existing at the
time of said construction, unless this requirement
is waived by the railroad.
§ 2677(21). Same—Division of cost.—The di-
vision of the costs of elimination of grade-cross-
ings by means of grade separation structures
shall be as follows:
(a) The total cost of surveys and of the prepa-
ration of the plans and specifications, and of the
estimates of the cost thereof, shall be paid, one
half by the department or county board, and one
half by the railroad or railroads involved.
(b) The total cost of a grade-crossing elimi-
nation by the use of an overpass or underpass,
including the establishment of drainage, shall be
paid, one half by the department or (as the case
may be) the board, and one half by the railroad
or railroads involved; provided, that the con-
struction expense in which the railroad or rail-
roads involved may be required to participate
shall be confined to the grade-separation structure
and the approaches thereto not exceeding three
hundred (300) feet on each side from the center
line of the track or tracks as measured along the
center of the highways. The approaches shall
not be regarded as extending farther than from
grade point to grade point, and the railroad shall
not be charged with any cost of paving, except
on the flooring of an overpass.
(c) In no plan providing either for an over-
pass or underpass shall the department or board
interfere with or change the grade or alignment
of the tracks of any railroad, or relocate the line
of the railroad, without its consent. Nothing
herein, however, shall prevent the department or
county board and the railroad or railroads in-
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volved from mutually agreeing to the change of
the grade or alignment of any track or tracks, or
the relocation of the same, and in case of such
an agreement the expense of making such
change shall be borne equally by the department
or board and the railroad or railroads involved;
provided, that such change in the railroad-tracks
has been made at the written request of the de-
partment or county board.
§ 2677(22). Same — Automatic signaling de-
vice, required when.—Whenever in the judgment
of the department the installation of an auto-
matic signaling device may be reasonably re-
quired at a grade-crossing of a State road, and
whenever in the judgment of a board the in-
stallation of an automatic signaling device may
be reasonably required at a grade-crossing of a
county road, the department or (as the case may
be) a board may require, by written order, the
railroad or railroads involved to provide such au-
tomatic signaling device as may be appropriate.
In any such case the expense of acquiring and
installing such device shall be divided equally
between the department or county board and the
railroad or railroads involved, but the railroad or
railroads involved shall at its or their own ex-
pense maintain the same.
§ 2677(23). Same—Underpass or overpass un-
safe or inadequate; improvement.—Whenever in
the judgment of the department exercised in re-
spect of a State road, or in the judgment of a
county board exercised in respect of a county
public road, an existing underpass or overpass,
constructed prior to the approval of this Act, is
unsafe or inadequate to serve the traffic for
which it was constructed, then the department,
when State roads be involved, or the board,
when county public roads be involved, may pro-
ceed to bring about the improvement or better-
ment of the existing structure. And in any such
event the procedure and division of the cost of
construction and the cost of the maintenance of
such improvement or betterment, shall be as
herein set forth in section 2677(18), (19), (20),
(21) and (24) of this Act.
§ 2677(24). Same—Maintenance of overpass,
etc.—After the construction of an overpass or
underpass, it shall be the duty of the department
in the case of State roads, and of the county
board in the case of county public roads, to
maintain at its or their own expense the drain-
age, surface, and pavement of the highway and
bridge, as well as the approaches and guard-rails,
if any; except that when an overpass is con-
structed with a floor of wood, then the railroad
or railroads shall maintain such floor. It shall
be the duty of the railroad or railroads to main-
tain at its expense the foundations, piers, abut-
ments, and superstructures of all underpasses
and overpasses located within the limits of its
right-of-way.
§ 2677(25) Same—Selection of material.—The
railroad company or companies involved shall
have the right to select the material to be used
in the construction of the grade-separation struc-
ture, provided that such material shall not be
less durable than creosoted timber of a quality at
least equal to that required by the standard
specifications of the department for its own
bridge work. Neither the department nor any
county board shall require any railroad company
to construct an underpass of a design, specifica-
tion, or plan, the strength of which, in the judg-
ment of the railroad company, shall not be suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of its traffic
thereover. In no event shall any railroad com-
pany be required to participate in the cost of the
construction of any overhead bridge upon a basis
or proportion in excess of the cost of a bridge
that would be suitable to carry ordinary highway
traffic according to the standards of the depart-
ment, which standards are now for a strength
sufficient to support a fifteen-ton roller.
§ 2677(26). Same
—
Judicial review of order,
etc., of department or board.—Any judgment,
decision, or order of the department, or of any
county board, whether entered upon any ques-
tion involving the practicability, advisability, or
necessity of eliminating any crossing at grade or
involving the apportionment of cost of construc-
tion, or any other question arising under this
Act, shall be subject to judicial review. Pending
the final determination of any proceeding at law
or in equity so instituted, the department or any
county board may, without prejudice to either
party, and at its own risk, proceed with the work
of eliminating the crossing at grade involved in
such litigation, subject to final judgment of the
court as to all questions involved in such litiga-
tion.
§ 2677(27). Same—Special agreements as to re-
location, etc.—Nothing in this Act shall be con^
strued to prevent such department or county board
from reaching special agreements with railroad
companies providing for grade-crossing elimina-
tion by means of relocation of either the railroad
or highway involved, or by other means and ar-
ranging for joint participation in the cost of such
elimination on an agreed basis.
§ 2677(28). Same—Use of right of way.—In
all cases where grade-separation structures are
built hereunder, the railroad shall permit the
use, free of cost, of so much of its right-of-way
as may be necessary.
§ 2677(29). Same—Cost where different rail-
roads involved.—Where more than one railroad
is involved in the separation of crossings at grade,
that portion of the cost of construction and
maintenance which this Act provides shall be
paid by the railroad or railroads shall be
apportioned between such railroads by agree-
ment; and in case they can not agree, the same
shall be fixed by the department or (as the case
may be) by the county board, after a hearing,
subject to a judicial review as provided in section
11, 2677(26) of this Act.
§ 2677(30). Same—Crossings closed; status of
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crossings in case of relocation.—All existing
grade-crossings replaced by grade-separation
structures, or avoided by relocation of highways
and no longer used by the general public, shall,
where possible, be closed, and where continued
shall be private crossings and not subject to the
provisions of the statutes of Georgia relating to
railroad-crossings.
§ 2677(31). Same—Limit of annual expendi-
ture of railroad.—No railroad shall be required
to expend in any one calendar year, under any
or all of the provisions of this Act, a sum in ex-
cess of $40,000.00; provided that no railroad
whose gross earnings from both inter and intra-
state business in the State of Georgia, as re-
ported to the Public Service Commission of
Georgia for the preceding calendar year, did not
-exceed $2,000,000.00 shall be required without
its consent to expend in any one calendar year,
under the provisions of this Act, a sum in excess
of $3,000.00. In any case where the proportion-
ate part to be paid by a railroad for the elimina-
tion of a crossing at grade, when added to
amounts theretofore expended and /or for which
obligations have been incurred, would exceed the
amount which a railroad may be required to ex-
pend under the provisions of this section, the de-
partment may pay the excess over and above the
aggregate of payments legally permissible for
requirement of the railroad, and thereafter collect
the same with legal interest during succeeding
calendar year or years; but nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed as requiring any rail-
road company to expend in grade-elimination
•costs and protection in any one calendar year
more than the applicable amount as hereinbefore
specified.
§§ 2698(b)-269S(bb). Park's Code.
See §§ 2677(16) -2677(31).
SECTION 6
Railroads as Common Carriers, and Herein of
Other Carriers
§ 2711. (§ 2263). Definition.
A person undertaking to transport goods as a private
carrier and not as a common carrier is bound only to ordi-
nary diligence. The plaintiff in this case, having sued the
defendant merely as a private carrier, can not complain
•that the court instructed the jury that the defendant was
charged with the exercise of ordinary care only. More-
over, the evidence authorized the inference that the de-
fendant was only a private carrier, and there is no assign-
ment that the court erred in failing to submit the question
of whether he was a common carrier. Bloomberg- Michael
Furniture Co. v. Urquhart, 38 Ga. App. 304, 143 S. E-
789.
§ 2712. (§ 2264.) Common carrier.
III. DEFENSES.
Generally.—See Central, etc., R. Co. v. Council Bros., 36
Ga. App. 573, 137 S. E. 569, stating in part the rule set out
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Act of God—Distinguished from Unavoidable Accident.—
An act of God means any act produced by physical causes
which are inevitable. In other words, unavoidable acci-
dents are the same as the acts of God. Central, etc., R.
Co. v. Council Bros., 36 Ga. App. 573, 137 S. E- 569; Fish v.
Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. Dec. 393. These cases seem
to conflict with Harmony Grove Tel. Co. v. Potts, 24 Ga.
App. 178, 180, 100 S. E. 236, where it wis said that a dis-
tinction exists between an act of God and an unavoidable
accident. It appears though that in the Fish case, and in
the Central of Ga. Ry. Co. case, only phenomena were with-
in the contemplation of the courts, while in the Telephone
Co. case the court was considering not only natural acci-
dents, which were appropriately classed as acts of God, but
also "accidents arising from the negligence or act of man,"
which are classed as unavoidable accidents. It is submitted
that unavoidable accidents is a broad and comprehensive
classification, including not only "the negligence or act of
man," but also "natural accidents." The so called acts of
God are as unavoidable as the acts of man.
—
Ed. Note.
§ 2713. (§ 2265.) Bailee must show no con-
curring negligence.
Necessary Proof When Accident Result of Vis Major.—
The rule applicable, were it alleged that the damage had
been brought about by some vis major, such as an earth-
quake, lightning, or flood, in which the human element
does not and could not enter, would seem to be that where
it is alleged that the damage was thus occasioned, it is not
necessary for the carrier to show that such an occurrence
was in a legal sense an act of God, and its defense would be
complete upon proof being made that its own negligence did
not contribute to the loss thus caused by an occurrence over
which it had no control. Southern R. Co. v. Standard
Growers Exch., 34 Ga. App. 534, 130 S. E. 373.
§ 2713(1). Proof of injury, prima facie evidence
of want of reasonable skill and care, applies to
motor busses.—In all actions against railroad
companies for damages done to persons or prop-
erty, proof of injury inflicted by the running of
locomotives or cars of such company, shall be
prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable
skill and care on the part of the servants of the
company in reference to such injury. The pro-
visions of this bill shall also apply to all persons,
firms or corporations operating busses for hire.
This section shall also apply to passengers of
railroad companies. Acts 1929, p. 316, § 1.
§ 2714. (§ 2266). Carrier of passengers.
Applied in Georgia Railway and Power Company v. Gil-
bert, 39 Ga. App. 56, 146 S. E- 33.
§ 2726, (§ 2276). Effect of notice to limit.
A contract between a shipper and a carrier for the ship-
ment of goods by sea from a port in this State to a port
in the State of Florida is in no event to be governed by
the provisions of this section. Bloomberg- Michael Furni-
ture Co. v. Urquhart, 38 Ga. App. 304, 143 S. E- 789.
§ 2730. (§ 2279.) Time of responsibility.
Ending of Responsibility as Carrier.—See Central, etc., R.
Co. v. Leverette, 34 Ga. App. 304, 129 S. E- 292, following
the principle stated in paragraph two under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
SECTION 7
Connecting Roads; Receipt and Delivery of
Freight, etc.
§ 2770. (§ 2316). Railroads to make prompt
settlements for overcharges.
Applied in Lumberman's Co. v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co.,
37 Ga. App. 176, 139 S. E- 116.
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§ 2774. Transportation of perishable products.
Cited in Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Meister, 37 Ga.
App. 570, 572, 140 S. E- 905.
§ 2780.
etc.
SECTION 8
Injuries by Railroads
(§ 2321.) Damages by running of cars,
I. IN GENERAL.
Constitutionality.—The presumption of negligence raised
by this section is unreasonable and arbitrary, and violates
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Western & A. R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 49 S.
Ct. 445.
Presumption of Proximate Cause.—Under the section there
arises, upon proof of injury to a person by a servant of a
railroad company, not only a presumption of negligence of
the company, but a presumption that the company's negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the injury. Western, etc.,
Railroad v. Dobbs, 36 Ga. App. 516, 137 S. E- 407. And a
charge to the jury which amounts to an instruction to this
effect is not error. Id.
Section Modifies General Rule as to Liability of Master.—
The general rule that the master is liable for the acts of his
servants when done within the scope of their employment,
whether the act is wilful or otherwise, is modified as to
railway cases, by this section. Furney v. Tower, 36 Ga.
App. 698, 137 S. E. 850.
For What Acts Liable.—Before the presumption of negli-
gence against a railway company under this section can
arise it must be shown that the act complained of was per-
petrated by the servant in the conduct of the business of
his employment, as the section should be construed with
section 4413. Latimore v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga.
App. 263, 129 S. F- 108. But it is immaterial whether the
act done was in the scope of the servant's particular em-
ployment. Furney v. Tower, 36 Ga. App. 698, 137 S. F. 850.
II. APPLICATION OF RULE.
Injury to Dog.—In Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v.
Buchannon, 35 Ga. App. 156, 157, 132 S. F- 253, it was said
by Luke, J., who delivered the opinion: "A prima facie
case was made for plaintiffs by proof that the dog was
killed by the defendant's locomotive, and there should have
been a recovery unless the company made it appear that its
agents exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and dil-
igence. It was the duty of the company, through its
delegated agents and employees, to keep a lookout ahead of
the train and to use ordinary and reasonable diligence to
discover the dog upon the track and to avoid injuring it."
Applies to Street Railways.—This section applies to street-
railways. Greeson v. Bailey, 167 Ga. 638, 639, 146 S. E- 490;
Thomas v. Bailey, 167 Ga. 638, 639, 146 S. F. 490, citing
Corday v. Sav., etc., Ry Co., 117 Ga. 464, 43 S. F- 755.
A presumption of negligence proximately causing an in-
jury arises against a railroad company upon proof that the
injury was caused by the operation of the defendant's
train. It is not necessary, in order to enable the plain-
tiff to avail himself of this presumption, for him to prove,
otherwise than by showing that his injury was caused by
the operation of the defendant's train, that the presumed
negligence of the defendant proximately caused the injury.
Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Dobbs, 36 Ga. App. 516,
137 S. E. 407; Western, etc., Railroad v. Thompson, 38 Ga.
App. 599, 144 S. F. 831.
Applied in Georgia Railway and Power Company v. Gil-
bert, 39 Ga. App. 56, 146 S. F- 33.
Cited in Western, etc., Railroad v. Peterson, 168 Ga. 259,
268, 147 S. E- 513.
III. PRACTICE AND PLEADING.
Charge Improperly Construing Section.—Where the trial
judge charged the jury as follows: "I charge you that the
burden of proof in this case rests upon the plaintiff, that is
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to satisfy the minds
of the jury by the preponderance of the testimony of all the
material allegations set out in the original petition in this
case and the amendments that have been made and al-
lowed by the court in the trial of this case," it was held
that this excerpt deprived the plaintiff of the benefit of the
presumption arising in proper cases under the section and
was erroneous. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Bridwell, 34 Ga.
App. 77, 84, 128 S. E. 238.
§ 2781. (§ 2322.) Consent or negligence.
Effect of Contributory Negligence.—Railroad company
held liable to person injured while walking along pathway
near train though his negligence was a contributing cause
of his injury. Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran (Ga.), 29
Fed. (2d) 206, 207.
Comparative Negligence Law.—Where a trial judge charged
the jury in substance that where both parties were negli-
gent, but the plaintiff could not have avoided injury by the
exercise of ordinary care, and the defendant's was greater
than that of the plaintiff, that the rule of comparative neg-
ligence and consequent diminution of damages was appli-
cable, it was held upon appeal, that this instruction did not
contravene the rule laid lown in Americus, etc., R. Co. v.
Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. E- 105, nor did it exclude the de-
fense that the plaintiff's injury was brought about by his
own failure to exercise ordinary care. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Anderson, 35 Ga. App. 292, 133 S. E- 63.
Duty to Charge on Request.—Where the evidence author-
ized the inference that the plaintiff was negligent, it was
error prejudicial to the defendants not to comply with a
written request to charge in effect the rule of this section.
Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134 S. E. 824.
And a charge that the damage which the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover should "be reduced as you may find
their negligence to be" is not a full and clear statement of
the rule. Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134
S. E- 824.
Applied in Seaboard Air -Line Ry. Co. v. Sarman, 38 Ga.
App. 637, 144 S. E- 810.
§ 2782. Injury by coemployee.
of neg-
section,
Conclusiveness of Presumption.—The presumption
ligence against the employer, arising under this
from death of a railroad employee, is not conclusive, and, if
rebutted by uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence, the
court should direct the verdict for the defendant. Walker
v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 725.
In an action for death of a railroad employee, supposedly
killed when handle of alleged defective jack under freight
car flew violently up and struck him under the chin, the
presumption of negligence, arising under this section, was
conclusively rebutted, and the verdict for the defendant was
properly directed. Walker v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., 8
Fed. (2d), 725.
Compared with Federal Employer's Liability Act.—The
Federal employer's liability act does not contain, the pro-
vision embodied in this section to the effect that no re-
covery shall be had '"if the person killed or injured brought
about his death or injury by his own carelessness amount-
ing to a failure to- exercise ordinary care." Under the
Federal employer's liability act, "where it appears that the
negligence of the defendant and that of the plaintiff con-
curred in producing the injury, the negligence of both par-
ties is to be deemed the proximate cause of the injury."
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Solomon, 37 Ga. App. 737,
738, 141 S. F. 917, citing L. & N. R. Co. v. Paschal, 145
Ga. 521(1), 89 S. E- 620.
§ 2788.
ployees.
(§ 2324.) Receiver's liability to em-
Consent of Appointing Court Not Requisite to Suit.—This
section and the following section (section 2789) are excep-
tions to the general rule that before a suit can be main-
tained against a receiver appointed by the courts of this
State it is necessary for the consent of the appointing court
to be obtained. Bugg v. Lang, 35 Ga. App. 704, 134 S. E-
623. And no consent is necessary by the express terms of
the Judicial Code (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, section 1048)
when the appointment is by a Federal Court. Id.
Effect upon Federal Receivers.—The authority extended
under the Federal statute for suits in the State courts
against Federal receivers is paramount, and is in no wise
affected by this section. Bugg v. Lang, 35 Ga. App. 704, 134
S. E. 623. See also Eddy v. Lafayette, 49 Fed. 807, 1 C. C.
A. 441.
Lien Subject to Debt Due United States.—A debt of the
railroad to the United States has priority over a lien
created by this section. Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville,
etc.. Co. (Ga.), 30 Fed. (2d) 525.
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SECTION 10
Lien against Railroads
Liens for wages of railroad§ 2793, (§ 2329).
employees.
Attaches to Property as Employees Only.—The special
lien given by this section attaches to the property of their
employers only. Poss Brothers Lumber Co. v. Haynie, 37
Ga. App. 60, 139 S. F. 127.
So where an owner of timber engages another, as inde-
pendent contractor, to remove the timber from the woods
and saw it into lumber, for a consideration of so much per-
thousand feet, according to dimensions and specifications to
be furnished from time to time by the owner, and where
the owner reserves no control of the business thus to be
carried on by the other contracting party, and does not
^interfere and assume such control, servants employed by
the latter for the purpose of executing the contract are not
employees of the owner of the timber, and lumber manu-
factured from such timber is not subject to a lien in favor
of such employees. Poss Brothers L,umber Co. v. Haynie,
37 Ga. App. 60, 139 S. F- 127.
Priorities.
—L,iens under this section and §§ 2/94-2796 for
claims incurred prior to receivtership, though having
priority over the mortgage and other debts of the railroad
company, are subject to a debt due to the United States.
Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville, etc., Co. (Ga.). 30 Fed.
(2d) 525.
The general scheme of priorities to apply in the dis-
tribution of the proceeds of sale of the railroad company's
property is as follows: (1) Court costs, expenses of sale,
compensation, and expenses of officers of court, including
receivers, attorneys, and special master. (2) Taxes, state,
county, and municipality. (3) Receiver's certificates. (4)
Other debts of the receivership authorized by the court,
not including unauthorized loans of cash, but including
tort liabilities. (5) The debt due the United States. (6)
Unbarred liens under the state laws for wages, supplies,
and damages due by the corporation before receivership.
(7) The bond mortgage. (8) Other debts due by the cor-
poration, including any unauthorized loans to the receiver,
which can be shown to have been used for the benefit of
the corporation. Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville, etc., R.
Co. (Ga.), 30 Fed. (2d) 525, 530.
SECTION 11
Suits Against Railroads and Electric Companies.
§ 2798, (§ 2334.) Must be sued where action
originates; definition of "electric companies."
See notes to § 2259.
Venue of Continuous Tort to (Passenger.—This law is ap-
plicable in a case where a passenger brings suit in tort
against a railroad company for negligence in carrying her
beyond her destination in a particular county and through
that county into another state, where further damages re-
sult from the continued wrong; and where the railroad com-
pany has an agent in the county where the tort originated,
the venue of a suit for such injury is exclusively in that
county. Southern R. Co. v. Clark, 162 Ga. 616, 134 S. F.
605.
ARTICLE 7
Telegraph and Telephone Companies
SECTION 4
Suits against Telegraph Companies
§ 2814. (§ 2348). Telegraph companies, where
suable.
See notes to § 2259.
ARTICLE 8
Trust Companies
SECTION 2
Their Powers
§ 2817. Corporate powers.
Power to Contract.—The power to make contracts given
by this section cannot be held to authorize all sorts of
contracts, because many special sorts are named after
wards, some with limitations and conditions. It is no
more than the general power to contract for the proper
corporate purposes elsewhere set forth, and does not give
a trust company authority to guarantee the paper of banks
for which it acts as financial agent. In re Bankers' Trust
Co. (Ga.), 27 Fed. (2d) 912, 913.
Cited in Mobley v. Minter, 38 Ga. App. 798, 812, 145 S.
F- 894.
I
SECTION 5
Act of 1927
§§ 2820(a) -2820 (j). Park's Code.
See §§ 2821(15)-2821(25).
§ 2821(15). Definitions. — The term "trust
company" shall be construed to mean a corpora-
tion having power to execute trusts, and to act
in any fiduciary capacity, whether such corpora-
tion has been heretofore organized under the pre-
vious acts of the General Assembly of this State
or as hereafter organized under this act or any
amendment thereto. The term "person" as used
in this act shall be construed to mean an individ-
ual, a partnership, or an incorporated association.
The word "superintendent," as used in this Act
refers to and shall mean the Superintendent of
banks. Acts 1927, p. 344.
§ 2821(16). Unauthorized use of the word
trust company.—No corporation or person, ex-
cept a corporation duly authorized to do a trust
business in this State, shall as a designation or
name or part of a designation or name, under
which business is or may be conducted make use
of the word "trust" in any corporate, artificial,
or business name or title, or make use of any of-
fice sign at the place where such business is
transacted having thereon any word or words
indicating that such is the place or office of a
trust company. And the use or circulation of any
letterheads, billheads, blank forms, notes, receipts,
certificates, circulars, or any written or printed
or partly written and partly printed paper what-
ever having thereon any word or words indicat-
ing that such business is the business of a trust
company, is prohibited to any corporation or per-
son except those duly authorized under the laws
of this State to do a trust business. Except as
herein otherwise indicated, the provisions of this
Act shall apply to all trust companies heretofore
incorporated or doing business at the date of the
approval of this Act as well as those hereafter
incorporated or established. Provided, however,
that any corporation regularly chartered and or-
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ganized and engaged in business on the date of
the approval of this Act may continue to use its
corporate name, but where the words "trust" or
"trust company" are a part of such corporate
name, the corporation shall on all signs, adver-
tisements, letterheads, billheads, and other printed
forms, use in connection with its corporate name
the words, "Not under State Supervision."
§ 2821(17). Duties and powers of the superin-
tendent of banks.—Except as may hereafter be
prescribed by law, the Superintendent of Banks,
in addition to the duties and powers prescribed
in this Act, shall have, possess, and exercise all
that jurisdiction, control, supervision, and author-
ity over trust companies organized or doing busi-
ness under this Act, which he now has or may
hereafter be given by the laws of this State over
State banks. He shall require reports and make
examinations of said trust companies in like man-
ner as is now required of State banks. Trust
companies for this examination, supervision, and
control shall pay to the Superintendent of Banks
the same fees that State banks are now or may
hereafter be required to pay. The funds derived
from this source shall be used to defray the ex-
penses of the Department of Banking.
§ 2821(18). Guaranty.—That no trust company
shall engage in or guarantee the payment of bonds
and notes secured by mortgage or deed to real
estate within the State of Georgia, or secured by
pledge of any choses in action, unless it shall first
set apart an amount of its assets, the same to be
fixed by the Superintendent of Banks, but in no
event to be less than ten thousand ($10,000.00)
dollars, as a guaranty fund, which said guaranty
fund shall be maintained, unimpaired, or invested
in bonds of the United States, or of this State, or
of any political subdivision of this State, when
and as required to do so by the said superintend-
ent, so long as any guaranty is outstanding. The
superintendent shall have the right to designate
the place where said guaranty fund shall be de-
posited. This restriction shall be in addition to
the restrictions now imposed by law on trust com-
panies doing business in this State.
§ 2821(19). Trust companies receiving depos-
its.—That no trust company shall be allowed to
receive deposits of any character unless and un-
til its charter shall have been amended so as to
confer upon it banking powers and privileges;
and when such amendments shall have been ob-
tained and the Superintendent of Banks shall have
issued his permit for said company to receive de-
posits and do business as a bank, it shall be sub-
ject to all the provisions of the law relating to
banks. Provided, that trust companies heretofore
incorporated under the laws of Georgia, with
power in their original or amended charters to
receive deposits, and that are now conducting
their business and reporting to the Superintend-
ent of Banks, shall not be required to further
amend their charters in order to continue con-
ducting such business, but they shall be subject
to all the provisions of banking laws of this
State, subjecting them to the inspection and su-
pervision of the Superintendent of Banks, and
their dealing in stocks, bonds, and other securi-
[
ties shall be subject to inspection and approval
of the Superintendent of Banks.
§ 2821(20). Dealing in stocks and bonds.—
Trust companies operating as investment bank-
ers, and maintaining departments for the pur-
pose [purchase?] and sale of securities, may pur-
chase for resale whole issues or parts of issues
of stocks, and debentures of industrial, railroad,
and public-service corporations, and other invest-
ment securities, and may resell and deal in the
same under such regulations as may be prescribed
by the Superintendent of Banks.
§ 2821(21). Amendment to charters.—That the
method of obtaining an amendment to the char-
ter of trust company, so as to confer upon it
oanking powers and privileges, and authorize it
to receive deposits, shall be the same as that pro-
vided for the amendment of the charter of a bank
by sections 1 to 7, inclusive, of article 19 of the
Banking Act of 1919, except that the amendment
must be authorized by the vote of two-thirds of
the outstanding capital stock. When the charter
shall have been amended, the stockholders shall
be liable to depositors to the same extent as are
the stockholders of a bank under article 18 of
the Banking Act.
§ 2821(22). Surrender of authority to receive
deposits, etc.—Any trust company that has here-
tofore or may hereafter acquire the right to re-
ceive deposits, and thereby become subject to the
provisions of this Act, shall have the right to sur-
render to the Secretary of State its authority to
receive deposits and to do a banking business,
without impairing in any respect its charter rights
to conduct a trust company business, and there-
upon shall cease to have the right to receive de-
posits, but may conduct business as a trust com-
pany as though it had never had the right to re-
ceive deposits or to do a banking business.
§ 2821(23). Time in which amendment ob-
tained.—Trust companies which have not acquired
banking powers, but are receiving savings or
other deposits, shall be allowed twelve months
from the date of the approval of this Act to se-
cure amendments to their respective charters,
conferring such powers, or to pay off and settle
with their depositors.
§ 2821(24). Penalty.—Any person who as an
officer of any corporation or in his individual ca-
pacity shall violate the provisions of this Act, or
who shall knowingly permit the violation thereof
by any corporation with which he is connected,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 2821(25). Certain corporations not affected
by this Act.—Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to affect, embrace, or include, or to bring
within the operation of this Act any corporation
chartered by the Superior Court, having trust
company powers and without banking powers,
and which does not receive deposits subject to
check, and which invests its funds in loans on real
estate.
Approved August 25, 1927.
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ARTICLE 9
Corporations Created by Superior Court
SECTION 1
How Incorporated and Dissolved.
§ 2822. (§ 2349). Special terms to grant char-
ters.
Cited in McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond, etc., Co., 168
Ga. 145, 148, 147 S. F- 102.
Superior courts may create§ 2823. (§ 2350.)
what corporations.
Constitutional Provision.—In 1912 the constitution was
amended so as to provide that the General Assembly "may
confer this authority to grant corporate powers and privi-
leges to private companies to the judges of the superior
court in vacation." It will be noted that at present the su-
perior courts receive their power to create corporations by
virtue of the constitution. This power, however, "shall be"
exercised in the manner which the legislature "shall pre-
scribe by law." Free Gift Society v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 857,
864, 137 S. F- 382.
Courts May Not Delegate Power.—There is no provision
of our constitution or statute law authorizing the superior
court to commit its delegated powers to a corporation which
the court creates by virtue of the power given it by the con-
stitution and law, so as to authorize the corporation thus
created to itself charter other corporations without regard
to the provisions of our law concerning the acts necessary
to be done before the court itself can create such corpo-
rations. Free Gift Society v. Fdwards, 163 Ga. 857, 864, 137
S. F. 382.
Cited in McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond, etc., Co., 168 Ga.
145, 148, 147 S. F. 102.
§ 2823(a). Park's Code.
See § 2823(1).
§ 2823 (a-l). Park's Code.
See § 2192(1).
§ 2823(1). Charters granted in vacation.
Amendment after Publication. — The order of incorpora-
tion is not void where an amendment of the petition, chang-
ing the period of incorporation from thirty to twenty years,
is permitted after publication, on the ground that such an
order was not based upon an application that had been pub-
lished as required by law. Rogers v. Toccoa Fleet. Power
Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S. F- 272.
Act Changed Rule.—Prior to the passage and approval of
this act the judge of the superior court was without juris-
diction to grant a charter to a private corporation in vaca-
tion in a county other than where the application was pend-
ing. An order purporting to grant a charter in vacation and
in another county is a mere nullity. Rogers v. Toccoa
Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131 S. F. 517.
SECTION 2
Schools, Churches, Societies, etc.
§ 2824. (§ 2351). Incorporation of schools,
churches, etc.
Presumption of Incorporation.—While a suit cannot be
maintained against an unincorporated church, such action
being a mere nullity, in an action against the church itself,
where the petition is silent as to incorporation and the
church answers without raising the question, it will be
presumed, in the absence of demurrer, that the defendant
Ga.—10 ' [
church had become incorporated under the provisions of
this section. Zeigler v. Perry, 37 Ga. App. 647, 141 S. E-
426.
§ 28301 (§ 2357). Societies incorporated.
Name, Style and Objects of Association.—Where a plain-
tiff in its petition designates itself as Tremont Temple Bap-
tist Church, and alleges that it is "a duly organized religious
society, and that a certificate of said society has been duly
filed and recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior
court" of the county in which the church is located, th.s
shows a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the sec-
tion. Hartsfield v. Tremont Temple Baptist Church, 163
Ga. 557, 136 S. F- 550.
SECTION 7B
Fraternal Benefit Societies
§ 2877(44). Incorporation of fraternal benefit
societies of other States.—'Any fraternal benefit
society or association organized and incorporated
under the laws of any other state, and licensed
to do business in this State, which has assets in-
cluding liens charged against certificates in ex-
cess of the required reserve liability when its
outstanding certificates or contracts are valued
on the National Fraternal Congress Table of
Mortality with an interest assumption of not
more than 4%, or upon the optional standard set
forth in section 23, Part I, Title V, No. 524, en-
titled "An Act for the regulation and control of
fraternal benefit societies," etc., approved Aug-
ust 17th, 1914, or upon some higher standard,
may become such fraternal benefit society incor-
porated under the laws of this State under such
name or names as it may select, and with a con-
tinuation without intermission or cessation of all
its powers, rights, and privileges and of all mu-
tual existing corporate rights, obligations, liabil-
ities, powers, contracts, liens, privileges, and du-
ties at the time existing between said corporation
and its members. Its officers shall be continued
in office for the terms for which they were
elected, with the same rights, responsibilities, li-
abilities, duties, powers, and privileges as at the
time enjoyed and imposed upon them, it being
the purpose of this Act to extend and continue
such society or association as such a corporation
of this State, the same as if it had in all respects
originally been incorporated under the laws of
this State. That in orde'r to become such a cor-
poration of this State, the officers of such society
or association such as the board of control, trus-
tees, directors, council, executive council, or by
whatever name known, when thereunto duly au-
thorized by its supreme representative or govern-
ing body, by whatever name known, shall file
with the Secretary of State of this State a certi-
fied copy of its articles of incorporation or char-
ter under which it is then operating, together
with a petition asking that such society or asso-
ciation be incorporated as such fraternal benefit
society under whatever name or names it may
select. That upon the filing of the same with the
Secretary of State of this State and paying a fee
of one hundred ($100.00) dollars therefo'r, such
society or association shall immediately thereby
become incorporated as a fraternal benefit society
of this State and the Secretary of State shall is-
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sue to it a certificate of incorporation as a frater-
nal benefit society with the powers and privileges
appertaining thereto. That upon filing a copy of
said certificate of incorporation with the Insur-
ance Commissioner of this State and paying a fee
of twenty-five ($25.00) dollars therefor, he shall
issue to such fraternal benefit society a license
to do business in this State. Such society shall,
except as provided in this Act, be governed by
the general laws of this State in respect to fra-
ternal benefit societies. Provided, however, that
in no event shall any charter rights be granted
under this Act which conflict with the general
laws of Georgia applicable to such societies or
organization; and wherever such conflict occurs,
if any, that part of such charter 'shall be consid-
ered stricken, and the remainder not so conflict-
ing with such laws shall be and constitute the
charter rights granted hereunder. Nor shall this
Act in any way exempt such societies' or organi-
zations from any taxes, licenses, or fees which
may be acquired of them under existing laws of
this State applicable to such societies or organi-
zation. Acts 1929, p. 241, § 1.
§ 2877(45). Funds which may be used for ex-
penses.—Such benefit society, after setting up the
'required reserves on the mortality standard
aforesaid, may use any portion of its assets in ex-
cess of such reserves as and for its expenses in
the procuring, maintaining), and conducting its
business. Acts 1929, p. 243, § 2.
§ 2877(46). Forms of certificates issuable
Any fraternal benefit society maintaining reserve
as herein provided may issue to its members or
to juveniles such forms of certificate upon such
plan of insurance, providing for paid-up insur-
ance, extended insurance, cash-surrender value,
whole life and endowment, accident or indemnity,
and payable to such beneficiary as may be au-
thorized in the laws of such society. Such so-
ciety shall have a supreme representative govern-
ing body, said representatives to have the qualifi-
cations which are required by the laws of such
societ3r
,
and subordinate lodges or branches by
whatever name known, into which members at
their option be admitted in accordance with its
laws. Acts 1929, p. 243, § 3.
§ 2877(47). Remedy in forum of society to be
sought before suit; proviso.—No court shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or suits against
any such fraternal benefit society, unless and un-
til such member shall have first exhausted his
remedies within the forums of the society. Pro-
vided, that any member or beneficiary may sue
upon any certificate or contract, seeking to re-
cover any death or disability loss provided under
the terms of such contract or by the laws of such
society. Acts 1929, p. 244, § 4.
warehouse receipts for a debt. Augusta Bonded Public
Warehouse Co. v. Georgia R. Bank, 166 Ga. 105, 110, 142
S. E. 559.
On the facts of record and the findings of the jury there-
on, a bank to which warehouse receipts were pledged as-
collateral security for notes of the pledgor company did not
take the papers with notice of any secret equity of the
warehouseman, and acquired sufficient title to support an
action against the warehouseman for the value of the goods
.stored by the pledgor company, after they had been fraud-
ulently withdrawn from the warehouse, without surrender
of the receipts, by the vice-president and general mana-
ger of that company. The receipts and indorsements
thereon were admissible in evidence over the objections
offered. Augusta Bonded Public Warehouse Co. v. Georgia
R. Bank, 166 Ga. 105, 142 S. E. 559.
SECTION 11
Bonded Public Warehousemen
§ 2914. Title passes by transfer of receipt.
This provision is not an exclusive form for pledging
ARTICLE 10
Co-operative Marketing Associations
SECTION 1
Under Acts of 1920
§§ 2909 (k), 2909 (o), 2909 (p), 2909 (s) 2909 (x).
Park's Code.
See §§ 2928(42), 2928(46), 2928(47), (2928(50), 2928(55)
respectively.
§ 2928(a). Park's Code.
See § 2982(1).
§ 2928(1). Organization; capital stock; appli-
cation; title; dividends; reserve, profits.
Individual Liability of Members.—Individual liability for
debts of a corporation can not be imposed upon all its mem-
bers by a by-law adopted by vote of a majority of the
members where no provision for such liability is made by
statute or charter. Corporations without capital stock are
within this rule. Mitcham v. Citizens Bank, 34 Ga. App.
707, 131 S. E- 181.
Where an action is against the corporation and all its
members, the petition should be dismissed on demurrer on
the ground of misjoinder of parties. Mitcham v. Citizens
Bank, 34 Ga. App. 707, 131 S. E. 181.
SECTION 2
Under Acts of 1921
§ 2928(p). Park's Code.
See § 2928(16).
§ 2928(16). Powersj—Each association incor-
porated under this Act shall have the following
powers
:
(a) To engage in any activity in connection
with the marketing, selling, harvesting, preserv-
ing, drying, processing, canning, packing, storing,
handling, ginning or utilization of any agricul-
tural products produced or delivered to it by its
members; or the manufacturing or marketing of
the by-products thereof; or in connection with
the purchase, hiring, or use by its members of
supplies, machinery or equipment; or in the fi-
nancing of any such activities; or in any one or
more of the activities 'Specified in this section.
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The association, however, shall handle and deal
in the agricultural products of non-members,
equal in value to, but not greater in value than,
that handled by its member's.
Ob) To borrow money and to make advances
to members.
(c) To act as the agent or representative of
any member or members in any of the above
mentioned activities.
(d) To purchase or otherwise acquire, and to
hold, own, and exercise all rights of ownership
in, and to sell, transfer, or pledge shares of the
capital stock or bonds of any corporation or asso-
ciation engaged in any related activity or in the
handling or marketing of any of the products
handled by the association.
(e) To establish reserves and to invest the
funds thereof in bonds or such other property as
may be provided in the By-Laws.
(f) To buy, hold and exercise all privileges of
ownership over such real or personal property
as ma}' be necessary or convenient for the con-
ducting and operation of any of the business of
the association or incidental thereto.
(g) To establish, secure, own and develop
patents, trade marks and copyrights.
(h) To do each and everything necessary, suit-
able or proper for the accomplishment of any
one of the purposes or the attainment of any
one or more of the objects herein enumerated;
or conducive to or expedient for the interest or
benefit of the association; and to contract ac-
cordingly; and in addition to exercise and pos-
sess all powers, rights and privilege necessary or
incidental to the purposes for which the asso-
ciation is organized or to the activities in which
it is engaged; and in addition, any other rights,
powers, and privileges granted by the laws of
this State to ordinary corporations, except such
as a're inconsistent with express provisions of
this Act; and to do any such thing any where.
Acts 1921, pp. 139, 140-1, 142; 1929, p. 223.
§ 2928 (q). Park's Code.
See .§ 2923(17).
§ 2928(17). Members to handle products only
through association.—Under the terms and con-
ditions prescribed in its By-Laws, an association
may admit as members (or issue common stock
to) only persons or associations or corporations
composed solely of persons engaged in the pro-
duction of the agricultural products to be han-
dled by or through the association, including the
lessees and tenants of land used for the produc-
tion of such products and any lessors and land-
lords who receive as rent all or part of the crop
raised on the leased premises; and any such per-
sons or associations of persons or corporation-
may be citizens of or organized under the laws
of this State or any other state of the United
States.
If a member of a non-stock association be
other than a natural person, such members may
be represented by any individual, associate, of-
ficer or member thereof, duly authorized in writ-
ing.
One association organized hereunder may be-
come a member or stockholder of any other as-
[1
sociation or associations organized hereunder.
Acts 1921, pp. 139, 142; 1925, p. 150; 1929, p. 223.
§ 2928 (aa). Park's Code.
See § 2928(27).
§ 2928 (27). Marketing contracts.
Attorney's Fees.—This section, properly construed, au-
thorizes parties contracting in pursuance of the statute to
stipulate for the payment of attorney's fees by the mem-
ber to the association, in the circumstances therein stated.
No prior notice of intended suit is requisite to a recovery
of such fees in an action for breach of the contract. Civil
Code § 4252 is not applicable. Brown v. Georgia Cotton
Growers Ass'n, 164 Ga. 712, 139 S. F- 417.
CHAPTER 3
Sale of Stocks, Bonds, etc.; "Blue Sky Law"
§ 2928 (42). Law designated.
It will be presumed, in the absence of anything to show
the contrary, that this law was complied with. Suddath v.
Blanchard, 39 Ga. App. 262, 146 S. F. 798.
Contracts Held Voidable.—In this suit to recover on a
stock subscription the petition affirmatively disclosed such
a state of facts as rendered the subscription voidable under
the securities act, and thus subject to general demurrer.
On this question the case is controlled by the decision cf
the Supreme Court in Felton v. Highlands Hotel Co., 165
Ga. 598, 141 S. F- 793; Cassini v. Highlands Hotel Co., 37
Ga. App. 778, 142 S. F. 565.
§ 2928 (46). Definition of terms.
"Issluers.";—Persons who procure contracts of subscrip-
tion to the stock of a proposed corporation not in esse but
which may be organized in the future are not issuers of
such stock within the intent and meaning of that term as
defined in the Georgia securities law. Felton v. Highlands
Hotel Co., 165 Ga. 598, 141 S. F- 793.
§ 2928(47). License necessary.
Persons to Whom Applicable—In Action for Commission.
—The defendant, being the issuer, was not required to
obtain a permit from the securities commission before put-
ting the stock on the market. Even if the agent or solicitor
was required to do this before proceeding to sell the stock,
there being nothing to show that when entering into the
contract sued on the parties anticipated that the plaintiff
would not comply with the law, the defendant can not es-
cape liability for commissions merely because the agent,
after the making of the contract, may have violated the
criminal law "in selling the stock without a license. Floding
Inc. v. Gunter, 36 Ga. App. 450, 136 S. F. 798.
§ 2928(50). Class "B" defined; act not applica-
ble.
Sale of Class "A" No Offense.—Taylor v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 4, 128 S. F. 228.
§ 2928 (55). Action arising on sales; non-resi-
dent applicants; attorney; service of process.
Failure of Corporation to Comply.—Under this section, in
whatever character or capacity they may appear, persons
as well as firms and corporations who purpose either to
issue or sell stock in an existing or proposed corporation
must file with the securities commission the statement pre-
scribed by law; and failure to file such statement avoids
the subscription, thereby relieving the subscriber and en-
titling him to the return of any payments made upon the
illegal contract. Felton v. Highlands Hotel Co., 165 Ga.
598, 141 S. E'. 793.
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THIRD TITLE
Of Domestic Relations
CHAPTER 1
Of Husband and Wife
ARTICLE l
Of Marriage and Divorce
SECTION 1
Marriage, How and by Whom Contracted
§ 2931. (§ 2412.) Who is able to contract.
Previous Marriage.—If a man who had a living wife un-
divorced entered into a ceremonial marriage with another
woman who was not shown to have known of the former
marriage, and they cohabited as husband and wife from the
time of such marriage and continued to do so after the
death of the first wife, they will be considered thereafter as
lawfully married. Hamilton v. Bell, 161 Ga. 739, 132 S.
E. 83.
§ 2935. (§ 2416). Void marriages.
Ratification.—If the parties cohabited as husband and
wife from the time of the ceremonial marriage, and so con-
tinued after the husband's disabilities were removed, they
will be considered as lawfully married. Hawkins v. Haw-
kins, 166 Ga. 153, 142 S. E. 684.
§ 2938. Notice of application to be posted; con-
sent of parent or guardian.—Immediately upon
receiving application for a license the ordinary
or his deputy shall post in the ordinary's office a
notice giving the names and residents of the par-
ties applying therefor, and the date of application.
No license shall be issued earlier than five days
following the date of application for such license,
within which period of five days objections to the
proposed marriage may be entered; provided the
foregoing provisions shall not apply to persons
who have arrived at the age of twenty-one years;
and upon application for license being made, and
the applicant therein claims the party to be twenty-
one years of age, or over, it shall be the duty of
the ordinary to whom application for license is
made to satisfy himself that the applicant's con-
tention as to age is true. If said ordinary does
not know of his own knowledge that both par-
ties for whom a marriage license is sought are
twenty-one years of age, or over, shall require
applicants to furnish birth certificates, or, in lieu
thereof, affidavits from at least two persons show-
ing the ages of both parties to be twenty-one years
of age, or over; and upon the failure of applicant
to convince the ordinary in the foregoing way,
shall be required to post notice of said applica-
tion for the period of five days, as is provided in
Georgia Laws 1924, page 53; provided that in case
of emergency or extraordinary circumstance the
judge of the court having probate jurisdiction may
authorize the license to be issued at any time be-
fore the expiration of said five days. It shall be the
duty of the ordinary and his deputy to inquire as to
ages of all persons for whom marriage licenses
are asked; and if there be any grounds of suspi-
cion that the female is a minor under the age of
eighteen years, such ordinary and his deputy shall
refuse to grant the license until the written con-
sent of the parents or guardian, if any, controlling
such minor, shall be produced and filed in his
office; and any ordinary who, himself or deputy,
shall fail to post in his office facts pertaining to
the application, or who shall issue a license in vio-
lation of the time provision, shall knowingly grant
such license without such consent, or without
proper precaution in inquiring into the fact of
minority, or for the marriage of a female to his
knowledge domiciled in another county, shall for-
feit the sum of $500.00 for every such Act, to be
recovered at the suit of the clerk of the Superior
Court, and added to the educational fund of the
county. The posting of said notice may be dis-
pensed with in the case the parents or guardian
of the female appears in person before the ordi-
nary and consents in writing to the issuance of
said license. Acts 1924, pp. 53, 54; 1927, p. 224.
Editor's Note.—The first proviso and all that follows it
down to the second proviso was inserted by the amendment
of 1927. The amendment also effected certain minor changes
of phraseology not affecting the substance.
§ 2938(a). Park's Code.
See § 2938(1).
§ 2938(1). Application for license; information
as to impediments, etc.—Marriage license shall be
issued under the rules prescribed by the preced-
ing section on written application made by the
person seeking license therefor, verified by oath
of applicant, which application shall state that
there is no legal impediment to marriage, and
shall give the full name of the proposed husband,
with date of birth, present address, and name of
father and mother, if known, and if unknown shall
so state, with present name of proposed wife with
date of her birth and present address, with name
of father and mother, if known, and if unknown
shall so state, and shall be supported by affidavits
of two reputable citizens of the United States of
America as to truth of recitals in said applica-
tion, which application shall be filed in the office
of ordinary before marriage license shall be is-
sued upon such application, and such application
shall remain in the permanent files in the office
of the ordinary, and may be used as evidence in
any court of law under the rules of evidence made
and provided in similar cases. Acts 1927, p. 226.
SECTION 2
Of Divorces, and How Obtained
§ 2944. (§ 2425.) Total and partial, how granted.
Cited in Gay v. Pantell, 164 Ga. 738, 139 S. E. 543.
§ 2945. (§ 2426.) Grounds for total divorce.
See annotations to section 2951.
§> 2946., (§i 2427). Discretionary grounds.
Applied in Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 98, 106, 145 S. E). 63.
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 168 Ga. 478, 148 S. E). 151.
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§ 2948. (§ 2429). Condonation, collusion, etc.
Applied in Harrell v. Harrell, 165 Ga. 837, 142 S. E- 278.
Cited in Fain v. Fain, 168 Ga. 552, 148 S. E. 395.
§ 2949. (§ 2430.) Confessions of party.
Nonsuit.—Where evidence of a confession is the sole
support of a libel for divorce on the ground of adultery, a
nonsuit is not erroneous. Eangley v. Eangley, 165 Ga.
122, 139 S. F- 821.
§ 2951. (§ 2432.) Proceedings.
Right to Expressly Waive Certain Rights.—None of the
provisions of this section or sections 2945, 2952 and 2975 af-
fect the general principle which allows a litigant to ex-
pressly waive rights accorded him upon which he may
either insist or relinquish at his option. Don v. Don, 162
Ga. 240, 243, 133 S. E- 242.
§ 2953, (§ 2434).
when.
Libelant can not dismiss,
No Dismissal before Verdict.—The libelant can dismiss
his or her divorce suit, without the consent of the libelee,
at any time before one verdict in favor of the libelee is
rendered. This principle is necessarily deducible from this
section. Black v. Black, 165 Ga. 243, 140 S. F. 364.
§ 2954. (§ 2435.) Schedule.
Filing in Case of Separation.—Where the parties have sep-
arated it is error to order the schedule to be filed as of the
date of filing petition for divorce. Smith v. Smith, 162
Ga. 349, 133 S. E- 842.
Applied in Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 98, 106, 145 S. E. 63.
Cited in Meadows v. Meadows, 161 Ga. 90, 129 S. E. 659.
§ 2955. (§ 2436.) Transfer pending suit.
Section Not Applicable in Suit for Alimony without Di-
vorce.—In a suit by a wife against her husband for alimony
when no suit for divorce is pending, and no schedule of the
husband's property is filed, it is not error on the trial, when
an ancillary proceeding has been filed subsequently to the
filing of the alimony suit, to cancel a deed executed by the
husband to his sister, to refuse to give this section in charge.
Chandler v. Chandler, 161 Ga. 350, 130 S. E- 685.
Same—Bona Fides a Question for Jury.—In such a suit it
was error for the court to charge that a certain deed which
purported to convey to a third person, a large portion of the
respondent's realty which was alleged in the petition was his
property, did not have the effect to pass title to the grantee;
it being a question of fact for the jury to decide whether it
had been executed bona fide in payment of a pre-existing
debt. Mathews v. Mathews, 162 Ga. 233, 133 S. E. 254.
Subordinate to Schedule.—The restriction on alienation
imposed by this section of the Civil Code operates only
to the extent of rendering the alienation subordinate to
any disposition of the scheduled proverty which may be
made by the jury in the final verdict. Stephens v. Steph-
ens, 168 Ga. 630, 148 S. F- 522.
§ 2956. (§ 2437.) Verdict of jury.
When Section Applicable.—This section only refers to cases
where a divorce proceeding is pending. Chandler v. Chandler,
161 Ga. 350, 130 S. E. 685.
§ 2964. (§ 2445.) Disabilities, how determined.
In General.—This section provides for a petition and
hearing on the question of having plaintiff's disabilities
removed. It does not provide for a subsequent hearing.
No attack was made on the validity of this section of
the code, and no question was made as to the right of the
plaintiff to bring a suit under this section for removal of
his disabilites; but it was contended that he did not have
the right to bring a second suit under this section of the
code after a judgment against him in a former proceeding
under the same section. Ison v. Ison, 166 Ga. 225, 142 S. E-
889.
§ 2971. (§ 2452.) Custody of children.
Award to Maternal Grandparents.—Conflicting evidence as
to the fitness of either the father or the mother to have
custody of the child, the judge does not abuse his discretion
in awarding such custody to the maternal grandparents of
the child. Phillips v. Phillips, 161 Ga. 79, 129 S. E. 644.
Admissibility of Evidence Tending to Show Immorality of
Wife.—The proper disposition of the minor children, issue
of the marriage, was involved in the case as made by the
pleadings. This being so, evidence tending to show im-
morality in the wife was admissible over the objection that
it was irrelevant and did not support the alleged ground
for divorce. Goodin v. Goodin, 166 Ga. 38, 142 S. E- 158.
Section Dees Not Apply Unless Divorce Is Granted. —
Under this and section 2980 the trial judge can exercise
this power only when divorces are granted, or can only
make a disposition of the minor children of the marriage
during the period the divorce proceeding is pending. Where
the case is terminated without a divorce being granted to
either of the parties, the court can not exercise this power.
This power is one incident to the divorce proceeding, and
is exercisable only as above stated. Black v. Black, 165
Ga. 243, 140 S. F. 364, citing Brightwell v. Brightwell, 161
Ga. 8 (2), 125 S. F- 658; Keppel v. Keppel, 92 Ga. 506, 17
S. F. 976.
§ 2972.
child.
(§ 2453.) Habeas corpus for wife or
Procedure Same as for Habeas Corpus Generally.—No dif-
ferent procedure is provided for obtaining a trial of the writ
of habeas corpus under this section of the code from the pro-
visions for the trial of habeas corpus generally, but it is
contemplated that the writ shall issue and be tried under this
section as provided in the sections relating to habeas corpus
generally. Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 120, 132 S. E-
757.
SECTION 3
Of Alimony
§ 2975. (§ 2456.) Permanent and temporary.
When Contention Made That Husband Has no "Estate."—
In the instant case the trial judge did not err in awarding
temporary alimony and attorney's fees over the contention
that the husband had no "estate" out of which the allowance
could be made. Eundy v. Eundy, 162 Ga. 42, 132 S. E- 389.
§ 2976. (§ 2457). Proceedings to obtain.
Cited in Bradley v. Bradley, 168 Ga. 648, 148 S. E. 591,
§ 2979. (§ 2460.) Merits not in issue.
Purpose.—The code as evidenced by this section looks to
requiring the husband and father to perform his duty of
supporting the wife and children; and it is not necessary
to allege, with such strictness as would be required in a
libel for divorce, such facts as would authorize the grant
of a divorce. Webb v. Webb, 165 Ga. 305, 140 S. E- 872.
§ 2980. (§ 2461.) Support and custody of
children pending suits for divorce,
Cited in Hooten v. Hooten, 168 Ga. 86, 147 S. E. 373.
§ 2981.
trial.
(§ 2462.) Alimony for children on final
Failure to Specify Amount Minor Child Entitled to, etc.—
A verdict and decree in a divorce case are not void on the
ground that the verdict allowing a stated sum as alimony for
the support of the wife and child does not specify what
amount the minor child should be entitled to for its sup-
port, nor in what manner, how often, nor to whom it
should be paid. Cunningham v. Faulkner, 163 Ga. 19, 135
S. E. 403.
When Charge Corrects Previous Error.—When the trial
judge, in his charge, instructs the jury to specify "how
often, to whom, and until when" the alimony for the child
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is to be paid, a previous statement that the father is liable
for the support of his minor child until it arrives at the age
of 21 years, is not thereby rendered harmless. Barlow v.
Barlow, 161 Ga. 202, 129 S. E- 860.
Proceeding for alimony be-§ 2986. (§ 2467.)
fore the judge.
For Express Use of Minor Child.—Under the circumstances
of the instant case the trial judge did not err in entering a
judgment awarding attorney's fees and alimony to the wife
for the express use of the minor child. Waller v. Waller, 163
Ga. 377, 136 S. E. 149.
Petition Held Sufficient.—Under this section the petition
in the instant case was sufficient to withstand the gen-
eral demurrer. Webb v. Webb, 165 Ga. 305, 140 S. E- 872.
ARTICLE 2
Of Rights and Liabilities of Husband and Wife
§ 2993. (§ 2474). Wife's property, when sep-
arate.
Transaction in Guise of Quitclaim Deed.—If the wife by
a quitclaim deed conveyed land to another, under a
scheme by which such person was to sell the same, or so
much thereof as might be necessary, and apply the pro-
ceeds to the extinguishment of the debts of her husband,
such quitclaim deed was null and void, and persons, ac-
quiring title to the land under the grantee in such quit-
claim deed, with notice, acquired no title against the
wife. It follows that the court erred in rejecting evi-
dence offered by the plaintiff to establish the fact that such
quitclaim deed was made by her to the grantee therein
for the purpose of paying her husband's debts. Sikes v.
Seckinger, 164 Ga. 96, 110, 137 S. E. 833.
§ 2996. (§ 2477.) Agency of wife in respect
to necessaries.
Presumption of Husband's Duty of Support.—Cohabitation
raises a presumption of the wife's authority to purchase
necessaries on the credit of her husband; and where the
husband seeks to avoid liability on account of purchases
so made, he has the burden of "showing that the goods
were supplied under such circumstances that he is not
bound to pay for them." Shaw v. Allen & Co., 34 Ga.
App. Ill, 113, 128 S. E. 699. It is submitted that this is not
a case of agency proper, but rather has reference to the hus-
band's legal duty to support his wife. So long as he owes
her the duty of support he is bound for her necessaries.
When this duty ceases to exist, the husband is no longer
bound. This is to be distinguished from cases where the
husband has held his wife out, by a course of dealing, as
his agent. In the instant case the cohabitation merely
raises the presumption of the husband's continued duty of
support, and places upon him the duty of showing that the
wife has forfeited the right to his support. This is the gen-
eral rule.
—
Ed. Note.
Same—Agreement with Wife's Mother.—An agreement be-
tween the mother and the husband, for the mother to take
the wife to her home and bear the expense of her support and
maintenance, was held not to relieve the husband from his
obligation to support and maintain his wife. Akin v. Akin,
163 Ga. 18, 135 S. E. 402.
ARTICLE 3
Of Marriage Contracts and Settlements
§ 3007. (§ 2488.) Wife feme sole as to her
separate estate.
See notes to § 4413.
I. IN GENERAL.
Title conveyed by husband as security for debt pre-
vailed against claim of wife in Hodgson v. Hart, 165 Ga.
882, 886, 142 S. E- 267.
Cited in Carter v. Owenby, 39 Ga. App. 402, 147 S.
E. 405.
II. CONTRACTS OF SURETYSHIP.
A. Generally.
Applies to All Contracts
—
Question of Fraud. — Whether
the lender could be defrauded into believing that a married
woman could enter into a contract of suretyship, the mere
tact that the defendant wife, together with her husband,
may have known at the time of the transaction that her
promise as a surety was not binding would not operate to
change the rule and to render her liable on the contract
where otherwise she was not. Rhodes v. Gunn, 34 Ga. App.
115, 128 S. E. 213.
Tests as to What Constitutes Suretyship Contract. — A
wife can not bind her separate estate by any contract of
suretyship nor by any assumption of the debts of her hus-
band, and "No superficial appearance will be permitted to
lead the court away from the true inwardness of the trans-
action." Rhodes v. Gunn, 34 Ga. App. 115, 128 S. E. 213,
citing Gross v. Smith, 31 Ga. App. 95, 119 S. E. 541.
Loan Contract.—Where the real purpose of the loan
contract was to borrow money from plaintiff with which
to pay the debts of the husband, and the wife signed and
executed a contract as surety with notice on the part of
the lender, she was entitled to submit this issue to the
jury; and the court erred in dismissing the answer set-
ting up such defense. Braswell v. Federal Land Bank,
165 Ga. 123, 139 S. E. 861.
B. Conveyance to Secure Husband's or Son's Debts.
In General.—A deed given by a married woman, in pur-
suance of a scheme by which she pledges her individual
property as security for the debt of another, is void in toto.
Lee v. Johnston, 162 Ga. 560, 134 S. E- 166.
To Secure Partnership Debt.—A note and deed given by
a defendant is not binding upon her as a married woman,
where it is given as security for a debt of a partnership of
which her husband wa,s a member, and it is immaterial
whether the debt is assumed as security or paid as her
husband's debt at the insistence of the creditor who knew
all the circumstances upon which the payment was being
made. Boykin v. Bohler, 163 Ga. 807, 137 S'. E. 45.
III. ASSUMPTION OF HUSBAND'S DEBTS.
A. In General.
Under this section if the wife did not in fact purchase
and was not to receive a stock of goods under a con-
tract sued on, but the whole transaction was merely a
colorable scheme or device by which the wife was in-
duced by the plaintiff to assume the previous debt of
the husband, without any valid consideration flowing to
her, she would have the right to repudiate the entire
illegal and void transaction, no matter by what device
its true inwardness and purpose had been concealed.
Robinson Co. v. Rice, 39 Ga. App. 785, 786, 148 S. E. 542.
This provision does not prevent a widow, even after
she has married again and during her second wedlock,
from giving her note, secured by a mortgage on her in
dividual property, as an original undertaking, in extin-
guishment of a debt contracted by her deceased husband
during her marriage with him. Montgomery v. Padgett,
33 Ga. App. 389, 144 S. E- 41.
Validity of Indirect Method of Assuming Husband's
Debts.—Where, by a scheme or device to which her hus-
band's creditor is a party, a wife is induced to make a gift
to her husband of her separate estate for the purpose of
being used by the husband in the payment of his debt to
the creditor, and the husband conveys the property to the
creditor in extinguishment of the debt, such transaction
may, at the instance of the wife, be treated as void and as
passing no title from the wife. Calhoun v. Hill, 35 Ga. App.
18, 131 S. E. 918.
C. Loan to Wife to Pay Debts of Husband.
Lender Husband's Creditor.—See Jackson v. Jackson, 161
Ga. 837, 132 S. E- 79, citing and following the paragraph set
out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3009. (§ 2490.) Sale to husband or trustees.
Absolutely Void.—A sale and conveyance in violation
of this section is not only voidable but void. Glover v.
Summerour, 165 Ga. 513, 141 S. E- 211, citing Echols v.
Green, 140 Ga. 678, 79 S. E. 557.
Deed Reciting Consideration Constitutes Sale on Face.
—Where a deed from a wife to her husband recites a
valuable consideration, such deed upon its face is a con-
tract of sale by the wife to the husband. Glover v.
Summerour, 165 Ga. 513, 141 S. E. 211, citing Martin v.
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White, 115 Ga. 866, 42 S. E- 279; Shackelford v. Orris,
135 Ga. 29, 68 S. E. 838; Rich v. Rich, 147 Ga. 488, (3), 94
S. E. 566.
Deed May Constitute Color of Title.—While a deed of
bargain and sale of land by a wife to her husband with-
out an order of the superior court is void, nevertheless
such deed may constitute color of title. The court did
not err in allowing the introduction in evidence of the
deed from the wife of defendant's intestate to her hus-
band, to show color of title. Goss v. Brannon, 167 Ga.
498, 146 S. E- 187.
Who May Attack.—A wife's judgment creditor for
the price of goods sold to her is not her privy by blood or
estate, and as such authorized to attack her deed under
this section. Royster Guano Co. v. Odum, 167 Ga. 655.
146 S. E. 475. See McArthur v. Ryles, 162 Ga. 413, 134
S. E- 76, following and applying the paragraph set out
under this paragraph in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3010. (§ 2491.) Wife may give to husband.
Applied in Glover v. Summerour, 165 Ga. 513, 141 S.
E. 211; Mack v. Pardee, 39 Ga. App. 310, 318, 147 S. £
147.
§ 3011. (§ 2492.) A married woman may con-
tract; presumptions.
Where Husband Wife's Agent.—Where a husband clothed
by a written power of attorney, cancelled a certificate of
stock standing in the name of his wife, and had a new cer-
tificate issued to himself, even though the legal title passed
to the husband, the shares were impressed with a trust, and
they were in equity still the property of the wife, as were
likewise all income or profits arising or derived from said
stock. Bacon v. Bacon, 161 Ga. 978, 133 S. E- 512.
Applied in Davis v. Barrett, 163 Ga. 666, 136 S. E. 904.
CHAPTER 2
Of Parent and Child
ARTICLE 1
Legitimate Children
§ 3016. (§ 2497.) Mode of adopting child.
—
Any person desirous of adopting a child, so as
to render it capable of inheriting his estate, may
present a petition to the superior court of the
county in which said child may be domiciled,
setting forth the name of the father, or, if he be
dead or has abandoned his family, the mother,
and the consent of such father or mother to the
act of adoption; if the child has neither father
nor mother, the consent of no person shall be
necessary to said adoption. The court, upon be-
ing satisfied with the truth of the facts stated in
the petition, and of the fact that such father or
mother has notice of such application (which
notice may be by publication, as required in eq-
uity cases for non-resident defendants), or if the
father or mother has abandoned the child, and
being further satisfied that such adoption would
be to the interest of the child, shall declare said
child to be the adopted child of such person and
capable of inheriting his estate, and also what
shall be the name of such child; thenceforward
the relation between such person and the adopted
child shall be, as to their legal rights and liabili-
ties, the relation of parent and child, except that
the adopted father shall never inherit from the
child. To all other persons the adopted child
shall stand as if no such act of adoption had
been taken.
(a) Provided, that no person may adopt a
child under this Act unless such person is (l) at
least twenty-five years of age, or (2) married and
living with husband or wife. The petitioner must
be at least ten years older than the child, a resi-
dent of this State, and financially able and morally
fit to have the care of the child. If the child is
14 years of age or over, his consent shall be nec-
essary to the adoption.
(b) The petition, duly verified in duplicate, shall
be filed jointly by husband and wife, unless the
person desiring to adopt is unmarried, and shall
contain the name and age of the child, the ad-
dress and age of the petitioner, the name by
which the child is to be known, whether the par-
ents are living or not, names and addresses of
the living parents or guardians, if known to the
petitioner, and a description of any property be-
longing to said child.
(c) Upon the filing of the petition the court
shall issue summons to the next of kin, parents
or guardians, brothers and sisters, if living within
the State, and legal notice if a non-resident by
service if possible, otherwise by publication once
a week for four weeks in the official organ of the
county where such proceedings are pending.
After the expiration of thirty days from the date
of filing of the petition, the case shall be placed
upon the regular calendar of the court for a hear-
ing before the judge without a jury, and the court
shall hear evidence from witnesses as to the good
character, moral fitness, and financial ability of
the petitioner to care for the child, as well as all
other allegations in the petition. When a child
has been awarded by court order, or otherwise
legally and permanently surrendered, to the cus-
tody of a licensed child-placing agency for perma-
nent placing in a foster home, such agency shall
be served with summons in lieu of parents and
relatives, and the written consent of such agency
shall be filed with the court before adoption can
be granted.
(d) Upon the first hearing the court may pass
an order only granting temporary custody of the
child tc« the petitioner. Final adoption shall be
grantecr only upon a second hearing after the
child shall have been in the custody and care of
the petitioner for a period of six months.
(e) A copy of the decree of adoption shall be
filed with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics.
Acts 1855-6, p. 260; 1859, p. 36; 1882-3, p. 59;
1889, p. 69; 1927, p. 142.
Editor's Note.—The clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of
this section were added by the amendment of 1927.
Presumotion That Proceedings Regular.
—Every presump-
tion is to be indulged to sustain a proceeding of adoption by
a court of competent jurisdiction. Harper v. Lindsev, 162
Ga. 44, 132 S. E. 63».
Estoppel of Parents.—Where adoptive parents seek and
obtain the decree they ask for in a court of their selection,
and take the child or children so adopted into the family
and treat them as their own, they and their heirs and per-
sonal representatives are estopped from asserting that the
child is not legally adopted. Harper v. Iyindsey, 162 Ga.
44, 132 S. E. 639.
§ 3020. (§ 2501.) Parent's obligation.
No Application to Alimony Proceedings.—This section has
no application to proceedings for alimony. Barlow v.
Barlow, 161 Ga. 202, 129 S. E. 860.
When Mother Must Support Children.—See note under
section 554.
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§ 3021. (§ 2502.) Parental power, how lost.
In General.—The right to the services of children and the
obligation to maintain them go together. Whatever de-
prives the parent of the right to the custody and services
of the child, without fault on his part, relieves him from the
duty to support the child. Thompson v. Georgia Ry. & P.
Co., 163 Ga. 598, 603, 136 S. E. 895.
Right to Earnings. — Where a minor child labors and
earns money, the presumption is that the proceeds of his
labor belongs to his father, if living; and where it is
claimed that such in fact belongs to the minor, that pre-
sumption must be overcome by proof of the fact that the
father has, either expressly or impliedly, manumitted the
minor so as to allow the proceeds of the labor to go to the
minor. Jones v. McCowen, 34 Ga. App. 801, 131 S. E. 290.
A father may give to a minor child the right to the pro-
ducts of his labor which products cannot be levied on as
property of the father. See Ehrlich & Co. v. King, 34 Ga.
App. 787, 131 S. E. 524.
Paragraph 5—Effect of Marriage.—The child who mar-
ries assumes inconsistent responsibilities which entitle him
to the proceeds of his own labor. He becomes the head of
a new family, and is no longer a member of the family of
his parent. This being so, the parent is under no legal ob-
ligation to support him. Thompson v. Georgia Ry. & P.
Co., 163 Ga. 598, 604, 136 S. E. 895.
Error, under the facts, in award to father of nine-year
boy living with grandparents. See Dial v. Reid, 166 Ga.
245, 142 S. E. 881.
Applied in Proctor v. Proctor, 164 Ga. 721, 139 S.
E. 531.
Cited in Hooten v. Hooten, 168 Ga. 86, 147 S. E. 373.
§ 3022(a). Park's Code.
See § 3022(1).
§ 3022. (1). Custody of minor children, no
prima facie right in father.
Quoted in Proctor v. Proctor, 164 Ga. 721, 139 S. E.
531.
CHAPTER 3
Of Guardian and Ward
ARTICLE 1
Their Appointment, Powers, Duties, Liabilities,
Settlements, Resignation, etc.
App.
SECTION 1
How and by Whom Appointed
§ 3032. (§ 2513.) Natural guardian.
Cited in Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Norwood, 38 Ga.
534, 538, 144 S. E. 387.
§ 3047. (§ 2528.) Bond and oath.
As to suit on guardian's bond in ward's name, see note
under section 3054.
§ 3049. (§ 2530.) Additional bond.
Cited in Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Norwood, 38 Ga. App.
534, 538, 144 S. E. 387.
§ 3054. (§ 2535.) Suit on guardian's bond.
Suit by Ward in Own Name. — Although the statutory
bond required of a guardian under section 3047 is payable
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to the ordinary, suit thereon may be maintained by the
ward in his own name after becoming of age, and need not
be maintained by the ordinary suing for the use of the
ward. Sheppard v. Clark, 35 Ga. App. 503, 134 S. E- 125.
Guardian Need Not Be Joined. — It is not mandatory,
under this section, that the guardian be sued in the same
action with the surety. It is merely permissible. Shep-
pard v. Clark, 162 Ga. 143, 132 S. E. 755.
Petition in Action against Guardian and Sureties.—In a
suit against the guardian and his surety, it is not necessary
to allege that the plaintiff has obtained a judgment against
the guardian in his representative capacity, in order to show
a cause of action against the surety. American Surety Co.
v. Macon Savings Bank, 162 Ga. 143, 132 S. E- 636. In
this case the history of this section and section 3974, in re-
gard to suits upon administrator's bonds, is reviewed and
the two sections are held to be analogous.
—
Ed. Note.
Petition in Action against Sureties Alone. — In a suit
against the sureties upon a guardian's bond by the ward
after becoming of age, where the guardian was not made a
party defendant, the petition, which recited that a personal
judgment had been obtained against the guardian in a suit
by the ward and which recited a return of nulla bona upon
an execution issued thereon and that the execution had not
Deen paid, set out a cause of action and was not subject to
general demurrer, nor to special demurrer upon the ground
of non-joinder of parties. Sheppard v. Clark, 35 Ga. App.
503, 134 S. E. 125.
Same
—
Amendment. — In a suit upon a guardian's bond
against the sureties on it, the guardian not being joined as
a party defendant either in his representative capacity or
in his individual capacity, the petition is subject to amend-
ment by alleging judgments rendered against the guardian
in his representative capacity and in his individual capacity.
Sheppard v. Clark, 162 Ga. 143, 132 S. E. 755.
SECTION 2
The Powers, Duties and Liabilities of Guard-
ians.
§ 3063. (§ 2544). Failing to make returns.
Applied in Davis v. Culpepper, 167 Ga. 637, 146 S.
319.
§§ 3075(a) -3075(g). Park's Code.
See §§ 4804(1) -4804 (7).
E.
ARTICLE 2
Guardians of Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons
Non Compos Mentis.
§ 3092. (§ 2573.) Examination of capacity to
manage his estate.
Constitutionality. — In Roberson v. Roberson, 165 Ga.
447, 141 S. E. 306, it is said: "If the act of August 20,
1918 (Acts 1918, p. 162, amending this section), is
_
uncon-
stitutional for any reason, the petitioner can avail him-
self of this defense before the ordinary upon the hear-
ing of the application for the appointment of a guardian
lor him upon the ground of his imbecility; the ordinary,
as a branch of the judiciary of this State, having au-
thority, under the above provision of the constitution, to
declare said act void if unconstitutional for any of the
reasons assigned by petitioner.
Ten Days' Notice.—Under the provisions of this section
the ordinary is not authorized to issue a commission de
lunatico inquirendo until "ten days' notice of such ap-
plication has been given to the three nearest adult rel-
atives of such person," unless there is no such relative
within this State. Jackson v. Harris, 165 Ga. 873, 142
Si. E. 273.
Where such an application was issued and served on
September 3, the hearing thereon could not lawfully be
had until September 14. Excluding either the first or
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last day, as required by section 4, paragraph 8, of the
Civil Code, ten days did not elapse between September
3 and September 13. Consequently the judgment appoint-
ing a guardian for the alleged imbecile on September 13
was void. Jackson v. Harris, 165 Ga. 873, 142 S. E. 273.
In view of the foregoing ruling a sale of the property
of the alleged imbecile by her alleged guardian was un-
authorized, and the court erred in refusing to enjoin such
sale. Jackson v. Harris, 165 Ga. 873, 142 S. E. 273.
§ .3103. Appointed without trial when in sana-
torium; certificate from director of United States
Veterans Bureau.—The ordinaries of the several
counties of this State are authorized to appoint
guardians for idiots, lunatic's, and insane persons
without a trial, as in section 3092 whenever it
shall be made to appear to them that such idiot,
lunatic, or insane person is in the lunatic asy-
lum upon commitment thereto, or when it is
shown by the certificate of the superintendent of
the lunatic asylum in which the party is con-
fined that such person is insane and that it is
necessary for such idiot, lunatic, or insane per-
son to have a guardian to take charge of his
property. Where a petition is filed for the ap-
pointment of a guardian of a mentally incom-
petent ward, a certificate of the Director of the
United States Veterans' Bureau or his authorized
representative, setting forth the fact that such
person has been rated incompetent by the United
States Veterans' Bureau on examination in ac-
cordance with the laws and regulations govern-
ing such United States Veterans' Bureau, and
that the appointment of a guardian is a condition
precedent to the payment of any monies due such
person by the United States Veterans' Bureau,
shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity
for such appointment, and the ordinaries of the
several counties of this State shall be and they
are hereby authorized to appoint guardians with-
out a trial, as in section 3092 of the Civil Code
of Georgia of 1910, for any incompetent ward
entitled to any benefits which may be payable to
such incompetent by the United States Veterans'
Bureau or its successor. Acts 1929, p. 250, § 1.
§ 3103(1). Definitions of "Bureau," "estate,"
"income," "benefits," "Director," "ward," and
"guardian."—As used in the amendment of the
preceding section and the section following,
the term "person" includes a partnership,
corporation, or an association; the term "Bu-
reau" means the United States Veterans' Bu-
reau or its successor; the term "estate" and
"income" shall include only monies received by
the guardian from the Bureau and all earnings,
interest, and profits derived therefrom; the term
"benefits" shall mean all monies payable by the
United States through the Bureau; the term "Di-
rector" means the Director of the United States
Veterans' Bureau or his successor; the term
"ward" means a beneficiary of the Bureau; the
term "guardian" as used herein shall mean any
person acting as a fiduciary for a ward. Acts
1929, p. 251, § 2.
§ 3103(2). When guardian must be appointed
prior to payments of benefits.—Whenever, pur-
suant to any law of the United States or regu-
lation of the Bureau, the Director requires, prior
to payment of benefits, that a guardian be ap-
pointed for a ward, such appointment shall be
made in the manner hereinafter provided. Acts
1929, p. 251, § 3.
§ 3103(3). Unlawful to act as guardian of more
than 5 wards not of the same family.—Except as
hereinafter provided, it shall be unlawful for any
person to accept appointment as guardian of any
ward if such proposed guardian shall at that time
be acting as guardian for five wards. In any
case, upon presentation of a petition by an at-
torney of the Bureau under this section, alleg-
ing that a guardian is acting in a fiduciary capac-
ity for more than five wards and requesting his
discharge for that reason, the court, upon proof
substantiating the petition, shall require a final
accounting forthwith from such guardian, and
shall discharge such guardian in said case. The
limitations of this section shall not apply where
the guardian is a bank or trust company acting
fo'r the ward's estates only. An individual may
be guardian of more than five wards if they are
all members of the same family. Acts 1929, p.
251, § 4.
§ 3103(4). Petition for appointment.—A peti-
tion for the appointment of a guardian may be
filed in the court of ordinary having jurisdiction,
by or on behalf of any person who under existing
law is entitled to priority of appointment. If
there be no person so entitled, or if the person so
entitled shall neglect or refuse to file such a pe-
tition within thirty days after mailing of notice
by the Bureau to the last known address of such
person, indicating the necessity for the same, a
petition for such appointment may be filed in the
court of ordinary having jurisdiction, by or on
behalf of any responsible person residing in this
State. The petition fo'r appointment shall set
forth the name, age, place of residence of the
ward, the names and places of residence of the
nearest relative if known, and the fact that such
ward is entitled to receive monies payable by or
through the Bureau, and shall set forth the
amount of monies then due and the amount of
probable future payments. The petition shall
also set forth the name and address of the person
or institution, if any, having actual custody of the
ward. In the case of a mentally incompetent
ward, the petition shall show that such ward has
been rated incompetent on examination by the
Bureau in accordance with the laws and regula-
tions governing the Bureau. Acts 1929, p.
252, § 5.
§ 3103(5). Petition in case of minor.—Where
a petition is filed for the appointment of a guard-
ian of a minor ward, a certificate of the director,
or his representative, setting forth the age of
is'uch minor as shown by the records of the
Bureau, and the fact that the appointment of a
guardian is a condition precedent to the payment
of any monies due the minor by the Bureau,
shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity for
such appointment. Acts 1929, p. 252, § 5(a).
§ 3103(6). Notice of petition.—Upon the filing
of a petition for the appointment of a guardian
under the provisions of this Act, the court shall
cause such notice to be given as is provided by
law. Acts 1929, p. 253, § (5b).
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§ 3103(7). Fitness of appointee; bond of
guardian.—'Before making an appointment under
the provisions of this Act the court shall be sat-
isfied that the guardian whose appointment is
sought is a fit and proper person to be appointed.
Upon the appointment being made the guardian
shall execute and file a bond to be approved by
the court, in an amount not less than the sum then
due and estimated to become payable during the
ensuing year. The said bond shall be a surety
bond made by a solvent surety company in the
form, and be conditioned as required of guardians
appointed under general guardianship laws of
this State. The court shall have the power
from time to time to require the guard-
ian to file an additional bond. Provided, how-
ever, that where the total estate coming into the
hands of such guardian shall at no time exceed
the sum of $500.00, then a bond with personal
sureties, with at least two such sureties thereon,
may be accepted if such personal sureties are sol-
vent and are worth respectively the amount
named as the penalty of the bond. Acts 1929, p.
253, § 6.
§ 3103(8). Annual accounting.—Every guard-
ian, who shall receive on account of his ward
any monies from the Bureau, shall file with the
court annually, in the same manner as provided
for under the general law of this State for guard-
ians, a full, true and accurate account, on oath,
of all monies so received by him, of all disburse-
ments thereof, and showing the balance thereof
in his hands at the date of such account, and how
invested. A certified copy of each of such ac-
counts filed with the court shall be sent by the
guardian to the office of the Bureau having ju-
risdiction over the area in which such court is
located. Acts 1929, p. 253, § 7.
§ 3103(9). Removal of guardian not account-
ing.—If any guardian shall fail to file any ac-
count of the monies received by him from the
Bureau, or shall fail to furnish the Bureau a
copy of his accounts as required by this Act,
such failure shall be ground for removal. Acts
1929, p. 254, § 7(a).
§ 3103(10). Compensation of guardian.—Com-
pensation payable to such guardians shall not
exceed five per cent, of the income of the ward
during any year. In the event of extraordinary
services rendered by such guardian, the court
may, upon petition and after hearing thereon,
authorize additional compensation therefor, pay-
able from the estate of the ward. Notice of such
petition and hearing shall be given the proper
office of the Bureau not less than thirty days
prior to the hearing on such petition. No com-
pensation shall be allowed on the corpus of an
estate received from a preceding guardian. The
guardian may be allowed from the estate of his
ward reasonable premiums paid by him to any
corporate surety upon his bond. Acts 1929, p.
254, § 8.
§ 3103(11). Investment of funds. — Every
guardian shall invest the funds of the estate in
such manner or in such securities, in which the
guardian has no interest, as provided by law
for general guardians in this State. Acts 1929,
p. 254, § 9.
§ 3103(12). Expenditures; authority for. — A
guardian shall not apply any portion of the es-
tate of his ward for the support and maintenance
of any person other than his ward, except upon
order of the court after a hearing, notice of
which has been given the proper office of the
Bureau in the manner provided in section 8 of
this Act. Acts 1929, p. 254, § 10.
§ 3103(13). Commitment to U. S. Veterans'
Bureau Hospital.—Whenever it appears that an
incompetent or insane veteran of any war, mili-
tary occupation or expedition is eligible for treat-
ment in a United States Veterans' Bureau Hos-
pital and commitment to such hospital is neces-
sary for the proper ca're and treatment of such
veteran, the courts of ordinary of this State are
hereby authorized to communicate with the of-
ficial in charge of such hospital, with reference
to available facilities and eligibility, and upon
receipt of a certificate of eligibility from the of-
ficial in charge of such hospital the court may
then direct such veteran's commitment to such
United States Veterans' Bureau Hospital. There-
after such veteran upon admission shall be sub-
ject to the rules and regulations of such hospital,
and the officials of such hospital shall be vested
with the same powers now exercised by the su-
perintendent of the State hospital for mental dis-
eases wiithin this State with reference to the
retention of custody of the veteran so committed.
Notice of such pending proceedings shall be fur-
nished the person to be committed, and his right
to appear and defend shall not be denied. Pro-
vided, further, that if a veteran ' shall choose to
defend such action, he shall be tried before a
lunacy commission in the court of ordinary hav-
ing jurisdiction, in the same manner as is pro-
vided for other lunatics, idiots, and persons non
compos mentis in section 3092 of the Civil Code
of 1910. Acts 1929, p. 254, § 11.
§ 3103(14). Defense; petition for discharge of
guardian.—When a minor for whom a guardian
has been appointed under the provisions of this
Act or other laws of this State shall have at-
tained his Or her majority, and if incompetent
shall be declared competent by the Bureau and
the court, and when any incompetent ward, not
a minor, shall be declared competent by said
Bureau and the court, the guardian shall upon
making a satisfactory accounting be discharged
upon a petition filed for that purpose. Acts 1929,
p. 255, § 12.
§ 3103(15). Act to be construed liberally. —
This Act shall be construed liberally to secure
the beneficial intents and purposes thereof, and
shall apply only to beneficiaries of the Bureau,
who are entitled to any benefits of said Bureau.
Acts 1929, p. 255, § 13.
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CHAPTER 4
Master and Servant
ARTICLE 2
Master's Liability to Servant
§ 3129. (§ 2610.) Injuries to coemployees.
Definition of Fellow Servants. — In determining whether
certain servants are fellow servants it is necessary to decide
whether the servants, the nature of their duties being con-
sidered, were "about the same business," or were "engaged
in the common pursuit,"—a phrase which is occasionally
found in the decisions, which means the same thing as being
""about the same business." Holliday v. Merchants, etc.,
Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 953, 132 S. E. 210.
Same—Editor's Note. — See Holliday v. Merchants &
Miners Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 132 S. E. 210, following the
statement made under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
§ 3130. (§ 2611.) Duty of master.
III. DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE MACHINERY AND
APPLIANCES.
A. In General.
Stated in Fulton Bakery v. Williams, 37 Ga. App. 780,
141 S. E. 922.
Applied in Southern Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 39 Ga.
App. 588, 147 S. E. 800.
IV. DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE TO WORK.
A. In General.
Degree of Care.—It is the master's duty to exercise ordi-
nary and reasonable care to furnish the servant with a safe
place to work, under this and the following section. White-
hurst v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 728.
C. Application of Rule.
1. In General.
Places to Which Rule Relates. — See Flippin v. Central
etc., Ry. Co., 35 Ga. App. 243, 132 S. E. 918, affirming the
statement made under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
VI. DUTY IN REGARD TO INSPECTION AND
REPAIR
When a Question for Jury.—In servant's action for in-
juries from ladder's breaking, whether in exercise of reason-
able care in making inspection defendant would not have
ascertained that rung of ladder was decayed was for the
jury, although the ladder had been recently painted, con-
cealing the defect; it not appearing that examination be-
fore the ladder was painted would not have disclosed the
defect. Whitehurst v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 728.
§ 3131. (§ 2612.) Duty of servant.
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISKS BY SERVANTS.
B. Risks Ordinarily Incidental to Service.
1. In General.
Where a servant has equal means with his master of
knowing of the defect or danger which brought about his
injury, this is an assumed risk. Threlkeld v. Anthony, 36
Ga. App. 227, 136 S. E. 285.
III. ACTIONS FOR INJURIES TO SERVANTS.
A. In General.
Burden of Proof.—The burden is on the plaintiff to show
not only, negligence on the part of the master, but due care
on his own part; and it must appear that the plaintiff did
not know, and had not equal means of knowing, all that
which is charged as negligence, and that by the exercise of
ordinary care he could not have known thereof. Flippin v.
Central, etc., Ry. Co., 35 Ga. App. 243, 132 S. E. 918.
Applied in Newman v. Griffin Foundry, etc., Co., 38
Ga. App. 518, 144 S. E. 386.
ARTICLE 4
Child Labor Regulated
§ 3149 (h-1). Park's Code.
See § 3149(1).
§ 3149(1). Employment of children under 14
in mills, etc., prohibited.
Provision in Insurance Policy. — A provision in an em-
ployer's liability policy of insurance to the effect that the
policy shall not apply to injuries sustained by any person
employed by the insured "in violation of law as to age, or
under the age of fourteen years if there' is no legal age
limit," contemplates a violation of this section. Savannah
Kaolin Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 35 Ga. App. 24, 131 S. E-
919.
It does not contemplate merely a criminal violation of the
act, which occurs only where the employer knowingly em-
ploys a person under the prohibited age. Savannah
Kaolin Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 35 Ga. App. 24, 131 S. E-
919.
ARTICLE 6
Workmen's Compensation Act.
§ 3154(a). Park's Code.
See § 3154(1).
§ 3154(1). Titles.
Purpose of the Act.—In Goelitz v. Industrial Board, 278
111. 164, 115 N. E- 855, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
"The fundamental basis of workmen's compensation laws
is that there is a large element of public interest in
accidents occurring from modern industrial conditions, and
that the economic loss caused by such accidents should not
necessarily rest upon the public, but that the industry in
which an accident occurred shall pay, in the first instance,
for the accident." Globe Indemnity Co. v. I,ankford, 35 Ga.
App. 599, 603, 134 S. E. 357.
Constitutionality.—The workmen's compensation act is
not void because in violation of § 6545, nor as attempting
to regulate interstate commerce, "in so far as this partic-
t;lar case is concerned." Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S. E. 121.
§ 3154(b). Park's Code.
See § 3154(2).
§ 3154(2). Definition of terms; compensation
on basis of wage.
Employees of Counties.
—So much of the workmen's
compensation act as requires the counties of this State
to insure their employees against, or pay them compen-
sation for, personal injuries or for their deaths while in
the employment of the counties, violates § 6562, of the
constitution. Floyd County v. Scoggings, 164 Ga. 485,
139 S. E. 11.
Same
—
Convict.—A convict injured while serving a sen-
tence in a county chain-gang is not an employee of the
county and is not entitled to compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Lawson v. Travelers' Ins.
Co., 37 Ga. App. 85, 139 S. E. 96.
Baseball Player.—Relation between baseball player and
ball -club held that of employee and employer. Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S. E. 121.
Truck Driver Hired by Employer to Construction Com-
pany.—Held employee of company, which was not re-
lieved from liability for compensation for an injury merely
because it may neither have paid, nor have been liable
to pay, wages directly to the employee. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Stapleton, 37 Ga. App. 707,
141 S. E. '506, 507.
Officer of Corporation and Person Engaged to Build
Residence.—Relation of employer and employee did not
exist between officer of corporation and person engaged
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to build his residence. Hartford Accident, etc., Co. v.
Thompson, 167 Ga. 897, 147 S. E. 50.
Relatively to an individual person, the word "em-
ployer" as thus used refers to one engaged in business
operated for gain or profit, and the word "employee"
refers only to persons who are employees "in the usual
course of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of
the. employer or * * incidental thereto." As thus con-
strued the statute does not confer jurisdiction to award
compensation for injuries arising out of employment,
where, as in this case, the business of the employer is
that of an official in a corporation and the employment
of the employee is that of constructing a residence for
the employer, being a work wholly disconnected from the
business of the latter carried on for gain or profit. Hart-
ford Accident, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 167 Ga. 897, 900,
147 S. E- 50.
Policeman of County.—The term "employee," in this sec-
tion does not apply to a county policeman elected or
appointed by the county, since it is not the relation of em-
ployer and employee which exists between a county and
such a county policeman, but such a county policeman is a
public officer. Goss v. Gordon County, 35 Ga. App. 325, 133
S. E. 68. See also section 3154(8) and annotations thereto.
County Treasurer and Clerk of Board of Roads.—Where
the treasurer of a certain county became ex-officio clerk
of the board of roads and revenues of that county, he was
held to be an officer and not an employee within the meaning
of this act. U. S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Watts, 35 Ga.
App. 447, 133 S. E. 476.
Hernia.—The provisions of sub- section (e) of this sec-
tion which require that "all hernia, inguinal, femoral or
otherwise, so proven to be the result of an injury !jy
accident arising out of and in the course of employment,
shall be treated in a surgical manner by radical opera-
tion," must be taken as subject to the provisions of sec-
tions 3154(26), 3154(27), which limit the liability of the
employer for any such treatment to a period of thirty
days following the accident, and the sum of $100. Southern
Surety Co. v. Byck, 39 Ga. App. 699, 148 S. E. 294, 295.
Independent Contractors and Their Employees. — See
notes under § 3154(20).
II. ACCIDENT IN EMPLOYMENT.
See annotations to section 3154(14), as to what constitutes
injuries arising "out of the employment."
When Injury Arises in Course of Employment.—An injury
is received "in the course of" the employment when it
comes while tne workman is doing the duty which he is
employed to perform. It "arises out of" the employment,
when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon considera-
tion of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be per-
formed and the resulting injury. The causative danger
must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neigh-
borhood. It must be incidental to the character of the
business and not independent of the relation of the master
and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected,
but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in
a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed
from that source as a natural consequence. Georgia Rail
way, etc., Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 410, 129 S. E-
799; Globe Indemnity Co. v. McKendree, 39 Ga. App. 53,
146 S. E. 46.
Under the workmen's compensation law, an employee is
entitled to compensation for injuries from accidents aris-
ing out of and in the course of the employment; that is,
for such occurrences as might have been reasonably con-
templated by the employer as a risk naturally incident
to the nature of the employment, or such as, after the
event, might be seen to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the business of the employment, and to
have arisen out of and flowed from that source as a
natural consequence. Keen v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 34 Ga. App. 257, 129 S. E. 174; United States Fidelity,
etc., Co. v. Green, 38 Ga. App. 50, 142 S. E. 464, 465;
Maddox v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 690, 148 S.
E- 307.
An Accident Arises "Out of" the Employment.—See
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557, 559, 127
S. E. 121, citing and following the statement under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Necessity of Concurrence.—See Refining Co. v. Sheffield,
162 Ga. 656, 134 S. E- 761, and Montgomery v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 39 Ga. App. 210, 146 S. E- 504, following the
paragraphs set out under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Violation of Rule Not Approved by Commission.—An act
done in violation of the rule against the use of the elevator
by employees is not necessarily one out of the scope of the
employment, to the extent of excluding the master and
servant relation; and, where there is nothing to show that
the rule had been approved by the industrial commission, its
violation would not bar compensation. American, etc., Ins.
Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 491, 137 S. E- 113.
Temporary Suspension of Employment.—Where a mem-
ber of a crew on a vessel then lying at the docks, a part of
the terminals of the defendant, obtained shore-leave and,
after two hours spent ashore returned to the terminals and
demanded entrance at a gate, even if the relationship of
master and servant existing between the member of the
crew and the transportation company had been suspended
that relationship came immediately into existence again as
soon as the servant returned to the gate and demanded ad-
mittance. Holliday v. Merchants, etc., Transp. Co., 161
Ga. 949, 132 S. E. 210.
Replacing Belts at Ginnery.—An injury received in replac-
ing the belts at a ginnery, from which they had been bor-
rowed for use in the sawmill of the lumber company, arose
"out of and in the course of" the injured person's em-
ployment with that company. Zurich General Accident, etc.,
Co. v Ellington, 34 Ga. App. 490, 130 S. E- 220.
Accidents on Public Highway.—Where the duties of
the employee entail his presence or travel upon the
highway, the claim for an injury there occurring is not
to be barred because it results from a risk common to
all others upon the highway under like conditions, unless
ic is also common to the general public without regard
to such conditions, and independently of place, employ-
ment, or pursuit. Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree,
39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S. E. 46, 47.
Same—Injury from Falling Tree.—Where an employee,
while traveling in an automobile upon a public highway
in the regular course of his employment, was killed in a
section of woodland through which the road passed, by a
tree which stood near the road and which was blown
upon him and his automobile by a sudden and violent
storm, his death arose out of his employment, within the
meaning of this section. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Mac-
Kendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S. E- 46.
An injury on fishing expedition in navigable waters is
compensable. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Grant, 39 Ga.
App. 668, 146 S. E- 792.
Drowning of watchman while seeking to save his dog
held not to have occurred in performance of his duties
to his master. Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 39
Ga. App. 210, 146 S. E. 504.
Injury While Engaged in Horseplay.—Death of em-
ployee falling on knife when engaged in "horseplay" with
another employee did not "arise out of employment."
Maddox v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 690, 148 S.
E- 307.
Discharge of Pistol Handled by Meddler. -Accidental
discharge of pistol, being handled by fellow servant as
mere meddler, causing death held not to arise out of
employment. United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Green,
38 Ga. App. 50, 142 S. E. 464.
Policeman Injured While at Supper.—A policeman may
be in the discharge of his duty while wiping the gun
furnished him by the city when at home for his supper.
Employers' Inability Assur. Corp. v. Henderson, 37 Ga.
App. 238, 139 S. E. 688.
Sudden Emergency.—An employee does not, in contem-
plation of law, go outside his employment if, when con-
fronted with a sudden emergency, he steps beyond his
regularly designated duties in an attempt to save him-
self from injury, to rescue another employee from danger,
or to save his employer's property. Metropolitan Cas-
ualty Ins. Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38, 146 S. E. 37, 39.
Deceased, in catching hold of a live, smoking, and dis-
i connected wire, lying out in the yard, in spite of the
repeated warnings of a fellow employee, held not to have
acted in any such emergency, so as to bring himself
within the scope and operation of such rule. Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38, 146 S. E-
37, 39.
Evidence.—In Norwick Union Indemnity Co. v. Johnson,
36 Ga. App. 186, 136 S. E- 335, it was held that the evidence
did not authorize the finding that injury arose out of and in
the cause of employment. Conversely, in Accident Corp. v.
Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S. E- 174; Guarantee Corp. v.
Wallace, 35 Ga. App. 571, 134 S. E- 334, and American, etc.,
Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 137 S. E. 113, and
Employers' Inability Assur. Corp. v. Treadwell, 37 Ga.
App. 759, 142 S. E- 182, it was held that the evidence au-
thorized the finding that injury did arise out of and in
the cause of the employment.
The obligation of the employer under the act is not th^t
of an absolute insurer, and the burden is upon the
claimant to prove that the injury arose in the course of
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the employment and also out of it. Savannah River
lumber Co. v. Bush, 37 Ga. App. 539, 140 S. E- 899, 900.
Findings of Fact Conclusive.—It is not enough for the com-
mission to state, merely as a conclusion, in the language of
the statute, that the injury is found to have arisen out of
and in the course of the employment. This does not mean,
however, that it is improper for the commission to give
its conclusion in the language of the statute, where the
findings of fact as stated are sufficient to justify such con-
clusion. What the court meant in Southeastern Express
Co. v. Edmondson, 30 Ga. App. 697, 119 S. E. 39, was that
a mere statement that the commission finds that the in-
jury arose out of and in the course of the employment is
not such a finding of fact as would justify an award, when
it stands unsupported by any other findings of fact to
justify it as a conclusion. American, etc., Ins. Co. v.
Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 490, 137 S. E- 113.
III. DISEASE ARISING FROM ACCIDENT.
When Disease Results Naturally and Unavoidably.—See
Casualty Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 374, 129 S. E. 880,
quoting and following the paragraph set out under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Statements after Occurrence of Injury. — The statements
of the employee tending to show that he had suffered an
injury and that the injury resulted in hernia, having been
made some time after the alleged injury, and being merely
narrative and descriptive of something which had fully taken
place and become a thing of the past, had no probative
value in establishing the fact that he was injured. Bolton
v. Columbia Casualty Co., 34 Ga. App. 658, 130 S. E. ^35.
IV. WILFUL INJURY BY THIRD PERSON.
Assaults for Reasons Not Personal to Employee.—Where
one in the discharge of his duties, is required to travel upon
a train, his exposure to an unprovoked assault by a pas-
senger, who jumps up from his seat and begins shooting at
the passengers, is not a risk incident to the employment,
and the death of the employee as a result of such an assault
is not an injury which arises out of the employment, and
therefore is not compensable. Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557, 137 S. E. 121.
V. COMPENSATION FROM EMPLOYER AND THIRD
PERSON—SUBROGATION.
Applied.—For the application of the provision as to sub-
rogation, see Western Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 35
Ga. App. 363, -133 S'. E- 645.
The lien of an attorney under § 3364 is not superseded
by the subsequently enacted provision contained in sub-
section d of this section giving to the person who has
paid compensation to the employee under the act a right,
by subrogation to the right of the employee, to collect
the amount of the compensation paid, out of a fund which
the employee has recovered in a tort action against an-
other for damages sustained by the employee as a result
of the injury for which the compensation has been paid.
Where, however, the fund recovered in the tort action by
the employee against the person whose wrongful act in-
flicted the injury, as damages for the injury for which
the employee had already received compensation, is suffi-
ciently large to cover both the amount of the compensa-
tion and the amount of the fee for which the attorney
has a lien upon the judgment, the person paying the
compensation is entitled to collect, out of the judgment
in the tort action, the full amount of the compensation
paid, without deduction therefrom of any amount to be
applied towards the satisfaction of the attorney's lien for
fees. Branch & Howard v. Georgia Casualty Co., 39 Ga.
App. 319, 147 S. E. 144.
§ 3154(d). Park's Code.
See § 3154(4).
§ 3154(4). Exemption; notices to reject.
As to presumption where there are less number of em-
ployees than ten, see note to section 3154(15).
Burden of Proving Rejection of Act.—The burden is
upon the employee to prove that the employer rejected
the act. This burden is not carried by showing that the
employer has not complied with the insurance feature of
the act. McCoy v. Southern Lumber Co., 38 Ga. App.
251, 143 S. E- 611, 612.
§§ 3154(g), 3154(h). Park's Code.
See §t§ 3154(7), 3154(8).
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§ 3154(7). Relief from obligations.
See annotations to section 3154(45).
Employee Not Precluded Notwithstanding Agreement. —
An^ employee can not be deprived of the compensation to
which he is entitled thereunder by any agreement between
himself and his employer, notwithstanding its approval by
the industrial commission. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lank-
ford, 35 Ga. App. 599, 600, 134 S. E. 357.
§ 3154(8). Provisions not applicable to public
employees.
Policeman as Employee—Insurance Expressly Covering.
—Although a city policeman may not be an "employee"
within the meaning of that term as used in this act,
yet where an insurance company insures a city under the
workmen's compensation act and the policy expressly cover*
policemen employed by the city and the salaries of the
policemen are taken into consideration in fixing the pre-
mium, the policemen, in so far as the insurance company is
concerned, are employees of the city and entitled to com-
pensation under the policy. Frankfort General Ins. Co. v.
Conduitt, 74 Ind. App. 584 (127 N. E. 212); Kennedy v
Kennedy Mfg. Co., 177 App. Div. 56 (163 N. Y. Supp. 944);
Maryland Casualty' Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App. 759, 134 S. E.
788. See notes to section 3154(2).
Necessity for Election to Come under Act.—Although
the plaintiff policeman may not have elected to come
under the workmen's compensation act, such election is
immaterial to his right to recover compensation as against
the insurance carrier, since the insurance carrier, in
issuing the policy, regards him as an employee, and it
is not necessary for employees of a municipality to elect
to come under the act in order to be entitled to compen-
sation. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Henderson,
37 Ga. App. 238, 139 S. E. 688.
§§ 3154(n)-3154(p). Park's Code.
See §§ 3154(14)-3154(16).
§ 3154. (14). Employee's misconduct.
Duty Required by Statute.—Where an employee while
traveling in an automobile driven by himself was killed
at a public railroad-crossing in a collision between a
train and the automobile, compensation should not be
denied to his dependents, under the workmen's compensa-
tion act, merely because he may have violated the crim
inal law of this State in not having his vehicle undrr
immediate control on approaching the crossing, and in
approaching it at a greater speed than 10 miles per ho'.ir.
Such conduct on his part would not, without more, con-
stitute wilful misconduct, or a wilful failure or refusal to
perform "a duty required by statute," within the mean-
ing of this section. Carroll v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 39
Ga. App. 78, 146 S. E. 788.
Violation of Traffic Law.—The mere violation by an
employee of a criminal statute prescribing rules and
regulations in regard to traffic upon a public highway
can not amount to wilful misconduct or to a wilful fail-
ure or refusal to perform a duty required by statute, so
as to bar compensation under the workmen's compensa-
tion act. Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Pardue, 39 Ga. App.
87, 146 S. E. 638.
Applied in Fulton Bakery v. Williams, 37 Ga. App.
780, 141 S. E. 922.
§ 3154(15). Common carriers.
Evidence Must Show Requisite Number of Employees.—
The judge of the superior court did not err in setting-
aside the award of the industrial commission, upon the
ground that the evidence failed to show that the em
ployer had ten or more employees regularly in service
in the same business. Vandergriff v. Shepard, 39 Ga. App.
791, 148 S. E. 596.
Presumption of Operating under This Act. — There is no
presumption that an employer and an employee are oper-
ating under the provisions of the workmen's compensation
act where it does not appear that the employer regularly
had in service as many as ten employees in the same busi-
ness within this State. Bussell v. Dannenberg Co., 34 Ga.
App. 792, 132 S. E- 230.
Parts of Same Business.
—Under the evidence adduced
before the industrial commission in this case, the cotton-
gin and the planing mill were not parts of the same
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business, within the meaning of this section, although
they were each operated with power from the same boiler
and engine and were owned and controlled by the same
persons; and it appearing from the evidence that the de-
cedent was employed only at the gin, and that less than
ten employees were regularly employed at that business,
and that no election had been made by him and his em-
ployers to become bound by the act, the provisions
thereof were inapplicable. Carswell v. Woodward Bros.,
38 Ga. App. 152, 142 S. E. 907.
§ 3154(16). Action against exempted employer.
Applied in Fulton Bakery Incorporated v. Williams, 35
Ga. App. 681, 134 S. E. 621.
§§ 3154(s), 3154(t). Park's Code.
See §§ 3154(19), 3154(20).
§ 3154(19). Settlements encouraged.
This section is not necessarily in conflict with § 10.
Thomas v. Macken, 37 Ga. App. 624, 141 S. E- 316.
§ 3154(20). Contractor, when liable; recovery.
Employees of Independent Contractor. — See Zurich Gen-
eral Accident, etc., Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S.
Fy. 173, citing and following the paragraph set out under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926. See also, Irving
v. Home Acci. Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 551, 137 S. E. 105.
Whether Person Employed Independent Contractor or
Servant.—Payment by piecework does not necessarily
determine the character of the service but the true test
in determining whether one is engaged as a servant or
occupies the status of an independent contractor ordinarily
lies in the answer to the question whether or not the
work is to be done according to the workman's own
methods, without being subject to the employer's control
except as to results to be obtained. Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Radney, 37 Ga. App. 286, 139 S. E. 832.
Evidence that claimant, engaged in hauling logs to
mill of lumber company, furnished own truck and em-
ployees, bore own expenses, and was paid per thousand
feet, and that company exercised no direction or control
over his work, authorized finding that relation of em-
ployer and employee did not exist between parties. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Radney, 37 Ga. App. 286, 139 S.
E. 832.
One employed by owner of timber furnishing sawmill
to saw the timber into lumber held an independent con-
tractor. Irving v. Home Ace. Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 551,
137 S. E. 105, where the evidence authorizes the inference
that the claimant's husband was employed by the al-
leged employer to operate a sawmill, that for his services
he was paid a certain sum per 1,000 feet for all lumber
cut, the help being paid by the employer, that the em-
ployer retained the right to direct the time and the
manner of the execution of the work; the claimant's hus-
band was not an independent contractor, but was a
servant of the employer and one for whose death com-
pensation is collectible under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Treadwell, 37
Ga. App. 759, 142 S. E. 182, 183, citing Aetna Life In-
surance Co. v. Palmer, 33 Ga. App. 522, 126 S. E. 862;
Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813, 131 S. E- 527.
Relation at the Time of Injury Governs.—Whatever may
have been the previous relation of the deceased employee to
rhe defendant, where the evidence authorizes the finding
that at the time of the accident which resulted in his death
he was an employee of the defendant, and not the employee
of an independent contractor, the authorized finding of the
industrial commission upon this issue can not be disturbed.
See, in this connection, Ocean Accident, etc., Corp. v.
Council, 35 Ga. App. 632, 134 S. E. 331; Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Wilson, 36 Ga. App. 784, 138 S. E- 246.
Institution of Claim against Immediate Employer Pre-
requisite.—Whatever may be the state of evidence as to the
existence of the relation of master and servant between the
defendant and the plaintiff, where that part of this section
which provides that every claim for compensation under this
section shall be in the first instance presented to and insti-
tuted against the immediate employer, has not been complied
with, no recovery can be had against the principal em-
ployer who is not the immediate employer. Zurich General
Accident, etc., Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S. E- W3.
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§ 3154(w). Park's Code.
See § 3154(23).
§ 3154(23). Notice of accident or injury by em-
ployee.
Notice to Immediate Superior. — The evidence authorized
the inference that the representative of the injured em-
ployee immediately gave notice of the injury to the im-
mediate superior of the injured employee, and therefore a
written notice to the employer was not necessary. Ocean
Accident, etc., Corp. v. Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S. E-
174.
It being undisputed that no notice of the accident was
given until after the time prescribed in this section, and
there being evidence to support a finding that the fad-
ure to give timely notice did not come within any of the
exceptions set out in the statute, this court can not dis-
turb the order denying compensation, which was based
on the ground that the claim for compensation was
barred by failure to give the required notice. James v.
Fite, 38 Ga. App. 759, 145 S. E. 536.
§ 3154(y). Park's Code.
See § 3154(25).
§ 3154(25). Time of filing claim.
Provides Adequate Remedy at Law.—Under the pro-
viso of this section the employee has an adequate remedy
at law, and for this reason he can not apply to a court
of equity for relief. Bishop v. Bussey, 164 Ga. 642, 13 !J>
S. E. 212.
Cited in Clark v. Maryland Casualty Co., 39 Ga. App*
668, 148 S. E. 286.
§ 3154(z). Park's Code.
See § 3154(26).
§ 3154(26). Medical attention; failure to pro-
vide.
Cited in Southern Surety Co. v. Byck, 39 Ga. App. 699,
148 S. E. 294, 295.
§§ 3154(aa). 3154(bb). Park's Code.
See §§ 3154(27), 3154(28).
§ 3154(27). Liability for medical attention
limited.
No Liability over One Hundred Debars.—Under the pro-
visions of this section the Industrial Commission has no au-
thority to award more than the limit prescribed by
this section where the insurance carrier made no agreement
that it would be liable for more than the statutory amount.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chandler, 162 Ga.
244, 133 S. E. 237; Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Chandler, 35 Ga. App. 464, 134 S. E. 122.
Cited in Southern Surety Co. v. Byck, 39 Ga. App. 699,
148 S. E. 294, 295.
§ 3154(28). Physical examination; refusal to
submit to treatment.
It is unnecessary in the instant case to decide whether
the refusal by the claimant wife to permit such an au-
topsy, as proved in this section, would, ipso facto and in
all cases, preclude the right to compensation and au-
thorize the dismissal of a claim therefor, and, if not,
whether the statute would have such effect in a case
where the demand for the autopsy had not been made un-
til about a month after the decedent had been buried,
since it appears in this case that the employer, on mak-
ing such demand under the quoted provision, ^ was en-
joined from proceeding with the autopsy, which judg-
ment of the superior court, adjudicating that the employer
was not entitled, under the statute, to such autopsy, re-
mains unexcepted to. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Lay,
39 Ga. App. 273, 146 S. E. 641.
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§ 3154(ff). Park's Code.
See § 3154(32).
§ 3154(32). Compensation payments.
Permanent Loss of Use of Hand—Total.—Under this sec-
tion an employee who suffers a permanent and total loss
• of the use of a hand, by reason of an accident arising
out of and in the course of employment, may be allowed
compensation at the rate of one-half his weekly wages,
for a period of not more than 10 weeks, for total in-
capacity for work, and is entitled to receive one-half of
his weekly wages for an additional period of 150 weeks
as compensation for the permanent handicap. South v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 47, 146 S. E- 45, 46.
Same—Partial.—Under this section an employee who
suffers a permanent but partial loss of the use of a hand
may be allowed compensation at the rate of one-half his
weekly wages for a period of not more than 10 weeks, for
total incapacity for work, and is entitled to receive, for
an additional period of 150 weeks, weekly payments in
such proportion of the weekly payment provided by the
act for total loss of the use of such member as the par-
tial loss bears to the total loss. South v. Indemnity Ins.
Co., 39 Ga. App. 47, 146 S. E. 45, 46.
§ 3154(hh). Park's Code.
See § 3154(34).
§ 3154(34). Injuries not specified in section
3154(32).
Properly construed, the language employed in this sec-
tion evidences an intention on the part of the General
Assembly to subject employers only to liability for acci-
dents, misfortunes, or injuries resulting to their em-
ployees during the time of service or employment, and
the provisions of this section were evidently embodied in
the act with this end in view. American Mutual Liabil-
ity Ins. Co. v. Brock, 165 Ga. 771, 142 S. E. 101.
If the language of this section be so construed as to
render an employer liable for an injury accruing to an
employee in his employment who has already been previ-
ously injured in a prior employment, just as if such em-
ployee had never been previously injured, the incorpora-
tion of this section in the act would be ineffectual and
nugatory. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Brock,
165 Ga. 771, 142 S. E- 101.
Rate of Compensation for Injury to Already Injured Part.
—Where an employee who in childhood had lost a foot and
a part of one leg to within three inches of the knee, suffered
a compensable injury to the remaining portion of his leg,
as a result of which he sustained a 50 per cent, loss of the
use of that portion, he was entitled to compensation for such
Dartial loss of use at the rate of 50 per cent, of the amount
which he should have received for the loss of a leg or for
the loss of use of a leg, irrespective of the previous dis-
ability or injury. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v.
Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772, 135 S. E. 103.
§ 3154(kk). Park's Code.
See § 3154(37).
§ 3154(37). Accidents outside of State.
Commission Has Jurisdiction.—Though the death of
claimant's husband resulted from injuries received in an
accident which occurred outside of the State of Georgia,
the Industrial Commission of this State was not without
jurisdiction to entertain the case growing out of a clahn
for compensation. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S. E. 121.
. § 3154(11). Park's Code.
See §. 3154(38).
§ 3154(38). Death; funeral; dependents.
See notes under § 3154(39).
Cited in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Washington, 37 Ga. App. 140, 139 S. E. 359, 360.
§ 3154(mm). Park's Code.
See § 3154(39).
List of dependents; termination of§ 3154(39).
dependence.
In General.—Dependency, as contemplated in the act,
does not arise solely by reason of the employment of the
employee and the contribution by him from his wages
to the support of the claimant, but may arise otherwise
as out of services rendered to the claimant by the em-
ployee, who is his child, in work about the home. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S. IS-
189, 190.
Payable to Dependents Only—Death of Dependent.—The
compensation act contemplates that compensation awarded
thereunder shall be awarded to dependents only. It fol-
lows that where compensation, payable in weekly install-
ments under the terms of the act, has been awarded to
a widow on account of the death of her husband as a re-
sult of injuries received by him arising out of and in the
course of his employment, and the widow dies before all
the installments awarded her have become due and pay-
able, the installments becoming due and payable after her
death are not payable to her estate. United States Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Co. v. Hairston, 37 Ga. App. 234, 139 S.
E. 685.
Same—Construction of Award.—Where, after the death
of the widow, an administratrix is appointed for her es-
tate and the original award of compensation is by the in-
dustrial commission amended by an order which recites
the death of the widow as claimant, and which provides
that the "compensation due" the claimant "is now due
and payable to" the administratrix, this amended order
of the industrial commission, in so far as it provides that
the compensation shall be payable to the administratrix,
will not be construed as making an illegal award to the
administratrix of all the remaining installments accruing
and becoming due after the death of the claimant.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hairston, 37
Ga. App. 234, 139 S. E- 685.
Father Dependent upon Minor Child.—-Where it appears
that the father, who is the head of the family, is in fact
dependent upon his minor child, an award of compensa-
tion to the father for the death of the child is not in-
valid as being for the father and the use of himself and
his wife and another minor child. Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S. F. 189, 190.
Conclusive Presumption as to Dependency of Child under
18—Construction of Stepfather Clause.—Under this section
a child under eighteen years of age is conclusively presumed
to be wholly dependent on the parent, and is therefore en-
citled to compensation for the homicide of the parent in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the statute. The clause of
the act providing that the term "child" as thus used shall
include "stepchild" and that the term "parent" shall include
"step-parents" is to be liberally construed as enlarging the
sphere of conclusive dependency in favor of such a child,
so as to include a right which would not otherwise con-
clusively exist. The provision is not to be construed as
intended to exclude by unnecessary implication a plainly
established claim for the homicide of an actual parent.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 35 Ga. App. 214, 132 S. E.
265. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Washington, 37 Ga. App. 140, 139 S. F- 359, 360.
A. child under eighteen is conclusively presumed to be de-
pendent upon his father. Hence if his mother is divorced
and marries another man who becomes his stepfather, this
section establishes a principle of double dependency, and the
stepfather clause of the section does not preclude him from
recovering for the homicide of his actual father. Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 35 Ga. App. 214, 220, 132 S. E- 265.
Evidence.
—
Evidence held to show a state of partial de-
pendency. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Washington, 37 Ga. App. 140, 139 S. E. 359, 360.
Where the evidence shows, without dispute, that tiie
employee for whose injury or death compensation is
sought had been employed for a period less than three
months prior to the accident, the evidence does not af-
firmatively disprove the fact of dependency for three
months, as required under this section as a condition to
the allowance of compensation. Maryland Casualty Co.
v Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S. E. 189, 190.
Finding as to Desertion Conclusive When Supported by
Any Evidence.—The findings of the industrial commission
on questions of fact, which would include any issue upon
the question of voluntary desertion by a claimant wife, if
supported by any evidence, are conclusive. United States
Casualty Co. v. Matthews, 35 Ga. App. 526, 133 S. E. 875;
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Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 812, 129 S.
F. 75; Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Council, 35 Ga.
App. 632, 134 S. F. 331.
Admission of Desertion Amounting to Conclusion of Law.
—The finding of the commissioner before whom the case
was originally tried, that the claimant was not entitled to
compensation on account of her admission "that she had vol-
untarily left her husband," was a conclusion of law, based
upon her own testimony; and hence reversible. Ocean Ac-
cident & Guaranty Corp. v. Council, 35 Ga. App. 632, 134
S. F. 331.
Question of Fact.
—Except where the workmen's compen-
sation act specifically creates a presumption of dependency'
in favor of named classes, the question of dependency is
one of fact rather than of law. United States Fidelity cc
Guaranty Co. v. Washington, 37 Ga. App. 140, 139 S. F-
359, 360.
§ 3154(ss). Park's Code.
See § 3154(45).
§ 3154(45). Review of awards.
See annotations to section 3154(58).
Waiver of Right by Contract.—See Globe Indemnity Com-
pany v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599, 134 S. F. 357, citing and
following the paragraph set out under this catchline in
Georgia Code of 1926. See notes of this case under section
3154(50).
Review for Change in Condition.
—Under this section up-
on, application to review an award for a change in con-
dition, the essentials leading up to the award are to be
taken as res judicata, but the physical condition of the
employee remains open to inquiry. South v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 47, 146 S. F. 45, 46, citing Globe
Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599, 134 S. F.
357.
Thus, where the evidence before the industrial com-
mission upon such review authorizes a finding that there
has been a change in the condition of the claimant, a
new award of compensation, based upon such changed
condition, may be entered, although the original awaid
may have been based upon a disability found by the
commission, at the time of making such original award,
to be permanent. South v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 39 Ga.
App. 47, 146 S. F. 45, 46.
However, under this section, no review by the com-
mission of an award of compensation previously made
""shall affect such award as regards any monies paid.''
Accordingly, while the commission may, upon reviewing
an award previously made, make a new award "ending,
diminishing, or increasing the compensation previously
awarded," such an award can not be made retroactive
so as to be made effective as of the date of the original
award, since to do so would ''affect the award previously
made as regards" monies paid, but the new award can
only become effective as of the time it is entered, and
the claimant can not be required to account for monies
already paid him under the previous award. South v. In-
demnity Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 47, 146 S. F. 45, 46.
When the commission found on review that the condi-
tion of the claimant had changed, he was subsequently en-
titled only to compensation as for a permanent partial loss,
instead of as for a permanent total loss, of the use of the
injured member. But the commission was not authorized
to discontinue his compensation entirely, but should have
entered a new award allowing him subsequent diminished
compensation for the continuing permanent partial loss of
the use of such member in the proportion that such par-
tial loss bears to such total loss. South v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 47, 146 S. F- 45, 46.
Same—Wrongful Dismissal by Deputy Commissioner.—
Where upon an application by the insurer for an award
ending compensation, on the ground of a change in con-
dition, the deputy commissioner, appointed by the com-
mission for the purpose of taking testimony, acted be-
yond his authority in dismissing the case, it was compe-
tent for the commission to treat the application as stilt
pending and to consider the testimony taken by the deputy
commissioner, with that subsequently introduced, in de-
termining the final disposition to be made of the appli-
cation. Robertson v. Aetna Fife Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App.
703, 141 S. F. 504, 505.
§ 3154(xx). Park's Code.
See § 3154(50).
§ 3154(50). Industrial Commission created.
Administrative Body—Jurisdiction.—The Industrial Com-
mission is not- a court of general jurisdiction, nor even of
limited common law jurisdiction, but it is an industrial
commission, made so by express terms of the act of the leg-
islature to administer its provisions as provided therein;
as such administrative commission it possesses only such
jurisdiction, powers, and authority as are conferred upon it
by the legislature, or such as arise therefrom by necessary
implication to carry out the full and complete exercise of
the powers granted. Gravitt v. Ga. Casualty Co., 158 Ga.
613, 123 S. F- 897; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35
Ga. App. 599, 601, 134 S. F. 357.
§ 3154(ccc). Park's Code.
See § 3154(55).
§ 3154(55). Agreements.
Not in Conflict with Section 10.—This section is not
necessarily in conflict with section 10 of the Civil Code
of 1910, which provides that "a person may waive or re-
nounce what the law has established in his favor, when
he does not thereby injure others or affect the public in-
terest." Thomas v. Macken, 37 Ga. App. 624, 141 S. F-
316.
Finality of Award upon the Agreement of Parties. —
Where the employer and the claimant reach an agreement
in regard to compensation, and a memorandum of the agree-
ment is filed with, and approved by, the industrial com-
mission, and thereupon the commission makes an award to
the claimant, and notice of the award is given to the in-
terested parties, the award is final and cannot be set aside,
diminished, or increased, unless the parties disagree as to
the continuance of any weekly payment under the agree-
ment. Lattimore v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 35
Ga. App. 250, 133 S. F. 291.
§§ 3154(eee)-3154(hhh). Park's Code.
See §§ 3154(57) -3154(60).
§ 3154(57). Conduct of hearings.
Award Directed against Both Employer and Insurer. —
The award of the industrial commission should be directed
against both the employer and the insurance carrier instead
of against the insurance carrier only. Hartford Accident,
etc., Co. v. Hall, 36 Ga. App. 574, 576, 137 S. F. 415.
But an award against an insurer should not be set
aside at the instance of that party upon the ground that
at was not also against the employer. An omission in
this regard, if error at all as against the insurer, could
amount only to an error of form and not of substance.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Newton, 37
Ga. App. 70, 139 S. F. 365, 366.
An award which is directed both to the employer and
to the insurance carrier, as well as to the claimant, and
orders the insurance carrier, "for the" employer, to pay to
the claimant certain sums of money specified, is not an
award against the insurance carrier alone, but is an
award against both the employer and the insurance car-
rier. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Newton,
37 Ga. App. 70, 139 S. F. 365, 366.
Statement of Findings.—-The requirement of this section
that an award of the commission be accompanied by a
statement of the findings of fact contemplates a concise
but comprehensive statement of the cause and circum-
stances of the accident, as the commission shall find it to
have occurred; and it is not enough to state merely in
the language of the statute that the injury is or is not
found to have arisen out of and in the course of employ-
ment. In other words the statement must support the
legal conclusions arrived at. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38, 146 S. F. 37, 39.
§ 3154(58). Review.
Discretion of Commission as to Rule 26.—Rule 26 of the
industrial commission, laying down the conditions upon
which the full commission will hear evidence on review, is
to be enforced or relaxed in the discretion of the commission,
without interference by the courts. American, etc., Ins. Co.
v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 137 S. F. 113.
Adequate Remedy Provided.—If the industrial commis-
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sion, on the filing of an application by an employer as
provided in this section, causes written notice to be
served upon the injured employee or his dependents, the
person so notified may object to the jurisdiction of the
industrial commission on any ground that will show an
absence of authority of the commission to inquire into
the matter. Ballenger v. Rock Run Iron Co., 166 Ga.
490, 143 S. E. 595.
Where the industrial commission causes notice to Le
served as indicated above, the employee or his depend-
ents having a remedy at law as stated in the preceding
npte, by filing with the industrial commission objections
to the jurisdiction of that body, a court of equity will
not entertain a petition by such injured employee or his
dependents, in which the only relief sought is a writ of
injunction to prevent the industrial commission from tak-
ing and exercising jurisdiction in the matter. Ballenger
v Rock Run Iron Co., 166 Ga. 490, 143 S. F. 595.
Finality of Award.—In Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Fattimore, 165 Ga. 501, 141 S. F- 195, it was held,
that the award submitted by the commission to the de-
pendent and the insurance carrier was not such a final
award as to deprive the commission of jurisdiction to re-
view and revise the award submitted, and enter a filial
award in the case approving the agreement.
§ 3154(59). Appeals to Superior Court; writ of
error.
Exception Must Point out Error.—An exception on appeal
from an award of the industrial committee, on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence must point out the particular evi-
dence objected to or the ground of objections. Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App. 759, 134 S. F. 788.
Brief of Evidence.—The Code provisions, requiring that,
in motions for new trials and in certain other cases, a
brief of the evidence shall be made, and shall be ap-
proved by the trial judge, do not apply to compensation
cases. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bohan-
non, 36 Ga. App. 34, 135 S. F. 319.
Raising New Point on Appeal. — See Fidelity Co. v.
Christian, 35 Ga. App. 326, 133 S. F- 639, and Ocean Accident,
etc., Corp. v. Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S. F- 174, citing
and following the statement made under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Findings of Fact Conclusive.—See Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 35
Ga. App. 182, 132 S. F- 240. Fidelity Co. v. Christian, 35 Ga.
App. 326, 133 S. F- 639; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Miller, 36
Ga. App. 631, 137 S. F- 788; Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Fngland, 160 Ga. 810, 129 S. F- 75; Robertson v.
Aetna Fife Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 703, 141 S. F- 504;
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38,
146 S. F- 37, 39; Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Fardue, 39
Ga. App. 87, 146 S. F- 638, 639; Washington v. United
States Fidelity, etc., Co., 39 Ga. App. 481, 147 S. F.
533, 534; Southern Surety Co. v. Byck, 39 Ga. App. 699,
148 S. F. 294, 295; United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v.
Price, 38 Ga. App. 346, 144 S. F- 146, 147; Savannah River
Lumber Co. v. Bush, 37 Ga. App. 539, 140 S. F. 899, 900,
following the statement made under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
But the judgment of the superior court affirming the
award of the industrial commission in a case where the evi-
dence fails to show that the death of the deceased arose out
of and in the course of his employment, will be reversed
upon appeal to the court of appeals. Georgia Casualty Co.
v. Kilburn, 36 Ga. App. 761, 138 S. F- 257.
Affirmance of Award.—The judgment of the superior
court approving the award must be affirmed where the
appellate court cannot say that there is no evidence to
support the finding of the industrial commission. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Turk, 36 Ga. App. 199, 136 S. F- 87.
Affirmance of the award made by Commission, held
proper. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Grant, 39 Ga. App.
668, 146 S. F- 792; Standard Ace. Ins. Co. .v. Pardue, 39
Ga. App. 87, 146 S. F. 638; Metropolitan Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S. F- 121; Hartford Acci-
dent, etc., Co. v. Durden, 38 Ga. App. 182, 143 S. F- 511,
512; Lattimore v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 67
Ga. App. 688, 141 S. F- 669, 670; Brown v. United States
Fidelity, etc., Co., 38 Ga. App. 461, 144 S. F- 343.
Recoinmital of Case.—Held proper in Maryland Casu-
alty Co. v. Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S. F. 189, 190;
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Washington,
37 Ga. App. 140, 139 S. F. 359, 360.
A judgment recommitting the case sufficiently indi-
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cates the question for determination on another hearing
before Commission where it recites that "the evidence is
insufficient to establish dependency for a period of three
months prior to the injury," and that "the evidence is
not sufficiently definite and clear as to expense of last
illness and funeral bills, and the Commission shall also re-
ceive testimony as to these amounts." Maryland Casualty
Co v. Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S. F. 189, 190.
Sufficiency of Evidence Equivalent to Verdict, etc.—-See
Fidelity Co. v. Christian, 35 Ga. App. 326, 133 S. F- 639,
following the statement made under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
Correct Order Not Affected by Erroneous Finding as to
Notice.—Where the order of the commission denying com-
pensation is not erroneous upon a given ground and was not
affected by an erroneous finding as to lack of notice, it will
be sustained irrespective of any error affecting a finding
that there was a lack of notice. Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Fngland, 34 Ga. App. 354, 129 S. F- 446.
Court Authorized to Enter Proper Judgment.—On the
appeal of the claimant from an award made on an erroneous
basis the superior court is authorized to enter the proper
final judgment upon the findings as made. American, etc.,
Ins. Co. v. Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772, 135 S. F- 103.
Power to Re-Open Case.—"The Georgia workmen's com-
pensation act provides for an appeal from the award itself
(Park's Code Supp. § 3154(ggg), Michie's Ga. Code, §
3154(59), as rendered by the commission; but the com-
mission has no power or authority to re-open a case for
the purpose of amending its award, by making it opera-
tive against one of the defendants personally, instead of
against the trade-name under which that defendant con-
ducted his business. If it has no jurisdiction for such
purpose, then the superior court would also be without
jurisdiction for that purpose, on appeal. Bishop v. Bus-
sey, 164 Ga. 642, 646, 139 S. F. 212.
§ 3154(60).
commission.
Judgment in accordance with
In General.—In a case in which the State Industrial
Commission has entered an award against an employer,
allowing compensation for injuries sustained by an em-
ployee (and in which no further proceedings were had up-
on appeal), and thereafter the employer fails to comply
with the terms of the award, such award may be en-
forced by suit and judgment in the superior court of the
employer's residence. Savannah Lumber Co. v. Burch,
165 Ga. 706, 142 S. F- 83.
If the insurance carrier becomes insolvent or for any
reason the security fails to comply with his obligation,
the liability for compensation which has been established
by the industrial commission may be enforced by judg-
ment against the employer. Savannah Lumber Co. v.
Burch, 165 Ga. 706, 142 S. F. 83.
Cited in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Hairston, 37 Ga. App. 234, 139 S. F- 685.
§ 3154(mmm). Park's Code.
See § 3154(65).
§ 3154(65). Records and reports of injuries
and termination of incapacity. — (a) Every em-
ployer who accepts the provisions of this Act
relative to the payment of compensation shall
hereafter keep a record of all injuries, fatal or
otherwise, received by his employees in the
course of their employment, on 'blanks approved
by the commission. Within ten days after the
occurrence and knowledge thereof, as provided
in section 23, of an injury to an employee re-
quiring medical or surgical treatment, or caus-
ing his absence from work for more than seven
days, a report thereof shall be made in writing
and mailed to the commission on blanks to be
procured from the commission for this purpose,
(b) The records of the commission, in so far
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as they refer to accidents, injuries, and settle-
ments shall not be open to the public; but only
to the parties satisfying the commission of their
interest in such records and the right to inspect
them. (c) Upon the termination of the dis-
ability of the injured employee, the employer
shall make a supplementary report to the com-
mission on blanks to be procured from the com-
mission for the purpose, (d) The said report
shall contain the name, nature, and location of
the business of the employer, the name, age, sex,
and wages and occupation of the injured em-
ployee, and shall state date and hour of the ac-
cident causing the injury, the nature and cause
of the injury, and such other information as
may be required by the commission, (e) Any
such employer who refuses or wilfully neglects
to make the report required by this section shall
be liable for a penalty of not more than twenty-
five dollars for each refusal or wilful neglect, to
be assessed by a commissioner in an open hear-
ing, with the right of review as in other cases.
In the event the employer has transmitted the
report to the insurance carrier for the transmis-
sion by the insurance carrier to the Industrial
Commission, the insurance carrier wilfully neg-
lecting or failing to transmit the report when
made to the insurance carrier by the employer
shall be liable and shall pay the fine, (f) Every
employer shall, upon "request of the commission,
report the number of its employees, hours of
their labor, and number of days of operation of
business. Acts 1929, p. 358, § 1.
§ 3154(ttt). Park's Code.
See § 3154(71).
§ 3154(71). Policy or contract of insurance.
Construction of Policy.—Where an insurance policy is-
sued to an employer assuring against liability under the
Workmen's Compensation Act provides that it "is written
to cover a portable sawmill, an American outfit using a
case tractor," and further provides that "it is hereby
agreed and understood that this policy covers only the
mills specifically described above, and all other work or
operations of the assured are excluded from this policy
coverage," the words "an American outfit using a case
tractor" are words of description and identification, and
are not words of limitation or warranty. Employers' Ina-
bility Assur. Corp. v. Treadwell, 37 Ga. App. 759, 142 S.
E. 182, 183.
Same
—
Liability under Policy.—And where, at the time
oi the injury received by an employee covered by the
policy, the mill had been changed, and there had been
substituted therefor another mill with a longer carriage,
but where there had been no further change or substitu-
tion of any other part of the outfit, but the engine, the
tractor, the saw, the belting, and all other equipment,
except the mill, had remained the same, the identity of
the mill outfit covered by the policy was the same, and
there is a liability under the policy for an accident tj
an employee received from a log falling upon him as he
was loading it upon a log cart to be transported to the
mill, where the accident arose out of and in the course
of his employment. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v.
Treadwell, 37 Ga. App. 759, 142 S. E. 182, 183.
Effect of Insurer's Default.—In Savannah Lumber Co.
v. Burch, 36 Ga. App. 621, 137 S. E- 786, it was held that
the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to a
widow's petition against the employer of her deceased hus-
band workman, for the amount of awarded compensation
remaining unpaid because of receivership of insurer.
Cited in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Newton, 37 Ga. App. 70, 139 S. E- 365.
§ 3154(xxx). Park's Code.
See § 3154(75).
§ 3154(75). Prorating of commission expenses;
reports; audits.— (a) The rates, charged by all
carriers of insurance, including the parties to any
reciprocal, or other plan or scheme writing in-
surance against the liability for compensation
under this Act, shall be fair, reasonable, and
adequate, with due allowance for merit rating,
and all risks of the same kind and degree of haz-
ard shall be written at the same rate by the same
carrier. The basic rates for policies or contracts
of insurance against liability for compensation un-
der this Act shall be filed with the Insurance
Commissioner for his approval, and no policy of
insurance against such liability shall be valid un-
til the basic rates thereof have been filed with,
approved, and not subsequently disapproved by
the Insurance Commissioner. Any plan or
scheme for modification of such basic rates by
physical inspection or experience or merit rat-
ing shall likewise be filed with the Insurance
Commissioner and by him approved, and no car-
rier of insurance shall write any such policy or
contract until after filing and approval of a basic
rate therefor and a schedule or plan to be em-
ployed in producing individual rates for risks.
(b) Each such insurance carrier, including the
parties to any mutual, reciprocal, or other plan
or scheme writing insurance against the liability
for compensation under this Act, shall 'report to
the Insurance Commissioner as provided by law,
and in accordance with such reasonable rules as
the Insurance Commissioner may at any time
prescribe for the purpose of determining the sol-
vency of the carrier, and the adequacy or rea-
sonableness of its rates and reserves; for such
purpose the Insurance Commissioner may in-
spect all the books and records of such insurance
carrier and its agent or agents, and examine its
agents, officers, and directors under oath. (c)
Said commissioner shall have the power to, in
such manner and by such means as he may deem
proper and adequate, gather statistics and infor-
mation and make investigations concerning rates
for such insurance, and to that end he may take
into consideration the income and earnings, from
any and every source whatever, of any such com-
pany and may call upon members of the Indus-
trial Commission to sit with him in an advisory
capacity at any investigation or hearing concern-
ing such rates. Authority is hereby conferred
upon the Insurance Commissioner to make such
arrangements with the Industrial Commission as
may be agreeable to the Industrial Commission
for collecting, compiling, preserving, and pub-
lishing statistical and other data in connection
with the work of regulating workmen's compen-
sation insurance rates; and whenever he deems
proper, with the consent of the Industrial Com-
mission, he may appoint members of the Indus-
trial Commission, or its employees, as special
agents of the Insurance Commissioner to take
testimony and make reports with reference to
any matter involving questions of workmen's
compensation insurance rates. Any party at in-
terest may appeal from any decision of the In-
surance Commissioner, made under this section,
in the manner provided by law. Acts 1929, p.
360, § 2.
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FOURTH TITLE
Of Relations Arising from Other Contracts
CHAPTER 1
Of Partnerships
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
§ 3155. (§ 2626.) How Created.
This Section Not Exhaustive. — As between themselves,
"the intent of the parties is the true test of a partnership,
which may be created by a contract giving rights or im-
posing liabilities differing from those from which the law
ordinarily infers a partnership." Allgood v. Feckoury, 36 Ga.
App. 42, 43, 135 S. E. 314, citing Huggins v. Huggins, 117
Ga. 151, 43 S. E. 759.
§ 3157. (§ 2628). Open partner, etc.
See notes to § 3180.
(§ 2629.) What constitutes a partner-§ 3158.
ship.
In General.
—Whenever a joint enterprise, a joint risk, a
joint sharing of expenses, and a joint interest in the profits
and losses concur, a partnership exists. Smith v. Hancock,
163 Ga. 222, 231, 136 S. E. 52.
Joint and Common Interest Distinguished.—A joint in-
terest in partnership property is another and a very distinct
thing from a common interest in the profits alone. The
former interest is that of an owner, who has a right to dis-
pose of the profits, and that makes him a partner; but a
common interest in the profits confers no title jointly with
the other and gives no power to control and dispose of the
profits as owner. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222, 231, 136
S. E. 52.
No partnership was created by an agreement that the
plaintiff should conduct in the defendant's name a store
which was to be owned and supplied with goods by the de-
fendant, and should receive an equal share of the net profits.
Allgood v. Feckoury, 36 Ga. App. 42, 135 S. E. 314. For a
case where the contract between the parties was held to
constitute a partnership, see Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222,
136 S. E- 52. See also Barrow v. Georgia Chemical Works,
34 Ga. App. 31, 128 S'. E- 14; Nellis & Co. v. Green, 36 Ga.
App. 684, 137 S. E. 843.
§ 3160. (§ 2631). Death of a partner as it af-
fects continuance.
Applied in Clark v.
248, 145 S. E. 73.
Tennessee Chemical Co., 167 Ga.
§ 3162. (§ 2633). How it is dissolved.
Applied in Clark v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 167 Ga.
248, 145 S. E. 73.
§ 3164. (§ 2635.) Effect of dissolution.
Notice to Creditor.—The fact that a creditor may have
had no sufficient notice of the dissolution of the partnership
does not affect the actual right of one of the erstwhile mem-
bers to contract on behalf of the partnership. Citizens Nat.
Bank v. Jennings, 35 Ga. App. 553, 555, 134 S. E- 114.
Applied in Clark v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 167 Ga.
248, 145 S. E. 73.
§ 3166. (§ 2637.) Denial by defendant
Sufficiency of Denial.—A plea of no partnership in which
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it was set up that at the time of the execution of a note
there was in fact no such partnership, for the reason that
the partnership had a short time before been dissolved, is
demurrable where it fails to allege that notice of such dis-
solution had been given as required by law, or that both the
original payee and the present holder of the note, at the
time of the accrual of their respective rights in it, had ac-
tual knowledge of such dissolution. Cooke v. Faucett, 35
Ga. App. 209, 132 S. E. 268.
ARTICLE 2
Rights and Liabilities of Partners among
Themselves
§ 3172. (§ 2643.) Power of each partner.
Negotiable Paper.—One of the defenses which may be
maintained against the suit of a bona fide holder upon a
negotiable instrument is a plea of non est factum. But "if
a partnership, under any circumstances, has the implied
right and power to execute notes, one to whom they are
offered in the market has a right to presume that they were
issued under the circumstances which gave the requisite
authority." 8 Corpus Juris, 522. Cooke v. Faucett, 35 Ga.
App. 209, 132 S. E. 268.
§ 3176. (§ 2647.) Surviving partner.
Statute of Limitations.—After the dissolution of a partner-
ship by death of one of the partners, the statute of limita-
tions does not commence to run in favor of the surviving
partner against the estate of the deceased partner as long
as there are debts due by the partnership to be paid, or debts
due it to be collected, or until a sufficient time has elapsed
since the dissolution of the firm to raise the presumption
that all debts due from the partnership have been paid, and
that all debts due to it have been collected. Purvis v. John-
son, 163 Ga. 698, 137 S. E. 50.
It will be presumed that, before the expiration of a period
of nine years, all debts due by the firm had been paid and
those due to the firm had been collected; and tolling from
the statute of limitations the five years allowed for the
taking out of administration upon the estate of the deceased
partner, the suit as to an accounting for the personal assets
of the partnership, which was not brought within four years
of the expiration of the five-year period, was barred. Purvis
v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698, 137 S. E- 50.
ARTICLE 3
Rights and Liabilities of Partners to Third
Persons
§ 3180. (§ 2651). Bound by acts of partner.
Ostensible Partner.—Where one allows the continued
use of his name as partner after retiring from a particu-
lar business, and thereby induces another to deal with the
business as a partnership, such ostensible partner will
be estopped to deny the partnership relation as to acts
within the ordinary scope of such business under § 3157-
But, in order to hold the ostensible partner liable, the
contract must be in relation to and in the scope of that
particular business or adventure which the retiring part-
ner knowingly allowed, under this section and § 3182.
Leidy v. Gould, 37 Ga. App. 410, 140 S. E. 400.
§ 3188. (§ 2659). Power after dissolution.
See under section 3164 note "Notice to Creditor."
Applied in Clark v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 167 G-
248, 145 S. E. 73.
§ 3190. (§ 2661). Garnishment on partner's
interest.
Not Limited to Judgment Creditor.—The right of a
creditor to subject to the process of garnishment his
§ 3216 STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 3222
debtor's interest in a partnership is not limited to a judg-
ment creditor only; but the debtor's interest in the part-
nership assets may be reached by a garnishment issued
on a suit pending against the debtor. Oscilla Grocery Co.
v. Wilcox Ives & Co., 37 Ga. App. 718, 141 S. E- 822.
A judgment against a partner is not a lien upon his
individual interest in the firm property, and such interest
is not liable to levy and sale under execution upon such
judgment, even after dissolution, but must be reached
by process of garnishment. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Pendergrass Banking Co., 164 Ga. 302, 138 S. E. 223.
CHAPTER 2
Debtor and Creditor
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
SECTION 1
Relation Defined, etc.
§ 3216. (§ 2687). Rights of creditors favored.
See notes to § 5419.
§ 3217. (§ 2688.) Equitable assets.
What Would "Jeopard the Collections."—To refuse eq
uitable interference by appointment of a receiver for devi-
see's interest in vested remainder, in suit by his creditors
against executor would "jeopard the collections" of debts,
within the meaning of this section. Bank of Statesboro
v. Waters, 165 Ga. 848, 851, 142 S. E. 156.
Insurance Policy.—The cash surrender and cash loan value
of a policy of life insurance accruing at the end of a specified
tontine period is not subject to garnishment by creditors of
the insured; nor will such value be made available to the
judgment creditor of the insured by a court of equity in pro-
ceedings instituted for the purpose of obtaining equitable
relief analogous to a process of garnishment at law. Farm-
ers, etc., Bank v. National Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 793, 131 fc>.
E- 9A2.
§ 3220. (§ 2691). Compulsory election.
Sale under Power in Security Deed.—This is not ap-
plied to restrain sale under power in security deeds,
where equity in lands is set apart as year's support. Red-
man
-v. Thaxton, 167 Ga. 646, 146 S. E. 445.
SECTION 2
Statute of Frauds
§ 3222. (§ 2693.) Obligations which must be
in writing.
Statute Must Be Pleaded.—A plea necessary to make
defense under. Smith v. Marbut- Williams Lumber Co.,
S7 Ga. App. 239, 139 S. E. 590.
Particular Premises Held within. Provision.—Oral prom
ise held within the statute, where creditor of A, to in-
duce B to lend money to A for payment of the debt,
promised B to reimburse him if A failed to do so.
Scheuer Brothers & Co. v. Hushinsky, 37 Ga. App. 318,
140 S. E. 394.
An agreement to indorse the notes of another, given m
payment of the latter's debt to a third person, must com-
ply with the requirements of this section. Massell Realty
Co. v. Hanbury, 165 Ga. 534, 548, 141 S. E. 653.
Statute Makes Contract Unenforceable Merely.—A parol
contract unenforceable by reason of the statute of frauds
is nevertheless a valid, subsisting contract as between per-
sons other than the contracting parties, for purposes other
than a recovery upon it. Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Per-
kins Mfg. Co., 35 Ga. App. 767, 134 S. E. 831. And therefore
the fact that a contract may be required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing will not preclude the establishment
of its contents by parol, where it has not in fact been re-
duced to writing. Id.
Presumption That Contract Is Written.—See Beasley v.
Howard, 34 Ga. App. 102, 128 S. E- 203, citing Kiser Com-
pany v. Padrick, 30 Ga. App. 642, 118 S. E- 791. Bank v.
Lovvorn Grocery Co., 34 Ga. App. 772, 131 S. E- 301, citmg
Ansley v. Hightower, 120 Ga. 719, 48 S. E- 197, following
statement made under this catchline in Georgia Code of 1926.
Promise Not within Provision—Promise to Pay Physician.
—Where a physician renders professional services to a minor
child of a tenant, solely upon the credit of the landlord's
promise to pay for such services, the promise is an original
and not a collateral undertaking, and is not within the stat-
ute of frauds. Pope v. Ellis, 34 Ga. App. 185, 129 S. E- U.
Same—Agreement to Collect or "Guarantee" Loan.—Neither
an agent's promise to collect a loan nor an agreement, as a
part of a contract of agency, to "guarantee" it, constitutes
a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage
of another, and the statute of frauds is not applicable. Ben-
ton v. Roberts, 35 Ga. App. 749, 134 S. E- 846.
Contract Partly in Writing.—A contract for the sale of
land, which is partly in writing and partly in parol, is not
enforceable, by reason of the statute of frauds. Thompson
v. Colonial Trust Co., 35 Ga. App. 12, 131 S. E- 921.
Contract for Resale of Land.—A contract to resell land
to the original seller is a contract for the sale of land which
comes under the statute of frauds. Amerson v. Cox, 35
Ga. App. 83, 132 S. E. 105.
Optional Contract Included.—An option to purchase rented
premises is a contract required by the statute of frauds
to be in writing by this section. Robinson v. Odom, 35 Ga.
App. 262, 133 S. E- 53. See also Kennington v. Small, 36
Ga. App. 176, 136 S. E- 326.
Joint Adventure in Lands Not within Section.—An
agreement to enter a joint adventure for the purpose of deal-
ing in lands into which one is to put property and another
his service, and which does not contemplate a transfer of
title is not within the statute, notwithstanding it may be
intended that as an incident of the enterprise one of the
parties may take title to lands for the benefit of both.
Manget v. Carlton, 34 Ga. App. 556, 130 S. E- 604.
Contract of Resale.
—See Singer Company v. Gray & Son,
34 Ga. App. 345, 129 S. E- 555, following the principle stated
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Sufficiency of Writing.—All that the statute of frauds
requires is written evidence of the agreement. The mem-
orandum may even consist of entries made by the party
to be charged on his or his agent's books. So entries in
the records of a corporation may prove a contract by it.
Massell Realty Co. v. Hanbury, 165 Ga. 534, 548, 141 S.
E. 653.
Every essential element of a sale must be expressed in
writing to meet the requirements of this section. Tip-
pins v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 415, 417, 51 S. E- 410; Massell
Realty Co. v. Hanbury, 165 Ga. 534, 544, 141 S. E. 653.
Where a party relies upon a written memorandum, it
must show, not only the terms of the contract, but also
that both parties assented to those terms. It is not nec-
essary that both parties assent in writing, but the writing
must show that both parties assented. Otherwise the
writing does not evidence a contract. In re Hartley
(Ga.), 29 Fed. (2d) 916, 918.
Implied Trust.—Parol evidence held insufficient, as to
payment of purchase-price of land, to raise implied trust.
Scott v. Williams, 167 Ga. 386, 388, 145 S. E. 651.
Lease.—A contract sought to be canceled in this pro-
ceeding, purporting to be a lease of real estate for a pe-
riod of seven years, falls under this section. Baxley
Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359, 140 S. E. 869.
Agreement between maker of security deed and grantee
therein, as to bidding in the property at sale under power
therein, for the purpose of perfecting sale between them
and defeating and delaying liens of other creditors, was
illegal and not enforceable. Chenoweth v. Williams, 39
Ga. App. 347, 147 S. E. 180.
Sufficiency of Writing Letters Acknowledging Terms.—
See Edison v. Plant Bros. & Co., 35 Ga. App. 683, 134 S.
E. 627, following the principle stated under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Correspondence between opposing counsel was properly
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admitted as tending to prove the existence of the contract
sued on and that such contracts were consequently not
within the statute. Garrard v. Oil Co., 35 Ga. App. 137,
132 S. E. 234.
Applied in Scheuer Brothers & Co. v. Hushinsky, 37
Ga. App. 318, 140 S. E. 394.
Applied also in Gregg v. Hall, 164 Ga. 628, 139 S. E. 339.
Stated in Beasely v. Howard, 34 Ga. App. 102, 128 S. E.
203.
§ 3223. (§ 2694.) Exceptions.
Purchase of Lease.—Oral agreement to buy land it
vendor would buy an outstanding turpentine timber lease
thereon, not taken out of the statute by his purchase of
the lease, nor by the fact that, relying on the agree-
ment and in accordance with vendee's instructions, he
omitted to cultivate the land. Schadmann v. Durrence,
37 Ga. App. 640, 141 S. E. 331.
Agreement Not to Levy on Crop.—An oral agreement,
based on a consideration, not to levy on a crop is enforce-
able where there has been performance and acceptance. Arm-
strong v. Reynolds, 36 Ga. App. 594, 137 S. E- 637.
When Whole Performance Necessary to Prevent Fraud.—
See Bank v. Winter Inc., 161 Ga. 898, 905, 132 S. E- 422,
following the principle stated under this catchline in the
Georgia Cede of 1926.
Contracts for the Sale of Goods, etc.—Performance by a
creditor making delivery, and acceptance by the debtor of
such delivery, of goods in accordance with the terms of an
oral contract will take the same without the statute. Paf-
ford v. Hinson & Co., 34 Ga. App. 73, 128 S. E- 207.
Fruit Packed and Shipped.
—See Nellis & Co. v. Houser,
35 Ga. App. 33, 132 S. E- 142, following the principle stated
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Goods Specially Made. — The special manufacturing of
goods done in compliance with the intent and purpose of the
order, and within the time specified, amounts to such part
performance of the contract on the part of the vendor as
would render it a fraud on the part of the vendee to refuse
acceptance. Edison v. Plant Bros. & Co., 35 Ga. App. 683,
134 S. E- 627.
Stated in Gragg v. Hall, 164 Ga. 628, 139 S. E. 339.
Applied in 'Kennington v. Small, 36 Ga. App. 176, 136 S.
E. 326.
Applied also in Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga.
359, 140 S. E- 869; Home Mixture Guano Co. v. McKoone,
168 Ga. 317, 147 S. E- 711.
ARTICLE 2
Acts Void as against Creditors
§ 3224. (§ 2695.) Void acts.
I. IN GENERAL.
Conveyances, though void under this section as to cred-
itors and the other persons designated, are good between
those above designated. Gunn v. Chapman, 166 Ga. 279.
142 S. E. 873, citing Jones v. Dougherty, 10 Ga. 273;
Tufts v. DuBignon, 61 Ga. 322(5).
This section having reference to conveyances and trans-
fers in fraud of "creditors and others," can not be in-
voked by one who was not a creditor of the party who.se
conveyance or transfer was attacked and who held no
rightful claim or demand against him, but who was, on
the contrary, a mere debtor of such party. Gunn v. Chap-
man, 166 Ga. 279, 142 S. E- 873; Mas-sell v. Fourth Na-
tional Bank, 38 Ga. App. 601, 144 S. E- 806; Mobley v.
Merchants & Planters Bank, 157 Ga. 658(3), 122 S. E.
223; Mitchell v. Langley, 148 Ga. 244, 246, 96 S. E. 430;
Peck v. Calhoun, 38 Ga. App. 764, 145 S. E. 528.
Applied in Davenport & Broadhurst v. Wood, 166 Ga.
365, 143 S. E- 398; Seagraves v. Couch, 168 Ga. 38, 147
S. E- 61.
Applied also in Gunn v. Chapman, 166 Ga. 279, 142 S. E-
873; Young v. Cochran Banking Co., 166 Ga. 877, 144 S.
E. 652.
III. CHARACTER OF TRANSACTION AND BADGES
OF FRAUD.
Conveyance to Oneself as Trustee.—The making of a deed
by a person as an individual to himself in his representative
capacity, the deed being for land in which he has a contin-
gent remainder, is, on insolvency, sufficient evidence on
[
which to base a verdict that the deed was executed with the
intent to hinder and delay collection of the grantor's other
debts. Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 806, 137 S. E- 64.
Evidences of Fraud.—"Failure to produce testimony is a
badge of fraud, where the bona fides of the transaction is
in issue, and witnesses who ought to be able to explain it
are in reach." Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796. 806, 137
S. E- 64.
Same—Disposing of Entire Property.—See Eberhardt v.
Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 806, 137 S. E. 64, citing and following
the statement in the first paragraph under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3226. Merchandise, how sold in bulk.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Purpose of Sections.—This section is for protection of then
existing creditors, who are to be notified, and in absence of
fraud such sale cannot be attacked by subsequent credi-
tors for noncompliance with this act. Dodd v. Raines, 1
Fed. (2d), 658.
Sufficiency of Presumption of Fraud to Avoid Transfer in
Bankruptcy.—To entitle a trustee to recover property as
transferred by bankrupt within four months with intent
to defraud creditors, under Bankruptcy Act, section 67e
(Comp. St. section 9651), there must be proof of actual in-
tent to defraud, and a presumption of fraud raised by this
statute is not sufficient. Dodd v. Raines, 1 Fed. (2d). 658.
II. APPLICATION OF SECTION.
No Distinction between Creditor.—This section draws no
distinction between those creditors whose debts may have
arisen from sales of merchandise and such creditors as
sustain that relation by reason of indebtedness created by
the debtor for other independent and disassociated reasons.
It applies as well to a sale of a stock of goods in bulk by it
debtor to a creditor in extinguishment of his debt as to a
sale for cash or on credit. Anderson v. Merchants, etc.,
Bank, 161 Ga. 12, 129 S. E- 650.
Part of Stock.—A sale or transfer of a stock of goods,
wares, or merchandise may amount to a fraud, under the
bulk-sales, although only a part of the stock be sold,
where the sale, is "out of the usual or ordinary course < i
the business or trade of the vendor." Goodman v Clark -
son, 39 Ga. App. 383, 147 S. E- 183.
CHAPTER 3
Preferences and Assignments for Benefit of
Creditors
§ 3230. (§ 2697.) Legal preference.
Methods of Preferring Creditors—Good Faith.—See Bank
v. Ellison, 162 Ga. 657, 134 S. E- 751, citing and following the
statement in the second paragraph under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Bankrupt Debtor.—A voluntary bankrupt having an assign-
able interest in the property claimed by him in his petition
as exempt under the constitution and homestead laws of this
state can transfer this interest in good faith to his creditor
either in extinguishment of, or to secure, a pre-existing
debt, before the property is set aside by the trustee in
bankruptcy, and before the same is confirmed by the bank-
rupt court. Silver v. Chapman, 163 Ga. 604, 136 S. E- 914.
When Right to Prefer Extinguished. — The right of the
debtor to prefer one creditor to another in a bona fide trans-
action continues up to the date when a judgment or liei> is
obtained against him. The mere pendency of a suit does
not extinguish that right to prefer. Bank v. Ellison, 162
Ga. 657, 134 S. E- 751.
CHAPTER 5
Mortgages
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
§ 3256. (§ 2723.) What is a mortgage, and
what it may embrace.
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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Distinguished from Security Deed.—A statutory mortgage
in this State does not convey title, but only creates a lien
on property. A statutory security deed conveys title to
property as security, and is expressly declared to be "not a
mortgage." The latter has been declared to be in effect an
equitable mortgage, but vastly different rights arise from
the effect of the two classes of security. Carmichael v.
Citizens, etc., Bank, 162 Ga. 735, 134 S. E. 771; Bank v.
Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449, 134 S. E. 107.
The objects of a mortgage and security deed and a bill of
sale to personalty under the provisions of the Code are
identical—security for debt. While recognizing the techni-
cal difference between a mortgage and security deed and as
hereinbefore pointed out, the court has treated deeds to se-
cure debts and bills of sale to secure debts as equitable
mortgages. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449, 134 S. E- 107.
See also Hill v. Smith, 163 Ga. 71, 135 S. E. 423.
III. AFTER ACQUIRED INTEREST AND INCREASE.
General Ride.—See Dunson Co. v. Cotton Mills, 34 Ga.
App. 768, 131 S. E. 186, citing and following the statement
in the last paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Same—Bill of Sale to Secure Debt.—The object of the
statute was to devise a practical means to enable owners
of such class of property to use it as a security. The stat-
ute should be construed in this light; and when so con-
strued, giving due effect to substance as compared to form,
the provision as to after acquired property is sufficient to
include bills of sale to secure debt, though not expressly
named therein. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449, 134 S. E.
107. See note of this Case under § 3306.
§ 3257. Form and execution.
See notes to § 3318.
§ 3258. (§ 2725.) Reducing deed to mortgage.
Possession—Effect of Possession in Vendor.—See Sims v.
Sims, 162 Ga. 523, 527, 134 S. E. 308, citing and following
the law as stated under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Under this section, a deed absolute on its face can only
brt shown by parol evidence to have been intended to con-
vey title only for the purpose of securing debt, where the
grantee has not been put in possession of the property.
Pitts v. Cox, 167 Ga. 228, 231, 145 S. E. 61, citing Askew v.
Thomas, 129 Ga. 325, 58 S. E. 854; Mercer v. Morgan, 136
Ga. 632, 71 S. E- 1075; Berry v. Williams, 141 Ga. 642, 81
S. E- 881; Copelin v. Williams, 152 Ga. 692, 111 S. E- 186.
Deed to Secure Debt.—There is nothing in this section
o: the Code which will prevent an assignee of the grantee
who m an absolute deed conveyed to his wife the land
thereby conveyed from treating it as a deed to secure
debt, and, upon payment of the money thereby se-
cured, reconveying the land to the grantor. Pitts v.
Cox, 167 Ga. 228, 231, 145 S. E. 61.
A deed absolute in form may be shown to have been
made to secure a debt, where the maker remains in pos-
session of the land; but where the grantee in a deed or
bdl of sale absolute on its face is in possession of the
property, such muniment of title shall not be proved 'at
the instance of the parties) by parol evidence to be oniy
a mortgage, unless fraud in its procurement is the issue
to be tried. In this case the maker of the deed absolute
in form had surrendered possession to the grantee, and
the latter was in possession at the time of the filing of
the petition. Durden-Powers Co. v. O'Brien, 165 Ga. 728,
142 S. E. 90.
While the issue as to what was the true intent of the
parties in the execution of a written instrument is fre-
quently for the determination of a jury, who, upon con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances, are to de-
termine whether a certain writing evidences an absolute
conveyance or a mere security for the payment of a loan,,
nevertheless the construction of unambiguous contracts m
writing is for the court, and in the state of the pleadings
in this case the contracts attached as a part of the peti-
tion were so plain and unambiguous as not to require the
intervention of a jury. Durden-Powers Co. v. O'Brien,
165 Ga. 728, 142 S. E- 90.
§ 3259. (§ 2726). Registry.
Where a contract which, under the rules of the gov-
erning common law, must be construed by the courts of
this State as one of conditional sale is executed in an-
other State, and the property is brought into this State,
the reservation of title in the seller is not effective as
against one who in good faith has here acquired title to
the property without actual notice of such reservation,
unless the contract was duly recorded as required by
this section and section 3319. Olmstead v. Carolina-Port-
land Cement Co., 30 Ga. App. 126, 117 S. E- 255; Burg-
steiner v Street-Overland Co., 30 Ga. App. 140 (4), 143,
117 S. E. 268; Motors Mortgage Corp. v. Purchase-
Money Note Co., 38 Ga. App. 222, 143 S. E. 459.
§ 3261. (§ 2728). How admitted in evidence.
Cited in Steiner v. Blair, 38 Ga. App. 753, 145 S. E- 471.
§ 3262. (§ 2729.) Defective record.
See notes to § 3307.
§ 3268. (§ 2735). Debt barred, mortgage may
still be foreclosed.
See note to 4359.
§ 3270. (§ 2737.) Cancellation of mortgage.
Stated in Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 362, 130 S. E- 681.
Cited in Blumenfeld v. Citizens Bank, etc., Co., 168 Ga.
327, 334, 147 S. E. 581.
ARTICLE 2
Mortgages on Real Estate, How Enforced
SECTION 1
Application to Foreclose; When, Where, and
How Made, and Proceedings Thereon
§ 3278.
how.
(§ 2745.) Transferee may foreclose,
Evidence Justifying Recovery.—In a suit upon a mortgage
note, instituted by the payee for the use of an assignee,
where it appears that the assignee is the holder of the legal
title, the assignee is the real party at interest. Although
the petition may not be amended by striking the name of
the nominal party plaintiff and substituting therefor the
name of the assignee as plaintiff, there may nevertheless be
a recovery for the plaintiff upon evidence which sustains
only the right of the assignee to recover, where such evi-
dence has been admitted without objection. Carden v. Hall,
34 Ga. App. 806, 131 S. E. 296.
ARTICLE 3
Of Mortgages on Personal Property, and Bills
of Sale to Secure Debts, How Foreclosed
SECTION l
Application to Foreclose, by Whom and
How Made
§ 3292. (§ 2759.) Mortgaged property, when
sold without foreclosure.
Estoppel to Deny Consent.—Where the holder of the sub-
sequent mortgage failed to question the legal right of the
other holder to intervene in a proceeding for distribution of
process from a foreclosure without foreclosing her mort-
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gage, and where the jury found against the holder of the
subsequent mortgage, and judgment was entered in favor
of the other holder, the holder of the subsequent mortgage
will not be heard to insist for the first time that it is illegal
because the earlier mortgage had not been foreclosed and no
•equitable reason for claiming the fund derived from a sale
under the subsequent mortgage was set out in the interven-
tion. Bank v. Goolsby, 34 Ga. App. 217, 129 S. E- 8.
§ 3296. (§ 2763). Mortgagor to have notice.
This section is applicable to justice courts, and not to
superior courts; and in the case at bar the trial court
correctly overruled the motion to dismiss the levy based
upon this section. Golden v. Easteling & Sons, 37 Ga.
App. 172, 139 S. E- 102.
Remedy Not Exclusive.—In a contract for the sale of
personal property, where the purchaser agrees that upon
default in any payment due under the contract he will
voluntarily surrender the property to the seller, to be
sold and the proceeds applied upon the indebtedness, or
agrees that upon such default the seller may institute
trover proceedings to recover the property, etc., these
remedies are cumulative of the seller's right to collect
the indebtedness in any other manner as provided by
law; and the seller's failure to pursue, for the collection
of the indebtedness, any method prescribed in the con-
tract for that purpose, can not be a defense against the
seller's right to foreclose as provided by law under this
section. Jones Motor Co. v. Macon Savings Bank, 37
Ga. App. 767, 142 S. E. 199.
Not Essential That Holder of Legal Title Convey Same
to Debtor.—The 1921 amendment of this section has ref-
erence to contracts retaining title in the seller of per-
sonal property sold to secure the purchase money. Jt
i:s not essential to the validity of a levy upon personal
property, made pursuant to this code section, that the
holder of the legal title as security for the debt shall
convey the title to the debtor for the purpose of levy and
sale. A levy upon personal property in a proceeding to
foreclose a retention-of-title contract, made pursuant to
this code section, was a legal levy although the title
was not put into the debtor for the purpose of levy and
sale. Jones Motor Co. v. Macon Savings Bank, 37 Ga.
App. 767, 142 S. E- 199.
Effect of 1921 Amendment.—In the passage of the act
of 1921, amendatory of this section the General Assembly
did not purport or intend to change or affect the nature
of the instrument mentioned in the Code section, or io
transform an instrument retaining title into a mere mort-
gage; but it was the purpose of the General Assembly,
and within its power, to provide, as it did, another
method to enforce the collection of debts where title is
retained, by providing that the owner of any bill of sale
to personal property to secure a debt, or written contract
where title is retained to personal property to secure a
debt, may foreclose the same in the same manner as
mortgages on personal property are foreclosed. Macon
Savings Bank v. Jones Motor Co., 168 Ga. 805.
The provision of the act of 1921 referred to in the pre-
ceding head note does not suggest or require that the
owner of a bill of sale to personal property shall convey
or reconvey to the debtor the personal property covered
by such bill of sale, prior to the foreclosure of his con-
tract in the manner in which mortgages are foreclosed,
or the recordation of such a conveyance as provided in
section 6037 of the Code of 1910. The remedies provided
by section 3298 and that provided by section 6037 ar»
distinct and altogether independent of each other. Macon
Savings Bank v. Jones Motor Co., 168 Ga. 805.
The setting aside of the property afterwards, as being
exempt from levy and sale by virtue of the homestead
and exemption laws, in no wise affected the previously
acquired title of the lender. Where, after a levy upon
the property under a proceeding to foreclose the bill of
sale as provided in section 3298 of the Civil Code of 1910
as amended by an act approved August 15, 1921 (Ga. L,.
1921, p. 114), the borrower filed a claim to the property,
upon the ground that it was exempt from levy and sale
by virtue of the homestead and exemption laws, and
where it appeared from the claim filed that the property
levied upon was impressed with exemption after the
borrower had executed the bill of sale to secure the debt
to the lender, the court did not err in dismissing the
claim on demurrer and allowing the levy to proceed.
Tarver v. Beneficial Loan Society of Macon, 39 Ga. App.
646, 148 S. E. 288.
SECTION 2
Of Defenses, When and How Made
§ 3301. (§ 2766.) Replevy bond.
Failure to Give Proper Bond or Affidavit.—See Bridges v.
Melton, 34 Ga. App. 480, 129 S. E. 913, citing and following
the statements made under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 6
Sales to Secure Debts
§ 3306. (§ 2771.) Absolute deeds and not
mortgages.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Distinguished from Mortgage.—See notes to § 3256.
Applies to Both Realty and Personalty.—A bill of sale of
personalty to secure a debt stands on the same footing as a
deed to realty to secure a debt. The status of each is pro-
vided for in this section. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 448,
134 S. E- 107.
Attaches to After-Acquired Property.—Where a bill of sale
on an ordinary stock of merchandise changing in specifics is
executed merely to secure a debt, the bill of sale will attach
to after-acquired portions of the stock as in case of mort-
gages, whether or not the bill of sale makes express refer-
ence to such after-acquired property. Bank v. Beard, 162
Ga. 446, 134 S. E- 107. See note of this case under § 3256.
The expression "personal property," as used in this
section includes choses in action as well as visible, tan-
gible personal property. Garrard v. Milledgeville Bank-
ing Co., 168 Ga. 339, 343, 147 S. E. 766.
Applied in Tarver v. Beneficial Loan Society of Macon,
39 Ga. App. 646, 148 S. E- 288.
II. DETERMINING WHETHER INSTRUMENT IS
MORTGAGE OR DEED TO SECURE DEBT.
Distinctions.—See notes to § 3256.
IV. LIEN OF SECURITY DEED, FI. FA. AND
PRIORITIES.
Priorities.—See Bank v. Ins. Co., 163 Ga. 718, 721, 137 S.
E- 53, following the statement made under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
V. RIGHTS OF GRANTOR AND CREDITOR.
Interest of Grantor.—The grantor in a deed under this
section retains the right of possession and the right of
redemption by payment of the debt, and consequently an
equitable estate in the land which may be assigned or
subjected to payment of his debts. Citizens & Southern
Bank v. Realty, etc., Co., 167 Ga. 170, 171, 144 S. E- 893;
Uvalda Naval Stores Co. v. Cullen, 165 Ga. 115, 117, 139
S, E. 810.
Timber Rights.—A deed under this section passes the
title to the land and the timbey growing thereon to the
vendee therein. Ponder & Co. v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 165 Ga. 366, 140 S. E. 761.
VI. TRANSFER OR ASSIGNMENTS.
Rights of Transferee.—A transferee of the grantee named
in the security deed occupies the position of such grantee as
against the grantor and those claiming under him. Gilliard
v. Johnston, 161 Ga. 17, 129 S. E- 434.
VII. FORECLOSURE.
Where security deed, executed subsequent to two deeds
to secure debt, subsequent security deed was made to
secure an indebtedness represented by a promissory note,
under this section and on its face recited the debt and
the purpose to secure it, the creditor could foreclose the
deed as an equitable mortgage, although the grantor
therein had been discharged as a bankrupt from the pay-
ment of his debts. Smith v. Farmers Bank, 165 Ga. 470,
141 S. E. 203, citing Pusser v. Thompson, 132 Ga. 280, 64
S. E- 75, 22 L. R- A. (N. S.) 571.
§ 3307. (§ 2772.) Record of such deeds.
Necessity for Record.—A "bill of sale" as contemplated by
this section is a "deed" to personalty, and is included in the
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meaning of the word "deeds" as employed in section 3320;
and consequently under that law bills of sale to secure debt
are required to be recorded. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 451,
134 S. E- 107.
Defective Record.—Construing section 3262 with this section
a defective record of security deed will be equivalent to no
record, and, in the language of this section, it will "remain
valid against the persons executing" it, but will be "post-
poned to all liens created or obtained, or purchases made,
prior to" a legal record of the security deed. Bank v. Ins.
Co., 163 Ga. 718, 722, 137 S. F- 53.
The words "liens created or obtained," as employed in
the section, have been held to refer to liens arising by con-
tract, and not by operation of law. Donovan v. Simmons,
96 Ga. 340, 22 S. F- 966; Griffeth v. Posey, 98 Ga. 475, 25
S. E- 515; Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 450, 134 S. E- 107.
The language, "all liens created or obtained," in this
section of the Civil Code, embraces both liens created by
contract and arising by operation of law. Under that
section a common-law judgment against a grantor, ob-
tained after the execution of a security deed by him, and
entry of the execution from such judgment on the gen-
eral execution docket within ten days from its rendition,
but before the actual record of the security deed, is
superior to such deed. Saunders v. Citizens First Nat.
Bank, 165 Ga. 558, 142 S. F. 127; Saunders v. Citizens
First Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 141, 142 S. E. 734.
Priority of lien of judgment duly recorded over earlier
security deed recorded afterward. Saunders v. Citizens
Bank, 165 Ga. 558, 142 S. F- 127.
Security deed superior to debt outstanding evidenced
by unrecorded deed. Mortgage Co. v. Bank, 166 Ga. 412,
415, 143 S. F. 562.
Where Recorded.—A retention-of-title contract attested by
a person described as a commercial notary public of L.
county, although the caption of the instrument indicates
that it was executed in a town in W. county is presumably
officially executed in L,. county. It nevertheless is legally
executed to record in W. county, the residence of the maker.
Smith v. Simmons, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S. F- 312.
No Prior Lien for Money Judgment unless Execution
Entered. — Applying this section, as modified by sections
3320 and 3321, a money judgment against the grantor or
maker of a bill of sale to secure a debt would not have a lien
as against third parties or those claiming under the bill of
sale, unless an execution issuing on the judgment should be
entered on the execution docket. Consequently a junior
money judgment upon which no execution was issued and
placed on the execution docket would not create a lien with-
in the meaning of this section, to which the bill of sale there-
in referred to could be postponed. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga.
446, 452, 134 S. F. 107.
Priority between Bill of Sale and General Execution.
—
Where a bill of sale to secure a debt as provided in this
section, is executed and subsequently recorded, whether
or not such recording should occur within thirty days after
the date of the execution of the paper, such bill of sale is
superior in dignity to a subsequently obtained unrecorded
general execution. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 453, 134 S.
E. 107.
The status of a recorded bill of sale to secure a debt,
which was not recorded until after the time provided by
law, is inferior in dignity to a subsequently obtained exe-
cution which was recorded prior to the record of the bill of
sale. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 454, 134 S. F- 107.
Same—Record from Time of Filing.—In a contest between
a bill of sale to secure a debt and a lien of a subsequently
recorded general execution, the record of the bill of sale
dates back from the time of its filing for record in the
office of the clerk of the superior court. Bank v. Beard, 162
Ga. 446, 455, 134 S. F- 107.
Same—Same—Fractions of a Day.—Where a priority as
between a bill of sale to secure a debt and the lien of a sub-
sequently recorded general execution depends upon whether
the bill of sale was recorded first or the general execution
was entered upon the execution docket first, such recording
and such entry upon the execution docket having occurred
on the same day, in determining such priority fractions of a
day are to be considered. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 134
S. E. 107.
§ 3309. (§ 2774.) To reconvey title of prop-
erty conveyed to secure debts.
As to the distinction between a security deed and a mort-
gage, see note under section 3256.
Effect of Failure to Record Cancellation.—If record of can-
cellation is not effected according to this section, the se-
curity deed appearing of record to be valid, a purchaser with-
out notice acquires title. Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 362,
130 S. E. 681.
Not Affected by Grantee.—In Massell v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 38 Ga. App. 601, 605, 144 S. F. 806, it is said:
"Furthermore, upon payment of the debt defendant will
have his remedy, regardless of the position or attitude
either of the plaintiff or of the grantee in the security
deed."
v. Citizens Bank, etc., Co., 165
581.
Cited in Blumenfeld
Ga. 327, 334, 147 S. F.
See notes to § 3259.
§ 3310. (§ 2775.) Liens against vendee do not
attach to the property.
In General.—The right of the mortgagee under this section,
will be defeated by the payment of the secured debt, either
by the vendor or his assignee. Gilliard v. Johnston & Miller,
161 Ga. 17, 129 S. F- 434.
CHAPTER 8
Conditional Sales
§ 3318. (§ 2776.) Conditional sales, how exe-
cuted.
I. IN GENERAL.
History.—The provision of section 1 of the act of Sep
tember 30, 1885 (Acts 1884-5, p. 124), which permitted al!
deeds to realty and all bills of sale to personalty, made
to secure debt, to be recorded within thirty days from
their date, was repealed by the act of October 1, 188?
(Acts 1889, p. 106), now embodied in this section. Saun-
ders v. Citizens First Nat. Bank. 165 Ga. 558, 142 S. K-
127; S. C. 389 Ga. App. 141, 142 S. F- 744.
Object of Section.—This section is in the nature of a stat-
ute of frauds and outlaws all reservations of title as against
third persons where the contract is not written. The words
"third parties" include creditors, but are not restricted to
them, and are to be construed literally. Flemming v. Drake,
163 Ga. 872, 137 S. F. 268.
Effect of Failure of Clerk to Perform Duty.—Under
this section of the code, all that is required of the gran-
tee and all that he can do is to file his deed for record.
The actual recording is the duty of the clerk, and the
statute does not contemplate that a failure on the part of
the clerk to perform this duty or an erroneous perform-
ance of it shall operate to defeat the grantee who has
properlv filed his deed." Willie v. Hines-Yelton Lum-
ber Co., 167 Ga. 883, 891, 146 S. F. 901, citing Durrence
v. Northern Nat. Bank, 117 Ga. 385, 386, 43 S. F. 726:
Greenfield v. Stout, 122 Ga. 303, 50 S. F- HI.
II. FORM AND REQUISITES.
A. Writing, Execution, etc.
Description of Property.—The rights of a third party, ac-
quiring title in good faith from the vendee, are protected,
where the record of the alleged conditional sale shows on
its face that not only was no particular property described,
but that at the time the instrument was signed no particular
property was in the minds of the parties, and that conse-
quently no attempt was or could have been made by the in-
strument to specify or even refer to any particular property.
Stevens Hdw. Co. v. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 268, 129 S. E. 172.
Same—Parol Evidence.—Under this section and § 3257,
parol evidence is admissible to apply a description to the
subject-matter and indentify the property, but the writing
must contain the key to the description. Parol cannot
supply a necessary element of the description. If the
property is described as a counter sold to a named per-
son, it is permissible to show by parol that only one
counter was sold, and to point out that counter; but :t
is not permissible to supply the description by parol by
showing first that a counter was sold and then identify-
ing the counter. In re Hartley (Ga.), 29 Fed. (2d) 916,
918.
A description of property in a written order as 1-512-
Warren Counter, held -insufficient. However, if the paper
had described the property as 1-512-Warren Counter, sold
by the Warren Company to the purchaser, or bought bi
him from the Warren Company, the description would
have been sufficient, under the holding in Thomas Furni-
ture Co. v. T. & C. Furniture Co., 120 Ga. 879, 48 S. E.
333. In re Hartley (Ga.), 29 Fed. (2d) 916, 918.
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Must Be in Writing.—Under this and the following section
whenever personal property is sold and delivered with a con-
dition that title shall remain in the vendor until the pur-
chase price is paid, to be valid as against third parties, the
contract must be in writing and recorded within thirty days
after delivery of the property sold, which is the time when
the sale becomes effective under the terms of the statute.
Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Dingier, 8 Fed. (2d), 493.
Same—Written Order for Goods.—Under this section
the sale must be evidenced in writing and the written
contract of sale attested. The writing must show that
a sale has been made. A written order for goods does
not evidence a sale and is not sufficient to effect a valid
reservation of title. In re Hartley (Ga.), 29 Fed. (2d',
916, 918.
Affidavit of execution of a conditional sale contract by
salesman who signed the contract as such and not on
the line for attesting witness, held not to entitle it to
record, and such contract is not vaKd as against buyer's
trustee in bankruptcy. In re Hartley (Ga.), 29 Fed. (2d)
916.
B. PARTICULAR INSTRUMENTS.
Stipulations for Paying Rent or Hire.—Where a written
contract provides that the bailee may at any time before the
expiration of the period of rental become the purchaser of
the property upon the payment of the aggregate rental value,
upon which payment he shall receive credit for the payments
previously made as rental, the contract constitutes a condi-
tional sale. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Tidwell & Co., 36
Ga. App. 525, 137 S. E- 128.
§ 3319. (§ 2777.) How recorded.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Necessity of Recordation—Record Necessary Only as against
Third Parties.
—See II,
the preceding section.
A, Writing Execution, etc., under
III. PRIORITIES.
A. In General.
Necessity for Recordation.
—See Sewing Machine Co. v.
Tidwell & Co., 36 Ga. App. 525, confirming the matter set
out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 9
Registration of Transfers and Liens
§ 3321. General Execution Docket.—The clerk
of the Superior Court of each county shall be
required to keep a general execution docket; and
as against the interest of third parties acting in
good faith and without notice, who may have ac-
quired a transfer or lien binding the defendant's
property, no money judgment obtained within the
county of defendant's residence, in any court of
this State, whether superior court, ordinary's
court, county court, city court, or justice court,
or United States court in this State, municipal
court or other courts, shall have a lien upon the
property of the defendant from the rendition
thereof, unless the execution issuing thereon shall
be entered upon said docket within ten days
from the time the judgment is rendered. When
the execution shall be entered upon the docket
after the ten days, the lien shall date from such
entry; and in all counties -of this State having by
the United States Census of 1920, or which may
have by any future census a population of more
than two hundred thousand inhabitants, the lien
shall date only from the tiime the execution shall
have been entered upon such general execution
docket. Acts 1929, p. 166, '§ 1.
Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 306, 139 S.Cited in Burt
E. 912.
§ 3324. (§ 2782). Clerk's fees.
Cited in Benton v. Benton, 164 Ga. 541, 546, 139 S.
E- 68.
CHAPTER 10
Liens Other than Mortgages
ARTICLE 1
To Whom Granted, Rank and Priority
§ 3329. (§ 2787). Liens established.
The statute of this State, as codified in sections 3329,
3334, and 3339 of the Civil Code of 1910, which gives to
laborers a general lien upon the property of their em-
ployers for labor performed, has no extra-territorial ef-
fect, and gives no lien arising out of a contract for labor,,
made in another State and executed by labor performed
therein. Downs v. Bedford, 39 Ga. App. 155, 146 S. E.
514.
§ 3333. (§ 2791.) Rank of liens for taxes.
In General.—Taxes due the State are not only against the
owner but against the property also, regardless of judg-
ments, mortgages, sales, transfers, or incumbrances of
any kind. Bibb Nat'l Bank v. Colson, 162 Ga. 471, 134 S.
E. 85. See Stephens v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Ga. 380, 143
S. E. 386.
Lien for Paving Streets.—A lien against property owners
for the proportionate costs of paving streets has the rank
of a tax lien and its dignity takes rank under this section,
and consequently takes priority over a prior mortgage.
Brunswick v. Gordon Realty Co., 163 Ga. 636, 642, 136 S.
E- 898.
Quoted in Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Appling
County, 164 Ga. 861, 139 S. E. 674.
§ 3334. (§ 2792). Lien of laborers, general.
The statute of this State, as codified in sections 3329,
3334, and 3339 of the Civil Code of 1910, which gives to la-
borers a general lien upon the property of their employers
for labor performed, has no extra-territorial effect, and
gives no lien arising out of a contract for labor, made in
another State and executed by labor performed therein.
Downs v. Bedford, 39 Ga. App. 155, 146 S. E- 514.
§ 3335. (§ 2793.) Special lien of laborers.
To What Property Applicable.—The special lien given by
this section to laborers, on the product of their labor, at-
taches to the property of their employers only. Jones v.
Central Georgia Lumber Co., 35 Ga. App. 172, 132 S. E. 236.
§ 333*6. Laundrymen, liens in favor of.
Applied in Myrick v. Dixon, 37 Ga. App. 536, 140 S. E-
920.
§ 3339. (§ 2794). Rank of laborers' liens, and
how they arise.
The statute of this State, as codified in sections 3329, 3334,
and 3339 of the Civil Code of 1910, which gives to laborers
a general lien upon the property of their employers for la-
bor performed, has no extra-territorial effect, and gives
no lien arising out of a contract for labor, made in an-
other State and executed by labor performed therein. Downs
v. Bedford, 39 Ga. App. 155, 146 S. E. 514.
Cited in Gardner v. Smith, 39 Ga. App. 224, 146 S. E-
648.
§ 3340. (§ 2795). Landlord's lien.
Discharge in Bankruptcy. — A landlord's lien for rent,
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whether the special hen upon the crops grown on the
rented premises which is created by this section, or the
general lien which arises upon the levy of a distress war-
rant, is not a lien created by judgment or one "obtained
through legal proceedings," and is therefore not, under the
bankruptcy act of 1898 (30 Stat. 565), § 67-1, discharged
the filing of a petition for the tenant's discharge in bank-
ruptcy, although within four months of the creation of the
lien. Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U. S. 631, 32 Sup. Ct. 699,
56 L- ed. 1233; In re Burns, 175 Fed. 633; White v. Idelson,
38 Ga. App. 612, 144 S. E- 802.
§ 3341. (§ 2796). Rank of such lien.
No Conflict With Section 4000.—"This section gives the
landlord a special lien for rent on the crops, from the
date of the maturity of the crops, on the lands rented. And
we do not think there is any conflict between the provi-
sions of this section and section 4000." Evans v. Carroll,
167 Ga. 68, 81, 144 S. E. 912.
The debts due for rent, referred to in section 4000, are
not debts for rent arising during the year in which the crops
upon the rented land are grown, but this provision refers
to debts of the decedent arising by contract made by him
prior to the time of his death. Evans v. Carroll, 167 Ga.
68, 81, 144 S. E- 912.
Crops Raised by Administrators.—The fact that the crop
upon which the lien is here asserted was raised upon lands
upon which administrators were continuing to conduct the
business of the decedent does not deprive the landlord of
the special lien provided for under this section. Evans v.
Carroll, 167 Ga. 68, 81, 144 S. E- 912.
§ 3348. (§ 2800). Liens for supplies, etc., fur-
nished.
As to penalty for giving false information regarding liens
tinder this section see section 713 of the Penal Code.
I. BY AND TO WHOM SUPPLIES FURNISHED.
Landlord as Surety.
—See O'Quinn v. Carter, 34 Ga. App.
310, 129 S. E- 296, citing and following the statement made
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF LIEN.
Not Affected by Bankruptcy.—See Sitton v. Turner, 34
Ga. App. 12, 128 S. E. 77, citing and following the state-
ments under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Similar to Claim for Purchase Money.—Under this sec-
tion, landlords furnishing supplies to their tenants for the
purpose of making crops on the rented premises have a
lien, by operation of law, on the crops there made in the
year for which the supplies were furnished and such a
lien is in the nature of a claim for purchase-money. Mutual
Fertilizer Co. v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36 Ga. App. 322, 136
S. E. 803.
Execution Against Supplies.—Quaere : After supplies have
been furnished but before they are utilized by the tenant
for the purpose intended, are they subject to levy and sale
under executions against the tenant held by third persons?
Mutual Fertilizer Co. v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36 Ga. App.
322, 136 S. E. 803.
Time Lien Attaches.—The lien of a materialman on real
estate, under this section, when created and declared as
required by § 3353, attaches from the time the materialman
commences, under the contract, to deliver material, and
takes priority over title acquired with actual notice of the
materialman's claim of lien by a subsequent grantee from
the owner of real estate to secure debts, although the deed
is executed and recorded before the completion of the con-
tract of the materialman to furnish material, and before
the claim of lien is recorded, and before the commencement
of an action to foreclose the lien or recover the amount of
the claim. Picklesimer v. Smith, 164 Ga. 600, 139 S. E- 72.
When a contractor or materialman has done work or fur-
nished material for the improvement of real estate, their
liens when declared and created, as provided in the Civil
Code (1910), § 3353, attach from the time the work under
the contract is commenced or the material is furnished, as
against third persons having actual notice of such liens.
Marbut-Williams Lumber Co. v. Dixie Electric Co., 166
Ga. 42, 142 S. E- 270, citing Guaranty Investment Co. v.
Athens Engineering Co., 152 Ga. 596 (5), (6), 110 S. E. 873.
In the light of what has been held above, a contractor's
ben under this statute can not attach or exist prior to de-
livery of any of the material; and it follows that a holder
of legal title to realty, under a security deed executed by
the owner and duly recorded prior to delivery of material
furnished to such owner for improvement of the realty, can
not at the time of taking the security be affected with no-
tice of any lien which the materialman may set up for
material furnished to improve the property. Marbut-Wil-
liams Lumber Co. v. Dixie Electric Co., 166 Ga. 42, 142
S. E. 270.
Where, after materialmen had furnished material to im-
prove the real estate embraced in the deed above referred to,
the owner executes and delivers to the vendee therein a
second deed to secure debt, and the vendee takes such sec-
ond deed with actual notice of the claims of liens by such
materialmen, the liens of the materialmen, when created
and declared as required by this section 3353 of the Civil
Code, would take priority over the title acquired by the
vendee in such second security deed. Picklesimer v.
Smith, 164 Ga. 600, 139 S. E- 72. See notes to 3352.
§ 3353. (§ 2804.) Mechanics' liens, how de-
clared and created.
Waiver of Right to Object to Lien.—An owner who re-
sists foreclosure upon the ground that the material was
not such as provided for by the contract may waive the
right to assert this defense, and thereby be estopped to
dispute evidence on the part of the materialman to the
contrary. Acceptance and use of such material without ob-
jection or complaint, and payment therefor to another in-
stead of to the materialman, will authorize the conclusion
that the owner waived his right and estopped himself.
Rylander v. Koppe, 162 Ga. 300, 301, 133 S. E- 236.
§ 3354. (§ 2805.) Mechanic's lien on per-
sonalty.
Enforcement.—See Young v. Alford, 36 Ga. App. 708, 137
S. E. 914, citing and following the statement made under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3356. (§ 2807.) Liens in favor of planing-
mills, etc.
Applied in Young v. Alford, 36 Ga. App. 708, 137 S. E.
914.
§ 3364. (§ 2814). Lien of attorneys at law.
Strictly Construed.—Unless the petition in this case sets
forth a state of facts which brings the case within the
terms of this provision of this section, it must fail as a
suit to foreclose a lien. This statute, creating liens in
favor of attorneys at law, is in derogation of the common
law, and is to be strictly construed. Middleton v. West-
moreland, 164 Ga. 324, 328, 138 S. E- 852, citing Brown v.
Georgia, Carolina & Northern Ry. Co., 101 Ga. 80, 83, 28 S.
E. 634.
Same Lien for Defending and Bringing Suit. — Attorneys
at law, employed and serving in defense against^ suits, have
the same liens and means of foreclosure which are al-
lowed to attorneys at law who are employed to sue for any
property, if the defense is successful. Middleton v. West-
moreland, 164 Ga. 324, 328, 138 S. E- 852.
Contingent Fee.—The mere engagement by a prospective
suitor of an attorney at law, upon a contingent fee, does
not create a lien for fees in favor of the latter, in the
cause of action respecting which he is employed; but upon
the filing of a suit by him a lien attaches in his favor in
such suit, which the plaintiff and defendant are not at
liberty to settle so as to defeat the attorney's claim for
fees. Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 328, 138 S.
E. 852.
§§ 3364(a) -3364(e). Park's Code.
See §§ 3364(l)-3364(5).
§ 3364(1). Jeweler's liens for repair.—It shall
be lawful for any jeweler, or other person, firm,
or corporation engaged in the business of repair-
ing watches, clocks, jewelry and other articles of
similar character, to sell such articles upon which
charges for repairs, including work done and ma-
terials furnished, have not been paid, which have
remained in the possession of such jeweler, per-
son, firm, or corporation, for a period of one year
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after the completion of said repairs, for the pur-
pose of enforcing the lien of such jeweler, per-
son, firm, or corporation for materials furnished
and work done in repairing such article or arti-
cles. Acts 1927, p. 218.
§ 3364(2). Notice before sale.—Before any
sale shall be made as provided in section 3364(1),
the person, firm, or corporation making such sale
shall give thirty days' notice thereof by posting
a notice of such sale before the court-house door
of the county in which such repairs were made,
giving the name of the owner of the article or
articles so repaired, if known, and if not known,
the name of the person from whom such article
or articles were received, a description of the ar-
ticle or articles to be sold, and the name of the
person, firm, or corporation making such repans
and proposing to make such sale; and shall also
give written notice thereof by sending a registered
letter to the last known address of the owner of
such article or articles, or the person who left
such article or articles for repairs, advising such
persons of the time and place of sale, the descrip-
tion of the article or articles to be sold, and the
amount claimed by said person, firm, or corpo-
ration for such repairs, including work done and
materials furnished, and the said amount so
claimed for such repairs shall also be stated in
the notice posted before the court-house door as
hereinbefore stated.
§ 3364(3). Sale at public outcry before court-
house.—All sales made under the provisions of
this Act shall be made at public outcry, before
the court-house door of the county where the per-
son, firm, or corporation making such sale had
his place of business at the time of receiving the
article or articles to be sold, and during the hours
provided by law for holding sheriff's sales.
§ 3364(4). Application of proceeds.—The pro-
ceeds of any sale made under the provisions of
this Act shall be applied first to the payment of
the lien for services rendered by the person, firm,
or corporation making such sale, for work done
and materials furnished in repairing such article
or articles sold, including the cost of the regis-
tered notice hereinbefore provided for, and the
residue, if any, shall be paid to the ordinary of
the county wherein such sale shall have taker,
place, who shall hold said sum for a period of
one year, during which time the owner or own-
ers of the article or articles so sold may claim said
residue; but at the end of said period of one year,
if said residue shall not have been claimed by the
owner or owners of the article or articles, so sold,
then and in that event said residue shall by the
said ordinary be placed in the common-school
fund of the county wherein said sale was made.
§ 3364(5). Display of sign as to intention to
sell.—Any jeweler, person, firm, or corporation
desiring to avail himself of the provisions of this
Act shall display a sign in his place of business
notifying the public that all articles left for re-
pairs will be sold for charges at the expiration
of one year from completion of such repairs.
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ARTICLE 3
Foreclosure of Liens on Personal Property.
§ 3366. (§ 2816.) Enforcement of liens on per-
sonalty.
What Counter-Affidavit Must Contain.—Only defensive
matter to a foreclosure of a lien on personalty being re-
quired in a counter-affidavit filed by the defendant under
this section such an affidavit, when made by the defend-
ant's agent, as provided in section 3607, need not contain
a sworn averment that the affiant is agent for the de-
fendant. It is sufficient if such affidavit is in fact made by
the defendant's duly authorized agent, and where the af-
fidavit purports on its face to be executed by such agent,
the agency is presumed and the affidavit is prima facie
valid. Georgia Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 34 Ga. App. 281,
129 S. E. 303.
Judgment.
—Where, upon the foreclosure of a laborer's
general lien as provided in sections 3366 et seq. of the Civil
Code of 1910, the property seized is not replevied, no gen-
eral judgment thereon can be rendered, even though a
counter-affidavit disputing the correctness of the plaintiff's
claim is filed by the defendant. Only a judgment estab-
lishing the lien upon the property seized can be legally ren-
dered. Downs v. Bedford, 39 Ga. App. 155, 146 S. F. 514,
query as to whether applicable to liens for labor under
foreign contracts.
ARTICLE 4
Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 3374. (§ 2824.) Attorney's rights in claim
cases.
Cited in Porter v. Stewart, 163 Ga. 655, 660, 137 S. F. 28.
CHAPTER U
Homestead
ARTICLE 1
Exemptions
SECTION 1
Surveyor's Return; Approval of Plat and Appli-
cation
§ 3386. (§ 2836.) Objections, how and when
made.
Effect in Bankruptcy of Failure to Set Aside Exemption.
—The fact that the bankrupts, as residents of Georgia,
did not set apart exemptions in the manner provided by
either Const. Ga. art. 9, sec. 1, or sections 3416, 3378, et
seq., did not preclude the allowance of exemptions under
such law in bankruptcy proceedings. Clark v. Nirenbaum,
8 Fed. (2d). 451.
The purpose of an objection to the schedule for want of
sufficiency and fullness is to prevent the allowance of the
homestead (section 3378 paragraph 3), and it does not fail as
an objection under this section merely because it may be
described as an "objection to the homestead." Alday v.
Spooner, 35 Ga. App. 614, 617, 134 S. F- 343.
When Appeal Lies.—Where a creditor filed objections, one
of which was to the schedule for want of sufficiency and
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fullness in that the applicant had omitted certain per-
sonalty, appeal to the superior court lies from an adverse
judgment of the ordinary. Alday v. Spooner, 35 Ga. App.
614, 134 S. F- 343. See note of this case under § 3388.
§ 3388. (§ 2838.) Appraisers and appeals.
Objections Not Limited to Schedule.—This section does not
provide exclusively for objections to the schedule. The
creditor is not required to object to the schedule, if he de-
sires to dispute "the propriety of the survey, or the value
of the premises so platted as the homestead." Alday v.
Spooner, 35 Ga. App. 614, 616, 134 S. F- 343.
SECTION n
§ 3413. (§ 2863). Debtor may waive exemp-
tion.
Instrument Constituting Waiver.—If a customer who is
indebted to a merchant on an open account makes a writ-
ten financial statement to the merchant, which expresses a
waiver of homestead exemption relative to his present in-
debtedness and to any future indebtedness that may be
incurred on accoimt of subsequent purchase of goods, but
does not at the time agree to make purchases, and the
merchant does not at the time bind himself to extend fu-
ture credit, the homestead waiver expressed in the state-
ment will not be contemporaneous with a subsequent con-
tract of purchase resulting from a sale of goods wherein
the merchant on faith of the waiver extends credit, and
will not be a valid waiver as against the debt created by rea-
son of the subsequently purchased goods. Frank & Co. v.
Weiner, 167 Ga. 892, 147 S. F- 51.
ARTICLE 2
Statutory or Short Homestead
SECTION l
Property Exempt from Sale
§ 3416. (§ 2866.) Property exempt from sale.
As to effect in bankruptcy of failure to set aside home-
stead exemption, see note to § 3378. See annotations under
§ 6582.
I. GENERAL NOTE.
Exemption as Homestead—Waiver after Setting Apart.—
There is no true homestead in Georgia, but under this sec-
tion there is a direct exemption of property without regard
to residence or home, realty or personalty, and though such
exemption may be waived before setting apart (Const. Ga.
art. 9, sections 3, 5), after setting apart of exempt property
it cannot be aliened or incumbered by debtor. In re Tram-
mell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Increase of Exemption.—Debtor's right of exemption under
Const. Ga. art. 9, section 1, and this section, affects debtor's
whole property as an inchoate incumbrance created by law,
and cannot be increased as to debts in existence without vio-
lating contract clause of Federal Constitution. In re Tram-
mell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Setting Aside in Bankruptcy Court.—"Setting apart" of
debtor's exempt property is a mere identification of the
property to which the exemption is applied, the burden of
securing which is put on debtor and is a proper function
of bankruptcy court, whose action is equivalent to action by
the state court in effectuating exemption. In re Trammell,
5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Alienage as Affecting Right. — Alienage of resident of
state is no bar to claim of exemption provided by this sec-
tion. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Same—Where Family Resident Out of State.—Alien resi-
dent of Georgia having no family within State, but hav-
ing mother in Poland and sister in other state to whom he
regularly sends money, is not the head of a family entitled
to exemption provided by this section. In re Trammell, 5
Fed. (2d), 326.
When Property Set Aside to Defeat Sale.—Setting apart
of property exempt under this section, though necessary to
defeat sale, is timely, when not had before levy, if made
before sale. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
After Acquired Property.—Property not owned by a debt-
or, when filing his schedule of property exempted under this
section but which is afterwards acquired by him, is not sub-
ject to exemption under the schedule, although described
therein. Smith v. Fckles, 65 Ga. 326; Fuller v. Doyal, 34
Ga. App. 245, 129 S. F- 117.
II. PARAGRAPH 1.
Act of Ordinary Ministerial.—The act of the ordinary in
receiving and recording the schedule of land to be set
apart as a homestead under this section, is ministerial, and
may be collaterally attacked in a case involving the title.
Kimsey v. Rogers, 166 Ga. 176, 142 S. F- 667.
Proof of Value.—It not affirmatively appearing from the
schedule that the house and land embraced therein exceeded
in value $500 when the schedule was filed, and it affirm-
atively appearing from the petition in this case that the
same was about of the value of $400, we can not say as
a matter of law - that the exemption of this property was
void for the reason that the value of the house and land
embraced in the schedule, and situated in a village, ex-
ceeded in value said amount at the time the schedule, was
filed. Wood v. Wood, 166 Ga. 519, 143 S. F- 770.
Demurrer.
—
Fven if the homestead was void, so far as
the house and land are concerned, for the reason that their
value exceeded $500 at the time the schedule was filed, this
fact would not render the petition subject to general de-
murrer; the plaintiff, while alleging the existence of the
homestead, not asserting any rights thereto under her peti-
tion in this case. Wood v. Wood, 166 Ga. 519, 520, 143 S.
F. 770.
SECTION 2
How Set Apart
§ 3421. (§ 2871.) Sale subject to incumbrance.
Pending Application.—See Rogers v. Kimsey, 163 Ga. 146,
135 S. F- 497, citing and following the statement under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 12
Interest and Usury
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
§ 3426. What is lawful interest.
Where bonds misappropriated by corporate officers ac-
tually bore 8 per cent., but the record did not show that
any interest had been or would be paid thereon, and the
recovery was for full par value whereas the bonds were
sold for 85 cents on the dollar, the allowance of interest on
the judgment at 7% in accordance with this section was
proper. FLnt River Pecan Co. v. Fry (Ga.), 29 Fed.
(2d) 157, 159.
§ 3427. (§ 2877). What is usury.
Pretenses and Contrivances Prohibited.—It is the policy
of the laws of this State to inhibit the taking of usury under
every and any pretense of contrivance whatsoever. Mc-
Gehee v. Petree, 165 Ga. 492, 141 S. F- 206, citing Trout-
man v. Barnett, 9 Ga. 30, 35.
Purchase of a Note.—The evidence required finding of
usurious transaction in guise of the purchase of a note in
McGehee v. Petree, 165 Ga. 492, 141 S. F- 206.
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§ 3431. (§ 2881.) Interest only from demand,
when.
Provision That Obligation Bear No Interest.—A stipu-
lation in a contract for the sale of goods, to be delivered
within a reasonable time in the future and to be paid for
on delivery, to the effect that the obligation of the purchaser
was to bear no interest, did not mean that the purchaser
would not be required to pay interest in case of and after
his default, but was merely a provision against the payment
of interest prior to the maturity of the purchase-money.
Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga. App. 630, 130 S. E- 600.
Becomes Part of Contract.—This section entered into and
became one of the material terms of the paving contract,
and, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, in-
terest does not run against any installment until default
or at any time prior to maturity. Cochran v. City of
Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 583, 146 S. E- 462.
§ 3432. (§ 2882). Interest on judgments.
As all judgments bear interest from the date of rendi-
tion under this section, it is immaterial that the verdict
found dees not provide for future interest. The judg-
ment therefore, in so far as it provides for future interest,
is lawful, and is not invalid upon the ground that it does
not follow the verdict. Tang v. South Georgia Investment
Co., 38 Ga. App. 430, 144 S. E. 149.
§ 3434. (§ 2884.) Interest on liquidated demands.
I. WHEN INTEREST ALLOWED.
When Recovery Exceeds Amount Stated in Bond. — The
defendant may be liable, though the aggregate amount of
the plaintiff's recovery, both for principal and interest, will
exceed the maximum amount of the defendant's liability
as stated in a bond. United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v.
Koehler, 36 Ga. App. 396, 137 S. E. 85.
On Damages Recovered for Breach of Sale Contract.—Un-
der this section interest is recoverable on damages recovered
for breach of a contract of sale by the buyer from the time
the amount of damages became fixed by a resale. Bell v.
Lamborn, 2 Fed. (2d), 205.
II. LIQUIDATED DEMANDS.
A. Particular Instances of Liquidated Demands.
1. In General.
Breach of a Contract of Sale.—Where a purchaser breached
a contract by a failure to pay the purchase-money on the
•delivery of the goods, the seller was entitled to recover the
agreed purchase-price as liquidated damages, with interest
thereon from the time the purchaser was liable and bound to
pay. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga. App. 630, 130 S. E. 600.
Liquidation Is a Certain and Fixed Amount.—A debt is
liquidated when it is certain how much is due and when
it is due. An unliquidated claim is one which one of the
parties to the contract or transaction can not alone render
certain. Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Keeter, 167 Ga. 231, 236,
145 S. E. 68, citing Roberts v. Prior, 20 Ga. 561.
§ 3436. (§ 2886.) Beyond eight per cent, interest
forbidden.
What Constitutes Usury. — There are four requisites of
•every usurious transaction: (1) A loan or forbearance of
money, either express or implied. (2) Upon an under-
standing that the principal shall or may be returned. (3)
And that for such loan or forbearance a greater profit than
is authorized by law shall be paid or is agreed to be paid.
(4) That the contract was made with an intent to violate
the law. The fourth element may be implied if all the others
are expressed upon the face of the contract. Bank v. Farm-
ers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801, 810, 132 S. E- 221.
Court Will Look at Substance of Transaction.—The inge-
nuity of man has not devised a contrivance by which usury
can be legalized, if it appears that the purpose of the scheme
was to exact a larger profit for the use of the money act-
ually advanced than eight per cent, per annum. In deter-
mining whether the contract is usurious the substance of
the transaction will be critically inspected and analyzed; for
the name by which the transaction is denominated is al-
together immaterial if it appears that a loan of money was
the foundation and basis of the agreement which is under
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consideration. Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801,
132 S. E. 221.
If an agreement is a mere device or subterfuge by which
one party was permitted to charge a higher than the law-
ful rate of interest allowed in this State for a loan of money,
the agreement would be usurious, and the company could
collect no interest at all. Stewart v. Miller & Company, 161
Ga. 919, 925, 132 S. E. 535.
"Underwriting" Not within Section.—An "underwriting,"
is not an agreement to loan money and under the circum-
stances of the case this section does not apply. Stewart
v. Miller & Co., 161 Ga. 919, 132 S. E. 535.
Transaction with underwriter of bond issue, who received
discount of 15 per cent from face value of bonds and other
specific allowances, is not usurious, under this section, in
view of necessity for resale of bonds. G. L. Miller & Co. v.
Claridge Manor Co., 14 Fed. (2d), 859.
Where a debtor who has been adjudicated a bankrupt,
but who has not obtained a discharge, arranges with one of
his creditors for a loan of money on condition that he will
execute a note to cover the loan, with lawful interest and
also the amount of his previous indebtedness to the creditor,
the transaction is a valid and enforceable renewal of the
antecedent debt, and the note is not usurious because it
contains a promise to pay the same. Cameron v. Meador-
Pasley Company, 39 Ga. App. 712, 148 S. E- 309.
Allowance of Expenses—Burden of Proof.—The party al-
leging that a transaction with an underwriter of a bond
issue was usurious by reason of an allowance for expenses
has the burden of proving that the amount was so extravagant
as to show bad faith. G. L. Miller & Co. v. Claridge Manor
Co., 14 Fed. (2d), 859.
Charging Interest on Interest Due.—A contract to pay
eight per cent, per annum semi-annually, with interest on
the semi-annual payments of interest after due, does not
constitute usury under this section. Pendergrass v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 163 Ga. 671, 137 S. E- 36.
Question for Jury.—The question as to whether one in-
tends to exact usury by a contrivance or device or whether
the alleged charge is bona fide for actual services is for the
determination of the jury. Bank v. Farmers State Bank,
161 Ga. 801, 132 S. E. 221.
§ 3438, Park's Code.
See § 3438(1).
§ 3438 (1). All interest forfeited for usury.
Section 3444 and section 700 of the Penal Code were not
repealed by this section. Bennett v. Lowry, 167 Ga. 347,
145 S. E. 505.
Where, as a condition precedent to the obtaining of a
loan of money upon which the full legal rate of interest is
charged, and without other consideration or inducement to
him, the borrower is required by the lender to become
surety for a third person upon a note to cover past and
future interest upon a pre-existing debt due to the lender
by such third person, and thus to extend the maturity of
such old debt from a date in the past to a date in the fu-
ture, the borrower's promise as contained in the note so
executed as surety is in the nature of interest upon the
loan to himself, and, being additional to the legal rate, is
subject to be forfeited as usury. Winder Nat. Bank v.
Graham, 38 Ga. App. 552, 144 S. E- 357.
Constitutionality.—See Mitchell v. Loan & Investment
Co., 161 Ga. 215, 130 S. E- 565, approving the statement un-
der this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Forfeiture of Interest Is Sole Forfeit.—Under the laws of
Georgia the exaction of a higher rate of interest for the use
of money than eight per centum per annum is unlawful,
and prevents the collection of any interest whatever. Bank
v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801, 132 S. E. 221; but no
other forfeit shall be occasioned. Stewart v. Miller & Co.,
161 Ga. 919, 132 S. E- 535; Padgett v. Jones, 34 Ga. App.
244, 129 S. E- 109.
Thus an assignment of salary to secure a usurious debt
would be valid as to the principal. Flood v. Empire Invest-
ment Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 271, 133 S. E- 50.
§ 3444. Rate greater than five per cent per
month punished.
Not Repealed by Section 3438(1).—This section and sec-
tion 700 of the Penal Code were not repealed by section
3438(1). Bennett v. Lowry, 167 Ga. 347, 145 S. E. 505.
§ 3446 PRINCIPAL AND SURETY § 3541
ARTICLE 2
Business of Loans on Personal Property
§ 3446. License required.
See note to § 1770(61).
Purpose of Article.—As the only provision in this article
for raising revenue is that contained in § 3447 it is mani-
fest that its purpose is not the raising of revenue, but is
the protection of those who are compelled to borrow from
improper lenders who have failed to comply with the stat-
utes for such protection. McL,amb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App.
210, 129 S. E. 570.
Effect of Noncompliance on Contract.—Therefore a contract
made without a compliance with and in violation of the
statute is void and unenforceable. McEamb v. Phillips,
34 Ga. App. 210, 129 S. E- 570.
Not Applicable to Isolated Purchases.—The general tenor
of this and the following section is to require such licenses
of persons engaged in the business, and not of a person
not engaged in the business and who makes an isolated
purchase of wages or salaries. Spurlock v. Garner, 38 Ga.
App. 614, 144 S. E. 819.
§ 3453. Sale or assignment of wages.
This section is not to be construed as requiring a person
who is not "generally" engaged "in the business of buying
wages or salaries," but who has made a single isolated
purchase of salary by taking a salary assignment, to ob-
tain a license as required by the act. This section is to
be construed as bringing within the requirements of the
act a sale and assignment of wages when made for the
purpose of securing a debt, whether in existence or whether
created at the time of the sale or assignment, in addition
to an absolute sale of wages or salaries. Spurlock v. Gar-
ner, 38 Ga. App. 614, 144 S. E- 819.
CHAPTER 13
Of Bailments
ARTICLE l
General Principles
§ 3471. (§ 2898). Ordinary.
Applied in Southern Railway Co. v. Rundle, 37 Ga. App.
272, 274, 139 S. E- 830.
§ 3472. (§ 2899.) Extraordinary.
Scope of Section.—See Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App. 202,
204, 136 S. E- 96, citing and following the statement under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3473. (§ 2900.) Gross neglect.
When Violation of Speed Law Not Gross Negligence.—
Conceding, but not deciding, that the State law, prohibiting
the driving of automobiles at a greater rate of speed than
ten miles an hour while approaching and traversing inter-
sections of public highways, applies to intersections of
streets in a city, the violation of this law would not con-
stitute gross negligence. Southern Ry. Co. v. Davis, 132
Ga. 812, 817, 65 S. E. 131; Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App.
202, 204, 136 S. E. 96.
§ 3474. (§ 2901.) Due care in child.
No Invariable Rule.—The care and diligence required of
an infant of tender years is not fixed by any invariable rule
with reference to the age of the infant or otherwise. It
depends upon the capacity of the particular infant, taking
into consideration his age as well as other matters. Mc-
Larty v. Southern Ry. Co. 127 Ga. 161, 56 S. E- 297; Mac-
Dougald Construction Co. v. Mewborn, 34 Ga. App. 333,
337, 129 S. E. 917.
Infants under Fourteen.—Infants under fourteen years of
age are chargeable with contributory negligence resulting
from a want of such care as their mental and physical ca-
pacity fits them for exercising, and assume the risk of those
patent, obvious and known dangers which they are able to
appreciate and avoid. Evans v. Josephine Mills, 119 Ga. 448,
46 S. E- 674; MacDougald Construction Co. v. Mewborn,
34 Ga. App. 333, 337, 129 S. E. 917.
Question of Capacity for Jury.—See Western & Atlantic
R. R. v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 134 S. E- 134.
Applied in McCombs v. Southern Railway Co., 39 Ga.
App. 716, 720, 148 S. E. 407.
§ 3475. (§ 2902.) Imputable negligence.
Negligence of Husband Not Imputed to Wife.—Where a
husband, not acting as agent of his wife, operates an au-
tomobile not belonging to the wife, but under her command,
his negligence is not imputable to the wife. Holloway v.
Mayor, 35 Ga. App. 87, 132 S. E. 106.
Instructions to Jury.—For a case where it was not error
to instruct the jury, as a matter of law, that the negligence
of the driver of the vehicle was not imputable to the per-
son for whose homicide the action was brought. See West-
ern & Atlantic Railroad v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 134 S. E.
134.
ARTICLE 3
Of Deposits
§ 3508. (§ 2935). Liability of innkeeper for
stolen goods.
See notes to § 2731.
ARTICLE 5
Pledges and Pawns
§ 3528. (§ 2956). What is a pawn.
Cited in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Washington etc., Co., 167
Ga. 354, 360, 145 S. E- 761.
§ 3533. (§ 2961.) Transfer.
Transferee Stands in Transferor's Shoes.—The transferee
of a pledge is a purchaser of the thing pledged. Continental
Trust Co. v. Bank, 162 Ga. 758, 761, 134 S. E- 775.
CHAPTER 14
Of Principal and Surety
36 Ga.
ARTICLE 1
The Contract
§ 3540. (§ 2968.) Stricti juris.
Section cited in Southern Surety Co. v. Williams,
App. 692, 137 S. E. 861.
§ 3541. (§ 2969.) Form immaterial.
Cited in Mulling v. Bank, 35 Ga. App. 55, 135 S. E. 222;
Federal Reserve Bank v. Lane, 35 Ga. App. 177, 132 S. E. 247.
Cited also in Durden v. Youmans, 37 Ga. App. 182, 139
S. E. 91.
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§ 3543 RELATIONS OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 3571
ARTICLE 2
Relative Rights of Creditor and Surety.
§ 3543. (§ 2971). A change of contract.
Applied in Payne v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 41,
142 S. E- 310.
§ 3544. (§ 2972.) Of risk.
See notes to § 4294(120).
I. IN GENERAL.
Effect of New Promise Made In Ignorance of Discharge.
—A new promise to pay the obligation, made by a surety
in ignorance of the fact that he has been released and dis-
charged, is not binding. Crandall v. Shepard, 166 Ga. 889,
144 S. E- 772.
Applied in Short v. Jordan, 39 Ga. App. 45, 146 S. E. 31.
II. ACTS OF CREDITOR IN GENERAL.
Splitting Debt.—Where a debtor to secure a debt depos-
its more than one piece of property, whether personal or
real, as security in gross for an entire debt, the amount
of which is definitely fixed in the contract, it is not within
the power of the holder of such collateral, whether he be
the original creditor or a transferee, to split the debt so
as to make it the liability of two persons instead of one,
and to be paid in full as to a- portion of the original amount,
with a provision that it shall still retain vigor as to the
other debtor. Loftis v. Clay, 164 Ga. 845, 850, 139 S. E-
668.
§ 3545. (§ 2973). Tender by surety.
The burden is upon the surety to prove that the tender
and demand were made either to the superintendent of
banks or to one duly authorized by him, as provided in the
act, to make collections for the bank. Simmons v. Bennett,
39 Ga. App. 272, 146 S. E. 799.
§ 3546. (§ 2974). Notice to sue.
A notice which states that the principal's residence is
"Waycross, Ga.," but which does not state the county of
the principal's residence, is not the notice required by
this section. Seckinger v. Exchange Bank, 38 Ga. App. 667,
145 S. E. 94.
The provision in this section requires actual notice. Con-
structive notice, if there be any, arising by virtue of an
act of the legislature incorporating a city, that the city is
in a particular county, will not suffice as a compliance with
this section. Seckinger v. Exchange Bank, 38 Ga. App. 667,
145 S. E. 94.
This section of the Civil Code is applicable to a case
where the contract sued on in Georgia was executed in an-
other State. Watkins Co. v. Seawright, 168 Ga. 750, 149
S. E. 45.
§ 3550. (§ 2978). Judgment against surety.
Former Law.—Prior to the act of 1893, now embraced in
this section, it was necessary to bring an independent suit
on all bonds given in an equitable proceeding; and since
the passage of said act, judgment can be entered up against
the principal and his sureties at the same time in an equi-
table proceeding only in a case where a bond has been made
by the losing party, conditioned to pay the eventual con-
demnation-money in the action. United States Fidelity,
etc., Co. v. Tucker, 165 Ga. 283, 286, 140 S. E. 866, citing
Jordan v. Callaway, 138 Ga. 209, 75 S. E. 101.
Bond of indemnity, not for condemnation-money; no judg-
ment entry as in case of appeal. U. S. Fidelity, etc., Co.
v. Tucker, 165 Ga. 283, 286, 140 S. E. 866; Cf. American,
etc., Ins. Co. v. McGlothin, 165 Ga. 173, 140 S. E- 354.
ARTICLE 3
Rights of Surety against Principal
§ 3552. (§ 2980). For money paid.
Payment by a surety or indorser of a debt past due en-
titles him to proceed immediately against his principal for
the sum paid, with interest thereon, and all legal costs
to which be may have been subjected by deiault of his
principal. Under the facts of this case the plaintiff was a
surety or indorser and not a guarantor, and is to be subro-
gated to the rights of the payee in the notes in contro-
versy to the extent of his payment. Electric City Brick Co.
v. Hagler, 168 Ga. 836, 149 S. E- 126.
§ 3553. (§ 2981). Effect cf judgment against
surety.
Cited in Hunter v. Burson, 168 Ga. 59, 147 S. E. 53.
§ 3556. (§ 2984.) Proof of suretyship.
Apparent Joint Principals.—See Nunnally v. Colt Co., 34
Ga. App. 247, 129 S. E- 119, following the principle stated in
the first paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Same—Married Women.—Where a married woman signs a
note ostensibly as a maker jointly with her husband, whe i
in fact she is a surety only, before she can establish the
fact of her suretyship as against the payee of the note it must
be made to appear, despite her apparent relationship as
principal, that the payee, with knowledge of the facts
which would constitute her a surety, contracted with her
as a surety. Bennett v. Danforth, 36 Ga. App. 466, 137
S. E- 285.
§ 3559. (§ 2987). When sued separately.
Cited in Hunter v. Burson, 168 Ga. 59, 147 S. E- 53.
ARTICLE 4
.
Rights of Sureties Among Themselves
§ 3564. (§ 2992). Right of contribution.
Two or more sureties who have paid the debt of their
insolvent principal may jointly sue a cosurety for contribu-
tion, even where their action is based upon their right to
contribution predicated upon the implied promise springing
from the payment of the debt alone, and is not based upon
notes paid off and transferred to them, where the plaintiff
sureties jointly paid the debt, although it was paid by
their individual funds. Durden v. Youmans, 37 Ga. App.
182, 139 S. E. 91.
ARTICLE 5
Rights of Sureties as to Third Persons
§ 3567. (§ 2995.) Subrogation.
In referring to sections 3567 and 3568 of said code, the
Supreme Court, in Train v. Emerson, 141 Ga. 95, 97, 80 S.
E. 554, said: "Whether the code sections serve to convert
the right of substitution from an equitable to a legal right
becomes quite immaterial since the enactment of our uni-
form procedure act, which permits the enforcement of equi-
table and legal rights in the same action in a court hav-
ing jurisdiction to administer both." Durden v. Youmans,
37 Ga. App. 182, 186, 139 S. E. 91.
Applied in McWhorter v. Bank, 162 Ga. 627, 134 S. E. 606.
Section Cited in Reid v. Whisenant, 161 Ga. 503, 131 S. E-
904.
CHAPTER 15
Of Principal and Agent
ARTICLE l
Relations of Principal and Agent Among Them-
selves
§ 3571. (§ 2999.) What may be done by agent.
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§ 3574 LIABILITIES OF PRINCIPAL AS TO THIRD PERSONS § 3595
Delegation of Power by Agent in General.—For a case
holding substantially with the doctrine laid down in the case
in paragraph three under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926, see Mathis v. Western, etc., Railroad, 35 Ga. App.
672, 680, 134 S. E- 793.
No agent may delegate his authority unless he is spe-
cially empowered to do so, and, for reasons that are en-
tirely obvious, this rule is usually given a very strict, if
not a literal application in case of public officers. Deariso
v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313, 322, 143 S. E. 915.
§ 3574. (§ 3002). Agency created; how,
agents of corporations.
Applies to Creation of All Agencies.—There is nothing in
this section which confines it to agencies created for the
execution of instruments under seal. It lays down a broad
and sweeping rule for the creation of all agencies. Byrd v.
Piha, 165 Ga. 397, 400, 141 S. E- 48.
Leases Executed by Agents.—Contracts creating the re-
lation of landlord and tenant, for any time exceeding one
year, must be in writing; and when executed by an agent,
the authority of the agent to execute it must likewise be in
writing. Byrd v. Piha, 165 Ga. 397, 141 S. E. 48.
§ 3575. (§ 3003.) Revocation.
Unreasonable Instructions-—Bona Fide Disregard.—Where
an agency is coupled with an interest, and the principal
gives to the agent unreasonable instructions detrimental to
the agent's interest, the agent may disregard the instruc-
tions and act for himself, provided he acts in good faith;
and the principal would be bound thereby. Southern Trad-
ing Corp. v. Benchley Bros., 34 Ga. App. 625, 130 S. E- 691.
§ 3576. (§ 3004.) Agent limited by his authority.
An agency to sell does not necessarily carry with it au-
thority to collect. The agent must act within the authority
granted bim, and persons dealing with any agent appointed
for a particular purpose are bound to inquire as to th<
extent of his authority. Miles v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 619,
141 S. E- 314.
Section Applied in Benton v. Roberts, 35 Ga. App. 749, 134
S. E. 846.
§ 3577. (§ 3005.) Money deposited by agent.
Section Quoted in Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E- 542.
§ 3578. (§ 3006.) Payment to agent failing to
produce obligation.
Section Quoted in Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E. 542,
Applied in Osborn v. War Finance Corporation, 39 Ga.
App. 42, 145 S. E. 917.
§ 3579. (§ 3007.) Agents and fiduciaries to keep
accounts.
When a receiver is called upon for an accounting, the
burden is upon him to support his claim for expenditures
by proper vouchers, or to show some sufficient reason why
he can not do so. Dodge v. Hatchett, 118 Ga. 883, 45 S.
E. 667; Merritt v. George, 168 Ga. 497, 500, 148 S. E. 334.
Section Quoted in Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E- 542.
§ 3581. (§ 3009.) Diligence of an agent.
See note to P. C. 211(28).
Section Cited in Benton v. Roberts, 35 Ga. App. 749, 134
S. E. 846.
§ 3584. (§ 3012.) Estoppel.
Sub-Agent May Deny Title in Employing Agent and in
Corporation.—In Paschal v. Godley, 34 Ga. App. 321, 322, 129
S. E- 565, it was said: "While an agent can not dispute his
principal's title except in certain instances not present in
this case, yet if * * * in possession of the cattle merely
by virtue of an employment by * * * an officer of the
corporation, * * * he would not because of these facts be
estopped from defending upon the ground that the title was
* * * in the company."
859.
§ 3587. (§ 3015.) Brokers right to commission.
I. IN GENERAL
Applied in Latimer v. Gifford, 37 Ga. App. 1, 138 S. E-
II. COMPENSATION.
A. In General.
Limitations Must Be Embodied in Contract.—If the
owner of the property desires to limit his liability for com-
missions in a manner other than that which is governed
by the general rule, such as that commissions will be due
only in the event of a consummated sale, provision for such
limitation of liability must be embodied in the authority
to sell. Hall v. Vandiver, 37 Ga. App. 656, 141 S. E. 332.
B. Sale by Principal.
As to sale by principal, see City National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Orr, 39 Ga. App. 217, 146 S. E- 795.
Before Broker Procures Purchasers—Exclusive Authority
and Exclusive Right.—A distinction has been raised between
an exclusive agency to sell and an exclusive right to sell
Several cases in which there was merely an exclusive agency
have called attention to the fact that an exclusive right was
not conferred, without stating what the effect of conferring
such right would be, and when that question has come
squarely before the courts they have held that, conferring
the exclusive right to sell excluded sales by the owners them-
selves. 10 A. I,. R- 818. See dissenting opinion of Luke, J.,
in Barrington v. Dunwody, 35 Ga. App. 517, 520, 134 S. E-
130.
Same—Same—Result as to Owners Right to Sell.—"Ob-
viously if the broker is given an exclusive right to sell, it
precludes his employer from selling in any manner other than
through that particular broker's agency. The grant of
merely an exclusive agency, however, does not have the ef-
fect of preventing the owner from selling independently
through his own personal efforts, as it simply secures to
the broker an exclusive 'agency,'" that is, the employer can
not sell through the medium of another broker without vio-
lating the terms of his agreement and rendering himself li-
able therefor." 4 R. C. L- 260, section 12. Quoted in the dis-
senting opinion of Luke, J., in Barrington v. Dunwody, 35
Ga. App. 517, 520, 134 S. E. 130.
D. Modification of Effects of Section by Contract—Sales
Agents—Necessity for Consummation of Sale.
Modification by Agreement.—An owner may stipulate in
the contract of listment that he is not to be subject to the
payment of brokerage commissioners until the actual accept-
ance of title by the officer. Kiser Real Estate Co. v. Ship
pen Hardwood Eumber Co., 34 Ga. App. 308, 129 S. E. 294.
§ 3591. (§ 3019). Effect of ratification.
Ratification of an agent's act is presumed from slight cir-
cumstances and is as effective as if the act was originally
authorized, and is not revocable. Napier v. Pool, 39 Ga.
App. 196, 146 S. E. 783.
ARTICLE 2
Rights and Liabilities of Principal as to Third
Persons
§ 3595. (§ 3023.) Extent of authority.
III. SPECIAL AGENTS.
Duty to Investigate Authority.—For a case which adheres
to the rule laid down in the first paragraph under this catch-
line in Georgia Code of 1926, see Quillion & Bros. v. Wales
Adding Machine Co., 34 Ga. App. 135, 136, 128 S. E- 698.
How Far Principal Bound.—One who deals with a special
agent, knowing at the time the limits within which the
agent, under the terms of his appointment, has authority to
bind his principal, is bound to act with reference to this
knowledge, and can not hold the principal liable for loss
occasioned by acts of the agent in excess of, or contrary to,
the latter's authority in the premises. See Littleton v. Loan
etc., Asso., 97 Ga. 172, 25 S. E- 826: Quillan & Bros. v.
Wales Adding Machine Co., 34 Ga. App. 135, 136, 128 S. E-
698.
Authority to Collect.—In Quillan & Bros. v. Wales Adding
Machine Co., 34 Ga. App. 135, 137, 128 S. E- 698, is quoted
the following statement taken from an opinion delivered by
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§ 3596 REALTY § 3633
Mr. Justice Eewis, in Walton Guano Co,, v. McCall, 111 Ga.
114, 116, 36 S. E- 469*: "As a general rule a special agent or
attorney to collect a debt is not authorized to receive any-
thing as a payment thereon except actual cash." In the
same case it was added that an agency does not necessarily
include an agency to collect.
Cited in Armour Fertilizer Works v. Maddox, 168 Ga.
429, 148 S. E. 152; Miles v. Foy, 38 Ga. App. 473, 474, 144
S. E. 802; Johnson v. Milam, 38 Ga. App. 568, 144 S. E-
346.
§ 3596. (§ 3024). Failing to disclose principal.
Illustrative Case.—Where certain individuals composing
a committee to represent the general citizenry, whose names
and identities were not disclosed, purchased a monument to
be erected as a memorial to the soldiers from a given
county who died in the World War, and the contract of
purchase and sale was duly executed by the seller in terms
of the agreement, the members of the committee may be
held liable as individuals in a suit by the seller on account
for the price of the monument. Schneider Marble Co. v.
Knight, 37 Ga. App. 646, 141 S. F- 420.
Cited m Miles v. Foy, 38 Ga. App. 473, 476, 144 S. E- 802.
§ 3606. (§ 3034.) Agent is a competent witness.
I. IN GENERAL.
Cited in George v. Rathstein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. F-
414.
II. DECLARATIONS OF AGENT
A. Generally
Agent Must Be Acting for (Principal.—Under this section
and section 5779 "declarations of an agent as to business
transacted by him, in order to be admissible against his
principal, must have been made by him while representing
the principal in the transaction in controversy, and must
also have been a part of the negotiation, and constituting
the res gestae." National Building Asso. v. Quin, 120 Ga.
358(2), 47 S. E. 962. "Admissions of the alleged agent of a
corporation are not admissible to bind the corporation
unless the agency be shown." Ninth District Agricultural
& Mechanical School v. Wofford Power Co., 37 Ga. App.
271, 139 S. E. 916.
Where, although it appeared that the person whose ad-
missions were introduced was the agent of the defendant
"from 1917 to 1924," there was nothing to show when such
admissions were made, or that they were made during the
existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's
authority, a verdict in the plaintiff's favor was without
evidence to support it as to such items. Ninth District Ag-
ricultural & Mechanical School v. Wofford Power Co., 37
Ga. App. 271, 139 S. E- 916.
ARTICLE 3
Rights and Liabilities of Agent as to Third
Persons
§ 3607. (§ 3035.) Agent may act under this Code,
for principal.
See notes to § 3366 par. 6.
§ 3611. (§ 3039). When responsible for credit
given.
Illustration.—A person who has obtained a diversion of a
shipment of goods during transportation by a carrier is not
liable for a resulting additonal freight charge, where, in
ordering the diversion, he was acting as agent for another,
and the carrier must have known of this fact. B. & O.
R. Co. v. Johnson- Battle Lumber Co., 37 Ga. App. 729, 141
S. E. 678.
But where a person would relieve himself from personal
liability on the ground of such agency, he ordinarily has
the burden of proving the fact of agency as well as knowl-
edge thereof by the opposite party. Citizens Nat. Bank v.
Jennings, 35 Ga. App. 553, 134 S. E- 114; 2 C. J. 923; B. &
O. R. Co. v. Johnson-Battle Lumber Co., 37 Ga. App. 729,
731, 141 S. E. 678.
§ 3613. (§ 3041). Liability for excess of
authority.
See notes to § 4413.
FIFTH TITLE
Of Property and the Tenure by Which it is Held
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CHAPTER 1
Of Realty
§ 3619. (§ 3047). Lateral support.
Acquisition by Prescription.—The extent of an easement
to use a wall of an adjoining owner for the support of a
building, which is acquired by prescription, is the enjoy-
ment of the use of the wall for the support of the house as
it existed during the period of prescription. Eevinson v.
Goode, 164 Ga. 361, 138 S. E- 583.
The owner of a wall which is subject to an easement by
prescription for the support of the building of an adjoining
owner has the right, on raising the wall higher, to the sole
use thereof unaffected by any easement for the use of the
new portion to support an additional story of the house to
which the easement belongs. Eevinson v. Goode, 164 Ga.
361, 138 S. E. 583.
§ 3620. (§ 3048). Excavations by adjoining
owners.
If irreparable injury to the property of the adjacent
proprietor will probably result from failure by the exca-
vator to exercise ordinary care and reasonable precaution
to sustain the land with the buildings thereon, equity will
afford relief by injunction. Massell Realty Improvement Co.
v. MacMillan Co., 168 Ga. 164, 147 S. E- 38.
Under proper construction of this and the preceding sec-
tion where a proprietor desires to make a necessary exca-
vation up to the line of a lot for the purpose of construct-
ing a building, and the adjacent proprietor has an existing
building the wall of which extends along the property line,
so that the work of excavating will withdraw lateral sup-
port of the wall and tend to render it unsafe, it is the duty
of the party desiring to make the excavation to give the
adjoining proprietor reasonable notice of his intention to
make the excavation, and also to exercise ordinary care and
take reasonable precautions to sustain the land of the
other, so as to avoid injury to the land including the build-
ing thereon. Massell Realty Improvement Co. v. Mac-
Millan Co., 168 Ga. 164, 147 S. E. 38.
§ 3621. (§ 3049). Fixtures.
Particular Fixtures Considered and Principles Illustrated
—
Machinery.—Boilers, smokestacks, etc., installed in creamery
plant, removal of which would incapacitate plant, is, under
this section, fixtures included within a prior mortgage of
after-acquired property, which became superior to vendor's
reservation of title. In re Moultrie Creamery & Produce Co.,
2 Fed. (2d), 129.
However heavy mill machinery not attached to the build-
ing, but held in place by its own weight, does not pass under
a mortgage of the realty and appurtenances, which did not
mention the machinery. Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Ding-
ier, 8 Fed. (2d), 493.
§ 3630. (§ 3058.) Streams boundary lines.
Constitutionality. — The provisions in this section as to
change of currents and gradual accretions are not uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the due-process clause of the
State and Federal Constitutions. Johnson v. Hume, 163 Ga.
867, 137 S. E. 56.
§ 3633. (§ 3061). Power of owner of streams.
See notes to § 4475.
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§ 3639 ABSOLUTE ESTATES OR IN FEE SIMPLE § 3660
§ 3639. (§ 3063). Bridge or ferry right.
Loss of profits in operating- public ferry, resulting from
condemnation of land for bridge on public highway, not re-
coverable. State Highway Board v. Willcox, 168 Ga. 886,
149 S. E. 182.
Cited in Woodruff v. Bowers, 165 Ga. 408, 140 S. E). 844.
§ 3645. (§ 3069). Parol license, when not re-
vocable.
Cited in Garrard v. Milledgevillle Banking Co., 168 Ga.
339, 342, 147 S. E- 766.
CHAPTER 2
Of Personalty
§ 3651(1). Crops; liens, how attested and re-
corded; levies on unmatured crops.
Effect of Sale of Land with Growing Crops.—Since the
passage of this section the purchaser of lands upon which
crops are growing, at a sale by the trustee in bankruptcy
of the owner of the land, does not acquire any interest in
or title to such crops. Such purchaser under such sale only
acquires title to the land so purchased, and the right to the
rents, issues, and profits thereof after the date of his pur-
chase. Chatham Chemical Co. v. Vidalia Chemical Co., 163
Ga. 276, 136 S. E. 62.
Effect of Land Mortgage upon Crop Mortgage.—Want of
valid title in the mortgagor to the premises on which mort-
gaged crops are grown, and outstanding title in a third
person who is no party to the suit, does not bar an action
brought by the mortgagee to foreclose and enforce his mort-
gage on such crops. Chatham Chemical Co. v. Vidalia
Chemical Co., 163 Ga. 276, 136 S. E. 62.
Title to Crops on Land Encumbered before but Sold
after Section.—Notwithstanding this section, the purchaser
of lands under a power of sale in a security deed of older
date than the section acquired title to crops grown after
the passage of this section at the time of the sale if they
were grown and owned by the grantor in such deed;
but if the grantor had in fact, prior to such sale, rented in
good faith these lands to others, who raised such crops,
such purchaser did not acquire title to them, but only the
interest of the grantor in such deed in these crops. Chason
v. O'Neal, 158 Ga. 725, 124 S. E. 519; Brooks v. Causey, 36
Ga. App. 233, 136 S. E- 282.
§ 3652. (§ 3076.) Rights and remedies.
There Can Be No Right of Action until There Has Been
a Wrong.—See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-Hood Co.,
161 Ga. 480, 131 S. E- 283, which quotes with approval the
doctrine of the cases under this catchline in Georgia Code
of 1924.
Where one sustains an injury to his person and also dam-
age to his property from the same act or acts of negligence
of another, two distinct causes of action arise in favor of
the person so aggrieved, and a recovery for the damage to
his property is not a bar to a subsequent action for the
injury to his person. Endsley v. Ga. Railway & Power
Co., 37 Ga. App. 439, 140 S. E- 386.
§ 3653 (§ 3077.) Assignment of choses in action.
II. DEFINITION AND GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Cited in Garrard v. Milledgeville Banking Co., 168 Ga.
339, 342, 147 S. E. 766.
III. WHAT IS ASSIGNABLE.
B. Under This Section.
2. Particular Choses Considered.
Funds in Potential Existence.—It is not necessary that
the fund attempted to be assigned shall be in actual exist-
ence at the time, for it is well settled that it is sufficient if
it "exists potentially." Brown Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga.
App. 652, 656, 130 S. E. 695.
special form is necessary, but the assignment will be suf-
ficient if its language discloses the intention of the owner
to transfer his rights to the assignee. Hence, an indorse-
ment on a non-negotiable promissory note, "Pay to acct.
Isabella L. Calhoun, Trustee," signed by the payee there-
in, was, when accompanied by delivery, sufficient to au-
thorize such transferee to bring suit thereon against the
maker. Peck v. Calhoun, 39 Ga. App. 764, 145 S. E- 528.
VI. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.
Immediate Change of Ownership.—In order to infer an
equitable assignment, such facts and circumstances must
appear, as would not only raise an equity between the as-
signor and the assignee, but show that the parties con-
templated an immediate change of ownership with respect
to the particular fund in question, not a change of owner-
ship when the fund should be collected or realized, but at
the time of the transaction relied upon to constitute the as-
signment. Brown Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga. App. 632,
656, 130 S. E- 695.
§ 3654. (§ 3078). Assignment of fund..
The effect of this section is not to render illegal all
equitable assignments resting in parol. This section was
codified from the decision in Baer v. English, 84 Ga. 403,
(11 S. E. 453, 20 Am. St. R. 372), which dealt with the
question whether an ordinary bill of exchange, until ac-
cepted, operated as an assignment. In that case Judge
Bleckley said: "There may be cases (see Daniel v. Tar-
ver, 70 Ga. 203) in which the doctrine of equitable assign-
ment would still have application, notwithstanding the
Code furnishes the means by which to accomplish a legat
assignment without any aid from equitable principles.""
Beasley v. Anderson, 167 Ga. 470, 146 S. E. 22.
§ 3655. (§ 3079). What not assignable.
The right of action in the assignee of a salary assign-
ment, to recover against the assignor for damage result-
ing from the assignor's collecting the assigned salary and
appropriating it to his own use, does not arise out of fraud
on the assignee, but involves a right of property. The right
of action is assignable, under this section as interpreted in
Sullivan v. Curling, 149 Ga. 96, 99 S. E- 533; Information
Buying Company v. Morgan, 39 Ga. App. 292, 147 S. E. 128.
§§ 3655 (a) -3655(c). Park's Code.
See § 3651(1).
SIXTH TITLE
Estates and Rights Attached Thereto
For
IV. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
A. In General.
this purpose of assignment under this section
CHAPTER 1
Of Absolute Estates or in Fee Simple
§ 3659. (§ 3083.) What words create.
Intention of Maker Cardinal Rule of Construction.—For
cases holding substantially with cases cited under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Banks v. Mor-
gan, 163 Ga. 468, 470, 136 S. E- 434, and cases there cited.
Words of Inheritance.—Pursuant to this section it is
held that, as a reservation is a grant by implication of a
thing reserved, words of inheritance are no longer neces-
sary to convey an estate in fee simple to the grantor. In
the case of an exception, words of inheritance are neces-
sary. Grant v. Haymes, 164 Ga. 371, 379, 138 S. E. 892.
Applied in Hollomon v. Board of Education, 168 Ga. 359,.
364, 147 S. E. 882.
§ 3660. (§ 3084). Technical words.
"Heirs of the Body."—Under this section and the case
of Starnes v. Sanders, 151 Ga. 632 (108 S. E- 37), the words
"heirs of the body" mean children, and not grandchildren.
Baynes v. Aiken, 166 Ga. 898, 899, 144 S. E- 736.
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§ 3667 LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3691
CHAPTER 3
Of Estates for Life
§ 3667. (§ 3091). Increase.
Where a testator devised and bequeathed to one for life
"the use, income, and profits" of certain real and personal
property, with remainder over to others, with power in the
executors to sell and reinvest in "income- producing prop-
erty or securities," subject to the same uses, and the
property devised was sold and reinvested in property which
enhanced in value, such enhancement in value became a
part of the corpus of the estate and inured to the benefit
of the remaindermen, and could not be colllected by and
for the use of the life- tenant. Wood v. Davis, 168 Ga.
504, 148 S. F. 330.
CHAPTER 3
Of Estates in Remainder and Reversion
No particular estate neces-§ 3675. (§
sary.
"Ordinarily the election of the widow to take against the
will has the effect of accelerating any remainders limited
to take effect after a life-estate given to her." 28 R. C. I,.
333. See Toombs v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 766, 57 S. F- 59, where
the doctrine is distinctly recognized. Bank v. Futch, 164
Ga. 181, 184, 138 S. F- 60.
§ 3676. (§ 3100.) Vested or contingent.
What Uncertainties Make Contingency.—There is a dis-
tinction between the uncertainty which makes a remainder
contingent and the uncertainty of the estate ever taking
effect in possession, which is incidental to even a vested
remainder. In a vested remainder the time of possession
and the enjoyment being deferred, there is always an un-
certainty as to whether the estate will ever be enjoyed in
possession. Walters v. Walters, 163 Ga. 884, 890, 137 S. F.
386. See also, 23 R. C. L. 500, sec. 33.
Same—Vested Subject to Be Divested.—Where remain-
ders are subject to be divested, in whole or in part, by the
disposition of the whole or some part of the property left
by the testator, this contingency does not deprive the re-
mainder of its character as vested. Walters v. Walters, 163
Ga. 884, 890, 137 S. F- 386. See also Melton v. Camp, 121
Ga. 693, 49 S. F- 690.
Illustrations of Vested Remainders.—For a case holding
substantially with McDonald v. Taylor, 107 Ga. 43, 32 S. F-
879, cited under this catchline in Georgia Code of 1926, see
Walters v. Walters, 163 Ga. 884, 890, 137 S. F- 386.
Applied in McCoy v. Olive, 168 Ga. 492, 4%, 148 S. F-
327.
§ 3678. (§ 3102.) Perpetuities,
Cases Not within Rule.—Clearly the limitation of an es-
tate to plaintiff for life, and at her death to her children
born and to be born, does not create a perpetuity. Palmer
v. Neely, 162 Ga. 767, 135 S. F- 90.
§ 3680. (§ 3104). Vesting of remainders
favored.
Contrary Intention Not Evidenced by Will.—A devise o*.
realty for life, with remainder to testator's "lawful heirs,"
vests the remainder in those answering such description at
the time of testator's death, unless the will evidences a
manifest intention to the contrary, though the life-tenant is
one of the class who will take the remainder. In the pres-
ent case the will does not evidence any manifest intention
contrary to the general rule. Payne v. Brown, 164 Ga.
171, 137 S. F. 921.
Applied in construing devises of personalty and realty
in Schoen v. Israel, 168 Ga. 779, 149 S. F- 124.
§ 3681. (§ 3105.) Assent of the executor.
General Rule.—The first sentence of this section merely
states the general rule. David v. David, 162 Ga. 528, 134 S.
F. 301.
§ 3682. (§ 3105). Merger.
Purpose of Doctrine.—The doctrine of merger of estates
is designed primarily for the benefit of one who acquire
an interest in property greater than he possessed in the
first instance, and will not be held to apply, against his
will, to his disadvantage. Seaboard Air-Line Railway Co.
v. Holhday, 165 Ga. 200, 204, 140 S. F- 507.
Necessity of Being in Same Person.—One estate car: not
be merged in another, unless both estates are owned by
the same person in the same right. Sea-board Air-Line
Railway Co. v. Holliday, 165 Ga. 200, 140 S. E. 507.
No merger can take place until such identity of person
and of present interest in point of facts exists. Whenever
a greater and a lesser estate meet in one and the same pe? -
son, without any intermediate estate, the lesser is sunk in the
greater. Seaboard Air-Line Railway Co. v. Holliday, 165
Ga. 200, 204, 140 S. F. 507.
Estates Must Be Coextensive and Commensurate.—In oi -
der for legal and equitable estate to merge, the estates
must be coextensive and commensurate. Seaboard Air-Lme
Railway Co. v. Holliday, 165 Ga. 200, 204, 140 S. F. 507.
Fractional legal estates and fractional equitable estates
can not merge where the fractions are not the same. An
equitable undivided interest in an equity of redemption
can not merge with the legal fee. Seaboard Air-Fine Rail-
way Co. v. Holliday, 165 Ga. 200, 204, 140 S. F- 507.
So a one-half undivided life-estate is not mergeable with
a five sixths remainder in fee. Before there can be a mei-
ger of estates, the instrument alleged to convey the greater
estate must convey an estate in the property in which the
lesser estate exists, and must in fact convey in such prop-
erty a greater estate than the lesser estate already carved
therefrom. Seaboard Air-Fine Railway Co. v. Holliday,,
165 Ga. 200, 204, 140 S. F- 507.
Equitable title of decedent and year's support were
merged into estate by deed to widow and children. Her
conveyance was limited to her interest. Hines v. Moore. 168
Ga. 415, 148 S. F. 162.
Interest under first mortgage merged into title of pur-
chaser, under language of transfer. Bank of Stephen' v.
Growers Finance Corp., 168 Ga. 108, 147 S. F. 113.
No merger by security-deed holder taking quitclaim deed
and transfer of tax executions after judgment lien has in-
tervened. Pope v. Hammond, 167 Ga. 821, 149 S. E. 204.
§ 3683. (§ 3107). Lien on one's own property.
In McDuffie v. Merchants Bank, 168 Ga. 231, 234, 147 S. F.
Ill, it is said: "The bank had no interest to protect as re-
garded the second tract of land embraced in the Forman se-
curity deed, by reason of the fact that the debt secured by
the assignment of Mrs. McDuffie's bond for title had been
fully paid, and by reason of the release referred to in the
preceding paragraph. Consequently the purchase by the
bank of the lien in Forman merely put the bank in every
respect in Forman's shoes."
CHAPTER 4
Of Estates for Years
§ 3685. (§ 3109.) Definition.
Leasehold as Realty.—The plaintiff had a written lease
from the owner of the premises in question, for a term of
five years. This created an estate in realty in the lessee as
an estate for years, if it be in lands, passes as realty in.
this State. Anderson v. Kokomo Rubber Co., 161 Ga. 842,
846, 132 S. F. 76.
CHAPTER 5
Of Landlord and Tenant
§ 3691. (§ 3115). Relation of landlord and
tenant exists, when.
A trustee in brankruptcy of a lessee has only the same
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§ 3692 LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3711
rights and interest that the tenant has under the contract
of lease, and can not enforce a different contract. The les-
see could not assign his lease without the consent of his
landlord, and neither could the trustee in bankruptcy. Cox
v. Howell, 37 Ga. App. 596, 141 S. E- 82.
§ 3692- (§ 3116.) Implied contract to pay rent.
Security Deed Given but Possession Retained.—One who
makes to a creditor for the purpose of securing a debt, a
deed to land, but retains possession of the land, does not
thereby become the "tenant" either of such creditor or of
his vendee. Finn v. Reese, 36 Ga. App. 591, 592, 137 S. E.
574. See also, Ray v. Boyd, 96 Ga. 808, 22 S. E- 916.
Cited in Roberts v. Roberts, 39 Ga. App. 810, 148 S. E-
606.
§ 3693. (§ 3117). How created.
See notes to § 3574.
Applied in Candler v. Smyth, 168 Ga. 276, 147 S. E- 552.
§ 3694 (§ 3118.) Landlord not liable for negli-
gence of tenant.
Duty and Liability of Landlord for Repairs.—It would
seem that the degree of diligence required under the sec-
tion in keeping the premises safe does not consist in either
slight diligence or of extraordinary diligence, but rather
consists of ordinary care, such as a prudent householder
might reasonably be expected to exercise. See Cuthbert v.
Schofield, 35 Ga. App. 443, 133 S. E. 303.
§ 3696. (§ 3120). Removal of fixtures by ten-
ant.
Under the provisions of this section of the code a tenant
during the term or during a continuation thereof, or while
he is in possession under the landlord, may remove such
fixtures erected by him. After the term and possession are
ended, they are regarded as abandoned to the use of the
landlord, and become the latter's property. Accordingly, in
the instant suit in trover to recover certain shelving sup-
plied by the tenant for use in the rented property, the
lease having expired, they could not be recovered, even as
trade fixtures, if attached to the realty. Powell v. Griffith,
38 Ga. App. 40, 142 S. E. 466.
§ 3698. (§ 3122.) Estoppel.
Stated in English v. Little, 164 Ga. 805, 139 S. E. 67S.
Section cited in Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135 S. E.
195.
§ 3699. (§ 3123.) Repairs and improvements.
II. DUTY AND LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.
Extent of Landlord's Duty to Repair—Premises Suited for
Purpose.
—
Except as provided by this section there is in
this State, as at common law, no implied covenant that the
premises are suitable for the purpose for which they are
leased, or for the particular use for which they are in-
tended by the tenant. Cox v. Lowney Co., 35 Ga. App. 51,
132 S. E. 257. And an instruction that it is the duty of the
landlord to make the premises suitable for the purpose in-
tended is erroneous. Id.
In this case the court cites the decisions appearing under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926 and admits that
they would seem to support a holding to the contrary. A
nice distinction, however, is drawn between the duty to
keep in repair and the duty to make repairs, and, on reason
and principle, it appears that such a distinction is justifiable
because if the property leased is inherently unfitted for
purposes intended, irrespective of repairs, (in the principle
case a basement as a candy storeroom) the tenant should
be charged with notice of the inadequacies. The situation
is analogous to that which exists when premises are leased
which contain patent defects under which circumstances
the landlord is not held accountable for repairs.
—
Ed. Note.
In a case where the landlord has fully parted with pos-
session and right to the possession of the premises, there
is no duty of inspection on his part for the purpose of
discovering defects arising subsequent to the time of the
lease, and he is, therefore, not liable to his tenant
for injuries resulting from defects thus arising, unless
he has had actual knowledge of them, or has been
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notified of such defects and has failed to make re-
pairs within a reasonable time and the tenant could not
have avoided the injuries resulting therefrom by the exer-
cise of ordinary care on his own part. Stack v. Harris, 111
Ga. 149, 36 S. E- 615; McGee v. Hardacre, 27 Ga. App. 106
(2), 107 S. E. 563; Kleinbert v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774. 148
S. E. 535.
§ 3700. (§ 3124). Distress for rent.
Removal of Goods.—The intent and purpose of an agri-
cultural tenant in removing crops grown on the rented
premises is immaterial. Wheeler v. Mote, 37 Ga. App.
547, 140 S. E. 904.
Where, however, the rent of an agricultural tenant is
payable in specifics, and where, under the terms of the
rent agreement, the produce is to be delivered by the ten-
ant by a certain date and at a warehouse beyond the limits
of the rented premises, the tenant is authorized, in com-
pliance with the terms of the rent agreement, to remove
the produce called for by the contract to the place desig-
nated by the agreement, and to hold the same for the
landlord in the place thus specified pending the maturity of
the rent obligation. Wheeler v. Mote, 37 Ga. App. 547, 140
S. E. 904.
in§ 3705, (§ 3129.) Title to cropper's crop
landlord.
Title to Crop—When Goes to Cropper.—For a case hold-
ing substantially with cases cited under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926, see Folds v. Harris, 34 Ga. App.
445, 446, 129 S. E- 664.
Same—After Settlement and before Division.—Where there
has been no division of the crop between the landlord and
the cropper and where the cropper's portion of the crop has
not been set aside, and thus the cropper has not received
his part of the crop, no title to the crop passes into him,
although he may have settled with the landlord for all ad-
vances made. Atlanta Trust Co. v. Oliver-McDonald Com-
pany, 36 Ga. App. 360, 136 S. E. 824.
Same—Interest of Landlord.—A landlord's interest in the
title to crops grown by his cropper is only to the extent of
the value of the landlord's portion of the crops, as well as
of any indebtedness for advances made to the cropper.
Franklin v. Tanner, 34 Ga. App. 254, 129 S. E- 114.
Trover against Third Person.—A landlord, who has not
settled with his cropper but has received only a part of the
crops to which he is entitled and whose interest in the re-
maining crops is in an amount less than their value, can,
in a trover suit for their conversion against a third person,
who has acquired them by purchase from the cropper, re-
cover only to the extent of the amount of his claim against
the cropper. Franklin v. Tanner, 34 Ga. App. 254, 129 S.
E. 114.
Illustration.—Under this section and § 3707 the title to
the bale of cotton and the cottonseed levied on, of a crop
raised by the claimant, a cropper on land of his landlord,
the defendant in execution, was in the landlord, and not in
the cropper, the crop not having been divided between them
and the cropper being indebted to the landlord for supplies.
The property levied on, therefore, was not subject to the
execution, and the judge of the superior court erred in not
sustaining the certiorari from the verdict in the justice's
court which found the property subject. Cavin v. McWhor-
ter, 37 Ga. App. 477, 140 S. E. 778.
Under the provisions of this section where land is cul-
tivated for the owner by a share-cropper, pursuant to the
legal relation of landlord and cropper, the landlord until he
has received his part of the crops and has been fully paid
for all advances made to the cropper in the year in which
the crops were raised, to aid in making the crops, ordi-
narily has such possession of the crops as will authorize the
issuance of a possessory warrant at his instance to recover
possession of the crops from a third person who takes pos-
session thereof without his consent and without other law-
ful warrant or authority. Whitworth v. Carter, 39 Ga.
App. 625, 147 S. E. 904.
§ 3707. (§ 3131). Cropper.
See notes to sec. 3705.
§ 3711. (§ 3135.) Casualties no abatement of
rent.
What Amounts to Eviction.—Where a landlord enters
upon the rented premises for the ostensible purpose of
§ 3712 THEIR CREATION AND NATURE § 3739
making repairs, irrespective of whether it is in conformity
with a legal obligation due to his tenant, or whether it is
for the purpose of protecting his own property, if his con-
duct consists of negligent acts of such grave and permanent
character as would render the premises unfit for tenancy,
and is such as would legally import the intent to deprive
the tenant of their enjoyment, it amounts in law to an evic-
tion of the tenant, and the landlord can not thereafter re-
cover subsequently accruing rent. Feinberg v. Sutker, 35
Ga. App. 505, 134 S. E- 173.
§ 3712. Interfering with certain relations.
Section Compared with Section 125 of Penal Code.—This
section and the following section (section 3713) make it un-
lawful to do the things therein specified, even though there
would be no conflict with the employee's duty under his
contract of employment, which is something quite different
from enticing, persuading, or decoying the servant to desert
his employer during his term of service, as prohibited by
section 125 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the ruling as to
the Constitutional invalidity of this section and the follow-
ing section is not to be applied to that section of the Penal
Code. Rhoden v. State, 161 Ga. 73, 78, 129 S. E. 640.
Gl
CHAPTER 6
Of Estates on Condition
§ 3716. (§ 3136). Definition.
Applied in Hollomon v. Board of Education, 168
359, 364, 147 S. E. 882.
§ 3717. (§ 3137.) Precedent and subsequent.
Section cited in Grantham v. Royal Insurance Co., 34 Ga.
App. 415, 130 S. E. 589.
§ 3721. (3141.) Effect of breach of condition.
Necessity of Entry to Revest Estate.—The grantor in a
deed containing a condition subsequent, upon a breach
thereof, is not revested with the title until there has been
an entry. Barnesville v. Stafford, 161 Ga. 588, 592, 131 S.
E. 487.
CHAPTER 7
Of Tenancy in Common
§ 3723. (§ 3143). Definition of tenancy in com-
mon*
Rule Stated—Trustee and Cestui Que Trust.—If a trustee
acquires title to specific realty for his individual use and
also for the use of his cestui que trust, the entire estate
will be an estate in common, and the trustee and the cestui
que trust will be tenants in common. Carmichael v. Citi-
zens & Southern Bank, 162 Ga. 735, 134 S. E. 771.
§3724. (§ 3144). Rights and liabilities of co-
tenants.
Action by Adverse Claimant against Cotenant.—Proof of
title of tenants in common to land from which timber has
been cut and removed by one of them, superior to the title
of an adverse claimant, will entitle the tenant so cutting
and removing the timber to its proceeds, as against such
adverse claimant, notwithstanding the fact that the tenant
cutting and removing the timber in such proceeding alleges
ownership of the land and timber in severalty. Horn v.
Towson, 163 Ga. 37, 135 S. E. 487.
§ 3725. (§ 3145). Adverse possession.
Possession by Widow.—Prescriptive title not be predi-
cated on possession by widow to whose children unde-
scribed land was set apart as year's support. Newsome
v. Moore, 166 Ga. 301, 143 S. E. 400.
§ 3727. (§ 3147). Accounting between coten-
ants.
Encumbrance of Estate—Cotenant's Superior Lien.—This
section does not make the claim for indebtedness superior
to a security deed made by the tenant in common individ-
ually, purporting to convey his undivided interest in the
realty to a third person as security for his personal obliga-
tion. Carmichael v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 162 Ga.
735, 134 S. E. 771.
CHAPTER 8
Of Trust Estates, Trusts and Trustees, and
Deeds to Interests in Property for its Im-
provement
ARTICLE 1
Of Their Creation and Nature
§ 3728, (§ 3148). Definition.
Stated in Macy v. Hays, 163 Ga. 478, 485, 136 S. E- 517.
§ 3733. (§ 3153). Express, etc.
See note to § 2366(70).
There can be no expressed trust unless it is created in
writing. Macy v. Hays, 163 Ga. 478, 485, 136 S. E- 517.
Examples of application will be found in Macy v. Hays,
163 Ga. 478, 136 S. E- 517.
§ 3736. (§ 3156). Execution of trusts.
Illustration of Executory Trusts.—The following case is an
example of an executory trust. Burton v. Patton, 162 Ga.
610, 134 S. E. 603.
§ 3739. (§ 3159). Implied trusts.
See notes to § 2366(70).
Money Must Be Paid at or before Purchase.—For a case
reiterating the principle declared in the cases under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see McDonald v.
Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
Must Have Paid as Own.—In the first paragraph of
this section, the person in whose favor a trust is claimed
to result must have paid the purchase-money as his own.
If he merely advances the whole or a part of the pur-
chase-money as a loan, no implied trust arises. Mag.d
v. Byrd, 164 Ga. 609, 618, 139 S. E. 61, citing Johnston v.
Coney, 120 Ga. 767, 776, 48 S. E- 373.
Only a Portion Need Be Paid.—An implied trust re-
sults from the fact that one person's money has been in-
vested in land and the conveyance taken in the name of
another. Such implied trust may arise from the pay-
ment of a portion of the purchase money. Berry v.
Brunson, 166 Ga. 523, 143 S. E. 761.
To set up and establish such implied trust it is only
necessary to allege and prove that one person furnished
all or a portion of the purchase-money of the land, and
that the deed was taken in the name of the person to
whom the money was so furnished. Berry v. Brunson,
166 Ga. 523, 143 S. E- 761.
When Member of Firm Holds Land for Other Members.
—Where land is bought in whole or in part with money con-
tributed by one of the members of a firm, and the legal title
is taken in the name of the other members, under an agree-
ment that the latter is to hold the land for the use of
the firm, an implied trust arises in favor of the partnership,
and the members become equitable owners and equitable
tenants in common of the land. McDonald v. Dabney, 161
Ga. 711, 132 S. E. 547.
Express Authorization.—An implied trust ex maleficio
did not arise from the use of bonds in paying for
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property in part, as he was expressly authorized to use
them for this purpose. Magid v. Byrd, 164 Ga. 609, 139
S. F- 61.
Pleading—Sufficiency of Allegation.—For case wherein the
allegations of the petition as amended, construed most
strongly against the pleader, were held not to raise an im-
plied trust upon the principles of this section, see Drake v.
Drake, 161 Ga. 87, 129 S. F. 635.
Evidence.—To engraft an implied trust upon an absolute
deed by parol evidence, such evidence ought to be clear and
satisfactory. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. F.
547
Proof.—Ordinarily, where one person seeks to enforce an
implied trust in land because it was paid for in part by his
money and title thereto was taken in the name of another,
he must prove the amount of his money so used; but where
real estate is purchased with funds of a partnership, con-
tributed by both members, and title is taken in the name of
one of the members under an agreement that he is to hold
the same for the use of the firm, this rule does not apply.
The partner seeking to enforce the implied trust arising
under these circumstances will not be required to show the
specific amount of the funds contributed by him to the
partnership capital which went into the purchase thereof.
McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 732, 132 S. F- 547.
Paragraph Applied in Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga.
403, 410, 131 S. F- 75; Manget v. Carlton, 34 Ga. App. 556,
559, 130 S. F- 604; Carmichael v. Citizens, etc., Bank, 162
Ga. 735, 134 S. F- 771.
Applied also in Hollomon v. Board of Education, 168 Ga.
359, 364, 147 S. F- 882.
ARTICLE 2
Ot Trustees; Their Appointment, Powers, Etc.
§ 3744. (§ 3164). Proceeding at chambers.
Personal interest of trustees conflicting with that < f
trust estate, ground for removal in equity. Clark v.
Clark, 167 Ga. 1, 144 S. F. 787.
§ 3753. (§ 3170). Duty of trustees.
Power of a trustee to retain investments received from
the creator of the trust is, in the absence of contrary
statute or provision in the instrument creating the trust,
not different from his power to make investments; and
where testamentary trustees receive, as a part of the
trust estate, stock in manufacturing corporations, they
are not justified, in the absence of some authority to the
contrary in the instrument creating the trust, in con-
tinuing such investments, thpugh made by the testator.
It is their duty to convert said stocks into money within
z reasonable time, and invest the proceeds in securities
authorized by law or by an order of the superior court.
Otherwise they are liable for loss arising from deprecia-
tion in value of such stock. Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. 1,
2, 144 S. F- 787.
§ 3755. (§ 3172). Sales by trustee.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga.
1. 18, 144 S. F. 787.
§ 3762. (§ 3179). Purchaser with notice.
Notice of Trust Relationship—What Instrument Notice of.
— A. purchaser of land is charged with notice of recitals in
the deed to his vendor, to the effect that the land was pur-
chased with proceeds of the sale of trust funds. Carmichael
v. Citizens, etc., Bank, 162 Ga. 736, 134 S. F- 771. Citing
Cheney v. Rodgers, 54 Ga. 168; Hancock v. Gumm, 151
Ga. 667, 107 S. F- 872, 16 A. I,. R. 1003; Rosen v. Wolff,
152 Ga. 578, 585, 110 S. F- 877. But he is not charged with
notice of such recitals when contained in a deed by the
vendor to another person, even though the deed purports to
convey a part of the same general tract. The recital, in
order to charge notice to the purchaser, must be in an in-
strument constituting a link in his chain of title. Carmichael
v. Citizens, etc., Bank, supra, citing, Hancock v. Gumm,
supra.
Innocent Purchaser from Purchaser with Notice. — If a
grantee in the security deed, with notice of the equity of the
claimants in the hands therein conveyed, transferred for
value a note thereby secured to another without notice of
such equity and who took the same in good faith, the latter
acquired at least an equitable interest in such land as a
purchaser, and holds such interest free from the secret
equity of the claimants and the implied trust set up. First
Nat. Bank v. Pounds, 163 Ga. 551, 136 S. F. 528.
§ 3773. (§ 3189). Lien on estates for trust funds.
When Funds of Estate Loaned.—When an administrator
deposits with, or lends to, a firm of which he is a partner the
funds of the estate which he represents, and the same are
mingled with the funds of the firm and used in its business,
upon the dissolution of the firm by the death of such partner
(the administrator) the beneficiary of the trust fund thus mis-
applied has a lien upon the assets of the firm in the hands
of the surviving partner, superior to those of the firm's un-
secured creditors. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 132 S.
F. 626.
ARTICLE 3
Of Trusts and Trustees
§ 3779. (§ 3195). Trusts.
In General.—If the trustee omits to act when required
by duty to do so, or is wanting in necessary care and
diligence in the due execution of the trust which he has
undertaken, a court of equity will interpose. The relief
granted will always be molded and framed so as to ren-
der the trust effectual, and secure the best interests ot
all parties. A court of equity, having assumed jurisdic-
tion over the trust for one purpose, will give effect to all
the rights of the beneficiaries. Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. 1,
18, 144 S. E- 787.
Applied in Manget v. National City Bank, 168 Ga. 876,
882, 149 S. F. 213.
§ 3780. (§ 3196). When court will declare one a
trustee.
Section Quoted in McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 731,
132 S. F- 547.
§ 3781. (§ 3197). Want of trustee.
Appointment by Court for Educational and Religious
Trusts.—For a case following, in a material manner, the
principle enunciated in the first paragraph under this catch-
line in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Dominy v. Stanley, 162
Ga. 211, 133 S. F. 245.
§ 3785. (§ 3201). Tracing assets.
When Traceable May Always Follow.—The beneficiary of
a trust may always follow the trust funds wherever they can
be traced. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 707, 132 S.
F. 626.
Need Not Show Investment in Specific Property.—It is
not indispensably necessary for the beneficiary, in order
to trace trust funds, to show that they have been invested
in specific property by the trustee or the person aiding the
trustee in the misapplication of the funds. Miller & Co. v.
Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 708, 132 S. F- 626. But it is necessary
that they should be clearly traced and identified either in
original or substitute form. Id.
Same—Ober v. Cochran Reconciled.—In Ober & Sons Co.
v. Cochran, 118 Ga. 396, 45 S. F. 382, 98 Am. St. Rep. 118,
Mr. Presiding Justice Fish used some language which at
first blush might seem to conflict with the rule as an-
nounced by the Georgia Courts. That language is: "In or-
der to recover a trust fund which has been misapplied by
the trustee or person holding it in a fiduciary character, it
must be clearly identified or distinctly traced into the
property, fund, or chose in action which is to be made sub-
ject to replace it." This does not mean that the trust fund
can not be traced into the general property or funds of
such trustee or person holding it in a fiduciary capacity. If
the funds can be traced into the general property or funds
of such trustee or person, the trust will be enforced. Mil-
ler & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 709, 132 S. F- 626.
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ARTICLE 4
Claims Against Trust Estates
§ 3786. (§ 3202). Claims against trust estates,
etc.
Necessary Parties.
—Under this section et seq., a claim
against a trust estate may be enforced in a court of law,
and in such a case the trustees are the only necessary
parties. Zeigler v. Perry, 37 Ga. App. 647, 141 S. E. 426.
SEVENTH TITLE
Of Title and Mode of Conveyance
CHAPTER 1
Of Title by Grant
ARTICLE 3
Processioning
§ 3j818i. (§ 3244). What is processioning.
When There Is No County Surveyor.—While, under the
provisions of this section et seq., it is the duty of pro-
cessioners, upon proper application, to "appoint a day
v/hen a majority of them, with the county surveyor, will
trace and mark the said lines," when there is no county
surveyor the processioners may, under the provisions of
section 603 of the Civil Code, specially engage any com-
petent person, a citizen of the county, to perform his
duties, provided such person is first sworn to "do the
same skillfully, faithfully, and impartially, to the best
of his knowledge; or, in default of such person, the county
surveyor of an adjoining county may officiate." Tisinger
v Ellerbee, 37 Ga. App. 391, 140 S. E. 522.
§ 3820. (§ 3246). Rules in disputed lines.
When Construction Most Favorable to Grantee Prevails.—
Where all other means of ascertaining the true construction
of a deed fails, and a doubt still remains, that construction
is rather to be preferred which is most favorable to the
grantee. Holder v. Jordan Realty Co., 163 Ga. 645, 650, 136
S. E- 907, citing Tyler on Boundaries, 119, 120; Harris v.
Hull, 70 Ga. 831.
Section Given in Charge.—As to a case sustaining a trial
judge's charge to the jury involving a substantial portion
of the section, see Cherokee Ochre Co. v. Georgia Ochre
Co., 162 Ga. 620, 134 S. E. 616.
In Butler v. Lovelace-Eubanks Lumber Co., 37 Ga. App.
74, 76, 139 S. E. 83, it was held that the reference in the
charge to the provision of this section was not author-
ized, one of the main contentions of the defendant being
that a large rock, placed by nature, constituted one of
the dividing corner-marks, fixing the beginning point of
the true but disputed line between the adjoining premises.
The instructions in which the court gave in charge to
the jury the principles of section 3820 of the Civil Code of
1910, referring to natural landmarks and ancient or gen-
uine landmarks, and as to the general reputation in the
neighborhood as to ancient landmarks of more than thirty
years standing, even if not adjusted to the evidence,
could not have misled the jury upon the idea that the
tree referred to in Thompson's evidence as having been
marked by Killen "was evidence of an ancient landmark
which might control the jury." The error, therefore,
was not of sufficient materiality to have injured the
plaintiff or to require the grant of a new trial. Black-
well v. Houston County, 168 Ga. 248, 147 S. E- 574.
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§ 3821. (§ 3247). General reputation, when evi-
dence.
Binding on Grantees.—See Booker v. Booker, 36 Ga. App.
738, 138 S. E- 251, for a case following the cases cited under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Conventional Agreement to Establish Acquiescence.—It is
not essential that the acquiescence be manifested by a con-
ventional agreement. Sapp v. Odom, 165 Ga. 437, 141 S.
E. 201.
Acquiescence by conduct for a period of time less than
seven years will not suffice to establish a dividing line
between adjoining-land owners, in virtue of this section.
Sapp v. Odom, 165 Ga. 437, 141 S. E. 201, citing McAleer
v. Glover, 146 Ga. 369, 91 S. E- 114; Osteen v. Wynn, 131
Ga. 209, 62 S. E- 37, 127 Am. St. R. 212.
A line may be established under this section irrespective
of whether its true location was theretofore actually un-
ascertained or disputed. Yarbrough v. Stuckey, 39 Ga.
App. 265, 145 S. E. 160.
Cited in Tyson v. Anderson, 164 Ga. 673, 139 S. E. 410.
§ 3822. (§ 3248). Adverse possession.
'
Applied in Yarbrough v. Stuckey, 39 Ga. App. 265, 147
S. E. 160.
§ 3823. (§ 3249). Protest and appeal to superior
court.
Discrepancies in Dower Plat and Processioners.—Where it
appeared conclusively that the surveyor for the procession-
ers followed the line between the lands of the litigants as
shown by the dower plat, any errors made upon the lines
between other landowners, or any discrepancies in the
dower plat and the plat made by the processioners, were
immaterial and harmless. Groover v. Durrence, 36 Ga. App.
543, 137 S. E. 299.
Survey of Other Boundaries.—Where the only dispute is
over the dividing line between two tracts of land, a survey
of other boundaries is unnecessary. Groover v. Durrence,
36 Ga. App. 543, 137 S. E. 299.
§ 3824(1). Instruments to be bought for sur-
veyors.—In counties of Georgia having a popu-
lation of not less than 39,841 and not more than
39,845, according to the United States Census of
1920, the Boards of Roads and Revenues, County
Commissioners, or Ordinal, as the case may be;
shall purchase for the county surveyor a modern
instrument or compass for his use while in office.
Acts 1929, p. 168, § 2.
CHAPTER 2
Of Title by Will
ARTICLE 1
Of the Nature of Wills, by Whom and How Ex-
ecuted
§ 3828, (§ 3254). Form.
III. INSTRUMENTS HELD TO BE DEED.
Reserving Right to Dispose of Land.—The court erred
in restricting to a limited purpose an instrument in writ-
ing tendered by the defendant, upon the ground that the
instrument offered was testamentary in character and not
a deed. The paper offered had all the essential terms of
a deed, and was not rendered testamentary in character
by the clause reserving to the grantor the right to dis-
pose of the land in fee simple. Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga.
368, 145 S. E- 661.
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§ 3830. (§ 3256). Mutual wills.
In General.—Mutual wills are those which contain re-
ciprocal provisions, giving the separate property of each
testator to the other. Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738,
144 S. E. 319.
Agreements to make wills are not established merely
because two persons simultaneously make reciprocal tes-
tamentary dispositions in favor of each other, when the
language of such wills contains nothing to the effect that
the instruments are the result of a contract. Where mu-
tual wills are the result of a contract based upon a valid
consideration, and where after the death of one of the
parties the survivor has accepted benefits under the will
of the other which was executed pursuant to an agree-
ment, equity will, where the facts are fully proved, in-
terpose to prevent fraud, and will compel the execution
of such agreement by the survivor. Clements v. Jones,
166 Ga. 738, 144 S. E. 319.
Revocation.—Mutual wills, even with a covenant against
revocation, can still be revoked. Clements v. Jones, 166
Ga. 738,' 144 S. E. 319.
The general rule is, that if two persons execute wills at
the same' time, either by one or two instruments, mak-
ing reciprocal dispositions in favor of each other, the
mere execution of such wills does not impose such a legal
obligation as will prevent revocation. Clements v. Jones,
166 Ga. 738, 144 S. E. 319.
§ 3832. (§ 3258). Power of testators.
Providing for Creation of Corporation.—A testator under
the laws of this State can provide by his will for the crea-
tion by his executors of a corporation to which the executors
shall convey the residue of his estate for the purpose of
carrving on his general business. Palmer v. Neely, 162 Ga.
767, *135 S. E- 90.
Cited in Chauncey v. Barlow, 166 Ga. 156, 142 S. E. 673;
Deans v. Deans, 166 Ga. 555, 144 S. E. 116.
§ 3834. (§ 3260). Will should be voluntary.
Definition of Undue Influence.—Undue influence, to in-
validate a will, must amount to force or fear—must, in
effect, make the will the mental offspring of some other
person, and must be operative on the mind of the testa-
tor at the time the will is executed. It must destroy the
free agency of the testator and constrain him to do what
is against his will, but what he is unable to refuse. Gal-
loway v. Hogg, 167 Ga. 502, 524, 146 S. E- 156, citing
Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 50 Am. D. 329; Morris v.
Stokes, 21 Ga. 552; Thompson v. Davitte, 59 Ga. 472;
DeNief v. Howell, 138 Ga. 248, 251(6), 75 S. E. 202.
§ 3840. (§ 3266). Insane persons.
Monomania under This Section—Particular Type of Mania.
—Mania is a form of insanity accompanied by more or less
excitement, which sometimes amounts to fury. The person
so affected is subject to hallucinations and delusions, and
is impressed with the reality of events which have never oc-
curred and things which do not exist, and his actions are
more or less in conformity with his belief in these particu-
lars. Hall v. Unger, 11 Fed. Cas. 261, 263 (No. 5949). This
mania may extend to all objects; or it may be confined to one
or a few objects, in which latter case it is called monomania.
Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615, 628, 131 S. E. 535.
§ 3841. (§ 3267). Eccentricity, imbecility, etc.
Rule of Evidence.—The section is a rule of evidence, and
may be given in charge on an issue of devisavit vel non,
without specially pleading such rule, where there is evi-
dence to authorize such charge. Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615,
623, 131 S. E. 535.
An instruction undertaking to give the principle of this
section was held inadequate in Galloway v. Hogg, 167
Ga. 502, 146 S. E- 156.
§ 3842. (§ 3268). Amount of capacity neces-
sary.
Standard of Mental Capacity—Charges.—In his charge to
the jury the judge gave certain instructions which would
probably lead the jury to conclude that the capacity to
contract was identical with the capacity to make a valid
will; and this identity does not exist. Such instructions
were erroneous. Tarlton v. Richardson, 163 Ga. 553, 136 S. E-
526.
§ 3846. (§ 3272). Formalities of execution.
II. SIGNATURE OF TESTATOR.
Testator's Name Signed by Another.—Where a person's
name is signed for him, at his direction and in his presence,
by another, the signature becomes his own. The relation-
ship of principal and agent is not thereby created, nor does
the doctrine of such a relationship become involved. Neal
v. Harber, 35 Ga. App. 628, 134 S. E. 347.
Acknowledgment of Signature.—It is absolutely neces-
sary that the attesting witnesses either actually see the tes-
tator sign the instrument, or that the testator acknowledge
his signature thereto either expressly or impliedly. Wood
v. Davis, 161 Ga. 690, 693, 131 S. E- 885.
§ 3850. (§ 3276). Knowledge of contents.
Under the evidence, a finding that the testatrix had
knowledge of the contents of the will was demanded.
Cook v. Washington, 166 Ga. 329, 143 S. E. 409.
§ 3851. (§ 3277.) Charitable devises.
In General.—If a testator leave a wife or child or de-
scendant of child, and the will be executed less than
ninety days before the testator's death, a devise therein
to a charitable use is void. Wesley Memorial Hospital v.
Thompson, 164 Ga. 466, 139 S. E. 15.
Execution within Ninety Days of Death.—Under this sec-
tion a bequest to an educational institution by will which
was executed less than 90 days before death is void. South-
ern Industrial Inst. v. Marsh, lz Fed. (2d), 347.
ARTICLE 2
Of Probate and Its Effect
§ 3863. (§ 3289). Copy of a will, when estab-
lished.
Charge to jury in language somewhat stronger than
this section held no cause for reversal. Peck v. Irwin,
168 Ga. 442, 148 S. E- 88.
§ 3864.
office.
(§ 3290.) Original will to remain in
Section Cited in Young v. Certainteed Products Corp., 35
Ga. App. 419, 133 S. E. 279.
§ 3870. (§ 3296.) Admission of executor, etc.
Origin.—This section had its origin in codification, and
not in statute. Brown v. Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 154, 135 S. E.
721.
General Rule Stated.—It has been held that declarations
made before its execution, by parties who afterwards become
legatees under the will, are not admissible against the valid-
ity of the will. Brown v. Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 154, 135 S.
E. 721, citing 2 Schouler on Wills (6th ed), section 809; In
re Ames, 51 Iowa, 596 (2 N. W. 408); Burton v. Scott, 3
Rand. 399, 407; Thompson v. Thompson, 13 Ohio St. 356, 363.
Executor Who Is Propounder and Legatee.—See Brown v.
Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 154, 135 S. E- 721, which upholds the
doctrine of the case under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 3
Probate of Foreign Wills
§ 3873. (§ 3299.) What requisite if land de-
vised.
Sections 3873-3880 Explained.—Under sections 3873-3880 a
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foreign will can be probated, and Georgia property willed
thereunder can be administered, only by such resident ex-
ecutor as may be named therein, or, if none, by a resident
administrator with the will annexed, appointed at the in-
stance of any heir, legatee, distributee, devisee, or creditor
of the testator. The purpose and effect of the act of 1894,
now incorporated in these sections, is not only to require
the domestic probate of foreign wills before Georgia prop-
erty can be administered thereunder, but also to prohibit
such probate and the administration of Georgia property
willed thereunder by any person other than a resident exec-
utor or a resident administrator with the will annexed,
selected and appointed as therein provided, to the exclusion
of the executor therein named or any administrator with the
will annexed appointed elsewhere. League v. Churchill, 36
Ga. App. 681, 137 S. E. 800; S. C. 164 Ga. 36, 137 S. E- 632.
§ 3880. (§ 3306). No foreign executor to act
after January 1st, 1895.
See notes to § 3872.
ARTICLE 4
Of the Executor
§ 3886. (§ 3310). Executor de son tort.
In a suit by an heir at law of an estate to recover of
the defendants under authority of this section, for hav-
ing, as executors de son tort, intermeddled with the per-
sonalty belonging to the estate and converted it to their
own use, the plaintiff's right to recover can in no wise
be affected by the fact that advancements had been made
to him by the intestate in her lifetime, or by the fact
that one of the defendants had performed services for the
intestate. Herrington v. Herrington, 38 Ga. App. 596,
144 S. E. 673.
§ 3892. (§ 3316). Powers, duties, and liabili-
ties.
When land has been sold at an administrator's sale, and
a lien thereon transferred by virtue of this section to the
proceeds, such lien should be paid from such proceeds.
In such circumstances the plaintiffs could proceed to as-
sert their equitable right to have their lien paid out of
the proceeds of the executors' sale. They can not ob-
tain a general judgment de bonis decedentis, but can only
claim that the fund arising from the property, or so
much thereof as might be necessary, should be applied to
the payment of their lien, subject, however, to have legit-
imate defenses raised as to the legality and priority of
their attorney's lien, or the amount due thereon. Mid-
dleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 331, 138 S. E. 852.
ARTICLE 5
Of Devises and Legacies
§ 3895. (§ 3319). Assets to pay debts.
See notes to § 5358.
Title in Executor Until Assent.—Title to the property
must be vested in some one during the period of admin-
istration, and in case of a will it vests in the executor.
Under the plain language of this section it can not be
in the devisee or legatee. Willingham v. Watson, 165
Ga. 870, 872, 142 S. E. 458.
Not applied in suit by widow to cancel deed by testa-
tor (of date later than his will), for mental incapacity.
McLarty v. Abercrombie, 168 Ga. 745, 149 S. E. 30.
§ 3896. (§ 3320.) Effect of assent.
Effect of Assent Where Debts Made Permanent to Will.1—
Where executors, directed to carry out business ventures
of testator, incurred debts pursuant to will, they could not
thereafter interfere with rights of creditors by assenting to
devises or legacies. Holt v. Daniel Sons & Palmer Co.,
8 Fed. (2d), 700.
Such assent perfects the inchoate title of the legatee,
and, once given, is generally irrevocable. Citizens Bank
of Vidalia v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 160 Ga. 109(2),
127 S. E- 219; Cull v. Cull, 39 Ga. App. 164, 146 S. E. 559.
§ 3900. (§ 3324.) Intention of testator.
I. IN GENERAL.
This section was the law before there was a Code.
Payne v. Brown, 164 Ga. 171, 174, 137 S. E. 921.
When May Have Effect as It Stands.—In the instant case
the trial judge did not err in rejecting parol evidence tend-
ing to show that the testator instructed the scrivener to so
draw the will as to give to his brother and sister an es-
tate in remainder in the property real and personal given
his wife for life or widowhood under his will, when the will,
as it stands, may have effect. Hill v. Hill, 161 Ga. 356, 359,
130 S. E- 575.
Applied in Coleman v. Harrison, 168 Ga. 859, 866, 149
S. E- 141.
§ 3906. (§ 3330.) Lapsed legacies.
"Execute" Synonymous with "Made."—The word "exe-
cuted" in the phrase "when the will is executed," as used
in the section is synonymous with the word "made." Mac-
Intyre v. MdL-ean, 162 Ga. 280, 133 S. E- 471.
§ 3908. (§ 3322). Ademption of legacy.
Where testatrix never became possessed of the property
bequeathed this section cannot apply. Adams v. Bishop,
164 Ga. 367, 138 S. E- 849.
§ 3909. (§ 3333). Substitution.
Like Kind or Character.
—
Land held by absolute deed
is not property of "like kind" with a note secured by a
deed to the same land, within the meaning of this sec-
tion. Morgan v. Wolpert, 164 Ga. 462, 139 S. E. 15.
§ 3910. (§ 3334.) Election.
Renouncing Inconsistent Rights.—For a case following the
doctrine embodied in the note under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926, see Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1,
10, 129 S. E. 837.
§ 3913. (§ 3337.) Devise changed from real
to personal property, and vice versa.
Proceeds of Realty Treated as Personalty.—On the theory
of equitable conversion, the proceeds of real estate sold un-
der a power of sale conferred by the will of a decedent are
usually regarded as personal assets of the estate. Brown
Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga. App. 652, 655, 130 S. E. 695,
citing 11 R. C. L- 120.
ARTICLE 7
Of Nuncupative Wills
§ 3925. (§ 3349.) Nuncupative wills, when
good.
Supersedes § 20 English Statute of Frauds.—Section 20
of the English statute of frauds (29 Car. II, c. 3) is not
of force in this State, having been superseded by this
section. Robinson v. Jones, 167 Ga. 38, 144 S. E. 774.
Cited and partially stated in Felker v. Taylor, 162 Ga.
433, 134 S. E- 52.
§ 3926. (§ 3350.) When proved.
Partially Stated in Felker v. Taylor, 162 Ga. 433, 134 S.
E. 52.
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CHAPTER 3
Of Title by Descent and Administration
ARTICLE 1
Of Inheritable Property and the Relative Rights
of the Heirs and Administrator
§ 3929. (§ 3353.) Descent to heirs.
Realty—Equitable Estate Therein.—When the father of
the plaintiffs died intestate, holding possession of lands
under bonds for title with a part of the purchase-money
paid, he had a beneficial interest or equitable estate therein.
Upon his death this interest or estate descended to his heirs
at law. Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403, 409, 131 S.
E- 75-
Where on a sale of land the purchaser pays a part of the
purchase-money in cash and receives from the seller a bond
for title obligating the seller to convey the land on pay-
ment of the balance of the purchase-money, the purchaser
has a beneficial or equitable estate in the land, and where
the purchaser dies intestate the estate passes directly to
his heirs at law. Weems v. Kidd, 37 Ga. App. 8, citing
Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403, 131 S. E- 75; Gholston
v. Northeastern Banking Co., 158 Ga. 291, 293, 123 S. E.
11, 35 A. I,. R. 23; Dunson v. Lewis, 156 Ga. 692, 700, 119
S. E. 846.
Applied in Hefner v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 37
Ga. App. 801, 142 S. E. 303.
§ 3931. (§ 3355.) Rules of inheritance.
See notes to §§ 3092, 2366(49).
Wife "Heir" of Husband.—The widow of a deceased per-
son is not, strictly speaking, an heir at law of her husband.
Haddock v. Callahan Grocery Co., 163 Ga. 204, 135 S. E- 747.
The life-tenant not having exercised the power of dis-
position by will, at her death the living son and the liv-
ing daughter of the grantor took each a fourth interest in
the land, and each of two sets of grandchildren of the
grantor took a fourth interest per stirpes as heirs of the
grantor by representation. Baynes v. Aiken, 166 Ga. 898,
144 S. E.' 736.
§ 3933. (§ 3357). Right of administrator.
Applied in Usry v. Cato, 168 Ga. 240, 146 S. E. 905.
§ 3934. (§ 3358). May recover from heirs,
etc., when.
See § 5240.
ARTICLE 2
Of Administration
man died intestate leaving no wife nor any relatives except
one sister and the children and grandchildren of four de-
ceased sisters and one deceased brother, all said relatives
being sui juris and qualified to administer on the estate, the
person selected in writing by the sister of the intestate
was entitled to letters of administration in preference to
the person selected in writing by a majority of the children
of the intestate's deceased sisters and brother, although these
constituted a majority both numerically and in point of in-
terest. Dawson v. Shave, 162 Ga. 126, 132 S. E. 912.
SECTION 3
The Appointment of Administrators, Their Bond
and Removal
§ 3972. (§ 3396.) Bond of administrator.
Liability of Administrator and Sureties.—The condition
requires the administrator to account for all the money and
property belonging to the estate he administers and coming
into his hands as such administrators, and to distribute
such money and the proceeds of such property in accordance
with law. The sureties on the bond of such an admin-
istrator are liable for any breach of the condition of the
bond, including any failure of the administrator to discharge
faithfully his duty in collecting and preserving and distribut-
ing the assets of the estate. Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App. 519,
137 S. E. 290.
§ 3974. (§ 3398.) Suit on bonds.
Liability Joint and Several.—The obligation of an admin-
istrator and the sureties on his bond is joint and several.
Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App. 519, 137 S. E- 290.
Suits against Sureties Alone.—For a case following cases
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Macon Savings Bank, 162 Ga. 143, 147, 132
S. E. 636.
Compared with Section 3054.—In American Surety Co. v.
Macon Savings Bank, 162 Ga. 143, 147, 132 S. E- 636, it was
said to be manifest, by a comparison of the two sections
[this section and section 3054] that while the language used
in each is somewhat different, the purpose of the codifiers
was the same.
Suit lies on bond of administrator, without joining him,
after judgment de bonis and entry of nulla bona. Hunter
v. Burson, 168 Ga. 60, 147 S. E- 53.
The effect of this section is to permit a suit to be
brought on the bond in the first instance against the ad-
ministrator and his sureties. Bailey v. McAlpin, 122
Ga. 616(5), 50 S. E- 388; Hunter v. Burcon, 168 Ga. 59,
14/ S. E. 53.
SECTION 1
Different Kinds of Administrators and Rules for
Granting Letters
§ 3935. (§ 3359). Temporary letters,
"Effects" as used in this section means personalty.
Rents accruing after death are no part of the "effects"
of the deceased. Rents accruing and unpaid an the time
of death would be. Lee v. Moore, 37 Ga. App. 279, 139
S. E. 922, citing Collins v. Henry, 155 Ga. 886(1), 8$9, 118
S. E. 729; Autrey v. Autrey, 94 Ga. 579, 20 S. E. 431.
§ 3943. (§ 3367.) Rules for granting letters.
Sister's Rights Prior to Nieces and Nephews.—Where a
SECTION 5
Of Managing the Estate and Paying the Debts
§ 4001. (§ 3525). Estate bound for debts.
See notes to § 3341.
Paragraph Five.—Cited in Eason v.
Ga. 63, 144 S. E- 770.
Kicklighter, 167
§ 4004. (§ 3428.) Compromises by adminis-
trator.
Provisions Must Be Followed.—An agreement by a guard-
ian to compromise an indebtedness due to the ward is in-
valid in the absence of a compliance by the guardian with
any of the provisions of this and the two following sections.
Nix v. Monroe, 36 Ga. App. 356, 136 S. E- 806.
§ 4005. (§ 3429.) May make compromise.
Provisions Must Be Followed.—See same catchline under
section 4004.
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§ 4006. (§ 3430.) Trustee may compromise
claims.
Requirements of Section Requisite to Compromise.—See
note "Provisions Must Be Followed" under section 4004.
§ 4009. (§ 3433). Debts barred by limitation.
Applied in Wardlaw v. Withers, 39 Ga. App. 600, 148
S. F. 16.
§ 4012, (§ 3436). May continue business of
deceased.
The term, "current year," as used in this section,
refers to the calendar year, and not to an arbitrary busi-
ness year fixed by local custom or otherwise. Clark v.
Tennessee Chemical Co., 167 Ga. 248, 145 S. F. 73, quoting
King v. Johnson, 96 Ga. 497, 23 S. F- 500.
Liability of Administrator for Failure to Rent Land.—
The administrator, having n'o duty of renting the lands,
was not liable for a failure to rent them. Hence the
court erred in charging the jury that the administrator
was bound for the reasonable rental value of the lands
for the period in controversy, viz., the years succeeding
that in which the intestate died. Lee v. Moore, 37 Ga.
App. 279, 139 S. F. 922, citing Cross v. Johnson, 82 Ga.
67, 8 S. F. 56.
SECTION 7
Of Administrator's Sale
§ 4029. (§ 3453). Sale divests lien.
In Stephens v. First National Bank, 166 Ga. 380, 143
S. F- 386, it was held that the court erred in ordering the
dismissal of the levy upon the ground that no legal levy
could be made under the facts of the case. Distinguishing
the case of Herrington v. Tolbert, 110 Ga. 528, 35 S. F.
687.
Cited in Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 330.
13? S. F. 852.
§ 4033. (§ 3457.) Property held adversely.
Exception to General Rule.—Where an administratrix and
her attorney knew that certain land was being held adversely
to the estate and that the heir in possession had actually
filed his claim thereto on the very day of the sale and just
before the sale, and they concealed this fact, then such pos-
session held adversely to the estate by a third person and
his filing of a claim would constitute such fraud as would be
relievable in equity, and would prevent the application of
the doctrine of caveat emptor. Dukes v. Bashlor, 162 Ga. 403,
407, 134 S. F. 98.
SECTION 8
Of Distribution, Advancements, and Year's
Support
§ 4041. (§ 3465.) Year's support of family.
I. EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS.
Effect of Prior Deed to Defraud Creditors.—A deed made
to defraud creditors, though void as to them, is good be-
tween the grantor and the grantee, and the former after
executing such deed has no title to the property thereby con-
veyed; and thereafter the same can not be set apart as a
year's support for his widow. McDowell v. McMurria, 107
Ga. 812, 33 S. F- 709; Bank v. Powell, 163 Ga. 291, 135 S.
F. 922.
Right to Support Absolute.—The right to a support for
the widow and minor children, provided for in this sec-
tion is absolute (Miller v. Miller, 105 Ga. 305, 31 S. F. 186;
Goss v. Harris, 117 Ga. 345, 43 S. F. 734), and vests in such
widow and minor child or children "upon the death" of
the husband. (Brown v. Joiner, 77 Ga. 232, 3 S. F. 157;
Swain v. Stewart, 98 Ga. 366, 25 S. F. 831; Anders v.
First Nat. Bank, 165 Ga. 682, 143 S. F- 98.
II. PRIORITY OVER OTHER CLAIMS.
Antecedent Debts.—Where the widow incurs debts for
the support of herself and the minor children before or
after a statutory year's support is set apart for them,
some of the debts being for merchandise and the like
purchased for the family, and some for money borrowed
to operate a farm for support of the family, although
the farm does not afford a support to the family, and
although some of the debts have been created prior to
the setting apart of the year's support, if the widow,
after the setting apart of the year's support for herself
and the minor children, execute security deeds conveying
the land so set apart as security for the debts, such
conveyance will be within her power and binding upon
her and the children. The case differs from Hill v. Van-
Duzer, 111 Ga. 867, 36 S. F- 966, and similar cases in
which the antecedent debt was not created for the sup-
port of the widow and minor children. Anders v. First
Nat. Bank, 165 Ga. 682, 142 S. F- 98.
The widow may incur, for support of herself and minor
children of her deceased husband, a debt that will be
enforceable against property set apart from the husband's
estate as a year's support.
(a) As the right of the widow and minor children to a
year's support to be set apart from the estate becomes
absolute and vested upon the death of the husband and
father, the widow may, after the death of husband and
prior to the setting apart of the year's support for them,
incur a debt for support of herself and the minor children,
and the debt so incurred will be enforceable against prop-
erty subsequently set apart for their support from the es-
tate of the decedent.
(b) So far as incurring a debt for the support of the
widow and minor children is concerned there is no ground
for difference between incurring the debt before the
year's support is set apart and after it is set apart. The
necessity therefor may be as urgent in the one case as ir:
the other. Anders v. First Nat. Bank, 165 Ga. 682, 142
S. F. 98.
Such a debt may be incurred by the widow in a farm-
ing or other enterprise, where the enterprise is carried on
for the support of the widow and minor children (Sexton
v. Burruss, 144 Ga. 192, 86 S. F- 537; Phillips v. Cook,
15S Ga. 151, 123 S. F- 108; Patterson v. Swift, 163 Ga.
297, 2, 136 S. F- 68); and whethei or not the enterprise
was a failure. Jones v. Wilkes, 146 Ga. 803, 92 S. F.
517; Anders v. First Nat. Bank, 165 Ga. 682, 142 S. F- 9S.
III. TO WHOM ALLOWED.
In General.—Under this law, if there are no minor
children, the widow may obtain a year's support for her-
self. If there are minor children, it is for their benefit
as well as hers. There is nothing in the law which ex-
cludes her from taking a , child's part if she has a year's
support assigned to her. Federal Land Bank v. Henson,
166 Ga. 857, 144 S. F. 728, citing Cole v. Cole, 135 Ga. 1°,
21, 68 S. F. 784.
IV. METHOD AND PROCEDURE.
Time of Application.—This section does not provide a
limit of time after the death of the husband within which
an application for year's support shall be made. Conse-
quently mere lapse of time will not, as matter of law,
bar the right to apply for the statutory year's support.
Federal Land Bank v. Henson, 166 Ga. 857, 144 S. F. 728.
But long lapse of time between the death of the hus-
band and the widow's application for year's support may
be considered by the ordinary in connection with other
facts tending to show that the widow had received a
support from the estate or had waived it expressly or im-
pliedly. And in passing upon the application the ordinary
should give weight to evidence as to such facts in de-
termining the amount to be granted, or whether the ap-
plication should be wholly refused. Federal Land Bank
v. Henson, 166 Ga. 857, 144 S. F- 728, citing Riddle v.
Shoupe, 147 Ga. 387, 94 S. F. 336, and cit.; Blassingame
v. Rose, 34 Ga. 418; Wells v. Wilder, 36 Ga. 194.
VI. NATURE AND AMOUNT OF PROPERTY.
Kind of Property Assignable.—The year's support provided
for under this section must be set apart "from the estate"
of the deceased husband or father. Summerford v. Gilbert,
37 Ga. 59; Bank v. Powell, 163 Ga. 291, 135 S. F- 922.
§ 4042. (§ 3466.) Support continued, when.
Where Executor Has Made Advances.—Where a widow
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consumed property of the estate of her deceased husband as
a support and accepted advances from the executor for that
purpose, and where these transactions occurred prior to the
grant of a first year's support and might have been pleaded
in defense thereto, they can not be shown in defense to an
application by her for a second year's support. Hill v. Hill,
36 Ga. App. 327, 136 S. E- 480, citing Fulghum v. Fulghum,
111 Ga. 635, 36 S. E. 602, 37 S. E- 774; Wood v. Brown, 121
Ga. 471, 49 S. E- 295.
Pending Litigation.—Where an estate being administered
under a will is kept together for a longer period than twelve
months by a suit of the executor for the construction of the
will (Hill v. Hill, 161 Ga. 356, 130 S. E. 575), and not by
any fault of the testator's widow, the widow, if there are
no debts, will ordinarily be entitled to support from the es-
tate for each year that it is thus kept together. Hill v.
Hill, 36 Ga. App. 327, 136 S. E- 480.
§ 4043. (§ 3467). Return of appraisers.
Editor's Note—Effect of 1918 Amendment.—The provi-
sion of the act of 1918, amendatory of this section that
the appraisers appointed to set apart a year's support
shall make a full and accurate description of the land so
set apart, does not make the provision for "a careful
plat" mandatory where a plat is not essential to a full
and accurate description. For this reason the provision
for a plat is merely directory in its nature, and sub-
stantial compliance with the requirement as a whole may
be effected by a complete and accurate description. Will-
cox v. Beechwood Bank Mill Co., lo6 Ga. 367, 143 S. E-
405; Mitchell v. Lagrange Banking & Trust Co., 16o Ga.
675, 678, 144 S. E- 267.
Execution.—In Rove v. Liveoak, 38 Ga. App. 405, 407,
144 S. E. 45, it is said: "The year's support being in
money, and presumably having been made the judgment
of the court (provided this was necessary—see Cowan v.
Corbett, 68 Ga. 66; Civil Code (1910), § 4043, the widow
could have enforced the same by execution against the
defendant as administrator."
§ 4052. (§ 3474.) Advancements.
Advancements Claimed Only in Cases of Intestacy.—In this
State it is only in cases of intestacy that parties can claim
advancements or be compelled to account for them. Robin-
son v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 4, 129 S. E- 837, citing Huggins
v. Huggins, 71 Ga. 66.
Advancements Distinguished from Debts.—An advancement
differs from a debt in that there is no enforceable liability
on the part of the child to repay during the lifetime of the
donor or after his death, except in the way of suffering a
deduction in his portion of the estate. Robinson v. Ramsey,
161 Ga. 1, 6, 129 S. E- 837.
Same—Example.—In a will the term used by the testator,
that each of certain children "owes the estate" a named
sum of money, without any direction that this debt shall be
treated as an advancement, fixes the status of the transac-
tion as one of debts, and "debt" is not synonymous with
"advancement." Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 129 S. E.
837.
Charge.—It was held no error in refusing to include this
section in charge to jury, under the facts in Home Mix-
ture Guano Co. v. McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S. E. 711.
SECTION 9
Of Commissions and Extra Compensation, and
Expense of Giving Bond
§ 4067. (§ 3489.) Extra compensation.
Executor Must Show Nature of Services.—Where an exec-
utor claims compensation for extra services, the nature,
character, extent, and value of such services must be satis-
factorily proved by him; and in the absence of such show-
ing, the refusal of the lower court to approve an exception
to the auditor's finding of fact that the executor rendered
no extra services will not be reversed where it appears that
another finding of the auditor allows the executor compen-
sation for all extra services so proved by the evidence.
Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 129 S. E- 846.
Order Presumably Valid.—The order of the ordinary, al-
though not conclusive on the parties in interest, furnishes
at least prima facie evidence that the executor was entitled
to the amount. Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 47, 129 S.
E. 846.
[1
§ 4069. (§ 3491.) Forfeiture of commissions.
In General.—It can not be said as a matter of law that an
executor forfeits all compensation by reason of his neglect
or misconduct in the administration of an estate. Under
the evidence and facts of the case, it was a question of fact
to be determined in the first instance by the auditor, and in
the second instance upon exception to such finding by the
judge. Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 51, 129 S. E. 846,
citing Adair v. St. Amand, 136 Ga. 1, 70 S. E. 578.
Relief from Forfeit—When Will Provides Compensation.
—
Where the will provided for reasonable compensation to the
executor instead of commissions, the order of the ordinary
would relieve the executor from forfeiture of such compen-
sation by reason of such failure to make returns. Clements
v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 129 S. E- 846.
SECTION 10
Of Final Settlements and Receipts
§ 4073. (§ 3493). Settlement before ordinary.
Cited in Coleman v. Hodges, 166 Ga.
375.
5, 290, 142 S.
§ 4075. (§ 3495). Settlement in court of eq-
uity.
In General.—The courts of equity have concurrent jur-
isdiction with the courts of ordinary over the settlement
of accounts of administrators (Clements v. Fletcher, 154
Ga. 386, 114 S. E- 637), and in the administration of estates
of deceased persons, in all cases where equitable interfer-
ence is necessary or proper to the full protection of the
rights of the parties at interest. Morrison v. McFarland,
147 Ga. 465, 94 S. E. 569; Davis v. Culpepper, 167 Ga. 637,
146 S. E. 319.
§ 4077. (3497). Basis of settlement.
This being a suit on a guardian's bond, and it appear-
ing that the guardianship began on February 3, 1919, the
plaintiff's recovery should have included interest from
the expiration of one year as to all items received by the
guardian in the meantime. As to the one item received
by the guardian after one year, interest should have been
charged from the date when the same was received. Fi-
delity, etc., Co. v. Norwood, 38 Ga. App. 534, 144 S. E.
387.
SECTION 16
Of Foreign Administrators
§ 4105. Transfer of stock, etc. — Such foreign
executor or administrator or foreign guardian
may transfer the stock of any bank or other cor-
poration in this State standing in the naune of
the decedent or ward, and check for deposits
made by him and dividends declared on his stock,
filing with the bank or corporation a certified
copy of his appointment and qualification. Acts
1929, p. 169, § 1.
CHAPTER 4
Of Title by Contract
ARTICLE l
Of Private Sales
§ 4106. (§ 3526.) Essentials of a sale.
Consent of Parties—Double Agency.—In a suit in trover,
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it indisputably appearing that when the property sued for
was turned over by the agent of the plaintiff to himself as
the agent of the defendant it was without the knowledge or
consent of either principal, and with no further purpose or
intent than that the principals might thereafter agree upon
a sale and the terms of a sale as between themselves, the
transaction did not meet the requirements of a sale. Wil-
lingham Stone Co. v. Whitestone Marble Co., 36 Ga. App.
230, 136 S. E- 180.
Completed Sale.—See Hatchett v. State, 34 Ga. App. 134,
128 S. E- 687, affirming the second paragraph under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4112. (§ 3532). Duress or fraud voids sale.
See notes to § 4255.
§ 4113. (§ 3533.) What is fraud.
See notes to § 4305.
Misrepresentation.—In the forum of conscience a misrepre-
sentation of the first kind mentioned in this section is of
deeper dye than one of the latter kind; but in the forum of
law both constitute fraud, the former positive fraud, and
the latter legal fraud. Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 683, 132
S. E- 442.
Cited in Olive v. McCoy, 166 Ga. 113, 114, 142 S. E. 533
See notes to § 4255.
A servant being free to accept or reject employment,
and knowing as well as the^ master of the dangers inci-
dent thereto, the fact that he was required to carry the
pistol in order to continue in the service did not amount
to duress, nor to a wilful or wanton disregard of the
servant's safety. Newman v. Griffin Foundry, etc., Co.,
38 Ga. App. 518, 144 S. E. 386.
Applied m Daniel Brothers Company v. Richardson, 39
Ga. App. 212, 146 S. E. 505.
§ 4117. (§ 3537.) Possibility can not be sold
Futures.
—See catchline "Cotton Futures" under section
4256.
§ 4119. (§ 3539.) Agent in possession and
with apparent right to sell.
Where the person to whom the property is delivered is
given, by the person from whom he received it, only its
mere possession, and is given no indicia of the right to
sell or dispose of the property, which, "according to the
custom of trade or the common understanding of the
wcrld," usually accompanies the authority to sell or dis-
pose of the property, he can not by a sale to an inno-
cent purchaser divest the true owner's title. Chafin v.
Cox, 39 Ga. App. 301, 147 S. E- 154.
Illustrations.
—See Pilcher v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 36 Ga.
App. 760, 138 S. F- 272, holding substantially the same as
the second paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4120. (§ 3540.) Purchaser without notice,
protected.
Purchaser from Fraudulent Grantee.—Where property was
conveyed to defraud creditors and the grantee sold to a bona
fide purchaser, the latter is protected under this section and
section 4535 although the grantee is not a "vendee" as the
word is used in this section. Bank v. Wheeler, 162 Ga. 635,
134 S. F- 753.
Quoted in Pilcher v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 36 Ga. App. 760,
138 S. E. 272.
§ 4122. (§ 3542.) Deficiency in sale of lands.
III. SALE BY TRACT OR ENTIRE BODY.
Number of Acres Descriptive Merely.—See Holliday v.
Ashford, 163 Ga. 505, 136 S. E- 524, holding substantially the
same as the paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4124. (§ 3544.) Purchaser losing land,
rights of.
Quoted in Holliday v. Ashford, 163 Ga. 505, 136 S. E- 524.
§ 4125. (§ 3545.) Delivery of goods essen-
tial.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY.
B. Delivery of Bill of Lading and Warehouse Receipts.
Warehouse Receipts.—See Continental Trust Co. v. Bank,
162 Ga. 758, 134 S. E- 775, quoting the second paragraph un-
der this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Applied in Clark v. Wood, 39 Ga. App. 340, 147 S. E. 17J.
§ 4126. (§ 3546). Title in certain articles not
to pass until paid for.
Applied in Manget v. National City Bank, 168 Ga. 376,
882, 149 S. E. 213.
§ 41281. (§ 3548). Consideration.
Applied.
—Construing together the terms of , a contract
for sale of cotton to be produced and delivered in the fu-
ture, the buying association was not allowed a discretion
as to whether it would deduct the cost of handling, grad-
ing, and marketing. Pursuing the plan specified, the con-
tract price was ascertainable, in view of this section.
Brown v. Georgia Cotton Ass'n, 164 Ga. 712, 139 S. E. 417.
§ 4130. (§ 3550.) Purchase-price, when due.
Cash Sale Presumed.—See Freeman v. Stedham, 34 Ga.
App. 143, 128 S. E- 702, affirming the first sentence in this
paragraph under the same catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Remedy of seller on de-§ 4131. (§ 3551.)
fault of buyer.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Section Not Exhaustive of Remedies.—The remedies pro-
vided by this section, are not exhaustive, nor is the seller
in every such case limited to one of the measures of dam-
age stated in this section. (Carolina Cement Co. v. Co-
lumbia Improvement Co., 3 Ga. App. 483, 60 S. E- 279;
United Roofing Co. v. Albany Mill Supply Co., 18 Ga.
App. 185, 89 S. E. 177). Morrison v. Finkovitch Inc., 37
Ga App. 57, 138 S. E. 917.
Action on Open Account.—A suit "on open account" can
not by amendment be changed into a suit under this section.
Butler v. Crown Cork, etc., Co., 34 Ga. App. 28, 128 S. E. 15.
Objection as to Time of Shipment.—In a suit brought by
the seller after he has sold the goods for the buyer under
this section the buyer will not be heard then to raise for the
first time the issue that the shipment was not made in strict
compliance with the contract as to time. Cobb Lumber Co.
v. Sunny South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E\ 759.
Cited in Abercrombie v. Georgia Distributing Co., 39
Ga. App. 654, 148 S. E. 296.
IV. STORING GOODS FOR VENDEE.
Waiver.—Where a purchaser notifies the seller to cancel
the order, but the seller, refusing to accept such tender of
breach, thereafter delivers the goods to a carrier, and the
purchaser, after their arrival, refuses acceptance, and the
seller proceeds to store them for the purchaser and brings
suit on the contract for the purchase price, such a mere
ineffective tender of delivery on the part of the seller would
not amount to a waiver on his part of his right to such a
procedure under this section, but he is still entitled to sue
not on open account for goods sold and delivered, but upon
the contract for the purchase price of the goods thus re-
tained by the purchaser. Edison v. Plant Bros. & Co., 35
Ga. App. 683, 134 S. E- 627.
§ 4135. (§ 3555.) Implied warranty.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION AND WARRANTY
OF TITLE.
Stipulation against Parol Alteration.—Because a written
contract of sale stipulates that it covers all the agreements
between the purchaser and seller, and that it can not be al-
tered or modified in any manner except by agreement in
writing of its officers, such stipulation does not prevent the
purchaser from setting up the implied warranty of the law.
Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889.
III. EXPRESS WARRANTY AS EFFECTING IM-
PLIED WARRANTY.
Express Warranty Excludes Implied One—Scope of Express
Warranty Important.—An express warranty may or may
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not exclude the implied warranty which the law attaches to
all contracts of sale, the exclusion of this implied warranty
being dependent upon the scope and terms of the express
warranty. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E- 889.
Where by private agreement the parties seek to take the
law in their own hands, they are at liberty to do so, and
the general rule is that an expressed warranty excludes the
implied warranty, but only to the extent that the expressed
warranty deals with matters which would have been cov-
ered by the implied warranty, and should not be construed
to exclude the implied warranty as to matters with which
it does not deal, and with which it does not conflict.
Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App.
463, 464, 144 S. E. 327.
Exclusion Not in Every Feature of Contract.—See Colt
Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E- 889, affirming the
holding of the first paragraph of this section in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4136. (§ 3556.) Effect of breach.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Partial Failure of Consideration.—An action for damages
for a breach of the implied warranty under subsection 2,
section 4135 lies where there is a partial failure of considera-
tion. Boone v. Lewis, 35 Ga. App. 478, 133 S. E- 653.
Applied in sale of an automobile in Wade v. Georgia Mo-
tor Sales, 38 Ga. App. 665, 145 S. E. 111.
III. DAMAGES.
Measure of Damages.—The measure of damages is the
difference between the price paid for the goods and their
actual value as reduced by their defective condition. Boone
v. Lewis, 35 Ga. App. 478, 133 S. E- 653.
See Colt Co. v. Mallory, 35 Ga. App. 289, 133 S. E. 55,
affirming the holding of the first sentence in paragraph 4
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Same—Travelling Expenses.
—
Expense properly and reason-
ably incurred by the plaintiff in travelling in order to
lessen the loss was a proper item of damages. Boone v.
Lewis, 35 Ga. App. 478, 133 S. E- 653.
Same—Testimony of Vendee as to Value of Goods.—Where
a defendant testified that goods were of no value to him in
the condition they were in, this did not show that they were
not of some value. Colt Co. v. Mallory, 35 Ga. App. 289,
291, 133 S. E- 55.
§ 4137. (§ 3557). Acceptance, presumption of
quality.
Section Applies to Express Warranty Only.—This section
relates to cases of express warranty (Cook v. Finch, 117
Ga. 541, 544, 44 S. E- 95), and the warranty in the instant
case was an implied one. Puffer Mfg. Co. v. Nunn, 37 Ga.
App. 358, 140 S. E- 395.
§ 4144. (§ 3564.) Essentials of gift.
Present Intention.—See Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 136
S. E. 444, quoting the sentence in the paragraph under the
same catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Transfer of Stock.—Under sections 4144-4147, transfer of
stock to educational institution, without delivery of certifi-
cates, did not constitute a gift; transfer being only prima
facie evidence of delivery. Southern Industrial Inst. v.
Marsh, 15 Fed. (2d), 347.
§ 4146. (§ 3566). Effect of written deed.
Applied in Cook v. Flanders, 164 Ga. 279, 291, 138 S. E-
218.
§ 4147. (§ 3567.) Delivery.
Delivery between Members of Same Family.—The rule as
to delivery is not so strictly applied to transactions be-
tween members of a family living in the same house, the
law in such cases accepting as delivery acts which would
not be so regarded if the transaction were between stran-
gers living in different places. Harrell v. Nicholson, 119
Ga. 45B, 460, 46 S. E. 623; Williams v. McElroy, 35 Ga. App.
420, 133 S. E. 297.
Deposit Subject to Checking Account.—A deposit made in
a bank by a parent for the benefit of a child but subject to
be drawn out at any time by either is not a gift under this
and the other sections of this chapter. Clark v. Bridges,
163 Ga. 542, 136 S. E. 444.
Renunciation of Dominion
—
Question for Jury.—Where a
husband as donor had parted absolutely with his title in
favor of his wife, and the subject-matter of the gift (cer-
tain promissory notes) remained in a box to which the wife
carried the key, but which contained articles belonging to
each, and to which each continued to have the right of ac-
cess, it became a question of fact for the jury to determine
whether, under the circumstances, the donor had in fact re-
linquished control by the gift. Williams v. McElroy, 35 Ga-
App. 420, 133 S. E- 297.
§ 4149. (§ 3569). Gifts void against creditors,
etc.
Cited in Davenport v. Wood, 166 Ga. 365, 366, 143 S. E-
398.
§ 4150. (§ 3570.) Presumption of gifts [of
personal property].
Question for Jury.—Gross v. Higginbotham, 34 Ga. App.
549, 130 S. E. 371, affirms the holding under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4153. (§ 3573). Gifts for illegal purposes.
Applied in Hollomon v. Board of Education, 168 Ga. 359,
364, 147 S. E. 882.
§ 4154. (§ 3574.; D( natio causa mortis.
Essentials.—Under this section, a gift causa mortis must
be intended to be absolute only in the event of death.
Southern Industrial Inst. v. Marsh, 15 Fed. (2d), 347.
CHAPTER 5
Of Title by Escheat and Forfeiture
§ 4155. (§ 3575.) Escheat.
Interest of State.—Where it is alleged that a deceased left
no heirs and that the will made by him was false and
fraudulent it was held that the State had sufficient interest
in the property to file a petition demanding probate of the
will and to caveat the probate since otherwise the State
would have no way of declaring the property escheated.
Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E. 542. The dissenting
opinion to this case by Russell, C. J., contains a discussion
of the history of escheats.—Ed. Note.
CHAPTER 6
Of Title by Prescription
§ 4164. (§ 3584.) Adverse possession.
When Possession Adverse.—Where a vendor sold property
to his wife and continued in possession without making her
a deed thereto as he promised, he does not hold adversely
to her. McArthur v. Ryals, 162 Ga. 413, 134 S. E- 76.
In defining the adverse possession which may be the
foundation of a prescriptive title, it is best to state the
necessary elements of such possession as they are stated
in this section of the Civil Code. Smith v. Board of Edu-
cation, 168 Ga. 755, 149 S. E. 136.
§ 4166. (§ 3586). Constructive possession.
Applied in Dinsmore v. Holcomb, 167 Ga. 20, 144 S. E,
780.
§ 4167. (§ 3587.) Possession extends to what
bounds.
Meaning of "Contiguous."—The word "contiguous," as used
in this section means to touch. Standard Dictionary; Web-
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ster's New International Dictionary. Accordingly, tracts of
land which corner with one another are contiguous. Morris
v. Gibson, 35 Ga. App. 689, 134 S. E- 796.
When One Deed Conveys Several Tracts.—The same deed
may make independent conveyances of two or more separate
and non-contiguous tracts of land. In such a case actual
possession of one or more of such distinct entities as thus
conveyed will not be extended by construction to include
them all. But where the several tracts designated as being
included by the terms of the conveyance actually adjoin or
corner, so as to in fact constitute a single parcel, actual
possession of a portion of the premises thus conveyed will
be extended by construction to include the entire premises.
Morris v. Gibson, 35 Ga. App. 689, 134 S. E- 796.
§ 4168. (§ 3588.) Possession for twenty years
gives title.
Other Titles Extinguished.—"When an adverse possessor
has held for the requisite period and his prescriptive title
ripens, it extinguishes all other inconsistent titles and it-
self becomes the true title." Powell on Actions for Land,
459, sec. 349. Danielly v. Lowe, 161 Ga. 279, 130 S. E. 687.
None of these disabilities existed under the facts of this
case. Brewton v. Brewton, 167 Ga. 633, 634, 146 S. E. 444.
§ 4169. (§ 3589). Possession for seven years
gives title, when.
Giving Section in Charge Held Harmless.—Although that
part of this section as to the title by prescription, which
relates to forged or fraudulent deeds was not applicable to
the case on trial, the giving of that section in charge to
the jury could not have harmed the plaintiff and was not
cause for a new trial. Butler v. Lovelace- Eubanks Lum-
ber Co., 37 Ga. App. 74, 139 S. E. 83.
§ 4171. (§ 3591). Dedication to public use.
Title Shown in Testator.—Even if under the language of
this section there had been a dedication by the plaintiffs'
testator in his lifetime of the lot of land in controversy
for public uses, this would not prevent the plaintiffs from
maintaining the suit to recover the land, if they show title
in the estate of the testator. Smith v. Lemon, 166 Ga. 93,
97, 142 S. E. 554.
§ 4175. (§ 3595.) Other exceptions.
Period of Non-Representation—No Deduction after Five
Years.—"If the estate remains unrepresented for more than
five years, no deduction at all from the adverse possessor's
term will be allowed in favor of the personal representative."
Powell's Actions for Land, 448. Danielly v. Lowe, 161 Ga.
279, 130 S. E. 687.
§ 4177.' (§ 3597). Fraud to prevent
tion.
prescrip-
Actual fraud can not be founded on presumptive notice,
on that sort of notice which is based upon record, or
which is presumed from want of diligence. Garrett v. Ad-
rain, 44 Ga. 274, 276, quoted and approved in Baxter v. Phil-
lips, 150 Ga. 498, 500, 104 S. E. 196; Mohr & Sons v. Dub-
berly, 165 Ga. 309, 312, 140 S. E. 856.
CHAPTER 7
Of Conveyances of Titles
ARTICLE 1
Generally
§ 4179. (§ 3599.) Requisites of a deed.
Consideration—Inquiry into—When Permissible.
—See Sikes
v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 133 S. E- 239, affirming the holding in
the first paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Requirement for Seal.—A seal is not an essential requisite
to a deed. Atlanta, Knoxville, etc., Ry. Co. v. McKinney,
124 Ga. 929, (5), 53 S. E- 701; Patterson v. Burns, 150 Ga. 198,
103 S. E. 241; Bank of Manchester v. Birmingham Trust
etc., Co., 156 Ga. 486, 119 S. E. 603; Citizens Bank v. Farr,
164 Ga. 880, 139 S. E- 658.
Consideration — Love and Affection.—Where a grantor
executes and delivers to the father of an infant of tender
years, in consideration of love and affection, a deed con-
veying to the infant son of the father title to a described
tract of land, delivery to the father and his possession of
the deed is evidence of delivery to the infant. Montgomery
v. Reeves, 167 Ga. 623, 146 S. E- 311.
§ 4180. (§ 3600). Grantee bound by conditions
in deed.
Applied in Phillips v. Blackwell, 164 Ga. 856, 139 S. E-
547; Peebles v. Perkins, 165 Ga. 159, 140 S. E. 360; Ren-
froe v. Alden, 164 Ga. 77, 137 S. E. 831.
§ 4182. (§ 3602.) Form of deed.
Form sufficient in Crider v. Woodward, 162 Ga. 743, 135
S E. 95; Citizens & Southern Bank v. Farr, 164 Ga. 880 ;
139 S. E. 658.
Intention to Transfer Must Appear.—This provision does
not dispense with the necessity of using language indicating
an intention of the maker to convey a present estate in
specific land to a named grantee. Caldwell v. Caldwell,
140 Ga. 736, 737, 79 S. E. 853; Tyson v. Hutchinson, 164
Ga. 661, 663, 139 S. E- 519.
§ 4184, (§ 3604). Deed of an infant.
See notes to § 4233.
§ 4187. (§ 3607.) Inconsistent clauses in
deed.
In General.—The holding of Thompson v. Hill, 137 Ga. 308,
73 S. E. 640, as set out under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926, is affirmed in Clark v. Robinson, 162 Ga. 395,
134 S. E- 72, and Holder v. Jordan Realty Co., 163 Ga. 645,
136 S. E. 907.
§ 4188, (§ 3608). Recitals do not estop.
See notes to § 5795.
§ 4190. (§ 3610.) Ancient deed.
Jury to Pass on Genuineness.—Where such a deed as de-
scribed in this section is apparently genuine, has come from
the proper custody, and is shown not to be inconsistent with
possession, or if other corroboration appears, it should be
admitted in evidence as prima facie established. But the
jury has the right to finally pass on its genuineness, after
hearing all the testimony pro and con. Gaskins v. Guthrie,
162 Ga. 103, 132 S. E- 764.
ARTICLE 2
Covenants and Warranty
§ 4195. (§ 3615). General warranty of land
covers known defect.
In Eifsey v. Finn, 38 Ga. App. 671, 674, 145 S. E. 519, it
is said: "It must indeed be a strong case to authorize a
court to say that a warranty deed does not warrant the
title to the property conveyed."
Applied in Eifsey v. Finn, 38 Ga. App. 671, 672, 145 S.
E. 519.
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ARTICLE 3
Of Registration
§ 4198. (§ 3618.) Deeds, when and where re-
corded.
Applied in Dorsey v. Clower, 162 Ga. 299, 133 S. F- 249.
§ 4198(1). Method of recording instruments
affecting land title. — All decrees, deeds, mort-
gages, or other instruments affecting the titles
to lands in this State shall be recorded by the
clerk upon good and substantial white paper, in
either printing, typewriting, or handwriting in
ink, which record shall be clear, legible, and per-
manent, but any record may be in any one or all
of said methods. Acts 1929, p. 321, § 1.
§ 4203. (§ 3821). If attested out of this state.
Injunction.—Upon hearing this case the judge refused an
injunction upon the condition that the defendants should
comply with the order of the judge contained therein, to the
effect that defendants, administrators upon the estate of
an intestate, have a deed to the tract of land in question
"legally attested or acknowledged so as to entitle the
same to record." This order, as the court was authorized
to hold upon a subsequent renewal of the application for
injunction, was substantially complied with; and it was
not error to refuse an injunction. Hagan v. Hagan, 165
Ga. 364, 141 S. F. 54.
§ 4205. (§ 3623). Probate by witness.
Substantial Compliance,—Where a subscribing witness to
a deed which is not officially attested at the time of its
execution appears before an officer authorized to officially
attest a deed, and on oath testifies to the execution and
delivery of such deed according to law, and signs an af-
fidavit setting forth such execution, and the certificate of
such officer to the affidavit states that it was "sworn to
before" him, but omits to certify that it was "subscribed"
in his presence, the affidavit of probate is a sufficient com-
pliance with the terms of this section. Willie v. Hines-
Yelton Ivumher Co., 167 Ga. 883, 146 S. F. 901.
§ 4210. (§ 3628). Deed evidence, when.
Does Not Refer to Instruments Forming Bases of Action.
—
-The provisions of this section of the code really have ap-
plication only in cases where a recorded deed is collaterally
introduced in evidence, and do not refer to instruments
forming the basis of the action. Steiner v. Blair, 38 Ga.
App. 753, 755, 145 S. F. 471.
Uinder this section, when the alleged maker of a deed
which is the basis of an action against him files an affi-
davit that the deed is a forgery, it is the duty of the
court to arrest the case and require an issue to be made
and tried as to the genuineness of the alleged instrument;
but the court does not err in refusing to require such an
issue to be made and in allowing the instrument to be
admitted in evidence, where the defendant admits the gen-
uineness of his signature, and where it appears, from his
testimony, that the purpose of the affidavit is not to en-
able him to prove a material and fraudulent alteration of
the instrument, subsequent to its execution, by the party
claiming a benefit thereunder, but is merely to show that
he was induced to sign the instrument without reading it,
relying upon the good faith of the opposite party to in-
corporate therein the terms of the agreement previously
arrived at. Ford v. Serenado Mfg. Co., 27 Ga. App. 535(2),
109 S. F- 415; Odum v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 38 Ga.
App. 46, 142 S. F. 470.
Who May Attack.—Under this section, a deed, when of-
fered, may be attacked by affidavit of forgery by the oppo-
site party, whether plaintiff or defendant, and even by
one who is not a party to the cause if he is the maker of
the deed or an heir of the maker of the deed. Steiner v.
Blair, 38 Ga. App. 753, 755, 145 S. F- 471.
Cited in Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 306, 139 S. F.
912.
§ 4212. (§ 3630.) Copy when evidence.
Proof of Inquiry as to Loss of Original Deed Requisite.
—
In order to admit in evidence a certified copy of a registered
deed, it must be shown that the original has been de-
stroyed, or that it was lost or inaccessible, or that due dili-
gence has been exercised in endeavoring by proper search
and inquiry to ascertain in whose custody it is. Beall v.
Francis, 163 Ga. 894, 896, 137 S. F- 251.
§ 4213. Bonds for title may be recorded.
The primary intent and purpose of the act was to give no-
tice to all persons dealing with the obligor, from the date
of the filing of the bond, "of the interest and equity of the
holder of such bond in the property therein described, so
that any one acquiring a lien on or title to the property
after the filing of the bond would take the property sub-
ject to the interest and equity of the obligee in the bond."
(Gleaton v. Wright, 149 Ga. 220, 100 S. F- 72); Fender v.
Hodges, 166 Ga. 727, 731, 144 S. F. 278.
W|here one obtained and duly recorded a security deed
in 1922, without notice of any kind of the existence of an
unrecorded bond for title from his grantor to the same
land dated in 1920, the former is entitled to priority in the
distribution of the proceeds derived from the sale of such
land. The same priority exists in favor of subsequent
holders under duly recorded deeds as against a transferee
of the bond, such transfer never having been recorded. Fen-
der v. Hodges, 166 Ga. 727, 144 S. F- 278.
§ 4213(1). Record of bonds for title, etc.; pri-
ority over deeds, etc.
Supplements Section 4213.—This section approved August
12, 1921 (Ga. Laws 1921, p. 157), made further provision for
recording bonds for title. It supplements the language of
Code section 4213, and made plainer its meaning. Fender
v. Hodges, 166 Ga. 727, 731, 144 S. F- 278".
A transfer of title held under the security deed, made to
assign all interest in the debt secured as in the land as se-
curity therefor, stands on the same basis as to execution
and recordation as the deed itself. Citizens & Southern
Bank v. Farr," 164 Ga. 880, 139 S. F- 658; Mortgage Guar.
Co. v. Atlanta Commercial Bank, 166 Ga. 412, 415, 143 S.
F- 562.
§ 4215(1). Park's Code.
See i§ 4213(1).
CHAPTER 8
Land Registration
§ 4215(a). Park's Code.
See § 4215(1).
§ 4215(1). Name of law.
Cited in Smith v. Board of Fducation, 166 Ga. 535, 143
S. F- 578.
§ 4215 (t). Park's Code.
See § 4215(20).
§ 4215(20). Powers of examiner; report; evi-
dence; notice; exceptions; jury trial; continu-
ance; verdict; procedure; new trials; recommital.
Neglect of Exceptor to Set Out Evidence.—The neglect of
a party excepting to an examiner's report on matters of
fact, or on matters of law dependent for a decision upon
the evidence, to set forth, in connection with each excep-
tion of law or fact, the evidence necessary to be consid-
ered in passing thereon, or to point out the same by ap-
propriate reference, or to attach as exhibits to his excep-
tions those portions of the evidence relied on to support the
exceptions, is sufficient reason in a land-registration pro-
ceeding for dismissing or disapproving the exceptions of
fact and for overruling or dismissing the exceptions of law.
Davis v. Varn Turpentine & Cattle Co., 167 Ga. 690, 146
S. F. 458.
[192]
§ 4219 CONSIDERATION § 4241
The procedure on the report of the examiner under the
land-registration act is the same as that on the report of
an auditor in an equity case. Bird v. South Ga. Industrial
Co., 150 Ga. 421, 104 S. F. 232; McCaw v. Nelson, 168 Ga.
202, 147 S. F- 364.
EIGHTH TITLE
Of Contracts
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 4219. (§ 3634.) Specialty.
An insurance policy under seal constituted a "specialty, '
under sections 4219, 4359, such that there could be no re-
covery of money paid under it, on ground of false repre-
sentations, as long as it remained uncanceled, and suit to
cancel and to recover such payment was not barred on
ground that complainant had adequate and complete remedy
at law. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Kittles, 2 Fed.
(2d), 211.
§ 4222. (§ 3637.) Essentials of a contract.
Subject Matter Not in Existence.—If a contract amounts
to an executory agreement for a bona fide sale of property
of a character such as under the circumstances and under
the law can be legally made the subject matter of a sale,
and is not merely speculative in character, the parties may
be bound, although the subject matter of the sale has no
existence at the time the agreement is entered upon, and
the seller expects to comply with his contract by subse-
quently acquiring the property thus agreed to be conveyed.
Parks v. Washington, etc., R. Co., 35 Ga. App. 635, 133 S.
F. 634. Citing Forsyth Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 201,
37 S. F- 485, 81 Am. St. R. 28; Jones v. Fuller, 27 Ga. App.
84, 107 S. F. 544; Gilbert v. Copeland, 22 Ga. App. 753, 97 S.
F. 251.
§ 4224. (§ 3639.) Conditions precedent and
subsequent.
Example of Condition Subsequent.—Where the commis-
sioners of a drainage district, enter into a collateral agree-
ment with a contractor by the terms of which such com-
missioners agree "to be personally responsible for the money
of the district until money can be secured by the issuing
and sale of bonds of said district or until the district se-
cures money from other sources," such collateral agreement
is based upon a condition subsequent; and upon the fulfil-
ment of the condition subsequent all liability under such
agreement, ipso facto, ceases. Board v. Williams, 34 Ga.
App. 731, 753, 131 S. F- 911.
Applied in Hollomon v. Board of Fducation, 168 Ga. 359,
364, 147 S. E. 882.
§ 4226. (§ 3641). Novation.
A note given for an existing indebtedness, even at a
higher rate of interest and due at a later date, is not given
for a new consideration, and therefore does not constitute
a novation. Brooks v. Jackins, 38 Ga. App. 57, 142 S. F. 574.
§ 4227. (§ 3642). Mutual temporary disregard
of contract.
In Googe v. York, 38 Ga. App. 62, 65, 142 S. F- 562, it
is said: "While it is true that the plaintiff delivered the
contract and permitted the defendant to take possession of
the premises upon the payment of only a part of the rent,
this was a mere voluntary indulgence and did not constitute
a departure from the terms of the original contract in re-
lation to the time for payment, within the meaning of sec-
tion 4227 of the Civil Code."
Cited in Stoddard v. Churchill Iyine, 37 Ga. App. 347, 348,
140 S. F. 778.
§ 4230. (§ 3645.) Assent is essential to contract.
Mutual Assent—Bank and Depositor.—Where a bank de-
livered to a depositor, money, neither he nor the bank in-
tending that it should be accepted by him in payment of
the amount due to him, but with the expectation on the
part of the bank that he should deliver the money to a third
party, the depositor was not paid and the bank continued
to be his debtor. Davis v. Farmers, etc., Bank, 36 Ga. App.
415, 419, 136 S. F. 816.
Unilateral Contracts.—An agreement by one of the parties
to a controversy to accept a certain sum of money in settle-
ment, without any promise by the other to pay it, does not
render the latter liable therefor, although the agreement is
in writing and signed by both of the parties. Manget v.
Carlton, 34 Ga. App. 556, 130 S. F- 604.
Illustrations—Note Accompanying Application for Insur-
ance Policy.—An application for a policy of insurance must
be accepted within a reasonable time, or else it may be
treated by the applicant as having been rejected. Home
Cns. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S. F- 70.
Same
— Same—Reasonable Time.—While the period consti-
tuting such a reasonable time may, as a general rule, be a
matter for determination by the jury under all the evidence,
yet where the insurance company appears to have remained
silent for approximately six months after receipt of the ap-
olication, the presumption that it was rejected becomes
conclusive. Home Ins. Co. v. Swan, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S.
F. 70.
Child not 10 years old, incapable of making gift of land;
attempt to make, not subject of affirmance at majority.
Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 305-6, 139 S. F. 912.
CHAPTER 2
Of the Parties
§ 4233. (§ 3648). Infant, when bound.
Ratification.—If the infant receives property or other
valuable consideration, and after arrival at age retains pos-
session of such property, or enjoys the proceeds of such
valuable consideration, such ratification of the contract
shall bind her. Civil Code (1910), § 4233. Holbrook v.
Montgomery, 165 Ga. 514, 141 S. F. 408.
Time of Dis^ifnrmEnce.—The infant may disaffirm the
deed within a reasonable time after attaining majority; and
if she fails to do so, the right of avoidance on the ground
of infancy will be lost. What is a reasonable time will de-
pend upon the facts of each case, but not be longer than
seven years after the disability is removed. (Nathans v.
Arkwright, 66 Ga. 179; McGarrity v. Cook, 154 Ga. 311,
114 S. F. 213); Holbrook v. Montgomery, 165 Ga. 514, 141 S.
F- 408.
When the lapse of time after majority is not longer than
seven years, what is a reasonable time for the disaffirm-
ance by an infant of her deed is a question for the jury,
under all the facts of the case. (Brown v. Carmichael, 152
Ga. 353, 110 S. F- 3); Holbrook v. Montgomery, 165 Ga. 514,
141 S. F- 408.
Restoration of Consideration Not a Condition Precedent.
—While an infant should not be allowed to avoid her con-
tract without making restitution of any money or property
which she has received under the contract, yet she is not
required to make restitution as a condition precedent to a
disaffirmance, unless at the time of disaffirmance she has
the fruits of the contract in her possession. If she can not
restore, she is not required to do so. (Shuford v. Alexander,
74 Ga. 293; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Dukes, 121 Ga. 787,
49 S. F. 788; Gonackey v. General Accident etc., Corpora-
tion, 6 Ga. App. 381, 65 S. F- 53); Holbrook v. Montgom-
ery, 165 Ga. 514, 141 S. F. 408.
CHAPTER 3
Of the Consideration
§ 4241. (§ 3656.) Nudum pactum.
Time for Acceptance—Insurance Policy.—Where a person
applies for a policy of insurance, accompany his applica-
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tion with a note to cover the premium, yet no policy of in-
surance was ever delivered or tendered to him by or ior
the company and was a nudum pactum, the note was with-
out any consideration to support it. Home Ins. Co. v.
Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S. E. 70.
Cannot Constitute Basis of Damages.—Where an agree-
ment was a nudum pactum, it constituted no legal basis for
a claim of damages put forward as for a breach of con-
tract. Massell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 601, 607,
144 S. E- 806.
.
An agreement between the superintendent of banks and
the maker of a promissory note, to the effect that the su-
perintendent will not enforce the stipulation in the note
with reference to the payment of attorney's fees, is not
binding where the agreement is entirely executory and is
not supported by a valuable consideration and where no ele-
ment of estoppel enters. Ross v. Southern Exchange Bank,
38 Ga. App. 532, 144 S. E- 338.
§ 4242. (§ 3657.) Valid consideration.
Concurrence of Benefit and Injury.—A consideration need
not be a benefit accruing to the promisor. Porter Fertilizer
Co. v. Brewer, 36 Ga. App. 329, 136 S. E. 477.
Past and Future Support.—A deed in consideration of one
dollar actually paid, and of past support of the grantors by
the grantees, and an agreement on the part of the grantees
for the future support of the grantors, is not a voluntary
conveyance, but one based upon a valuable consideration.
Dorsey v. Clower, 162 Ga. 299, 131 S. E. 249.
Notes to Be Discounted by Debtor.—Consideration not
wanting, where creditor executed notes payable to debtor,
to be indorsed and discounted by the debtor, the proceeds
to be applied to the debt, which was done. EaGrange Lum-
ber etc., Co. v. Farmers etc., Bank, 37 Ga. App. 409(4),
140 S. E. 766.
Where A and B wish to buy the same property, and A
has negotiated with the owner to the extent that the latter
will not negotiate with B until the negotiations with A
have terminated, a promissory note given by B to A in
consideration of the withdrawal by A from further nego-
tiations and the surrender to B of his right to purchase, is
not without consideration, and therefore, according to its
terms, is enforceable. Owens v. Glover Grocery Company,
39 Ga. App. 798, 148 S. E- 541.
§ 4243. (§ 3658.) Good and valuable considera-
tions.
Caring for Parents.—See note Past and Future Support
under section 4242.
§ 4246. (§ 3661). Mutual promises.
Applied in Jackson v. Forward Atlanta Commission In-
corporated, 39 Ga. App. 738, 148 S. E- 356.
§ 4248. (§ 3663). Impossible consideration.
Applied in EaGrange Lumber & Supply Co. v. Farmers &
Traders Bank, 37 Ga. App. 409, 140 S. E- 766.
§ 4250. (§ 3665.) Failure of consideration.
Notes—When Receipt of Consideration Acknowledged. —
Where a promissory note has been made, acknowledging re-
ceipt of the consideration the receipt of part of considera-
tion cannot be denied unless the admission and promise
resulted from the mutual mistake of the parties or unless
brought about by the mistake of one party knowingly taken
advantage of by the other. Spells v. Swift & Co., 34 Ga.
App. 620, 130 S. E. 593, citing Bonds v. Bonds, 102 Ga.
163, 29 S. E. 218 and Shelton & Co. v. Ellis, 70 Ga. 297, 301.
CHAPTER 4
Of Illegal and Void Contracts
§ 4251. (§ 3666). Void contracts.
Negotiable Instruments Given for Illegal Purpose.
Editor's Note under section 4294(57).
— See
§ 4252, (§ 3667.) Attorney's fees in notes.
See notes to § 5660.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Need Not Be in Writing.—There is no law requiring that
a promise to pay attorney's fees shall be in writing in order
to be enforceable under this section. Forsyth Mercantile Co.
v. Williams, 36 Ga. App. 130, 135 S. E- 755.
Waiver of Right.—See Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 35
Ga. App. 340, 133 S. E- 307, quoting the holding under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Amount of Fees Collectible.—Where a note provided for
10 per cent attorney's fees the defendant can not lessen his
liability by setting up the fact that plaintiff actually con-
tracted with his attorney for a less sum. Bank v. Farmers
State Bank, 35 Ga. App. 340, 133 S. E. 307.
Statutory Condition.—In providing that the contract is
void until the statutory condition is complied with, the
legislature did not contemplate the validation of a void
contract, but merely added a statutory condition to the
written contract to pay attorney's fees. Security Mort-
gage Co. v. Powers, 278 U. S. 149, 49 S. Ct. 84.
Where Debtor Insolvent.—The mere fact of the debtor's
insolvency does not prohibit the rendering of a judgment
for attorney's fees under this section. Security Mortgage
Go. v. Powers, 278 U. S. 149, 49 S. Ct. 84, 87.
III. NOTICE.
A. In General.
The liability for attorney's fees in a promissory note, be-
ing in its nature a penalty upon the maker for the failure
to pay the note by a specified time, the notice required
under under the statute and its service upon the defendant
within the required time as a condition precedent to such
liability must be established by evidence authoriz-
ing with some degree of certainty and without ambiguity
the inference that the required notice was given, and was
given within the required time. Edenfield v. Youmans,
38 Ga. App. 584, 144 S. E. 671.
The production of the notice for attorney's fees in re-
sponse to a notice to produce is a circumstance which, when
taken in connection with other testimony, is sufficient to
authorize the inference that the defendant received the stat-
utory notice for attorney's fees required by law. It ap-
pearing that the written notice for attorney's fees had been
produced in court in response to a notice to produce served
upon the defendant's counsel, and that therefore it had been
in the possession, power, custody, or control of the defend-
ant, it was properly admitted in evidence. Edenfield v.
Youmans, 38 Ga. App. 584, 144 S. E- 671.
Cited in Equitable Eife etc., So. v. Pattillo, 37 Ga. App.
398, 400, 140 S. E- 403.
B. Sufficiency of Notice.
Notice naming a term preceding the term to which the
suit is finally made returnable will not suffice. Russell v.
Life Ins. Co., 134 Ga. App. 640, 130 S. E. 689.
IV. THE RETURN DAY, PAYMENT AND
FILING SUIT.
Under the Federal equity rule 12, which requires the clerk
of a federal court on the filing of a bill to issue subpoena,,
returnable 20 days from the issuing thereof, such day is
"return day" of such bill, within the meaning of this sec-
tion. Perry v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Fed. (2d),
250.
V. TRIAL.
B. Evidence.
Necessity of Proof—Implied Where Case in Default.—See
State Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 36 Ga. App. 731, 137 S.
E. 905; affirming the holding given under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4253. (§ 3668). Contracts against public pol-
icy.
II. RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
Agreement without Limitation.—A covenant or mutual
agreement, on sale of all the equipment owned in the op-
eration of a barber- shop in a town, with the good will of
that business, that, as a part of the trade and an induce-
ment to buy, the seller would not thereafter again operate
a barber- shop in that town, construed as meaning that the
seller stipulated not to engage in his occupation as a
barber in that town under all circumstances at any time
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in the future, was unreasonable and void. Brown v. Wil-
liams, 166 Ga. 804, 140 S. F- 256.
§ 4254. (§ 3609). Fraud.
See notes to § 4712.
Cause of action to rescind contract to buy land, induced
by false representations, stated in Coral Gables Corporation
v. Hamilton, 168 Ga. 193, 147 S. F- 494.
§ 4255. (§ 3670). Duress.
Allegations Held Insufficient.—In a petition seeking can-
cellation of certain contracts and conveyances on the ground
that they were obtained by duress, the allegations relied
on to show duress were insufficient, and were specially de-
murrable. Keller v. Levison, 165 Ga. 178, 140 S. F- 493.
§ 4256. (§ 3671.) Gaming contracts.
Cotton Futures.—A cotton futures contract, though it is
condemned by section 4258, as unlawful, is not a gaming con-
tract in the sense and meaning of this section, and the
money paid upon such consideration may not be recovered
back. Lasseter v. O'Neill, 162 Ga. 826, 135 S. F- 78. The
history of these sections is thoroughly discussed in the
opinion to this case. It should be noted that this decision
practically overrules the cases cited under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926. The dissenting opinion of Hines,
J., is based upon this and other considerations. Fd. Note.
§§ 4257-4264. Repealed by Acts of 192-9, p.
245, § 8. See § 4264(8).
See note "Cotton Futures" under preceding section.
In General.—In general a state Legislature may prescribe
rules of evidence and may create presumptions of the ex-
istence cf a fact or fault from given facts, if there is really
some connection between them in reason or experience,
provided there is a fair opportunity for rebuttal allowed;
but it may not enact that facts which it could not declare
to be a crime, shall be sufficient, though only prima facie,
evidence of one. This statute belongs to the former class,
but even if such provisions are invalid they do not invali-
date the body of the act. Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed. (2d),
674, affirmed in 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct. 492.
Within Police Power of State.—A state statute prohibit-
ing contracts for future delivery in all cases where margins
are deposited is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of law, but is with-
in the police power of the state. Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed.
(2d), 674, affirmed in 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct. 492.
Does Not Conflict with Interstate Commerce Clause of
Constitution.—These sections do not conflict with article
1, section 8, paragraph 3, of the constitution of the
United States (Civil Code of 1910, § 6644), by which
the States delegated exclusive power to the United
States "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
(Alexander v. State, 86 Ga. 246, 12 S. F- 408, 10 L. R. A.
859; Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827, 92 S. F. 637; Fenner v.
Boykin, 3 F. (2d) 674; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240;
Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 46 Sup.
Ct. 367, 70 L. ed. 750, 45 A. L. R. 1370); Layton v. State,
165 Ga. 265, 140 S. F. 847.
Not Violative of "United. States Cotton-Futures Act".—
The act does not prohibit such transactions as are regulated
by and fall within the terms of the act of Congress known
by the short title of "United States cotton-futures act."
Fed. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1918, p. 359. Layton v . State, 165
Ga. 265, 140 S. F. 847.
Intent to Gamble Required. — These sections properly
construed, do not apply to contracts for future delivery
where there is an intent that the commodity bought or
sold shall actually be delivered, but makes penal transac-
tions on margins for future delivery where it is the intent
to gamble on the fluctuations of the market; that is, where
there is no intent to make actual delivery and "when the
intention or understanding of the parties is to receive or
pay the difference between the agreed price and the
market price at the time of settlement." Layton v. State,
165 Ga. 265, 140 S. F. 847; Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed. (2d),
674, affirmed in 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct. 492.
[1
Contracts Illegal Under Former Section 4258. — Tb:*
section does not apply to gaming as referred to in
section 4256, and as defined in Dyer v. Benson, 69 Ga.
609. Nor does it authorize suits to recover money or
property after it has been paid over in transactions such as
are described in the act. Lasseter v. O'Neill, 162 Ga. 826,
833, 135 S. F. 78. Same case 36 Ga. App. 55, 135 S. E. 224.
In accordance with the general rule where persons are in
pari delicto in the violation of a positive law, this section
contemplates leaving the parties where it found them. Lasse-
ter v. O'Neill, 162 Ga. 826, 833, 135 S. F- 78.
As to cotton futures contracts, see note under section
4256.
Wjhen Proviso Applies.—The proviso applies to transac-
tions where a party, by himself or agent, writes or wires
to another party, or his agent, in another State. This is
not unlawful. In the present case it is contended that in
this State, a person, acting through the firm of Fenner &
Beane, wrote or wired to the head office or other office of
that firm in another State. Such a transaction would be
lawful or unlawful, depending upon whether there was in
good faith at the time an intention to make or receive ac-
tual delivery or to "settle on the difference between the
agreed price and the market price.'' Layton v. State, 165
Ga. 265, 140 S. F. 847.
Not applicable where claimant is seeking to set up his
possession in face of his own deed, as against purchaser
for value. Rimes v. Floyd, 168 Ga. 426, 148 S. F. 86.
The use of the word "parlies" in this section is not to
be construed as meaning that such intention must have been
entertained by the parties on both sides of the contract.
It is used in the sense of persons either buying or selling
without intention to make actual delivery, without regard
to the intention of the party or parties contracted with
Layton v. State, 165 Ga. 265, 140 S. F. 847.
§ 4264(1). Meaning of "contract of sale;"
"person."—For the purpose of this Act the term
"contract for sale" shall be held to include sales,
purchases, agreements of sale, agreements to sell,
and agreements to purchase; that the word "per-
son" wherever used in this Act shall be construed
to import the plural or singular as the case de-
mands, and shall include individuals, associations,
partnerships, and corporations. Acts 1929. p.
245, § 1.
§ 4264(2). Future delivery contracts of sale;
when valid.—All contracts of sale for future de-
livery of cotton, grain, stocks, or other commodi-
ties, (1) made in accordance with the rules of
any board of trade, exchange, or similar institu-
tion, and (2) actually executed on the floor of
such board of trade, exchange, or similar institu-
tion, and performed or discharged according to
the rules thereof, and (3) when such contracts
of sale are placed with or through a regular mem-
ber in good standing of a cotton exchange, grain
exchange, board of trade, or similar institution,
organized under the laws of the State of Georgia
or any other State, shall be and they hereby are
declared to be valid and enforceable in the Courts
of this State, according to their terms. Provided,
that contracts of sale for future delivery of cot-
ton, in order to be valid and enforceable as pro-
vided herein, must not only conform to the
requirements of clauses one and two of this sec-
tion, but must also be made subject to the pro-
vision of the United States Cotton Futures Act
approved August 11th, 1916, and any amend-
ments thereto. Provided further, that if this
clause should for any reason be held inoperative,
then contracts for future delivery of cotton shall
be valid and enforceable if they conform to the
requirements of clauses one and two of this sec-
tion. Provided further, that all contracts as de-
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fined in section one hereof, where it is not con-
templated by the parties thereto that there shall
be an actual delivery of the commodities sold or
bought, shall be unlawful. Acts 1929, p. 245, § 2.
§ 4264(3). Contracts without bona fide intent
to deliver, void. — That any contract of sale for
future delivery of cotton, grain, stocks, or other
commodities, where it is not the bona fide inten-
tion of parties that the things mentioned therein
•are to be delivered, but which is to be settled ac-
cording to or upon the basis of the public market
quotations or prices made on any hoard of trade,
exchange, or other similar institution, without
ally actual bona fide execution and the carrying
•out of such contract upon the floor of such ex-
change, board of trade, or similar institution, in
accordance with the rules thereof, shall be null
and void and unenforceable in any court of this
State, and no action shall be maintained thereon
at the suit of any party. Acts 1929, p. 246, § 3.
§ 4264(4). "Bucket shop" defined.—A bucket-
shop is hereby defined to be and mean any place
of business wherein are made contracts of the
sort or character denounced by the preceding
section 3, and the maintenance or operation of a
bucket-shop at any point in this State is prohib-
ited. Acts 1929, p. 246, § 4.
§ 4264(5).—Written statement to principal in
contract, requirement as to.—Every person shall
furnish, upon demand, to any principal for whom
such person has executed any contract for future
delivery of any cotton, grain, stocks, or other
commodities, a written instrument setting forth
the name and location of the exchange, board of
trade, or similar institution, upon which such
contract has been executed, the date of the exe-
cution of the contract, and the name and address
of the person with whom such contract was ex-
ecuted; and if such person shall refuse or neglect
to furnish such statement upon reasonable de-
mand, such refusal or neglect shall be prima facie
evidence that such contract was an illegal con-
tract within the provisions of section 3 of this
Act, and that the person who executed it was
engaged in the maintenance and operation of a
bucket-shop, within the provisions of following
section. Acts 1929, p. 247, § 5.
§ 4264(6). Party or agent in illegal contract,
guilty of felony; penalty.—Any person either as
agent or principal, who enters into or assists in
making any contracts of sale of the sort or char-
acter denounced in the preceding section 3 of this
Act, for the future delivery of cotton, grain,
stocks, or other commodities, or who maintains
-i bucket-shop as that term is defined in section
4 of this Act, shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary not exceeding two years. Acts 1929, p.
247, § 6.
§ 4264(7). Cotton exchanges; boards of trade.
—There may be organized, in any city, town, or
municipality in the State of Georgia, voluntary
associations to be known as cotton exchanges,
boards of trade, or similar institutions, to receive
and post quotations on cotton, grain, stocks, or
other commodities for the 'benefit of the members
or other persons engaged in the production of
cotton, grain, or other commodities. Such asso-
ciation shall be composed of members, and shall
adopt a uniform set of rules and regulations not
incompatible with the laws of Georgia and of the
United States. They shall open their books to
inspection of all proper courts and officers when
•required to do so. Acts 1929, p. 247, § 7.
§ 4264(8). Laws Repealed. — The following
sections of the Civil Code of Georgia, to wit:
section 4257 prohibiting dealing in cotton futures,
section 4258 providing what contracts are illegal,
section 4259 providing a penalty, section 4260 re-
lating to discovery by witnesses, and excusing
witnesses from testifying, and section 4261 pro-
viding what facts shall constitute guilt, section
4262 relating to margins, when proof of guilt,
section 4263 relating to establishment of an of-
fice when proof of guilt, and section 4264 provid-
ing that bona fide trade is not prohibited, and
section 403 of the Penal Code, relating to dealing
in futures, each and all are hereby repealed. Acts
1929, p. 247, § 8.
§ 4264(9). Invalidity of part of Act not to in-
validate remainder.—If any clause, sentence, para-
graph, or part of this Act shall for any reason be
adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction
to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, im-
pair, or invalidate the remainder thereof, but
shall be confined in its operation to the clause,
sentence, or paragraph of part thereof directly in-
volved in the contracts in which such judgment
shall have been rendered; and any contract valid
under and satisfying the remaining clauses, sen-
tences, paragraphs, or parts of this Act shall be
valid and enforceable in the courts of this State.
Acts 1929, p. 248, § 9.
CHAPTER 5
Of Construction of Contracts
§ 4265. (§ 3672). Contracts, by whom con-
strued.
Cited in Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38
Ga. App. 463, 464, 144 S. E. 327.
§ 4266. (§ 3673.) Intention of parties must be
sought.
See notes to § 4268.
Secret Intentions.—In Atlanta, etc., Bank v. First Nat.
Bank, 38 Ga. App. 768, 771, 145 S. E. 521, it is said: "Al-
though it was testified by Q that he purposely made the
check payable to the manufacturer because some doubt that
had been engendered in his mind as to the solvency of the
local dealer with whom he made the contract of purchase,
this intention remained a secret in his own mind, and the
effect of the instrument which he then made and put into
circulation must be determined by his intention as ex-
pressed in the words of the written agreement (of which
the check was a part), construed in the light of the at-
tendant and surrounding circumstances."
Pledge Contract.—Although there may be special rules of
interpretation which would require that the pledge contract
be construed favorably to the pledgor, or to the maker of
one of the notes so pledged, and strictly against the pled-
gee, the ultimate and final criterion, as in all cases, is that
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the real object of the court should be to ascertain the in-
tention of the parties; and that where such intension is
clear and contravenes no rule of law, and sufficient words
are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced, ir-
respective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construc-
tion. Deen v. Bank of Hazlehurst, 39 Ga. App. 633, 147 b.
E- 909.
Deeds.—See Hill v. Smith, 163 Ga. 71, 135 S. E. 423, hold-
ing substantially the same as the cases in the first para-
graph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Section applied in Lanier v. Register, 163 Ga. 236, 135 S.
E. 719; Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Ga. App. 334, 132 S. E.
783.
Applied as to contract of sale of automobile in Motors
Mortgage Corp. v. Purchase-Money Note Co., 38 Ga. App.
222, 143 S. E- 459.
§ 4267. (§ 3674.) Intention of one party known
to the other.
Listing Property as Evidence Entitling Commissions.—In
a suit for a real- estate broker's commissions the burden is
on the plaintiff to establish a contract of listment and its
performance on his own part. While the letter and tele-
gram of the defendant did not bind him in express terms
to pay commissions, it can not be questioned that in thus
agreeing to list the property with the plaintiff he must
have known that the plaintiff understood he was to receive
the commission which had been specified in the letters to
which the defendant was replying. Accordingly, there was
established a contract listing the property with the plain-
tiff broker, which, had it been performed according to its
terms, would have entitled the plaintiff to the commissions
sued for. Hall v. Vandiver, 37 Ga. App. 656, 141 S. E- 332.
Expressed Terms.—In Columbus Bagging Co. v. Empire
Mills Co., 38 Ga. App. 793, 796, 145 S. E. 886, it is said-
"The defendant must have believed that the plaintiff in-
tended to enter into contractual relations upon the terms
expressed in its offer, and the existence of such belief must
have been apparent to the plaintiff. The rule stated in
this section seems to refer only to completed contracts, but
we think the reason of it is applicable in the present case.
Applied in Slade v. Raines, 16 Ga. 859, 132 S. E. 5c,
Googe v. York. 48 Ga. App. 62, 64, 142 S. E. 562.
§ 4268. (§ 3675.) Rules of interpretation.
Where Contract Ambiguous. — Where the description of
land applies equally to several tracts, a latent ambiguity
results, which may be explained by showing which one of
the several tracts was claimed by the grantor. 2 Delvin
on Real Estate (3d ed.), 2026, section 1043. Petretes v. At-
lanta Loan, etc., Co., 161 Ga. 468, 473, 131 S. E. 510.
Applied.— Rogers -Morgan Co. v. Webb, 34 Ga. App.
424, 130 S. E. 78; Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Ga.
App. 334, 335, 132 S. E. 783; Napier v. Pool, 39 Ga. App.
190, 146 S. E. 783.
Insurance Policy.—In accordance with this section, where
an insurance policy required an inventory to be taken it wa.c
held that a list showing the cost price of the articles was
sufficient and that the actual value was not required. Gold-
man v. Aetna Ins. Co., 162 Ga. 313, 133 S. E- 741.
Determined by Intention—Example.—In a contract where
the date named was- not fixed as a final and definite date
for delivery, but the time of shipment could be accelerated or
deferred at the will of the vendee, it could not reasonably
be said that shipment on the particular date mentioned
in the agreement was intended by the parties to be of the
very essence of the contract. Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny
South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759.
Contract of Employment.—Where an agency was estab-
lished in order that the agent or servant might take a car
to a certain place for the purpose of sale, provided that if
he failed to sell it, he would have it back that night before
the employer's garage was closed, time was of the very es-
sence of the conditional employment; and the servant's au-
thority and the master's liability were limited accordingly.
Palmer v. Heinzerling, 34 Ga. App. 544, 130 S. E. 537.
The rent note sued on being clear and unambiguous, the
court properly struck the plea which sought to vary the
note by parol evidence, and did not err in excluding the
testimony offered to sustain the plea. Sewell v. Armour
Fertilizer Works Inc., 39 Ga. App. 516, 147 S. E- 717.
Division of Consideration.—While proof of parol contem-
poraneous agreements is generally inadmissible to add
to, take from, or vary a written contract (Civil
Code sections 4268, 5788), the allegations of the peti-
tion setting forth the division to be made of the consider-
ation to be paid to the co-obligees under the contract do
not come within the inhibition of these sections of the
code, since such alleged facts in nowise add to, take
from, or vary the terms of the written instrument, but
merely set forth the respective interests of the obligers.
Bernstein v. Fagelson, 38 Ga. App. 294, 296, 143 S. E- 2^7.
Paragraph 1.—This case is controlled by that of Cody v.
Automobile Financing Inc., 37 Ga. App. 452, 140 S. E- 634; and
under the rulings there made, the court in the instant cas
erred in admitting the evidence which directly contradicted
the express provisions of the written contract. See also Had-
den v. Williams, 37 Ga. App. 464, 140 S. E. 797; Nolan v.
Calhoun, 38 Ga. App. 227, 143 S. E- 606.
Paragraph 2.—Applied as to construction of a fire insu<
ance policy in Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Wells. 38 Ga.
App. 99, 100, 142 S. E. 900.
Paragraph 6.—While it is well settled that in this State thai
when a contract is partly written and partly printed, the
written portion is entitled to "most consideration" (this sec-
tion, par. 6), and that if the printed portions of the contract
can not be reconciled with the written portions, the latter
prevail (Shackleford v. Fitzgerald, 151 Ga. 35, 39, 105 S.
E. 597; Cacldick Milling Co. v. Moultrie Grocery Co., 22
Ga. App. 524, 96 S. E. 583; Surles v. Miilliken, 97 Ga. 485,
25 S. E- 322), still the cardinal rule of construction is to as-
certain the intention of the parties, and "the construction
which willl uphold a contract in whole and in every part
is to be preferred, and the whole contract should be looked
to in arriving at the construction of any part." (§ 42i-S,
par. 3). Capital Wall Paper Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga.
App. 428, 144 S. E. 135.
Where the printed portion of a lease contract stipulated
in part that "the lessor will not be responsible to the ten-
ant or any other person for any loss of or damage to prop-
erty, however ocurring," and a written provision of the
agreement stipulated that "the lessor agrees to furnish
steam heat during the regular seasons for heat in the:
City of Atlanta, Georgia," the written and printed pot -
tions of the agreement must be construed in pari materia,
and that construction placed upon the contract which will
uphold it in whole and in every part, since there is no
irreconcilable conflict between the quoted provisions. The
printed portion of the agreement does not relieve the les-
sor from liability for a breach of his covenant to furnish
heat, but only from liability for resulting damage to prop-
erty growing out of such a failure. Capital Wall Paper
Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga. App. 428, 144 S. E- 135.
Paragraph 8.—Although time is not generally of the essence
of a contract, it may become so by express stipulation or rea-
sonable construction, and it is conpetent for the parties to a
series of promissory notes, maturing monthly through sev-
eral years, to provide that in case of default in the pay-
ment of any two of them, and a continuation of such de-
fault for a specified period, the entire series shall, at the
option of the holder thereof, become due and collectible.
Cone v. Hunter, 38 Ga. App. 45, 142 S. E- 468.
CHAPTER 6
Negotiable Instruments
ARTICLE 1
Of Negotiable Papers and How Transferred
§§ 4269(16), 4269(17). Park's Code.
See §§ 4294(16), 4294(17).
§§ 4270(3), 4270(4). Park's Code.
See §§ 4294(26), 4294(27).
§§ 4271(1), 4271(14), 4271(20). Park's Code,
See §§ 4294(30), 4294(43) and 4294(49), respectively.
§§ 4272(1), 4272(2), 4272(6), 4272(7), 4272(9).
Park's Code.
See §§ 4294(51). 4294(52). 4294(56), 4294(57j, 4294(59;,
respectively.
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§§ 4273(2), 4273(3), 4273(6). Park's Code.
See §§ 4294(61), 4294(62), 4294(65), respectively.
§ 4275(21). Park's Code.
See § 4294(109).
§ 4276. (§ 3684.)
ries security.
Transfer of secured note car-
Appllcability to Security Deed.—See First Nat. Bank v.
Pounds, 163 Ga. 551, 136 S. E- 528, quoting the second para-
graph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Wjhen the transferee of the purchase-money note reduces
the same to judgment, it is the duty of the vendor to con-
vey the land by quitclaim deed to the purchasers, to en-
able the transferee to levy upon and sell the same under
an execution issued upon the judgment obtained for the pur-
chase-money; and upon refusal of the vendor to make such
conveyance when requested to do so by his transferee, a
court of equity will compel the vendor to make such con-
veyance. Holbrook v. Adams, 166 Ga. 871, 144 S. E. 657.
Where a vendor sells land, takes a note for a part of the
purchase-money thereof, payable to himself or bearer, and
gives to the purchasers his bond for title, by which
he obligates himself to convey the land to them on pay-
ment of the note, the vendor holds the title to the land
as security for the payment of the purchase-money; and
when by mere delivery he transfers the note for value, before
due, to another, the transferee acquires the security held by
the vendor. Holbrook v. Adams, 166 Ga. 871, 144 S. E. 657.
Transmission by Express Assignment. — In the case of
Cross v. Citizens Bank, 160 Ga. 647, 128 S. E. 898, it was
said: ''The foregoing refers to implied transmission of
title to the security, but does not purport to exclude trans-
mission by express written assignment of the notes and
security, or to qualify the effect of such written assign-
ment." (See also Carter v. Johnson, 156 Ga. 207, 119 S.
E- 22; Carlton v. Reeves, 157 Ga. 602, 122 S. E- 320); Geor-
gia Eand & Sec. Co. v. Citizens Bank, 164 Ga. 852, 855,
139 S. E. 557.
§ 4276(2). Park's Code.
See § 4294(120).
ARTICLE 2
Of Indorsers, Notice, and Protest
§ 4284. (§ 3692). Public holidays.
As to Armistice day as legal Holiday, see § 1770(81).
§ 4284(1). Park's Code.
See '§ 4294(184).
ARTICLE 3
Of the Rights of Holders
§ 4291.^ (§ 3699.) What is notice.—Any cir-
cumstances which would place a prudent man
upon his guard, in purchasing- negotiable paper,
shall be sufficient to constitute notice to a pur-
chaser of such paper before it is due.
The principle embraced in this section was not, as to
warehouse receipts, superseded by section 4294(56), and the
court did not err in giving this principle in charge to the
jury. National Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 Ga.
737, 738, 146 S. E- 739.
ARTICLE 4
Negotiable Instrument in General
SECTION 1
Form and Interpretation
when effectual ; when§ 4294(16). Delivery;
presumed.
Applied in Hengstler v. Huguley- Scott Auto Company,
39 Ga. App. 287, 146 S. E- 645.
§ 4294(17). Construction where instrument is
ambiguious.
A promissory note signed by two or more persons as
makers, and containing the words, "I, we, or either of us
promise to pay," imports joint and several liability of the
makers. This- comports with this section. Powell v. Mo-
bley, 166 Ga. 163, 164, 142 S. E- 678.
SECTION 2
Consideration
§ 4294(26). What constitutes holder for value.
Not Applicable to Cotton Warehouse Receipt's.—The court
did not err in failing to give in charge to the jury the
principle embraced in section 26 of our negotiable instru-
ments law, as cotton warehouse receipts are not negotiable
instruments under said law, and said section is applicable
only to instruments negotiable thereunder. The verdict
and decree were supported by the evidence. National Bank
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 Ga. 737, 738, 146 S. E- 739.
§ 4294(27). When lien on instrument consti-
tutes holder for value.
Applied in In re Blalock (Ga.), 31 Fed. (2d) 612.
SECTION 3
Negotiation
§ 4294(30). What constitutes negotiation.
Effect of Transfer for Affection upon Necessity for In-
dorsement.—See Moore v Moore, 35 Ga. App. 39, 131 S. E.
922, quoting the holding under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Where a note payable to a named person or bearer is se-
cured by a mortgage likewise payable to such person or
bearer, the delivery of the note and mortgage to a third
person transfers the lien of the mortgage, independently
of any separate assignment in writing of the mortgage.
Mercer v. Raybon, 168 Ga. 500, 148 S. E- 334.
No one can be holder in due course of note payable to
named payee or order, without payee's indorsement. Fourth
National Bank v. Eattimore, 168 Ga. 550, 148 S. E. 396.
§ 4294(43). Indorsement where name is mis-
spelled, etc.
In Atlanta, etc., Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App.
768, 773, 145 S. E- 521, after quoting this section, it is said:
"It would seem that under the facts of this case it should
be held that the payee was the Stutz Atlanta Motor Com-
pany, and that its name was wrongly designated. In this
view, it would again result that the indorsements made
upon the check were legal and proper. First National Bank
v. National Bank, 136 Va. 276, 118 S. E. 82, 36 A. L. R.
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736; Integrity Trust v. People's National Bank, Co. v.
Lehigh Ave., etc., Bldg. & Loan Asso., 273 Pa. 46, 116
Atl. 539, 21 A. L. R. 1554."
§ 4294(49). Transfer without indorsement; ef-
fect of.
Transfer far Love and Affection.—Neither under the N. I.
L. nor under the law as it previously existed, does the
legal title to a negotiable promissory note, payable to or-
der, pass to a transferee for a consideration of love and
affection only and not for value, except by indorsement
upon the instrument itself or upon a paper attached to it.
Such a transferee, therefore, acquires no legal title to the
note by a separate transfer to him in writing executed by
the payee but unattached to the note. Moore v. Moore. 35
Ga. App. 39, 131 S. E- 922.
SECTION 4
Rights of the Holder
§ 4249(51). Rights of the holder to sue; pay-
ment.
Applied in Fourth Nat. Bank v. Lattimore, 168 Ga. 547,
550, 148 S. E- 396.
§ 4249(52). What constitutes a holder in due
course.
See notes to § 4291.
Receiving1 Note as Collateral.—A transferee of a negoti-
able promissory note, who received the note from the payee
before maturity, as collateral security for the payment of
a pre-existing debt, without notice of any equities existing
between the maker and the payee, is a bona fide holder
for value. Civil Code (1910), § 4289; Iyinderman, v. Atkins,
143 Ga. 366 (2), 85 S. E- 101; Patterson v. Peterson, 15 Ga.
App. 680 (2), 84 S. E. 163; Whittle v. Citizens Bank, 37
Ga. App. 693, 141 S. E- 668.
§ 4294(56). What constitutes notice of defect.
See notes to § 4530.
A promissory note given in the year 1921 for the pur-
chase-price of liquors sold in violation of the law is unen-
forceable, even in the hands of a bona fide holder for value,
who takes the same without notice of the consideration.
Crigler v. Laramore, 18 Ga. App. 132, 88 S. E- 901; White
County Bank v. Clermont State Bank, 37 Ga. App. 268, 140
S. E- 767; Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Miller, 37 Ga.
App. 668, 141 S. E- 419.
The circumstances relied on to overcome the presump-
tion that one is the bona fide holder of a negotiable paper
must have some probative force. To this effect see Ed-
wards & L,eutsch Lithographing Co. v. Vidalia Grocery
Co., 144 Ga. 514, 87 S. E. 675; Traders Securities Co. v.
Canton Drug Co., 38 Ga. App. 165, 171, 143 S. E- 452.
Applied in Citizens & Southern Bank v. Farr, 164 Ga.
S80, 882, 139 S. E- 658.
§ 4294(57). Rights of holder in due course.
Editor's Note.—In Commercial Bank v. Cohen, 34 Ga.
App. 756, 131 S. E- 117, the court held that "a check given
for whisky, being for an illegal consideration is void and
therefore not enforceable even by an innocent purchaser of
the check." This decision was based upon section 4286, which
has now been superseded by the provisions of the N. I. L,.
It seems probable that the cause of action in the case re-
ferred to arose prior to the adoption of the N. I. L,. since
by that law illegal consideration is not a valid defense
against a holder in due course.
And also in Howard v. Caldwell, 35 Ga. App. 366, 133 S.
E. 284, it is stated that under section 4286 the only de-
fenses permissible against a bona fide holder of a promis-
sory note are non est factum, gambling or immoral or il-
legal consideration and fraud in the procurement. The
court does not mention this section under which all but the
first of these are no longer defenses against a holder in due
course.
Defense of Non Est Factum by Partner.—As against a
bona fide holder the defense of non est factum set up by a
member of a partnership in a suit upon a note signed by
the firm amounts only to a denial of the factum of the
partnership's execution of the note and cannot concern
itself with restrictions upon the authority of the other part-
ner. See Cooke v. Faucett, 35 Ga. App. 209, 132 S. E.
268. This case was decided under section 4286 but it seems
to apply equally to this section as the defense of non est
factum is still available as against a holder in due course.
The holder of an instrument as collateral is a holder in
due course only to the extent of the debt secured. Wyche
v. Bank, 161 Ga. 329, 130 S. E- 566.
§ 4294(59). Who deemed holder in due course.
Since it appears conclusively from the evidence that the
defendant had not established any defense to the note, he
can not dispute the title of the plaintiff as a transferee
upon the ground that the plaintiff was not a bona fide
purchaser for value. Jones v. Roper, 39 Ga. App. 309, 147
S. E- 156.
Applied in Hengstler v. Huguley- Scott Auto Company,
39 Ga. App. 287, 146 S. E. 645.
SECTION 5
Liabilities of Parties
§ 4294(61). Liability of drawer.
Applied in Hengstler v. Huguley- Scott Auto Company,
39 Ga. App. 287, 146 S. E- 645.
§ 4294(62). Liability of acceptor.
Applied in Massell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 601,
602, 144 S. E- 806.
§ 4294(65). Warranty where negotiation by
delivery, etc.
Warehouse Receipt.—In the recent case of Continental
Trust Co. v. Bank, 162 Ga. 758, 764, 134 S. E- 775, constru-
ing section 4277, it was held that the transferor of a cotton
warehouse receipt impliedly warrants that the cotton repre-
sented by such receipt is in existence at the time the re-
ceipt is transferred.
SECTION 7
Notice of Dishonor.
§ 4294(109). Waiver of notice.
In the trial of this action against the drawer of certain
drafts which were cashed by the plaintiff bank and later
dishonored by the drawee, the evidence established conclu-
sively and as a matter of law an implied waiver of notice
of dishonor, and instructions which had the effect of eli-
minating the want of such notice as a defense were not er-
roneous. Biggers v. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 512, 144 S. E- 397.
SECTION 8
Discharge of Negotiable Instruments
§ 4294(120). When persons secondarily liable
on; discharged.
Necessity for Consideration to Discharge. — See Gay v.
Carpenter, 35 Ga. App. 768, 134 S. E- 803, affirming the hold-
ing stated under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Retaking of Property by Seller.—A retaking of property
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by the seller, for the purpose of holding' it until the pur-
chaser, who is the maker of a note for it, has paid part of
the purchase money, and a release of the property then to
the purchaser, when such retaking in no wise increases the
surety's risk, does not release the surety. Gay v. Car-
penter, 35 Ga. App. 768, 134 S. F. 803.
ARTICLE 6
Promissory Notes and Checks
§ 4294(184). Promissory note defined.
Agreement to Pay in Specifics.—All agreements to pay
in specifics are presumed to be made in favor of the debtor,
and he has the option of paying the debt either in specifics
or in money amounting to the value of the specifics. Mob-
ley v. Tufts, 36 Ga. App. 764, 765, 138 S. E- 272.
CHAPTER 7
Of Defenses to Contracts
ARTICLE l
Denial of the Contract
§ 4296. (§ 3702.) Effect of alteration.
Applied in Blaylock v. Walker County Bank, 36 Ga. App.
377, 136 S. F. 924; Aspinwall v. Holland, 39 Ga. App. 605,
147 S. E- 897; Miller v. Griffin, 39 Ga. App. 705, 148 S.
E. 354.
Cited in Gardner v. Fleetwood, 39 Ga. App. 51, 146 S.
E. 127.
§ 4299. (§ 3705.) Indorsement, etc., not to be
proved.
Applied in Massell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 601,
602, 144 S. F. 803.
Stated in Pope v. Woolford Realty Co., 35 Ga. App. 284,
134 S. F. 174.
335, 136 S. F- 403, quoting the holding under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Restitution—When Unnecessary.—Where an ex-husband
fraudulently induced his ex-wife to accept a much less
amount of alimony than she was entitled to under her judg-
ments, it was not necessary to restore or offer to restore the
amount of alimony which she received under the contract.
Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 365, 130 S. F- 681, citing Farnell v.
Brady, 159 Ga. 209, 125 S. F. 57.
Restitution a Condition Precedent.—The general rule is
that one who seeks the rescission of a contract' on the
ground of fraud must restore or offer to restore the con-
sideration received thereunder, as a condition precedent to
bringing the action. Napier v. Adams. 166 Ga. 403, 409,
143 S. E. 566.
Time of Restoration.—The party seeking rescission must
proceed with his offer to restore what he has received, with
that promptitude which the nature of the case and environ-
ment of the circumstances would require, as manifesting an
intention to treat, from the discovery of the fraud, what
he has received as the property of the other party. If he
waits an unreasonable long time to< tender back the sub-
ject of the contracts, the other party may well assume an
abandonment of the effort to rescind. Manget v. Cunning-
ham, 166 Ga. 71, 87, 142 S. E- 543. See Henderson v. Eott,
163 Ga. 326, 335, 136 S. E. 403; G-ibson v. Alford, 161 Ga.
672, 132 S. F. 442.
Effect of Recognition after Knowledge.—Where one is en-
titled to rescind a contract on ground of fraud or false rep-
resentations, and who has full knowledge of the material
circumstances of the case, freely and advisedly does any-
thing which amounts to a recognition of the transaction, or
acts in a manner inconsistent with a repudiation of the
contract, such conduct amounts to acquiescence, and, though
originally impeachable, the contract becomes unimpeachable
in equity. Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 132 S. E- 142. See
also Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 26, 128 S. E- 70.
Applied in Williams v. Fouche, 164 Ga. 311, 138 S. E.
580.
Cited in Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 165 Ga.
742, 756, 142 S. E- 73.
§ 4306. (§ 3712.) Without consent.
Effect of Recognition after Knowledge.—See same catch-
line under section 4305.
Stated in Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 26,
128 S. E. 70.
§ 4309. (§ 3715). Release.
The release of one of the persons so jointly liable op-
erated, prima facie, as a release of the others, and the ob-
ligation was apparently no longer enforceable against them.
Middlebrooks v. Phillips, 39 Ga. App. 263, 146 S. E. 653.
ARTICLE 2
Denial of the Obligation of a Contract, Either
Originally or by a Subsequent Act of the
Opposite Party
§ 4301. (§ 3707.) Conditions.
Applied in Rogers v. Southern Fertilizer, etc., Co.
Ga. App. 229, 136 S. E. 106.
36
§ 4304. (§ 3710.) Rescission.
When Rescission Complete.—If, while an option to pur-
chase rented premises was in force, it was, by mutual agree-
ment between the parties, surrendered to the maker in full
satisfaction and discharge of the several rent notes due him,
the rent contract was effectually rescinded. Robinson v.
Odom, 35 Ga. App. 262, 133 S. E- 53.
§ 4305. (§ 3711.) Rescission for fraud.
Opportunity of Party to Redress Wrong.—See Henderson
T. Eott, 163 Ga. 326, 335, 136 S. E- 403, quoting the holding
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Contract Not Void.—See Henderson v. Eott, 163 Ga. 326,
ARTICLE 3
Of Payment, and Herein of Appropriation of
> Payments
§ 4311. (§ 3717). Payment generally.
Under this section, if a general agent to collect money
receives in payment property other than money, the credi-
tor, so far as the debtor is concerned, is bound thereby.
Armour Fertilizer Works v. Maddox, 168 Ga. 429, 148 S.
E. 152.
§ 4314. (§ 3720.) Bank-bills, checks, and notes,
payment in.
General Effect of Giving Check or Note—Acceptance of
Offer.—The mailing of a check to the plaintiff on March
27, including rent through March 31, in compliance with
the express offer contained in the bill for rent presented by
the plaintiff on March 27, would not of itself amount to an
acceptance of the offer by noon of March 30, as required by
the terms of the offer. Williams-Thompson Co. v. Eouis~
ville, etc., R. Co., 35 Ga. App. 556, 558, 133 S. E. 633.
Promissory note reciting that it was for balance on ac-
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count was not payment, where not itself paid; error in not
admitting testimony that it was given and accepted not as
settlement, but merely as matter of bookkeeping. Schneider
Marble Co. v. Knight, 37 Ga. App. 646(3), 141 S. E. 420.
Whether the receipt of a promissory note amounts to a
payment of the original debt depends upon the intention of
the parties, and this intention may be proved by parol tes-
timony if the writing itself is silent or ambiguous on the
question. Schneider Marble Co. v. Knight, 37 Ga. App.
646, 141 S. E- 420.
One receiving a bank check for collection and application
must exercise reasonable diffligence in presenting it for pay-
ment, and if he negligently holds it for an unreasonable
time, without presentation, it is at his own risk. National
City Co. v. Mayor & Council, 38 Ga. App. 491, 144 S. E-
336.
The taking of a promissory note from a tenant by a land-
lord for an amount of rent, even after the rent is due, and
even though the note is payable in the future, will neither
extinguish nor postpone the landlord's right to distrain, nor
prevent final judgment in his favor in the distress-warrant
proceeding, where the note is surrendered to the maker, or
is sufficiently accounted for by showing that the maker will
incur no further risk of liability thereon. Brooks v. Jack-
ins, 38 Ga. App. 57, 142 S. E- 574.
Where personal property is delivered to another under
an agreement that he is to pay cash therefor, and where
the cash payment is made by a check, which the person re-
ceiving believes to be good, but which afterwards proves
to be worthless, no contract of sale arises, and no title to
the property passes. Chafin v. Cox, 39 Ga. App. 301, 147 S.
E. 154.
Applied in Manget v. National City Bank, 168 Ga. 876,
882, 149 S. E. 213.
§ 4316. (§ 3722.) Appropriation of payments.
Direction by Wife of Debtor.—Directions as to the appli-
cation of payments by the wife of the debtor, she not being
the agent of the debtor, do not bind the creditor. Neai v.
Harber, 35 Ga. App. 628, 134 S. E- 347.
§ 4317. (§ 3723). Voluntary payments.
Taxes—Recovery.—Where' a corporation pays an alleged
illegal occupation tax and it does not appear from the peti-
tion that there was a provision for any penalty by arrest, fine,
or imprisonment, or by seizure of property, or by molesta-
tion of business, for failure to pay the license tax assessed
the payment cannot be said to come under the exceptions in
this section. Savannah v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 36
Ga. App. 526, 137 S. E. 123.
This section is not unconstitutional for the reason that
it violates the due-process clauses of the State and Fed-
eral constitutions. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Mayor &
Aldermen, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S. E- 555.
Mere apprehension or threats of a civil proceeding to en-
force a claim, unaccompanied by any act of hardship or of
oppression, does not render a payment in response there-
to involuntary in the sense that it can be recovered,
under this section. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Mayor &
Aldermen, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S. E. 555.
Likewise, money paid under an apprehension or threat
of a criminal prosecution, when no warrant has been is-
sued or proceeding begun, and there is no urgent and im-
mediate danger, does not constitute duress so as to make
the payment compulsory. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Mayor
& Aldermen, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S. E- 555.
To the above" rule there is this exception: Where there
are demands and threats of persons clothed with govern-
mental authority to carry them into execution by arrest
and prosecvition, the case stands on a different footing from
demands and threats of private individuals, and money
paid because thereof may generally be recovered. Strachan
Shipping Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S.
E. 555.
Payment under Threats of Arrest.—Payment of a judg-
ment alleged to be void, where the facts are all known by
the defendant, and there is no misplaced confidence, and
no artifice, deception, or fraudulent practice used by the
other party, is a voluntary payment, and can not be re-
covered,, unless made under an urgent and immediate neces-
sity therefor, or to release person or property, although
such payment is made under protest. A mere threat to
levy such execution if not paid promptly or at once does
not render the payment involuntary. West v. Brown, 165
Ga. 187, 140 S. E. 500, citing Williams v. Stewart, 115 Ga.
864, 42 S. E. 256.
Applied in Daniel Brothers Company v. Richardson, 39
Ga. App. 121, 146 S. E. 505; Wardlaw v. Withers, 39 Ga.
App. 600, 148 S. E- 16; Darby v. Vidalia, 168 Ga. 842, 149
S. E. 223.
ARTICLE 4
Of Performance, and Herein of Tender
§ 4318. (§ 3724.) Performance of contracts.
See notes to §4305.
Substantial Compliance.—Where an entire lighting plant*
with the exception of a certain valve designated as "one
iron, free gratis," was delivered within the time allowed
under the contract and the seller notified the purchaser
that such valve was not then in stock but would be subse-
quently forwarded, and "it was shipped later by express,"
the jury were authorized to find that the seller had substan-
tially complied with his obligation to deliver the entire
plant within a reasonable time. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga.
App. 630, 130 S. E. 600.
§ 4321. (§ 3727). Fault of other party.
See notes to § 4305.
§ 4322. (§ 372&) Tender.
Incomplete Tender Not within Section.—See Jeanes v.
Atlanta, etc., Nat. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 568, 570, 130 S. E.
353, holding the same as the second paragraph under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 5
Accord and Satisfaction
§ 4326. (§ 3732.) What is accord and satisfac-
tion.
Promise in Executory Agreement.—See Messenger Pub.
Co. v. Overstreet, 36 Ga. App. 458, 137 S. E. 125, holding
substantially the same as the first sentence under this catch-
line in the Georgia Code of 1926.
A dispute or controversy is not an essential element of
some forms of accord and satisfaction, as an accord and
satisfaction of a liquidated claim by the giving and accept-
ance of a smaller sum and some additional consideration, such
as new security, payment of the debts before due, payment
by a third person, or where property, or personal services
are accepted from an insolvent debtor in satisfaction. Burg-
amy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 141 S. E. 42.
§ 4328. (§ 3734). Must be of benefit to cred-
itor.
Generally an essential element to sustain an accord and
satisfaction of an entire debt or disputed claim by the giv-
ing of a less sum of money than that claimed, and nothing
more, is a bona fide dispute or controversy; but this rule
does not apply where the damages are unliquidated. Burg-
amy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 141 S. E- 42.
Applied in Decatur Bank & Trust Co. v. American Sav.
Bank, 166 Ga. 789, 144 S. E. 285; Decatur Bank & Trust Co.
v. Hibernia Savings, Building & Eoan Asso., 166 Ga. 789,
144 S. E. 285.
§ 4329. (§ 3735). Less than debt is not satis-
faction.
Accord and Satisfaction or Demurrer.—If a creditor agrees
to accept a less amount than his claim in property, and
does accept it in discharge of such claim, the defendant
may plead it by way of accord and satisfaction; or, if such
facts appear from the petition of the plaintiff, he can take
advantage of it by demurrer. Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga.
384, 141 S. E. 42.
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ARTICLE 6
Of Pendency of Another Action, and Former
Recovery
§ 4331. (§ 3737). Plaintiff required to elect be-
tween suits.
In General.—The rule against splitting causes of action as
embodied in this section, is neither harsh or inflexible. And
its proper administration in cases like the one under consid-
eration need never cause injustice, or deny the plaintiff any
part of the fair and full determination of his every right.
Georgia Ry. & Power Co, v. Endsley, 167 Ga. 439, 445, 145
S. E. 851.
Applied in Hines v. Moore, 168 Ga. 451, 452, 148 S. E. 162.
§ 4335. (§ 3741.) Former judgment.
I. IN GENERAL.
Applied in Chastain v. Chastain, 163 Ga. 69, 135 S. E.
439; Atlanta v. Smith, 165 Ga. 146, 140 S. E. 369; Miller
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 Ga. 321, 147 S. E- 527.
Cilted in Lovett v. Barwick, 39 Ga. App. 326, 147 S. E. 133.
II. PARTIES.
Third Parties Not Barred by Findings.—Since "in cases
of attachment the claim may be interposed either before or
after judgment" (§ 5120), where a claimant, in response to
a levy of the execution in attachment, files his claim to
property in the hands of a garnishee, he is not estopped by
the previous judgment in favor of the plaintiff in attach-
ment against the garnishee on the issue tried, on a traverse
of his answer, to which such claimant was not a party nor
is he bound merely by reason of the fact that during the
trial of the traverse to the garnishee's answer, he was
physically present at the trial, but took no part therein.
Tarver v. Jones. 34 Ga. App. 716, 131 S. E- 102.
IV. JUDGMENT AS ESTOPPEL.
Estoppel Generally.—The doctrine of estoppel by judg-
ment has reference to previous litigation between the same
parties based upon a different cause of action, and there is
such an estoppel only as to such matters as were neces-
sarily or actually adjudicated in the former litigation.
Farmer v. Baird, 35 Ga. App. 208, 132 S. E- 260.
Where Motion to Set Aside Overruled.—The previous
judgment of the trial court overruling a motion to set aside
amounts to an adjudication that the original judgment
could not be set aside for any reason that was or which
might have been assigned, and that judgment renders a
subsequent motion in arrest subject to the application of
the doctrine of res judicata. Farmer v. Baird, 35 Ga. App.
208, 209, 132 S. E. 260.
§ 4336. (§ 3742). Judgment conclusive of what.
A judgment on affidavit of illegality of execution is a
bar to equitable relief thereafter, under this section. Cone
v. Eubanks, 176 Ga. 384, 145 S. E. 652.
Affirmance of the judgment without condition or direc-
tion left the trial court without jurisdiction to entertain
or pass on a "special plea" filed after the judgment of af-
firmance. Federal Investment Co. v. Ewing, 166 Ga. 246,
142 S. E. 890.
Where a creditor obtains a personal judgment against a
trustee on a note executed by the latter for goods, mer-
chandise, and cash obtained and used for the benefit of
his cestuis que trust, and on which a nulla bona has been
returned, the creditor may proceed to subject the trust
property to the payment of the judgment. The judgment
against the trustee does not render the subsequent pro-
ceeding res adjudicata under this section. Faulk v. Smith,
168 Ga. 448, 148 S. E- 100.
Applied in Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 390, 141 S.
E. 42; Lester v. Southern Security Co., 168 Ga. 307, 147
S. E- 529.
§ 4337. (§ 3743). Parol evidence admissible.
Cited in Lovett v. Barwick, 39 Ga. App. 326, 147 S. E- 133.
§ 4338. (§ 3744.) Effect of sustaining demur-
rer.
Dismissal of a petition on special demurrer not extend-
[ 202 ]
ing to the existence of the alleged cause of action was not
a bar to a later suit by the plaintiff on the same cause.
Kennedy v. Ayers, 166 Ga. 206, 142 S. E. 859.
Applied in Cox v. Cox, 163 Ga. 93, 135 S. E. 504.
ARTICLE 7
Of Set-Off and Recoupment
§ 4339. (§ 3745.) Set-off.
See catchline "Plea of Usury" under section 4348.
See notes to § 4350.
Under the Civil Code §§ 4339, 4340, 4341, any mutual de-
mand between the parties existing at the commencement
of the suit may be set off, and except as provided in § 4344,
the debts may be separated and distinct and need not have
arisen in mutual dealings. Reynolds v. Speer, 39 Ga. App.
570, 144 S. E- 358.
Agreements in More Than One Contract.—Where a plain-
tiff agreed to sell and also to install a lighting plant, set-off
for improper installation will be allowed whether the con-
tract to install was part of the contract of sale or was a
separate contract. Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550, 134
S. E. 142.
§ 4340. (§ 3746). What may be set off.
Indorsers who were sued jointly on note could set off ac-
count due to firm in which they were sole members. Oliver
v. Godley, 38 Ga. App. 66, 73-4, 142 S. E- 566.
Applied in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Ran-
kin, 39 Ga. App. 373, 147 S. E. 157.
§ 4341. (§ 3747). Mutual debts.
Set-off of Unliquidated Claim Due by Principal.—In an
action on a note given by a principal and sureties, the
defendants may set off unliquidated damages flowing from
the breach of an independent contract between the plain-
tiff and the principal, and competent testimony tending
to support this plea should not be repelled. Webb-Harris
Auto Co. v. Industrial Co., 164 Ga. 54, 137 S. E. 770.
§ 4344. (§ 3750.) Set-off against negotiable
note.
Editor's Note.—In Fulton Nat. Bank v. Redmond, 161 Ga.
204, 130 S. E- 568, the holdings of Tinsley v. Beall, 2 Ga.
134, and Polk v. Stewart, 144 Ga. 335, 336, 87 S. E- 21, as set
out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, are
quoted and approved.
Essential Elements of Plea.—See Fulton Nat. Bank v.
Redmond, 161 Ga. 204, 130 S. E- 568, quoting the paragraph
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Applied in Pullen v. Powell, 35 Ga. App. 333, 132 S. E.
922.
§ 4348. (§ 3754.) Effect of dismissal after set-
off filed.
Plea of Usury.—Where in an action on a note the de-
fendant pleaded that because of usury the plaintiff was en-
titled to recover only the sum which the defendant had ob-
tained, the plea went merely to the justice in part of the
plaintiff's demand, and was not a plea of set-off, within the
meaning of this section. Pope v. Woolford Realty Co., 35
Ga. App. 284, 134 S. E. 174.
Cited in Hayles v. So. Ry. (Ga.), 25 Fed. (2d) 758, 759.
§ 4350. (§ 3756.) Recoupment.
Editor's Note—When Recoupment Allowed.—It is the
recognized rule that, under a contractual relationship, the
injured party may, where the rules of pleading permit,
waive his rights under the contract, and recoup in tort,
except where the breach complained of is simply the neg-
lect of a duty expressly provided for by the contract itself.
Porter v. Davey Tree-Expert Co., 34 Ga. App. 355, 359, 129
S. E. 557.
But a cross-action based on a tort can not be so amended
as to base it on a contract. Tench v. Downey Hospital, 36
Ga. App. 20, 135 S. E- 106.
§ 4351 EXCEPTIONS AND DISABILITIES § 4378
For recoupment to lie, the plaintiff should be liable to the
defendant under the contract sued upon. Tench v. Downey
Hospital, 36 Ga. App. 20, 135 S. F- 106.
The suit having been brought for the purpose of setting-
aside a sheriff's sale on the ground of mistake or error in
the sale as to the land actually sold, because of an omis-
sion from the advertisement of a part of the land that had
been levied upon and which should have been sold, the de-
fendant could not set up the defense of set-off or recouo-
ment. Frey v. Plarry F. Winter Inc., 166 Ga. 453, 143 S.
F 902.
Persons Who May Recoup Damages.—See Tennessee
Chemical Co. v. George, 161 Ga. 563, 131 S. F. 493, holding
substantially the same as the first two sentences under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Burden of Proof.—See Porter v. Davey Tree-Fxpert Co.,
34 Ga. App. 355, 356, 129 S. F- 557 holding the same as the
paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926
and citing additional cases.
§ 4351. (§ 3757). Differs from set-off.
Cited in Jordan v. Investment Corp. of Savannah, 39 Ga.
App. 144, 148, 146 S. F- 498.
§ 4352. (§ 3758.) For what it lies.
Necessary Allegations.—A plea in the nature of a recoup-
ment for alleged overpayments which nowhere alleges upon
what terms or conditions, if any, the alleged overpayments
were made, fails to set out any right in the defendant to
recover against the plaintiff. Risener v. Kidd, 35 Ga. App.
38, 132 S. F. 112.
ARTICLE 8
Of Limitation of Actions on Contracts
SECTION 1 •
Periods of Limitations
§ 43581 (§ 3764). Motions to set aside judg-
ments and decrees, made when.
Applied in Longshore v. Collier, 37 Ga. App. 450, 140 S.
F. 636.
§ 4359. (§ 3765). On specialties.
Instruments Governed by Section.—This section has been
applied to contracts for the purchase of land, which would
include contracts for the purchase of an interest in land,
such as the purported lease here brought to be canceled.
Baxely Hardware Co. v. Morris, 155 Ga. 359, 140 S. F-
869, citing Flrod v. Bagley, 150 Ga. 329, 103 S. F- 841.
When Suit Commences.—Filing of a petition to foreclose
a mortgage, with issuance of rule nisi, unless followed by
timely service, can not be treated as the commencement of
the suit on the date of filing, so as to prevent attachment
ot the bar of limitation. Simmerson v. Herringdine, 166 Ga.
143, 142 S. F. 687.
Parties.—One who purchased the mortgaged property be-
fore the petition to foreclose was filed and the rule nisi is-
sued, and who was not a party to that proceeding, was not
bound by the judgment of foreclosure, and could set up its
invalidity, and the bar of limitation on the trial of his
claim interposed on levy of execution from that judgment.
Simmerson v. Herringdine, 166 Ga. 143, 142 S. F. 687.
The statute of limitations, applicable to actions upon
open account or for breach of any contract not under the
hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any im-
plied assumpsit or undertaking, does not apply to an ac-
tion for the recovery of purchase-money under a con-
tract under seal. Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 1*8
S. F- 62.
§ 4360. (§ 3766). Statutory rights.
In Mobley v. Sasser, 38 Ga. App. 383, 385. 144 S. F. 151.
it is said: "But counsel for the plaintiff in error urt;e
that section 4360 of the Civil Code of 1910, which provides
that 'All suits for the enforcement of rights accruing to
individuals under statutes, acts of incorporation, or by
operation of law, shall be brought within twenty years
after the right of action accrues,' is authority for bring-
ing such suits within twenty years after the right of ac-
tion accrues. We can not agree with this contention.
That this section is not applicable to the cases under con-
sideration is shown by the decision of Judge Sibley and
the Georgia cases he cites in Anderson v. Anderson, 23
Fed. (2d), 331."
§ 4361. (§ 3767). Simple contracts.
Applied in Buchanan v. Huson, 39 Ga. App. 734, 736,
148 S. F. 345.
§ 4362. (§ 3768.) Open accounts.
Instances Where Section Not Applied.—This section does
not apply to the right of a road commissioner to collect
salary that is due him. Sammons v. Glascock County, 161
Ga. 893, 131 S. F. 881.
This section does not apply to a widows application for
a year's support. The right to a year's support is not an
open account, nor is it based upon a contract, or an im-
plied assumpsit or undertaking. Bacon v. Bacon, 37 Ga.
App. 171, 139 S. F. HI.
Applied in Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. F-
826.
§ 4363. (§ 3769). Mutual accounts.
Applied.—Under application of this section, a plea con-
taining a statement of an account by the defendant
against the plaintiff, which did not allege that the credit
therein extended was on the strength or basis of credit
extended by the plaintiff to the defendant, when consid-
ered with reference to the allegations of the petition,
which contained a statement of account in favor of the
plaintiff against the defendant, and which did not allege
that the credit extended by the plaintiff was on the
strength of mutual dealings between the parties, was in-
sufficient to set up such mutual account as to which the
statute of limitations would not begin to run until the
date of the last item. Bird v. Chander, 166 Ga. 707, 144
S F- 265.
§ 4369. (§ 3775.) Limitations in equity.
Injunction against Paving Ordinance.—Where the owner
of property stood by and allowed street improvements to be
carried to completion, and received the benefits of the work
and enjoyed them for several years, without taking any
legal proceedings to prevent the expenditure of the money
when the work was being carried on; he is estopped from
enjoining a sale of his property to pay assessments. Raines
v. Clay, 161 Ga. 574, 578, 131 S. F- 499.
SECTION 2
Exceptions and Disabilities
§ 4374. (§ 3779.) Persons excepted.
Applied in Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403, 131 S. F.
75.
§ 4378. (§ 3783.) Absence from state of de-
fendant.
The Removal of a Debtor.—In order for the removal of a
debtor from this State to suspend the operation of the stat-
ute of limitations, it must be accompanied by an intention
to change his legal residence or domicile. Stanfield v.
Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. F. 826.
Ownership of Property within State.—The fact that the
defendant might have owned property within the State
during the period of his nonresidence does not operate to
prevent the tolling of the statute. Kimball v. Kimball, 35
Ga. App. 462, 133 S. F. 295.
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§ 4380. (§ 3785). Fraud.
When Statute Applicable.—"This statute has been con-
sidered applicable where legal relief because of fraud was
sought, Kirkley v. Sharp, 98 Ga. 484, 25 S. F. 562; and
also equitable, Short v. Mathis, 107 Ga. 807, 33 S. F. 694.
It applies, also, where the cause of action was not an
original fraud, but where its existence was fraudulently
concealed. The fraud in the latter instance must be an
actual moral fraud, and not a mere constructive one. An-
derson v. Foster, 112 Ga. 270, 37 S. F- 426; Maxwell v.
Walsh, 117 Ga. 467, 43 S. E. 704. The statute doubtless
has the same meaning when fraud is the cause of action."
Anderson v. Gailey (Ga.), 33 Fed. (2d), 589, 592.
Statute held not applicable to suit by receiver for mis-
conduct and negligence of directors of National Bank in
making and handling loans. Anderson v. Gailey (Ga.),
33 Fed. (2d), 589.
Neglect, etc., of Agent.
—Where unskillfulness and neg-
lect in an agent is the cause of action, the unskilful act
itsielf sets the statute in motion, and not the occurrence
of the special damage, and ignorance of it by the plain-
tiff is not important. Anderson v. Gailey (Ga.), 33 Fed.
(2d), 589, 593.
§ 4381. (§ 3786). Nonsuit or dismissal.
I. EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Construction and Application.—This section is a remedial
statute and is to be liberally construed; and while the
second suit must be substantially the same cause of ac-
tion, it does not have to be a literal copy of that dis-
missed. Cox v. Strickland, 120 Ga. 104(5), 47 S. F. 912,
1 Ann. Cas. 870; Gust v. Atlantic Coast line R. Co., 37
Ga. App. 102, 139 S. F. 97.
II. PARTICULAR SUITS.
Certiorari.—Where a valid certiorari has been dismissed,
it may be renewed within six months under the provi-
sions of this section. Gragg Lumber Co. v. Collins, 37
Ga. App. 76, 77, 139 S. F. 84.
III. PARTIES AND CAUSES OF ACTION MUST
BE THE SAME.
Within the purview of the statute, the case under con-
sideration is substantially the same as the one dismissed,
and the court erred in sustaining the general demurrer
and dismissing the petition. Guest v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 37 Ga. App. 102, 139 S. F. 97.
Where a petition seeks to renew a former suit within
six months of the dismissal of the suit, which would
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations, as pro-
vided in this section and section 5626 of the Code, it must
at pear from the renewal petition that the new suit js
substantially the same cause of action as that of ths
former suit. Barber v. City of Rome, 39 Ga. App. 225,
146 S. F. 856.
SECTION 3
New Promise
§ 4384. Discharge in bankruptcy; new promise.
Applied in Massey v. Winchester, 38 Ga. App. 186, 143
S. F. 617.
§ 4386. (§ 3790). Effect of new promise.
If pending a suit for injury to reputation, which action
was barred by limitation when commenced, the parties
entered into an agreement for payment of money in set-
tlement of the suit and of all other demands, a right of
action on such agreement would be a new and distinct
cause that could not be added by amendment to the su*t
for the tort. Heath v. Philpot, 165 Ga. 844, 142 S. F. 283.
Applied in Cameron v. Meador-Pasley Company, 39
Ga. App. 712, 148 S. F. 309.
CHAPTER 8
Of Breach and Damage
§ 4390. (§ 3794.) Liquidated damages.
In Absence of Agreement Fixing Damages.—Where no
agreement fixing the amount of damages in case of the
breach of a contract is embraced in the contract itself, the
damages accruing to either party by reason of a breach are
such as will compensate him for the injury sustained.
Spalding Constr. Co. v. Simon, 36 Ga. App. 723, 725, 137 S.
F. 901.
Applied in Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550, 134 S. F.
142; Standard Motors Finance Co. v. O'Neal, 35 Ga. App.
727, 134 S. F. 843; Southwest Georgia Development Co. v.
Griffin, 38 Ga. App. 276, 143
:
S. F. 784.
Cited in Fndslev v. Ga. Ry. & Power Co., 37 Ga. 439.
442, 140 S. F. 386.
§ 4391. (§ 3795.) Penalties.
Cited in Standard Motors Finance Co. v. O'Neal,
App. 727, 134 S. F. 843.
35 Ga.
§ 4392. (§ 3796). Expense of litigation.
Attorney's Fees.—Acting in bad faith, or being stub-
bornly litigious, or causing the plaintiff unnecessary
trouble or expense might in a particular case suffice to
authorize a finding for attorney's fees. O'Neal v. Spivey,
167 Ga. 176, 177, 145 S. F. 71.
Under the evidence in this case the jury was author-
ized to find that the defendant acted in bad faith ami
was stubbornly litigious and caused the plaintiff unneces-
sary trouble and expense, even if he had not paid the at-
torney it was necessary for him to employ. In the ab-
sence of any agreement as to the amount of the fee, th;r
attorney is entitled to compensation quantum meruit.
O'Neal v. Spivey, 167 Ga. 176, 177, 145 S. F. 71.
In an action to recover damages for breach of contract
of sale by the buyer, including expenses incurred by the
buyer in carrying same out, and a cash payment on the
purchase money, and for cancellation of the contract, th's
court held that attorneys' fees might be allowed by the
jury where the defendant had acted in bad faith ami
caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.
Mendel v. Leader, 136 Ga. 442, 71 S. F. 753. By parity
of reasoning, where suit is brought by the maker to can-
cel a note and deed to secure the same, against the de-
fendant who, for a valuable consideration, had agreed
to pay off the note and cancel the same of record, and
who had paid off the note but who had taken a transfer
to himself of the note and of the deed to secure it, and
who had refused, upon demand, to surrender the note and
cancel the deed, the jury trying the case might allow the
attorneys' fees for such breach of his contract by the de-
fendant, where he had acted in bad faith, and caused the
plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. Mendel v.
Leader, supra. Felder v. Paulk, 165 Ga. 135 S. F. 873.
§ 4393. (§ 3797.) Exemplary damages.
Strict Construction.—In Copeland
817, 821, 138 S. F- 267, it was said:
yet we must construe this section
relating to the same subject, and,
think that while the rule stated th
well-nigh universal one, it is still
exception whatever. It seems that
found in the provision for smart
section 299."
v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App.
trA strong word is 'never',
in the light of all others
on so construing it, we
erein is a very strict and
not a rule without any
at least one exception is
-money as contained in
§ 4394. (§ 3798.) Remote damages.
Damages which are the legal and natural result of the
breach are not necessarily too remote merely because they
may be to some extent contingent. Walker v. Jenkins,
32 Ga. App. 238(5), 123 S. F. 161; Reynolds v. Speer, 38
Ga. App. 570, 144 S. F. 358.
Applied in Bank v. Riehle, 36 Ga. App. 470, 137 S. F. 642;
Courier-Herald Pub. Co. v. American Type Founders Co.,
34 Ga. App. 473, 130 S. F- 80; Gary v. Central of Ga.
Ry. Co., 37 Ga. App. 744, 750, 141 S. F. 819.
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§ 4395. (§ 3799.) Damages contemplated by
parties.
Applied in Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550, 134 S. E-
142; Reynolds v. Speer, 38 Ga. App. 570, 144 S. E. 358.
Stated in Neal v. Medlin, 36 Ga. App. 796, 797, 138 S. E.
254.
§ 4396. (§ 3800.) Interest.
Question of Interest within Discretion of Jury.—Whether
interest from the time of the breach shall be added to the
damages is within the discretion of the jury. Black v.
Automatic Sprinkler Co., 35 Ga. App. 8, 131 S. E- 543.
§ 4398. (§ 3802.) Plaintiff bound to lessen
•damage.
This section is applicable only where the damages can be
lessened by reasonable efforts and expense. Reid v. Whise-
nant, 161 Ga. 503, 510, 131 S. E- 904.
Applied in Pullman Co. v. Strang, 35 Ga. App. 59, 80, 132
S. E- 399; Evans v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 38 Ga.
App. 146, 142 S. E. 909.
Quoted in part in Western, etc., Railroad v. Townsend,
35 Ga. App. 70, 135 S. E- 439.
§ 4399. (§ 3803). Discretion of jury as to
damages.
Applied ;n State Highway Board v. Willcox, 168 Ga. 883,
£96, 149 S. E- 182; Willcox v. State Highway Board, j3
Ga. App. 373, 374, 144 S. E. 214.
§ 4400. (§ 3804.) On covenants of warranty to
land.
Stated in Neal v. Medlin, 36 Ga. App. 796, 138 S. E- 254.
NINTH TITLE
Of Torts, or Injuries to Persons or Property
CHAPTER 1
General Principles, and Herein of Fraud and
Deceit
§ 4403. (§ 3807.) What are torts.
Paragraph Two—Safe-keeping of Convicts.—If county com-
missioners failed to perform the public duty resting up.n
them to erect suitable quarters for the safe-keeping and
support of the county convicts under their control,
they would be liable, if at all, for only such special dam-
ages as the plaintiff sustained by reason of their infraction
of this public duty. McConnell v. Floyd County, 164 Ga.
177, 137 S. E. 919.
Paragraph Three—Legal Wrong.—While it has been held
that the breach of an unexpressed but implied duty aris-
ing out of a contract gives the injured party the right of
election as to his remedy, so that he may rely either up-
on his right under the contract or proceed for damages
as in case of tort, still, in order for such a breach of an
implied duty to give rise to a right of election on the
part of the complainant, there must be a legal wrong
committed upon the person or property of the complain-
ing party. Varn Turpentine, etc., Co. v. Allen, 38 Ga.
App. 408, 144 S. E. 47.
Section Quoted and applied in Strachan Shipping Co. v.
Hazlip-Hood Cotton Co., 35 Ga. App. 94, 132 S. E- 454.
§ 4405. (§ 3809). Breach of legal duty gives
action.
Fraud and Deceit.—Where parties conspire to defraud
the plaintiff or make a willful misrepresentation of mate-
rial fact to induce the plaintiff to act to his injury, an
action for deceit will lie. The directors of a corporation
may be liable for false statements in regard to the af-
fairs of the corporation, as for fraud and deceit. Hines
v. Wilson, 164 Ga. 888, 139 S. E. 802.
§ 4407. (§ 3811.) Cases of election.
Stated in Tennessee Chemical Co. v. George, 161 Ga. 563,
564, 131 S. E- 493.
Applied in Perry v. Griffin, 39 Ga. App. 170, 146 S. E.
567.
§ 4408. (§ 3812.) Privity.
Applied in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-Hood Cotton
Co., 35 Ga. App. 94, 98, 132 S. E. 454; King Hardware Co.
v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 362, 147 S. E- 119.
§ 4409. (§ 3813). Fraud and damage give ac-
tion.
Cited in Hoffman, v. Eynch (Ga.), 23 Fed. (2d) 518.
§ 4410. (§ 3814.) Deceit.
Actionable Misrepresentation—When Vendee Need Only
Believe.—Where the basis upon which the contract was en-
tered upon lies in the existence or nonexistence of certain
material facts, the verity of which needs must be ascer-
tained from the statement of one acquainted with such
facts, each of the contracting parties has a right to rely
upon the truth of the other's statements with reference
thereto, when such statements relate to matters apparently
within the knowledge of the party asserting them; and to
do this without checking up the statements with the dec-
larations of other and different persons, in order, by such
an investigation, to test their probable truth. Deibert v.
McWhorter, 34 Ga. App. 803, 804, 132 S. E. HO.
Mere Concealment Provision Charged.—Where the plain-
tiff is proceeding ex delicto for deceit, it is not cause for a
new trial to the defendant that the judge in his charge to
the jury, which included this section, gave that part of the
section dealing with "mere concealment." Deibert v. Mc-
Whorter, 34 Ga. App. 803, 132 S. E. HO.
In any suit sounding in tort for damages on account of
actual fraud, the gist of the action is the purpose and d2-
sign to deceive. Citing 10 Michie's Enc. Dig. 409. Penn
Mutual Eife Ins. Co. v. Taggart, 38 Ga. App. 509, 511, 144
S. E. 400.
§ 4413. (§ 3817.) By wife, servant, etc.
Where Public Officer Is Employed.— If a public officer
is employed and paid by the master to perform certain
acts for him, and if in the prosecution and scope of the
master's business such officer commits a tort, the mas-
ter is liable therefor. Massachusetts Cotton Mills v.
Hawkins, 164 Ga. 594, 139 S. E. 52.
So where a manufacturing company employs and pays a
public officer to keep order on its premises, protect its
property, and make arrests of persons violating the
State laws, if such servant in the prosecution of his du-
ties as such servant and within the scope of the master s
business commits a tortious act, the master is liable lor
the servant's tort. Massachusetts Cotton Mills v. Haw-
kins, 164 Ga. 594, 139 S. E. 52.
The owner of an automobile driven by another is not
liable for the act of a servant who exceeds his authority
by permitting a third person to ride with him. Greeson
v. Bailey, 167 Ga. 638, 146 S. E. 490; Thomas v. Bailey,
167 Ga. 638, 146 S. E. 490.
A husband, under this section, and existing statutes
enlarging the rights and functions of married women, is
not liable for an independent tort committed by the wi:e
in the operation of an automobile not furnished by him
to the wife, and not used in the husband's business, but
operated without his consent, command, or participation
in any way. Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 142 S. E. HI.
Service of Process.—In this State a husband now is li-
able for the torts of his wife only when they are com-
mitted by her in the capacity of agent; and where it is
sought to hold the husband liable for some wrong com-
mitted by her within the scope of her agency, a suit may
b? maintained against the husband without joining the
wife as a party defendant. If both are named as defend-
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ants, but the wife is not served, such lack of service as
to the wife is no cause for dismissing the suit as to the
husband. Miller v. Straus, 38 Ga. App. 781, 145 S. F. 501.
iPurely Personal Quarrels.—Where it appeared that the
real purpose of the person assaulted in approaching the agent
of a railroad company at his place of business was solely to
renew a mere personal quarrel between the plaintiff and the
agent, the plaintiff being under notice that the agent was
acting according to his instructions, the railroad company
had no concern in what passed between them, and the trial
judge did not err in granting a nonsuit. Dugger v. Central,
etc., R. Co., 36 Ga. App. 782, 783, 138 S. F- 266. But see the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Hines in Holliday v. Mer-
chants, etc., Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 964, 132 S. F. 210.
Application of Section to Railway Cases.—While this
code section has been applied in numerous railway cases, it
appears that the rule of liability on the part of railway
jompanies is not wholly fixed and determined by the pro-
vision of law quoted, but is enlarged or modified by the
provisions of section 2780. Moore v. DeKalb Supply Co., 34
Ga. App. 375, 377, 129 S. F- 899.
Applied in Massachusetts Cotton Mills v. Byrd, 38 Ga.
App. 241, 243, 143 S. F. 610.
Cited in Fisher v. Georgia Northern R. Co., 35 Ga. App.
733, 134 S. F- 827.
§ 4414. (§ 3818.) By employee.
In General.—Where one "contracts with an individual ex-
ercising an independent employment, for him to do a work
not in itself unlawful or attended with danger to others,
such work to be done according to the contractor's own
methods and not subject to the employer's control or orders
except as to results to be obtained, the employer is not li-
able for the wrongful or negligent acts of such independent
contractor or his servants." Zurich General Acci., etc., Ins. Co.
v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S. F- 173, quoting from Quinan
v. Standard Fuel Supply Co.. 25 Ga. App. 47, 102 S. F- 543.
Same—Test for Determining Relationship.—Under the sec-
tion and the decisions relating thereto, the test to be ap-
plied, in determining the relationship of the parties under
a contract, lies in whether it gives, or the employer as-
sumes, the right to control the time and manner of exe-
cuting the work, as distinguished from the right merely to
require results in conformity to the contract. Zurich Gen-
eral Acci., etc., Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S. F.
173, citing 39 C. J. p. 1322, section 1525; 42 A. L. R. 616,
III a.
One operating a collection agency whereby he under-
takes the collection of debts on a commission, and whose
services are in no wise subject to the employer's control
or orders as to the time, manner, or method of their ex-
ecution, does not occupy the status of a servant, but
must be taken as exercising an independent business.
Where one contracts with an individual thus exercising
an independent business, for him to do a work not in it-
self unlawful or attended with danger to others, the em-
ployer is not liable for the wrongful or negligent acts of
the independent contractor or his servants. Calvert v.
Atlanta Hub Co., 37 Ga. App. 295, 139 S. F. 917.
No Ratification Shown.—The facts of the instant case
show no such ratification of the alleged tort by the de-
fendant as would render it liable under sections 4415 and
4416. Calvert v. Atlanta Hub Co., Inc., 37 Ga. App. 295,
139 S. F. 917.
Applied in Calvert v. Atlanta Hub Co., Inc., 37 Ga. App.
295. 139 S. F. 917; Davis v. Starrett Bros., 39 Ga. App.
422, 428, 147 S. F. 530.
Cited in Poss Brothers Lumber Co. v. Haynie, 37 Ga.
App. 60, 62, 139 S. F- 127; Hughes v. Weekley Flevator
Co., 37 Ga. App. 130, 132, 138 S. F. 633.
§ 4419. (§ 3823.) Frauds by acts or silence.
Applied in May v. Yearty, 34 Ga. App. 29, 128 S. F. 67;
Burton v. Parris, 168 Ga. 407, 148 S. F. 11.
Cited in Watkins Co. v. Rivers, 37 Ga. App. 560, 140
S. F. 770.
S. F- 303. This rule is not in conflict with those cases, of
which the case of Fulton Ice, etc., Co. v. Pece, 29 Ga. App.
507, 116 S. F- 57, is typical, in which the owner or occupier
of land is required, under this section, to exercise extra-
ordinary diligence towards an invitee, in discovering and
repairing defects in the premises entered upon. In the Pece
case, supra, the object causing the injury was not alleged
to have been "apparently sound and in safe condition," but
was shown to be old and worn. In the Cultbert case the
owner was without actual knowledge of the defect, and there
was nothing to indicate the propriety or necessity of mak-
ing an inspection. Ordinary diligence would certainly not
require an inspection where there is no reason to think
an inspection necessary. See 29 Corpus Juris 427(2). Be-
sides the rule of inspection might be applied with a much
greater degree of rigidity in cases like the Pece case, supra,
relating to dangerous instrumentalities.
The duty to an invitee seems to be to exercise ordinary
care to keep the premises safe, not reasonably safe.
Western, etc., Railroad v. Hetzel, 38 Ga. App. 556, 564,
144 S. F. 506.
Assault by Ball Player.—Where a baseball player em-
ployed by the proprietor of a baseball park left his posi-
tion upon the grounds and entered the grandstand, and
there assaulted a spectator because the latter had "ragged"
him or criticized his playing, the assault was not com-
mitted within the scope of his employment nor in the
prosecution of his master's business, but was his personal
act in resenting a real or fancied insult. Atlanta Base-
ball Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ga. App. 497, 144 S. F. 351.
There being nothing in the petition to show that the
assault complained of, or anything of such character,
could or should have been anticipated by the defendant,
or that the defendant failed to do anything that it should
have done for the safety or protection of the plaintiff as
its invitee, the petition fails to show negligence, and the
general demurrer thereto should have been sustained.
Atlanta Baseball Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ga. App. 497, 144
S. F- 351.
Erroneous Charge as to Duty to Invitee.—A charge to the
jury to the effect that such a landowner is under the duty
to see that the premises are "in such condition that the
person invited may approach and remain thereon in safety,"
was error, in that the court, instead of charging, according
to the true rule, that the duty of the landowner is to keep
his premises safe, placed upon the landowner the heavier
burden of seeing that the person on the premises remained
there in safety. Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App.
804, 134 S. F 824.
Applied in Bussell v. Dannenberg Co., 34 Ga. App. 792, 132
S. F- 230; Hickman v. Toole, 35 Ga. App. 697, 134 S. F. 635.
CHAPTER 2
Of Injuries to the Person
§ 4420. (§ 3824.) Owner bound to keep prem-
ises safe, when.
Editor's Note.—It would seem that the degree of diligence
required, under the section, in keeping the premises safe,
does not consist in either slight diligence or of extraordi-
nary diligence, but rather consists of ordinary care, such as
a prudent householder might reasonably be expected to
exercise. See Cuthbert v. Schofield, 35 Ga. App. 443, 133
ARTICLE l
Physical Injuries
§ 4422. (§ 3826.) Physical injuries.
Charge When Suit Based upon Negligence Alone.—In a
suit for personal injuries based upon negligence alone, it
is inapt to give in charge this section. Georgia R. etc., Co.
v. Bryans, 35 Ga. App. 713, 134 S. F- 787; Hirsch v. Plow-
den, 35 Ga. App. 763, 134 S. F. 833.
§ 4423. (§ 3827). What is tort on a person.
^Humiliation by deposit of filth by horse on woman in
circus; cause of action stated. Christy Bros. Circus v.
Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S. F. 680.
Any unlawful touching of a person's body, although no
actual physical hurt may ensue therefrom, yet, since it
violates a personal right, constitutes a physical injury to
that person. The unlawful touching need not be direct,
but may be indirect as by the precipitation upon the body
of a person of any material substance. Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S. F- 680.
The court having properlv instructed the jury as U
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the relative rights of the parties under the pleadings and
the evidence, it was not error to fail to give in charge th-3
definition of a tort as contained in this section. Christ}'
Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S. E. 680.
§ 4424. (§ 3828.) Recovery for homicide, when.
Recovery for Death of Child—Dependency of Mother. —
In order for a mother to recover under the provisions of this
section for the homicide of her child, it must appear not
only, that the child contributed substantially or materially to
her support, but also that she was dependent upon it to an
appreciable or material degree therefor. Owens v. Anchor
Duck Mills, 34 Ga. App. 315, 129 S. E- 301. When mother
was inmate of Georgia State Sanitarium, as an insane per-
son long prior to, and at the time of homicide, she was not
dependent upon the said child. Id.
Same—Measure of Damages.—Where the defendant is li-
able and there is no reason to reduce the damages, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the decedent's
life. Western, etc., Railroad v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 546,
134 S. E. 134.
1924 Amendment—Constitutionality. — The amendment of
1924 adding the words "minor or sui juris" after the words
"child or children" is constitutional. Peeler v. Central, etc.,
R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. E- 24.
Same—Purpose.—It was the purpose of the General Assem-
bly in the passage of this act to exclude dependency as a pre-
requisite essential to a child's right to recover for the homi-
cide of a parent; and the provision of the act entitling a
child, whether minor or sui juris, to recover damages for
the homicide of its parent, properly construed, makes the
question whether the child is dependent upon such parent
in any respect wholly immaterial. Peeler v. Central, etc.,
R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. E- 24.
Same—Action by Adult Child under Section Prior to
Amendment.—An adult child cannot recover for the homicide
of his widowed mother, where such homicide occurred prior
to the amendment of August 18, 1924. Thompson v. Georgia
R., etc Co., 163 Ga. 598, 136 S. E. 895. See also Peeler v.
Central, etc., R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. E. 24.
Homicide of Son.—Under this section, a mother has no
right to sue for the homicide of her son where he leaves
a wife or child, and, where she does so sue, her petition
must affirmatively allege that her son left no wife or
child, or it is subject to be dismissed on general demurrer.
Butts v. City of Moultrie, 39 Ga. App. 685, 148 S. E. 273.
Homicide of Mother.—Under this section, a child may
recover for the homicide of his mother (the mother leav-
ing no husband or other children) without showing that
he was dependent upon her and that she contributed to
his support. It follows that in this case the trial judge
erred in charging the jury that before the plaintiff could
recover he must prove that he was dependent upon his
deceased mother and that she contributed to his support.
However, that error was cured by a subsequent charge
which informed the jury of the court's error and gave
the correct law on the subject. Petty v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co., 39 Ga. App. 689, 148 S. E. 303.
§ 4425. (§ 3829.) Definition of terms in pre-
ceding section.
See notes 'to § 4503.
Section controlling principle in Leslie v. Macon, 35 Ga.
App. 484, 133 S. E- 638. See also fairly complete list of
cases there cited as applying the section.
§ 4426. (§ 3830.) Diligence of plaintiff.
See notes to § 2781.
Charge of Section.—A charge embodying, substantially,
the language of the section, was not erroneous as impressing
the jury that the plaintiff was under a duty to avoid the
consequences of the defendant's negligence, though such
negligence was not known or apparent to her, or was rea-
sonably to be apprehended by her, and that if she didn't
avoid it she could not recover. Howard v. Georgia, Ry.,
etc., Co., 35 Ga. App. 273, 133 S. E. 57. In this connection,
see also, Central, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barnett, 35 Ga. App.
528, 134 . S. E- 126.
Same—When Judge Must Give.—Where the pleadings and
the evidence make an issue as to the plaintiff's diligence and
the defendant's negligence, it is error for the court to omit
an instruction to the jury embodying the principle expressed
in the code section, even in the absence of any request to do
so. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Mcelroy, 36 Ga. App. 143, 144,
136 S. E. 85.
Contributory Negligence.—Where by the exercise of or-
dinary care the deceased could have avoided the consequence
to himself caused by the defendant's negligence, a nonsu't
was properly ordered. Little v. Rome R., etc., Co., 35 Ga.
App. 482, 483, 133 S. E. 643; as to the plaintiff's duty gen-
erally in this connection, see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Anderson, 35 Ga. App. 292, 133 S. E 63.
Same — Instruction to Jury. — It is improper to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff must have been free from
negligence before it can recover. Lime- Cola Bottling Co. v.
Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103, 128 S. E- 226.
Same—Same—Rule as to Contributory Negligence and
Diminution of Damages Confused. — An instruction to the
jury, in which the rule expressed in the section which pre-
cludes a recovery where the plaintiff has failed to exercise
ordinary care, is confused with the rule as to comparative
negligence and diminution or apportionment of damages, is
erroneous. Brown v. Meikleham, 34 Ga. App. 207, 128 S. E-
918.
One who knowingly and voluntarily takes a risk of in •
jury, the danger of which is so obvious that no person oi
ordinary prudence would have subjected himself thereto,
can not hold another liable for damages for injuries thus-
occasioned. Culbreath v. Kutz Co., 37 Ga. App. 425, 432,
140 S. E. 419.
Applied in Peeples v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 37
Ga. App. 8,7, 88, 139 S. E. 85; Mills v. Barker, 38 Ga.
App. 734, 736, 145 S. E. 502.
§ 4427. (§ 3831). Malpractice of surgery and
medicine.
Charging Section.—In omitting the word "skill" and us
ing different language from that of the Code, the trial
judge, in view of the evidence and of the remainder of
his charge to the jury, did not commit an error which
would entitle the plaintiff to a new trial, when, immedi-
ately after charging the rule laid down in the Code, that
a surgeon must exercise "a reasonable degree ol care and
skill", he charged that the plaintiff would not be entitled'
to recover if the defendant exercised "all ordinary and
reasonable care, diligence, and prudence." McLendon v.
Daniel, 37 Ga. App. 524, 141 S. E. 77.
Applied in Hughes v. Weaver, 39 Ga. App. 597, 148 ?.
E 12.
ARTICLE 2
Injuries to Reputation
SECTION 1
Of Libel and Slander
§ 4428. (§ 3832). Libel.
The fact that the defendant's newspaper published the
alleged libelous charge as a statement made by another
person constitutes no justification. Kirkland v. Consti-
tution Publishing Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 634, 144 S. E. 821.
§ 4429. (§ 3833.) Malice.
In General.—It is slanderous per se to falsely utter and
publish a statement, with reference to a married woman, to
the effect that she is the common wife of her husband and
another man. Malice and damage will be inferred. Barker
v. Green, 34 Ga. App. 574, 130 S. E- 599.
Words Spoken in Jest and Retraction as Defense.—Malice
is an "aggravating circumstance." The existence of malice
would not be conclusively rebutted by proof of a retraxit,
accompanied by an explanation that the words were spoken
merely in jest, and only for the purpose of "teasing" the
person to whom they were addressed. Barker v. Green, 34
Ga. App. 574, 130 S. E. 599.
Erroneously Charged—Corrected in Time.—It was not cause
for a new trial to the losing party that the presiding judge
gave in charge to the jury all of the section, when immedi-
ately thereafter he expressly informed them that a part of
the section was not applicable, and correctly instructed them
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as to which part was applicable.
App. 574, 130 S. E- 599.
Barker v. Green, 34 Ga.
§ 4432. (§ 3836). What privileged.
Cited in Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 559, 564, 148
S. E. 622.
§ 4433. (§ 3837.) Slander.
In General—Prima Facie Case.—Where the statements
tended to show affliction with a contagious disease, and
calculated to injure the plaintiff in her profession, and the
evidence did not affirmatively show that the alleged slan-
derous statements were privileged; a prima facie case for the
plaintiff was made out, and the court erred in granting a
nonsuit. Brown v. McCann, 36 Ga. App. 812, 138 S. E. 247.
§ 4436. (§ 3840). Privileged communications.
A newspaper is not privileged, under this section, or
otherwise, to publish a libelous charge about a public of-
ficial as respects the conduct of his office. Kirkland v.
Constitution Publishing Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S. E. 821.
SECTION 2
Malicious Prosecution
§ 4440. (§ 3844.) Probable cause.
Cited in Norman v. Young, 35 Ga. App. 221, 132 S. E- 414.
§ 4444. (§ 3848). Malice inferred, when.
Although in this action for alleged malicious use of l-.-
gal process the plaintiff alleged that process of garnish-
ment, based on an action against him by the defendant,
was instituted by the latter maliciously and without prob-
able cause, with knowledge that there was a good de-
fense to the original action and with the purpose of har-
assing him into making a settlement of that action, the
petition failed to set forth any fact that would authorize
the conclusion that the garnishment was sued out mali-
ciously and without probable cause. Hallman v. Ozburn,
38 Ga. App. 514, 144 S. E. 344.
§ 4446. (§ 3850.) When the right accrues.
Abandonment of Prosecution.—While the procuring from
the committing court of an order discharging the defendant
in a warrant amounts to a termination of the prosecution
when no further action is taken, the mere allegation of such
discharge, without at least showing in general terms that
the prosecution has been terminated, does not meet the re-
quirements of this section. Rogers Co. v. Murray, 35 Ga.
App. 49, 50, 132 S. E- 139.
ARTICLE 3
Other Torts to the Person
SECTION 1
False Imprisonment
§ 4448. (§ 3852). Under warrant
Applied in Teasley v. Nelson, 39 Ga. App. 773, 148 S.
E. 534.
SECTION 3
Nuisances and Other Injuries to Health
§ 4457. (§ 3861). What is a nuisance.
A filling-station is not per se a nuisance. Standard Oil
Co. v. Kahn, 165 Ga. 575, 141 S. E. 643.
Mere apprehension of inconveniences arising from a fill-
ing-station in course of construction, the same being for
a lawful business use, is not sufficient to authorize an
injunction. Richmond Cotton Oil Co. v. Castellaw, 134
Ga. 472, 67 S. E. 1126; Standard Oil Co. v. Kahn, 165 Ga.
575, 581, 141 S. E. 643.
Undertaking Establishment.—Interlocutory restraint of
maintenance of undertaking establishment in residential
and school district, affirmed. Harris v. Sutton, 168 Ga.
565, 148 S. E. 403.
§ 4460. (§ 3864.) Sale of unwholesome provi-
sions.
Pleadings.—For a case substantially following the case
cited under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see
Copeland v. Curtis, 36 Ga. App. 255, 136 S. E- 324.
Liability of Original Vendor.—The general rule is that
where personal property sold by A to B is resold by B to
C. there is no implied warranty. Young v. Certainteed Prod-
ucts Corp., 35 Ga. App. 419, 133 S. E. 279. Whether the
rule is applicable under this section
—
Quaere.
SECTION 4
Of Indirect Injuries to the Person
wrong is joint§ 4469. (§ 3873). Procurer of
wrongdoer.
One who by advice, counsel, or command, procures an-
other to commit a wrong may be held liable equally with
the actual perpetrator, and may be sued separately or
jointly with him; and this is true irrespective of whether
there exists between the two any such relation as master
and servant, or other relation giving to the one authority
over the other. Wilder v. Gardner, 39 Ga. App. 608, 147
S. E. 911.
ARTICLE 1
To Real Estate
CHAPTER 3
Of Injuries to Property
§ 4470. (§ 3874). Interfering with enjoyment of.
Operation of Engines.—Under this provision and 4474
no presumption does or can arise, because the defendant
ran and operated its engines, etc., on the railroad tracks
on plaintiff's land, where dust and cinders affected the
cleanliness of his refining plant and endangered his build-
ing by fire, and did the other acts complained of, that
any of these acts were done lawfully. Williams v. Sea-
board Air-Line Railway Co., 165 Ga. 655, 660, 141 S. E. 80S.
§ 4471. (§ 3875.) Right or possession.
Liability of Lessee to Subsequent Lessee.—Where the
owner of certain realty leased the same to a tenant, and be-
fore the expiration of the term of the tenancy executed a
lease of the same premises to a second lessee, the latter,
upon the expiration of the time of the former tenancy, was
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vested with the right of possession of the property; and
where the former tenant refused to surrender possession, the
second tenant could maintain an action for damages against
the former tenant for withholding the right of possession.
Anderson v. Kokomo Rubber Co., 161 Ga. 842, 132 S. E. 76.
The Supreme Court, in this case, reversed the Court of
Appeals holding in the same case, Kokomo Rubber Co. v.
Anderson, 33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S. E- 783. See under catch-
line "Lessee Not Liable to Subsequent Lessee," Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4473. (§ 3877). Bare title.
Applied i'n Citizens, etc., Bank v. Edelstein, 38 Ga. App.
56, 142 S. E. 307.
§ 4474. (§ 3878). Disputed possession.
See notes to i§ 4470.
§ 4475. (§ 3879). Watercourses.
Applied.—The case involving a special covenant, the gen-
eral principles embodied in § 3633 and this section relat-
ing to rights of upper and lower proprietors on unnavi-
gable streams, have no application. Peebles v. Perkins,
165 Ga. 159, 140 S. E. 360.
§ 4479. (§ 3883.) Slander of title.
When Right of Action Accrues.—In an action for false,
slanderous, and malicious words impugning the title to the
plaintiff's lands, the right of action accrues to the plaintiff
upon the doing of the act complained of, just as in injuries
to personal reputation. King v. Miller, 35 Ga. App. 427,
133 S. E- 302.
ARTICLE £
Injuries to Personalty Generally
§ 4483. (§ 3887). Trover.
Cited in Hoffman v. Lynch (Ga.), 23 Fed. (2d) 518.
§ 4484. Defenses in trover cases.
This section is sufficiently broad to include not only
the immediate assignee of the vendor, but also the as
signee of such assignee, and that the plaintiff in error
had the right to interpose any defense allowable under
the statute. Jordan v. Investment Corp. of Savannah. 3')
Ga. App. 148, 146 S. E. 498.
A defendant may plead set-off in a trover action
brought under this section and the court erred in hold-
ing that the answer as amended did not set out any de-
fense to the suit. Jordan v. Investment Corp. of Savannah,
39 Ga. App. 144, 146 S. E. 498.
§ 4485. (§ 3888.) Trespass.
Trespass by Domestic Animals. — If domestic animals,
such as oxen and horses, injure .any one in person or prop-
erty when they are rightfully in the place where they do
the mischief, the owner of such animals is not liable for such
injury unless he knows they are accustomed to do mischief;
and such knowledge must be alleged and proved. But if they
are wrongfully in the place where they do the mischief, the
owner is liable, though he had no notice that they were ac-
customed to do so before. Wright v. Turner, 35 Ga. App.
241, 132 S. E- 650, citing Clark v. State, 35 Ga. App. 241,
132 S. E. 650; Cooley on Torts, 341, 342 (2d ed. 402); Reed
v. Southern Exp. Co., 95 Ga. 108, 22 S. E- 133.
CHAPTER 4
Of Defenses
ARTICLE 1
Of Justification
§ 4489. (§ 3892.) Extenuation.
Jury to Consider Testimony.—When the defendant has in-
troduced testimony tending to sustain a plea of justifica-
tion, though it fails to make it out, the jury may take such
testimony into consideration in mitigation of damages. Hut-
cheson v. Browning, 34 Ga. App. 276, 129 S. E- 125, citing
Henderson v. Fox, 80 Ga. 479, 6 S. E- 164; Ransone v. Christ-
ian, 49 Ga. 491; Ivester v. Coe, 33 Ga. App. 620, 127 S. E.
790, 792; 5 Corpus Juris, 674 (section 112).
ARTICLE 2
Of Satisfaction, and Herein of Tender
§ 4493. (§ 3896.) Tender of damages.
Refers to iPlea of Tender.—The right and privilege given
to the defendant by the provisions of the section contemplates
and has reference to a plea of tender filed in response to the
plaintiff's suit, and not to a mere oral offer or proposal to
settle the suit by a future delivery of the property involved.
Downs Motor Co. v. Colbert, 34 Ga. App. 542, 130 S. E.
592.
§ 4494. (§ 3897.) Tender in trover.
Incomplete Tender.—The requirements of this section
can not be taken as having been met when the alleged
tender of the automobile consisted of an offer to return
it stripped of various parts of the machinery with which
it was equipped when received by the defendant, and
likewise stripped of the various portions of the equipment
which had been substituted for the original equipment by
the defendant mechanic. Chalker & Russell v. Savannah
Motor Co., 37 Ga. App. 532, 140 S. E. 916.
Applied in Downs Motor Co. v. Colbert, 34 Ga. App. 542,
130 S. E. 592.
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ARTICLE 3
Limitation of Actions
§ 4495. (§ 3898.) For damages to realty.
Quoted in King v. Miller, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S. E. 302.
§ 4496. (§ 3899). To personalty.
Damage sustained by a father for the loss of the
services of his minor child is damage to a property right,
and a suit for damages thus arising may be brought
within four years. Bainbridge Power Co. v. Ivey, 38 Ga.
App. 586, 144 S. E. 825.
Cited in Endsley v. Ga. Ry. & Power Co., 37 Ga. App.
439, 442, 140 S. E. 386.
§ 4497. (§ 3900.) To the person.
Applied in Mansor v. Wilcox, 35 Ga. App. 213, 132 S. E-
251.
Applied to bar a suit for injury to reputation in Bag-
well v. Rice, etc., Co., 38 Ga. App. 87, 143 S. E- 125.
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CHAPTER 5
Of Damages
§ 4502. (§ 3905). General rule.
Cited in Endsley v. Ga. Ry. & Power Co., 37 Ga.
App. 439, 442, 140 S. E. 386; Clay v. Brown, 38 Ga. App.
157, 142 S. E. 911; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Smith,
38 Ga. App. 20, 24, 142 S. E. 308.
§ 4503. (§ 3906.) Aggravation.
Charge of Section in Slander Case.—In a case of slander
where the words were spoken merely in jest, and only for
the purpose of "teasing" the person to whom they were ad-
dressed,—where the evidence showed that the utterance was
made and published as alleged, a charge to the jury in the
language of this section was not error on the ground that
there was no evidence of "aggravating circumstances."
Barker v. Green, 34 Ga. App. 574, 130 S. E- 599.
Whether this section cannot be applicable at all in a
slander case is not presented in and is not passed on by
Barker v. Green, 34 Ga. App. 574, 130 N. C. 599.
No Punitive Damages in Action for Homicide of Hus-
band.—A wife, when suing for the homicide of her
husband, under section 4425, can not recover, in addition
to a sum representing the full value of the husband's
life, a sum for punitive and exemplary damages, as pro-
vided in this section. Engle v. Finch, 165 Ga. 131, 139
S. E. 868.
§ 4504. (§ 3907.) Vindictive damages.
See annotations to the preceding section.
Instruction as to Present Worth of Pain.—A jury in a
personal injury suit, where damages for future pain and
suffering are sued for, should not be instructed that the
amount representing the monetary compensation for future
pain and suffering should be reduced to its present worth.
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Maffett, 36 Ga. App. 513, 137 S.
E. 404.
It would be proper, however, in such a case to instruct the
jury that in awarding damages for future pain and suffering
they should give consideration to the fact that the plaintiff
is receiving a present cash consideration for damage not yet
sustained. Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134
S. E. 824.
§ 4505. (§ 3908.) Necessary expenses.
Instruction as to Reasonable Expenses for Medical Atten-
tion.—An instruction to the jury that the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover the reasonable expenses that were in-
curred for medical attention "on account of injuries" was
equivalent to an instruction that the plaintiff could recover
the "necessary expenses consequent upon the injury," as
provided in this section. Orange Crush Bottling Co. v.
Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S. E- 259.
§ 4507. (§ 3910). General damages, special
damages.
Cited in Endsley v. Ga. Ry. & Power Co., 37 Ga.
App. 439, 442, 140 S. E. 386.
§ 45085. (§ 3911). Direct and consequential
damages.
Recovery Limited to Direct Damages.—Where any re-
covery authorized is limited to direct damages, that is,
damages such as "follow immediately upon the act
done" a recovery can not be had under a petition which
makes no claim for damages of such character, but
limits the nature and basis of the recovery sought to
subsequently accruing consequential damages. City Coun-
cil of Aigista v. Lamar, 37 Ga. App. 418, 419, 140 S. E-
763.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Letton v. Kitchen, 166
Ga. 121, 130, 142 S. E. 658.
§ 4509. (§ 3912.) Damages too remote, when.
Presence of Other Hypotheses as to Cause 'of Injury.—
Where there were several reasonable hypotheses as to the
cause of the injury with which the evidence was not less
consistent than with the conclusion sought to be estab-
lished, the evidence was insufficient to authorize a finding
that the injury was the proximate result of the defendant's
negligence. Pullman Co. v. Strang, 35 Ga. App. 59, 80, 132
S. E. 399.
§ 4510. (§ 3913.) Rule to ascertain.
A result intended by a wrongdoer cannot, under this and
the following section, be too remote for recovery of dam-
ages. Richards v. International Agricultural Corp., 10 Fed.
(2d), 218.
§ 4514. (§ 3917). Highest amount proved.
Cited in Hoffman v. Lynch (Ga.), 23 Fed. (2d) 518.
TENTH TITLE
Of Equity
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 4518. (§ 3921.) Equity jurisdiction.
The Municipal Court of the City of Atlanta Has No Equity
Jurisdiction.—See Ahlgren v. Walton, 34 Ga. App. 42, 128 S.
E- 585.
Applied in Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, i68>
Ga. 15, 30, 147 S. E. 87.
§ 4519. (§ 3922). Grounds of relief.
Applied in ' Edwards Manufacturing Co. v. Hood, 157
Ga. 144, 145 S. E- 87.
§ 4520. (§ 3923). Equity follows the law.
Garnishment.
—
Equitable petition did not lie to garnish
wages of warden of county chain-gang. McConnell v.
Floyd County, 164 Ga. 178, 137 S. E. 919.
Applied in determining which of several parcels held
by taxpayer under bonds for title was liable for taxes.
Planters Warehouse Co. v. Simpson, 164 Ga. 190, 13S
S. E- 55.
Applied on issue between county and holder of security
deed as to tax payments for specified years. Phcenix Ins.
Co. v. Appling County, 164 Ga. 861, 139 S, E- 674.
§ 4521. (§ 3924.) Complaint must do equity.
Applicable Where Both Legal and Equitable Relief Sought.
—The principle established by this section is as well appli-
cable where one in an equity suit seeks both legal and equit-
able relief, as where he seeks a purely equitable right.
Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 550, 134 S. E- 152.
Favorite Maxim.—The equitable maxim which is embodied
in this section is a favorite maxim in equity. Duke v.
Ayers, 163 Ga. 444, 454, 136 S. E- 410; Autry v. Southern
Ry. Co., 167 Ga. 136, 142, 144 S. E. 741.
Applications.—In Magid v. Byrd, 164 Ga. 609, 139 S.
E 61, it is said: "Even should Magid be treated as-
substituted trustee for these bondholders, who had used
his own funds in buying this property for their account,
these bondholders can not recover the property from hint
without having first refunded or offered to refund to him
the funds so used by him for their benefit, the maxim of
this section applies."
Petitioner should not be allowed to enjoin the plaintiff
from enforcing her judgment against it and the surety
upon its supersedeas bond, where it does not pay or offer
to pay her the amount which it admits it owes her on the
joint judgment. Autry v. Southern Ry. Co., 167 Ga. 136,.
144 S. E. 741.
Cited in Mayor v. Brown, 168 Ga. 1, 12.
§ 4522. (§ 3925.) Complete justice.
Effect of Dismissal of Petition upon Cross BilL—The dis-
missal of the plaintiff's petition will not have the effect of
dismissing a cross-bill of the defendant, although the relief
prayed is not equitable in character and is cognizable in a
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court of law, in view of the uniform procedure act. Jackson
v. Mathis, 35 Ga. App. 178, 132 S. F- 410.
Favorite Maxim.—The maxim embodied in this section is a
favorite maxim of equity. Henderson v. Eott, 163 Ga. 326,
331, 136 S. E- 403.
Application.
—
Equity seeks always to do complete jus-
tice; and having the parties before it rightfully for the
purpose of cancelling said deeds from the husband to the
wife, it could proceed to give full relief to the plaintiffs
in reference to the subject-matter of the suit, the court
having jurisdiction for that purpose, by ordering the
property sold subject to the security deed, or by making
the holder of the security deed a party to the case, and
ordering the sale of the property embraced in the se-
curity deed, applying the proceeds of the sale first to the
payment of such secured debt, and the balance to the
judgments of the plaintiffs. Roach v. Terry, 164 Ga. 421
138 S. E. 902.
§ 4528. (§ 3931.) Possession notice of title.
Reference for Review of Cases.
—
For an exhaustive review
of cases decided upon the principle inculcated by this sec-
tion, see McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
Notice of Whose Rights.—Possession is not only notice of
the rights of the possessor, but of those under whom he
claims. Walker v. Neil, 117 Ga. 733, 745, 45 S. F- 387; Austin
v. Southern Home Bldg., etc., Assn., 122 Ga. 439, 50 S. E.
382; McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 724, 132 S. F- 547.
Exclusiveness of Occupancy.—The possession of land
which will be notice of the occupant's title must have some
element in it indicative that the occupancy is exclusive in
its nature. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
Possession Open, Visible, etc.—In order for the possession
to have the effect of notice it must be actual, open, visible,
exclusive and unambiguous. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga.
711, 132 S. E. 547.
Possession of land by tenants of wife gave notice to
purchaser under execution sale against husband. Sikes v.
Seckinger, 164 Ga. 96, 137 S. E- &33.
§ 4529. (§ 3832.) Notice.
Applied in Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Augusta Veneer
Co., 35 Ga. App. 686, 134 S. E. 790.
Notice Received in Representative Capacity.—Notice re-
ceived in representative capacity affects act transacted in
personal capacity. Puckett v. Jones, 36 Ga. App. 253, 136
S. F. 462.
§ 4530. (§ 3933.) Notice extends to facts dis-
covered.
Section Not Superseded.—This principle is not super-
seded by section 4294(56) of our negotiable instruments
law, as to instruments not embraced therein. National
Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co., 167 Ga. 737, 146 S. E.
739.
The record of a conditional sale is notxe to the world
that the owner of the property has parted with his abso-
lute dominion over it, but retains the title as security
for his debt, and of every fact which might be ascer-
tained from an inquiry which the record properly sug
gests. Chattanooga Finance Corp. v. Bitting, 38 Gi.
App. 490, 144 S. F. 331.
Where, however, all that the record discloses is that
the vendee of the property owes a stated portion of the
purchase price, and that the title to the property is re-
served in the vendor until the purchase price is fully
paid, and there is nothing to indicate or suggest that the
vendee has executed a negotiable note for the unpaid
purchase price, there is nothing to put on inquiry a pur-
chaser from the vendor in possession of the property as
to the rights of any one who might claim as the trans-
feree of an undisclosed negotiable instrument. In such
a case an innocent purchaser from the vendor in posses-
sion is only bound to inquire into the respective claims
of the vendor and the vendee under the recorded instru-
ment. Chattanooga Finance Corp. v. Bitting, 38 Ga.
App. 490, 144 S. E. 331.
Changing Section.—In Benton v. Benton, 164 Ga. 541,
550, 139 S. F- 68, it is said: "Besides, after giving the
instruction complained of, the court read to the jury
section 4530 of the Code of 1910, which declares tha't
"Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on
inquiry is notice of everything to which it is afterwards
found such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a fact,
due to negligence, is equivalent to knowledge, in fixing
the rights of parties." The court then read to the jury
section 4626 of the Code of 1910, which declares that
"Fraud may not be presumed, but, being in itself subtle,
slight circumstances may be sufficient to carry conviction
of its existence." So we are of the opinion that the court
fully and fairly presented to the jury the principles of
law applicable to the issues raised in this case, and that
a new trial should not be granted because of the instruc-
tion with which we have been dealing."
Waiver in Insurance. — The unauthorized act of an
agent, done in the principal's behalf, can not be ratified
by the principal without actual knowledge of the act. The
provisions of this section have no application to the
subject of waiver as related to conditions imposing for-
feitures in contracts of insurance. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Blount, 165 Ga. 193, 140 S. E. 496; Penn Mu-
tual Fife Ins. Co. v. Blount, 39 Ga. App. 429, 437, 147
S. F. 768.
Description of Stock of Goods.—Under this section descrip-
tion of property in a chattel mortgage as "our stock of mer-
chandise consisting of dry goods, shoes, clothing, groceries,
and hardware," is sufficient where it is shown that the
mortgagor was a well-known firm and had only one stock
of goods, which was located in the town where the mort-
gage was executed. In re Coleman, 2 Fed. (2d), 254.
Applied in Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Augusta Veneer
Co., 35 Ga. App. 686, 134 S. F- 790.
Charge of Section Upheld.—The charge of the court in
substance as this section was upheld under the evidence
and circumstances of the case. Darden v. Washington, 35
Ga. App. 777, 134 S. E- 813.
Cited in North Georgia Trust, etc., Co. v. Hulme, 35 Ga,
App. 627, 134 S. E. 200; Fender v. Hodges, 38 Ga. App.
78, 82, 142 S. F. 753.
§ 4531. (§ 3934.) Bona fide purchaser.
See annotations to § 3762.
Evidence as to Bona Fides Conflicting—Injunction De-
nied.—Injunction against exercising power of sale will be
denied where there is conflict of evidence that the creditor
had knowledge that the land was paid for by the debtor
with trust fund. Johnson v. Southern States Phosphate,
etc., Co., 163 Ga. 98, 135 S. E. 435.
Right of Bona Fide Purchaser Unqualified.—The purchaser
is entitled to his bargain, if made in good faith, and can
not be disturbed in his possession, no matter what equitable
arrangement the holder of the secret equity proposes as
affording protection to all the parties concerned, and a court
of equity has no jurisdiction to interfere with such vested
legal right and title. Johnson v. Southern States Phosphate,
etc., Co., 163 Ga. 98, 105, 135 S. E. 435.
A bona fide mortgagee stands precisely in the attitude of
a bona fide purchaser, and is entitled to the same protec-
tion. Johnson v. Southern States Phosphate, etc., Co., 163
Ga. 98, 105, 135 S. F- 435.
Illustration.—Pursuant to this section and section 4535
it is held that where the husband has the paper title to
land in his own name, and, being in possession, conveys
fhe same by deed to his second wife, his. deed to her
being based in part upon a valuable consideration and in
part upon a good consideration, and being taken witn-
cut notice of the claim of his children by a former mar-
riage to the land, based upon an implied trust growing
out of the fact that the land was bought with money ri
their mother and title taken in the name of the .husband
when it should have been taken in the name of the
former wife, the title of the second wife is superior tc
the secret equity of the children by the former marriage.
DeEoach v. Purcell, 166 Ga. 362, 143 S. E- 424.
Cited in Eong v. Atlanta Trust Co., 164 Ga. 21, 137 S.
F. 394.
§ 4532. (§ 3935). May do what court would
compel.
Specific Performance.—Parties can voluntarily do what
equity will compel them to do; and equity will' not en-
tertain a bill for specific performance when the parties
have already performed what they ought to have done.
Sikes v. Seckinger, 164 Ga. 96, 137 S. E. 833.
§ 4533. (§ 3936.) Lis pendens, notice by.
Bankruptcy against H., Notice to W's Mortgagee.—The
pendency of bankruptcy proceedings against the husband is
general notice to the mortgagee of the wife who claims title
under the husband. Chatham Chemical Co. v. Vidalia
Chemical Co., 163 Ga. 276, 278, 136 S. E- 62.
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§ 4534 ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE § 4567
Illustration..—The plaintiff in the instant case bought
the property in controversy pending litigation between the
defendant and the person from whom the plaintiff bought
it, in which litigation the deed of plaintiff's vendor wis
canceled. The land in controversy was subsequently
levied upon by the sheriff under a fi. fa. obtained in
favor of the defendant in error against the husband of
the plaintiff's vendor. Applying the principles of this
section the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer
and in dismissing the petition. Bennett v. Stokey, 164
Ga. 694, 139 S. E. 346.
Cited in Bennett v. Stokey, 164 Ga. 694, 139 S. E. 346.
§ 4534. (§ 3937). Both parties.
Applied in Felder v. Paulk, 165 Ga. 135, 139 S. E- 873.
§ 4335. (§ 3938.) Purchaser without notice
from one with notice, and vice versa.
See notes to § 4531.
Principle Applied.—See Bank v. Wheeler, 162 Ga. 635, 134
S. E- 753.
Applied to bona fide holder of note from a mala- fide
grantee in a security deed. First Nat. Bank v. Pounds, 163
Ga. 551, 136 S. E. 528.
The reason is that otherwise a bona fide purchaser might
be deprived of selling his property for full value. North
Georgia Trust, etc., Co. v. Hulme, 35 Ga. App. 627, 134 S.
E. 200.
Cited in Long v. Atlanta Trust Co., 164 Ga. 21, 137 S.
E 394.
§ 4536. (§ 3939). Laches.
Under the facts in this case it cannot be held as a mat-
ter of law that the plaintiff is precluded, by her delay
and laches in discovering the fraud, from prosecuting her
suit for rescission. Cohron v. Woodland Hills Co., 164
Ga. 581, 590, 139 S. E. 56.
§ 4537. (§ 3940.) Which of two innocent per-
sons to bear loss.
Must Be Equally Innocent.—The principle announced in
this section, is not applicable in this case, for the reason
that the principals are not innocent parties, but are each
chargeable with the fraud perpetrated by the common
agent. Napier v. Adams, 166 Ga. 403, 412, 143 S. E. 566.
Instances of Application.—Undisclosed principal subject to
same defenses as are available against the agent. Truluck
v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 34 Ga. App. 501, 130 S.
E 356.
When an alleged principal, by acts or conduct, has
knowingly caused or permitted another to appear as his
agent, he will be estopped to deny the agency, to the
injury of third persons who have in good faith and in
reasonable prudence dealt with the apparent agent on the
faith of the relation. Davis v. Citizens' -Floyd Bank &
Trust Co., 37 Ga. App. 275, 139 S. E- 826.
The failure of H to record a bond and transfer placed
it in the power of R to deceive and defraud some other
person by misrepresenting the facts, and that is what
occurred; consequently this section applies. Fender v.
Hodges, 166 Ga. 727, 734, 144 S. E. 278.
Applied as between holders of security deeds, later re-
corded first, without notice of earlier. Mortgage Guar.
Co. v. Atlanta Commercial Bank, 166 Ga. 412, 416, 143
S E. 562.
This section applies against the maker of a check to a
thief for stolen property, and in favor of an indorsee who
cashed it. Milner v. First Nat. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 668,
670, 145 S. E- 101.
Cited in Moseley v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167
Ga. 491. 145 S. E- 877.
§ 4538. (§ 3941.) Common-law remedy.
Prayer for Discovery, etc., Immaterial—When.—Notwith-
standing the prayer for "discovery," "accounting," and re-
lief in equity, where the petition alleges no cause showing
inadequacy at law, equity has no jurisdiction. Decatur
County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 36 Ga. App. 611, 137 S. E- 918.
Partition Proceedings.—In proceedings for partition where
no peculiar circumstances are shown for equitable jurisdic-
tion, equity will not interfere; the remedy prescribed at law
in § 5355 being sufficient for partition purposes. Saffold V.
Anderson, 162 Ga. 408, 410, 134 S. E. 81.
Cancelling Policy after Loss on Ground of Fraud.—The
question whether equity will cancel a policy and enjoin
proceedings at law thereon, on the ground of fraud, that
defense being available at law, was raised but not decided in
Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 568, 573, 131 S.
E. 490.
Award of industrial commission, not reformed, where
plaintiff had remedy under workmen's compensation act.
Bishop v. Bussey- 164 Ga. 642, 139 S. E- 212.
Application.—In Bishop v. Bussey, 164 Ga. 642, 646, 139 S.
E. 212, it is said: "This judgment of the superior court can
not be held or treated as void, but must either stand, or
be reformed so as to speak the truth; that is, that the al-
leged corporation under which Bishop did business was in
fact F. A. Bishop, and only a court of equity could set
aside or reform the judgment of the superior court under
the facts, and give complete relief, as was done in this
case. See Civil Code (1910), § 4538; Michie's Georgia Code
(1926), § 4538, and cit.; Ga. Peruvian Ochre Co. v. Cherokee
Ochre Co., 152 Ga. 150, 154, 108 S. E. 609."
Applied in Continental Trust Co. v. Sabine Basket Co..
165 Ga. 591, 594, 141 S. E- 664.
§ 4540. (§ 3943). Concurrent jurisdiction.
Stated in Davis v. Culpepper, 167 Ga. 637, 146 S. E- 319.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Letton v. Kitchen, 166 Ga.
121, 130, 142 S. E- 658.
CHAPTER 3
Of Perpetuation of Testimony
ARTICLE 2
Method of Perpetuating Testimony
§ 4560. (§ 3963.) Application and order.
Effect of Failure to Bring Suit against All Parties Named.
—Where an application is made naming several parties as
possible defendants, it is not necessary that a suit be in-
stituted against all persons named in order to use the testi-
mony against one of them. Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664,
135 S. E. 195.
CHAPTER 4
Of Accident and Mistake
§ 4567. (§ 3970.) Error in form.
Relief Notwithstanding Set off at Law.—The equitable re-
lief prescribed by this section will be given notwithstanding
the existence of a defense by way of set off in favor of the
defendant which he might be availed of at law. Gibson v.
Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 682, 132 S. E- 442.
Mistake on One Side, Fraud on the Other.—In addition to
reforming a contract when, from mutual mistake or mistake
common to both parties, an instrument does not express
the true agreement of the parties, a court of equity will also
reform an instrument where there is ignorance or mistake
on one side, and fraud or inequitable conduct on the other.
Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 682, 132 S. E- 442.
Correcting Misdescription to Conform to Agreement.—
Where it is made to appear that an agreement was made
with reference to a certain designated piece of land, reforma-
tion of the contract made to evidence the agreement will be
decreed if the misdescription in the contract or deed includes
more land than ought to be included, or contains less than
the parties agreed upon. Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 682,
132 S. E- 442.
Applied in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 166 Ga.
747, 144 S. E- 256; Blaylock v. Hackel, 164 Ga. 257, 138
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§ 4568 ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS § 4600
S. E- 333; Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 159, 138 S.
E. 62.
§ 4568. (§ 3971.) Rule of construction as to
conditions.
Cited in Grantham v. Royal Ins. Co., 34 Ga. App. 415, 130
S. E- 589.
§ 4571. (§ 3974). Relief in equity for negli-
gence of complainant, when.
Error in disallowing interventions of non-resident cred-
itors, after time limit in order for filing claims in receiver-
ship against bankrupt. Columbus Iron Works v. Sibley,
164 Ga. 121, 122, 137 S. E. 757.
Applied in Martin v. Turner, 166 Ga. 293, 295, 143 S. E-
239.
§ 4576. (§ 3979). Mistake of law by parties.
Applied in State Highway Dept. v. Fidelity, etc., Co.,
168 Ga. 288, 290, 147 S. E- 522.
§ 4578. (§ 3981.) Reforming a contract, etc.
If mistake is relied on, it must be distinctly charged and
stated with precision, the particular mistake being shown
and how it occurred. In other words, the pleader should
state why the terms of the actual contract happened to be
left out, or how terms not agreed on came to be inserted.
R. C. E. 361. Frank v. Nathan, 159 Ga. 202, 208, 125 S.
E- 66; Martin v. Turner, 166 Ga. 293, 295, 143 S. E. 239.
Applied in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 166 Ga.
747, 748, 144 S. E- 256.
§ 4580. (§ 3983.) Mistake of fact.
See notes to § 4567.
Laches Repelled by Other Circumstances.—While the suit
was brought many years after the making of the deed, the
original purchaser, and the other two parties plaintiff had
been in continual possession of the land, and the plaintiffs
were not aware of the mistake in the deed until a short
time before the suit was brought. This fact, and where there
had been no assertion of a claim adverse to the rights of
the plaintiffs, as set up in the petition, and no fact or cir-
cumstance to put plaintiffs on notice of such claim, and
the further fact that no rights of third parties had inter-
vened, warrants the finding that the plaintiffs were not bar-
red by laches. Sweetman v. Dailey, 162 Ga. 295, 133 S. E-
257.
§ 45811. (§ 39&4). Negligence and concealment.
No inability to read and no other sufficient reason is al-
leged as an excuse for ignorance of the facts, and for fail-
ure within reasonable time to' apply for equitable relief.
Paris v. Treadaway, 166 Ga. 138, 140, 142 S. E. 693.
If a purchaser has equal opportunities with his vendor
for discovering the identity of the land sold, he is bound
to avail himself of those opportunities. If he fails to do
so and on account of his own gross negligence he is in-
jured, relief will not be granted to him on the ground of
mutual mistake as to the identity of the property. How-
ever, if the sale was induced by a false representation of
the sale agent of the seller as to the identity of the prop-
erty known by the agent to be false, the purchaser would
not be required to show diligence in investigating the truth
of the representations, in order to be entitled to a rescis-
sion on the ground of fraud. Hamlin v. Johns, 166 Ga.
880, 881, 144 S. E- 659.
§ 4584. (§ 3987). Equity may set aside judg-
ments.
Applied in Bryant v. Bush, 165 Ga. 252, 140 S. E- 366;
Fain v. Fain, 166 Ga. 504, 143 S. E- 586.
§ 4585. (§ 3988). Setting aside judgments for
good defense.
CHAPTER 5
Of Account and Set-Off
§ 4586. (§ 3989.) Account.
Accounting between Parties.—A court of equity has ju
risdiction in all cases of an accounting and settlement be-
tween partners. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222, 229, 136 S.
E- 52.
§ 4587. (§ 3990.) Mingling of goods.
Applied against a sheriff as to fund procured from execu-
tion sale. Finance Co. v. Eowry, 36 Ga. App. 337, 136 S.
E- 475.
Applied in Johnson v. King Eumber Co., 39 Ga. App. 280,
147 S. E. 142.
§ 4588. (§ 3991), Contribution.
Nothing Paid.—It does not lie in the mouth of petitioner
to claim contribution when it has paid nothing upon the
alleged joint obligation. Autry v. Southern Ry. Co., 167
Ga. 136, 142, 144 S. E- 741.
surcharge and§ 4591. (§ 3994). Party must
falsify.
Applied in Walker v. Industrial Stores Co., 37 Ga. App.
448, 140 S. E- 519.
§ 45)93. (§ 3996). Equitable set-off.
Set-Off Not Allowed.—To an action ex contractu dam-
ages sounding in tort can not be pleaded in defense, where
neither the insolvency nor non-residence of the plaintiff is
set up. Berry v. Brunson, 166 Ga. 523, 530, 143 S. E. 761.
Set-Off Permitted.—Where there is an individual claim
of the estate against C, who is both executor and legatee
under the will of testator, and who as legatee is entitled
to a balance on a legacy under the will, his individvtal debt
to the estate can, both under the bankrupt law and equit-
able principles, be set off against his legacy. Bellah v.
Cleghorn, 165 Ga. 494, 497, 141 S. E. 311.
Accommodation maker of note to corporation could set-
off liability of its organizers before capital subscribed.
Crandall v. Shepard, 166 Ga. 396, 402, 143 S. E- 587.
CHAPTER 6
Of Administration of Assets
§ 4596. (§ 3999.) Interfering with administra-
tion.
Applied in Bryant v. Bush, 165 Ga. 252, 140 S. E- 366.
Cited in Nash v. Cowart, 162 Ga. 236, 133 S. E- 263.
§ 4597. (§ 4000.) Petitions for direction.
See notes to § 5419.
Only Representative Can Ask Relief.—Under this section
only the representative of the estate may ask for the di-
rection of a court. Palmer v. Neely, 162 Ga. 767, 135 So
E. 90.
Cash Surrender Value of Policy.—The cash surrender and
cash loan value of a policy of life insurance accruing at the
end of a specified tontine period is not subject to garnishment
by creditors of the insured; nor will such value be made
available to the judgment creditor of the insured by a court
of equity in proceedings instituted for the purpose of ob-
taining equitable relief analogous to a process of garnish-
ment at law. Farmers, etc., Bank v. National Eife Ins.
Co., 161 Ga. 793, 131 S. E- 902.
Cited in Cooper v. Reeves, 161 Ga. 232, 131 S. E- 63.
§ 4600. (§ 4003). Creditor's petitions.
Applied in Bryant v. Bush, 165 Ga. 252, 140 S. E. 366. See notes to § 4571.
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§ 4609 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE § 4638
CHAPTER 8
Of Election
§ 4609. (§ 4012.) Election.
Cited in Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135 S. E- 195,
which case was distinguished from Lamar v. McLaren, 107
Ga. 591, 34 S. E. 116, decided under this section.
§ 4610. (§ 4013.) By a legatee.
Cited in Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 10, 129 S. E.
837.
CHAPTER 9
Of Execution of Powers
§ 4620. (§ 4023.) Power of sale in deeds of
trust, etc.
Sale of Part of Land Not Authorized.—The holder of a se-
curity deed, which conveys a single tract of land, can not
under a power of sale contained in said deed which author-
izes such holder to sell the same upon default of the grantor
in paying the debt secured thereby, sell a part of said tract,
but must sell the whole. Doyle v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 163
Ga. 140, 142, 135 S. E. 501.
Where the title to land is conveyed to secure a debt, and
the instrument is not merely a mortgage, a power of sale
on failure to make payment is a power coupled with an
interest, and is not revoked by the death of the debtor.
Lewis v. King, 165 Ga. 705, 141 S. E- 909.
CHAPTER 10
Of Fraud
§ 4621. (§ 4024). Jurisdiction over fraud.
In General.—This section was codified from Trippe v.
Ward, 2 Ga. 304, in which the principle is stated thus: "In
cases of fraud (with the exception of fraud in obtaining a
will) courts of equity and courts of law have concurrent
jurisdiction, and the court which first acquires jurisdiction
is entitled to return it." DeLaperriere v. Williams, 167 Ga.
648, 652, 146 S. E- 482.
§ 4622. (§ 4025). Actual and constructive fraud.
In Lathrop v. Miller, 164 Ga. 167, 138 S. E- 50, it was
held: "Neither of the foregoing allegations is sufficient to
sustain a cause of action based upon fraud. It was held
in the case of Anderson v. Goodwin, 125 Ga. 669, 54 S.
E. 682: 'Mere allegations of fraud are insufficient. "It is
well settled that a general allegation of fraud in a bill
amounts to nothing—it is necessary that the complainant
show, by specifications, wherein the fraud consists.' And
see, to the same effect, Carter v. Anderson, 4 Ga. 519; Mil-
ler, v. Butler, 121 Ga. 761, 49 S. E- 754; Mobley v. Belcher,
144 Ga. 444, 87 S. E. 470."
A married woman who marries another man, knowing that
her husband is still living, and when the marriage has not
been dissolved by divorce, perpetrates a fraud upon the
man whom she so marries and who is ignorant of her ex-
isting marriage, without disclosing to him her existing
marriage. Collins v. Collins, 165 Ga. 198, 140 S. E- 501.
Applied in Bryant v. Bush, 165 Ga. 252, 140 S. E- 366;
King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 362, 147 S. E-
119.
§ 4623. (§ 4026.) Misrepresentation.
See notes to § 4712.
Applied in Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Taggart, 38 Ga.
App. 509, 511, 144 S. E- 400; Nix v. Citizens Bank, 35 Ga.
App. 546, 130 S. E. 597.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Hamlin v. Johns, 166 Ga.
880, 882, 144 S. E. 659.
§ 4626. (§ 4029). Slight evidence sometimes
sufficient.
An instruction in the language of this section, was not
error for failure to charge in immediate connection "that
slight circumstances also may be sufficient to rebut the
existence of fraud." Strickland v. Jackson Banking Co., 166
Ga. 713, 144 S. E- 262.
But there being no allegation or evidence of any confi-
dential relation between any of the plaintiffs and any of
the defendants, or that the relief sought was because of a
breach of duty arising from such relation, an instruction
in the language of this section was harmfully erroneous.
Strickland v. Jackson Banking Co., 166 Ga. 713, 144 S. E.
262.
Cited in Slade v. Raines, 165 Ga. 8, 139 S. E- 805; Trad-
ers
1
' Securities Co. v. Canton Drug Co., 38 Ga. App. 165,
170, 143 S. E. 452; Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 803.
137 S. E. 64.
§ 4628. (§ 4031). Confidential relations prevent-
ing acquisition of adverse rights.
Applied as between principal and agent in Napier v.
Adams, 166 Ga. 403, 406, 143 S. E- 566.
§ 4629. (§ 4032). Fraud annuls deeds, judg-
ments, etc.
See notes to § 4712.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Feingold v. McDonald
Mortgage & Realty Co., 166 Ga. 838, 846, 145 S. E- 90.
Family Transactions.—This rule is particularly true in
family transactions. Stephens v. Stephens, 168 Ga. 530, 645,
148 S. E- 522.
CHAPTER 11
Of Specific Performance
§ 4633. (§ 4036.) Specific performance, when
decreed.
Includes Parol Contracts.—This section includes parol as
well as written contracts. Valdosta Machinery Co. v. Fin-
ley, 164 Ga. 706, 709, 139 S. E. 337.
Parol evidence was admissible in support of the very
definite description of the purchased premises as embodied
in the petition, and the description was such that parol evi-
dence was admissible for the purpose of identification of
the subject-matter of the contract. The ruling upon the
special demurrers is controlled by the principles announced
in the second division of the opinion. Valdosta Machinery
Co. v. Finley, 164 Ga. 706, 139 S. E- 337.
Applied in Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga.
15, 30, 147 S. E. 87.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Hamlin v. Johns, 166 Ga.
880, 882, 144 S. E- 659.
§ 4634. (§ 4037.) Parol contract for land.
Parol Evidence Is Admissible.—In an action for specific
performance of a contract, not in writing, for the exchange
of lands, parol evidence is necessarily admissible for the
purpose of proving such contract. Hattaway v. Dickens, 163
Ga. 755, 137 S. E- 57.
Payment of Full Purchase Price—Erroneous Instruction.
—In a dispute between two - claimants as to the ownership of
land, where it appeared that one of them bought the land un-
der a parol contract and paid the full purchase price with-
out receiving a deed, an instruction to the jury that "the
only question to be considered by them is who has the su-
perior title, the legal written title, to the land in question,"
is erroneous as excluding from the jury the right of the
claimant under this section. Franklin v. Womack, 162 Ga.
715, 134 S. E- 758.
§ 4636. (§ 4039). Voluntary promises.
Cited in Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 306, 139 S. E. 912.
§ 4637. (§ 4040.) Inadequacy of price.
In Hankinson v. Hankinson, 168 Ga. 156, 163, 147 S. E-
106, after quoting this section it is said: "But we do not
think that this principle is applicable to its full extent
where an oral contract to make a will, under the circum-
stances and for the consideration set forth in the petition
in this case, is shown. Flemister v. Central Georgia Power
Co., 140 Ga. 511 (8), 517, 79 S. E- 148; McGee v. Young, 132
Ga. 606, 64 S. E. 689."
Applied in Chan v. Judge, 36 Ga. App. 13, 134 S. E- 925.
§ 4638w (§ 4041). Ability of complainant to
comply.
Applied in Smith v. David, 168 Ga. 511, 524, 148 S. E- 265.
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THE CODE OF PRACTICE
FIRST TITLE
Courts of Original Jurisdiction, Their Officers,
Organizations, and Practice
CHAPTER l
General Provisions
§ 4642. (§ 4045.) When judicial officer is dis-
qualified.
Grounds Enumerated Exhaustive. — The statutory grounds
of the disqualification of a judge are set forth in this sec-
tion, and are exhaustive of the subject. It follows that
basis or prejudice on the part of a judge is no ground for
his disqualification. Hendricks v. State, 34 Ga. App. 508,
130 S. E- 539.
The above statutory grounds of disqualification of an
ordinary are exhaustive, and the fact that the ordinary
is a partisan of the contestant does not disqualify such
officer from presiding in the contest of the mayor's elec-
tion. Moore v. Dugas, 166 Ga. 493, 143 S. E. 591.
Prejudice or bias, not based on interest, will not dis-
qualify the ordinary from presiding in such a contest. Moore
v. Dugas, 166 Ga. 493, 143 S. E. 591.
Former Counsel.—The rule as to disqualification when the
judge has served as counsel in the case, applied in Faulk-
ner v. Walker, 36 Ga. App. 636, 137 S. E- 909.
Disqualification to Forfeit Bond.—A presiding judge who
is disqualified to try a criminal case is also disqualified to
forfeit a bond in such case, or to grant a rule nisi on the
forfeiture. Faulkner v. Walker, 36 Ga. App. 636, 137 S. E-
909.
Illustration.—In Edwards v. Gabrels, 168 Ga. 738, 741, 148
S. E- 913, it appeared that the judge would have a pecuni-
ary interest in the question as to whether or not adminis-
trators, who are alleged to be mismanaging the estate and
wasting it, should be removed and a receiver be appointed
who would conserve the estate. Hence this section ap-
plied.
Even if upon objections made at the proper time the
judge should have held himself disqualified in the present
case, the defendant could not, after having gone through
a large part of the trial, object to the judge on the ground
of his disqualification, without showing that he did not
know of this disqualification until after the trial began. He
is estopped from doing so. He could not go into the trial,
take chances for favorable rulings of the court, and then,
when the rulings were adverse to him, raise the question
of the disqualification of the court. Wood v. Cauthen, 168
Ga. 766, 149 S. E. 138.
§ 4643. (§ 4046.) Powers of courts to punish
for contempt.
"The bribing or attempting to bribe the witness who had
been subpoenaed to appear against the sons of the respond-
ent was opposing, striving against, or attempting to ob-
struct the process of the court, and was intended to bring
to naught and baffle such processes of the court, and
therefore in every respect, falls within the meaning given
by the lexicographers to the word 'resist' as contained in
§ 4643 of the Civil Code of 1910, and should be given the
meaning here ascribed to it in view of the context of the
statute; though it would not necessarily be applicable to
the term 'resist' as used in the Penal Code (1910), § 311,
because there the act of resisting contemplated and de-
nounced as criminal is one committed while the officer is in
the act of executing or attempting to execute some process
of the court." Herring v. State, 165 Ga. 254, 256, 140 S.
E. 491.
All constitutional courts have the inherent power to de-
fine and punish contempts; and this right is not denied or
limited by this section. Jones v. The State, 39 Ga. App. 1,
147 S. E. 806.
There is no merit in the contention that the court erred
[
in holding the defendant in contempt of court because it
did not appear that the alleged offense was commited in
the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to inter-
fere with the administration of law and justice. Burge v.
State, 38 Ga. App. 690, 691, 145 S. E. 463.
Trial by Jury—Violation of Mandamus.
—
Every court has
power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and
processes; and in a proceeding for contempt growing out of
the alleged violation by the defendant therein of a manda-
mus absolute, the judge can determine all questions of fact
without the intervention of a jury, except in the cases pro-
vided for in this section. Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161
Ga. 287, 130 S. E- 580.
Illustration.—It was contempt of court, under the pro-
visions of this section for the accused to make to the father
and brother of the witness statements intending that they
should be communicated to the witness, where such state-
ments naturally tended to coerce and were expected to
coerce the witness. Herring v. State, 165 Ga. 254, 140 S.
E. 491; Herring v. State, 37 Ga. App. 594, 141 S. E. 89;
Echols v. State, 37 Ga. App. 594, 141 S. E- 89.
Cited in Smith v. State, 36 Ga. App. 37, 39, 135 S. E- 102.
§ 4644. (§ 4047.) Powers of courts enumer-
ated.
General Consideration!—Interference with Receivers Posses-
sion.—One who dispossesses the receiver of property consigned
to him by the court dispossesses the court, and of course be-
comes in contempt of court ; and he may be punished for
contempt, and the property may be restored. A contempt of
court being complete by dispossessing the receiver, the fact
that no injunctive order has been passed does not affect the
case. Coker v. Norman, 162 Ga. 351, 133 S. E- 740.
Paragraph 4—Power to Secure Attendance of Witness.
—
Where it is necessary in order to secure the attendance of
a witness at court to make him testify, the court has ample
authority to secure his attendance by requiring him to give
bail, or, in default thereof, to go to jail. Pullen v. Cleckler,
162 Ga. Ill, 114, 132 S. E- 761.
Cited in Smith v. State, 36 Ga. App. 37, 39, 135 S. E- 102.
CHAPTER 2
Justices' Courts, Their Officers, and Practice
ARTICLE 1
Justices of the Peace, Notaries Public, and
Their Courts
§ 4665. (§ 4068). Civil jurisdiction.
A justice's court has jurisdiction of a suit upon a note
where the principal sum claimed does not exceed $100, ir-
respective of any interest that may be due. The principal
sum sued for in this case being $96, the court had ju-
risdiction even though the amount exceeded $100 when the
accrued interest was added. Southern Express Co. v. Hil-
ton, 94 Ga. 450, 20 S. E. 126; Dumas v. Barnesville Bank,
38 Ga. App. 293, 143 S. E- 794.
ARTICLE 4
Of Jurisdiction of Justices' Courts
§ 4712. (§ 4113). If justice of the peace is a
party.
Applied in Cohron v. Woodland Hills Co., 164 Ga. 581, 587,
139 S. E. 56.
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§ 4715 ORDINARIES § 4796
ARTICLE 5
Commencement of Suits, Service, etc.
§ 4715. (§ 4116.) Suits, how commenced.
Liberal Construction.—Niceties in pleading are not required
in a justice's court. Accordingly, a liberal construction has
been given to this section. If the defendant is informed of
the nature of the plaintiff's demand against him, the re-
quirement of this section is met. Ladd Lime, etc., Co. v.
Case, 34 Ga. App. 190, 129 S. E. 6.
§ 4717. (§ 4118.) Summons, how served.
The statutory method of service is exclusive, and such a
defendant can not be served by leaving a copy "at his of-
fice" unless his office is also his most notorious place of
abode, or residence. Bennett v. Taylor, 36 Ga. App. 752, 754,
138 S. E- 273.
ARTICLE 6
Pleas and Defenses
§ 4726. (§ 4127.) Defendant may plead as in
superior court.
Cited in Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga. 62, 71, 129 S. E. 787.
ARTICLE 7
Evidence
§ 4730. (§ 4130). Accounts, how provided.
If the plea is not sworn to, it does not amount to the
counter-affidavit provided by this section. Dixon v. Holli-
man, 37 Ga. App. 352, 353, 140 S. E- 384.
ARTICLE 8
Trial and Judgment
§ 4737. (§ 4137). Justice to give judgment.
Applied in Cook v. Flanders, 164 Ga. 279, 138 S. E- 218.
ARTICLE 9
Appeals and Juries
§ 4738. (§ 4138). Appeals, when and how en-
tered.
Applied in Armstrong & Bros. Co. v. Crane, 37 Ga. App.
587, 588, 141 S. L\ 217.
§ 4742.
court.
(§ 4142.) Appeals to the superior
Jurisdictional Amount as Affected by Counterclaim..—Al-
though the plaintiff's claim be less than $50, where a count-
er-claim is filed for more than $50 but not exceeding the
maximum jurisdictional amount of $100, the defendant may
appeal to the superior court. Owens v. College Park Supply
Co., 35 Ga. App. 618, 134 S. E. 179.
Applied in Armstrong & Bros. Co. v. Crane, 37 Ga. App.
587, 588, 141 S. E- 217.
ARTICLE 10
Claims, Garnishments, and Other Issues in Jus-
tices Courts
§ 4755. (§ 4155). Traverse of answer, and
proceedings thereon.
When the plaintiff in fi. fa. files no exceptions or tra-
verse to the answer of the garnishee, even though such an-
swer be incomplete, the garnishee should be discharged.
Haney & Tinsley v. Owens, 39 Ga. App. 462, 467, 147 S.
E- 720.
ARTICLE 12
Justices Courts May Rule the Constables, etc.
§ 4763. (§ 4163). Constables may be ruled.
Cited in Peek v. Irwin, 164 Ga. 450, 139 S. E. 27.
CHAPTER 3
Ordinaries
ARTICLE 1
Ordinaries and Their Courts
§ 4786. (§ 4228.) Eligibility and disability of
ordinary.
Extent of Prohibition upon Acting as Guardian.—The code
provisions which prohibit an ordinary from acting as guard-
ian of a minor do not prevent an ordinary from recovering
in behalf of a minor money derived from benefit insurance
where the act of 1918 authorizes an ordinary to receive and
collect such money. Foster v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 734, 137
S. E. 847.
ARTICLE 2
Jurisdiction of Courts of Ordinary
§ 4790. (§ 4232.) Jurisdiction, etc.
The distribution mentioned in this section refers to the
distribution of the property of the intestate to persons who
are entitled to receive the same at the time of distribution
as heirs at law of the intestate. It has no reference to any
other distribution of the property of the intestate to per-
sons other than heirs who may have some title to it or
equitable claim therein. Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384,
391, 141 S. E. 42.
Cited in Coleman v. Hodges, 166 Ga. 288, 290, 142 S. E.
875.
ARTICLE 3
Jurisdiction over County Affairs
§ 4796. (§ 4238). Authority over county mat-
ters.
See notes
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to § 1551(133).
§ 4804(1) OTHER AUTHORITY OF ORDINARY § 4804(7)
ARTICLE 4
Other Authority of Ordinary
§ 4804(1). Custody and distribution when no
legal guardian.—The ordinaries of the several
counties of this State be and they are hereby
made and constituted the legal custodians and
distributors of all moneys due and owing to any
minor child or children, idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons non compos mentis, who
have no legal and qualified guardian, to receive
and collect all such moneys due or owing to
such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons non compos mentis, aris-
ing from such insurance policies, benefit soci-
eties, legacies, inheritances, or from any other
source; provided, that the amount due such
minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons,
and persons non compos mentis from all sources
does not exceed the amount of five hundred
dollars, without any appointment or qualifying
order, he is authorized to take charge of such
money or funds for such minor or minors,
idiots, lunatics, and insane persons and persons
non compos mentis, by virtue of his office as
ordinary in the county of the residence of such
minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons,
and persons non compos mentis, and the cer-
tificate of such ordinary, that no legally quali-
fied guardian has been so appointed and that the
estate of such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics,
insane persons, and persons non compos mentis,
from all sources, does not exceed the amount of
five hundred dollars ($500.00), shall be con-
clusive, and shall be sufficient authority to jus-
tify any debtor or debtors in making payment
of monies due as aforesaid, claims therefor hav-
ing been made by such ordinary. Acts 1918,
pp. 198, 199; 1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 constituted the or-
dinaries custodian and distributor of moneys due and owing
to idiots, lunatics, insane persons and persons non compos
mentis.
Collection of Benefit Insurance.—The code provisions which
prohibit an ordinary from acting as guardian of a minor do
not prevent an ordinary from recovering in behalf of a minor
money derived from benefit insurance where this act au-
thorizes an ordinary to receive and collect such money. Fos-
ter v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 734. 137 S. E. 847.
§ 4804(2). Employment of counsel.—The or
dinary of the county of the residence of such
(minor or minors), idiots, lunatics, insane persons,
and persons non compos mentis is hereby au-
thorized and permitted, in his discretion, to em-
ploy counsel to bring suit to recover any amount
due such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, in-
sane persons, and persons non compos mentis,
in the name of such ordinary as guardian for
such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane
persons and persons non compos mentis, in any
court having jurisdiction thereof, and such or-
dinary shall have authority to pay such counsel
so employed a reasonable fee for his services in
such matters, which is necessary to enforce the
right of such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics,
insane persons, and persons non compos mentis,
out of the funds so collected. Acts 1918, pp.
198, 199; 1927, p. 258.
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Editor's Note.—The ordinary of the county of residence of
"idiots, lunatics, insane persons and persons non-compos
mentis" was brought within the operation of this section by
the amendment of 1927. In amending the section the words
"minor and minors," which appeared immediately before the
above referred insertion, were inadvertantly, it is believed,
left out. The preliminary statement of the amendatory act
directs no such omission, and from a reading of the section
as a whole it becomes evident that it was not the intention
of the legislature to leave out those words. Hence they are in-
serted parenthetically at the place where they originally
appeared.
§ 4804(4). Record open to inspection.—It
shall be the duty of such ordinaries to keep a
well-bound book properly indexed, in which a
complete record shall be kept of all money re-
ceived by him for such minor or minors, idiot,
lunatic, insane persons, and persons non com-
pos mentis; said record shall show from what
source said funds were derived, and to show to
whom and for what such money was paid,
which book shall be open for inspection of the
public at all times, as other records in his office
Acts 1918, pp. 198, 199; 1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927, the ordinary is
required to keep record of moneys received for idiots, luna-
tics, insane persons and persons non compos mentis.
§ 4804(6). Payment authorized.—The ordi-
nary receiving such funds is hereby authorized
and directed to pay out said funds so received
by him, or whatever amount he may think nec-
essary, for the support, education, and main-
tenance of such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics,
and insane persons and persons non compos
mentis, as he may think in his judgment proper
and right, and when so expended shall be final,
and no liability shall attach to such ordinary or
his bondsmen by reason of such expenditures
when properly done. Acts 1918, pp. 198, 199;
1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—The provision as to the payment for the
support, education, etc., of idiots, lunatics, insane persons
and persons non compos mentis, was introduced by the
amendment of 1927.
§ 4804(7). Deposit of funds.—When any such
funds shall come into the hands of the ordinary
of any county, belonging to such minor or
minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and per-
sons non compos mentis, and there shall be no
cause or necessity arising for the payment out
of said funds for support, education, and main-
tenance of such minor or minors, idiots, luna-
tics, insane persons, and persons non compos
mentis, then in that event it shall be the duty
of such ordinary to place said funds in some
good and solvent bank, in the savings depart-
ment of such bank at the then current rate of
interest allowed on saving deposits, and when
so deposited there shall be no further liability
against such ordinary or his bondsmen when
such deposit is made in good faith. Acts 1918,
pp. 198, 199; 1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 extended the opera-
tion of this section to funds of idiots, lunatics, insane per-
sons and persons non compos mentis.
§ 4828 SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS JUDGES § 4864
CHAPTER 5
City Courts
ARTICLE 1
Judges May Exchange
§ 4828. Judges may exchange.
A judge of a city court can preside in another city court
and try all cases in which the "home" judge is disqualified
or which he is providentially prevented from trying. How-
ever, the "visitimg" judge, while so presiding, has no
authority to try a case which the home judge is not dis-
qualified to try or which he is not providentially prevented
from trying, unless both parties to the cause consent to
such trial. Rowland v. State, 38 Ga. App. 131, 142 S. E.
917; Rowland v. State, 38 Ga. App. 135, 142 S. E- 919.
CHAPTER 5A
City Courts Established upon Recommendation
of Grand Jury
ARTICLE l
Organization and Jurisdiction
§ 4831(b). Park's Code.
See § 4831(2).
§ 4831(2). (§ 4271). Jurisdiction.
Applied in Myrick v. Dixon, 37 Ga. App. 536, 140 S. E-
920.
CHAPTER 6
The Superior Courts and Their Officers
ARTICLE 1
The Superior Court and Its Judges
§ 4839. (§ 4315.) Must hold courts as pre-
scribed by law.
Reference. — As to terms in McDuffie, Bryan, Bacon,
Dougherty, Echols, Forsyth, Jeff Davis, Jenkins, Lamar
Building, Pulaski, Robin, Tift, Turner, see acts of 1927 pp.
175, et seq.
Effect of Sitting in Wrong County.—A charter, granted by
a court sitting in a county other than the one prescribed by
law, is void. Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131
S. E. 517.
§ 4847. (§ 4318). Written charges.
The act of 1925 creating the municipal court of Macon,
permitting oral charges to the jury is not unconstitutional
because in conflict with this section. Robinson v. Odom,
168 Ga. 81, 147 S. E- 569.
§ 4849.
courts.
(§ 4320.) Jurisdiction of superior
To Compel Attendance of Witness. — This section is not
applicable to a situation where a witness having been sub-
poenaed to attend the superior court, fails to do so, and
the court proceeds by attachment to compel his attendance
and punish him by a fine not exceeding three hundred dol-
lars; this being governed by section 5852. Pullen v. Cleckler,
162 Ga. Ill, 132 S. E- 761.
Applied in Jones v. State, 39 Ga. App. 1, 4, 147 S. E- 806.
§ 4850. (§ 4321.) Judges may grant writs
of certiorari, etc.
Cross Reference.—As to the enforcement by the judge of
delivery of property to receiver, see annotations to section
5475.
§ 4858. (§ 4329.)
when.
Judge appointed by clerk
Under proper construction of this section considered with
§§ 4855 and 4857 when a case in the superior court in which
the judge is disqualified is reached in its order on the call
of the docket for trial, if the judge has not in fact pro-
cured the services of another judge and if the parties to
the case have not selected an attorney at law to preside in
the case, it is the duty of the clerk, or, in his absence, of
the deputy clerk, "to select some competent attorney prac-
ticing in that court" to preside in the case. It is not es-
sential to the validity of the act of the clerk in selecting
the attorney to try the case that an effort should have
been made by the judge to procure the services of another
judge; or that the parties must have attempted and failed
to agree in the selection of an attorney to try the case;
or that the order appointing the attorney should first be
spread upon the minutes of the court ; or that one of the
parties who was absent at the time of the selection by the
clerk was not notified by his adversary of his intention to
demand that the clerk select an attorney to preside in the
case. The foregoing decision comports with the principle
ruled in Beck v. Henderson, 76 Ga. 360; Steam Laundry Co.
v. Thompson, 91 Ga. 47, 16 S. E. 198. The request to re-
view and overrule the decision in Beck v. Henderson is
denied. Robinson v. McArthur, 166 Ga. 611, 144 S. E- 19.
§ 4863. (§ 4334.)
on facts, error.
Judge expressing opinion
I. EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Applied in Millsaps v. Strange Co., 37 Ga. App. 716, 141
S. E. 513; Spivey v. State, 38 Ga. App. 213, 214, 143 S. E.
450.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES.
Contentions of the Parties.—Instructing the jury as to what
the court understood to be the contentions of the parties, is
not an expression of opinion. McArthur v. Ryals, 162 Ga.
413, 418, 134 S. E. 76.
Instruction as to Circumstantial Evidence, Held as Error
as Expression of Opinion.—Cook v. State, 36 Ga. App. 582, 137
S. E- 640.
Assumption of Commission of Crime.—There being nothing
in the evidence or in the defendant's statement to dispute
the facts that the alleged crime was committed, and his de-
fense resting solely upon the contention that he did not
participate in the offense, the court, in charging the jury,
did not violate the provisions of this section in assuming that
a crime had been committed. Pruitt v. State, 36 Ga. App.
736, 138 S. E. 251.
Language of judge on trial for divorce and alimony, held
no expression or intimation of opinion. Tribble v. Tribble,
166 Ga. 850, 144 S. E. 665.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.
"You Seem to Be Fishing Anyhow" Not Expressive of
Opinion.—The use of the sentence by the court "well go ahead
and use him (the witness) ; you seem to be fishing anyhow,"
was, under the circumstances of the case, held not to be an
intimation of opinion by the judge. Richardson v. State, 161
Ga. 640, 131 S. E. 682.
§ 4864. Within what time judges shall decide
motions.
Provision Directory.—The provision as to the duty of the
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§ 4870 CLERKS OF SUPERIOR COURTS § 4901(6)
judge to notify counsel of the overruling of a motion for a
new trial, is directory only, and will not suffice, when con-
sidered in connection with section 6152, to extend the time
prescribed therein for presenting balls of exception for
approval. Burnett v. McDaniel & Co., 35 Ga. App. 367, 133
S. E- 268.
ARTICLE 2
Judicial Districts and Circuits
§ 4870. (§ 4339.) Thirty-three judicial cir-
cuits.—The entire state is divided into thirty-
three judicial circuits, in reference to the juris-
diction and sessions of the superior court, as fol-
lows, to wit:
Augusta Circuit, composed of the counties of
Burke, Columbia, and Richmond. Acts 1807, p.
38; 1927, p. 175.
Toombs Circuit, composed of the counties of
Clascock, Lincoln, McDuffie, Taliaferro, Warren,
and Wilkes. Acts 1910, p. 63; 1927, p. 175.
Editor's Note.—The county of McDuffie was added to
Toombs Circuit by the amendment of 1927. The paragraphs
here set out were the only ones affected. This act makes
provisions so as not to affect the rights of solicitor general
during the present time.
ficio clerk of a city court, be removed from office by the
judge of the superior court, as is provided in this section.
Wallace v. State, 34 Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E. 299.
ARTICLE 3
Sessions and Adjournments of Superior Courts
§ 4877. (§ 4346.) Terms adjourned five days
before next term.
Motion for New Trial Goes to Next Term.—The preced-
ing term of the court stands adjourned by operation of law
five days prior to the commencement of the succeeding term;
and a motion for new trial made in one term automatically
goes over to the next regular term, and the judge is without
jurisdiction to dismiss it in vacation. Marshall v. State, 34
Ga. App. 434, 129 S. E. 665.
ARTICLE 4
Clerks of Superior Courts
§ 4893. (§ 4362). May administer oaths, etc.
Applied in Myrick v. Dixon, 37 Ga. App. 536, 140 S. E-
920.
§ 4897. (§ 4366.) May be removed.
Pleading—Particularity of Charges.—Where the petition
alleges that the acts of misconduct which are grounds for
removal are illustrated in detail by a certain auditor's re-
port on file in the office of the clerk of the superior court
(who is the defendant), and which is referred to in the peti-
tion as an exhibit, the charges are alleged with a degree of
particularity sufficient to put the defendant on notice. Wal-
lace v. State, 34 Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E- 299.
Part of Default in Other Capacity than Clerk of Superior
Court.—Although it may appear from the petition and ex-
hibits that a certain part of the money collected was col-
lected by the clerk in his capacity of clerk of the city court,
and that certain of the records alleged to have been im-
properly kept were improperly kept by him as clerk of th»
city court, the petition sets out sufficient grounds for his
removal as clerk of the superior court. Wallace v. State, 34
Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E. 299.
But he can not, by reason of any misconduct on his part
in the discharge of the duties devolving on him as ex-of-
§ 4901(6). Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highway; report of city planning com-
mission.—In any county having a population of
60,000 or more inhabitants by the last United
States Census, it shall be unlawful to record or
receive for record in the office of the clerk of the
superior court any map or plat for the laying out
of any street or highway unless it bears the en-
dorsement thereon of the commissioners of
roads and revenues, provided that if the land to
be platted is located within a city having a city
planning commission established by charter, or
outside of such city within six (6) miles of the
limits thereof, such endorsement shall be by the
mayor and general council of such city. Before
approving a plan or plat of such subdivision of
land, the commissioners of roads and revenues or
the mayor and general council, shall consider
the location, widths and grades of the proposed
streets or highways within or adjacent to such
subdivision. Each such subdivision of land
shall have adequate means of access to the lots
therein from the public streets or highways and
shall be so laid out as to provide for the con-
tinuation of existing streets and highways and
for the proposed highway widenings deemed
necessary in the public interest by such commis-
sioners of roads and revenues or such mayor and
general council and shall be so laid out as to per-
mit of an appropriate subdivision of adjoining
properties; provided that such commissioners or
such mayor and general council may waive or
modify any of the above conditions or require-
ments wherever owing to the peculiar shape or
location of the land such condition or require-
ment cannot in the judgment of such commis-
sioners or of such mayor and general council
reasonably be demanded with due regard to the
appropriate development of the land to be sub-
divided. Any such map must first be submitted
to the city planning commission for considera-
tion and report to the mayor and general council
provided the property thus platted
v
is loioated
within such city or within six miles of the limits
thereof. The foregoing provisions shall likewise
apply when any person in said territory desires
to construct sewers or disposal plants or similar
construction for the disposal of sewerage. In
such event the provisions of this section apply, so
that the plans for the construction of said sew-
erage and disposal plants must be approved in
the same manner as is provided for the approval
of plats and the penalty provided in section
4901(7) shall apply to all improvements and
any subdivisions wherein sewers or disposal
plants as herein provided are constructed; the
same penalty concerning same shall apply for
failure to have the plans for the same approved
before being installed as applies to selling land
as herein provided with reference to recording
plats. Acts 1921, pp. 216, 219; 1923, p. Ill; 1927,
p. 318.
Editor's Note.—The last two sentences of this section are
new with the amendment of 1927.
The Act of 1927 makes no reference to the Act of 1923
which reduced the required population from 200,000 to 60,-
000 but amends the original act, enacted in 1921. Although
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§ 4905 APPEALS § 5015
the Act of 1927 fixes the required population at 200,000 or
more in view of the Act of 1923 it would seem that 60,000 is
the intended minimum.
ARTICLE 5
Sheriffs and Their Duties
§ 4905. (§ 4371). Oath of office.
In this section the article "the" is used before the noun
"judge." It would not be a proper construction of the
language, "the judge of the superior court," to hold that
in a county, such as Fulton, where there are five superior-
court judges, this oath could not be administered to the
Sheriff by any one of these judges, for the reason that the
statute requires this oath to be administered by "the
judge," when in fact there was no such judge in Fulton
county. This is a familiar illustration of the fact that the
ar/ticle "the," as used in statutes, is often used in the
sense of any. Howell v. State, 164 Ga. 204, 241, 138 S. E.
206.
§ 4915. (§ 4381.) Sheriffs may execute justice-
court processes.
Applied in MeBrien v. Harris, 39 Ga. App. 41, 145 S. F-
919; Parrish v. Barwick, 167 Ga. 214, 216, 144 S. F- 735.
CHAPTER 7
Attorneys at Law
ARTICLE 10
General Principles
§ 4954. (§ 4416). Liability of attorneys to be
ruled.
Relationship Necessary.—Certain facts held not to consti-
tute the relation of attorney and client, and application of
section denied. Smith v. International lawyers, 35 Ga.
App. 158, 132 S. F. 245.
§ 4956. (§ 4418.) Limitation on authority.
This section is sound law based upon sound policy. A vio-
lation of that law is an act contrary to public policy, and
for that reason it cannot become law merely through the
violation of the law whether by an attorney or an adminis-
trator. Pate v. Newsome, 167 Ga. 867, 878, 147 S. F- 44.
Burden of Proof.—Where the defendant to a suit contends
that he settled the claim by paying the plaintiff's attorney
less than the full amount thereof, the burden is upon the
defendant to show affirmatively that the plaintiff's attorney
had special authority from his client to make the settle-
ment. High v. Hollis, 35 Ga. App. 195, 132 S. E- 260.
Applied in Rawls v. Heath, 36 Ga. App. 372, 376, 136 S. E.
822.
§ 4957. (§ 4419.) Improper conduct by counsel.
On the trial of an indictment for murder it was error to
allow the solicitor-general, over objections of defendant's
counsel, to argue to the jury that "statistics compiled by
reliable authorities, published in a book which he (the so-
licitor-general) had and could produce, showed that Georgia
had 561 murders in 1922," and to argue to the jury in con-
sequence thereof to strictly enforce the law in the case
on trial and to impose the capital penalty. Fair v. State,
168 Ga. 409, 148 S. F. 144.
Having instructed the jury that the argument of coun-
sel that another than the defendant would have to pay the
[
verdict rendered against the defendant was improper and
should not be considered by them, the court did not err in
overruling the motion for a mistrial. Atlanta, etc., R. Co.
v. Smith, 38 Ga. App. 20, 142 S. F- 308.
IV. MISTRIAL.
B. Instructions Remedying Improper Remarks.
See Furney v. Tower, 36 Ga. App. 698, applying the prin-
ciple stated under this analysis line in the Code.
ARTICLE 11
Proceedings to Remove Attorney
§ 4976. (§ 4438). Plea or refusal to answer.
Cited in Garrard v. Milledgeville Banking Co., 168 Ga.
339, 342, 147 S. F. 766.
CHAPTER 8
Stenographers
§ 4985. (§ 4447.) Compensation in civil cases.
Assessment of Costs against Public Treasury.—The court
cannot assess the cost of stenographic reports against the
public treasury in a civil case between private parties.
Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga. App. 671, 134 S. F. 621.
§ 4989(a). Park's Code.
See § 5989(3).
SECOND TITLE
Special Rights, Remedies, and Proceedings
CHAPTER l
Appeals
ARTICLE 1
In What Cases Allowed
§ 4998. (§ 4453). Appeals lie in what cases.
Cross Reference.—See annotations to § 4742.
§ 5000. (§ 4455). Appeal when to be entered.
See notes to § 5113.
When Section Applicable.—Unless there are provisions
made where a greater or less time is fixed for entering ap-
peals in particular cases, the general provision of this sec-
tion will control. Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246, 253,
134 S. F- 42.
ARTICLE 3
Effect of Appeals
§ 5015. (§ 4470.) Effects of appeal.
Applied to Judgment of Justice's Court.—Upon appeal the
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judgment of justice's court remains operative with all of
its incidents, save in so far as it is incapable of enforce-
ment pending the appeal. Haygood v. King, 161 Ga. 732,
132 S. E- 62.
§ 5022. (§ 4477.) Arbitrators limited by sub-
mission.
Cited in United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Corbett, 35 Ga.
App. 606, 612, 134 S. E- 336.
CHAPTER 3
Of Attachments
ARTICLE 1
Of issuing Attachments
§ 5055. (§ 5410). Grounds of attachment.
To Invoke Equitable Remedies.—A declaration in attach-
ment may invoke equitable remedies and relief under §
5406. Coral Gables Corporation v. Hamilton, 168 Ga. 191,
147 S. E, 494.
§ 5056. (§ 4511.) By whom affidavit may be
made.
Cross Reference.—For affidavit as to garnishment, see §
5269.
§ 5060. (§ 4515). Attachment, who may issue.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Lane v. Bradfield, 37 Ga.
App. 395, 396, 140 S. E, 417.
§ 5097. (§ 4551). If the garnishee fails to an-
swer, etc.
If, under the provisions of this section, a formal motion on
the part of the plaintiff is necessary to a valid judgment
against a garnishee in default (Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga.
62, 129 S. E. 787), where such judgment has in fact been
rendered it will be presumed, nothing to the contrary ap-
pearing, that the judgment was rendered when the gar-
nishment case was reached in its order on the docket and
upon motion of the plaintiff. Brumbelow Heating & Plumb-
ing Co. Inc. v. Atlanta Furniture Co., 39 Ga. App. 72, 146
S. E- 639.
Applied in Myrick v. Jones-Stewart Motor Co., 39 Ga.
App. 614, 616, 147 S. E. 917.
ARTICLE 2
In What Manner, on What Property Executed,
and Proceedings Thereon
§ 5075. (§ 4530). Duty of the officer to whom
the attachment is directed.
Cited in Lane v. Bradfield, 37 Ga. App. 395, 396, 140 S.
E. 417.
ARTICLE 6
Of Pleadings and Defenses in Attachment
§ 5104. (§ 4558). Defendant may make his de-
fense.
Applied in Hattaway Lumber Co. v. Southern Lumber
Co., 39 Ga. App. 741, 148 S. E. 358.
§ 5107. (§ 4561.) No traverse shall delay plain-
tiff.
Disposal of Traverse.—Notwithstanding this section, a trav-
erse to the grounds of attachment should be first disposed
of, unless it be continued for cause. This provision of the
Code simply means that nothing that works a continuance
of the traverse only shall postpone the main case. Alvaton
Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga. App. 151, 128 S. E. 781.
Effect of Finding Issue in Defendant's Favor.—When an
issue on a traverse is found in favor of the defendant, all he
gains is that the levy falls, and if a judgment is obtained on
the merits it does not date from the time of the levy as
provided by § 5124, but it would take lien on the property
attached as well as on other property, from the date of the
judgment only. Blakely Milling, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 34
Ga. App. 129, 128 S. E- 688.
ARTICLE 4
Attachments against Fraudulent Debtors.
§ 5088. (§ 4543). Attachments where debtor is
fraudulently disposing of his property.
See § 6139(1).
Applied in Young v. Cochran Banking Co., 166 Ga. 877,
878, 144 S..E. 652.
ARTICLE 5
Proceedings on Garnishment in Attachment
§j 5094. (§ 4549). Garnishment^ how obtained,
Cited in Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga. 62, 64, 129 S. E. 787.
ARTICLE 7
Replevy and Disposition of Property Attached
§ 5113. (§ 4567.) Defendant may replevy prop-
erty, officer's duty.
Bond Required only After Levy.—The bond provided for
in this section is required only after the levy of the at-
tachment, and not after judgment on the attachment
against the property. Lafferty Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 37
Ga. App. 226, 139 S. E. 587.
Validity of Bond Dependent on Validity of Attachment.
—
The validity of a replevy bond filed by a defendant in at-
tachment as provided in this section, is dependent upon the
validity of the attachment; and where the attachment has
been dismissed, no liability attaches against the surety on
the replevy bond, notwithstanding the plaintiff in attach-
ment may, after obtaining jurisdiction in personam over the
defendant, have proceeded with the suit and obtained a
common-law judgment thereon against the defendant. Any-
thing to the contrary contained in Blakely Milling & Trad-
ing Co. v. Thompson, 34 Ga. App. 129, 128 S. E- 688, must
yield to the superior authority of the Supreme Court as
expressed supra, which under the constitution of this State
is controlling. Burnette v. Johnson, 38 Ga. App. 396, 144
S. E. 36.
Effect of Bankruptcy.—Where, upon the levy of an at-
tachment for purchase-money, the defendant replevied the
property by giving bond and security as provided in this
section, and where within four months after the levy of
such attachment the defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt,
the lien of the attachment was void, and the principal
debtor and the surety on the replevy bond were both dis-
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charged. longshore v. Collier, 37 Ga. App. 450, 140 S. E.
636.
Cited in Blakely Milling, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 34 Ga.
App. 129, 128 S. E. 688.
ARTICLE 9
Of Lien of Attachments, Judgment and Execution
§ 5124. (§ 4578.) Lien of attachments.
Cross Reference.
—See annotations to § 5107.
CHAPTER 4
Auditors
ARTICLE 1
Appointment and Powers
§ 5127. (§ 4581.) Auditor instead of master.
Applied as to reference to auditor by the judge of his own
motion. Darien Bank v. Clifton, 162 Ga. 625, 134 S. E- 619.
Applied also in King v. Bank, 166 Ga. 463, 143 S. E. 423.
§ 5128, (§ 4582.) Auditor at law.
Cited in Holston Box, etc., Co. v. Vonberg, 34 Ga. App.
298, 129 S. E- 562.
§ 5129. (§ 4583.) Powers of auditor.
Cited in Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App. 519, 520, 137 S. E- 290.
ARTICLE 3
Exceptions
§ 5136. (§ 4590). Exceptions as to matters not
in record.
Exceptions at Law Must Be Verified.—The grounds upon
which these exceptions at law are based must be verified
by reference to the auditor's report; and if the report af-
fords no means of verification, the exceptions can not be
considered, unless otherwise certified by the auditor. Pat-
terson v. Burtz, 39 Ga. App. 139, 143, 146 S. E. 330.
Applied in Patterson v. Burtz, 39 Ga. App. 139, 142, 146
S. E- 330.
§ 5139. (§ 4583.) Report may be recommitted.
Cited in Holston Box, etc., Co. v. Vonberg, 34 Ga. App,
298, 300, 129 S. E. 562.
ARTICLE 4
Hearing of Exceptions and Final Disposition of
Case
§ 5141. (§ 4595.) Jury trial, when.
Constitutionality.
—The provision in this section is not
unconstitutional for the alleged reason that it violates the
constitution, § 6545. Bank of Eumpkin v. Farmers State
Bank, 167 Ga. 766, 146 S. E- 754.
Right to Jury Trial without Demand in City Court.—This
section is a general law, but must be construed with refer-
ence to the local statute creating the city court of Lexing-
ton, providing how a jury trial in causes pending therein
may be dispensed with. It seems that the load statute
would apply to trials of exceptions of fact to an auditor's
report; that is, there must be a demand for jury trial.
Shehane v. Wimbish, 34 Ga. App. 608, 612, 131 S. E. 104.
§ 5146. (§ 4600.) What evidence to be read
to jury, and of verdict.
Presumption and Burden of Proof.—Auditor's findings are
prima facie true, and the burden of overcoming them is on
the exceptor. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 712, 132 S.
E. 547. '
CHAPTER 5
Bail in Actions for Personalty
§ 5150. (§ 4604). Bail in trover.
Cited in Hoffman v. Eynch (Ga.), 23 Fed. (2d) 518.
§ 5153. (§ 4607.) Perishable property, how sold.
Applied as to amount of recovery in action of trover. Stand-
ard Motors Finance Co. v. O'Neal, 35 Ga. App. 727, 134 S.
E. 843.
§ 5154. (§ 4608). Release of defendant without
security, when.
Time of Giving Notice.—The giving of "five days notice
of the time and place of hearing," required by this section
is not complied with by serving the plaintiff, on the first day
of May, with notice of hearing on the fifth day of May fol-
lowing. From the first day of May to the fifth day of May
is only four days. Hardin v. Mutual Clothing Co., 34 Ga
App. 466, 129 S. E. 907.
Failure to Answer No Waiver.—Where a defendant peti-
tions the court for a discharge, and the respondent fails to
file a written answer to the petition, the respondent is not
to be considered as in default, but may appear and introduce
evidence in rebuttal of that offered by the petitioner. Har-
ris v. Hines, 35 Ga. App. 414, 133 S. E- 294.
CHAPTER 6
Of Claims to Property in Execution
ARTICLE 1
How and by Whom Interposed
§ 5157. (§ 4611). Claims to be on oath.
Applied in Becker v. Truitt, 39 Ga. App. 286, 146 S. E-
654.
ARTICLE 2
When, Where, and How Tried
§ 5167. (§ 4621). Where claim to be returned.
Where an execution is levied upon personalty, and the
property is claimed by a third person, the execution, with
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the entry of the officer, and the claim, form the pleadings,
and it is not necessary for the plaintiff, on the trial of the
right of property, to introduce the execution in evidence.
Nelson v. Brannon, 32 Ga. App. 455, 123 S. F. 735; Bacon
v. Hinesville Bank, 38 Ga. App. 422, 144 S. F. 125.
§ 516,8, (§ 4622). Tried by petit jury.
Sections 5168 and 5926 construed together in Callaway v.
Life Ins. Co., 166 Ga. 818, 144 S. F- 381.
§ 5169. (§ 4623). Oath in claim cases.
A charge in a claim case, that if the jury believed that
the claim was interposed for delay only, they should award
damages to the plaintiff against the claimant, is a correct
statement of the law. The charge is not subject to the ex-
ception that it was incorrect and tended to confuse the
jury, to the prejudice of the claimant's case, and that the
court in so charging erred in ignoring other phases of the
case than that of delay. Nesmith v. Nesmith, 37 Ga. App.
779, 142 S. F- 176.
§ 5170. (§ 4624.) Burden of proof on plaintiff.
Burden is on claimant, when defendant in fi. fa. is in pos-
session to show his title to the property in defendant's pos-
session. Jones Motor Co. v. Finch Motor Co., 34 Ga. App.
399, 129 S. F. 915.
Burden on Plaintiff in Fi. Fa. When Possession Unknown.
—Where it does not appear in whose possession the property
was found, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in fi. fa.
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Crawford, 34 Ga. App. 719, 131
S. F- 103.
Recital that Defendant Was in Possession.—A recital in
an entry of levy that defendant was in possession of the
property at time of levy makes a prima facie case on issue
raised by claim interposed. Thompson v. Vanderbilt, 166
Ga. 132, 142 S. F. 665.
Applied in Peterson v. Wilbanks, 163 Ga. 742, 753, 137 S.
F. 69; Blount v. Dunlap, 34 Ga. App. 666, 130 S. F. 693.
CHAPTER 8
Of the Writ of Certiorari
ARTICLE 2
How Obtained, and Proceedings Thereon
§ 5181. (§ 4635.) From the court of ordinary.
Noncompliance Ground of Dismissal.—Noncompliance with
the requirements of setting forth "plainly and distinctly
the error complained of," and failure to set forth the
grounds of the motion for a new trial or attach them to the
petition as an exhibit, is a ground for dismissal. Fast River
Nat. Bank v. FUman, 36 Ga. App. 263, 136 S. E. 799.
§ 5183. (§ 4637). From justices and other in-
ferior judicatories.
Under the provisions of this section of the Civil Code,
requiring that a petition for certiorari "shall plainly and
distinctly set forth the errors complained of," a mere gen-
eral averment of error, in connection with which there is
no statement or assignment whatever as to how or where-
in the rulings complained of were erroneous, presents no
case or question for decision by the judge of the superior
court. Chan v. Judge, 36 Ga. App. 13, 134 S. F. 925; Davis
v. Lee, 38 Ga. App. 667, 145 S. F. 110.
Applied in Thompson v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co.,
39 Ga. App. 809, 148 S. F- 621.
§ 5185. (§ 4639.) Bond and security to be given.
I EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Effect of Inability of Bond Attached to Petition.—The fil-
ing with the clerk of the superior court of the certiorari
bond required under this section being a condition prece-
dent only to the issuance of the writ and not to the sanc-
tion of the petition for certiorari, the certiorari is valid
as respects any requirement as to the giving and filing of
the bond, where a valid legally required bond is filed with
the clerk of the superior court prior to the issuance of the
writ, notwithstanding the bond attached to the petition may
be invalid. Gragg Lumber Co. v. Collins, 37 Ga. App. 76,
139 S. F. 84, citing Smith v. McCranie, 14 Ga. App. 721,
82 S. F- 307.
II. EXECUTION, ATTESTATION, SIGNATURE AND
SEAL.
The judge of the superior court did not err in dismissing
a petition for certiorari which was accompanied by a cer-
tificate as to the payment of costs, signed only by the dep-
uty clerk of the municipal court. Thorns v. Thompson Co.,
38 Ga. App. 779, 145 S. F- 533.
There is nothing in the act creating the municipal court
of Atlanta, or in any of the acts amendatory thereof, which
could be taken to change the rule with respect to the ne-
cessity of signing such certificate by the officer whose de-
cision is the subject-matter of complaint. Thorns v. Thomp-
son Co., 38 Ga. App. 779, 145 S. F. 533.
IV. PAYMENT OF COSTS AND CERTIFICATE.
Certificate—Sufficiency of.—A certificate made by the judge
whose judgment is the subject matter of complaint, that
"the petitioner has paid all accrued costs to this date in the
sum of $9.25" is sufficient as a compliance with this section.
Whitley v. Jackson, 34 Ga. App. 286, 129 S. F- 662.
§ 5187. (§ 4641.) Affidavit in lieu of bond.
What Must Affidavit State.—The affidavit should allege
that owing to his poverty the affiant is unable to give the
required security; merely stating that the affiant "is unable
to give the security, as required by law," is not sufficient,
and the affidavit not being amendable, the certiorari is void.
Roberts v. Selman, 34 Ga. App. 171, 128 S. F- 694.
§ 5188. (§ 4642.) Must be applied for in thirty
days.
Judgment Sustaining Demurrer Not Final Determination.
—A judgment sustaining a demurrer to a petition, which
grants leave to the plaintiff to amend on pain of dismissing
the suit, is not a final judgment, and certiorari does not lie
thereto. Messengale v. Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 807,
131 S. F. 299.
Applied in Towery v. McCaysville, 38 Ga. App. 85, 142
S. F. 702.
§ 5190. (§ 4644.) Ten days notice to the ad-
verse party.
Immaterial Variance between Process and Record.—A de-
fendant in certiorari being entitled only to written notice of
the sanction of the writ of certiorari and the time and place
of hearing, and not to service of a copy of any of the pro-
ceedings, it is immaterial that a copy of the proceedings
served, showed as surety upon the certiorari bond a name
different from that appearing as surety upon such bond as it
appeared of record. Whitley v. Jackson, 34 Ga. App. 286,
129 S. F. 662.
Sufficiency of Notice.—Notice of sanction and of the time
and place of hearing of a petition for certiorari may be
established otherwise than by an acknowledgment of serv-
ice or other proof of notice appearing upon the petition it-
self. McAlister v. State, 77 Ga. 599, 3 S. F- 163; Jones v.
Gill, 121 Ga. 93, 48 S. F- 688. The notice may, upon the
hearing of the certiorari, be established otherwise by proper
proof, such as a written acknowledgment of service, signed
by one of the attorneys for the defendant in certiorari, re-
citing that the written notice required under this section
of the Civil Code of 1910 has been made as required by law.
McDaniel v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 37 Ga. App. 782,
142 S. F. 178.
Applied in Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 39 Ga. App.
808, 148 S. F. 614.
§ 5191. (§ 4645). Shall operate as a supersedeas.
Cited in Hargett v. Columbus, 36 Ga. App. 628, 629, 137 S.
F. 911.
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ARTICLE 3
Of the Answer, Hearing, Judgment and Costs
SECTION 1
Of the Answer
§ 5195. (§ 4646.) Answer filed five days before
the first day of term.
Applied in Heinz v. Backus, 34 Ga. App. 203, 205,
E- 915.
128 S.
§ 5196. (§ 4647.) Exceptions to answer.
Certainty and Definiteness of Exceptions.
—
Exceptions must
specify the defects. They must be so definite, apt, and cer-
tain that the magistrate may be able to understand the ex-
act nature of the deficiency. Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga.
App. 671, 134 S. E. 621.
Method Prescribed by Section Exclusive.—An incomplete
answer to a writ of certiorari can be perfected only by ex-
ceptions taken thereto in the manner prescribed by this sec-
tion. Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga. App. 671, 134 S. E. 621.
SECTION 2
Of the Hearing
§ 5199. (§ 4650). Errors must be set forth.
A ground of motion for new trial that the verdict "is
excessive" is too general. Bart v. Seheider, 39 Ga. App.
467, 469, 147 S. E- 430.
SECTION 3
Of the Judgment and Costs
§ 5201. (§ 4652). Certiorari may be dismissed
or returned.
Returning Case—Verdict Contrary to Evidence.—In a case
when the only error alleged is that the verdict is contrary
to the law and the evidence, it is erroneous to render a final
judgment in petitioner's favor; for the reason that in such
a case the error complained of is not "an error in law which
must finally govern the case." Tuten v. Towles, 36 Ga. App.
328, 136 S. E. 537.
Final Decisions. — Under this section upon the hear-
ing of a certiorari, wherever the case can be determined
as a matter of law, the court must make a final disposi-
tion of it. Where it involves both law and facts, when
there is no dispute as to the facts, the superior court may
make a final disposition of the case. Longshore v. Collier,
37 Ga. App. 450, 140 S. E- 636.
Applied as to entering final decision where there is ques-
tion of fact to be decided in the lower court. Strickland v.
American Nat. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 549, 130 S. E- 598.
Cited in Shehane v. Wimbish, 34 Ga. App. 608, 613, 131 S.
E- 104; Flood v. Empire Inv. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 270, 133
S E- 60; Whitworth v. Carter, 39 Ga. App. 625, 630,
147 S. E. 904.
§ 5203. (§ 4654.) Damage may be awarded.
Cited in Flood v. Empire Inv. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 270
133 S. E. 60.
CHAPTER 9
Condemnation of Private Property
ARTICLE l
Notice, and to Whom Given
§ 5206. (§ 4657). Taking private property.
Applied in Central of Ga. Railway Co. v. Thomas, 167
Ga. 110, 144 S. E. 739.
Cited .in Willcox v. State Highway Board, 38 Ga. App.
373, 378, 144 S. E- 214.
§ 5209. (§ 4660.) Notice to owner.
Time for Appointment of Assessor.—Construing together
this section and sections 5218, 5216, and 5219, the landowner
has until the day fixed for the hearing in the notice in which
to appoint his assessors, which hearing shall not be less than
fifteen days from the time of serving the notice. A different
ruling is not required by the decision in City of Ehberton v.
Adams, 130 Ga. 501, 61 S. E- 18, decided by five Justices.
Sheppard v. Edison, 161 Ga. 907, 132 S. E- 218.
Applied in Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Thomas,
167 Ga. 110, 144 S. E- 739.
§ 5216. (§ 4667.) How service effected.
See note to § 5209.
§ 5218, (§ 4669.) Direction and contents of
notice.
See note to § 5209.
ARTICLE 2
Appointment of Assessors
§ 5219. (§ 4670.) When assessor to be ap-
pointed by ordinary.
See note to § 5209.
ARTICLE 4
To What Condemnations Applicable,
Appeal, Final Judgment, etc.
§ 5229. (§ 4679). Appeal not to delay, when.
Cited in Gaston Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 304, 130 S.
E. 580.
§ 5234(1). Condemnation for gas pipe-lines.—
The power of eminent domain is hereby granted
to and conferred upon persons who are or may
be engaged in constructing or operating pipe-
lines for the transportation and/or distribution
of natural or artificial gas; and upon persons who
are or niay be engaged in furnishing natural or
artificial gas for heating, lighting, and/or power
purposes in the State of Georgia. Acts 1929,
P. 219, § 1.
§ 5235 (§ 4685.) To what condemnation appli-
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cable.—"The method of condemnation of prop-
erty and assessment of damages hereinbefore
provided shall applj' to condemnation by cities,
counties, railroads, telegraph, canal, mining, and
waterworks companies, drainage iby counties,
tramroads, light-houses, and beacon construc-
tions, and to all persons or corporations having
the privilege of exercising the right of eminent
domain. The method herein referred to shall
also apply to persons who are or may be engaged
in constructing or operating pipe-lines for the
transportation and/or distribution of natural or
artificial gas; and upon persons who are or may
be engaged in furnishing natural or artificial gas
for lighting, heating and/or power purposes in
the State of Georgia."
The word "persons" as herein used in this sec-
tion and 5234(1) shall include individuals, part-
nerships, associations, and corporations, domes-
tic or foreign; and shall include the singular as
well as the plural. Acts 1929, p. 220, § 2.
§ 5240. Water-power owners may condemn.
Editor's Note and General Consideration.—The question
of the constitutionality of this section was suggested by
counsel but not raised in Rogers v. Toccoa Elect. Power Co.,
163 Ga. 919, 137 S. E. 272.
Effect of Furnishing: Power in Another State.—A corpora-
tion having the power of eminent domain under this section
would not lose such power because it also furnished electric
power in Tennessee. Rogers v. Toccoa Elect. Power Co., 163
Ga. 919, 137 S. E. 272.
Injunction
—
Proper Remedy to Determine Power of Emi-
nent Domain.—In a proceeding under this section the sole
question to be passed upon by the assessors is the amount of
compensation to be paid. In such proceedings the assessors
can not pass upon the legal power of the company to institute
such proceedings. The remedy of the landowner is to apply
to a court of equity to enjoin the condemnation proceedings
if they are unauthorized. Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 161
Ga. 524, 526, 131 S. E. 517.
What Determines "Public Use."—Whether a purpose is a
public or private purpose within the meaning of the law
relating to eminent domain does not depend on use or the
amount of use by the public, but upon the right of the pub-
lic to such use. Rogers v. Toccoa Elect. Power Co., 163 Ga.
919, 137 S. 3- 272.
Applied in the case of electric power company. Rogers
Toccoa Elect. Power Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S. E- 272.
§ 5240(a). Park's Code.
See § 5240(1).
§ 5240(1). Condemnation of road or highway
for power plant generating electricity.—Where
any proceeding to condemn a public road or
highway is instituted, if the same is a part of the
State highway system, or jurisdiction or control
thereof has been taken over or assumed by the
State Highway Board or other State authority,
the notice of intention to condemn shall be ad-
dressed to and served upon the chairman of the
State Highway Board or such other officer as
may hereafter be vested with the supervision and
control of said State highway system; and if
said road or highway is under the supervision or
control of county authorities, the notice of in-
tention to condemn shall be addressed to and
served upon the ordinary, chairman of the board of
commissioners of roads and revenues, commis-
sioner of roads and revenues, or such other
officer as is by law vested with jurisdiction over
and control of the public roads of the county in
which said road to be condemned is located. The
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procedure in such condemnation of public roads
and highways shall be the same as provided by
the general laws of the State, as now embodied
in section 5206 et seq. of the Code of Georgia and
as the same may hereafter be amended, in so far
as the same is not in conflict with the provisions
of this section; and the public officer or officers
to be notified and served as aforesaid shall act
for and in behalf of the State or county, as the
case may be, in the appointment of an assessor
and in all other respects as provided in said gen-
eral law of the State with respect to the owner
or owners of property sought to be condemned.
Provided, however, before any public road con-
demned under the provisions of this section can
be used by the condemnor, the new road, includ-
ing any and all bridges and culverts that may be
necessary as a part thereof, shall be laid out and
constructed >by the condemnor and by the con-
demnor made ready for use by the public, all of
which new construction shall be approved by the
authorities having control of the road con-
demned; and provided further that the terms
"public road" or "public highway," whenever used
in this section or section 5240 shall include not
only highways and roads proper, but bridges,
culverts, and appurtenances as well. Acts 19'27,
p. 373.
§ 5243. Condemnation for public roads.
Additional Land for Road.—Whenever a public road is al-
ready established, and it becomes necessary to condemn land
for the purpose of grading, improving, turnpiking, paving,
widening, or macadamizing the same, for the use and con-
venience of the public, the county authorities must pursue
the method laid down in this section. But when the State
highway department wishes to condemn land for rights of
way for State-aid roads, it is not required to, and can not,
pursue this method. Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga.
84, 98, 132 S. E. 902.
Meaniing of "Improvitng'.j,r—The authority .conferred by
this provision of law to condemn lands for "improving"
public roads within the meaning of that term as employed
in the statute, is sufficient to authorize the" county au-
thorities to condemn a strip of land fifty feet wide and
three hundred and thirty-four feet long, extending from
the north line of an existing road to the east line of such
road, near the point where said lines of the road form a
sharp angle, in order that the road, when so "improved,"
shall follow a gradual curve and avoid the existing sharp
angle in the road. Parris v. Glynn County, 167 Ga. 149,
144 S. E. 785.
§ 5245. Notice, how signed and served.
Not Affected by Sections 640 or 5246. — The proceedings
for condemnation referred to above are not rendered in-
applicable on account of the provisions in section 640, re-
lating to procedure by county authorities for establishing
a "new road or alteration in an old road." See Cook v.
State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E. 902. Nor are
such proceedings rendered inapplicable on account of the
provision in § 5246, which declares that the county au-
thorities after final judgment fixing damages to be paid
for condemned property "may decline to accept the land
so sought to be condemned." Parris v. Glynn County, 167
Ga. 149, 144 S. E. 785.
The notice required under this section is jurisdictional,
and such notice should be given to the landowner by such
county authorities, who should also name the date for the
assessment. As the time fixed by the judge for the hear-
ing has passed, the county authorities can now give a
new notice and proceed with the assessment. The judg-
ment is affirmed, with direction that the county authorities
be permitted to give new notice of the time and place of
hearing and proceed with the assessment of damages. Par-
rish v. Glynn County, 167 Ga. 149, 144 S. E. 785.
§ 5246(a) GARNISHMENTS § 5281
ARTICLE 5
Condemnation on Petition of State or Federal
Government
§ 5246(a). Park's Code.
See § 5246(1).
§ 5246(1) « When petition authorized; proce-
dure in case of doubt as to title.
Proceeding in Rem—Parties.—Under this section the State
Highway Board can, in one proceeding, condemn a right of
way over two tracts of land, one owned by one of the plain-
tiffs and the other owned by both plaintiffs, such proceeding
being one in rem and not against individuals. In such a pro-
ceeding all persons interested will be allotted the damages
to which they are respectively entitled. Cook v. State. High-
way Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. F- 902.
The venue is in the county in which the land lies; but if
the tract of land lies in two conties, such proceeding can
be brought in the superior court of either county. Cook v.
State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E. 902.
Necessity of Condemning All of Defendant's Land in One
Proceeding.—In a proceeding to condemn a right of way and
approaches to a public bridge on one side of the river, it
is not a good objection to said proceeding that the plaintiffs
would be entitled to recover damages for their lands lying
on the opposite bank of said stream, the proceeding not be-
ing instituted to condemn a right of way over said lands.
Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. F- 902.
Recovery for Injury to Ferry Right.—If this proceeding
damages the plaintiffs by destroying any rights of ferry
which they might have over said river, such damages can
be assessed in the present proceeding. Cook v. State High-
way Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. F- 902.
CHAPTER 10
Dower
ARTICLE 1
Defined, How Assigned, How Barred, Etc.
§ 5249. (§ 468(9). How barred.
Paragraph Three. — This paragraph is to be construed
with the third paragraph of § 3931. When so construed
as applicable to a case where an intestate has left a widow
and child or children and an estate in realty, the widow is
entitled, in distribution of the estate, to share in the
realty with the child or children, provided within one
year from the grant of letters of administration she elects
to take a child's part in lieu of dower. Federal Land
Bank v. Henson, 166 Ga. 857, 144 S. F- 728.
CHAPTER 11
Garnishments
ARTICLE 1
How Issued and Served; Answer; and What Is
Subject to
§ 5265. (§ 4705). Garnishment.
Suit Pending—When.—A suit is pending, within the mean-
ing of this section, although a judgment may in fact have
been rendered in the suit, when there still remains a legal
possibility that the judgment may be reversed, as when a
bill of exceptions to the judgment has been tendered and cer-
tified by the trial judge and has been filed with the clerk of
the Court of Appeals. Carrollton Bank v. Glass, 35 Ga. App.
89, 132 S. F. 238.
§ 5268. (§ 4708). Garnishment, how obtained.
Cross References.
—See annotations to succeeding section,
and annotations under section 4392.
§ 5269. (§ 4709). How and by whom issued,
etc,
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Applied in Myrick v. Jones- Stewart Motor Co., 39 Ga.
App. 614, 616, 147 S. F- 917.
II. SUMMONS, SERVICE AND RETURN.
Upon a Partnership.
—Garnishments may be issued upon
pending suits and summons of garnishments be served
upon any "person" who is supposed to be indebted to, or
who has in his possession property or effects belonging to,
the defendant. A partnership is but an association of per-
sons, and has always been amendable to suit at common
law. Ocilla Grocery Co. v. Wilcox, Ives & Co., 37 Ga.
App. 718, 720, 141 S. F 822.
III. ANSWER
Time of Filing Answer.—Where the garnishee fails to an-
swer at the first and the second terms of court, but files
an answer on the first day of the third term before the gar-
nishment case has been called on the docket and before a
motion has been made by the plaintiff to enter a judgment
obtained during the second term, such answer is not too
late. Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga. 62, 129 S. F- 787.
§ 5272. (§ 4712). What is subject to garnish-
ment.
Proceeds of Realty Sold by Execution.—If executors, em-
powered by will to sell lands, of the decedent, sell them for
the purpose of division, the proceeds are personalty, unin-
pressed with the character of real estate, and therefore are
subject to garnishment. Brown Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga.
App. 652, 130 S. F. 695.
§ 5273. Indebtedness accruing after service of
summons.
See notes to § 5290.
Lien.—After the garnishment lien has been attached by
the service of the summons, the garnishee will not be per-
mitted to divest the lien in favor of the plaintiff by en-
tering upon any sort of contract with the defendant where-
by it is sought to divert the obligation from the defend-
ant to another. Gibson v. Motor Finance Co., 37 Ga.
App. 392, 140 S. F. 424.
ARTICLE 4
Answer, Traverse, Claim, and Judgment
Answer of garnishee and§ 5281, (§ 4719.)
judgment.
When Judgment May Be Entered on Dissolution Bond.—
Where a garnishment is sued out pendente lite by the plain-
tiff and dissolved by the defendant, there can be no judg-
ment rendered on the bond given to dissolve the garnishment
until after judgment is rendered in the main action in favor
of the plaintiff against the defendant therein. Cone v. Glid-
Sen Stores Co., 36 Ga. App. 246, 136 S. F- 170.
Default Judgment against Garnishee.—Where a garnish-
ment has been dissolved by the defendant in the main case,
if the garnishee fails or refuses to answer, judgment by de-
fault may Be rendered against him for such amount as may
have been obtained by judgment against the defendant; and
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upon such judgment against the garnishee being entered,
judgment may be had for the amount thereof against the
defendant and the sureties on the bond to dissolve the gar-
nishment. Carpenter v. Bryson, 35 Ga. App. 622, 134 S. E- 180.
§ 5282. (§ 4720). Claimants may dissolve
garnishment.
Cited in Tarver v. Jones, 34 Ga. App. 716, 131 S. E. 102;
Johnson v. Planters Bank, 34 Ga. App. 241, 129 S. E. 125.
§ 5290. (§ 4724). Money raised by garnish-
ment how distributed.
As between two judgments the older and superior one
has the prior lien. This is true even as to a lien on a fund
brought into court by a garnishment sued out in the case
out of which the junior judgment issued. This rule is not
changed by section 5273 of the Civil Code of 1910, codifying
an act approved November 11, 1901. The decision in the
case of General Motors v. Bank of Valdosta, 31 Ga. App.
475, 120 S. E. 794, is hereby overruled. Herndon v. Braddy,
39 Ga. App. 165, 146 S. E. 495.
CHAPTER 12
Of the Illegality of Executions
§ 5306. (§ 4737). No illegality until after levy.
Applied in Carter v. Alma State Bank, 34 Ga. App. 766, 131
S. E. 184.
§ 5307. (§ 4387). Illegality, how returned and
tried.
Applied in Mobley v. Goodwyn, 39 Ga. App. 64, 68, 146
S. E. 28.
§ 5308. (§ 4739). Damages for delay only.
Damages Assessed When Portion of Affidavit Dismissed.
—
Where a portion of an affidavit of illegality has been dismissed
on demurrer for insufficiency, and the remainder is admitted
to be incorrect, the jury may be authorized to infer from
this that it was filed for delay only, and a verdict assessing
damages in favor of the plaintiff in execution, at less than
25% of the principal debt, will not be disturbed, where
there is any evidence to support it, unless for some material
error of law. Felker v. Still, 35 Ga. App. 236, 133 S. E- 519.
§ 5311. (§ 4742),. When illegality can not go
behind judgment.
The affidavit of illegality in the instant case being based
solely upon the ground that one of the jurors rendering the
verdict upon which the judgment attacked is based was dis-
qualified by reason of interest, and it not being alleged
that the defendant had not been served, or that he had
not had "his day in court," it was not error to dismiss
the affidavit of illegality, on demurrer. Owen v. Federal
Land Bank, 37 Ga. App. 394, 140 S. F- 425.
To deny that a judgment ought to have been rendered
on account of pre-existing facts, is to go behind the judg-
ment. Tuff v. Loh, 38 Ga. App. 526, 144 S. E- 670.
Pursuant to this section it is held that a levy under an
execution can not be arrested by a statutory affidavit of
illegality which seeks to set up that the judgment on
which the execution was issued was obtained during the
absence of the defendant, and while absent by permission
of the court. That the present proceeding is not one in
equity has been determined by the Supreme Court in trans-
ferring the case from that court to this court. Flanigan
v. Hutchins, 39 Ga. App. 220, 146 S. E. 500.
[
CHAPTER 13
Lost Papers, Where, When, and How Established
§ 5312. (§ 4743). Office papers may be estab-
lished instanter.
Upon the loss of any office paper in the superior court, a
copy may be established instanter, on motion. A written
sentence in a criminal case in the superior court does not
cease to be an office paper or record because it has not
been recorded in the record book of writs in the office of
the clerk of the superior court. Teasley v. Nelson, 164
Ga. 242, 138 S. F. 72.
CHAPTER 14
Nuisances and Their Abatement
§ 5329. (§ 4760) May be removed, and how.
Necessity of Actual Existence of Nuisance.—This and the
following sections were not intended to afford a remedy
against that which is not an actually existing nuisance, as
distinguished from that which may or probably will become
such. The language of this section seems to admit of no
other construction. Fairview Cemetery Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga.
App. 709, 719, 138 S. F. 88.
Effect of Supersedeas.—The plaintiffs had obtained, in
a proceeding brought under this section, a judgment de-
claring a cemetery a nuisance, and a very drastic order
abating the same. The defendants applied for and ob-
tained a certiorari to review this judgment, and thus ob-
tained a supersedeas of the judgment. The effect of the
supersedeas is to prevent the enforcement of this judgment
in toto. So it prevents the enforcement of that portion of
the judgment which enjoins the defendants from making
additional burials in the cemetery. The effect of a super-
sedeas can not be enjoined or destroyed by injunction. Fair-
view Cemetery Co. v. Wood, 164 Ga. 85, 88, 137 S. E- 761.
§ 5331. (§ 47©2), Nuisances in cities, how
abated.
Cited in City Council v. Saunders, 164 Ga. 235, 138 S.
E. 234.
§ 5335. "Blind Tiger" a nuisance.
See notes to § 5331.
§ 5337(2). House of prostitution; house and
contents a nuisance.
Amendment Showing Abatement Pending Suit.—It was
error to refuse to allow a verified amendment to the defend-
ant's answer to a petition to enjoin him from conducting
a nuisance in violation of this statute; the allegations of the
amendment showing that the nuisance had been absolutely
discontinued a few days after the beginning of the proceeding
for injunction, and several weeks before the trial, and that
all issues in the proceeding had become moot. (Two JJ. dis-
sent.) Yancey v. State, 161 Ga. 138, 129 S. E. 642.
§ 5340(a). Park's Cole.
See § 5337(2).
CHAPTER 15
Officers of Court, Rules Against
§ 5343. (§ 4771). Money collected by officers
may be demanded, etc.
Necessity for Demand.—In Battle v. Ricks Lumber Co.,
38 Ga. App. 621, 144 S. E- 919, it was held that even if this
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section and section 5350 were applicable a judgment en-
tered against the defendant sheriff, in so far as it adjudged
him due to the plaintiff 20 per cent, interest, is contrary
to law, since it does not appear that any demand had ever
been made upon the sheriff for the money claimed and for
which judgment against him was entered.
§ 5340. (§ 4774). Rules nisi against officers.
Cited in Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 297, 130
S. E- 580.
§ 5347. (§ 4775). Answer to rule nisi, and sub-
sequent proceedings.
Traverse of Answer.—Traverse of answer to remedial pro-
ceeding for contempt is not necessary, and the court can
hear, without such traverse, the evidence to determine
whether the defendant has or has not violated the order of
the court. Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 297, 130 S.
E- 580.
§ 5350. (§ 4778). Lien of rule absolute.
See notes to § 5343.
CHAPTER 16
Of Partition
ARTICLE l
General Principles
§ 5355. (§ 4783). Partition.
Necessity of Peculiar Circumstances.—Where no peculiar
circumstances are shown, equity will not take cognizanee
of a partition suit. Safford v. Anderson, 162 Ga. 408, 134
S. E- 81.
ARTICLE 2
Partition of Land
SECTION 1
Where, How and by Whom the Application for
Partition Must Be Made.
§ 5358. (§ 4786). Proceedings to partition.
Executors can join with the surviving cotenant for the
partition of land owned jointly by their testatrix and such
surviving cotenant, where the testatrix makes devises of
such land, and where the partition of such land between
the estate and the surviving cotenant is necessary for its
due administration by the executors. Peck v. Watson, 165
Ga. 853, 142 S. E. 450.
CHAPTER 17
Possessory Warrant and Proceedings Thereon
ARTICLE 1
By Whom and upon What Ground Possessory
Warrant May Issue
§ 5371. (§ 4799). Possessory warrant, by whom
and on what ground issued^
See notes to § 3705.
Personal property which has recently disappeared from
the "quiet, peaceable, and legally acquired possession" of
the owner without his consent may, under this section be
recovered by him, by possessory warrant, from a person in
possession of it who claims it as a bona fide purchaser from
a stranger. The possessor under such circumstances holds
it "without lawful warrant or authority," and has no
right to the possession as against the owner. Hogan v.
O'Dell, 39 Ga. App. 43, 146 S. E. 43.
CHAPTER 18
Trespassers on Land and Tenants Holding
Over
ARTICLE l
Proceedings Against Intruders on Land and
Tenants Holding Over
SECTION 1
Proceedings Against Intruders
§ 5380. (§ 4808). Intruders, how ejected.
Bona Fide Claim to Possession Good Defense.—That the
alleged intruder claims the legal right to possession of the
land in good faith is a legal defense against eviction under
such process. Hill v. Security Eoan, etc., Co., 35 Ga. App.
93, 132 S. E- 107.
Necessity of Process and Return.—Under this section, no
process or return of service is required. Hill v. Security
Eoan, etc., Co., 35 Ga. App. 93, 132 S. E- 107.
§ 5382. (§ 4810). Return of affidavit and trial.
Trial at What Term.—The proceeding under section 5380
being strictly summary and there being no provision as to
when an issue formed upon a counter-affidavit to such a
proceeding under this section may be tried, the trial of such
an issue may be held at the term of court during which the
counter-affidavit is filed. Hill v. Security Eoan, etc., Co.,
35 Ga. App. 93, 132 S. E. 107.
SECTION 2
Proceedings Against Tenants Holding Over
§ 5389. (§ 4817). Double rent and writ of
possession, when.
Demand for Rent.—It is not essential that the plaintiff
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should prove a demand for payment of the rent prior to the
institution of the proceeding. Moore v. Collins, 36 Ga. App.
701, 138 S. E- 81, and cases cited.
Time from Which Rent Runs.—Where the tenant files a
counter-affidavit and bond, he may be charged with double
rent, or double the rental value of the property, as the case
may be (see Stanley v. Stembridge, 140 Ga. 750, 79 S. E.
842), from the date of the demand for the premises, or, if
such date is not shown, from the date of the issuance of the
dispossessory warrant, provided the plaintiff is entitled to
prevail in such case. Moore v. Collins, 36 Ga. App. 701, 138
S. E- 81, and cases cited.
Effect of Receivership of the Property upon Payment of
Double Rent.—Whether or not double rent is uncollectiDie
for a period during which the rented premises are in posses-
sion of a receiver, the pendency of the receivership will pre-
vent the collection of double rent only when the control and
possession of the property by the receiver prevented the
tenant from moving out and surrendering the rented premises
to the landlord. Graf v. Shiver, 36 Ga. App. 532, 137 S. E-
283.
§ 539L (§ 4819),; Property, how replevied.
Since the replevy bond for the eventual condemnation
money given by the tenant after the levy of a distress
warrant, as provided in this section, takes the place of
the lien which is not nullified or discharged by the tenant's
bankruptcy, the surety is liable on the replevy bond not-
withstanding the tenant's liability for the debt is dis-
charged by the tenant's bankruptcy. White v. Idelson, 38
Ga. App. 612, 144 S. E. 802.
§ 5391(a). Park's Code.
See § 5391(1).
§ 5391(1). Bond for delivery.
This section does not render a judgment in favor of the
landlord on the replevy bond superior in rank to judg-
ments in favor of other persons, obtained at the same
term of court. Kirsch v. Witt, 37 Ga. App. 402, 140 S. E.
511.
Where both of such bonds were given in a distress war-
rant proceeding, and where merely by agreement of the
parties in that case the landlord obtained judgment against
the surety for the amount of his claim, with a stipulation
in the judgment that the sum was "to be made first out
of the goods levied upon in this case, and second out of
the defendants and their surety," there was no election
to proceed against the property on the forthcoming bond
as provided in this section. Kirsch v. Witt, 37 Ga. App.
402, 140 S. E. 511.
THIRD TITLE
Extraordinary and Equitable Remedies and
Pleadings
CHAPTER l
Joinder of Legal and Equitable Causes
§ 5406. (§ 4833).
remedies applied.
See notes to § 5055.
Equitable or legal rights,
I, HISTORY, PURPOSE, EFFECT AND CON-
STRUCTION.
Construed with Section 5407.—Referring to this section
and to section 5407, the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Jen-
kins, 146 Ga. 344, (91 S. E. 50, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 322), said:
"These acts have been construed with the utmost liberality,
to the end that all the remedies and relief to which the
respective parties in any civil cause might be entitled
should be applied and accorded in one action." Durdens
v. Youmans, 37 Ga. App. 182, 186, 139 S. E. 91.
The purpose of this act was to afford a party the op-
portunity to have all his rights in regard to the subject-mat-
ter tried in one action in the superior court. Delaney v.
Sheehan, 138 Ga. 510, 513, 75 S. E. 632; Penn Mutual Eife
Ins. Co. v. Taggart, 38 Ga. App. 509, 513, 144 S. E. 400.
This section does not purport to create rights otherwise
unauthorized or prohibited. Penn. Mutual Eife Ins. Co.
v. Taggart, 38 Ga. App. 509, 513, 144 S. E- 400.
III. OPERATION UPON SUBJECT MATTER.
Petition Not Demurrable on Certain Grounds.—Since the
passage of this section a petition which sets forth a legal
cause of action, though using terms appropriate to an equit-
able proceeding, is not demurrable on the grounds (a) that
it sets forth no cause of action (b) that there is no equity
in the petition, and (c) that the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law. Smith v. Hancock, 165 Ga. 222, 136 S. E- 52.
Attacking Assignment of Partnership Assets.—In a gar-
nishment proceeding pending in the superior court, wherein
a creditor seeks to subject to the process of garnishment
the alleged assets of his debtor in a partnership, the cred-
itor, as the plaintiff, may, under the authority of §§ 5406-
5413, by an equitable amendment filed in aid of the suit,
attack as void against creditors the transfer or assign-
ment of the partnership assets made by the debtor during
the pendency of the garnishment proceedings, and may by
such amendment add as parties defendant the present de-
fendant debtor as seller and transferor of his partnership
assets, and his transferee and subsequent transferees in-
cluding the transferee or transferees in whom the title
thereto is at present apparently vested. Ocilla Grocery Co.
v. Wilcox, Ives & Co., 37 Ga. App. 718, 141 S. E- 822.
§ 5407. (§ 4834). Equitable relief from the
court.
Amendment seeking equitable relief in common law suit
allowed. Moon v. First Nat. Bank, 163 Ga. 489, 136 S. E. 433.
§ 5411. (§ 4838). New parties and extraordinary
remedies for defendant.
Amendment of Bill of Exceptions Filed by New Party, Al-
lowed.—McMillian v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. E- 921.
Maker's Rights in Action upon the Note by Transferee.—
In an action upon a note by the transferee thereof against
the maker, the latter can set up his defenses against the
payee, and also can make the payee a party to the suit. Mc-
Millan v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. E- 921.
CHAPTER 2
Parties in Equitable Proceedings
§ 5415. (§ 4841). Who may sue.
A disallowance of interventions by non-resident creditors,
after the time limit in order for filing and proof of claims,
in creditors' bill and receivership against bankrupt, was
error. Columbus Iron Works v. Sibley, 164 Ga. 121, 122, 137
S. E. 757.
§ 5417. (§ 4844). Parties.
Judgment Creditor as Party Defendant.—In Swift & Co. v.
First Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 543, 549, 132 S. E- 99, it was held
that the judgment creditor was properly joined as defendant,
in a suit for injunction by mortgagee to prevent the sale of
the property under levy.
Person Interested.
—Whoever has an interest in the de-
cree sought should be made a party, if it is practicable.
Waters v. Waters, 167 Ga. 389, 390, 145 S. E. 460.
§ 5419. (§ 4846). Multiplicity ground for con-
solidation, when.
Instances of Common Rights.—In the two equitable ac-
tions that were consolidated the defendants were the same.
In both actions the petitioners, having separate claims
based on similar grounds of complaint and a common in-
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terest in attacking an alleged conspiracy upon the part of
the defendants to defraud creditors supplying material that
went into the improvement of real estate, sued in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated. In the
circumstances it was not error to allow a consolidation of
the case, although the parties plaintiff in the original peti-
tion were not identical. Turner v. Security Plumbing Co.,
165 Ga. 652, 141 S. E. 651.
Where the plaintiff is seeking to hold all the defendants
liable in an amount sufficient to make good the capital
stock of the corporation, with interest, and each of the de-
fendants has an interest in the matter common to all of
them, which is connected with all other matters involved
in the suit, the petition is not multifarious. Crandall v.
Shepard, 166 Ga. 396, 143 S. E. 587.
Pursuant to this section and section 3216, it is held that
one suit may be brought to recover on the debt and to set
aside fraudulent conveyances, joining debtor and grantees.
Hines v. Wilson, 164 Ga. 888, 139 S. E- 802.
The cross-petition was maintainable under the provisions
and under § 5419, relating to multiplicity of suits as a
ground for consolidation and under § 5469, par. 2, relat-
ing to bill of peace and multiplicity of suits. Jones v.
Nisbet, 165 Ga. 826, 142 S. E. 164.
CHAPTER 3
Trial and Its Incidents
§ 5423. (§ 4850). Special verdicts and costs.
Costs in chancery do not always follow the event of the suit,
but are awarded according to the justice of the cause. They
rest in the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised
upon full view of the merits and circumstances of the case.
Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Culbreth, 162 Ga. 474, 134 S.
E- 608.
(a) In an equity case it is the province of the judge to
determine upon whom the costs shall fall, (b) Auditor's fees
may, in the discretion of the court, be apportioned between
the parties, (c) The stenographer's fee for reporting the
evidence in a case shall be paid upon such terms as the
parties may agree upon; and if no agreement is entered into
as to the payment thereof, then in such manner as may be
prescribed by the presiding judge. McDonald v. Dabney,
161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
Applied in Grizzard v. Eord, 167 Ga. 531, 146 S. E- 126.
CHAPTER 4
Decrees
§ 5426. (§ 4853). Decrees and remedies.
Applied in Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga.
15, 30, 147 S. E- 87.
Cited in Swift & Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 543, 550,
132 S. E. 99; Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 114, 135 S. E
481.
§ 5429. (§ 4856). Confirmation of sale under
decree.
Applied.—Wingfield v. Bennett, 36 Ga. App. 27, 134 S. E-
840.
§ 5434. (§ 4861). Dormant decrees, revival.
In Fischer v. Fischer, 164 Ga. 81, 84, 137 S. E- 821, it is
said: "We do not think that the decree in this case award-
ing as alimony for the benefit of Mrs. Fischer and her
minor child a sum payable in installments is such a decree
for money as is contemplated in section 5434 of the Civil
Code, providing for the dormancy of decrees."
Although the proceedings in this case were instituted
thirteen years after the judgment and decree for alimony
sought to be enforced, the demand of the plaintiff was not
barred by the statute of limitations, nor on the ground of
the dormancy of such judgment. Fischer v. Fischer, 164
Ga. 81, 137 S. E- 821.
CHAPTER 5
Proceedings at Chambers
§ 5438,. (§ 4865). Notice, when necessary.
Cited in Crandall v. Shepard, 166 Ga. 396, 143 S. E- 587.
CHAPTER 6
Of Extraordinary Remedies
ARTICLE 1
Mandamus, Quo Warranto, and Prohibition
§ 5440. (§ 4867). Mandamus to enforce official
duties.
Applied in Bashlor v. Bacon, 168 Ga. 370, 372, 147 S. E-
762.
§ 5441. (§ 4868). Lies not as private remedy.
Applies to Lawful Offices.—Public office, within the mean-
ing of this section, means an office which has been lawfully
created. Such an office must be created by the constitu-
tion, by seme statute, or by municipal ordinance passed in
pursuance of legislative authority. Benson v. Hines, 166
Ga. 781, 144 S. E. 287.
Discretionary Acts.—While mandamus is an appropriate
remedy to enforce the performance by a public officer of
any public duty which he neglects or refuses to perform,
it is not available to compel the performance of an act
which such an officer is not by law required to perform,
but, to the contrary, is clothed with discretionary power
which he may exercise in accordance with the best inter-
ests of the trust which he is authorized to administer.
Douglas v. Board of Education, 164 Ga. 271, 138 S. E- 226.
To enforce performance of a ministerial act as contra-
distinguished from a duty which is merely discretionary, the
obligation must be both peremptory and plainly defined;
the law must not only authorize the act, but it must re-
quire the act to be done. Douglas v. Board of Education,
164 Ga. 271, 138 S. E- 226.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Manry v. Gleaton, 164 Ga.
402, 474, 138 S. E- 777.
§ 5443. (§ 4870). When not granted.
Proper Remedy Should Be Resorted to in Lieu of Manda-
mus.—Where it appears that the applicant had a remedy for
any error of the ordinary, he can not neglect the remedy and
afterwards resort to mandamus proceedings. Sharp v. Mc-
Alpin, 162 Ga. 159, 161, 132 S. E- 891.
§ 5445. (§ 4872). Facts in issue, how and
when tried.
Applied.—Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E- 626.
§ 5451. (§ 4878.) Quo warrants.
Effect of Quo Warranto.—Injunctive order granted to op-
posing party is not a bar to quo warranto to try title to
office in club. Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555, 568, 146
S. E. 173.
§ 5458. (§ 4885.) Prohibition.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Byrd v.
Ga. 510, 143 S. E. 767.
City of Alma, 166
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ARTICLE 2
Ne Exeat and Quia Timet
§ 5465. (§ 4892). Proceeding quia timet.
Applied in Felder v. Paulk, 165 Ga. 135, 139 S. E. 873.
ARTICLE 3
Bills of Peace and Interpleader
§ 5469. (§ 4894). Bill of peace.
See notes to § 5419.
§ 5471. (§ 4896). Interpleader.
Applied in Fourth Nat. Bank v. Lattimore, 168 Ga. 547,
550, 148 S. E. 396.
§ 5475. (§
of the court.
ARTICLE 4
Receivers
4900). Receiver, when an officer
This section had its origin as far back as 1855, and has
been so frequently construed by this court that citation of
authority is not necessary to support the proposition that
where the rights of either party would be endangered for
the lack of a receiver, the discretion of the court in the
appointment of a receiver will not be disturbed unless there
is a manifest abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. I^agrange
Banking & Trust Co., 166 Ga. 675, 677, 144 S. E- 267.
Enforcement of Delivery of Property to Receiver.—A judge
may, in vacation, enforce the delivery of fund or property
to the receiver, by attaching and imprisoning any party
refusing obedience to his order. Coker v. Norman, 162 Ga.
351, 133 S. E. 740.
Applied in Crockett v. Tripp, 167 Ga. 322, 324, 145 S. E.
507.
Cited in Dixon v. Tucker, 167 Ga. 783, 784, 146 S. E-
736.
§ 5477. (§ 4902). Power of appointment to be
cautiously exercised.
Receiver in Divorce and Alimony Case.—In a suit for di-
vorce and alimony, under the circumstances of the case, the
prayer for appointment of receiver of the husband's property
was denied in view of this section. Reeve v. Reeve, 163 Ga.
95, 135 S. E. 434.
General Creditor May Not Enjoin Debtor.—In view of this
section and section 5495 creditors without lien cannot, as a
general rule, enjoin their debtors from disposing of property,
or obtain injunction or other extraordinary relief in equity.
Dixie Metal Products Co. v. Jones, 163 Ga. 70, 135 S. E. 406.
Applied in Continental Trust Co. v. Sabine Basket Co.,
165 Ga. 591, 594, 141 S. E- 664.
Cited in Dixon v. Tucker, 167 Ga. 783, 784, 146 S. E- 736.
§ 5478. (§ 4903). Intervention in equitable pro-
ceedings.
Cited in Blumenfeld v. Citizens Bank, etc., Co., 168 Ga.
327, 334, 147 S. E. 581.
§ 5479. (§ 4904). Receivers, when appointed.
Appointment without Hearing.—The grant of a temporary
injunction and the appointment of a receiver, without a
bearing and without sufficient grounds is erroneous. Board
v. Municipal Securities Corp., 161 Ga. 634, 131 S. E- 495.
Applied in Continental Trust Co. v. Sabine Basket Co.,
165 Ga. 591, 594, 141 S. E. 664.
§ 5488. Counsel fees, how regulated.
Where in a decree on exceptions to an auditor's report the
court taxed auditor's and receiver's fees and costs, half to
be paid by plaintiff and half by defendants, and plaintiff
excepted to so much of the decree as taxed him with any
part of such fees and costs, the writ of error is not subject
to dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to as-
sign error generally on the decree or on any definite part
of it. Turner v. Shupin, 166 Ga. 806, 144 S. E. 274.
CHAPTER 7
Injunctions
ARTICLE 1
When Granted
§ 5491. (§ 4914). Administration of criminal
laws, no interference by equity.
Proceedings under Ordinances.—Notwithstanding this sec-
tion where an ordinance illegal and unreasonable in itself is
being enforced by prosecution which would deprive a man of
his property, or destroy the carrying on of his lawful busi-
ness, a court of equity will interfere, specially where the au-
thorities are giving to it an interpretation not authorized by
its language. Lilburn v. Alford Bros., 163 Ga. 282, 284, 136 S.
E. 65.
Cited in City of Maoon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 157, 145
S. E. 57.
§ 5492. (§ 4915). Enjoining a court of law.
Good Legal Defense.—Petitioners have an adequate rem-
edy at law. All legal or equitable defenses alleged in the
petition for injunction may be pleaded in the bail-trover case
in the municipal court. Skinner v. Stewart Plumbing Co.,
166 Ga. 800, 144 S. E. 261.
Applied in Roberson v. Roberson, 165 Ga. 447, 141 S. E«
306.
§ 5494, (§ 4917.)
title in dispute.
Waste not enjoined when
Applied in Griner v. Culpepper, 164 Ga. 858, 139 S. E- 666.
§ 5495. (§ 4918). Creditors without liens.
Cross Reference.
—See annotations to § 5477.
A creditor having a justice's court judgment from which
an appeal has been taken, and who is otherwise entitled to
injunctive relief, does not come within the provisions of this
section. Haygood v. King, 161 Ga. 732, 132 S. E. 62.
Section Not Applicable.—This was an equitable action by
creditors as lienholders by virtue of a judgment of the su-
perior court reviving a dormant judgment. Such lien
dates from the date of the judgment of revival. This be-
ing so, the case predicated on the judgment reviving the
dormant judgment does not fall within the general rule as
stated in this section. Carter v. Martin, 165 Ga. 890, 142 S.
E. 277.
Applied in Continental Trust Co. v. Sabine Basket Co.,
165 Ga. 591, 594, 141 S. E- 664.
§ 5499. (§ 4922). Injunction can not compel.
Mandatory Injunction. — An injunction dispossessing one
party and admitting another to possession is equivalent to a
mandatory injunction, which is not within the proper scope
of injunction. Injunction is not available for the purpose of
accomplishing an eviction, or to prevent interference with
realty by one already in possession. Beck v. Kah, 163 Ga.
365, 136 S. E- 160; Burns v. Hale, 162 Ga. 336, 133 S. E. 857.
Order restraining obstruction of flow of water, not man-
datory, though lowering of dam incidentally required. Pee-
bles v. Perkins, 165 Ga. 159, 160, 140 S. E. 360.
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§ 5500'. (§ 4923). Perpetual injunction.
On the hearing of an application for temporary injunc-
tion the judge should not grant a permanent one, but only
one of an ad interim character, to remain of force until the
final trial. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shops v. Keith, 167
Ga. 735, 146 S. E. 455.
ARTICLE 2
Procedure in Injunction Cases
§ 5501. (§ 4924). Injunctions, in what manner
granted.
As to temporary injunction without hearing, see annota-
tions to sec. 5479.
§ 5502. (§ 4925). The hearing, writ of error,
judge's order.
Application to Interlocutory Injunction.—A bill of exceptions
will lie to the grant of an interlocutory injunction under this
section, and there is no merit in the motion to dismiss the
bill of exceptions on the ground that it "does not except to
any judgment or ruling upon any issue that is final in the
case." Brindle v. Goswick, 162 Ga. 432, 134 S. E. 83.
Extent to Which Supersedeas Operates.—One method of ob-
taining a supersedeas is that provided in this section. This
method is applicable in cases in which injunctions are
granted or dissolved. In such a case either party may sue
out a writ of error to the Supreme Court from a decision
against him, upon complying with the law applicable to the
same; but no such writ of error shall have the effect to
establish or deny any injunction independently of the order
of the judge. Tift v. Atlantic Coast Iyine R. Co., 161 Ga.
432, 447, 131 S. E. 46.
The rule applies where the exception is to the grant of
a temporary injunction, and the correctness of the deci-
sion depends solely upon a question of law. The judge
did not abuse his discretion in refusing a supersedeas in
this case. Peebles v. Perkins, 165 Ga. 159, 140 S. E. 360.
Applied in Flanigan v. Hutchins, 39 Ga. App. 220, 146 S.
E. 500.
§ 5504. (§ 4927). In application to enjoin cut-
ting timber.
Cited in Chappie v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632, 131 S. E- 505.
FOURTH TITLE
Of Actions
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 5513. (§ 4936). Implied obligations to pay.
Advancement or Loan.—Where the person making an ad-
vancement to a husband is a brother of the dead wife,
the advancement, if made voluntarily by him and without
a request from the husband, is inferably a gift, and there
does not arise as a matter of law any implied promise on
the part of the husband to repay the money thus advanced.
But where the advancement is made at the request of the
husband, either express or implied, although there is no
express promise to repay, an implied promise' by the hus-
band to repay is inferable. Eovett v. Allen, 34 Ga. App.
385, 129 S. E. 897.
Applied in Upchurch v. Maynard, 39 Ga. App. 332, 334,
147 S. E- 139.
§ 5514 (§ 4937). Joinder of legal and equitable
actions.
Editor's Note and General Consideration. — Jackson v.
Mathis, 35 Ga. App. 178, 132 S. E. 410, following the state-
ment in the Code of 1926 taken from Eacher v. Manley, 139
Ga. 80, 78 S. E- 188.
§ 5516. (§ 4939). Parties to actions on con-
tracts.
See annotation to sees. 4460 and 5689.
Exceptions to Section.—To this general rule there are ex-
ceptions. Where the purchaser of the assets of a firm agree
to pay their debts, a creditor of the firm can by bill, to
which the partners and purchasers are parties, enforce this
agreement for his benefit. Bell v. McGrady, 32 Ga. 257. So
where a married woman, having separate property, and be-
ing indebted to another by note, conveyed her separate es-
tate absolutely to others in consideration of their agree-
ment to pay her an annuity for life and all debts against her
separate property, the agreement may in equity be enforced
by her creditors. Reid v. Whienant, 161 Ga. 503, 507, 131
S. E- 904.
S's claim against M. T. on five notes and his claim
against M. T. and A. on two notes were not "distinct and
separate claims" within the meaning of this section. At-
kinson v. Shaw, 37 Ga. App. 32, 138 S. E- 592.
As an exception to this section where a contract is made
for the benefit of a third person as well as for the benefit
of the parties thereto, and where one of the parties to the
contract obtains money or other property which rightfully
belongs to such third person, he may sue thereon in his
own name for such money or property, as the law creates
both the privity and the promise. Manget v. National
City Bank, 168 Ga. 876, 149 S. E. 213.
Action on Promissory Note.—An action can not be main-
tained upon a promissory note payable to the order of a
named person, which has not been indorsed or otherwise
transferred, except in the name of the person to whom it
is payable. Kohn v. Colonial Hill Co., 38 Ga. App. 286,
144 S. E. 33.
Where two persons separately owning various articles of
personalty sell them jointly for a lump sum, the sellers
jointly own the debt against the buyer for the purchase-
money and may bring a joint suit against him for its re-
covery. Mathis v. Shaw, 38 Ga. App. 783, 145 S.' E. 465.
Ownership.—The assignee of a mortgage may enforce it
against the purchaser of the property who assumes payment.
Reid v. Whisenant, 161 Ga. 503, 507, 131 S'. E. 904.
Applied in action on an insurance policy in Staten v.
General Exchange Ins. Corp., 38 Ga. App. 415, 144 S. E- 53.
Cited in Young v. Certainteed Prod. Corp., 35 Ga. App.
419, 133 S. E- 279.
§ 5517. (§ 4940). Parties to actions for torts.
Applied in Webb v. Carpenter, 168 Ga. 398, 148 S. E- 80.
§ 5520. (§ 4943). Consolidation of cases.
Creditor Suits against Administratrix.—Where after sev-
eral suits are separately filed by judgment creditors of the
estate of a decedent against the administratrix and the
sureties on her bond, a receiver is appointed, under another
proceeding, to take charge of the estate, and where, after
his appointment the court, by consent of parties, passes an
order consolidating all the cases pending against the ad-
ministratrix and the sureties on her bond, directing that
they shall all proceed in the name of the' receiver as plain-
tiff, there is but one case for trial. Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga.
App. 519, 137 S. E- 290.
Conspiracy of Contractors and Owners.—No error in con-
solidating cases of alleged conspiracy of contractor and
owners to defeat materialmen, etc. Turner v. Security
Plumbing Co., 165 Ga. 652, 141 S. E. 651.
Separate Claims for Cutting Timber.—Plaintiffs held to
have right to consolidate separate suits for damages from
timber-cutting. Bainbridge Farm Co. v. Ball, 165 Ga. 582,
587, 141 S. E. 647.
Cited in Don v. Don, 162 Ga. 240, 243, 133 S. E. 242.
§ 5521. (§ 4944). Different claims may be
joined.
This statute is merely permissive, for had the legislature
determined to make the joinder obligatory, the word
"shall," instead of "may," would doubtless have been used.
Endsley v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 37 Ga. App. 439,
441, 140 S. E- 386.
Actions Which May Be Joined.—A count against a former
employer refusing to return an account book to the' plain-
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tiff, is one in tort, and hence properly joined with a count
for conversion of the book, under this section. Richards v.
International Agri. Corp., 10 Fed. (2d), 218.
Exception to Section.—The exception to this rule is where
equitable principles are involved, such as insolvency or non-
residence of the plaintiff. In such cases, where the court
has equitable jurisdiction, the general rule does not obtain,
and it is permissible to set up a defense founded either in
tort or on contract in response to a suit of either nature.
But where the court has not equitable jurisdiction, and the
suit is filed, for example, in a city court, such a court has
jurisdiction of such a dissimilar and equitable plea only
when it is purely defensive in its nature, and, if sustained,
would result in a verdict finding generally in favor of the
defendant. Porter v. Davey Tree-Expert Co., 34 Ga. App.
355, 357, 129 S. E- 557.
Cited in Hayles v. So. Ry. (Ga.), 25 Fed. (2d) 758, 759.
§ 5522. (§ 4945). Concurrent suits.
Applied in Jones v. Carter Electric Co., 164 Ga. 45, 137
S E. 624; Allen v. Landers, 39 Ga. App. 264, 146 S. E- 794;
Nix v. Citizens Bank, 35 Ga. App. 55, 56, 132 S. E. 249;
Chappie v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 630, 31 S. E- 505.
Cited in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Pittillo, 37 Ga.
App. 398, 401, 140 S. E. 403.
CHAPTER 2.
Actions, Where and How Brought.
ARTICLE l
Of the Venue
§ 5527. (§ 4950.) Equitable proceedings, venue.
See notes to § 6540.
A non-resident of the State, suing at law, submits to ju-
risdiction for equitable relief in same county. Wachovia
Bank v. Jones, 166 Ga. 747, 748, 144 S. E- 256.
A plaintiff in ejectment can not engraft upon the original
petition an amendment in the nature of a petition in equity,
praying for a judgment declaring a deed from himself to the
defendant, absolute in form, to be a security for debt only,
and for an equitable accounting between the parties, etc.,
without alleging that the defendant is a resident of the
county in which the suit is pending or a non-resident of
the State. Hutchings v. Merritt, 165 Ga. 650, 141 S. E- 652.
Instances Where General Rule of Section Applied.
—Suit to
recover possession of land and damages for cutting timber,
and for equitable relief relating to land and timber. Brindle
v. Goswick, 162 Ga. 432, 134 S. E. 83.
But an equitable action jointly against the vendee, in an
invalid reservation contract, and his transferee, brought in
the county of the transferee's residence, to recover as in
trover the article sold, and to reform the contract so as tc
make it include a description of that article, did not lie for
lack of jurisdiction. Flemming v. Drake, 163 Ga. 872, 137 S.
E. 268.
Stated in Waters v. Waters, 167 Ga. 389, 145 S. E- 460.
Applied in suit against resident and non-resident defend-
ants, involving land title. Hines v. Moore, 168 Ga. 452,
148 S. E. 162.
ARTICLE 3
Suits, How Commenced
SECTION 1
The Petition
§ 5538. (§ 4960). Suits, how commenced.
Description of Premises.—It is essential to the mainte-
nance of an action for the recovery of land that the prem-
ises sued for be described with such certainty as that, in
the event of a recovery by the plaintiff, a writ of possession
issued upon the judgment, and describing the premises as
laid in the petition, shall so identify the premises sued for
that the sheriff in the execution of the writ can deliver the
possession in accordance with its mandate. Morton Realty
Co. v. Molder, 164 Ga. 774, 139 S. E- 543.
A demurrer to a petition in an action of complaint for
land, which states that "No sufficient description of the
real estate sued for is set up in the plaintiff's petition," and
that the "petition does not specifically show that the land
sued for is any portion of the land set up in paragraph one
of the plaintiff's petition," is a special demurrer. Morton
Realty Co. v. Molder, 164. Ga. 774, 139 S. E- 543.
§ 5539. (§ 4961). Petition to be pragraphed.
Applied in Fain v. Fain, 166 Ga. 504, 143 S. E- 586; Dins-
more v. Holcomb, 167 Ga. 20, 144 S. E 780.
Cited in Pape v. Woolford Realty Co., 35 Ga. App. 284,
134 S. E. 174, and Cochran v. Carter, 35 Ga. App. 286, 132
S. E- 921.
SECTION 2
Exhibits
§ 5541. (§ 4963). Copies, exhibits, etc.
Editor's Note and General Consideration.—A contract re-
ferred to in note need not be set out where the note and1
not the contract constitutes the' cause of action. Reed v»
Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 48, 128 S. E- 201.
There is full compliance with this section where the peti-
tion sets forth, as to each of the notes sued on, the date,,
amount, maturity, rate of interest, and date from which
it runs, and attaches a specimen copy, with the further
statement that each of the notes sued on is otherwise identi-
cal in form. Reed v. Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 48, 49,
128 S. E. 201.
In Heyward v. Ramsey, 35 Ga. App. 472, 473, 134 S. E-
119, the court said: "Though the petition alleges that the
amount due the plaintiff was for services rendered 'as per
contract,' it was not necessary to attach a copy of the
contract."
This provision of law was met in this case, and there is
no merit in the demurrer on the ground that no copy of
the application for insurance and of the answers of the
insured to the medical examiner was attached to the pe-
tition as exhibits. Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Burkett, 38 Ga^
App. 328, 144 S. E. 29.
Where, as in the instant case, a suit is based upon a
written and unconditional promise to pay, which merely
sets forth that the obligation is secured by a land con-
tract, and where only a personal judgment is sought
against the defendant, and no relief is prayed for which
must be based upon the security contract referred to,
the petition is not subject to demurrer on the ground that
the contract referred to is not attached thereto. The
note sued on being unconditional in its obligation, any
advantage which the defendant might seek to take of any
clause which might possibly be contained in the security-
contract, as construed in connection with the instrument
sued on, could be pleaded by the defendant as a matter
of defense. Hazlehurst v. Stahl Florida Properties Co.,
39 Ga. App. 209, 146 S. E. 510.
The requirement of this section, as to setting out or
attaching to the plaintiff's petition copies of contracts,
etc., applies only where the instrument constitutes the
cause of action or the basis of the relief prayed for.
Where a contractor employed to erect a building was sued
by a subcontractor on a written contract between them
which referred to a contract between the former and the
owner of the building, the petition, to which a copy of
the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was
attached as an exhibit, was not subject to general de-
murrer or an oral motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the contract between the defendant and the
owner of the building was not set out or attached as an
exhibit. Krebs Co. v. Godfrey Marble and Tile Co., 39'
Ga. App. 494, 147 S. E- 399.
Cited in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 38 Ga~
App. 30, 142 S. E. 564.
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SECTION 5
Dismissal of Petitions
§ 5548. (§ 4970). Dismissal of petition.
Exception to Section.—A petition for habeas corpus is an
exception to the operation of this section. Hence, a peti-
tioner in a habeas corpus proceeding has no right to deprive
the court of jurisdiction, after jurisdiction has once at-
tached, by a voluntary dismissal. Collard v. McCormick,
162 Ga. 116, 124, 132 S. E. 757.
Applications.—There is nothing in the answer of the de-
fendant which renders it an answer in the nature of a
cross-petition thereby preventing dismissal. Winter v.
People's Bank, 166 Ga. 385, 391, 143 S. E- 387.
libelant's dismissal of divorce suit carried out cross-
bill of libelee. Black v. Black, 165 Ga. 243, 140 S. E. 364.
Time of Dismissal.
—Under § 5627, plaintiff may dismiss
an action at any time where no set-off is involved.
Hayles v. So. Ry. (Ga.), 25 Fed. (2d) 758.
When Dismissal Effective.
—When the judge has signed
an order of dismissal, the dismissal is immediately effec-
tive. Hayles v. So. Ry. (Ga.), 25 Fed. (2d) 758, 759.
Costs.—The question of costs is between the clerk and
party liable for such costs, and might be a sufficient rea-
son to induce the judge not to sign the order of dismissal,
or to affix a condition that the costs be paid. The op-
posite party cannot attack the validity of the order of
dismissal on this ground. Hayles v. So. Ry. (Ga.), 25
Fed. (2d) 758, 759.
SECTION 6
Certain Forms of Action Preserved
§ 5550. (§ 4972). Special statutory proceedings,
etc.
Cited in Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555, 570, 146 S.
E. 173.
ARTICLE 4
Filing, Process, and Service.
§ 5553. (§ 4975). Service on nonresident.
Street Address.
—When the street address of a non-
resident defendant in a divorce suit, who resides in a city
in which the streets are numbered, and in which mail is
delivered by carriers, is known to the plaintiff at the
time of the institution of the divorce suit, it is the duty
ot the plaintiff, in making an affidavit for the purpose of
obtaining an order to perfect service by publication, to
give therein such street address, or otherwise furnish it
to the court or its clerk, in order to enable the clerk to
properly address the envelope or package containing a
copy of the newspaper in which notice requiring the de-
fendant to appear is published. In such a case it is not
sufficient to give merely the city and State in which the
defendant resides. Millis v. Millis, 165 Ga. 233, 140 S.
E- 503.
§ 5554. (§ 4976). Service by publication, when.
Applied in Roberts v. Burnett, 164 Ga. 64, 137 S. E- 773;
Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 30, 147
S. E. 87.
§ 5556. (§ 497»). Service by publication.
Creditor's Suit.—While the above section of the Code
applies to suits between original parties yet it is the
court's opinion that by analogy it had a bearing upon a
petition in the nature of a creditor's suit. Columbus
Iron Works v. Sibley, 164 Ga. 121, 124, 137 S. E- 757.
Construction of Order with Section.—In Watters v.
Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S. E- 87, it is
[
said: "The order of the judge directing service by publi-
cation must be construed in connection with the provi-
sipns of the statute (this section) under which it was
granted, and was not void on the ground that it failed to
direct that service be perfected by 'publication twice a
month for two months' instead of directing merely 'that
service be perfected by publication in the paper in which
sheriff's advertisements are published.' "
§ 5557.
filed.
(§ 4979). Copy of publication to be
Generally.—See Faughnan v. Bashlor, 163 Ga. 525, 136 S.
E- 545, following the note' in the Georgia Code of 1926.
This section, being in derogation of the common
law, must be strictly construed in favor of getting no-
tice to the non-resident party. So it is held that a paper con-
taining this notice can not be mailed by any person ex-
cept the clerk or his deputy. Millis v. Millis, 165 Ga.
233, 236, 140 S. E. 503; Deariso v. Mobley, 38 Ga. App.
313, 322, 143 S. E. 915.
Any variance in the address as stated in the order for
publication and the certificate of the clerk would net
render the judgment void, it appearing that the address
was unknown. It is only where the address is known
that this section required that a copy of the newspaper
be mailed to the party. Watters v. Southern Brighton
Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S. E. 87.
§ 5558). (§ 4980). Judge to determine if serv-
ice properly perfected.
Order before Trial.—This section does not explicitly re-
quire the court to pass such order before the trial.
Millis v. Millis, 165 Ga. 233, 241, 140 S. E. 503.
Adjudication Not Jurisdictional.—The adjudication by
the trial judge that service has been perfected in these
ways, though essential and important, is like the return
of an officer of service, not jurisdictional. Millis v. Mil-
lis, 165 Ga. 233, 241, 140 S. E- 503.
§ 5559. (§ 4981).
cure defects.
Appearance and pleading
The defendant waived process by his general demurrer,
the second paragraph of the demurrer being "that no
cause of action is set out in said petition." Under this
section, the defendant was pleading to the merits in the
same breath that he was asserting that there was no
process; but it has uniformly been held that the filing
of a general demurrer is a waiver of process. Wilson v.
City Council, 165 Ga. 520, 522, 141 S. E- 412.
An acknowledgment and waiver of service, entered up-
on the petition by the defendant after his removal from
the county in which the suit was filed, would not amount
to a waiver of jurisdiction as to the defendant's person.
Bolton v. Keys, 38 Ga. App. 573, 144 S. E- 406.
Applied in Harper v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 37 Ga.
App. 433, 140 S. E. 408.
§ 5562, (§ 4984). When to be filed.
See notes to § 5965.
Applied in Fain v. Fain, 166 Ga. /504, 143 S. E- 586.
§ 5563, (§ 4985). Service of process, how
made.
See annotations to section 4717.
In Biggers v. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 521, 523, 144 S. E. 397,
it is said: "As to ordinary suits, this section provides
that leaving a copy at the defendant's residence shall be
sufficient service. The defendant here could not have been
so served. In a case of this sort the question is not one
of domicile merely, but is one of actual residence. Resi-
dence has been defined to be an act, and where a person
voluntarily removes from this State for the purpose of
living and carrying on business elsewhere for an unlim-
ited period, he is, for the purposes of attachment, a non-
resident of Georgia, notwithstanding he may occasionally
visit this State and may intend to return at some indefi-
nite time in the future."
§ 5566. (§ 4988). Entry of sheriff may be trav-
ersed.
Pleading—Affidavit of Illegality.—Where an affidavit of
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illegality is based upon the ground that the affiant was not
served in the suit, and where the affidavit sets forth a re-
turn of service by the sheriff and a traverse of such return
by the affiant, and it is not alleged in the traverse that
the traverse' was made at the next term of the court after
the affiant had notice of the sheriff's return, the affidavit
of illegality is subject to dismissal on demurrer. Knight v.
Jones, 63 Ga. 481; Clements v. Haskins, 35 Ga. App. 484, 134
S. E- 125.
An affidavit of illegality denying service raises no issue
where there exists an untraversed return of service, since
such an unimpeached return is conclusive upon that ques-
tion. Although a traverse to a return of service is a
proceeding distinct and independent from an affidavit of
illegality based upon a lack of service, it is nevertheless
permissible tc include the former with the latter, provided
the traverse be filed at the first term after notice of the
return of service, and provided further that the officer
entering the return is made a party. Hamilton v. Chit-
wood, 37 Ga. App. 393, 140 S. E. 518.
Applied in Schermerhorn v. National Fire Ins. Co., 38
Ga. App. 470, 144 S. E- 395.
§ 5570. (§ 4992). Service too late, good for
next term.
In a suit in a justice's court, service made after the
expiration of the term to which the suit is returnable
amounts to no service whatever, and is void; and in such
a case no judgment can legally be rendered against the
defendant where service is not waived. Collins v. Ken-
nedy, 39 Ga. App. 205, 146 S. E. 502.
§ 5573. (§ 4995). Special pleading not admitted.
Effect of Section upon Pleading Estoppel.—Under this sec-
tion it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead estoppel.
Every fact pleaded in an answer as true is treated as de-
nied by the plaintiff, and evidence may be introduced in be-
half of the plaintiff to rebut, controvert, or otherwise show
that for any reason the defense pleaded is not good against
the plaintiff's claim. But in a case where the defendant
relies upon estoppel as a defense, it must be pleaded because
other sections of this act require that the defense be plainly
and clearly presented. Brown v. Globe, etc., Fire Ins. Co.,
161 Ga. 849, 854, 133 S. E\ 260.
Applied in City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Orr, 39
Ga. App, 217, 146 S. F. 795.
the piainltiff's petition, the defendant's demurrer based
upon the ground that the controlling issue in the case
was res adjudicata should have been sustained, and the
court erred in overruling it. Merritt v. Hutchings, 158
Ga. 734, 148 S. F- 916.
§ 5585. (§ 5007.) The consent rule.
Actions to Which Limited.—The consent rule set out in
this section is applicable only to actions of ejectment brought
in the fictitious form. Horn v. Towson, 163 Ga. 37, 135 S.
F. 487.
§ 5586. (§ 5008). Plaintiff may recover on his
prior possession, when.
Prior possession is some evidence of title, and is sufficient
as a basis for recovery of possession as against a tres-
passer. Terrell v. Gould, 168 Ga. 607, 148 S. F. 515.
Evidence ot prior possession alone is sufficient to put
the defendant on proof that he has a better title than that
of the plaintiff. Terrell v. Gould, 168 Ga. 607, 148 S. E-
515.
§ 5587. Bona fide holder may set off the value
of permanent improvements.
"Adverse claim of title," under this section, need not
be evidenced by any writing. Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga.
423, 141 S. E. 188.
It was error to refuse a request to charge the jury that
under this section "the good faith of the purchaser or the
defendant who has possession is not necessarily destroyed
by error of judgment or the failure to exercise all possi-
ble diligence." Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 141 S. E. 188.
The court erred in charging the jury as follows: "One
who enters upon land under a conveyance from one not
in possession, and, so far as appears, not having any
color of title, enters and improves the premises at his
peril; the true owner is under no obligation to account
to him for taxes paid or for the cost of improvements
over and above the mesne profits accruing." The prin-
ciple announced in Tripp v. Fausett, 94 Ga. 330, 21 S. E-
572, is not applicable to a case which comes within this
section. Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 141 S. E- 188.
ARTICLE 5
In Ejectment
§ 5576. (§ 4998). Mesne profits, no separate
suit for.
Cited in Treadway v. Harris, 34 Ga. App. 583, 585, 130 S.
E. 827.
§ 5579. (§ 5001.) True claimant made defendant.
Defendant Not Bound by Judgment When Not Made a
Party.—A judgment in a former suit for land in which the
defendant was not a party and was not notified or made a
party under this section, is not admissible in evidence
against the defendant in a later suit for the land. Harrison
v. Hester, 163 Ga. 250, 251, 135 S. E- 845.
§ 5582. (§ 5004). Plaintiff recovers on his own
title.
Illustration.—The contention that the verdict in favor of
the plaintiff is without evidence to support it, and there-
fore contrary to law, because the plaintiff had not proved
title to the lot in dispute, is without merit, as the evi-
dence demanded a finding that the plaintiff had title, and
that the defendant had no title thereto. Walton v. Sikes,
165 Ga. 422, 141 S. E. 188.
§ 5583. (§ 5005). Judgment conclusive.
Upon application of this section to the facts alleged in
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CHAPTER "3
Making Parties Pending Action
§ 5598. (§ 5016). Parties made on motion.
Where pending a motion for a new trial, which was
subsequently overruled, the movant died, and a woman,
by order of the court, was made a party, upon petition
showing that she had been appointed administratrix of
the estate of the decedent, and upon the overruling of the
motion for new trial a bill of exceptions was sued out, as-
signing error upon that judgment, the writ of error will
not be dismissed upon the ground that no notice was
given to the opposite party, in compliance with the pro-
visions of this section, but it will be presumed that the
court had evidence before it that notice had been given
or waived. If as a matter of fact the proper notice had
not been given, the respondent in the motion should have
moved in time to vacate the judgment making the ad-
ministratrix a party. Stanaland v. Home, 165 Ga. 685, 142
S. E. 142.
§ 5601. (§ 5019.) Parties made in term or va-
cation.
Time at Which Rule Returnable.—No time is prescribed
at which the rule shall be returnable. That time is left to
the discretion of the court. Upon return of the rule the
judge can do no more than allow or refuse to allow the re-
spondent to be made a party. McMillan v. Spencer, 162 Ga.
659, 663, 134 S. F- 921.
§ 5602. (§ 5020.) Time of trial where parties
made.
Applied in McMillan v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 663, 134 S.
F. 921.
Cited in Fstes v. Callahan, 164 Ga. 744, 748, 139 S. E. 532.
5]
§ 5616 DEFENSES, PLEAS, ETC. § 5651
§ 5616. (§ 5034). Execution against deceased
defendants.
Cited in Parsley v. Manley, 166 Ga. 809, 812, 144 S. E.
242.
CHAPTER 4
Abatement, Retraxit, Dismissal, and Removal of
Actions
§ 5623. (§ 5041). Death of one of several de-
fendants.
Death after Reference to Auditor.—Under this section the
death of one of the defendant sureties after the filing of a
suit against principal and sureties on an adminitrator's
bond, and after a reference of the case to an auditor, but
before the hearing by the auditor, does not abate the suit or
deprive the auditor of jurisdiction. Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App.
519, 137 S. E. 290.
§ 5625. (§ 5043). Differs from dismissal.
As provided in this section, it is essential to the plain-
tiff's right to a recommencement of his suit, after a dis-
missal, that the accrued costs in the former suit be paid.
Gheesling v. Eouisville, etc., R. Co., 38 Ga. App. 485, 4S6,
144 S. E. 328.
Applied in Stinson v. Branan, 166 Ga. 752, 144 S. E. 324.
§ 5626. Renewal of suits in forma pauperis.
See notes to § 4381.
Applied in Manchester v. Beavers, 38 Ga. App. 337, 338,
144 S. E. 11.
§ 5627. (§ 5044.) Actions may be dismissed at
any time.
See annotations to section 5548.
FIFTH TITLE
Of Defenses and Proceedings Pending Action
CHAPTER l
Defenses, Pleas, Etc.
ARTICLE l
General Provisions
§ 5628. (§ 5045.) Sufficiency of petitions and
pleas determined at first term.
Effect of Order Allowing Time for Amendment.—An order
declaring that the petition would be dismissed unless
amended within a given time could not operate as a final
judgment of dismissal, and upon the amendment of the
petition the merits of the case could be determined. Smith
v. Bugg, 35 Ga. App. 317, 133 S. E- 49.
Applied in Hattaway Eumber Co. v. Southern Eumber
Corp., 39 Ga. App. 741, 148 S. E. 358.
§ 5630. (§ 5047). Modes of defense.
Effect of 1925 Amendment. — While, under the 1925
amendment of this section, the trial judge may hear and
determine all demurrers in equity causes in which ex-
traordinary relief is sought, at any interlocutory hear-
ing before the appearance or first term, he is not obliged
to do so, but may postpone the hearing of such demurrers
until the hearing of the same may be reached in due
order. Byrd v. Piha, 165 Ga. 397, 141 S. E. 48. For ap-
plication of the amendment, see Ward v. Parks, 166
Ga. 149, 142 S. E- 690; Cochran v. Knott, 165 Ga. 109,
139 S. E- 818.
Applied in Hattaway Eumber Co. v. Southern Lumber
Corp., 39 Ga. App. 741, 148 S. E. 358; Manchester v.
Beavers, 38 Ga. App. 337, 338, 144 S. E- 11.
§ 5631. (§ 5048.) Demurrer, grounds of.
See notes to § 5538.
When Proper—Grounds for Special Demurrer.—While mul-
tifariousness is a ground of demurrer under this section it
is not favored by the courts. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga.
222, 233, 136 S. E. 52.
Cited in Griffin Fuel Supply Co. v. Automobile Ins.
Co., 37 Ga. App. 208, 139 S. E. 367.
§ 5633. (§ 5050.) Demurrer to pleas.
See annotations to sec. 5573.
§ 5634. (§ 5051). Each paragraph to be sep-
arately answered.
Cited in Southern Crushed Stone, etc., Co. v. Dorn, 37
Ga. App. 564, 566, 141 S. E. 59.
§ 5638. (§ 5055.) Verified petition requires veri-
fied plea.
Authority of Corporate Officer.—Sworn averments as to
agency or authority of corporate officer, to make the affida-
vit, is not required. Georgia Eumber Co. v. Thompson, 34
Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E- 303.
§ 5640. (§ 5057). Verification of amended an-
swer required.
Cited in Davis v. Starrett Brothers Inc., 39 Ga. App.
422, 147 S. E. 530.
§ 5641. (§ 5058). Dilatory pleas must
sworn to.
be
A plea to the jurisdiction must be filed at the first
term. If not so filed, it will not be considered. Smith
v. Rawson, 61 Ga. 208. By parity of reasoning, a motion
to dismiss, or demurrer to, a petition, upon the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the person of a defendant, must
be urged at the appearance term, or it will not be con-
sidered. Roberts v. Burnett, 164 Ga. 64, 137 S. E. 773.
A plea to the jurisdiction, when no want of jurisdic-
tion appears on the face of the petition, is a dila-
tory plea; and it will not be considered unless filed
at the first term, made in person, and sworn to. Bilbo
v. Bilbo, 167 Ga. 602, 146 S. E. 446.
Applied in Hattaway Eumber Co. v. Southern Eumber
Corp., 39 Ga. App. 741, 148 S. E- 358.
§ 5647. (§ 5063.) Replication and order for trial.
See annotations to section 5573.
§ 5649. (§ 5065.) No part to be stricken out.
Applied in Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 26,
128 S. E- 70.
§ 5650. (§ 5066.) Pleas of non est factum must
be sworn to.
See notes to § 4210.
Applied in Wier v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 34 Ga. App.
461, 129 S. E- 915.
§ 5651. (§ 5067.) Petition and answer make is-
sue.
See annotations to § 5573.
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§ 5652 JURISDICTION § 5664
Applied in City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Orr,
39 Ga. App. 217, 146 S. F. 795.
§ 5652. (§ 5068.) Effect of amendment.
Immaterial Amendment.—While the filing of a material
amendment to the petition after the case has been entered
"in default" will open the default so as to give the defend-
ant full right to plead, the filing of an immaterial amend-
ment, whether before or after the entry of default, will not
affect the validity of the judgment rendered, since the
judgment cures any defective statement of the original cause
of action. Henderson v. Fllarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5, 131 S.
E. 524.
Effect of Striking Answer.—Under the provisions of
this section it was unnecessary to introduce any evidence
in the present case, since the court had stricken the
answers of the defendants, and they did not offer any
other or further defense by way of plea or answer.
Lcftis v. Clay, 164 Ga. 845, 139 S. E\ 668.
Applied in Citizens & Southern Bank v. Seigler, 167 Ga.
657, 146 S. F- 485; Land v. Pike's Peak Lumber Co., 35
Ga. App. 159, 132 S. F- 644; Taylor v. Keown, 36 Ga.
App. 631, '634, 137 S. F- 907.
ARTICLE 2
Judgment by Default
§ 5653, (§ 5069.) Call of appearance-docket.
When Section Applies.—If on the call of the appearance
docket at the appearance term a case is called in which the
defendant has filed no demurrer, plea, or answer, and the
judge marks the case on the docket "in default," such entry
by the judge on the docket is a judgment that the case is
in default. But such an entry is not a "judgment by de-
fault." At most it can only be a judgment that the case
is "in default" and in no sense is a rendition of a final judg-
ment against the defendant in response to the prayers of
the petition. L,ove v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 259,
262, 121 S. F- 648; Fraser v. Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. E\
550.
Effect of Agreement Extending Time.—The private stipu-
lation between the parties is not binding on the court, or op-
erative as extending the time provided by statute for filing
a defense. Fraser v. Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. F- 550.
Same—Manner of Taking Advantage of Agreement.—Not-
withstanding an agreement between the parties for a con-
tinuance, the defendant must appear before the court and
ask for a continuance as provided by law, or after being
marked "in default" must proceed as prescribed to open
the default. If he fails to follow such procedure the court is
without power to open it at a following term. Fraser v.
Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. F. 550.
Power of Clerk to Alter Entry.—If after an entry by the
judge at the appearance term the clerk of the court during
the same term, without direction or authority from the
judge, erases the entry "in default" on the docket by
drawing a line through it, such action upon the part of
the clerk should be treated as a mere clerical act in-
sufficient in law to modify or alter the default judgment
entered by the judge. Fraser v. Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137
S- F. 550.
Irregularity of Second Entry as Affecting First.—The orig-
inal entry of default made by the judge at the first term is
not affected by the fact that an entry is made at a subse-
quent term by virtue of an ex parte order of the judge eve.,
though the second entry might be irregular because the
defendant was not given a hearing. Fraser v. Neese, 163
Ga. 843, 137 S. F- 550.
Applied in Harper v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 37 Ga.
App. 433, 140 S. F. 408.
§ 5654. (§ 5070.) Opening default.
§ 5656. (§ 5072.) Opening default at trial term.
Discretion of Court.—See Strother v. Harper, 36 Ga. App.
445, 446, 136 S. F. 828, following statement under this catch-
line in Ga. Code of 1926.
Payment of costs is a mandatory requirement of this
section; and if not paid, judgment for the plaintiff may
be rendered by the iourt. Miller v. Phoenix Mutual L,ife
Ins. Co., 168 Ga. 321, 147 S. F. 527.
To What Courts Applicable.—While it has been held
that the provisions of this section do not have applica-
tion to suits in those courts wherein judgment may be
taken at the first term, where by the procedure pro-
vided for such courts the superior-court practice is im-
practicable and therefore inapplicable; Bridges v. Wil-
mington Savings Bank, 36 Ga. App. 239, 136 S. F- 281,
such rulings should not be given effect where, as here,
the act creating the city court does limit the time al-
lowed for the filing of pleas, and specifically provides
the method by which a defendant may "open the de-
fault" resulting from a failure to plead within the time
provided by the act. Cobb v. Burgamy, 39 Ga. App.
602, 147 S. F. 921.
Cited in Riggs v. Kinney, 37 Ga. App. 307, 140 S.
F. 41.
§ 5660. (§ 5076). Judgment
when.
without a jury,
Where a suit is brought upon a promissory note and
notice is gi\ en under § 4252 as a prerequisite to the
recovery of such fees, the note is an unconditional con-
tract in so far as it stipulates for the payment of prin-
cipal and interest, but is a conditional contract in ±o
for as it obligates the maker to pay attorney's fees.
Being conditional in part, the note is not "an uncon-
ditional contract in writing," and even though the suit
thereon should be in default, the case is not one in which
the court, under section 5660, is authorized to render a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff without a jury, as in
undefended suits in unconditional contracts in writing.
Fowler v. Bank, 38 Ga. App. 226, 143 S. F. 512.
§ 5662. (§ 5078.) Verdict in suits in default.
Direction of Verdict.
—While the judge may ordinarily have
no authority to render judgment without the verdict of a
jury, except in cases referred to in this section, and section
6516, this does not mean that, even in those cases where
the verdict of a jury is necessary, the court may not di-
rect it where it is demanded by the law and the facts. Pape
v. Woolford Realty Co., 35 Ga. App. 284, 134 S. F- 174. This
principle was applied with reference to a promissory note
and collection of attorney fees in State Mut. Iyife Ins. Co.
v. Jacobs, 36 Ga. App. 731, 137 S. F. 905.
Applied in Flanigan v. Hutchins, 164 Ga. 313, 138 S. F.
'93.
Cited in Cochran v. Carter, 35 Ga. App. 286, 132 S. F- 921.
ARTICLE 3
Particular Pleas
Effect of Failure to Make Proper Showings.—The movants
having failed to comply with the provisions of this and the
following section by not making the proper showing, it can
not be held that the court erred in denying the application,
especially as it does not appear that there was an abuse of
the discretion which the trial judge exercises over the
whole matter. Henderson v. Fllarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5, 131 S.
F. 524.
Applied in Fain v. Fain, 166 Ga. 504, 143 S. F. 586.
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SECTION l
To the Jurisdiction
§ 5664. (§ 5080.) Jurisdiction, when admitted.
Waiver of Jurisdiction of the Person.—If a defendant
appear and plead to the merits without pleading to the
jurisdiction and without excepting thereto, he thereby ad-
mits the jurisdiction of the court. The effect of a volun-
tary appearance and pleading to the merits is to waive
jurisdiction of the person, where the rights of third per-
sons are not thereby prejudiced. This rule applies to eq-
uitable cases. Waters v. Waters, 167 Ga. 389, 390, 145
S. F- 460.
§ 5665 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AMENDMENTS § 5686
Motion to Vacate after Verdict Not Waiver of Jurisdic-
tion.—Where a nonresident learning that verdict and judg-
ment had gone against him, first moved to vacate the ver-
dict and judgment, the appearance by such motion after the
rendition of the verdict and judgment is not such an ap-
pearance as to amount to a waiver of jurisdiction. Christian
v. Terry, 36 Ga. App. 815, 816, 134 S. E. 244.
Applied in Hattaway Lumber Co. v. Southern Lumber
Corp., 39 Ga. App. 741, 148 S. E. 358; Todd-Worsham
Auction Co. v. Underwood, 38 Ga. App. 792, 145 S. E. 889.
§ 5665. (§ 5081). Plea to the jurisdiction.
Pursuant to this section it was held that where an eq-
jitable petition for the partition of land brought in the
county where the land is located, against certain coten-
ants who reside in a different county in this State, and
against certain cotenants who reside beyond the limits of
this State, the jurisdiction of the court over the coten-
ants so residing in this State can be raised only by them,
either by plea, demurrer, or motion, and can not be urged
by a defendant residing in the county in which the suit
is instituted. Roberts v. Burnett, 164 Ga. 64, 137 S. E. 773.
Applied in Bilbo v. Bilbo, 167 Ga. 602, 146 S. E. 446.
§ 5666. (§ 5082.) Contents of the plea.
Allegation as to Lack of Jurisdiction Must Be Substan-
tiated by Facts.—The caveat merely contains the statement
that the court which passed the order adopting the children
was without jurisdiction over them. The rules of good
pleading require the allegation of facts to support this con-
clusion. The allegation is that they were adopted by a
court having no jurisdiction; and if the caveator desired to
collaterally attack the adoption for want of jurisdiction in
the court which did pass the order, the burden was upon
him to allege in a proper plea such facts upon which he
relied to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Harper v. Lindsey,
162 Ga. 44, 47, 132 S. E. 639.
SECTION 2
Of Set-Off and Usury
§ 5668. (§ 5084). Pleas of set-off.
Applied in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v.
Rankin, 39 Ga. App. 373, 147 S. E. 157.
CHAPTER 2
Of Amendments
SECTION 4
Non Est Factum, etc.
§ 5676. (§ 5092). Non est factum.
See notes to § 4210.
§ 5678. (§ 5094.) Pleas of former recovery and
pendency of former suit.
Connecticut Rule.—It would seem that the codifiers, by
this section, intended to adopt the Connecticut rule.
Hood v. Cooledge, 39 Ga. App. 476, 478, 147 S. L\ 426.
Cause Not Identical.—The pendency of an action for dam-
ages brought by the plaintiffs against the counties of Tel-
fair and Jeff Davis, for the wrongful taking and appropria-
tion of a right of way over their lands for a public road and
for a free public bridge, does not prevent the subsequent
proceeding brought by the state highway to condemn their
land for the same purposes. Cook v. State Highway Board,
162 Ga. 84, 96, 132 S. E. 902.
Applied in Holston Box, etc., Co. v. Vonberg, 34 Ga. App.
298, 129 S. E. 562.
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
§ 5681. (§ 5097.) Amendments of pleadings,,
when allowed.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Setting Out Cause of Action.—This section, properly con-
strued, means, that in order to admit of an amendment, a
valid cause of action must be set forth in the original dec-
laration. Macon v. Newberry, 35 Ga. App. 252, 132 S. E.
917.
Cited in City Council of Augusta v. Lamar, 37 Ga. App.
18, 420, 140 S. E. 763; Davis v. Starrett Brothers, Inc.„
339 Ga. App. 422, 147 S. E. 530.
IV. WHAT PLEADINGS AMENDABLE.
Material Evidence Omitted from Exceptions. — Where
within the time required by law a party files exceptions to
the auditor's report, but neglects to set forth in connection
with such exception the evidence necessary to be considerel
in passing thereon, or to point out the same by proper ref-
erence, or to attach it as exhibits to his exceptions, such
exceptions can be thereafter amended so as to cure these
defects. Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 129 S. E. 846.
§ 5682. (§ 5098.) Enough to amend by.
Amendment Showing Insurable Interest.—A petition in a
suit on a fire insurance policy may be amended to show the
insurable interest of the plaintiff. Georgia Farmers Fire Ins.
Co. v. Tanner, 34 Ga. App. 809, 131 S. E. 191.
Applied in Nashworthy v. Alford, 38 Ga. App. 286, 14i-
S. E. 622.
§ 5683. (§ 5099.) New cause of action and par-
ties not allowable.
Editor's Note.—See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-
Hood Cotton Co., 161 Ga. 480, 483, 131 S. E. 283, quoting
from the' case referred to under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Applicable Both at Law and in Equity.—This principle is
applicable both to actions at law or in equity. Magid v.
Byrd, 164 Ga. 609, 623, 139 S. E. 61.
Instances of Amendments Allowable within Rule.—A new
cause is not added where the consignor of goods in an action
in tort for damages struck an allegation that the goods
were lost and substituted an allegation that they were car-
ried to a place other than the destination, sold and the pro-
ceeds paid to another. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-
Hood Cotton Co., 161 Ga. 480, 131 S. E- 283.
Where an amendment merely corrected a contradiction,
but did not change the parties to the suit, the nature of
the transaction, or the cause of action; and it was properly
allowed. Burch v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 53,
66, 139 S. E. 123.
Adding New Parties.—New and distinct parties can not
properly be added by amendment in a proceeding to remove
obstructions from a private way. Troup v. Tomberlin, 34
Ga. App. 623, 130 S. E. 541.
Upon application of an employee, a court of equity could
not "reform" or amend a judgment of the superior court
so as to make it a judgment against a solje stockholder of
the corporation, who continued the business in the name
of the corporation, as this would be adding a new party,
which can only be done in cases expressly provided by
law. Bishop v. Bussey, 164 Ga. 642, 139 S. E. 212.
Applied in Exec. Com. of Baptist Convention v. Smith,.
39 Ga. App. 417, 420, 147 S. E. 418.
§ 5686. (§ 5102). Misnomers amendable in-
stanter.
Construed with Section 5681.—While this section provides^
that all misnomers on the civil side of the court may "be?
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§ 5687 CONTINUANCES § 5710
amended and corrected instanter," it must be construed in
connection with section 5681 of the same code, which pro-
vides that amendments may be made "at any stage of the
cause," and, so construed, even a misnomer in a petition
can not be amended after the case has been tried and a
verdict and judgment rendered. Georgia Motor Sales v.
Wade, 37 Ga. App. 24, 138 S. E. 797.
§ 5687. (§ 5103). Names of partners may be
added instanter.
In a suit against several corporations to recover in one
action damages for personal injuries, where the petition
alleged that some of the corporations had become merged
with one another, an amendment to the petition, adding as
new parties two other corporations, who, it is alleged,
committed the tort complained of, and praying that process
issued against them, was properly allowed. South Georgia
Power Co. v. Beavers, 39 Ga. App. 374, 146 S. E- 924.
§ 5689. (§ 5105.) Usee's name added and one
or more plaintiffs may be stricken.
Initial Right to Bring Action as Prerequisite.—A plaintiff
without the legal or equitable right to maintain a suit can-
not amend so as to sue for the use of another. Eudlam
Constr. Co. v. Cummings, 34 Ga. App. 786, 131 S. E. 191.
This principle was applied in a suit by a materialman who
attempted to substitute the obligee for his use where he im-
properly brought suit in his own name against a compensated
bonding company as surety, no indemnity being provided for
the materialman in the bond. American Surety Co. v. Bibb,
162 Ga. 388, 134 S. E. 100.
Applied in Kohn v. Colonial Hill Co., 39 Ga. App. 286,
144 S. E- 33.
terms and effect of an official entry, the relief obtained
results from a judgment of court fixing and declaring the
truth as to the controverted facts; whereas the altering by
the official amending his own entry or return results, not
from any compulsion of a judgment establishing the fact,
but from the voluntary act of the official himself. Scher-
merhorn v. National Fire Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 470, 144 S.
E. 395.
§ 5701. (§ 5117.) May be made nunc pro tunc.
Applied in Freeman v. Stedham, 34 Ga. App. 143, 128 S. E«
702.
§ 5693. (§ 5109). Amendment of process.
Cited in Calinet v. Hare, 37 Ga. App. 167, 168, 139 S.
115.
ARTICLE 2
Particular Cases
E.
SECTION l
Of Amending Verdicts, Judgments, and Execu-
tions
§ 5694. (§ 5110.) Amendment of verdict.
Applied as to separating the amount of the principal and
interest in a lump sum verdict. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga.
App. 630, 130 S. E. 600.
§ 5695. (§ 5111.) After dispersion of jury.
See annotation to § 5694.
§ 5698. (§ 5114). Executions may be amended.
Conformity to Verdict.—A judgment may be amended by
order of the court, in conformity to the verdict upon which
it is predicated. Jones v. Whitehead, 167 Ga. 848, 146 S.
E. 768.
SECTION 4
Of Other Amendments
§ 5706. (§ 5122.) Amendment of affidavits to
foreclose, etc.
The affidavit for garnishment is amendable by striking
therefrom the words "for which judgment has been obtained,"
and inserting in lieu thereof the words "for which is now
pending." Carrolton Bank v. Glass, 35 Ga. App. 89, 132 S.
E. 238.
Applied to amendment of distress warrant which failed to
allege that the tenant "is removing" or "seeking to remove"
his crops from the rented premises. Johnson v. Eock, 36 Ga.
App. 620, 137 S. E. 911.
§ 5707. (§ 5123.) Amendment of appeal and
other bonds.
The bond executed by an. applicant for garnishment, is
amendable under this section. Where neither the obliga-
tions of the sureties are altered nor the rights of the opposite
party prejudiced, such bond may be amended in any man-
ner to conform to the requirements of the statute, without
the consent of the sureties. Carrollton Bank v. Glass, 35
Ga. App. 89, 132 S. E. 238.
Instances of Amendments to Appeal Bonds.—The execu-
tion of a bond by the attorney in the attorney's own name
tor the plaintiff by name, instead of in the name of the
plaintiff by the attorney, is amendable. Whitley v. Jackson,
34 Ga. App. 286, 129 S. E. 662.
§ 570$. (§ 5125.) Clerical mistakes may b*
amended.
A clerical veriance in the name of the defendant as it ap-
pears in the petition and the process is curable by amend-
ment under this section. Grand Eodge Knignts of Pythias
v. Massey, 35 Ga. App. 140, 132 S. E. 270.
Effect.—Where a party resorts to a traverse in order to
annul the terms and effect of an official entry, the relief
obtained results from a judgment of court fixing and de-
claring the truth as to the controverted facts; whereas the
altering by the official in amending his own entry or re-
turn results, not from any compulsion of a judgment es-
tablishing the fact, but from the voluntary act of the of-
ficial himself. Schermerhorn v. National Fire Ins. Co., 38
Ga. App. 470, 144 S. E. 395.
SECTION 2
Amending Official Returns
§ 5700. (§ 5116.) Official entries amendable.
Where a party resorts to a traverse in order to annul the
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CHAPTER 3
Of Continuances
§ 5710. (§ 5126.) But one continuance at com-
mon law.
Editor's Note and General Consideration.—The discre-
tion in refusing a continuance was held not to be abused
where a continuance had been granted at two previous
terms and for one day at the third term. Camp v. Eanier,
36 Ga. App. 54, 135 S, E. 224. See Yeates v. Yeates, 162 Ga.
153, 132 S. E. 768, where a third continuance was refused.
§ 5715 RULES GOVERNING THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY § 5744
for absence of§ 5715. (§ 5129). Continuance
witnesses.
Showing insufficient to obtain continuance of murder trial
under this section. Evans v. State, 167 Ga. 261, 262, 145
S. E. 512.
The court did not err in refusing to continue the case
because of the absence of a witness who had not been sub-
poenaed. Sheffield v. Sheffield, 38 Ga. App. 685, 145 S.
E- 672.
SIXTH TITLE
Of Evidence
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 5731. (§ 5145). Preponderance of evidence.
Charging Section.—In the absence of a written request to
do so, it was not error for the court, after charging this
section to fail to give in charge § 5732, which states how
the preponderance of the evidence may be determined, and
what facts the jury may consider in deciding where the
preponderance of the evidence lies. Rome Ry. Co. v. King,
33 Ga. App. 383, 126 S. E. 294; Sims v. Sims, 167 Ga. 537,
538, 146 S. E- 170; Clark v. State, 167 Ga. 341, 145 S. E. 647.
In a suit under the Federal employer's liability act, an
instruction which defines "preponderance of evidence" in
the language of this section. Western & Atlantic Railroad
v. Eochridge, 39 Ga. App. 246, 147 S. E. 776.
§ 5732. (§ 5146.) How determined.
See notes to § 5731.
Number of Witnesses.—The ruling that it might amount
to reversible error, in charging the provisions of this sec-
tion, to fail to include in the charge the provision that "the
jury may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessary with the greater number,'
does not apply to a case where the number of witnesses on
both sides are the same. Atlanta Gas-Eight Co. v. Cook,
35 Ga. App. 622, 134 S. E. 198.
If the complaining party has introduced the greater num-
ber of witnesses, an omission to tell the jury in effect that
they may take into consideration that the greater number
of witnesses testified in favor of one party rather than the
other, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number, might be harmful error and warrant the
grant of a new trial; but where, as in the instant case,
the movant for new trial had introduced only three wit-
nesses and the prevailing party had introduced nine wit-
nesses, the omission to so charge must be treated as harm-
less. Farmers' State Bank v. Kelley, 166 Ga. 683, 144 S.
E. 258.
§ 5734. (§ 5148). Matters judicially recognized.
Cited in King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 355,
360, 147 S. E. 119.
§ 5736. (§ 5150.) Estoppels.
II. ESTOPPEL BY RECORD.
Admission in Pleadings.—In Duke v. Ayers, 163 Ga. 444,
453, 136 S. E- 410, the court said: "His answer was filed and
became a part of the record in the cause in which the judg-
ment issued. His admission of the non-payment of this judg-
ment was a solemn admission in judicio that the judgment
had not been paid. The court acted upon it and amended
the judgment as prayed. By such admission, made in
judicio, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that he had
paid off this judgment at a date prior to the making of such
admission."
III. ESTOPPEL BY DEED.
Conclusiveness of Recital as to Consideration.—Ordinarily,
where the statement in a deed as to its consideration is
merely by way of recital, the actual consideration of the
deed is subject to explanation; but if the consideration is
referred to in the deed in such a way as to make it one of
the terms or conditions of the contract, it can not be varied
by parol. Sikes v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 304, 133 S. E. 239.
Applied in Hardin v. Douglas, 168 Ga. 213, 147 S. E- 506.
Cited in Watkins Co. v. Rivers, 37 Ga. App. 560, 140 S.
E. 770.
§ 5737. (§ 5151.) Estoppel as to title to real
estate.
If estoppel by acts or false declarations can in any case
be the basis upon which to predicate the recovery of land,
it falls clearly within the provisions of this section. Groover
v. Simmons, 163 Ga. 778, 780, 137 S. E. 237.
Sufficiency of Evidence.—In Seaboard Air-Line Railway
Co. v. Holliday, 165 Ga. 200, 206, 140 S. E- 507, it is said:
"The plaintiff having shown by her proof that she had
the legal title to the premises in dispute and was entitled
to recover, and there being nothing in the evidence show-
ing or tending to show that the defendant or any of its
predecessors in title were ignorant of the true title when
they purchased, the evidence failed to establish any estop-
pel which would preclude the plaintiff from asserting and
recovering on her legal title."
§ 5739. (§ 5153.) Trustees estopped to claim
title adverse to estate.
Executors.—Where the plaintiff maintained a suit for
specific performance of the contract alleged, in which he
sought to have decreed in himself title to the entire prop-
erty owned by his testatrix at the time of her death, and
devised by her and given to the executor (plaintiff) and
other beneficiaries, it was held that he was estopped on the
ground that he had had the will probated and qualified as
executor, and continued in the office of executor for two
years, during which time he had discharged the duties of
his office and had paid out large sums of money; this con-
duct being inconsistent with his claim of title to the entire
estate of his testatrix. Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135
S. E. 195.
Trustee of Corporations.—The principles of this section
qpply to a trustee holding choses in action for a corporation.
Caswell v. Vanderbilt, 35 Ga. App. 34, 132 S. E- 123.
§ 5740. (§ 5154.) Prima facie presumptions.
Insanity shown once to have existed is, in the absence ot
proof to the contrary, presumed to continue. Stanfield v.
Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. E. 826.
§ 5743. (§ 5157.) Jury right to infer, what.
Cited in Yellow Cab Co. v. Nelson, 35 Ga. App. 694, 696,
134 S. E. 822.
CHAPTER 2
Of Rules Governing the Admission of Testimony
ARTICLE 1
General Rules
§ 5744. (§ 5158.) Must be relevant.
Editor's Note.—If the evidence offered by a party is ot
doubtful relevancy, it should nevertheless be admitted and
its weight left to the jury. Even where irrelevant evidence
is admitted over timely objection, it affords no cause for a
new trial, unless the nature of the evidence is such as rea-
sonably to prejudice the rights of the objecting party. Con-
tinental Trust Co. v. Bank, 36 Ga. App. 149, 136 S. E. 319.
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§ 5745 ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS § 5775
§ 5745. (§ 5159.) Character and conduct of
parties.
Applied in Swinney v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 45, 48, 132 S.
E. 228.
§ 5746. (§ 5160.) Burden of proof.
The burden of proof of the lack of consideration to a con-
tract falls upon the party asserting the defense. Bankers
Trust v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 35 Ga. App. 619, 134 S. E- 195.
Applied in Kimsey v. Rogers, 166 Ga. 176, 180, 142 S. E-
667.
Not applied to defendant not testifying where plaintiff
has not carried burden of proof. Seagraves v. Couch, 168
Ga. 39, 147 S. E. 61.
§ 5748u (§ 5162). Best evidence.
Where it is material to prove that a witness has been
convicted of an offense, the best evidence of that fact is
the record of the conviction. Iyovinger v. The State, 39
Ga. App. 116, 117, 146 S. E- 346.
Rulings on admissibility of evidence on ejectment trial,
not erroneous. Blackwell v. Houston County, 168 Ga. 248,
147 S. E- 574.
§ 5749. (§ 5163). Failure to produce evidence.
The instructions to the jury as to the presumption against
a party failing to produce evidence in his power or within
his reach were authorized by the facts. Eayfield v. O'Neill,
37 Ga. App. 265, 139 S. E- 924.
§ 5751. (§ 5165.) Positive and negative testi-
mony.
In General.
—
Eaw and logic both recognize the fact that
testimony as to a thing may be positive, negative, or con-
tradictory. Indeed, the rules of evidence announced in
our Civil Code are for the most part, in essence, principles
rather of logic than of law." Hughes v. Etheridge, 39
Ga. App. 730, 733, 148 S. E. 358.
Credibility of Witnesses.—Carter v. State, 34 Ga. App.
230, 129 S. E. 10, following Ga. Code 1926.
Cited in Yeates v. Yeates, 162 Ga. 153. 132 S. E. 768.
§ 5754. (§ 5168.) Officer de facto.
Applied in Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14, 134 S. E. 59, to
establish that deceased was a deputy sheriff.
§ 5759. (§ 5172.) Secondary evidence, when
admitted.
Accessibility or Diligence.—Beall v. Francis, 163 Ga. 894,
137 S. E. 251, applying principle announced in Ga. Code 1926.
Certified Copy of Marriage Contract.—It appearing from
the record that both parties to an alleged marriage con-
tract were dead, and that it could not be found among their
papers the court did not err in admitting, as secondary evi-
dence of the contents of such paper, certified copy of a
record in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the
county in which the maker of the instrument died. Beall v.
Francis, 163 Ga. 894, 137 S. E. 251.
ARTICLE 2
Of Hearsay
§ 5763. (§ 5176.) Sometimes original evidence.
A memorandum found on the person of deceased was held
admissible on trial for murder, as original evidence under
this section, Etheridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 199, 136 S. E- 72.
Applied in Davis v. Farmer's Bank, 36 Ga. App. 415, 422,
136 S. E. 816; Alvation Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga.
App. 151, 128 S. E. 781.
§ 5764. (§ 5177). Pedigree, how proved.
Where proof of the pedigree of plaintiffs, their parents,
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and the heirs at law of the latter, was essential to enable
the plaintiffs to recover, and an affidavit of a person since
deceased, related by blood to such parties, contained dec-
larations establishing such pedigree, such affidavit was ad-
missible to prove such pedigree, and was not objectionable
on the ground that the declarations were hearsay and not
binding on the defendants. Massell Realty Co. v. Hanbury,
165 Ga. 534, 141 S. E. 653.
Where such affidavit contained declarations tending to
establish such pedigree, and contained other statements
which were inadmissible if properly objected to, and
where the admissibility of such affidavit was objected to
as a whole, upon the ground that it was hearsay and not
binding upon the defendants, its admission over such ob-
jection is not ground for a new trial. Massell Realty Co.
v. Hanbury, 165 Ga. 534, 141 S. E- 653.
§ 5767. (§ 5180.) Declarations of persons in
possession.
Applied in Crider v. Woodward, 162 Ga. 743, 755, 135 S. E-
95; Smith v. Eemon, 166 Ga. 93, 142 S. E. 554; Smith v.
Smith, 167 Ga. 368, 369, 145 S. E- 661.
§ 5768. (§ 5181). Of deceased persons.
See notes to § 2366(71).
It was permissible for the defendant to prove that a
few months before applying for the insurance the insured
made to third persons declarations contrary to the facts
stated in the application, the same being admissible as dec-
larations of a person, since deceased, against his interest,
and not made with a view to pending litigation. Hend-
erson v. Jefferson Standard Eife Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App.
609, 147 S. E. 901.
§ 5769. (§ 5182.) Books of account.
Order of Proof.—No foundation for their admission hav-
ing been laid as required by this section the court did not
err in refusing to admit in evidence certain pages from the
defendants' ledger. Kennedy v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 166,
128 S. E. 779.
§ 5773. (§ 5186.) Testimony of witness on for-
mer trial.
In General.—The rule, found in this section permitting
the use of former testimony of an inaccessible witness arises
from the necessity of the case; and in this case, it ap-
pearing that the witness whose testimony on a former trial
was introduced was, at the time of the subsequent trial,
within the jurisdiction of the court and capable of testify-
ing, though physically unable to travel to the court, and
had been in that condition for about two years, and it not
appearing why interrogatories for the witness had not
been sued out or his depositions obtained as provided by
law, the court erred in allowing the introduction of the
former testimony. Herndon v. Chamberlain, 39 Ga. App.
207, 146 S. E- 503.
Inaccessibility. — Allen v. Davis, 34 Ga. App. 5, 12*
S. E. 74, applying principle stated in Ga. Code, 1926.
ARTICLE 3
Of Admissions and Confessions
§ 5775. (§ 5188.)
far evidence.
Admissions in pleadings, how
Pleadings Stricken or Withdrawn.—Where a part of a
petition or of a plea is stricken by amendment, the stricken
part may, if pertinent to any issue remaining in the case,
be offered in evidence; but, unless so offered and admitted
;n evidence, it is not evidence for the consideration of the
jury or proper matter for argument of counsel, save only
where the amendment is made after the evidence is closed.
Eydia Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gibbs, 108 Ga. 138, 33 S.
E. 945; Alabama Mid. R. Co. v. Guilford, 114 Ga. 627, 40
S. E. 794. A different rule is applicable to parts of plead-
ings that are not stricken. Continental Trust Co. v. Bank,
36 Ga. App. 149, 136 S'. E. 319.
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§ 5776 PAROL EVIDENCE TO AFFECT WRITTEN § 5789
§ 5776. (§ 5189.) Parties to record.
Admissions of Executors, etc.—On the investigation of an
issue of devisavit vel non, the admission of an ex-
ecutor before qualification, or of a legatee, unless tne
sole legatee, shall not be admissible in evidence to impeach
the will. To this general rule there is an exception: If
the admission be in reference to the conduct or the acts of
the executor or legatee himself as to some matter relevant
to the issue on trial, the same will be admitted to impeach
the will, although made by the executor before qualifica-
tion, or by a legatee who is not the sole legatee. Brown v.
Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 135 S. E. 721.
Same—Before Execution of Will.—Declarations made by
a person before the execution of a will, but who is after-
wards named therein as executor and a legatee, are inad-
missible to impeach the will as those of an executor and
legatee. Brown v. Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 135 S. E. 721.
Declarations or admissions of the propounder of a will,
made before the execution of the instrument and before he
became clothed with the trust, are inadmissible to impeach
the will when offered by caveators as the declarations or
admissions of a party to the record. Brown v. Kendrick,
163 Ga. 149, 135 S. E. 721.
Declarations as to Title.—In the trial of a claim case dec-
larations of a defendant in execution, made after the pen-
dency of litigation and prior to the time of levy, but at a
time when she was not in possession of the property levied
on, that she owned such property, are not admissible as
evidence and of no probative value even if admitted with-
out objection. Nelson v. Brannon, 32 Ga. App. 455, 123 S.
E. 735 and citations. McSwain v. Estroff, 34 Ga. App. 18o.
129 S. E. 16
An extrajudicial statement respecting the title to the
property levied on, made by the defendant in fi. fa. in a
claim case, is not inadmissible under this section as being
an admission, when it is offered and admitted in evidence
solely for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the
defendant in fi. fa. Nesmith v. Nesmith, 37 Ga. App. 779,
142 S. E. 176.
Admissions in Fi. Fa. Claim Cases. — The provision of
this section upon the subject of the admissibility of ad-
missions of defendants in fi. fa. in claim cases, has no
reference to the competency of a defendant in fi. fa. as a
witness in the trial of such a case, and would be no au-
thority for excluding his testimony on objection of the
plaintiff in fi. fa. when offered by the claimant. Cornelia
Bank v. Taylor, 37 Ga. App. 538, 140 S. E. 901.
Applied in Jenkins v. Best Trading Co., 39 Ga. App. 214,
146 S. E. 512; Bacon v. Hinesville Bank, 38 Ga. App. 422,
144 S. E. 125.
§ 5779. (§ 5192). Of agents.
See notes to § 3606.
Although the admissions of an agent, made during the
existence and in pursuance of his power, are evidence
against the principal under this section, the court erred
in admitting the declarations of the defendant's bookkeeper
with reference to the quality of the commodity furnished,
where it appeared that the declarations were not made dur-
ing the existence of any power delegated to the bookkeeper
to act for the defendant in accepting the goods sued for,
but were in fact made long after the time when the goods
were received and accepted, and where it further was not
made to appear that the bookkeeper was at any time clothed
with authority to act for the defendant in accepting or re-
jecting the commodity furnished and sued for. Smith v.
Vaughn, 37 Ga. App. 558, 140 S. E- 892.
§ 5781. (§ 5194.) Admissions improperly ob-
tained.
Applied in Duncan v. Bailey, 162 Ga. 457, 134 S. E. 87,
to reject admission made with view of compromise.
Applied also in Slade v. Raines, 165 Ga. 89, 139 S, E.
805, as to admission tending to compromise.
§ 5783. (§ 5196). Entire conversation.
know that the defendant told him that the defendant was
a member of a partnership, the testimony of the witness
was admissible, under section 5873 and its probative value
was for the jury. Scott v. Gidelight Manufacturing Co.,
37 Ga. App. 240, 139 S. E. 686.
Waiver.—Where only that part of this memorandum used
by the witness to refresh his recollection which contained
the statement made by the defendant with references to
the partnership was admitted in evidence at the instance
of the party who offered the witness, over objection urged
by the opposite party that it was inadmissible, the putting
in evidence later by the latter party of the remainder of
the memorandum amounted to a waiver of the objection
urged by him to the admission of that part of the memo-
randum with reference to the partnership. Scott v. Gide-
light Manufacturing Co., 37 Ga. App, 240, 241, 139 S. E-
686.
§ 5785. (§ 5198.) Confidential communications,
etc.
Communicaticins Overheard Admissible. — Confidential
communications between the husband and wife overheard by
a third person are not excluded under this clause of this
section. Sims v. State, 36 Ga. App. 266, 136 S. E- 460.
Terms of Attorney's Contract.—The terms of an attoi-
ney's contract do not come within the privilege provided by
this section. Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801,
816, 132 S. E. 221.
Letters written by the wife to the husband, found after
his dealh by his administrator in his safety-deposit box in
a bank, and taken therefrom by the administrator and pro-
duced by him in court and introduced against the wife-
upon her trial for the homicide of her, husband, were im-
properly admitted. McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210, 140 S.
E. 625.
§ 5786. (§ 5199). Attorney and client.
Communications between client and attorney are ex-
cluded from public policy, and are incompetent as evidence
against the client upon her trial for the homicide of her
husband; and this is so whether such letters were volun-
tarily produced by the attorney to be used against the
client, or were surreptitiously or otherwise taken from,
the possession of the attorney. McKie v. State, 165 Ga.
210, 140 S. E- 625.
Does Not Affect Probative Value.—This section 5873
prescribes a rule as to the admissibility of testimony, and
not a rule for the determination of its probative value.
Scott v. Gidelight Manufacturing Co., 37 Ga. App. 240, 241,
139 S. E. 686.
Where a witness testified that as to whether or not he
had any independent recollection outside of a report he
would not be positive, that only from the report did he
[ 242 ]
ARTICLE 4
Of Parol Evidence to Affect Written.
§ 5788. (§ 5201.) General rule.
Subsequent Agreement.—The rule of this section is not
violated by proof of a new and distinct subsequent agree-
ment in the nature of a novation. Wimberly v. Tannei,.
34 Ga. App. 313, 129 S. E. 306.
See notes to § 3258.
Division of Consideration.—While proof of parol contem-
poraneous agreements is generally inadmissible to add to,
take from, or vary a written contract, the allegations of
the petition setting forth the division to be made of the
consideration to be paid to the co-obligees under the con-
tract do not come within the inhibition of these sections
of the code, since such alleged facts in nowise add to,,
take from, or vary the terms of the written instrument,
but merely set forth the respective interests of the obligees.
Bernstein v. Fagelson, 38 Ga. App. 294, 296, 143 S. E- 237.
Statements Prior to Execution of Instrument.—Parol evi-
dence as to the terms of the agreement, and as to state-
ments of the defendant made previously to the execution of
the paper, is ineffectual to vary the terms of the written
instrument, even though admitted without objection. Cleg-
horn v. Shields, 165 Ga. 362, 141 S. E. 55.
Applied in McClure v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 39'
Ga. App. 753, 758, 148 S. E- 341; Deen v. Bank of Hazle-
hurst, 39 Ga. App. 633, 147 S. E- 909; EaGrange Female
College v. Cary, 168 Ga. 291, 147 S. E- 390.
§ 5789. (§ 5202). Contemporaneous writings.
If the date of an entry is uncertain because of illegibility
of the handwriting, this would constitute an ambiguity,.
§ 5790 PRODUCTION OF PAPERS § 5837
and make a jury question.
573, 577, 144 S. E. 406.
Bolton v. Keys, 38 Ga. App.
§ 5790. (§ 5203.) Void instruments.
Contract to Evade Usury, Penalty or Forfeiture.—It ts
always permissible to show by parol evidence that a paper
is but a cover for usury, penalty, forfeiture, or other illegal
advantage to one of the parties. For if the law did not
sedulously disregard form and seek for substance, nothing
would be easier than its evasion by giving innocent names
to prohibited acts. Flood v. Empire Invest. Co., 35 Ga.
App. 266, 270, 133 S. E- 60.
§ 5794. (§ 5207.) Other cases.
Subsequent Agreement.—See note to sec. 5788. The new
agreement contemplated by this section must be based upon
a valuable consideration and embody the essentials of a
new contract. Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.
E. 93.
May Not Be Invoked to Change Law. — Custom may
some times be invoked as entering into a contract, or sup-
plying incidents, but not to change the law. Ponder & Co.
v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 165 Ga. 366, 140 S. E- 761.
§ 5795. (§ 5208). Receipts.
Where a written lease states that the rent is a certain
amount and contains a mere recital that it is paid, it is
permissible to show by parol testimony that only a part of
the rent was paid at the execution of the agreement and
that the balance is still unpaid. Googe v. York, 38 Ga.
App. 62, 142 S. E. 562.
But where a contract calls for the payment of money
at a certain time, evidence of a parol agreement at vari-
ance with the writing as to such matter is not admissible.
Googe v. York, 38 Ga. App. 62, 142 S. E- 652.
CHAPTER 3
Of Records and Other Written Evidence
ARTICLE 1
Of Records and Public Documents
§ 5798. (§ 5211). Exemplifications.
Cited in Manley, v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 580, 144 S. E- 170.
§ 5803. (§ 5216),. Exemplification of municipal
records, etc.
Erroneous admission in evidence of pamphlet designated
as code of city ordinances, with parol evidence that city
was operated thereunder. W. & A. R. Co. v. Peterson, 168
Ga. 264, , 147 S. E- 513.
§ 5821. (§ 5234.) Effect of judgment on party
vouched into court.
Use of Former Judgment Where Party Was Vouched.—
There is no error in introducing a judgment against a
vendee of a stolen car, taking the car away from the vendee,
in an action by the vendee against the vendor for the pur-
chase money, where the vendee gave the vendor notice of
the former suit and the vendor failed to defend. Barrett v.
Miller, 36 Ga. App. 48, 135 S. E- 111.
Applied in Manget v. National City Bank, 168 Ga. 876, 882,
149 S. E. 213.
Cited in Lifsey v. Finn, 38 Ga. App. 671, 673, 145 S. E. 519.
ARTICLE 2
Of Private Writings
§ 5828. (5239). Production of proof.
Cited in Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 306, 139 S. E-
912.
§ 5833. (§ 5244.)
tions.
Subscribing witness, excep-
Bond for Title.—Where a bond for title admitted over ob-
jection is only collaterally material, it falls within this ex-
ception. Chance v. Chance, 163 Ga. 267, 135 S. E. 923.
The conveyance of the timber involved in this case was
not officially attested or probated, and for this reason it
was not properly recorded; and it does not fall within any
of the exceptions specified in this section of the code. Hines
v. Moore, 168 Ga. 451, 148 S. E- 162.
Cited in Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 306, 139 S. E-
912.
§ 5834. (§ 5245.) Other proof.
Circumstantial Evidence.—The existence and genuineness
of a deed may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Campbell v. Sims, 161 Ga. 517, 131 S. E. 483.
§ 5835. (§ 5246). Handwriting.
Applied in Guthrie v. Harper, 167 Ga.
320.
5, 592, 146 S. E.
§ 5836. (§ 5247.) Comparison of hands.
Signatures.—The jury may render a verdict establishing
the genuineness of an instrument from a comparison be-
tween the disputed signature and other signatures of the
defendant which are admittedly genuine, and from evidence
that the disputed signature "favors," "looks very mucn
like," "bears a great resemblance to," and "is the same
kind of handwriting" as the admittedly genuine signatures.
Collins v. Glisson, 35 Ga. App. Ill, 132 S. E. 114.
Comparison of Handwriting.—The court erred in admit-
ing in evidence the writings offered for the purpose of
comparison of handwriting, over the timely objection that
they were not submitted to the opposite party before he
announced himself ready for trial. Thomas v. The State,
39 Ga. App. 659, 148 S. E. 277.
CHAPTER 4
Of the Production of Papers
ARTICLE 1
Notice to Produce
§ 5837. (§ 524a.) Production of books,
may be compelled.
etc.,
There was no reversible error in overruling the demurrer
on the ground that the notice to produce fails to describe
with sufficient definiteness the receipts and other papers
connected with the policy of insurance. Life, etc., Ins. Co.
v. Burkett, 38 Ga. App. 328, 144 S. E- 29.
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§ 5849 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES § 5858
CHAPTER 5
Of Oral Testimony
ARTICLE 1
Of Witnesses, Their Attendance and Fees
§ 5849. (§ 5260.) Subpoena.
Appeal or New Trial—Letter as Notice.—Before the pre-
sumption of the receipt of a letter by the addressee arises,
so as to constitute a sufficient notice under this section
the evidence must affirmatively show that the letter was
written, properly addressed and stamped, and mailed. Row-
land v. State, 34 Ga. App. 689, 690, 131 S. E. 96.
§ 5852. (§ 5263.) Failure to attend.
Forcing Attendance and Punishment of Witnesses. —
Where a witness has been subpoenaed to attend the su-
perior court and fails to obey the precept, the court may,
under this section, proceed by attachment to compel the at-
tendance of such witness, and also to punish him by a fine
not exceeding three hundred dollars. But in such a case
section 4849, par. 5 does not apply. Pullen v. Cleckler, 162
Ga. Ill, 132 S. E- 761. See annotations to section 4849, par. 5.
ARTICLE 2
Of the Competency of Witnesses
§ 5856. (§ 5267.) Court decides competency.
Child of Tender Years.—Where, under the proof a child
of five years was not shown to possess sufficient intelligence
to understand the nature of an oath, or the penalty for its
violation, it was held that the court erred in permitting
the witness to testify. Edwards v. State, 162 Ga. 204, 132
S. E. 893.
It is within the discretion of the trial judge to deter-
mine whether or not a boy of nine years is competent as a
witness; and where the judge examines such boy as to
his understanding of the nature of an oath, and decides
that he is competent to testify, a new trial will not be
granted unless it appears that the discretion of the judge
has been abused. Bell v. State, 164 Ga. 292, 138 S. E. 238.
Applied in Goodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178, 132 S. E. 899.
§ 5858. (§ 5269.) Who are competent to tes-
tify.
See notes to § 5776.
Witness Present in Transaction.—The fact that evidence
by a disinterested witness may have been adduced for the
plaintiff, a personal representative, in support of a transac-
tion between the deceased and defendant would not operate
to alter the general rule. Shippey v. Carpenter, 36 Ga.
App. 61, 135 S. E. 220.
But the defendant may impeach the testimony of the
plaintiff's witness by denying that such witness was
present when the agreement between the decedent and
himself was made. Shippey v. Carpenter, 36 Ga. App. 6±.
135 S. E. 220.
Grantor as Witness.—In an action of ejectment, the op-
posite party to the deceased grantee of a deed is incompe-
tent under this section to testify in her own behalf to con-
versations and transactions with such deceased person
affecting adversely the title conveyed by the deed. Sikos
v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 303, 133 S. E. 239.
Party to Testamentary Contract. — Where a nephew and
uncle contracted so that the property passing to the
uncle's wife should become the nephew's upon her death,
the nephew is not a competent witness as to the contract
in an action of specific performance by the nephew against
the wife to enforce the contract. Hardeman v. Ellis, 16'
Ga. 664, 667, 135 S. E- 195.
Actions to Recover Purchase Price of Partnership. — On
the trial of an action to recover from a partnership a sum
paid by the plaintiff on the purchase-price of the partner-
ship business, the death of a member of the firm did not
render inadmissible as evidence for the plaintiff a letter
addressed to the firm by the plaintiff, in the lifetime of that
member, stating that the latter told him that the firm would
return the money. Saunders v. Hudson, 34 Ga. App. 75^
131 S. E. 115.
Testimony of Interpleader Competent When Representa-
tive Does Not Object.—On the trial of an action instituted
by an administrator praying for direction by the court in
the distribution of the estate of his decedent, testimon>
by one of the interpleading claimants, tending to show an
executed contract in parol under which she was entitled to
the estate, was not subject to exclusion on the objection
of the other interpleaders (the administrator not objecting)
upon the ground that the witness was incompetent to give
such testimony, because it was as to transactions or com-
munications with the decedent whose administrator was a
oarty. The administrator was not seeking a recovery, and
was not interested in the result save as a stakeholder or a
third party entitled to maintain a petition for interpleadei.
Cooper v. Reeves, 161 Ga. 232, 131 S. E. 63.
Witness Testifying against Interests.—Where the wit-
ness is not a party to the suit, and is not testifying in his
own interest, but is testifying against his interest, he
does not fall within the inhibition of this paragraph of this
section. Chance v. Chance, 163 Ga. 267, 135 S. E. 923.
Alleged Agent of Defendant, Witness against Adminis-
trator.—That a husband was present and looking after the
transaction when his wife executed a deed of conveyance
did not raise the implication, as matter of law, that he was
her agent, and did not disqualify him as a witness on the
trial of a suit defended by her, in which the administrators
of the deceased grantee in the deed were plaintiffs; it not
otherwise appearing that he was her agent, or that he
looked after the transaction on her behalf, or that he had a
legal or pecuniary interest in the result of the suit. Sikes
v., Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 133 S. E- 239.
Paragraph 1 of this section is not to be so extended by
construction as to embrace cases not strictly within its
letter. When a plaintiff institutes a suit and dies pendente
lite, and his executor is made a party in his stead, such
suit is not one instituted by the erecutor, and the surviving
defendant is not incompetent to testify as to transactions
cr communications with the deceased plaintiff. McEendon
v. Baldwin, 166 Ga. 794, 144 S. E- 271.
The testimony of a witness, since deceased, given under
oath on a former trial of the same case is admissible on
the subsequent trial thereof. McEendon v. Baldwin, 166
Ga. 794, 144 S. E. 271.
Administrator not incompetent as agent or as estoppel
trustee, from testifying for his son suing to recover estate
on oral agreement. Hankinson v. Hankinson, 168 Ga. 156,
161, 147 S. E. 106.
Heirs competent to testify as to contract of advancement
to one of them in action by his creditor to subject land ad-
vanced. Home Mixture Guano Co. v. McKoone, 168 Ga.
317, 147 S. E- 711.
Paragraph 8.—Where a party to a cause is sworn as a
witness in his own behalf on the trial of a case which he
loses, and where he moves for a new trial and files there-
with a brief of his testimony which is duly approved by the
court and made a part of the record, such testimony
amounts to a deposition within the meaning of paragraph
8 of the section. McEendon v. Baldwin, 166 Ga. 794, 144
S. E. 271.
Where the surviving party, after the death of the party
whose testimony is so preserved, introduces such testimony
on a trial of the case, he is a competent witness to rebut
such testimony. McEendon v. Baldwin, 166 Ga. 794, 144 S.
E- 271.
Testimony of Defendant Who Was Also Administrator.—
The court properly admitted the testimony of one of the
joint defendants, who was also an administrator of the
grantor in the deed, over the objection that the witness
was an administrator of the grantor and therefore incompe-
tent to testify to a fact. There is not merit in this objec-
tion. The situation here arising clearly falls within none
of the exceptions to the general rule as to the competency
of witnesses, contained in this section. May v. Eeverette,
164 Ga. 552, 553, 139 S. E. 31.
The plaintiff in a suit far specific performance of an al-
leged oral gift of land, defended by the administrator of the
deceased donor, was incompetent as a witness to give tes-
timony of going into possession and making of specified
improvements during the lifetime of the decedent, and re-
ferring to transactions with him which if alive he could
deny, explain, or rebut. Odum v. McArthur, 165 Ga. 103,
139 S. E. 870.
Applied as to transactions, in Campbell v. Sims, 161 Ga.
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517, 520, 131 S. E- 483; as to transferee, in Campbell v.
Sims, 161 Ga. 517, 520, 131 S. E. 483; also in Winkles v.
Drake, 165 Ga. 335, 141 S. E- 67; Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank v. Miller, 37 Ga. App. 668, 669, 141 S. E- 419.
§ 5862. (§ 5273.) Idiots, etc.
Evidence Admitted Erroneously.—When an examination by
the court shows that the child has no such knowledge it
is error to permit the child to testify over proper objection.
Morton v. State, 35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S. E. 647.
§ 5865. (§ 5276). Decision by inspection.
See notes to § 5856.
ARTICLE 3
Of the Examination of Witnesses
§ 5869. (§ 5280.) Separate examination.
Liberal Construction.—In administering the rule of this
section, the judge is invested with a broad discretion which
is to be liberallv construed, and the exercise of this dis-
cretion will not be controlled or overruled except in case of
an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances disclosed
by the record in this case we can not hold that the trial
judge abused his discretion, and that the exclusion of the
witness in the circumstances stated would require the grant
of a new trial. Groover v. Simmons, 161 Ga. 93, 129 S. E-
778.
§ 5874. (§ 5285.) Opinions of witness.
Opinion—Facts upon Which Conclusion Based. — On the
trial of an issue as to general mental incapacity to make a
will, a subscribing witness to the paper propounded as a
will may give in evidence his opinion as to whether the
testator at the time of executing the paper appeared "to
have sense enough to know who his children were," with
or without stating any other facts on which his opinion was
based. Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615, 131 S. E. 535.
The opinion of a witness may be given in evidence as to
the insolvency of a party, provided it is accompanied by
the facts upon which the opinion is founded. Bennett v.
American Bank, etc., Co., 162 Ga. 718, 729, 134 S. E. 781.
The court properly rejected the testimony of an affiant,
that as the result of years of study, observation, and ex-
perience, he was firmly convinced that the Masonic Order
in America is purely an altruistic, charitable institution,
and that the practice of charity is the real excuse for
its existence. The question was not one of opinion; and
if it had been, such testimony was a mere opinion and con-
clusion of the witness, who was not shown to be an ex-
pert, without the facts upon which such opinion and conclu-
sion was based. Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. Atlanta,
162 Ga. 244, 133 S. E. 864.
Same—Specific Instances of Question of Opinion. — The
question as to whether the car furnished could and did af-
ford proper refrigeration between the points of shipment,
when re-iced at regularly established icing stations, was
held one of opinion. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, 35 Ga.
App. 438, 143 S. E. 122.
Cited in Humphreys v. State, 35 Ga. App. 386, 133 S. E.
518.
§ 5875. (§ 5286.) Market value, how proved.
The jury are not bound by the opinion of experts as to
value. Black v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 35 Ga. App. 8,
131 S. E. 543.
Specific Applications.—Testimony as to the value of serv-
ices rendered is in the nature of opinion evidence. Western,
etc., Railroad v. Townsend, 36 Ga. App. 70, 72, 135 S. E. 439.
A witness may give his opinion as to market value of
notes or other property, and as to the solvency of a bank,
after having stated the fact or faots upon which he bases
his opinion. The weight to be given such opinion is a mat-
ter for the jury, who have power to disregard the reasons
given. Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55, 139 S. E. 877.
Testimony as to the market value of property being in
the nature of opinion evidence, and its probative value be-
ing dependant on the character and intelligence of the wit-
ness and his opportunity of forming a correct judgment as
to the value of the property, it is not conclusive upon the
jury- Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Cowart & Son, 38 Ga.
App. 426, 144 S. E. 213.
When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained
only by an examination of a large number of entries in
books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who
has made an examination and analysis of the books and
figures may testify as a witness and give summarized
statements of what the books show as a result of his inves-
tigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to
the court and the parties. Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55, 139
S. E- 877.
Applied in Blaylock v. Walker County Bank, 36 Ga. App.
377, 136 S. E. 924.
ARTICLE 4
Impeachment of Witnesses
§ 5879. (§ 5290.) Impeaching own witness.
Examination of Opposite Party.—An opposite party may
be cross-examined without entitling counsel for any oppo-
site party or parties, as a matter of absolute right, to cross-
examine the witness. Scarborough v. Walton, 36 Ga. Apn.
428, 136 S. E. 830.
Defendant can introduce former testimony of deceased
plaintiff, and then impeach it by his own testimony. Mc-
Lendon v. Baldwin, 166 Ga. 794, 798, 144 S. E. 271.
§ 5880. (§ 5291). Impeached
facts testified to.
by disproving
The charge of court giving this and the following sec-
tions, not subject to exceptions because of verbal inaccura-
cies. Bart v. Scheider, 39 Ga. App. 467, 469-71(3), 147 S. E-
430.
§ 5881. (§ 5292.) By contradictory statements.
Sufficiency of Previous Statement.—A previous statement
made by a witness, to be impeaching, must refer to matters
relevant to his testimony and to the case, and must con-
tradict some matter testified to by him. Otherwise, the
attempt to impeach will be unsuccessful. Tanner v. State,
163 Ga. 121, 129, 135 S. E. 917.
In the present case the jury could have found that the
engineer was impeached by a contradictory statement pre-
viously made by him as to a matter relevant to his tes-
timony and to the case. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Pitts,
38 Ga. App. 780, 145 S. E- 518.
§ 5883. (§ 5294.) Credibility of witnesses.
Applied in United States Fidelity Co. v. Hall, 34 Ga. App.
307, 129 S. E. 305.
§ 5884. (§ 5295.) What credit to impeached
witness.
Section Analyzed with Respect to Contradictions. — The
phrase "successfully contradicted" applies where a witness
has not been really impeached, but only where there has
been an effort to impeach. In the next sentence of the sec-
tion there is a provision applicable to a witness who has
been really impeached, or "successfully" impeached. It will
be observed that the language employed in this last referred
sentence fits exactly the definition of perjury. The con-
clusion, therefore, is that when one has been guilty of per-
jury, he should not be believed, unless corroborated. The
last sentence applies where the circumstances do not prove
the witness guilty of perjury. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206,
218, 135 S. E. 748.
Same—Use of "Successfully Impeached."—The expression
"successfully impeached" is inappropriate because it is con-
fusing to use it in place of the words "successfully contra-
dicted," as used in this section. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206,
218, 135 S. E. 748.
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ARTICLE 5
Public Excluded, When.
§ 5885. (§ 5926). When evidence vulgar, etc.
Under neither the constitution nor the statute laws of
Georgia is it ever reversible error for a trial judge, in his
discretion, to allow the public to occupy seats in the court-
room as long as their conduct is orderly, peaceful, and does
not tend to obstruct justice. Lancaster v. State, 168 Ga.
470, 475, 148 S. E- 139.
CHAPTER 6
Of Interrogatories and Depositions
ARTICLE 1
Commissions, How Issued and Returned
§ 5886. (§ 5297.) Who may be examined on
interrogatories.
See annotations to § 5910.
ARTICLE 3
Exceptions to Commissioners
§ 5904. (§ 5314). Exceptions, when taken.
Even if the interveners were parties in the trial, the ob-
jection was made as is required by this section, and it was
not made to appear that the intervening defendants were
ignorant of the defect in service prior to the trial. Cham-
blee v. Wayman, 167 Ga. 821, 146 S. E. 851.
ARTICLE 5
Evidence before Court Commissioners
§ 5910. (§ 5315.) Depositions taken without
order or commission.
Effect of Refusal to Testify.—A party to a pending action
who is a competent and compellable witness served with
proper notice for the taking of his depositions, but refuses
to answer proper questions upon the sole ground that he
does not come within any of the classes specified in section
5886, is guilty of contempt. Stephens v. liquid Carbomc
Co., 36 Ga. App. 363, 136 S. E. 808.
SEVENTH TITLE
The Verdict and Judgment
CHAPTER 1
Verdict and Judgment
ARTICLE 1
Of the Verdict and Its Reception
§ 5926. (§ 5331.) Direct verdict, when.
Sections 5168 and 5926 construed together in Callaway v.
L-ife Ins. Co., 166 Ga. 818, 144 S. E. 381.
Sufficiency of Evidence.—In Kemp v. Rossignol, 167 Ga.
820, 146 S. E. 897, it was held, that the evidence was not
of such character as authorized the direction of a verdict
for the defendant, under the provision of this section.
Testing Propriety of Directing Verdict.
—Where, under all
the circumstances, only one conclusion is reasonably possible,
the question ceases to be issuable as one of fact and be-
comes a question of law. Southern Pacific Co. v. DiCristina,
36 Ga. App. 433, 439, 137 S. E. 79.
Converse of Section.—Where there is conflicting evidence
as to material issues, it is error for the court to direct a
verdict. Bailey v. First Nat. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 454, 129 S.
E- 920.
Refusal to Direct Always Proper. — Roberts v. Groover,
161 Ga. 414, 131 S. E- 158.
In proceedings to> probate a will, upon a caveat for mental
incapacity, where the evidence did not support such in-
capacity, directing verdict for the propounder was held not
erroneous. Mason v. Taylor, 162 Ga. 149, 152, 132 S. E. 891.
Applied in Taylor v. Mentone Hotel & Co., 163 Ga. 357,
361, 136 S. E. 137; Burch v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 37 Ga.
App. 63, 66, 139 S. E. 123.
§ 5927. (§ 5332.) Construction of verdicts.
In General.—While it has been held that the construction
of a verdict may be aided by a consideration of the plead-
ings, and that all the undisputed facts proved upon the trial
may be examined and considered in construing the verdict,
this rule of construction is to be resorted to only when the
intent of the jury is not reasonably apparent from the lan-
guage of the verdict itself. Where the verdict is plain and
unmistakable in its terms and legal effect, it must speak
for itself. Turner v. Shackleford, 39 Ga. App. 49, 145 S. E.
913.
Alimony.—Properly construed in view of the pleadings,
the evidence, and the charge to the jury, the verdict was
not void for uncertainty, although it contained no finding
of the amount of alimony. Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga.
228, 140 S. E. 497.
Amount Where Verdict for Defendant.—A verdict in a
trover suit, which reads, "We, the jury, find the property
in dispute in favor of the defendant," will, at the instance
of the defenaant, be construed as a verdict finding for the
defendant for the value of the property in the amount
established by the plaintiff's affidavit for bail, which is
corroborated by the plaintiff's own personal testimony upon
the trial. This is true although the defendant may not,
prior to the rendition of the verdict, have elected to take a
verdict for the value of the property. Pound v. Baldwin, 34
Ga. App. 810, 131 S. E. 291.
A verdict is certain which can be made certain by what
itself contains or by the record. Smith v. Cooper, 161 Ga.
594, 595, 131 S. E. 478.
Verdicts are to be construed in the light of the pleadings
and the evidence, and all that is essential to a valid verdict
is substantial certainty to a common and reasonable intent.
It appearing from the pleadings and evidence in the record
in this case that the validity of two deeds was involved,
both relating to a single transaction, the court did not en
in construing the finding of the jury finding "the deed"
invalid as a reference to both deeds involved in the common
issue. Short v. Cofer, 161 Ga. 587, 131 S. E- 362.
Illustration.—On the trial of a case the jury returned the
following verdict: "We the jury find in favor of the de-
fendant. To pay Gragg L,umber Company $1100.00, with in-
terest at 7% from June the 21st, 1924, and all taxes up to
date." Verdicts should have a reasonable intendment un-
der this section. The verdict, construed in the light of the
pleadings and the evidence, was for $11,000.00, and not for
$1100.00, as expressed in figures in the verdict. Gragg v.
Hall, 164 Ga. 628, 637, 139 S. E- 339.
§ 5930. (§ 5335.) Plaintiff may choose verdict.
Section Construed with Section 4494. — The plaintiff does
not have the option given to him under this section, "if the
defendant at the first term will tender the property to the
plaintiff, together with reasonable hire for the same since
the conversion, disclaiming all claim of title." In such a
case the plaintiff is limited to a recovery of the property
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under the tender; and is chargeable with the cost, unless
it be shown that a previous demand for the property had
been made and refused. Downs Motor Co. v. Colbert, 34 Ga.
App. 542, 130 S. E- 592.
Effect of Election upon Issue.—The sole issue in the trial
of an action of trover is that of title to the property in dis-
pute; and the fact that the plaintiff may elect to take a
money verdict under this section in lieu of the specific per-
sonalty claimed can in no event alter that issue. Citizens
Bank v. Mullis, 161 Ga. 371. 131 S. E. 44.
§ 5933. (§ 5338.) Juries may sustain verdict.
Applied in Anderson v. Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 297, 129
S. E. 567.
ARTICLE 2
Of Entering Judgment
§ 5942. (§ 5347). Nonsuit, when granted.
Evidence showing that plaintiff ought not to recover,
sustains a grant of nonsuit. Durden v. Durden, 165 Ga. 813,
142 S. E- 151.
Applied in Morris v. Peachtree Heights Park Co., 38 Ga.
App. 303, 143 S. E. 909.
Cited in Peek v. Irwin, 164 Ga. 450, 452, 139 S. E. 27.
ARTICLE 3
Of the Effect and Lien of Judgments
§ 5943. (§ 5348). Conclusiveness of judgments.
The judgment regularly rendered between the creditor
and debtor, until set aside for fraud, accident, mistake, or
other cause, was conclusive and binding between them as
to the amount of the indebtedness. The agreement alleged
to have been made between the parties therefore was with-
out consideration and not binding. Creswell v. Bryant
Hardware Co., 166 Ga. 228, 142 S. E. 885.
§ 5944. (§ 5349). Judgments at same term of
equal date.
Applied in Kirach v. Witt, 37 Ga. App. 402, 140 S. E-
511; Herndon v. Braddy, 39 Ga. App. 165, 146 S. E- 495.
§ 5946. (§ 5351). Dignity and binding effect of
judgment.
Cited in Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 306, 139 S.
E- 912.
§ 5948. (§ 5353). Judgments do not bind
choses in action.
The right of a partner to a homestead exemption out of
the property of his firm is a chose in action; and the as-
signment of such chose in action by the partner, before the
institution of a collateral proceeding or a garnishment,
passes to the assignee the property in the chose in action
assigned, free from the lien of a general judgment previ-
ously rendered against the assignor. Citizens' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Pendergrass Banking Co., 164 Ga. 302, 138 S.
E- 223.
ARTICLE 5
How Attacked, and Herein of Motion in Arrest
of Judgment
§ 5957. (§ 5362). Motion in arrest of judg-
ment
cited in the opinion, there was no error in affirming a re-
fusal to set aside a judgment on motion filed after the
term when it was rendered. Gravitt v. State, 165 Ga. 779,
142 S. E. 100.
A motion to set aside a judgment will lie for any defeat
not amendable which appears on the face of the record or
pleadings (Civil Code of 1910, § 5957), but since a verdict
cures any defect which might has been corrected by amend-
ment, even though it could be assumed that the plaintiff
could have been required to amend his petition so as to
allege specifically and in terms that the defendant was
indebted to him as the payee on the unconditional, unin-
dorsed, and unpaid promise to pay, the petition did not fail
to set forth a cause of action, it being the general rule
that the payee of a note is presumed to continue in its
ownership. Hobbs v. Citizens Bank, 32 Ga. App. 522(4),
124 S. E- 72. See also Strickland v. Citizens National
B,ank, 15 Ga. App. 464, 83 S. E. 883; Brooke v. Fouts, 37 Ga.
App. 563, 140 S. E. 902.
Applied in Weems v. Kidd, 37 Ga. App. 8, 138 S. E- 863.
§ 5958. (§ 5363.) Nature of such motion.
Applied in 1/ongshore v. Collier, 37 Ga. App. 450, 140 S.
E. 636; Grogan v. Deraney, 38 Ga. App. 287, 289, 143 S.
E. 912.
§ 5960. (§ 5365.)
ground to arrest.
Amendable defects, no
Under the Civil Code, §§ 5957, 5958, and rulings in cases
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Applied to a distress warrant containing amendable defects.
Johnson v. Lock, 36 Ga. App. 620, 621, 137 S. E. 911.
Cited or applied in Hudson v. Cohen, 34 Ga. App. 119, 128
S. E- 205; Henderson v. EUarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5, 6, 131 S.
E. 524; Willcox v. Beechwood Band Mill Co., 166 Ga.
367, 372, 143 S. E- 405; Weems v. Kidd, 37 Ga. App. 8,
138 S. E. 863.
§ 5961. (§ 5366.) Judgments obtained by per-
jury will be set aside.
Subsequent Statement of Witness as to Falsity of Evi-
dence.—The fact that a witness for the state in a criminal
case, though he be the only witness for the prosecution, has
made declarations, since the trial, that this testimony given
upon the trial was false, is not cause for a new trial. Mor-
row v. State, 36 Ga. App. 217, 136 S. E. 92.
§ 5968. (§ 5367). Jurisdiction of the motion to
arrest.
This provision not applied to proceeding in equity by pe-
tition as in ordinary suit. Williamson v. Haddock, 165
Ga. 168, 140 S. E. 373.
§ 5963, (§ 5368). Judgments, how attacked.
Applied in Willcox v. Beechwood Band Mill Co., 166 Ga.
367, 372, 143 S. E- 405.
§ 5964. (§ 5369.) Judgments, when void.
Setting Aside by Justice.—A justice of the peace has no
authority to set aside a judgment rendered by him; the
subsequent entering of a second judgment purporting to set
aside the first mentioned judgment, was itself void and
should be treated as a nullity under this section. Edwards
v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 825, 137 S. E. 244.
Orders.—Where the judge's order shows on its face a
cotal lack of jurisdiction, the judgment is wholly void, and
may, under this section, be attacked collaterally. Rogers v.
Toccoa Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 528, 131 S. E. 517.
When Subject to Attack.—While the judgment of a court
having no jurisdiction of the person against whom it is
rendered may be void, where the court has jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and the defendant has been served, he
can not attack the judgment by affidavit of illegality. Ham-
ilton v. Chitwood, 37 Ga. App. 393, 140 S. E. 518.
Proceedings in the superior court in a case where it has
no jurisdiction of the subject-matter are nullities; and a
judgment, after the case has been dismissed upon demurrer
for lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, awarding
compensation to receivers and their attorneys, is null and
void. Deans v. Deans, 164 Ga. 162, 137 S. E. 829.
§ 5965 COSTS IN CIVIL CASES § 5989(7)
§ 5965. (§ 5370.) Equity may set aside judg-
ment.
Time of Filing Petition.—Where suit is brought in
equity to set aside a verdict and decree for fraud, ac-
cident, or mistake, under this and the following section,
the petition as in equity causes may be filed under the
§ 5562, either in -term time or vacation, returnable to the
next ensuing term commencing not less than twenty days
from the date on which the petition is filed. Williamson
v. Haddock, 165 Ga. 168, 140 S. E. 373.
Applied in Bryant v. Bush, 165 Ga. 252, 140 S. E. 366;
Ehrlick v. Bell, 163 Ga. 547, 136 S. E. 423.
§§ 5968 (a) -5968(d). Park's Code.
See i§§ 5968(1) -5968(4).
§ 5968(1). Jurisdiction to set aside judgment
on secured debt.—When a judgment shall be ren-
dered upon any obligation secured by a deed to
secure debt, a bond for title to realty, or a bill of
sale to personality, given under section 3306 of
the Civil Code, the court which rendered such
judgment, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall
have jurisdiction, power, and authority to vacate
and set aside said judgment at any time before
the sale of the property described in the deed,
bond for title, or bill of sale is made, upon mo-
tion of the attorney of the plaintiff and defendant
in fi. fa., and the payment of the costs. Acts
1927, p. 221.
§ 5968(2). Cancellation of ft. fa.—Whenever a
judgment shall be so vacated and set aside, the
clerk of the court in which it was rendered shall
mark the fi. fa. issued thereon cancelled and the
clerk of the Superior Court shall enter the same
upon the general execution docket, and make
thereon an appropriate reference to the order va-
cating the judgment. Whenever a judgment
shall as herein provided be vacated and set aside,
any deed reconveying the property to the defend-
ant in fi. fa. for the purpose of levy and sale shall
be, by virtue of the provisions hereof, automati-
cally cancelled and rendered null and void, and
the clerk of the Superior Court shall enter on the
record of such deed or reconveyance, when re-
corded, the word "cancelled," and make appro-
priate reference to the order vacating the judg-
ment.
§ 5968(3). Original status restored.—When a
judgment shall be vacated and set aside as here-
in provided, the obligation upon which the same
was rendered, as well as the deed, bond for title,
or bill of sale securing the same, shall be fully
restored in all respects to the original status of
the same which existed prior to the commence-
ment of the suit in which such judgment was ren-
dered, and thereafter the same shall be for all
purposes whatsoever legally of force and effect as
if suit had not been instituted and judgment ob-
tained on the said obligation.
§ 5968(4). Applicable to mortgage foreclosure.
—The jurisdiction, power, and authority to va-
cate and set aside a judgment, as hereinbefore
provided, shall extend to a judgment on pur-
chase-money note, conditional sale contract
where title is reserved as security, or bond for
title is given, and all other cases where it is nec-
essary under section 6037 of the Civil Code to re-
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convey property to the defendant in fi. fa. for the
purpose of levy and sale. The provisions of this
Act shall also extend and be applicable in all re-
spects to a judgment and decree foreclosing a
mortgage.
ARTICLE 6
Of the Transfer of Judgments
§ 5971. (§ 5376). Joint debtors may control fi.
fa., when.
Applied in Autry v. Southern Railway Co., 167 Ga. 136,
142, 144 S. E. 741.
EIGHTH TITLE
Costs in Civil Cases
CHAPTER 1
Of Costs in Civil Cases
ARTICLE 1
Who Liable for Costs; Compensation of Cer-
tain Stenographic Reporters
§ 5980'. (§ 5385). Who shall pay costs.
Applied in Grizzard v. Ford, 167 Ga. 531, 146 S. E. 126.
§ 5989(3). In counties containing cities of
more than 175,000 population.—One official court
reporter for each of the several divisions of the
superior and city courts in counties of this State
containing a city of more than 175,000 popula-
tion, according to the Federal census of 1920,
shall be paid out of the treasury of such county a
salary to be fixed by the commissioners of roads
and revenues of such county, not to exceed forty-
two hundred dollars per annum, payable monthly,
which salary shall be compensation in full for at-
tendance upon, and taking stenographic notes in,
any court or division thereof covered by this Act.
Acts 1923, p. 104; 1925, p. 164; 1927, p. 216.
Editor's Note.—The maximum salary to be paid to a court
reporter under this section was raised from three thousand
dollars to forty-two hundred dollars, by the amendment of
1927.
§ 5989(7)., Salary of stenographer of circuit
with city of 30,000 to 52,000 inhabitants.—From
and after September 1st, 1929, the compensation
of any and all stenographic reporters of all ju-
dicial circuits of this State, which are now or
which may be established, having therein a city
with a population of not less than 30,000 nor
more than 52,000 inhabitants, according to the
Federal census of 1920, shall be the sum of
$250.00 per month for reporting and transcribing
such criminal cases as are now required by law
248 ]
§ 5997 ABOLITION OF FEE SYSTEM IN CERTAIN COUNTIES § 6017(7)
to be reported, in the county wherein such city
is located, said salary to be paid monthly out of
the treasury of the county in which such city is
located, as other court expenses are paid, and
which compensation shall be in full for reporting
and transcribing such criminal cases as are now
required by law to be reported for and in the
county in which such city is located; and in the
other counties of said circuit such stenographic
reporter or reporters shall receive compensation
as now provided by law. Acts 1929, p. 325, § 1
CHAPTER 2
Fees of Officers of Court
ARTICLE 2
Fees of Sheriffs, Deputy Sheriffs and Bailiffs
§ 5997. (§ 5401). Fees of sheriffs.
Effect oi 1918 Amendment.—While compensation for such
services is provided by the act of 1918 amending this sec-
tion the amounts coming to such officers for such services
are not fixed and certain, but depend on the number of
juries summoned by them under said act, and for this
reason do not fall within the principles announced in I,amb
v. Toomer, 91 Ga. 621, 17 S. E. 966; Gamble v. Clark, 92
Ga. 695, 19 S. £. 54; Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga.
121, 47 S. E. 634; Clark v. Eve, 134 Ga. 788, 68 S. E- 598;
Tucker v. Shoemaker, 149 Ga. 250, 99 S. D. 865; Culberson
v. Watkins, 156 Ga. 185, 119 S. E. 319; Sammon" v. Glass-
cock County, 161 Ga. 893(3), 131 S. E. 881; Baggett v.
Barrow, 166 Ga. 700, 144 S. E. 251.
Claims of sheriffs for summoning juries under the provi-
sions of the act of 1918 amending this section fall within
the provisions of the section 411 of the Code, and when
not presented within twelve months after they accrue,
they are barred. Baggett v. Barrow, 166 Ga. 700, 144 S.
F,. 251.
The term "each jury," as used in the 1918 amendment of
this section, means each grand jury and each petit jury
drawn under the provisions of sections 823, 826, 866, 874.
and 875 of the Penal Code. Such term does not include
tales jurors, whether personally summoned by direction of
the judge or drawn to make up or complete panels of jur-
ors. Baggett v. Barrow, 166 Ga. 700, 144 S. E- 251.
ARTICLE 3
Compensation of Officers When No Fees Fixed
§ 6001. Compensation to officers, how allowed.
—The ordinaries of this state who by law are
vested with the management of the county busi-
ness, and for whom no compensation is now pro-
vided, and the sheriffs and clerks of the superior
courts, for public services in relation to which
existing laws provide no compensation, shall be
compensated as follows, to wit: Such officers
shall state their respective claims in writing, and
make affidavit to the correctness and justice
thereof, which so made out and verified shall be
submitted to the grand juries of their respective
counties at any regular term thereof at which a
grand jury is impaneled, after the services ren-
dered; provided, if such statement is not sub-
mitted at that term or at the next succeeding
term at which a grand jury is empaneled, such
claim for services shall be barred; and said grand
juries may in their discretion require other proof
of the justness - and correctness of such claims,
and, when satisfied that said claims are just and
correct, may allow the sum claimed, or so much
thereof as they may deem right and proper; and
when allowed, the ordinary of such county, or
other authority levying county taxes, shall assess
so much with the other county taxes as will pay
the same, which when collected and paid over
to the county treasurer of such county, shall be
paid by him to the parties thereto, without
further order, he taking a proper receipt therefor.
The compensation provided for in this section
shall be in full of all compensation of such of-
ficers for such services. Acts 1929, p. 171, § 1.
CHAPTER 3
Abolition of Fee System in Certain Counties
ARTICLE 1
Counties of 200,000 or More Population
§ 6017(1). County officers to receive salaries
instead of fees.
Cited in Georgia-Carolina Lumber Co. v. Wright, 161 Ga.
281, 285, 131 S. E. 173.
§ 6017(6). Commissions for collection of cor-
poration, occupation and other special taxes re-
turnable to state. — Provided however, commis-
sions now or hereafter allowed by law for the col-
lection of corporation, occupation and other special
taxes shall be collected by the officers aforesaid
for the use of the State and held as public moneys
belonging to the state and shall be remitted by
the officer collecting the same to the State in the
same manner and at the same time the taxes are
remitted, and none of said commissions shall be
turned into the county treasury. The provisions
of this section shall not apply to counties having
a population of not less than ninety thousand
(90,000) nor more than one hundred and fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants. Acts 1925, pp.
159, 160; 1927, p. 208.
Editor's Note.—The last sentence of the section was added
by the amendment of 1927.
ARTICLE 2
Counties of 44,000 to 60,000 Population and Coun-
ties of 70,000 to 150,000 Population
§ 6017(7). County officers to receive salaries
instead of fees; exception.—This Act shall apply
to all counties in the State of Georgia having by
the United States census of 1920 a population of
forty-four thousand to sixty thousand inhabitants
and to all counties in the State of Georgia having
by the United States census of 1920 a population
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of seventy thousand to one hundred and fifty
thousand inhabitants and to all counties in the
State which may by any future census of the
United States have a population of seventy thou-
sand to one hundred and fifty thousand inhabi-
tants except as hereinafter provided. In all such
counties the fee system for compensating the offi-
cers herein named shall be abolished except those
fees that are paid by the State to the Tax Collec-
tor and Tax Receiver and the officers herein
named shall thereafter be paid salaries as herein
provided instead of fees as under the present
system except for the fees to be paid by the State
as will be hereinafter provided. Acts 1924, p. 90;
1925, p. 161; 1927, p. 207.
Editor's Note.—The phrase "except as hereinafter pro-
vided" at the end of the first sentence, was inserted by the
amendment of 1927.
§ 6017(8). Salaries to be fixed annually 90
days before January 1.—The salaries, in all such
counties as are described in Section 6017(7), of
the Clerk of the Superior Court, (whether he be
•ex officio clerk of other courts or not) the Sher-
iff, the Ordinary, the Tax Collector, and the Tax
Receiver, shall be fixed for the terms of such offi-
cers, at least ninety days before the first of Jan-
uary, (beginning with January, 1926), by the
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, if there
be such, (whether the bodv shall consist of one
or several commissioners) or, in event that there
are no such Commissioners, the Ordinary or
other County authorities having charge of the
Roads and Revenues of such counties and such
salaries shall be fixed for each term, at the time
aforesaid, and shall not be changed during said
terms. Provided that in counties having a popu-
lation of not less than ninety thousand (90,000)
nor more than one hundred and fifty thousand
(150,000) by the census of the United States,
the clerk of the Superior Court shall be paid a
salary of nine thousand ($9,000.00) dollars per
annum; the sheriff a salary of seven thousand
($7,000.00) dollars per annum; the ordinary a sal-
ary of six thousand, five hundred ($6,500.00) dol-
lars per annum; the tax-collector a salary of one
thousand ($1,000.00) dollars per annum for serv-
ices collecting the countv taxes; the tax-receiver
a salary of three thousand, five hundred ($3,500.00.)
dollars per annum for receiving the returns
for county taxes; each of said salaries to be paid
in equal monthly installments. Provided that
nothing herein shall affect any fees or compensa-
tion that are now allowed by law to the said tax-
collector by the State of Georgia or that may be
fixed or allowed hereafter by law, it being the in-
tent of this proviso that the fees and compensa-
tion which said tax-collector receives from the
State shall not be abrogated and shall not be con-
sidered as any part of the salary he receives from
the County of Chatham. Acts 1924, p. 90; 1927,
p. 208.
Editor's Note.—Both of the provisos to this section were
added by the amendment of 1927.
§ 6017(11). Payment of salaries, how made.
—After said salaries and expenses are so fixed
and determined, as provided in §§ 6017(8), 6017(9)
and 6017(10), it shall be proper and lawful for the
treasurer of the county, or other custodian or de-
pository of county funds, out of the county funds
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which may be paid into the county treasury of
such county and derived under the provisions of
§6017(13) on or before the fifteenth day of each
month, to pay out the monthly portion of such
salaries and expenses to each officer herein named,
who shall retain his own salary, and disburse the
salaries of assistants and deputies and expenses
of the office. Provided, however, that it may be
lawful for the Treasurer of the County, or other
custodian or depository of County funds, to an-
ticipate the payment into the County Treasury
of funds derived under the provisions of § 6017(13)
and to pay out of County funds the monthly por-
tion of such salaries and expenses to each officer
herein named, as herein above provided. Such
disbursement shall be made in accordance with the
provisions of any local or special Act of any county
affected by the provision of this Act, regulating the
methods of disbursements of other county funds.
Provided, that as relates to counties having a pop-
ulation of not less than ninety thousand (90,000)
nor more than one hundred and fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, the words and figures, "as
provided in §§ 6017(8), 6017(9) and 6017(10)" as
used in this section shall not apply. Acts 1924, pp.
90, 92; 1925, p. 162; 1927, p. 209.
Editor's Note.—The last proviso was added by the amend-
ment of 1927.
NINTH TITLE
Of Executions and Sales Thereunder
CHAPTER 1
Of Different Kinds of Executions
ARTICLE 2
Of Fi. Fas., How Levied, and Proceedings
Thereon
§ 6026. (§ 5421.) Form of levy.
Cited in Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 136 S. E. 151; in
dissenting opinion in Lane v. Bradfield, 37 Ga. App. 395,
396, 140 S. E- 417.
§ 6028. (§ 5423.) On what property first
levied, right of.
Section Not Applicable to Tax Execution.—This section
does not apply to tax sales. McDaniel v. Thomas, 162 Ga.
592, 133 S. E. 624.
Effect Where Defendant Not Allowed to Point out Prop-
erty—Notice to Surety.—It is not a ground of illegality that
the defendant surety was not notified of the impending levy
and was given no opportunity to point out property either
in his possession or in the possession of one of the principals
in the judgment. Mulling v. Bank, 36 Ga. App. 55, 135 S. E.
222.
§ 6029. (§ 5424.) Sale of separate parcels
subject to lien.
To What Liens Applicable.—Applied to the enforcement
of a tax lien. Columbia Trust, etc
,
Co. v. Alston, 163 Ga.
83, 135 S. E. 431.
§ 6030 SATISFACTION OF EXECUTIONS § 6048
The rescission or cancellation of an executory contract
for the sale of land and the release of the purchaser from
the payment of the purchase-money due by him, consti-
tute an extinguishment of the contract of sale and put
an end to it, and such transaction does not amount to a
sale or alienation of the property by the vendee in such
contract, in the sense in which the words "sale" and
"alienation" are used in this section. Planters Ware-
house Co. v. Simpson, 164 Ga. 190, 138 S. E- 55.
The court will grant injunction against enforcement of
tax executions otherwise than as here provided. Douglas
v. Hannahatchee Ranch Corporation, 168 Ga. 238, 147 S.
E. 518.
§ 6030.
how.
(§ 5425.) Growing crop to be sold,
Stage of Maturity When Subject to Levy.—As to crops,
such as cotton, which do not mature on the stalk at one time,
but whose maturity is extended throughout the latter portion
of the growing season, the rational construction of this sec-
tion would be, that the crop is subject to levy, whenever it
has reached that stage of maturity when it is ready fir
harvesting to commence. Barnesville Bank v. Ingram, 34
Ga. App. 369, 129 S. E. 112.
§ 6031. (§ 5426.) Notice of levy on land.
•Cited in Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 384, 136 S. E. 151.
§
sale.
6032, (§ 5427.) Setting aside execution
Sec notes to § 4129.
Applied in Davis v. Elliott, 163 Ga. 169, 175, 135 S. E. 731.
Cited in Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 136 S. E. 151.
ARTICLE 3
Levy and Sale Where Defendant Has not Legal
Title
§ 6037. (§ 5432.) Levy, when contract of
purchase or bond for title made.
See notes to § 3298.
I. EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Applied in Corley v. Jarrell, 36 Ga. App. 225, 136 S. E. 177.
VI. FILING AND RECORDING.
Necessity for Filing and Recording Deed'—Proper Person
to Execute Deed.—Under this section, the "holder of the
legal title," and not the original vendor, is the proper per-
son to execute the quitclaim deed under the fi. fa. If a note
only is transferred and no deed is made conveying the legal
title to the land as security, then it is necessary, after the
transferee has obtained judgment, that the vendor execute a
quitclaim deed to the purchaser before the fi. fa. could have
been levied, because in that event the vendor would have
continued to be the holder of the legal title. Swinson v.
Shurling, 162 Ga. 604, 134 S. E. 613.
The fact that the vendor had previously conveyed the
land by warranty deed to one of the purchasers is not a
compliance with the requirements of this section. Hoi-
brook v. Adams, 166 Ga. 871, 872, 144 S. E. 657.
The property is not subject to levy and sale on a judg-
ment for the secured debt until it has been reconveyed
to the debtor, and until such reconveyance has been filed
and recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior
court. Callaway v. Life Ins. Co., 166 Ga. 818, 144 S. E-
381.
Where the vendor of land executed a quitclaim deed
thereto for the purpose of levying the execution which is-
sued upon the judgment against the vendee for the un-
paid purchase-money, such deed, filed and recorded before
the levy, is not invalid for such purpose, although not
recorded until after the death of the vendor. Terrell v.
Gould, 168 Ga. 607, 148 S. E. 515.
It is not necessary that a quitclaim deed made for the
purpose of levy and sale, under this section, should be
delivered to the debtor. Denton v. Hannah, 12 Ga. App.
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494(8), 77 S. E. 672; Terrell v. Gould, 168 Ga. 607, 148 S-
E. 515.
VII. LEVY AND SALE.
General Considerations.—Under this section, the holder
of a debt and of the legal title of land conveyed to him as
security by the debtor, may, upon default in payment, re-
duce the debt to judgment, place of record a quitclaim re-
investing the debtor with the legal title to the land, and
thereupon have the land levied on and sold in satisfaction
of the judgment, free from the claims of persons who pur-
chased the land from the debtor subject to the securitv
deed. Scott v. Paisley, 271 U. S. 632, 46 S. Ct. 591, af-
firming S. C. 158 Ga. 876, 124 S. E- 726.
Notice.—There is no principle entitling such purchasers
to notice of the exercise of this statutory power by the
creditor, and that in failing to provide such notice the
statute does not deprive them of property without due proc-
ess of law or deny them the equal protection of the laws.
Scott v. Paisley, supra.
§ 6038. (§ 5433.) Where another than vendor,
etc., has judgment.
In General—Scope—Applies to Stranger to Security Deed.—
Where it appears that a conveyance of title to the property
levied on, made by the defendant in execution to a strange."
prior to the levy, would, if valid, operate, under the section
to deprive the defendant in execution of any leviable interest
in the property, the plaintiff in execution may, in the same
action, for the purpose of subjecting the property to the
execution, attack the conveyance upon the ground of fraud.
This case is distinguishable from Sloan v. Loftis, 157 Ga.
93, 120 S. E. 781, in which it appears conclusively, as a
matter of law, that the legal title was in the claimant, and
that the only interest the defendant in execution had ever
had in the property levied upon was as a purchaser holding
under a bond for title. Remington v. Garrett, 34 Ga. App. 715,
130 S. E. 831.
No Levy Until Note Paid.—See Miller v. First Nat. Bank,
35 Ga. App. 334, 132 S. E- 783, holding the same as the
paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Cited in Duke v. Ayers, 163 Ga. 444, 454, 136 S. E. 410.
CHAPTER 2
Of Forthcoming Bonds
§ 6042. (§ 5437.) Rights of plaintiffs not af-
fected.
Section quoted in Garmany v. Loach, 34 Ga. App. 722, 131
S. E. 108.
§ 6043. (§ 5438). Measure of damages on
forthcoming bond.
Applied in Law v. Mullis, 37 Ga. App. 329, 140 S. E. 430.
CHAPTER 4
Of the Satisfaction of Executions
§ 6048. Release of property subject to execu-
tion.—If the plaintiff in execution, for a valuable
consideration, release property which is subject
thereto, it is a satisfaction of such execution to
the extent of the value of the property so re-
leased, so far as purchasers and creditors are con-
cerned; but nothing in this section shall apply to
any such release made by the transferee of any
execution issued for taxes due the State of Geor-
gia or any county or municipality therein, or
of any execution issued by any municipality of
this State on account of assessments made
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against real estate for street or other improve-
ments. In all such cases the fi. fa. shall be dis-
charged or satisfied only to the extent of the
amount of taxes or other assessments owing by
the parcel released. Acts of 1929, p. 172, § 6048.
The language, "a valuable consideration," in this sec-
tion, means a consideration "founded on money, or some-
thing convertible to money, or having a value in money,
except marriage, which is a valuable consideration;" and
such valuable consideration must flow to the plaintiff in
execution. The principle embodied in this section is not
applicable where the plaintiff in execution receives no ben-
efit from a release, but a third person incidentally re-
ceives a benefit therefrom. Saunders v. Citizens' First
Nat. Bank, 165 Ga. 558, 142 S. E- 127; 38 Ga. App. 141,
142 S. E. 744.
The evidence in this case demands a finding that the
liens of the tax fi. fas. were satisfied relatively to the
plaintiff's lot, on account of releases for values from the
liens of the same fi. fas. pn the other lots subject there-
to by the transferee and holder of the fi. fas. in favor of
grantees of said last-mentioned lots, who received deeds
to their lots from plaintiff's grantor subsequently to plain-
tiff's deed to his separate lot. Security Mortgage Co. v.
Bailey, 167 Ga. 119, 144 S. E. 899.
CHAPTER 5
Of Title by Judicial Sale
§ 6051. (§ 5446). Judicial sale passes title.
A sale regularly made by virtue of judicial process is-
suing from a court of competent jurisdiction conveys the
title as effectually as if the sale were made by the per-
son against whom the process issues; and the purchaser
at such sale is ordinarily entitled to immediate posses-
sion, which he may obtain by writ of possession; but this
is not his exclusive remedy. Hill v. Kitchens, 39 Ga.
App. 789, 148 S. E. 754.
§ 6052. (§ 5447). Such title is original.
Applied in Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 426, 141 S. £•
188.
CHAPTER 6
Of Sales under Execution
ARTICLE 1
When and Where Made
§ 6060. (§ 5455.) Place, time, and manner of
sales.
Not Applicable to Parties under Contract to Deliver.—
The provisions of the section, relieving levying officers in
certain instances from removing heavy property to the
court-house door, were made for the benefit of the officers
and the parties to processes levied by them, and not for the
benefit of other persons who may voluntarily contract in
writing by a statutory bond to deliver such property at the
court-house door. See Scruggs v. Bennett, 34 Ga. App. 131,
132, 128 S. E. 703, and cases there cited.
ARTICLE 2
Advertisement of Judicial Sales
§ 6062. (§ 5457). Sales, how advertised.
An advertisement, which described the fi. fa. as being
in favor of the original plaintiff and against the defend-
ant and stated their names, constituted a substantial com-
pliance with this section, although at the time of the levy
and of the advertisement the fi. fa. was owned by a
transferee, who had acquired it by a written transfer, and
who was not mentioned in the advertisement. Hill v.
Kitchens, 39 Ga. App. 789, 148 S. E. 754.
§ 6065(a). Park's Code.
See § 6065(1).
§ 6065(1). Selection of official organ. — "No
journal or newspaper published in this State
shall be declared or made the official organ of
any county for the publication of sheriff's sales,.
ordinary's citations, or any other advertising
commonly known and termed 'official or legal
advertising,' and required by law to be published
in such county official newspaper, unless such
newspaper shall have been continuously pub-
lished and mailed to a list of bonafide sub-
scribers for a period of two years, or is the di-
rect successor of such journal or newspaper, and
no change shall be made in official organship of
any county except in those counties in which
there is a city having a population of between
38,000 and 52,900 according to the official census
of the United States for the year 1920, upon the
action of the county commissioners or a majority
of said officers, and in all other counties upon the
concurrent action of the ordinary, sheriff, and
clerk of the superior court of said county, or a
majority of said officers: Provided, that in counties
where no journal or newspaper has been estab-
lished for two years the official organ may be
designated by the ordinary, sheriff, and clerk of
the superior court, a majority of these officers
governing. Provided further, that in counties of
this State having a population of not less than
11,370 and not more than 11,450, according to the
United States Census of 1920 or any future cen-
sus, the sheriff, ordinary, and the clerk of the
superior court, or a majority of such officers, may
select any newspaper published in any such
county as the official organ of said county for
publication of sheriff's sales, ordinary's citations,
and any other advertising commonly known and
termed 'official or legal advertising,' and required
by law to be published in such county official
newspaper." Acts 1929, p. 174, § 1.
§ 6065(2). When two or more journals pub-
lished in certain counties.—Provided, that in all
counties in the State of Georgia in which there is
a city having a population of between six thou-
sand eight hundred sixty (6860) and six thousand
eight hundred eighty (6880) according to the
official census of the United States of the year
1920, where there are published two or more
journals or newspapers qualified under this sec-
tion to be official organ of any county, then and
in that event the said officers shall rotate every
twTo years the official printing between said news-
papers, provided said papers are published at the
county site. Acts of 1929, p. 175, § 2.
ARTICLE 3
Sale of Perishable Property
§ 6068. (§ 5463.) Sale of perishable property.
As to amount of recovery, see note under section 5153.
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§ 6069 NEW TRIALS § 6090(a)
Liens.—For a case holding substantially with the case
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Cham-
bers v. Planters Bank, 161 Ga. 535, 131 S. E- 280.
One Filing Intervention Charged with Notice of Applica-
tion for Short-Order Sale.—One who files an intervention
claiming title to a vehicle against which condemnation pro-
ceedings have been instituted for transporting prohibited
liquors along the public highways is chargeable with notice
of an application, already of file in the same court, for a
"short-order" sale of the property under the section. Parker
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 370, 136 S. F. 800.
Proceeds of Sale.—Where the personal property levied
upon is afterwards regularly sold by virtue of a so-called
short-order sale, obtained after the due advertisement and
after the required notice to the defendant in execution,
as provided in this and the following sections, the pro-
ceeds of the sale, less the costs, should be credited upon
the indebtedness due by the defendant in execution. Jones
Motor Co. v. Macon Savings Bank, 37 Ga. App. 767, 142
S. E. 199.
§ 6069. (§ 5464.) How sold.
See note to preceding section under catchline "Liens."
Fd. Note.
It appearing that the required notice of intention to ap-
ply for an order for speedy sale of property under this
section, was not given, and it not appearing that the case
fell within either of the exceptions to that requirement
provided in the section, the court was without jurisdic-
tion to pass the order. Parker & Dunn v. State, 166 Ga.
256, 142 S. F. 879.
ARTICLE 4
Liability of Bidder at Public Sale
§ 6071. (§ 5466). Purchaser's liability.
Numerous decisions to the effect that the bidder takes
the "risk" when he refuses to comply with his bid and
lets the property be sold again, mean that he takes the
chance of the property bringing more or less than he bid,
thus eliminating or increasing his liability. Womack v.
Tidewell, 38 Ga. App. 232, 234, 143 S. F. 620.
In Morgan v. Wolpert, 164 Ga. 462, 139 S. F. 15, it was
held under the evidence that the acts of the sheriff
amounted to an election by the sheriff to treat the sale
as final, and preclude a resale under this section.
In Peek v. Peek, 166 Ga. 166, 142 S. F. 663, it is stated
that: "It is at least questionable whether the executor
or administrator could elect to resell after a delay of thir-
teen months at the instance of the purchaser."
TENTH TITLE
New Trials
CHAPTER 1
By Whom and for What Causes Allowed
§ 6080. (§ 5475). Rules nisi must be ssrved.
Time of Service.
—While no specific time is prescribed
by this section within which the respondent shall be
served with a copy of the rule nisi issued upon an appli-
cation for a new trial, it has been held that service must
be had a reasonable time before the hearing, and that
such service is essential unless service be waived. Peavy
v. Peavy, 167 Ga. 219, 221, 145 S. F. 55.
Motion in Writing.—Motions for new trial in municipal
court of Atlanta required to be in writing, where princi-
pal sum sued for is above $500. Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Watson, 39 Ga. App. 244, 146 S. F. 922.
§ 6084. (§ 5479.) For erroneous charge to jury,
etc.
Oral Charges.—
-The act of 1925 creating the municipal
court of Macon, permitting oral charges to the jury is not
unconstitutional because in conflict with this section.
Robinson v. Odom, 168 Ga. 81, 147 S. F. 569.
Section cited in May v. Yearty, 34 Ga. App. 29, 128 S. F-
67; Carr v. Hendrix, 34 Ga. App. 446, 129 S. F. 876.
§ 6085. (§ 5480.) On account of new evidence.
Facts Known by Summoned Witnesses Who Did Not
Testify.
—Where witnesses summoned by the defendant are
present at tne trial but are not examined, a new trial will
not be granted on the ground that since the verdict the de-
fendant has for the first time learned that they could have
testified to facts material to his defense. Rounsaville v.
State, 163 Ga. 391, 397, 136 S. F. 276; Hall v. State, 117 Ga.
263, 43 S. F- 718.
Effect of Failure to Comply.—When the requirements of
this section are not complied with, it is not error to over-
rule a ground of a motion for new trial based upon evi-
dence alleged to be newly discovered, which might pro-
duce a different result should a new trial be granted.
Blackwell v. Houston County, 168 Ga. 248, 147 S. F. 574.
§ 6086. (§ 5481.) Rule in such cases.
Discretion of Trial Judge.—That it is no abuse of discre-
tion to refuse a new trial when the proper affidavits sup-
porting witnesses are absent is reaffirmed in Carpenter v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 349, 133 S'. F. 350, and in Nelson v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 364, 133 S. F. 351.
Affidavits—In Support of Witnesses.—An affidavit in sup-
port of the witness upon whose newly discovered evidence
a new trial is sought must give the names of his associates,
d statement that he keeps good company not being suffi-
cient to meet this requirement, which is necessary to en-
able the prosecution to make a counter-showing; and
where such affidavit does not comply with this requirement,
the trial judge does not abuse his discretion by refusing to
grant a new trial on this ground. Brice v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 240, 129 S. F. 665, citing Ivey v. State, 154 Ga. 63, 113
S. E. 175. See also, Carpenter v. State, 35 Ga. App. 34),
133 S. E. 350; Wright v. State, 34 Ga. App. 505, 130 S. E.
216.
Affidavits.
—See also, Bryan v. Moncrief Furnace Co.,
3S Ga. App. 107, 142 S. F. 700; Thompson v. State, 166
Ga. 512, 515, 143 S. F- 896; Miller v. State, 166 Ga. 698,
144 S. E. 254.
Disqualification of Juror.—The provision of this section
that "if the newly discovered evidence is that of wit-
nesses, affidavits as to their residence, associates, means
of knowledge, character, and credibility must be adduced,"
does not apply where the purpose of the newly discovered
evidence is to show disqualification of a juror as in this
case; that section of the Code refers to witnesses whose
evidence is to be used on the merits of the case if a new
trial is had. Cray v. State, 37 Ga. App. 371, 140 S. F. 402.
Rule of Industrial Commission.—Rule 26 of the industrial
commission follows this section, relating to newly discovered
evidence as a ground for a new trial. American Mutual
Liability Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 491, 137 S. E.
113.
Quoted in part in Hewett v. State, 36 Ga. App. 664, 137
S'. E. 853.
Applied in Shahan v. State, 36 Ga. App. 315, 136 S. E.
798; Trammell v. Shirley, 38 Ga. App. 710, 145 S. F. 486;
Kingston v. State, 38 Ga. App. 674, 145 S. E. 468.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Bryan v. Moncrief Furnace
Co., 168 Ga. 833, 836, 149 S. E. 193.
§ 6089. (§ 5484). Application for new trial.
The word "made" used in this section is synonymous
with "filed." Therefore "it is essential to the validity of
a motion for a new trial that it should be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within the time prescribed by
law; and a motion which has not been so filed should be
dismissed, notwithstanding the judge before whom the
case is tried may have granted a rule nisi during the
term and within the time fixed by law for filing the mo-
tion." Peavy v. Peavy, 167 Ga. 219, 221, 145 S. E. 55.
Applied in Northwestern Fire, etc., Ins. Co. v. Bank,
38 Ga. App. 32, 142 S. E. 212.
§ 60190(a). Park's Code.
See § 6092(1).
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§ 6092l (§ 5487). Motion made after adjourn-
ment of court.
Where before entry of the remittitur the defendant filed
a so-called extraordinary motion for new trial, no ground
ot which met the requirements of law relating to such a
motion, there was not error in overruling it. Federal In-
vestment Co. v. Fwing, 166 Ga. 246, 142 S. F. 890.
§ 6092(1). Effect of failure to raise objections
before trial judge.
Applied in City Nat. Bank v. Bridges, 34 Ga. App. 178,
128 S. F. 694; Taunton v. Taylor, 37 Ga. App. 695, 141
S. F. 511; Heath v. Philpot, 165 Ga. 844, 846, 142 S. F. 283.
§ 6093. (§ 5488.) Brief of evidence.
General Considerations.—The brief of evidence requirea
is a condensed and succinct brief of material portions of
oral testimony; the briefer the brief the better, provided
it includes the substance of all the material portions of the
evidence, oral and documentary. It is not dependent ex-
clusively upon the stenographic report. The use of the
question and answer form in the brief, except in unusual
instances, is not permissible. Brown v. State, 163 Ga. 681,
137 S. F. 31.
Purpose Not to Review Judgment.—Although a case in
this court is one in which it is not sought to review a
judgment upon a motion for a new trial, yet what pur-
ports to be a brief of the evidence must be such a brief
as is required by this section. Cooper v. Harris, 39 Ga.
App. 607, 147 S. F. 805.
Sufficient Compliance.—In Peek v. Irwin, 164 Ga. 450,
139 S. F. 27, it is held that it can not be held that there
was no bona fide effort to brief the evidence as required
by this section. This case does not fall within the class
of cases (a number of which are cited in the opinion)
where the brief of the evidence was largely interspersed
with colloquies between court and counsel, with state-
ments of the stenographer, with the questions and an-
swers of the witness thereto, and large masses of docu-
mentary evidence, consisting of affidavits, copy suits,
deeds, letters, and other writings, much of which was ir-
relevant.
What Constitutes Non-Compliance.—Where the document
purporting to be a brief of the evidence is made up ot
portions of the pleadings together with the captions of the
same and other documentary evidence copied without brief-
ing, and where many pages of the oral evidence are not
briefed but are set out as questions and answers, such a
paper will be held to constitute no compliance with the law.
Davis v Gray, 163 Ga. 271, 136 S. F. 81.
Same—Absence of Bona Fide Effort to Comply.—Where
there had been no bona fide effort to comply with the re-
quirement of this section, the court will not undertake to
determine any question the decision of which is dependent
upon a consideration of the so-called brief of evidence an-
nexed to the bill of exceptions. Clay v. Austell School Dist.,
36 Ga. App. 354, 136 S. F. 540.
Applied in Bennett v. Carter, 168 Ga. 133, 147 S. F. 380:
Whitten v. Bacon, 165 Ga. 151, 140 S. F. 287; Richards v.
Mabry, 39 Ga. App. 707, 148 S. F. 289.
ELEVENTH TITLE
Supreme Court
CHAPTER l
The Supreme Court and Its Powers
§ 6103. (§ 5498.) Powers enumerated.
Applied in Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 557, 146 S. F.
173; Wilkes County v. Mayor and Council of Wash-
ington, 167 Ga. 181, 145 S. F. 47; Allen v. State, 164 Ga.
669, 139 S. F. 415.
Cited in Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 115, 135 S. F-
481.
CHAPTER 2
Its Judges
§ 6116. Reversal and affirmance; number of
judges.
Applied as to affirmance by operation of law when the
justices are equally divided. Irby v. Allen & Co., 161 Ga.
858, 131 S. E. 910.
CHAPTER 4
What Causes May Be Taken to the Supreme
Court
§ 6138. (§ 5526.) Writ of error.
I. EDITOR'S NOTE.
For cases holding substantially with the rule of the first
paragraph under this analysis line in the Georgia Code ot
1926, see American Agri. Chemical Co. v. Bank, 34 Ga.
App. 62, 128 S. F. 208; Brown v. Marbut- Williams bumb°r
Co., 34 Ga. App. 348, 129 S. F. 575.
II. WHEN WRIT OF ERROR OR BILL OF EXCEP-
TIONS LIE.
A. Premature Jurisdiction Generally.
When Premature. — The direction of a verdict finding
against a plea of res adjudicata is not such a final judgment
as is subject to review by direct bill of exceptions. The
ruling may be excepted to by exceptions pendente lite, upon
which error may be assigned in a bill of exceptions contain-
ing an exception to a final judgment; but the error alleged
to have been committed can not be reviewed in the Supreme
Court until there has been a final judgment in the lower
court. Douglas v. Hardin, 163 Ga. 643, 136 S. F- 793.
A motion to continue a cause is not a final judgment
within the meaning of this section. Stedham v. Farmers'
State Bank, 37 Ga. App. 605. 141 S. F. 90.
The striking of a plea in abatement is not a "final'*
judgment within the meaning of this section. Futch v.
State, 37 Ga. App. 151, 139 S. F. 110.
Order Rescinding Temporary Injunction.—Though a writ
ot error will lie to an order granting or denying an in-
junction, it will not lie to an order rescinding a previous
temporary restraining order. Such an order is not a final
adjudication of the case, and the writ of error sued out
to review the same is premature and must be dismissed
under the provisions of section 6138 of the Civil Code.
James v. Wilkerson, 164 Ga. 149, 138 S. F. 71.
Writ of error does not lie on dissolution of temporary
restraining order, not expressly refusing injunction. Goss
v. Brannon, 165 Ga. 502, 141 S. F. 295.
Refusal to set aside order making a party, and to
strike his answer, no basis for writ of error. Vanzant v.
First National Bank, 164 Ga. 772, 139 S. F. 537.
Recommittal to an auditor of a case which he reports
that he has dismissed is no final judgment on which a
writ of error lies. Herrington v. Baird, 164 Ga. 332, 138
S. F. 774.
Refusal of Amendment.—Final judgment as basis of
writ of error, not rendered by refusal of amendment in
pending suit for injunction. Ivey v. Forsyth, 164 Ga.
705, 139 S. F. 354.
Refusal to make new parties was interlocutory order
on which writ of error did not lie. Jackson v. Fite, 165
Ga. 382, 140 S. F. 754.
Striking Plea of Former Jeopardy.—Until there has
been a judgment finally disposing of the case in the trial
court, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to pass
upon an assignment of error complaining of the striking
of a plea of former jeopardy, filed by the accused. Vaughn
v. State, 38 Ga. App. 438, 144 S. F. 223.
B. Demurrers.
A writ of error lies upon the overruling of a general
demurrer to the petition, as a judgment sustaining the
demurrer would have finally disposed of the case. Con-
tinental Trust Co. v. Sabine Basket Co., 165 Ga. 591, 141
S. F. 664; Magid v. Byrd, 164 Ga. 609, 612, 139 S. F. 51.
The judgment complained of did not purport to dismiss
the petition in the pending action. In this respect the
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case differs from Rabun Mineral & Development Co. v.
Heyward, 163 Ga. 398, 136 S. E. 272, and Newton v.
Roberts, 163 Ga. 135, 135 S. E. 505. The judgment com-
plained of was not the refusal of an injunction, nor, if
it had been rendered as claimed by the plaintiff in error,
would it have been a final disposition of the cause, or
final as to any material party. Accordingly the writ of
error is premature and can not be entertained. Ivey v.
Forsyth, 164 Ga. 705, 139 S. E. 354.
Properly construed, the order of the judge in passing
on the demurrer is an interlocutory order, and is not
a final judgment in the case; and therefore, under this
section 6138, the bill of exceptions must be dismissed as
prematurely brought. Stephens v. Haugwitz, 167 Ga.
352, 145 S. E. 660.
An order overruling a demurrer to an affidavit of
illegality is such a final judgment as will support a writ
of error therefrom. Miles v. Swift, 38 Ga. App. 42, 142
S. E- 472.
Applied in Eeavitt v. Hunnicutt, 168 Ga. 788, 149 S.
E- 139; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 166 Ga. 153, 154, 142 S.
E. 684; Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 559, 567, 147
S. E- 714.
C. Other Instances of Final Disposition.
Judgment on General Demurrer.—A judgment overruling
the general demurrer to a petition, is a final determination
of the case and would authorize the defendant to assign
error thereon in a direct bill of exceptions. Newton v. Rob-
erts, 163 Ga. 135, 135 S. F. 505.
A judgment overruling a motion for new trial, after
verdict, is a final judgment on which a writ of error lies,
although no judgment on the verdict has been entered.
Aired v. Aired, 164 Ga. 186, 137 S. E- 823.
Order for Making New Party.—An order for making a
new party is a final disposition of the cause as to such new
party if the trial court refuses to make him a party, and
consequently a writ of error sued out by him cannot be
said to have been prematurely obtained. McMillan v.
Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. F. 921.
Applied in Seaboard Air L,ine R. Co. v. Sarman, 36 Ga.
App. 448, 136 S. F. 920; Cooper v. Whitehead, 163 Ga. 662,
136 S. F- 911.
§ 6139. (§ 5527.) Bills of exceptions; cross-
bills.
See annotation to section 6224.
II. BILLS OF EXCEPTION
A. Assignment of Error Generally
The bill of exceptions sued out by the superintendent
of banks in this case, though denominated therein as a
cross-bill of exceptions, is a main bill of exceptions as-
signing error upon the final judgment of the court be-
low; and it was not erroneous for the Court of Appeals,
in affirming the judgment sought to be reviewed by the
plaintiff in certiorari in her bill of exceptions, to reverse
the judgment complained of in the bill of exceptions
filed by the superintendent of banks. Latimer v. Ben-
nett, 167 Ga. 811, 146 S. E- 762.
Applied in Thompson v. Savannah Band & Trust Co.,
39 Ga. App. 809, 148 S. F. 621.
III. CROSS-BILLS.
General Considerations.—Calhoun Oil, etc., Co. v. West-
ern, etc., Railroad, 35 Ga. App. 436, 133 S. F. 348, affirms
the holding of the second sentence under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
1 § 6139(a). Park's Code.
See § 6139(1).
§ 6139(1). Exceptions pendente lite.
In an action filed under section 5088, it was held that
the mere fact that a copy of the exceptions pendente lite
appears in the transcript of the record is not a com-
pliance with the final bill of exceptions does not con-
tain an assignment of error either upon the exceptions
pendente lite or upon the ruling therein complained of.
House v. American Discount Co., 31 Ga. App. 396, 120
S. F. 701; Carter v. Vanlandingham, 37 Ga. App. 642, 141
S. F. 429.
There being no assignment in the final bill of excep-
tions either upon the exceptions pendente lite or upon
the rulings excepted to therein, no question is presented
for decision under the exceptions pendente lite. Alex-
ander v. Chispstead, 152 Ga. 851, 111 S. E- 552; House v.
American Discount Co., 31 Ga. App. 396, 120 S. F. 701;
Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 34 Ga. App. 555, 130
S. F. 378; Carter v. Vanlandingham, 37 Ga. App. 642,
141 S. F. 429; Hicks v. Brown Estate, 38 Ga. App. 659,
145 S. E. 99.
CHAPTER 5
Of Taking Cases to Supreme Court
ARTICLE l
Mode of Procedure
§ 6140. (§ 5528). Mode of taking cases to Su-
preme Court by bill of exceptions.
It will be noted that under this section, taken from
the act of 1889, it is not only required that the plaintiff
in error shall plainly and specifically set forth the
errors alleged to have been committed, but he must
primarily assert that the judgment rendered was error
and injurious to his cause. He must except to it.
Beall v. Mineral. Tone, Co., 167 Ga. 667, 669, 146 S.
E. 473.
§ 6144. When motion for new trial, etc., not
necessary.
Cited in Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S.
E. 70.
§ 6147. (§ 5534.) Judge to examine certificate.
Section Will Not Prevent Dismissal of Improperly Certi-
fied Certificate.—The judge's certificate to the bill of ex-
ceptions must state that it is true; and for lack of such
certification the bill of exceptions will be dismissed. This
is not a mere "want of technical conformity to the statutes
or rules regulating the practice in carrying cases to" tne
Supreme Court ; and this section will not prevent the dis-
missal of the bill of exceptions for the lack of such certifi-
cation. Cady v. Cady, 161 Ga. 556, 131 S. E. 282.
ARTICLE 2
Diminution of Record
§ 6149. (§ 5536.) Additional record, how pro-
cured.
In General.—It appearing from the record that the
petition for supplementation of the brief of evidence in
this case was presented to the trial judge within twenty
days after service of the bill of exceptions was acknowl-
edged by counsel for the defendant in error, and it
further appearing from the court's order directing that
the. fire-insurance policy declared upon and the other
policy be sent to this court, that these documents are
"true copies of the documents introduced in evidence in
the trial of the case and filed therein, and are material
to a clear understanding of the errors complained of,"
the contracts of insurance are properly before this
court, under this section and will be considered as a
part of the record in the case. Hall v. Continental Ins.
Co., 38 Ga. App. 814, 145 S. E- 891.
While this court may, under this section require the
clerk of the court below to certify and send up any por-
tion of the record of the case in that court which has
not been brought up, and which, in the opinion of this
court, is necessary to be before it in order to adjudicate
fully and fairly the questions at issue and the alleged
errors, and while this court may, under section 6151
when the incompleteness of the record in a material point
[ 255 ]
§ 6151 SERVICE OF BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS § 6061(1)
is suggested upon the oath of a party or his counsel,
consider as a part of the record the admission in writ-
ing of the opposite party as to the existence and effect
of the omitted part, these provisions of the statute have
reference only to the record actually made and existing
in the court below. Powell v. Griffith, 38 Ga. App. 40,
142 S. E. 466.
Additional record not ordered up, in view of non-au-
thentication of evidence. Federal Investment Co. v.
Ewing, 165 Ga. 435, 436, 141 S. E. 65.
What May Be Brought up.—For a case holding with the
principle set out under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926, see Free Gift Lodge v. Edwards, 161 Ga. 832, 132 6.
E. 206.
Applied in Eewis v. Moultrie Banking Co., 36 Ga. App.
347, 351, 136 S. E. 554.
§ 6151. Diminution of record.
Where a motion to dismiss informs the appellate court
of the existence of material parts of the record not
specified in the bill of exceptions, it is incumbent upon
this court to have the clerk of the trial court transmit
to it copies of the same unless the existence and legal
effect of the omitted portions of the record are admitted
in writing by the opposite party, in which case this
court can consider them as a part of the record without
having them sent up. Vandiver v. Georgia Ry., etc.,
Co., 38 Ga. App. 59, 60, 143 S. E- 455.
Delay Not Authorized. — The law embodied in this
section does not in any case authorize delay in tendering
to a trial judge a bill of exceptions alleging error in
a judgment rendered during a given term, for more than
thirty days after the final adjournment of the court for
that term. Blumenfeld v. Freeman, 38 Ga. App. 694, 145
S. E. 495.
Applied in Zachry v. Peoples Bank, 168 Ga. 469, 148
S. E. 165; Ward v. Parks, 166 Ga. 149, 150, 142 S. E- 690;
Kumpe v. Hudgins, 39 Ga. App. 788, 149 S. E- 56.
ARTICLE 3
Bills of Exceptions, When to Be Signed
§ 6152. (§ 5539.) Bill of exceptions, when to
be tendered.
General Considerations—Failure to Certify for More
than Thirty Days.—This section does not in any case au-
thorize delay in tendering a bill of exceptions for more
than thirty days after the final adjournment of the court
for that term. Birmingham Finance Co. v. Chisholm, 162
Ga. 501, 134 S. E. 301.
Delay or Extension of Time. — Cohen v. Brown, 35 Ga.
App. 508, 134 S. E. 119, affirms the holding given in the first
paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Burnett v. McDaniel & Co., 35 Ga. App. 367, 133 S. E- 268,
holds substantially the same as the second paragraph under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Same—Supersedeas Does Not Extend.—The fact that the
order of the superior court to which exception is taken pro-
vides that it shall operate as a supersedeas for twenty
days relates merely to the enforcement of the judgment
pending a valid writ of error, and did not have the effect of
changing the date of the order excepted to, or of extending
the time prescribed by law within which an appeal could e
taken. Cohen v. Brown, 35 Ga. App. 508, 134 S. E. 119.
Applied in Parrish v. Central, etc., R. Co., 36 Ga. App.
133, 135 S. E. 762; Forrester v. Frizzell, 35 Ga. App. 562,
134 S. E. 182; Hamilton v. Kinnebrew, 161 Ga. 495, 131 S.
E- 470; McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E. 547.
Cited in Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 699, 132 S. E.
626.
§ 6153. (§ 5540.) Fast bills of exception.
See notes to § 6138.
Cited in Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 132 S. E. 626.
§ 6154. (§ 5541.) Exceptions pendente lite.
Applied to cross bill of exceptions to review interlocutory
hearings to which no exception was filed within time pre-
scribed. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 132 S. E- 626.
ARTICLE 4
Proceedings in Case of Death or Refusal to
Sign
§ 6155.
absent.
(§ 5542.) When the judge is dead or
Failure to Tender to Judge.—The provisions of the section
are not applicable where a so-called bill of exceptions was
not certified by the judge of the trial court, but was verified
by the oath of the attorney for the plaintiff in error, and
where it appears that the bill of exceptions was never ten-
dered to the presiding judge for certification although
the judge lived for more than ninety days after the ad-
journment of the term of the court during which the judg-
ment complained of was rendered, and was capable of act-
ing and could have certified the bill had it been presented
to him in time. Einthicum v. Trust Co., 36 Ga. App. 423,
136 S. E. 813.
§ 6158. (§ 5545.) Judge refusing to certify.
Applied in Nash v. Sheppard, 161 Ga. 192, 129 S. E. 639.
§ 6159. (§ 5546). Judge failing to sign, how
compelled.
Conflict with Rules of Court.—The rules of the Su-
preme Court and of the Court of Appeals (§§ 6252, 6343),
in so far as they fix a twenty-day limit for filing an ap-
plication for mandamus nisi on refusal of a trial judge to
certify a bill of exceptions, are in conflict with this sec-
tion, and must yield thereto. Brown v. Hutcheson, 167
Ga. 451, 146 S. E. 27. See also, Brown v. Hutcheson, 39
Ga. App. 99, 146 S. E- 329.
Applied in Brown v. Hutcheson, 166 Ga. 644, 144 S. E. 17.
ARTICLE 5
Service of Bills of Exceptions
§ 6160. (§ 5547). Service of copy on defend-
ants.
A party in the trial court, who is interested in sus-
taining the verdict and the judgment refusing a new triaj,
i-5 an indispensable defendant in error; and failure make
him a party to the bill of exceptions, and to serve him
therewith or to obtain an acknowledgment of service with
consent that the case be heard in the Supreme Court, is
ground to dismiss the writ of error on motion. Rowe v.
Mobley, 166 Ga. 726, 144 S. E- 211.
Where an affidavit appears upon its face to have been
executed on January 31, 1927, after the certification of a
bill of exceptions on January 14, 1927, and the affidavit
recites indefinitely that after the certification of the bill
of exceptions the deponent delivered a copy of it to a
named attorney (who, it appears from the record, was
counsel for the opposite party in the trial court), and that
that attorney signed an acknowledgment of service and a
waiver of further notice or service, and where there is
nothing in the affidavit to indicate the dates of these
transactions, except that they occurred between the date
of the certification of the bill of exceptions and the date
of the execut/ion of the affidavit, the affidavit is insuffi-
cient to show that service of the bill of exceptions was
perfected within ten days after the date of its certifica-
tion, as required under this section. Tisinger v. Ellerbe-;,
37 Ga. App. 391, 140 S. E. 522.
Applied in Bussed v. Savannah Guano Co., 39 Ga. App.
613, 147 S. E- 914.
§ 6160(1). Parties bound by service on coun-
sel; waiver of defects.
General Considerations—Absence of Service or Acknowledg-
ment.—Where there is no service and no acknowledgment
of service or waiver thereof, the bill of exceptions will be
dismissed. Izlar v. Central, etc., R. Co., 162 Ga. 558, 134 S.
E- 315.
This and the following section are remedial, and to be
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liberally construed. Anderson v. Haas, 160 Ga. 420(2), 12S
S. E- 178. The acknowledgment of service of the bill of
exceptions having been signed by counsel for the tax-col-
lector, he is bound thereby; and by this section he can be
made a party defendant, although not named as such in
the bill of exceptions. So the motion to dismiss the bill of
exceptions is denied, and an order will be entered making
the tax-collector a party defendant in error. Bennett v.
Wilkes County, 164 Ga. 790, 792, 139 S. E. 566.
Parties Bound by Service upon Counsel—Non-residents ot
County.—Where it is attempted to serve a bill of exceptions
by leaving a copy thereof at the residence of the attorney
of the defendant in error, it must affirmatively appear that
the defendant in error is a non-resident of the county.
Saunders v. Saunders, 163 Ga. 770, 137 S. E. 15.
Sufficiency of Acknowledgment to Bind in Dual Capacity.
—Where an acknowledgment of service by "Atty. for X"
has been procured, X is bound both personally and in his
representative capacity, and the bill of exceptions can be
amended in the Supreme Court by making any person a
party defendant in error to the case who is bound by such
service, although such person may not have been named
in the bill of exceptions. Henderson v. Eott, 163 Ga. 326,
328, 136 S. E. 403.
Acknowledgment as Waiver—Service on Sunday. — The
Court of Appeals will not dismiss the bill of exceptions
merely because the service thereof appears to have been
acknowledged on a date which the court judicially knows
was Sunday, when counsel did not state in the entry of ac-
knowledgment that it was not to be construed as a waivei
of the defect. Bartow v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 57, 132 S. E-
103.
Defendants Designated by Et Al.—Where (although
service be acknowledged by the attorney for "defendants
in error") the bill of exceptions designates but one de-
fendant in error by name, referring to the other or oth-
ers by the words "et al.," the writ of error will be dis-
missed in the absence of an offer to amend. Adair v.
Bradford, 165 Ga. 288, 140 S. E. 878; McEachin v. Tones,
165 Ga. 403, 140 S. E. 878.
Applied in Bussell v. Savannah Guano Co., 39 Ga. App.
613, 147 S. E. 914; Daniels v. Avery, 167 Ga. 54, 145 S.
E- 45; Bennett v. Wilkes County, 164 Ga. 790, 139 S. E.
566; King v. Casey, 164 Ga. 117, 119, 137 S. E. 776; New-
ton v. Oglesby, 39 Ga. App. 704, 148 S. E. 347; Sanders
v. Sanders, 163 Ga. 770, 137 S. E. 15.
§ 6160(2). Bill of exceptions amended to make
person a party defendant.
Applied in Sanders v. Sanders, 163 Ga. 770, 137 S. E- 15;
Henderson v. I,ott, 163 Ga. 326, 328, 136 S. E. 403. See note
under preceding section.
Applied also in Muller v. Cooper, 165 Ga. 439, 440, 141
S. E. 300.
§§ 6164(a), 6164(b). Park's Code.
See §§ 6160(1), 6160(2).
229, 69 S. E. 106; Goodin v. Mills, 137 Ga. 282, 73 S. E. 399;
Tatum v. Trappnell, 30 Ga. App. 104, 117 S. E. 251.
Effect of Non-Compliance. — Where it appears from trie
certificate of the clerk of the trial court that the section
was not complied with, and that counsel for plaintiff in error
was the cause of such failure, the writ of error must be dis-
missed. Atlanta, etc., Nat. Bank v. Goodwin, 34 Ga. App.
169, 128 S. E. 691.
A bill filed on the sixteenth day after its certification,
and not within the fifteen days required by this section
must be dismissed. Jenkins v. Crockett, 164 Ga. 391, 133
S. E. 787.
Applied in Fields v. The State, 39 Ga. App. 644, 143
S- E. 170.
Cited in Alford v. Gibson, 161 Ga. 567, 131 S. E. 529.
CHAPTER 6
In the Supreme Court
ARTICLE 3
Making Parties, etc.
§ 6176. (§ 5562.) Essential parties.
Instances of Essential Parties—Usee May Be Essential
Party.—There may be cases in which the nominal plain-
tiff is so wholly without (interest in the suit, or the re-
sults thereof, as to make the usee the proper person upon
whom to perfect any service required to be made in be-
half of the defendant. Sligh v. Smith, 36 Ga. App. 237,
239, 136 S. E. 175.
An administrator who sought interpleader and direction
had no right to except to decree, all other parties being
satisfied with it. Bryan v. Rowland, 166 Ga. 719, 722, 144
S. E. 275.
Applied in Whitehurst v. Holly, 162 Ga. 323, 133 S. E. 861.
ARTICLE 6
Supersedeas
§ 6165. (§ 5552.) Supersedeas, how obtained.
Applied in Tift v. Atlantic Coast Eine R. Co., 161 Ga. 432,
447, 131 S. E. 46; Autry v. Southern Railway Co., 167 Ga.
136, 140, 144 S. E- 741.
ARTICLE 7
Duty of Clerks of Superior and City Courts
§ 6167. (§ 5554.) Filing in clerk's office.
Sufficient Filing.—For cases sustaining the principle stated
in the second sentence under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926, see Gibbs v. Hancock Mut. Eife Ins. Co., 35
Ga. App. 505, 133 S. E. 749; Norris v. Baker County, 135 Ga.
Ga.—17 [ 257 ]
ARTICLE 4
No Dismissals in Supreme Court, When
§ 6183. (§ 5569.) Unlawful to dismiss for tech-
nical defect.
Maps.—Assignment of error on admission of map in
evidence over objection held sufficient. Kearce v. Maloy,
166 Ga. 89, 142 S. E. 271.
An assignment of error upon a judgment sustaining a
demurrer to the petition, in this language, "to which rul-
ing plaintiff excepted, excepts now, and assigns the same
as error, on the ground that the petition as amended did
set forth a cause of action," is sufficient to present the
real issue; and the writ of error will not be dismissed be-
cause the assignment of error is insufficient. Thomas v.
Eester, 166 Ga. 274, 142 S. E. 870.
Applied in Colquitt County v. Bahnsen, 162 Ga. 340, 34i,
345, 133 S. E. 871; Stephens v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 36 Ga.
App. 363, 367, 136 S. E. 808.
Cited in Flood v. Empire Invest. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 133
S. E. 60.
§ 6184. (§ 5570.) Dismissal avoided by amend-
ment.
Amending to Conform to Judgment.—The plaintiff in error
should be allowed to amend the bill of exceptions so as to
make it conform with technical accuracy to the judgment.
Flood v. Empire Invest. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 268, 133 S. E- 60.
Adding Brief of Evidence.—The bill of exceptions is
amendable by adding to the specification of material parts
of the record the brief of evidence approved by the trial
judge and ordered filed as part of the record. Kimsey v.
Rogers, 166 Ga. 176, 142 S. E. 667; Simmerson v. Herring-
dine, 166 Ga. 143, 142 S, E- 687
§ 6186 RULES OF SUPREME COURT—MANDAMUS § 6252
Applied in Hughes v. The State, ^9 Ga. App. 834, 148
S. F- 756.
§ 6186. (§ 5572.) Benefits lost by negligence.
Applied in Barrett v. Union Banking Co., 163 Ga. 893, 137
S. F. 14.
§ 6187. No dismissal because not certified in
time.
Applied in Parrish v. Central, etc., R. Co., 36 Ga. App.
133, 135 S. F. 762.
ARTICLE 5
Amendments
§ 6190. (§ 5575.) Incomplete record, how cor-
rected.
Where a demurrer is not sent up as a part of record, the
Supreme Court is empowered under this section to require
it sent up. Bennett v. Benton, 162 Ga. 139, 140, 133 S. F-
855.
ARTICLE 7
Decisions
§ 6204. (§ 5585.) First grant of a new trial.
Where First New Trial Error.—It is error even to grant
a first new trial where the law and the evidence demands
the1 verdict as rendered, whether it was directed by the
court or returned at the volition of a jury. Jones Motor Co.
v. Finch Motor Co., 34 Ga. App. 399, 401, 129 S. F- 915.
Applied in Riggins v. Scott, 35 Ga. App. 465, 133 S. F.
647; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barksdale, 34 Ga. App. 812,
131 S. F- 298; Nabros v. Nabros, 161 Ga. 382, 131 S. F. 45.
See Douglas v. Hardin, 161 Ga. 838, 131 S. F. 896; Gunn
v. Chapman, 166 Ga. 279, 142 S. F. 873; Howell v. Booth,
39 Ga. App. 41, 145 S. F. 910; Dodgen v. Fowler, 39 Ga.
App. 515, 147 S. F. 775; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Ozburn, 38 Ga. App. 276, 143 S. F. 623; Brooks v. Jack-
ins, 38 Ga. App. 57, 142 S. F. 574; Belcher v. Land, 37
Ga. App. 346, 140 S. F- 423.
Cited in Whitworth v. Carter, 39 Ga. App. 625, 630, 147
S, F. 904.
§ 6207. (§ 5588.) Decision of, how reversed.
Applied in Hallman v. Atlanta Child's Home, 161 Ga. 247,
254, 130 S. F. 814.
Cited in Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga.
1, 42, 139 S. F. 890.
ARTICLE 8
Record and Costs
§ 6210. (§ 5591.) Attorney liable for costs.
Advance of Costs by Attorney Does Not Defeat Levy.—
A levy under an execution for costs, issued in the name of
the plaintiff for the use of officers of court, is not subject
to be arrested by affidavit of illegality on account of the
fact that the attorney for the plaintiff had advanced the'
costs incurred in the appellate court. Harvey v. Long Cigar,
etc., Co., 36 Ga. App. 45, 135 S. F. 222.
ARTICLE 9
Judgment and Remittitur
§ 6213. (§ 5594.) Damages in cases of af-
firmance.
Court Not Convinced That Case for Delay.
—See Guthrie
v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S. F- 93, holding the same
as the paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Must Be Judgment for Sum Certain.—See Clark v. Union
School District, 36 Ga. App. 80, 135 S. F- 318, holding sub-
stantially the same as the first sentence under this catch-
line in the Georgia Code of 1926.
When Is Case Brought Up for Delay—Objection That Ver-
dict Contrary to Law and Evidence. — Where the only
ground of exception presented was that the verdict is con-
trary to law and without evidence to support it, and where
it appears that under a proper application of the law the
evidence supports the verdict this section will be applied.
Yeomans v. Beasley, 36 Ga. App. 467, 137 S. F. 131.
Applied in Felker v. Still, 35 Ga. App. 236, 133 S. F.
519; Todd-Worsham Auction Co. v. Underwood, 38 Ga,
App. 792, 145 S. F. 889; Sheffield v. Sheffield, 38 Ga. App.
685, 145 S. F. 672.
§ 6217. (§ 5598). Judgment affirmed, execution
at once.
See notes to § 4336.
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF GEORGIA
II. Bills of Exceptions and Records
§ 6224. (§ 5605.) Rule 6. Bills of exceptions.
Bill Held Sufficient.—See Colquitt County v. Bahnsen,
162 Ga. 340, 345, 133 S. F- 871, where the bill of exceptions
was held to specify plainly the decision of the court denying
the plaintiff a mandamus absolute.
§ 6232.
bound.
IV. Costs
(§ 5613.) Rule 14. Attorneys, etc.,
Appointed Counsel Not Relieved of Payment.—Under this
rule of court the counsel can not be relieved from the pay-
ment of costs on the ground that he was appointed in the
court below to represent the defendant, the latter being un-
able to employ counsel, and being financially unable to re-
spond to him for the costs incurred. James v. State, 162 Ga.
42, 132 S. F. 417.
IX. Dockets and Call of Cases
§ 6249. (§ 5621). Rule 30. Want of prosecution.
Applied in Phillips v. Blackwell, 166 Ga. 737, 144 S. F.
319.
XI. Mandamus
§ 6252. (§ 5623). Rule 33. Application for,
when made.
See notes tc § 6159.
Applied in Brown v. Hutcheson, 166 Ga. 644, 144 S. F.
17; 38 Ga. App. 453, 144 S. F. 147.
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§ 61261 COMMON-LAW RULES—WRIT OF ERROR § 6318(a)
RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS
AS AMENDED IN 1924.
COMMON-LAW RULES
II. Attorneys.
§ 6261. (§ 5634,.) Rule 2. Arguments. — Ar-
guments of counsel shall be confined to the law
and the facts involved in the case then before
the court, on pain of being considered in con-
tempt; and in all civil cases questions of law
shall be argued exclusively to the court, and
questions of fact to the jury. Counsel shall
not be permitted, in the argument of criminal
cases, to read to the jury recitals of fact or
the reasoning of the court as applied thereto,
in decisions by the Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals.
§ 6263. (§ 5636.) Rule 4. Papers. — Attor-
neys receiving papers from the clerk under
order of the court, as provided by Rule 17,
shall in all cases receipt for the same and re-
turn the same on or before the call of the
case for trial; and after the trial of a case it
shall be the duty of attorneys to return all
the papers connected therewith to the clerk;
otherwise he or they shall be considered in
contempt of court.
§ 6264. (§ 5637.) Rule 5. Number of speeches
and time for argument.—Not more than two
counsel shall be permitted to argue any case
for each side except by express leave of the
court; and in no case shall more than one
counsel be heard in conclusion.
In all cases, civil, criminal and equitable, ex-
cept capital cases, argument shall be limited
to thirty minutes to the side, which may in
the discretion of the judge be extended upon
application before the argument begins. In
capital cases argument shall be limited to two
hours to the side, which may be extended by
the judge upon statement of counsel in his
place that he cannot do justice to the case in
the time allowed.
§ 6264(d). Park's Code.
See P. C. § 1055(4).
VI. Consent
§ 6278, (§ 5651). Rule 19. What consent en-
forced.
An oral agreement is not necessarily excluded by the
provisions of this section; on the other hand, an agree-
ment between attorneys, acting within the scope of their
authority, will be binding even though it is not in writ-
ing, where, it is not denied by the opposite party and
where, as here, it appears to have been executed to the
detriment of the party invoking it. While the agree-
ment relied on in this case was not in writing and while
there may be a difference between counsel as to the con-
struction to be placed upon the words which passed be-
tween them, there is in reality no dispute as to what was
said. Oliver v. Godley, 38 Ga. App. 66, 69, 142 S. E. 566.
[
VII. Continuances.
§ 6280. (§ 5653.) Rule 21. Three minutes. —
When a case is sounded for trial, the parties
shall immediately announce ready, or move to
continue; if three minutes should elapse before
the announcement or motion to continue, the
plaintiff's case will be dismissed, or the defend-
ant's plea stricken. No argument, without ex-
press leave of the court, shall be heard on a
motion to continue.
XII. Illegality
§ 6288. (§ 5662.) Rule 29. No second affi-
davit.
General Considerations — When First Affidavit Void. —
This section has no application where the first affidavit of
illegality was void. Bridges v. Melton, 34 Ga. App. 480,
129 S. E. 913.
The fact that the first affidavit was dismissed, without
a trial of the issues raised or attempted to be raised by
it. does not make an exception to the rule. Elders v.
Beasley, 167 Ga. 122, 123, 144 S. E. 909; Anderson v. Geor-
gia State Bank, 38 Ga. App. 225, 43 S. E. 461.
XIII. Interrogatories
§ 6291. (§ 5665.) Rule 32. Time allowed for
return.—The time to be allowed for the return
of commissions from any part of the United
States of North America, if less than one hun-
dred miles distant from the place of trial, shall
be ten days; if a greater distance, twenty days;
to any part of the West Indies or South Amer-
ica, forty days; or to any part of Europe, fifty
days, unless, in the discretion of the court, a
longer time shall be allowed.
XIV. Judgment
§ 6296(a). Rule 37 (a). Form of decree of
court in total divorce cases.—Two concurring
verdicts favoring a total divorce to plaintiff hav-
ing been rendered in the within case, it is con-
sidered, ordered and adjudged that said mar-
riage be, and the same is hereby annulled and a
total divorce granted between the parties with
liberty to the plaintiff to marry again. The de-
fendant shall be at liberty to marry
again.
Ordered further that the defendant pay the
cost of these proceedings.
This day of 19 . .
.
Judge Superior Courts Circuit.
XXVI. Writ of Error
§ 6318(a). Rule 60. Bill of exceptions in mis-
demeanor case.—That upon the filing of a bill
of exceptions in a misdemeanor case, counsel
for plaintiff-in-error be required to certify that
he verily believes that his client has good
grounds for reversal, and that upon an exami-
nation of the whole record, he does, in good
faith, appeal said case.
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§ 6348 RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN §' 6379
RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
VII. Mandamus
§ 6348. Rule 24. Application for, when made.
See notes to § 6159.
In General.—An application for a mandamus nisi to
compel a judge to certify a bill of exceptions must be
filed within twenty days after the refusal of the judge to
certify the bill of exceptions; and if not so filed, the pe-
tition will not be considered. Brown v. Hutcheson, 33
Ga. App. 453, 144 S. E. 147.
Applied in Brown v. Hutcheson, 166 Ga. 644, 144 S. E. 17.
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA
ARTICLE 1
Bills of Rights
SECTION 1
Rights of the Citizen
§ 6358. (§ 5699). Par. 2. Protection the duty
of government.
See notes to § 1551(99).
(§ 5700.) Par. 3. Life, liberty, and§ 6359.
property.
See annotations to §§ 5206, 6700.
See notes to § 4261, and P. C. 211(23).
Right to Hearing
—
Condemnation Law.—The provisions of
the' act of the General Assembly to amend the charter of
Edison, approved August 4, 1923, relating to the condemna-
tion of land for school purposes, the proceedings for con-
demnation, and the notice to be given to the owners of prop-
erty sought to be condemned, are not in violation of this
section inasmuch as the act provides for a hearing before
assessors duly appointed after notice, in the same manner
and under the same regulations as are contained in the gen-
eral law for condemnation of private property. Sheppard
v. Edison, 161 Ga. 907, 132 S. E. 218.
Same—Tax Law. — If the act of the General Assembly
furnishes the taxpayers notice and hearing before the act
becomes operative, there is no lack of due process. The tax-
payers are presumed to qualify, to inform themselves as to
the merits of the proposed issues, and to exercise their
rights as voters in all elections submitted to them. Where
they have this opportunity, there is no lack of "due process
of law" which would nullify proposed legislation. Green v.
Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 648, 135 S. E- 84.
Zoning Ordinance which deprives a person of the lawful
use of his property held unconstitutional, under this section.
Morrow v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 228, 133 S. E- 345.
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—The automobile
law of 1915 is not invalid under this section. L-ee v. State,
163 Ga. 239, 135 S. E- 912.
Expenditure of municipal funds for special services ren
dered in tax valuation, does not deprive citizens of prop-
erty without due process of law. Tietjen v. Savannah, 161
Ga. 125, 126, 129 S. E- 653.
Section 125 of the Penal Code is not unconstitutional as
violative of this section. Rhoden v. State, 161 Ga. 73, 129
S. E. 640.
Same—Ordinances.
—Ordinances making a tax assessment
for street improvement, a lien upon the property, is not vio-
lative of this section. Baugh v. EaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 130
S. E. 69.
The amendment of the charter of the City of Atlanta,
enacted by the General Assembly in 1925, does not con-
travene the due-process clause of the State constitution.
Etheridge v. Atlanta, 167 Ga. 222, 145 S. E. 84.
A municipal ordinance prohibiting public billiard and
poolrooms, is not repugnant to this section. Shaver v.
Martin, 166 Ga. 424, 143 S. E. 402.
§ 6360. (§ 5701). Par. 4. Right to the courts.
Applied in Boone v. Lord, 38 Ga. App. 397, 144 S. E. 123.
§ 6361. (§ 5702). Par. 5. Benefit of counsel,
accusation, list of witnesses, compulsory proc-
ess, and trial.
See notes to P. C. § 211(28).
This section is not violated by court's exclusion of ar-
gument on matter without the evidence. Jones v. State,
166 Ga. 251, 254, 142 S. E- 866.
This constitutional guaranty of "benefit of counsel"
means something more than the mere appointment by the
court of counsel to represent the accused. He is entitled
to a reasonable time for preparation by such counsel to
properly represent him on the trial. Sheppard v. State,
165 Ga. 460, 465, 141 S. E- 196.
Par. 6. Crimination of self§ 6362. (§ 5703.)
not compelled.
Evidence Obtained from Receiver of Accused.—The intro-
duction of documentary evidence obtained from a receiver
of the property and assets of one accused of crime, by the
process of subpoena duces tecum, although such evidence
may be incriminatory in its nature and tend to convict the'
accused of crime, is not violative of this section. Rawlings
v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E- 448.
§ 6364. (§ 5705.) Par. 8. Jeopardy of life,
etc., more than once, forbidden.
See notes to P. C. 1068.
Cited in Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206, 212, 135 S. E. 748"
dissenting opinion in Cliett v. State, 167 Ga. 835, 840,
147 S. E- 35.
§ 6369. (§ 5710). Par. 13. Religious opinions,
etc.
Cited in Sheppard v. Edison, 166 Ga. Ill, 142 S. E. 535.
§ 6370. (§ 5711.) Par. 14. Appropriations to
sects forbidden.
See annotations to § 6454.
§ 6372. (§ 5713). Par. 16. Searches and war-
rants.
Applied in Young v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 39 Ga.
App. 761, 766, 148 S. E. 414.
§ 6376. (§ 5717.) Par. 20. Contempts.
Cited in Pullen v. Cleckler, 162 Ga. Ill, 114, 132 S. E- 761.
§ 6379. (§ 5720.) Par. 23. Legislative, judi-
cial, and executive, separate.
See notes to § 2366(71).
Editor's Note and General Considerations.—The judicial de-
partment of the government can not interfere with any pro-
vision made by the legislative branch of the government
which the General Assembly may deem to be necessary as
expenses in discharging its duties of legislation. Speer v.
Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 537, 136 S. E- 425.
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—The banking law
of 1919 is not repugnant to this section. Felton v. Ben-
nett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E. 264.
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§ 6382 REGISTRATION § 6404
SECTION 2
Certain Offenses Defined
§ 6382. (§ 5723). Par. 1. Libel; jury in crim-
inal trials.
See notes to § P. C. 1060(2).
Applied in Allen v. State, 164 Ga. 669, 139 S. E- 415.
SECTION 3
Protection to Person and Property
§ 6388. (§ 5729.) Paragraph 1. Private ways;
just compensation.
In General.—In City Council of Augusta v. Lamar, 37
Ga. App. 418, 140 S. E. 763, after quoting this section,
the court says: "Accordingly, if property is damaged,
even by the prudent and proper exercise of a power con-
ferred by statute, the owner is entitled to just compensa-
tion in an amount represented by the difference between
the market value of the property before and after the
procedure taken for public purposes."
Effect of Enhancement of Value upon Amount of Dam-
ages.—In the application of this provision of the funda-
mental law the courts have uniformly recognized the
rule that where none of the property, or only a part of
it, is actually taken for public use, any enhancement of
the market value which arises directly from such public
improvement and which accrues directly to the particu-
lar property remaining may be »et off against the gross
damage which may be thus occasioned. Muecke v. Ma-
con, 34 Ga. App. 744, 131 S. E. 124.
Applied State Highway Board v. Baxter, 167 Ga. 12J,
144 S. E. 796; Brown v. Atlanta, 167 Ga. 416, 145 S. E.
855; Atlanta v. Hines, 39 Ga. App. 499, 500, 147 S. E. 416,
Habersham County v. Cornwall, 38 Ga. App. 419, 420, 144
S. E. 55.
Cited in Smith v. Floyd County, 36 Ga. App. 554, 137 b.
E. 646; Rogers v. Toccda Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 528, 131
S. E. 517.
§ 6389. (§ 5730.) Par. 2. Attainder; ex post
facto and retroactive laws, etc.
Instances of Valid Acts.—Municipal ordinance requiring
deposits by consumers of light and water, though having
meters, not invalid under this section as impairing the ob-
ligation of contract. Young v. Moultrie, 163 Ga. 829, 831, 137
S. E. 257.
Cited in Cochran v. Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 584, 146
S. E. 462.
SECTION 4
Special Legislation Forbidden
§ 6391. (§ 5732.) Paragraph 1. General laws,
and how varied.
See §§ 828(ppp); 828(19); 913(2); 913(13); 913(23); V.
C. 1060(2).
Collection of Fees.—In so far as the act of 1917, pur-
ports to make the costs and fees of the sheriff the prop-
erty of the particular county, and to make it the duty of
the clerk of the superior court to collect and distribute
such fees, it is a special law relating to a matter covered
by existing general laws, and to that extent the act is
violative . of this section. Harris County v. Williams,
167 Ga. 45, 144 S. E. 756.
Instances of Special Laws.—The act of 1924 (Ga. Laws
1924, p. 275) authorizing counties to change road in a town,
is a special law and unconstitutional under this section.
Shore v. Banks County, 162 Ga. 185, 186, 132 S. E. 753.
Section not applied to special law creating a city charter.
Baugh v. LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 82, 130 S. E. 69.
Cited in Cochran v. Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 584, 145
S. E, 462; Mayor v. Wilkinson County, 166 Ga. 460, 143
S. E. 769.
§ 6392. (§ 5733). Par. 2. What acts void.
Quoted in Roberson v. Roberson, 165 Ga. 447, 141 S.
E- 306.
Cited in Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 539, 136 S. E- 425.
SECTION 5
Governmental Rights of the People
§ 6393. (§ 5734.) Paragraph 1. State rights.
Cited in Green v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 648, 135 S. E- 84.
§ 6394. (§ 5735.) Par. 2, Enumeration of
rights not deny others.
Cited in Green v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 648, 135 S. E. 84.
ARTICLE 2
Elective Franchise
SECTION l
Qualification of Voters
§ 6397. Par. 3. Who entitled to register and
vote.
See note under section 34 paragraph 3.
SECTION 2
Registration
§ 6404. (§ 5738). Par. 1. Registration; who
disfranchised.
In Parks v. Ash, 168 Ga. 868, 874, 149 S. E. 207, after
quoting this section and sections 6406 and 6407 it is
said: "But we do not think that the framers of the
constitution intended that these sections should be ex-
haustive as to the disqualification of persons to fill of-
fices that might be created by statute. Certain offices
arc created by the constitution itself, and in certain
cases the constitution prescribes the qualifications which
will prevent one from holding or being eligible to such
office; and where the constitution does thus fix the
grounds of qualification and disqualification, the legisla-
ture can not by statute take from or add to those
grounds. But the office of county tax assessor and mem-
bership in the board of commissioners of roads and rev-
enues are not fixed by the constitution, and those bodies
are not created by the constitution. They are the
creatures of statutes; and that being true, the legisla-
ture, which enacts the law that establishes either of
these boards, can deal with the subject of qualification
and disqualification, provided they do not impinge on any
express provision in the constitution of the State or cf
the United States."
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§ 6430 REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS § 6463
ARTICLE 3
Legislative Department
SECTION 7
Enactment of Laws
1. Elections, returns,§ 6430. (§ 5764.) Par.
etc., disorderly conduct.
Under the provisions of this section the judge of the
superior court did not have jurisdiction to hold, in quo
warranto proceedngs, that a member of the General As-
sembly of Georgia, who had been elected to that position
and who had been sworn in as a member, was ineligible
or disqualified for membership in that body; and the
demurrer raising the contention that the court was with-
out jurisdiction should have been sustained. Rainey v.
Taylor, 166 Ga. 476, 143 S. E). 383.
§ 6437. (§ 5771.) Par. 8. One subject-matter
expressed.
See application as to section 3438, P. C. §§ 461(12), 419(1).
See notes to §§ 1551(136), 2366(52); P. C., §§ 211(28),
1069(1).
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—The banking law
of 1919 is not repugnant with this section. Felton v. Ben-
nett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E. 264.
The act of 1901 to create a new charter for the city of La-
Grange held not violative of this section. Baugh v. La-
Grange, 161 Ga. 80, 130 S. E. 69.
Acts of 1925 (Laws 1925, p. 896) amending incorporation
law of certain school was held not unconstitutional under
this section. English v. Smith, 162 Ga. 195, 133 S. E. 847.
Municipal ordinance relating to salaries of firemen was
held not unconstitutional under this section. Green v. At-
lanta, 162 Ga. 641, 135 S. E). 84.
An ordinance regulating sales of milk, and prohibit-
ing sales of impure milk, is not violative of this sec-
tion. Leontas v. Walker, 166 Ga. 266, 273, 142 S. L. 891.
The act of 1925 creating the municipal court of Macon,
permitting oral charges to the jury is not unconstitutional
because in conflict with this section. Robinson v. Odom,
168 Ga. 81, 147 S. E. 569.
Statutes and sec-
and East Thomaston, and cities having a popula-
tion of 25,000 or more inhabitants according to the
United States Census of 1920 or any future cen-
sus, authority to pass zoning and planning laws
whereby such cities may 'be zoned or districted
for various uses and other or different uses pro-
hibited therein, and regulating the use for which
said zones or districts may be set apart, and regu-
lating the plans lor development and improve-
ment of real estate therein. The General As-
sembly is given general authority to authorize
the cities of Atlanta, Savannah, Macon, Augusta,
Columbus, LaGrange, Brunswick, Wayoross, Al-
bany, Athens, Rome, Darien, Dublin, Decatur,
Valdosta, Newnan, Thomaston and East Thom-
aston, and cities having a population of 25,000 or
more inhabitants according to the United States
census of 1920 or any future census, to pass zon-
ing and planning laws. Acts 1927, p. 128.
§ 6445. (§ 5779.) Par. 17.
tions of Code, how amended.
Acts Not Violative.—The acts of 1924 as to recovery for
homicide of parent (Ga. L. 1924, p. 60) is not unconstitu-
tional as being in violation of this section. Peeler v. Cen-
tral, etc., R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. E}. 24.
This section was not violated by the act of 1925 amend-
ing the law under which Barnesville School is incorporated.
English v. Smith, 162 Ga. 195, 199, 133 S. E. 847.
Repeals by implication do not fall within the inhibition
of this provision of the constitution. Durham v. State,
166 Ga. 561, 144 S. L- 109.
§ 6446. (§ 5780.) Par. 18. Corporate powers,
how granted.
Cited in Free Gift Society v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 857, 864,
137 S. E. 382.
§ 6448. (§ 5782.) Par. 20. Street-railways.
Cited in Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 168 Ga. 705,
708, 149 S. L. 32.
§ 6450(1). Par. 22A. Zoning and planning laws.
— The General Assembly of the State shall
have authority to grant to the governing au-
thorities of the cities of Atlanta, Savannah,
Macon, Augusta, Columbus, LaGrange, Bruns-
wick, Waycroiss, Albany, Athens, Rome, Darien,
Dublin, Decatur, Valdosta, Newnan, Thomaston
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SECTION 9
Pay of Members
§ 6454. (§ 5788.) Paragraph 1. Compensa-
tion.
No Injunction Can Be , Granted.—Where the question is
not raised that the mileage is in an amount in excess of
that allowed by this section, but this proceeding merely
seeks to determine under what circumstances such mileage
may be allowed by the proper committees and presiding
officers of the General Assembly, the courts can grant no
injunction to enjoin the Treasurer of the State from paying
mileage. Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 537, 136 S. E>. 425.
SECTION 11
Married Woman's Property
§ 6456. (§ 5790.) Paragraph 1. Wife's estate.
See notes to § 3007.
Cited in Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 786, 142 S. K.
111.
ARTICLE 4
Power of the General Assembly over Taxation,
etc.
SECTION 2
Regulation of Corporations
§ 6463. (§ 5797.) Paragraph 1. Railroad
tariffs.
Section Not Intended to Limit Powers.—Independently of
this provision, the General Assembly possesses the' inherent
power to regulate public utilities. The conference upon the
General Assembly of the powers stated in this section was
not intended to limit its powers to those expressed in that
provision. Atlanta Terminal Co. v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 163 Ga. 897, 137 S. E- 556.
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§' 6464 JUSTICES OF THE BEACE § 6523
§ 6464. (§ 5798.) Par. 2. Right of eminent
domain; police power.
See notes to § 1207.
iPoIice Power—Regulation of Busses Valid.—Ordinance
regulating husoes for transportation of passengers in
streets, held not violative of this section. Schlesinger r.
Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 129 S. E. 861.
ARTICLE 5
Executive Department
SECTION 1
Governor
§ 6481. (§ 5815.)
pardons.
Par. 12. Reprieves and
Reprieve.—The constitution does not undertake to define
what is meant by a reprieve; properly construed, a reprieve
by the executive is nothing but a temporary suspension for
the period named in the respite of the execution of the sen-
tence imposed by the court. Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga.
106, 114, 135 S. E- 481.
Stay of Execution.—The contention that only the Governor
can stay the execution of a sentence in a case where such
sentence has been suspended by the Governor in the exer-
cise of his right to suspend the sentence by reprieve is un-
tenable under P. C. sec. 1069(7). Gore v. Humphries, 163
Ga. 106, 114, 135 S. E. 481.
SECTION 2
Other Executive Officers
§ 6490. Salaries.—The General Assembly shall
have power to prescribe ithe duties, authority, and
salaries of the Secretary of State, Comptroller-
General, and Treasurer, and to provide help and
expenses necessary for the operation of the de-
partment of each. Acts 1927, p. 121.
§§ 6491-6492. Repealed by amendment of 1927.
Editor's Note.—Acts 1927, p. 121, repealed §§ 6490-6492
and inserted new section 6490 in lieu thereof.
ARTICLE 6
Judiciary
SECTION 1
Courts
§ 6497. (§ 5831.) Paragraph 1. Courts enumer
ated.
See notes to § 1551(90).
SECTION 2
Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals
§ 6502. (§ 5836.) Par. 5. Jurisdiction.
Editor's Note.—In regard to the holding set out in the
third paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of
1926, it is said that the decision in the Yesbik case has since
been considered the chart and guide for the Supreme Court
in all subsequent cases where the rules there announced
were applicable. See King v. State, 155 Ga. 707, 712, 118 S.
E. 368. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Tomlin, 161 Ga. 749, 759,
132 S. E- 90.
Where one files a claim to personalty levied upon under
an attachment or other process, and in aid of his claim
files an amendment in which he seeks affirmative equi-
table relief, the original proceeding at law is converted
into a proceeding both at law and in equity. In such a
case, when a writ of error is sued out to review the final
judgment, the supreme court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine the assignments of error set out in the bill of ex-
ceptions. Benton v. Benton, 164 Ga. 541, 543, 139 S. E- 68.
Questions of constitutional law, not distinctly raised
and passed on in trial court, not decided on review.
Jackson v. Johnson, 164 Ga. 839, 841, 139 S. E. 663.
Constitutional Questions.—In Griggs v. State, 130 Ga. 16,
60 S. E. 103, the Supreme Court said: "This court will not
pass upon the' constitutionality of a statute unless it ap-
pears that the question was made in the court below and
passed upon by the trial judge, and further that the par-
ticular provision of the constitution alleged to have been
offended by the statute was clearly designated." United
States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Watts, 35 Ga. App. 447, 451,
133 S. E. 476.
Cited in Bernstein v. Fagelson, 166 Ga. 281, 286, 142 S.
E. 862.
§ 6506. Par. 9. Court of Appeals.
Nature of Question Certified—Constitutional Question.—
See Daniel v. Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S. E- 411, hold,
ing the same as the second sentence under this catchline in
the' Georgia Code of 1926, citing Gulf Paving Co. v. Atlanta,
149 Ga. 114, 99 S. E- 374.
Dismissal Case Reinstated.—Since the court has never
formulated the rules contemplated by the amendment of 1916
and at present no statute or rule provides for the giving of
notice to counsel of the hearing of cases in this court, where
counsel did not receive the notice which was mailed to him
and hence failed to prosecute and the case was dismissed
the court will reinstate the case in its discretion. Winder
v. Winder Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 882, 884, 132 S. E- 217.
Applied in Georgia Railroad, etc., Co. v. Stanley, 38
Ga. App. 773, 778, 145 S. E. 530.
Cited in Winder v. Winder Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 882, 132
S. E- 217; concurring opinion in Moreland v. State, 164
Ga. 467, 472, 139 S. E- 77.
SECTION 4
Jurisdiction of Superior Courts
§ 6516.
court.
(§ 5848.) Par. 7. Judgment by the
See note under section 5662.
Cited in Pierce v. Jones, 36 Ga. App. 561, 137 S. E- 296.
SECTION 7
Justices of the Peace
§ 6523. Paragraph 1. Justices, number and term.
—There shall be in each militia district one
justice of the peace, whose official term, except
when elected to fill an unexpired term, shall be
four years; provided, however, that the General
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Assembly may, in its discretion, abolish justice
courts and the office of justice of the peace and
of notary-public ex-officio justice of the peace in
any city of this State having a population of over
twenty thousand, and establish in lieu thereof such
court or courts or system of courts as the General
Assembly may, in its discretion, deem necessary,
conferring upon such new court or courts or
system of courts, when so established, the juris-
diction as to subject-matter now exercised by
justice courts and by justices of the peace and
notaries public ex-officio justices of the peace, to-
gether with such additional jurisdiction, either as
to amount or subject-matter, as may be provided
by law, whereof some other court has not ex-
clusive jurisdiction under this Constitution; to-
gether with such provision as to rules and pro-
cedure in such courts, and as to new trials and
the correction of errors in and by said courts, and
with such further provision for the correction of
errors by the Superior Court, or Court of Appeals,
or the Supreme Court, as the General Assembly
may, from time to time, in its discretion, provide
or authorize. Any court so established shall not
be subject to the rules of uniformity laid down
in Paragraph 1 of Section 9 of Article 6 of the
•Constitution of Georgia. And provided, however,
that* the General Assembly, in its discretion, may
abolish justice courts and the office of justice of
the peace and notary public ex-officio justice of
the peace in any county in this State having with-
in its borders a city having a population of over
twenty thousand, and establish in lieu thereof
such court or courts or system of courts as the
General Assembly may, in its discretion, deem
necessary; or conferring upon existing courts, by
extension of their jurisdiction, the jurisdiction as
to subject-matter now exercised by justice courts
and by justices of the peace and notaries public
ex-officio justices of the peace, together with such
additional jurisdiction, either as to amount or to
subject-matter as may be provided by law, where-
of some other court has not exclusive jurisdiction
under this Constitution; together also with such
provisions as to rules and procedure in such
courts, and as to new trials and the correction
of errors in and by said courts, and with such
further provision for the correction of errors by
the Superior Court or the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court as the General Assembly
may, from time to time, in its discretion, provide
oi authorize. The Municipal Court of Atlanta
shall have jurisdiction in Fulton County and
outside the city limits of Atlanta either con-
currently with, or supplemental to or in lieu of
justice courts, as may be now or hereafter pro-
vided by law. Any court so established shall
not be subject to the rules of uniformity laid
down in Paragraph 1 of Section 9 of Article 6
of the Constitution of Georgia. Provided that
nothing herein contained shall apply ;t|o Rich-
mond County. Acts 1927, pp. 118, 119.
Under constitutional amendment of 1912 of this section,
the General Assembly was authorized to abolish the offices
of justice of the peace and notary public and ex-officio
justice of the peace in certain cities, and to establish in
lieu thereof "such court or courts or system of courts as
the General Assembly may deem necessary." Under said
amendment express authority was granted to the Gen-
eral Assembly to confer upon such new court or courts
"additional jurisdiction either as to amount or subject-
matter as may be provided by law," with certain limita-
tions not material to the present issue. Collier v. Duffeil,
165 Ga. 421, 141 S. E. 194.
It follows from the above rulings, that, while the Gen-
eral Assembly had express constitutional authority to
confer additional jurisdiction within the prescribed limi-
tation "as to amount or subject-matter," such provision
can not by implication or inference deny to the General
Assembly the power also of conferring additional terri-
torial jurisdiction (not inconsistent with the constitution
oi Georgia and not repugnant to the Federal constitution).
Said amendment of 1912 does not in any manner restrict
the General Assembly in the matter of territorial juris-
diction. Collier v. Duffeil, 165 Ga. 421, 141 S. E. 194.
SECTION 9
Uniformity of Courts
§ 6527. (§ 5859.) Paragraph 1. Uniformity pro-
vided for.
See notes to P. C. § 1060(2).
The act of 1925 creating the municipal court of Macon,
permitting oral charges to> the jury is not unconstitutional
because in conflict with this section. Robinson v. Odom,
168 Ga. 81, 147 S. E. 569.
SECTION 13
Judicial Salaries
§ 6533, (§ 5864.) Paragraph 1. Salaries of
judges, etc.—The Justices of the Supreme Court
each shall have out of the Treasury of the State
salaries of $7,000.00 per annum; the Judges of
the Court of Appeals each shall have out of
the Treasury of the State salaries of $7,000.00
per annum; the Judges of the Superior Court
each shall have out of the Treasury of the
State salaries of $5,000.00 per annum; the at-
torney-general shall have a salary not to exceed
two thousand dollars per annum; and the solici-
tor-general each shall have salaries not to ex-
ceed two hundred and fifty dollars per annum;
but the attorney-general shall not have any fee
or perquisite in any cases arising after the adop-
tion of this Constitution; provided that the
County of Chatham shall, from its treasury, pay
to the Judge of the Superior Courts of the
Eastern Circuit $5,000.00 per annum; said pay-
ments are hereby declared to be a part of the
court expenses of said county, and shall be made
to the judge now in office, as well as his succes-
sors. Provided further, That the Board of
County Commissioners of Fulton County, or
such other board of persons as may from time
to time exercise the administrative powers of
Fulton County, shall have power and authority
to pay the Judges of the Superior Court of
Fulton County such sums, in addition to the
salaries paid by the State, as said administrative
authority or authorities may deem advisable, and
the amounts so paid are declared to be a part
oi the court expenses of said county. Provided
further, That the Board of County Commis-
sioners of the counties of Clarke, Floyd, Sumter,
and Bibb, or such other board or person as may
from time to time exercise the administrative
powers of said several counties, may supplement
from their respective county treasuries the sal-
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aries of the Judges of the circuits of which they
are a part by such sum as may be necessary
with salaries paid each of said judges from the
State Treasury to make a salary of $6,000.00 each
per annum of such judges; and such payments
are declared to be a part of the court expenses
of said counties, and such payments shall be
made to the judges now in office, as well as to
their successors. Provided further, That the
County of Fulton may supplement the salary of
the Judge of the Stone Mountain Circuit, or the
judges of such other circuit as may be hereafter
required to regularly preside therein, for addi-
tional services rendered in the Superior Court of
said county, such sum as will, with the salary
paid such judge from the State Treasury, make
a salary of $,6,000.00 per annum; said payments
are declared to be a part of the court expenses
of Fulton County, such payments to be made
to the judge now in office, as well as to his
successors. The provisions of this amendment
shall take effect and the salaries herein provided
for shall begin from the ratification of this
amendment, as provided in the second section
hereof, and shall apply to the incumbents in the
several offices, as well as their successors; and
provided, further, that the board of county com-
missioners of the County of Richmond, or such
other board or person as may from time to
time exercise the administrative powers of said
county, shall supplement from said county's treas-
ury the salary of the judge of the Superior
Court of the circuit of which the said County of
Richmond is a part, by such sum as may be nec-
essary with salaries paid such judge from the
State Treasury to make a salary for said judge
of $7,000.00 per annum; and such payments are
declared to be a part of the court expenses of
said county, and such payment shall be made to
the judge now in office, as well as to his succes-
sors. The provisions of this amendment shall
take effect and the salaries herein provided for
shall begin from the ratification of this amend-
ment, as provided in the second section thereof,
and shall apply to the incumbent in office, as
well as his successors. The Act of the General
Assembly of 1904 entitled "An Act to regulate
the salaries of Judges of the Superior Courts of
all Judicial Circuits of this State having, or that
may hereafter have therein a city with a popu-
lation of not less than 54,000, nor more than
75,000 inhabitants, and for other purposes," with
the Acts of the General Assembly of 1905 and
1906 amendatory thereof; and also of the Act
of the General Assembly of 1906, entitled "An
Act to Regulate the Compensation of Judges of
the Superior Courts for services rendered out-
side of their own Circuits in those Judicial Cir-
cuits of the State having therein a city of not
less than 75,000 inhabitants according to the
Census of 1900, and for other purposes," which
Acts provide for the payment from the treasuries
of the counties containing said cities to the
judges aforesaid of a part of their salaries, are
ratified, validated and confirmed as to the dates
of said respective enactments. Provided, that
the County of Muscogee from and after January
1, 1927, shall pay from its treasury to the Su-
perior Court judges of the circuit of which it
is a part such sums as will with the salary paid
each judge from the State Treasury, make a
salary of eight thousand dollars per annum to
each judge, and said payments are declared to be
a part of the court expense of such county. Acts
1910, p. 42; 1913, p. 30; 1916, p. 22; 1917, p. 36;
1918, p. 94; 1920, p. 20; 1922, p. 26; 1925, p.
70; 1927, p. 112.
§ 6534. (§ 5865.) Par. 2. How salaries may be
changed.
The 1916 amendment of this section does not affect the
right of sheriffs of the counties of this State to the fees
allowed them by law, nor does it purport to affect the
power of the solicitors-general, as provided by law, to
collect and disburse fees due to other officers of court, such
as sheriffs, or the like. Harris County v. Williams, 167
Ga. 45, 144 S. E. 756.
SECTION 15
Divorce
§ 6537. (§ 5868.) Par. 2 Last jury determines
disabilities.
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 168 Ga, 478, 148 S. E. 151.
SECTION 16
Venue
§ 6540. (§ 5871.) Par. 3. Equity cases.
See annotation to § 5527.
The proceeding to foreclose the lien in the instant case
was one in equity. This being so, the present suit ought
to be brought in the county of the residence of a defend-
ant against whom substantial relief is prayed. Middle-
ton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 330, 138 S. 3. 852.
When an alleged landlord sued out a statutory proceed-
ing to eject an alleged tenant for non-payment of rent,
the latter could file her suit in equity against the alleged
landlord to enjoin the dispossessory proceeding, where
she denied that the relation of landlord and tenant ex-
isted between her and the plaintiff in such proceeding,
but alleged that she held under such plaintiff under a
contract of sale, and in the same suit, in a proper case,
could seek specific performance, by the plaintiff in such
proceeding, of the contract of sale, without being re-
quired to file a counter-affidavit to such proceeding that
to give the bond required by the statute to arrest such
proceeding, and without being required to file her suit for
such equitable relief in the county where such proceed-
ing was instituted. Harvey v. Atlanta & L,owry National
Bank, 164 Ga. 625, 139 S. E. 147.
Generally suits for equitable relief must be brought in
the county of the residence of a defendant against whom
substantial relief is prayed. Waters v. Waters, 167 Ga.
389, 145 S. E. 460.
At an interlocutory hearing in vacation prior to the ap-
pearance term, the trial judge was authorized to hear and
determine demurrers in a county other than that of the
residence of the defendant or defendants where the equi-
table suit was pending. The hearing and judgment on
demurrer was not a trial of the case as contemplated by
this section. Holman v. Bridges, 165 Ga. 296, 140 S. E.
886.
Territorial jurisdiction of justices or municipal court
may be enlarged by legislative enactment. Collier v.
Duffell, 165 Ga. 421, 141 S. 3- 194.
§ 6541. (§ 5872.) Par. 4, Suits against joint
obligors, etc.
It was sufficiently alleged that defendants were joint
trespassers; and being so, they were properly joined as
parties defendant, and the venue of the suit as to both
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was in the county of the residence of either.
Chamblee, 165 Ga. 703, 141 S. E. 907.
Flowers v,
§ 6543. (§ 5874.) Par. 6. All other cases.
See notes to § 2259.
Applied in Collier v. Duffell, 165 Ga. 421, 141 S. E. 194;
Citizens, etc., Bank v. Taggart, 164 Ga. 351, 356, 138 S.
E. 898.
factory, and for the storage of the finished products, such
warehouses constituting an existing warehouse plant are
not an enlargement of its cotton factory within the mean-
ing of the above provisions of the constitution of this
State, and the same are not exempt from taxation under
this provision of the constitution. Columbus v. Muscogee
Mfg. Co., 165 Ga. 259, 140 S. F>. 860.
SECTION 18
Jury Trials
§ 6545. (§ 5876.) Paragraph 1. Trial by
jury.
See notes to §§ 3141(1), 5141.
Contempt Proceeding.—In a proceeding for contempt
against the defendant, growing out of his alleged violation
of a mandamus absolute, he is not entitled to a trial by a
jury when an issue of fact is raised. Gaston v. Shunk Plow
Co., 161 Ga. 287, 298, 130 S. E. 580.
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—Section 1697(13) is
not unconstitutional as violative of this section. I^ewis v
State Board, 162 Ga. 263, 133 S. F,. 469.
ARTICLE 7
Finance, Taxation, and Public Debt.
SECTION 6
Purposes of Taxation by Counties and Cities
§ 6561. (§ 5891.) Paragraph 1. Restrictions on
counties and cities.
Section 7 of the act of August 10 (acts 1920, pp. 741, 744),
which provides for the issuing of executions to enforce as-
sessments for paving sidewalks against abutting lots or
the owners thereof in the city of Bainbridge the levy of
such executions, and sales thereunder, as in cases of sales
for city taxes, does not violate this section. Bower v.
Bainbridge, 168 Ga. 616, 148 S. E. 517.
§ 6562. (§ 5892.)
counties limited.
Par. 2. Taxing power of
SECTION l
Power of Taxation
§ 6551. (§ 5882.) Paragraph 1. Taxation,
how and for what purposes exercised.
Power of Taxation Limited.—The General Assembly has
only those powers of taxation over the State which it is
permitted to exercise under the grant of power contained in
the constitution. Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 172, 174 132 S
E. 896.
SECTION 2
Taxation and Exemptions
§ 6553. (§ 5883.) Paragraph 1. Must be uni-
form, etc.; domestic animals.
See notes to § 993(235).
Cited in Cochran v. Thomasvillt, 167 Ga. 579, 584, 146
S. F. 462.
II. TAXES IMPOSED BY MUNICIPALITIES.
Instances of Municipal Taxes.—Under the general language
of this section, a leasehold estate in state owned property
(governor's mansion) is taxable by a municipality. Henry
Grady Hotel Co. v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 818, 135 S. E. 68.
§ 6554(a). Park's Code.
See § 6554(1).
§ 6554(1). Par. 2A. Industries exempt.
Where a resident corporation of this State, which owns
and operates a cotton factory, purchases existing ware-
Louses for the storage of cotton to be manufactured at its
See notes to § 3154(2).
The word "roads" does not include "streets" of munici-
palities in the county. Mitchell County v. Cochran, 162
Ga. 810, 815, 134 S. E- 768.
Applied in Commissioners v. Martin, 161 Ga. 220, 130 S. E.
569; McGennis v. McKinon, 165 Ga. 173, 141 S. E. 910.
Cited in Bank v. Hagedorn Constr. Co., 162 Ga. 488, 499,
134 S. E- 310.
SECTION 7
Limitation on Municipal Debts
§ 6563. Park's Code.
See §§ 6563, 6563(1).
§ 6563. (§ 5893.) Paragraph 1. Debt of coun-
ties and cities not to exceed seven per cent. —
Provided that the City of Columbus may issue
and sell "street-improvement bonds" without the
said assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters at
an election called thereon, but upon a majority
vote of the members of its governing body, with
these limitations: First, the terms of such bonds
shall in no case exceed ten j^ears. Second, the
amount of each issue shall be limited to the
amount assessed by such municipality upon each
improvement. Third, these bonds shall be issued
only for the grading, including curbs and gut-
ters, or paving or repaving of streets or portions
of streets or sidewalks. Fourth, the interest there-
on shall not exceed six per centum per annum.
Fifth, these bonds may be issued without regard
to the amount of other outstanding debts or
bonds of such municipality. Sixth, these bonds
not to be issued except in case such grading,
including curbs and gutters, pavement, or re-
pavement has been petitioned for in writing by
the owners of more than fifty per cent, of the
property abutting on the street or portion of
street paved or repaved.
Except that the City of LaGrange, from time
to time as necessary for the purpose of repair-
ing, purchasing, or constructing a waterworks
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system, including all necessary pipe-line, pump-
ing-stations, reservoirs, or anything else that
may be necessary for the building, constructing,
or operating a waterworks system for the City
of LaGrange, may incur a bonded indebtedness
in addition to and separate from the amount of
debts hereinbefore in this paragraph allowed to
be incurred, to an amount in the aggregate not
exceeding the sum of five hundred thousand
($500,000.00) dollars, and such indebtedness not
to be incurred except with the assent of two-
thirds of the qualified voters of said city at
an election or elections to be held as may now
or may hereafter be prescribed by law for the in-
curring of new debts by said City of LaGrange.
And except that Fulton County and/or Chat-
ham County, and/or Richmond County may, in
addition to the debts hereinbefore allowed, make
temporary loans between March 1st and De-
cember 1st in each year, to be paid out of
the taxes received by the county in that year, said
loans to be evidenced by promissory notes signed
by the chairman and clerk of the board having
charge of the levying of taxes in said county and
previously authorized by resolution by a majority
vote at a regular monthly meeting of such board
entered on the minutes. The aggregate amount
of said loans outstanding at any one time shall
not exceed fifty per cent, of the total gross in-
come of the county from taxes and other sources
in the preceding year, and no new loans shall be
made in one year until all loans made in the
previous year have been paid in full.
And except that the County of Ware may
be authorized to increase its 'bonded indebted-
ness in the sum of two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars in addition to the debts hereinbe-
fore in this paragraph allowed to be incurred, and
at a rate of interest not to exceed five per centum,
per annum; which said bonds shall run for a pe-
riod or periods of time not to exceed thirty years,
and may be issued from time to time, and in such
denominations as may be determined by the
county authorities of said county, to be signed by
the commissioner of roads and revenues of said
county, and the clerk of said commissioner, and
shall be known and designated as Hospital Con-
struction and Equipment bonds, and which said
bonds shall be sold, and the proceeds thereof used
and handled 'by the commissioner aforesaid, acting
with the clerk and ordinary, or by a committee or
commission selected, appointed, and qualified in
such way or method as such county authority may
designate. The proceeds of all bonds issued and
sold under this authority shall be used for the pur-
pose of acquiring a hospital-site in the City of
Waycross, or outside of Waycross, in Ware
County, and building, constructing, and equipping
thereon a hospital where medical and surgical
treatment and care may be provided those in need
of such. The power conferred by this amendment
shall be exercised under such rules and regulations
respecting the acquiring of a site, the building
and equipping of said hospital, as well as the op-
eration of the same, providing for payment for
such medical and surgical treatment and care in
such hospital, excepting only charity cases as the
county authorities acting alone or in conjunction
with the Waycross medical society may deem
[26
meet and proper. Acts 1927, pp. 110, 113, 123,
125.
See notes to § 1551(155).
Editor's Note.—Only the amendments of this section
subsequent to the Code of 1926 are set out above.
This section was adopted in view of existing C. C. § 507.
Central Ry. Co. v. Wright, 165 Ga. 1, 18, 139 S. E. 890.
Amended in 1918.—Illegal diversion of bond money to
purpose other than that specified, restrained. Fayetteville
v. Huddleston, 165 Ga. 899, 902, 142 S. E- 280. See Matthews
v. Darby, 165 Ga. 509, 510, 141 S. E. 304.
Debt Held Created.—Upon a proper construction of the
proposed contract, giving due consideration to its sub-
stance and looking to the intention of the parties as re-
vealed from the paper in its entirety, the obligations of
the city would amount to the creation of a debt within
the meaning of this section. Byars v. Griffin, 168 Ga. 41,
147 S. E. 66.
Definitions.—A registered voter under this section is one
who had been lawfully registered and who has the present
right to vote. Persons merely entitled to be registered or
those lawfully registered who have been disqualified to vote
are not included. Daniel v. Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S.
E. 411.
Issuance of Notes in Excess of Limit.—An issue of notes
in excess of the limit allowed by this section is void since
the tax digest of the county will show the assessed valua-
tion. And the county cannot make recitals which will estop
it from denying that the loan is in excess of the limit.
Baker v. Rockdale County, 161 Ga. 245, 130 S. E. 684.
Municipal Contract for Property Valuation.—Section is not
violated by municipal contract for special services in valu-
ing property for taxation. Tietjen v. Savannah, 161 Ga. 125,
134, 129 S. E- 653. Such contract was held not to constitute
a debt within the meaning of the section. Id.
§ 6563(1). Paragraph la. Coastal Highway
District; bonds; commissioner.
Editor's Note.—The Act of 1929, p. 217, § 1, provides
that "the Board of Commissioners of the Coastal High-
way District of Georgia shall have power and authority
to employ a fiscal agent at such compensation as may
be fixed by the board; and said fiscal agent shall have
authority to collect the assessments required for the
payment of interest and retirement of bonds of the
Cdastal Highway District from the counties composing
said district, and, from the sums so collected, to pay the
interest and retire the bonds. And said fiscal agent shall
have such other duties and authority as may be fixed by
said board of commissioners, not inconsistent with the
law." And by § 2 it is further provided that "any con-
demnation proceedings instituted by the Coastal Highway
District for the purpose of acquiring additional rights of
way or borrow pits may be instituted either under sec-
tion 5206 et seq. of the Code of Georgia, or under the
Acts of 1914, page 92, as codified in section 5246(1) et seq.
of Michie's Code of Georgia."
§ 6564. (§ 5894.)
bonds, how paid.
Par. 2. County and city
It can not be presumed that in the issuance of the bonds
in this case provision for the payment of the indebtedness
had not been made before the addition of the territory em-
braced in Union Grove district. That question was con-
cluded by the judgment of validation. Towns v. Work-
more Public School District, 166 Ga. 393, 396, 142 S. E. 877.
The fact that the light plant and the city hall were built
with the proceeds of bonds sold by the city does not re-
quire that the proceeds of the sales of these properties
should be applied to the redemption of these securities,
these properties being in no way pledged by the city to
the payment of these bonds, and the constitution of this
State requiring that the city should, at or before the time
of issuing said bonds, provide for the assessment and col-
lection of an anual tax sufficient in amount to pay the
principle and interest of any bonded indebtedness within
thirty years from the date of the incurring of the same.
Mathews v. Darby, 165 Ga. 509, 141 S. E- 304.
Installment Bonds.—Nothing in this section is inconsistent
with the authorization of an issue of bonds in installments
and the levy of the tax for the payment of each installment
in the' year of its issue. Brady v. Atlanta, 17 Fed. (2d), 764.
Cited in Bank v. Hagedorn, etc., Constr. Co., 162 Ga. 488,
498, 134 S. E. 310; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Liberty
County, 39 Ga. App. 75, 76, 146 S. E. 771.
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§ 6573.
bidden.
SECTION 16
Donations
(§ 5903.) Paragraph 1. Donations for-
The resolution relieving the bondsmen of liability, and
directing the payment by Miller County to the sureties the
amounts paid by them, is void and of no effect, because it
violates this section. The resolution was an attempt by
the General Assembly to donate to the sureties funds of
Miller County, which is beyond its constitutional power.
Smith v. Fuller, 135 Ga. 271, 69 S. F. 177, Ann. Cas. 1912A,
70; Geer v. Dancer, 164 Ga. 9, 137 S. F- 558.
ARTICLE 8
Education
SECTION 1
Common Schools
§ 6576. (§ 5906.) Paragraph 1, Common schools.
The State system of education provided for in the above
provision of the constitution embraces high schools op-
erated by funds whether derived from taxation or other-
wise; and no matriculation fee can be charged for cnildren
within the school age. Brinson v. Jackson, 168 Ga. 353,
148 S. F- 96.
A consolidated public school or high school established
and maintained in a consolidated school district in part by
the funds provided by the act of August 18, 1919 (Acts
1919, p. 287), is a common school of this State, admis-
sion to which must be free. The trustees by accepting the
benefits of such funds are estopped from denying that this
school is subject to the above constitutional provision mak-
ing the common schools free to the children of the State,
residing in the district. Wilson v. Stanford, 133 Ga. 483,
66 S. F. 258; Brinson v. Jackson, 168 Ga. 353, 148 S. F. 96.
Cited in Hooten v. Hooten, 168 Ga. 86, 147 S. F- 373.
SECTION 4
Educational Tax
§ 6579. (§ 5909.) Paragraph 1. Local taxation
for public schools.
See notes to §§ 1551(130), 1551(136).
The provision of the municipal charter of the city of Edi-
son is sufficiently broad to authorize exercise of the power
of eminent domain by the municipality for enlargement of
school grounds maintained by the city for public schools.
Sheppard v. Fdison, 166 Ga. Ill, 142 S. F- 535.
A local school tax of 5 mills levied for educational pur-
poses by the county authorities under the authority of the
Civil Code, § 1534, after an authorization by a popular vote
in the year 1912, was preserved by the constitutional
amendment of 1920, which provides that "no additional
election shall be required to maintain any local school tax
not in existence in districts, counties, or municipalities.'"
This constitutional amendment, which authorizes the county
authorities to levy a tax for educational purposes without a
vote if the people authorizing the tax, and which also pre-
serves the local county taxes for educational purposes al-
ready levied by the county authorities under authority of
the vote of the people as was provided by the law before the
passage of the amendment, does not authorize the imposi-
tion of a tax by counties for educational purposes in excess
of 5 mills, although the tax may have been levied by virtue
of authority obtained by vote of the people. Mcintosh
County v. Seaboard Air-L,ine Ry. Co., 38 Ga. App. 611, 144
S. F- 687.
Property Subject to Tax Levy.—The taxes provided for by
this section can only be levied upon "all taxable property of
the county outside of independent local systems" for the
support of county schools under the control of county boards
of education. Almand v. Board, 161 Ga. 911, 131 S. F- 897.
When Limit Is Reached.—Where the limit of five mills
has been reached by a local tax for the support of public
schools, the county authorities can not be compelled, on the
recommendation of the board of education, to levy an addi-
tional tax for educational purposes. Such additional tax is
not permissible under the law, outside of the independent
local systems. Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 172, 132 S. F- 896.
ARTICLE 9
Homestead and Exemptions
SECTION 1
Homestead
Paragraph 1. Homestead§ 6582. (§ 5912.)
and exemption.
Constitutionality—Increase of Exemption.—A debtor's right
of exemption under this section cannot be increased as to
debts in existence without violating contract clause of
Federal Constitution. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
"Setting Apart" of debtor's exempt property is a mere
identification of property to which exemption shall be ap-
plied, the burden of securing which is put on the debtor. In
re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326. And is timely if made before
sale, though after levy. Id.
Same—Bankruptcy Proceedings.—Property exempt under
this section and section 3416, but not set apart prior to pe-
tition in bankruptcy, may be set apart in the bankruptcy
proceeding. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326. And the ac-
tion of the bankruptcy court is equivalent to action by
State Court in effectuating exemption. Id.
What Constitutes Head of a Family.—A resident of Georgia
having no family within State, but having mother in Poland
and sister in another state to whom he regularly sends
money, is not the head of a family within the meaning of
this section, and section 3416. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d),
326.
Alienage of resident of state is no bar to claim of exemp-
tion provided by Const. Ga. Art. 9, section 1, and section
3416. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
ARTICLE 11
Counties and County Officers
SECTION 1
Counties
§ 6594. (§ 5924.) Paragraph 1. Counties are
corporate bodies.
Liability of County to Suit Generally.—This section sub-
jects the counties of this State to suit, but not to suits upon
all causes of action. It does not make them generally lia-
ble to suits, like individuals or as municipal corporations.
Being political subdivisions of the State, they can not be
sued unless made subject to suit expressly or by necessary
implication. Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Contracting
Co., 163 Ga. 929, 931, 137 S. F. 247.
Cited in McGinnis v. McKinnon, 165 Ga. 713, 141 S. F- 910.
§ 6597. (§ 5927.) Par. 4. Change of county-sites.
See notes to § 1551(136).
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Otherwise than by amendment of this section in 1919
county commissioners are not responsible for obligations
incurred by board of education to teachers. Rabinowitz v.
Douglas, 168 Ga. 698, 148 S. E- 740.
Applied in Stapleton v. Martin, 164 Ga. 336, 138 S. E- 767.
SECTION 2
County Officers
§ 6599. (§ 5929.) Paragraph 1. County officers.
Cited
E. 102.
in Culbreth v. Oannady, 16S Ga. 444, 446, 148 S.
SECTION 3
Uniformity in County Offices
§ 6600. (§ 5930.) Paragraph 1. County of-
fices to be uniform.
Cited in McDaniel v. Thomas, 162 Ga. 592, 593, 133 S. E-
624; Culbreth v. Cannady, 168 Ga. 444, 446, 148 S. E. 102.
ARTICLE 12
The Laws of General Operation in Force
in This State
SECTION 1
Laws of Force
§ 6608. (§ 5938.) Par. 7. Existing officers.
Cited in Wiley v. Douglass, 168 Ga. 659, 664, 147 S.
735.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
ARTICLE l
Legislative Department
SECTION 3
§ 6626. (§ 5956.) [1.] Senate, how chosen.
Applied in Bryant v. Bush, 165 Ga. 252, 140 S. E. 366.
SECTION 8
§ 6644. (§ 5974.) Powers of congress.
See notes to 4258.
SECTION 10
§ 6652. (§ 5982.) [1.] Limitations of the powers
ot the individual states.
Cited in Cochran v. Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 584, 146 S.
E. 462.
ARTICLE 8
Amendments.
§ 6700. (§ 6030.) Art. 14. [1.] Citizenship.
See notes to P. C. 247.
Tax Lien upon Property before Improvement.—An act
making a tax lien upon property before any paving or im-
provement is begun on the street for which the tax is levied
is not unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause
of this section. Baugh v. L,aGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 130 S. E. 69.
Cited in Cochran v. Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 584, 146
S. E- 462.
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PENAL CODE
CRIMES AND THEIR PUNISHMENT
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
§ 1. (§ 1.) Construction of statutes.
Paragraph 9 of this section is the cardinal rule in the
construction of statutes, and the intention when ascer-
tained must be carried into effect. Erwin v. Moore, 15
Ga. 361. The construction must square with common sense
and sound reasoning. Blalock v. State, 166 Ga. 465, 470,
143 S. E. 426.
§ 11. (§ 11.) Jeopardy of life, etc.
The plea of former jeopardy was held legally sufficient in
Cliett v. State, 167 Ga. 835, 147 S. E- 35.
§ 19. (§ 19). No conviction for an assault or
attempt when the crime is actually perpetrated.
Evidence held not authorizing conviction for attempt to
commit the crime of attempting the making of liquor. Raines
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 175, 176, 132 S. E- 243.
Applied in Jackson v. State, 38 Ga. App. 138, 142 S. E.
694.
§ 30. (§ 30.) Limitations of prosecutions.
Exception as to Running of Limitation—Allegation and
Proof.—In a criminal case, where an exception is relied upon
to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations, it must be
alleged and proved. Bazemore v. State, 34 Ga. App. 773,
131 s. e. 177.
Quoted in Bullard v. State, 34 Ga. App. 198, 200, 128 S.
E. 920.
FIRST DIVISION
Definition of a Crime. Persons Capable of Com-
mitting. Persons Punishable
ARTICLE 2
Infants, Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons Counseling
Them
§ 33. (§ 33.) Persons who are considered of
sound mind.
Cited in Burt v. Gooch, 37 Ga. App. 301, 302, 139 S E- 912.
§ 34. (§ 34.) Infant under the age of ten years.
Applied in McRae v. State, 163 Ga. 336, 342, 136 S. E. 268.
SECOND DIVISION
Principals and Accessories in Crime
ARTICLE 1
Principals in Fifst and Second Degree
§ 42. (§ 42.) Principals in first and second
gree.
Charge of section upheld. Coggeshall v. State, 161
259, 131 S. E. 57.
de-
Ga.
FOURTH DIVISION
Crimes Against the Person
ARTICLE 1
Homicide
§ 60. (§ 60.) Murder.
See notes to P. C. 67.
Repeating Charge.—After giving the definition of mur-
der as contained in this section, the judge in a subsequent
part of the charge again defined murder. The criticism was
that repetition of the charge tended to unduly impress on
the jury "the law of murder," and amounted to an ex-
pression of an opinion that "the accused was guilty of
murder," and indicated to the jury that the court "be-
lieved the defendant guilty and wanted him convicted."
The charge was not erroneous for the reason assigned. Ply-
mel v. State, 164 Ga. 677, 139 S. E- 349.
§ 61. (§ 61.) Express malice.
Circumstances Tending to Show Malice.—On the trial of
a man for the homicide of his sister-in-law, growing out
of a difficulty in which her husband also was killed by the
accused, evidence tending to show a previous difficulty be-
tween the accused and the husband (although such difficulty
occurred several months prior to the homicide), and the ex-
istence of bad blood between them, was admissible as tend-
ing to show malice, intent, or motive in killing the deceased.
Jeffords v. State, 162 Ga. 573, 134 S. E- 169.
§ 62, (§ 62.) Implied malice.
This section was properly given in charge in case of pas-
senger cutting conductor who was attempting to eject her
from car for improper conduct. Clinton v. State, 37 Ga.
App. 79, 80, 139 S. E. 82.
§ 63. (§ 63.) Murder, punishment.
Appliled in Morrow v. State, 168 Ga. 575,
500.
576, 148 S. E.
§ 64. (§ 64.) Manslaughter.
Applied in Little v. State, 164 Ga. 509, 139 S. E. 37.
§ 65. (§ 65.) Voluntary manslaughter.
Charge.—In the absence of a timely and appropriate writ-
ten request, it is not error, in charging upon the law of
voluntary manslaughter as contained in this section to
fail to qualify the statement that "provocation by words,
threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures shall in no
case be sufficient to free the person killing from the guilt
and crime of murder," by presenting also the principle that
words, threats, or menaces, under the facts of the case
might be sufficient to arouse the fears of a reasonable
man that his person was in apparent danger of a felonious
attack or that his life was in danger. Hartley v. State, 168
Ga. 296, 147 S. E. 504.
The court's charge upon the subject of manslaughter is
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not open to the criticism made upon it, when .read in con-
nection with the immediate context. Hill v. State, 164 Ga.
298, 138 S. E- 229. See also Plymel v. State, 164 Ga. 677,
139 S. E- 349; Holland v State, 166 Ga. 201, 203, 142 S. E.
739.
Applied in Brown v. State, 168 Ga. 671, 148 S. E- 583.
Cited in Salter v. The State, 39 Ga. App. 13; Fennell v.
State, 164 Ga. 59, 137 S. E. 762.
§ 67. (§ 67.) Involuntary manslaughter.
Death Caused by Speeding Involuntary Manslaughter.—
Where one operates an automobile upon a public street or
highway of this State at a rate of speed penalized by stat-
ute, or while he is under the influence of intoxicating li-
quors, and, in consequence thereof, he kills a human being
without any intention to do so, he is, under that view of the
case most favorable to him, guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter. Black v. State, 34 Ga. App. 449, 130 S. E. 591.
The proviso in this section must be considered in con-
nection with section 60 of the Penal Code, which defines
murder. There can be no murder without malice express or
implied. Wight v. State, 166 Ga. 1, 4, 141 S. E- 903.
Applied in Cain v. State, 39 Ga. App. 128, 130, 146 S. E-
340.
Cited in Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467, 139 S. E- 77.
§ 68. (§ 68.) Punishment.
Refusal to Charge to Consider Words or Threats not Error.
—It is not erroneous for the court, in instructing the jury on
the law of voluntary manslaughter, as contained in this
section, to fail or refuse to charge in immediate connection
therewith the right of the jury to consider words, threats,
or menaces in determining whether the circumstances at-
tending the homicide were such as to justify the fears of a
reasonable man that his life was in imminent danger or that
a felony was about to be committed upon his person. Brown
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 83, 135 S. E- 513.
§ 70. (§ 70.) Justifiable homicide.
Where this Section Governs Case, § 73 Excluded.—Where
the law of justifiable homicide to prevent the commission
of a felony upon the person of the slayer, as embraced in
this section and section 71, is involved, it is error to limit
the defense to justifiable homicide in a case of mutual com-
bat as embraced in section 73. Boatwright v. State, 162
Ga. 378, 134 S. E- 91.
Charging with Sections 71 and 73.—In a proper case, on
a trial of one indicted for murder, sections 70, 71, and 73
of the Penal Code may all be given in charge; but in-
structions as to the separate branches of the law of justi-
fiable homicide should not be so given as to confuse the
different defenses which may arise under those sections.
Little v. State, 164 Ga. 509, 139 S. E. 37.
The portions of the charge complained of in this case, re-
lating to the law of justifiable homicide under § 73, did
not limit the defense under § 70, and did not confuse the
separate defenses allowed the defendant under §§ 73 and 70.
Brown v. State, 168 Ga. 282, 147 S. E- 519.
Cited in Adams v. State, 168 Ga. 530, 542, 148 S. E- 386;
Clinton v. State, 37 Ga. App. 79, 80, 139 S. E. 82.
§ 71. (§ 71.) Fear must be reasonable.
Danger Apprehended Must Be Urgent and Pressing.—The
doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of
homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and
pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing. Martin
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 288, 291, 136 S. E- 324.
Request for Instruction as to Reasonable Fear's.—Where
this section had been given in charge, if further instruc-
tions were desired, relating to the doctrine of reasonable
fears as applicable to the case, there should have been ap-
propriate written requests. Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166,
129 S. E. 772.
Instruction Properly Refused.—Requested instruction on
reasonable fears as defense of homicide by shooting, prop-
erly refused. Little v. State, 166 Ga. 189, 190, 142 S. E-
674.
§ 72. (§ 72.) Killing in defense.
Application to Homicide of Officer.—The provisions of this
section are not applicable to killing of an arresting officer
who shot at a fleeing automobile. Howell v. State, 162 Ga.
14, 30, 134 S. E. 59.
Cited in Johnson v. State, 39 Ga. App. 836, 838, 148 S. E-
610.
§ 73. (§ 73.) The danger must be urgent.
Section Applicable for Cases of Mutual Combat.—Where
the law of justifiable homicide in cases of mutual combat is in-
volved, the court should instruct the jury that the provi-
sions of this section are applicable only in the event the
jury find that the accused and the deceased were engaged in
mutual combat. Boatwright v. State, 162 Ga. 378, 134 S. E.
91. See § 70.
On the trial of one indicted for murder, it is error to
charge this section which is applicable only to a case of
mutual combat, when there is neither evidence nor state-
ment of the defendant tending to show that at the time
of the homicide the deceased and the defendant were en-
gaged in a mutual combat. There is no evidence in the
present case to authorize such charge. Lamp v. State, 164
Ga. 57, 137 S. E. 765.
Applied in Ellis v. State, 166 Ga. 115, 142 S. E- 681; Par-
ker v. State, 37 Ga. App. 84, 139 S. E- 94.
Cited in Andrews v. State, 38 Ga. App. 701, 702, 145 S. E.
499.
§ 74. (§ 74.) Mutual protection.
Applied in Chisholm v. State, 162 Ga. 13, 132 S. E- 388.
§ 76. (§ 76.) Justifiable homicide not punished.
The failure of the court to charge the language of this
section was not error in view of the other portions of the
instructions actually given. Hill v. State, 164 Ga. 298, 138
S. E. 229.
ARTICLE 4
Rape
§ 94(a). Park's Code.
See § 94(1).
§ 94(1). Sexual intercourse with female under
fourteen.
Burden of Proving Capacity to Consent.—A female over
fourteen years of age is presumed to possess sufficient men-
tal capacity to intelligently assent to or dissent from acts
of sexual intercourse; and where in a rape case the conten-
tion of the State is that a woman above that age did not
possess such intelligence, the burden rests upon the State
to establish this fact. Smith v. State, 161 Ga. 421, 131 S.
E. 163.
Intercourse with an Imbecile Constitutes Rape Regardless
of Consent.—A man who has sexual intercourse with an im-
becile female, who is mentally incapable of expressing any
intelligent assent or dissent, or of exercising any judgment
in the matter, is guilty of rape, though no more force is
used than is necessary to accomplish the carnal act, and
though the woman offer no resistance. Smith v. State, 161
Ga. 421, 131 S. E- 163.
Indictment for Rape—Verdict for Fornication Void. —
Where one is tried on an indictment charging rape and
drawn under this section, a verdict finding the accused
guilty of fornication is null and void, and the judgment
based thereon should be arrested on motion of the defend-
ant. Holland v. State (this case), 161 Ga. 492, 131 S. E.
503. Holland v. State, 34 Ga. App. 824, 131 S E- 923.
ARTICLE 5
Assault, and Assault and Battery
§ 95. (§ 95.) Definition of assault.
Mere preparation to commit a violent injury upon the
person of another, unaccompanied by a physical effort to
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do so, will not amount to an assault. Fennell v. State, 154
Ga. 59, 63, 137 S. E- 762.
Opportunity but No Intention.—In this case there was
unquestionably an opportunity to commit a violent injury
on the person of the prosecutrix, but the facts entirely fail
to show any intention on the part of the defendant to do
so. Godboult v. State, 38 Ga. App. 137, 138, 142 S. E. 704.
§ 97. (§ 97.) Assault with intent to murder.
Effect of Section 115(1).—Section 115(1) of the Penal Code
does not in any sense modify or repeal this section. Gazaway
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E. 888.
Intent Question for Jury. — The intent with which a shot
is fired is a question for the jury. Gazaway v. State, 34
Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E. 888.
Common Law Offense Adopted.—This section of the Penal
Code was not intended to define what constitutes the of-
fense of assault with intent to commit murder, nor to cre-
ate a new statutory offense, but adopted the common-law
offense of an aggravated assault with intent to commit
murder, and changed the grade of the offense from that of
a misdemeanor to that of a felony. Wright v. State, 16«
Ga. 690, 148 S. E- 731.
The words "deadly weapon" in this section include all
means or instrumentalities by which assaults with intent
to commit murder may be made. Wright v. State, 168 Ga.
690, 148 S. E. 731.
§ 103.i (§ 103*) Opprobrious words may be
proved in defense.
Jury May Consider Conduct of Person Assaulted and De-
gree of Force Justified.—The jury may consider the actions
and conduct of the person assaulted at the time of the as-
sault, with other facts, in determining if force, and what
degree of force, on the part of the defendant was justified,
and if not justified, what, if any, effect should be given to
such facts as in mitigation. Hutchison v. Browning, 34
Ga. App. 276, 129 S. E. 125.
Cited in Chambers v. The State, 39 Ga. App. 662, 148 S.
E- 290.
ARTICLE 7
Kidnapping, and Industrial Home Children
§ 110. (§ 110.) Inveigling children.
Misapprehension as to the Age Is No Excuse. — The fact
that the accused was ignorant of the girl's age, and that
he believed, in good faith, and had good grounds to believe,
that she was more than eighteen years of age, is no defense
to an indictment under this section. Smiley v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 513, 130 S. E- 359.
ARTICLE 9
Shooting at Another
§ 115. (§ 113.) Shooting at another.
Applied to officer shooting at an automobile in which the
plaintiff was riding. Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817,
822, 138 S. E. 267.
Effect of Section 115(1).—Section 115(1) of the Penal Code
does not in any way modify or repeal this section. Gazaway
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E- 888. See annota-
tion to § 115(1).
ARTICLE 9A
Shooting at Dwelling House
§§ 115(a), 115(b). Park's Code.
See § 115(1).
§ 115(1). Shooting at occupied dwelling pro-
hibited; penalty.
Intent under this Section and Section 115.—The misde-
meanor of unlawfully shooting into an occupied dwelling
house under this section may be committed without an in-
tention to maim or wound any person therein; but the in-
tent to wound under section 115 is an essential element of
the felony of unlawfully shooting at another. Gazaway v.
v. State, 34 Ga. 442, 444, 129 S. E- 888.
Shooting at a Dwelling with Intent to Shoot at Another.—
While it is a misdemeanor for any person to shoot at any
occupied dwelling house, yet if, in addition to the essentials
of that offense, the elements of unlawfully shooting at an-
other or of assault with intent to murder are made to ap-
pear, the offender may be ptinished for the felony so shown.
Gazaway v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 129 S. E- 888.
Effect of Section upon §§ 97, 115.—This section does not in
any sense modify or repeal section 115, defining the offense
of unlawfully shooting at another, or section 97, which de-
fines the offense of assault with intent to murder. Gaza-
way v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E. 888.
ARTICLE 9B
Eavesdropper or "Peeping Tom "
§ 115(2). Unlawful to be eavesdropper" or
"Peeping Tom."
Applied in Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 304, 133 S. E. 42.
ARTICLE 10
Abandonment of Child
§ 116. (§ 114.) Abandonment of child.
Under this section an indictment would be insufficient
and bad if it failed to allege that such abandonment was
wilful. Carroll v. ^tna Eife Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 78, 81,
146 S. E. 788.
If the child is fed at the mother's breast, and if the
mother be abandoned by the father prior to the birth of the
child, and if this abandonment of both the mother and the
child continue after the birth, the child is abandoned by
the father. Chandler v. State, 38 Ga. App. 362, 364, 144 S.
E. 51.
The fact that the mother supplied the food, shelter and
clothing is no legal defense to an accusation against the
father under this section. Chandler v. State, 38 Ga. App.
362, 364, 144 S. E- 51.
ARTICLE 12
Blackmail and Threatening Letters
§ 118. (§ 116.) Blackmail defined.
Charge in the Language of Section.—An indictment which
charges the offense of blackmailing substantially in the'
language of this section is not demurrable. Beard v. State,
36 Ga. App. 266, 136 S. E- 333.
Cited in City Purchasing Co. v. Clough, 38 Ga. App. 53,
142 S. E. 469.
ARTICLE 14
Interfering with Apprentices, Servants, Croppers,
Farm Laborers, and Employees
§ 125. (§ 122.) Enticing, and attempting to en-
tice away, a servant, cropper, or farm laborer.
Constitutionality.—This section is not violative of the
constitution, § 6359. Rhoden v. State, 161 Ga. 73, 129 S. E.
640.
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§ 131(a). Park's Code.
See § 115(2).
FIFTH DIVISION
Crimes Against the Habitations or Persons
ARTICLE 2
Burglary
§ 146. (§ 149.) Burglary defined.
Allegation as to Place of Business.—Where the house en-
tered was not a "dwelling, mansion, or storehouse," it must
be alleged in the indictment that the house was a place
of business where valuable goods were contained or stored.
Moody v. State, 36 Ga. App. 284, 136 S. E- 464.
It is not essential that the house should be expressly de-
nominated in the indictment as a "place of business," if
descriptive words are used sufficient to show that the house
was used as a place of business of another. Moody v. State,
36 Ga. App. 284, 136 S. E- 464.
- Same—Mere Existence of Valuable Goods Not Sufficient.—
The mere fact that valuable goods were contained or stored
therein is not alone sufficient to make the house a place of
business, within the meaning of section. Moody v. State,
36 Ga. App. 284, 136 S. E- 464.
Church Building.—Whether an ordinary church building
or edifice, appropriated to public worship, is subject to be
burglarized, is not decided. Moody v. State, 36 Ga. App.
284, 136 S. E. ^64.
A smokehouse within, 65 feet of the owner's dwelling house
and used by him as an outhouse and place for storing meat
is among the buildings referred to in this section regard-
less of whether the smokehouse is within the same inclosure
as the dwelling. Moore v. State, 34 Ga. App. 182, 129 S.
E. 6.
SIXTH DIVISION
Crimes Relative to Property
ARTICLE 1
Robbery
§ 148. (§ 151.) Definition.
Request to Charge Definition of Robbery.—The omission
to give in charge the definition of robbery as in this sec-
tion is not error in the absence of request so to do. Gore
v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S. E- 36.
Larceny from the Person under § 172 and Robbery by
Force Distinguished.
—See Smith v. State, 38 Ga. App. 265,
143 S. E. 604.
§ 149. (§ 152.) By open force, punishment.
Charge of robbery upheld under the evidence in the case.
Watkins v. State, 36 Ga. App. 297, 136 S. E- 815.
ARTICLE 2
Larceny
§ 168. (§ 171.) Receiving stolen goods.
Conviction of Principal Thief.—An indictment under this
Ga.—18 [ 273 ]
section must allege that the principal thief has been indicted
and convicted. Ford v. State, 35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. E. 35 7 .
The conviction of the principal is not an element in the
crime defined in this section, but is a regulation which af-
fects the time when or the manner in which a person in-
dicted under said section can be tried. The gist of the of-
fense created by this section is buying or receiving goods
with the felonious knowledge that they were stolen. Ford
v. State, 35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. E- 353; 162 Ga. 422, 134
S. E. 95.
The record of the conviction of the principal thief is con-
clusive evidence of his conviction, but is merely prima facie
evidence of his guilt; but the introduction of such record
in evidence by the State places the onus upon the accessory
of disproving the guilt of the principal. Ford v. State,
35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. E- 353.
The accessory could waive the conviction of the princi-
pal and go to trial on the charge preferred against him.
Ford v. State. 35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. E. 353.
Applied in Ford v. State, 164 Ga. 638, 641, 139 S. E. 355.
§ 172. (§ 175.)
fined.
Larceny from the person de-
Larceny from the person under this section and robbery
by force under § 148 are distinguished in Smith v. State, 38
Ga. App. 265, 143 S. E- 604.
§ 176. (§ 179.) Punishment.
Applied in Tallent v. State, 37 Ga. App. 84, 138 S. E- 917.
§ 183(1). Larceny of automobile, etc.
By this section the larceny of an automobile was made a
felony; and any person convicted of this offense is punish-
able by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a time not
longer than five years nor less than one year. By section
1068 of the Penal Code any person, upon second conviction
for the larceny of an automobile, is punishable by impris-
onment in the penitentiary for five years, which punishment
is different from that imposed by this section for a first
conviction of the larceny of an automobile; and this being
so, the indictment for the second offense must allege the
indictment and conviction of the accused for the first of-
fense, and proof of such allegation must be made, before
the accused can be subjected to the punishment prescribed
in section 1068, the latter punishment being the maximum
punishment prescribed under the above act. Tribble v.
State, 168 Ga. 699, 148 S. E. 593.
§ 183J4 Park's Code.
See 183(1).
ARTICLE 3
Embezzlement and Fraudulent Conversions
§ 184. (§ 187.) Embezzlement by public officer.
Deposits of the public funds of the County of Fayette,
in the Bank of Fayetteville as "the depository and disburs-
ing agent" of said funds under the act of 1915 (Acts 1915, p.
233), creating a depository and disbursing agent of the
public funds of the county, were general deposits, title to
which became vested in such bank upon being deposited;
and neither the- depository nor its officers can be indicted
for embezzlement of such funds as the property of the
county. Blalock v. State, 166 Ga. 465, 143 S. E- 426.
§ 186. (§ 188.) Embezzlement by the bank or
other corporate officers, servants, or stockholders.
Substitution of Stock of Less Value for Stock of More
Value. — Where the corporate officer substituted certain
stock of less value for other stock of more value', deposited
as collateral security, with the intent to defraud, he was
held guilty of embezzlement under this section. Wilkins v.
State, 36 Ga. App. 743. 138 S. E. 253.
§ 202(j) FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING, ETC. § 231
ARTICLE 5
Banks and Bank Officers.
§ 202(j). Park's Code.
See § 211(10).
§ 202 (o). Park's Code.
See § 211(15).
§ 211. (10.) False entries.
Cited in Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 582, 144 S. F- 170.
§ 211(15). Falsely advertising that deposits are
insured.—Any officer, director, agent, or employee
of any bank, who shall advertise by any office sign
or upon any letterhead, billhead, blank note, re-
ceipt, certificate, circular, or on any written or
printed paper that the deposits in said bank are
insured or are guaranteed, unless such deposits
are in fact insured or guaranteed in a manner sat-
isfactory to the Superintendent of Banks and by
his express permission, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. Acts 1919, pp. 212, 214; 1927, pp. 19i5,
205.
Editor's Note.—This section prior to its amendment made
the act of advertisement an offense in the event the
deposits were not in fact insured or guaranteed. The phrase
"in a manner satisfactory to the superintendent of Banks
and by his express permission" did not then exist.
§ 202(t). Park's Code.
See § 211(20).
§ 211(20). Embezzlement.
This being a penal statute, it must be strictly construed.
Johnson v. State, 166 Ga. 755, 144 S. F- 283.
The indictment charges that the defendant, "being an
officer, director, agent, clerk, and employee of the Farm-
ers Bank of Climax, Ga., did embezzle, abstract, and wil-
fully misplace [misappljO the monies and funds of said
bank, to and in the amount and value of the sum of $20,-
000, with the intent to injure and defraud the bank." The
word "funds" includes all the available assets of the bank,
and therefore the charge complained of in the second spe-
cial ground of the motion for a new trial is without merit.
The defendant's conviction of the charge was authorized by
the evidence, and no reversible error is shown by the spe-
cial grounds of the motion for a new trial. Johnson v.
State, 37 Ga. App. 129, 139 S. F- 118.
Under an indictment based on this section, charging the
defendant with embezzlement of "moneys and funds" of a
bank, he could not be convicted of the embezzlement of
"notes, securities, or credits" of the bank; and the trial
judge erred in giving to the jury an instruction which au-
torized them to convict the defendant of the embezzlement
of notes, securities, or credits. Johnson v. State, 166 Ga.
755, 144 S. F- 283.
§§ 202 (bb), 202 (cc). Park's Code.
See §§ 211(28), 211(29).
§ 211(28). Bank insolvency deemed fraudulent.
Constitutionality.—This section does not violate the due-
process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions.
Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. F. 170.
This provision, properly construed, does not deny the ac-
cused the right of asserting any and all other defenses ap-
propriate in his case, and is not in violation of the state
constitution section 6359. Snead v. State, 165 Ga. 44, 139
S. F. 812.
The act did not contain matter different from its caption.
Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55, 139 S. F- 877.
The care and diligence required by this section is defined
by law. It is "that ordinary care, skill, and diligence re-
quired of bailee for hire." Civil Code, § 3581. Manley v.
State, 166 Ga. 563, 579. 144 S. F. 170.
Specifying and /Proving Acts Causing Insolvency.—A pre-
sentment charging one who was in charge of the affairs of
a bank at and during the time it became insolvent with the
offense of fraudulent insolvency need not allege or specify
the acts which caused the insolvency. The presumption
that the failure and insolvency of the bank was fraudulent
is rebuttable; but res ipsa loquitur. Sneed v. State, 165
Ga. 44, 139 S. F- 812.
In view of the prima facie presumption of a fraudulent
insolvency, which arises from the failure of a bank, that
such failure is due to the fraudulent mismanagement of the
officers having the same in charge, a presentment charging
this offense is sui generis, and it does not devolve upon the
prosecution to allege, nor to prove in the first instance any-
thing more than the fact that the bank became insolvent
while under the management and control of the accused and
during the period of time that he was in charge of the af-
fairs of the bank. Snead v. State, 165 Ga. 44, 139 S. F.
812.
Juror Related to Depositor.—Upon the trial of one indicted
under this section a person related within the prohibited
degrees to a depositor in the bank is disqualified to act as
a juror in the case. Snead v. State, 38 Ga. App. 797, 145
S. F- 918.
Evidence held admissible in indictment under this section
in Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55, 139 S. F- 877.
§ 211(2)9). Receiving deposits after insolvency.
Where a cashier of an insolvent bank, having charge
and control of the bank, and having knowledge of its in-
solvency, receives money on general deposit in the bank,
and thereby loss or injury results to the person who
made the deposit, the cashier is guilty of a felony, under
the provisions of this section. L,enhardt v. State, 37 Ga.
App. 41, 138 S. F- 590.
§ 202 (hh). Park's Code.
See § 211(34).
§ 211(34). Check or draft without funds.
Where in a prosecution under this section, it appears
from the evidence that the transaction amounted merely
to a promise by the giver of the check to pay in the fu-
ture, a conviction is not warranted. Highsmith v. State,
33 Ga. App. 192, 143 S. F. 445.
ARTICLE 11
Firing the Woods
§ 227. (§ 229.) Who may.—No person but a
resident of the county where the firing is done,
owning lands therein, or domiciled thereon, out-
side of any town incorporation, shall set on fire
any woods, lands, or marshes, nor shall such per-
sons, except between the first of January and the
first of March annually. Cobb, 824; 1927, p. 144.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927, the date con-
tained in the excepting clause was changed from February*
20, April 1, to January 1, March 1.
SEVENTH DIVISION
Forgery, Counterfeiting, and Unlawful Cur-
rency
ARTICLE 1
Forgery, Counterfeiting, and Unlawful Cur-
rency
§ 231. (§ 233). Forging official certificates,
etc.
Where Forged Instrument Composed of Two Parts. —
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§ 239 RESCUES AND ESCAPES § 319
Clause 7 applied in Johnson v. State, 36 Ga. App. 310, 136
S. E. 329, notwithstanding that the forged instrument was
composed of two parts, the other part being treated as sur-
plusage.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Beavers, 164
Ga. 702, 139 S. E. 344.
§ 239. (§ 237.) Bank check or draft.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Stanley v.
Ga. 702, 139 S. E. 344.
Beavers, 164
§ 247. (§ 245). Using fictitious names.
This section is not void on the ground that it is un-
reasonable and uncertain; nor is it in violation of § 6700.
Nissenbaum v. State, 167 Ga. 495, 146 S. E. 189.
A "bill of exchange," within the meaning of this sec-
tion, is set out in the indictment in this case, which
charges that the accused "did unlawfully, feloniously, and
fraudulently make and draw a certain bill of exchange
in the fictitious name of J. W. Ellison, as cashier of the
Corn Exchange Trust Co., of Chicago, Illinois, being in
form and substance as follows, to wit: 'The Corn Ex-
change Trust Co., Chicago, Illinois. No. 4025. Nov. 30,
1927. Pay to the order of Abe Greenberg $1500.00. Fif-
teen hundred dollars. Cashier's Check. J. W. Ellison,
Cashier.' ' Nissenbaum v. State, 38 Ga. App. 253, 143
S. E. 776.
§ 248. (§ 246.) Personating another.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Beavers, 164
Ga. 702, 139 S. E. 344.
§ 249. (§ 247.) Obtaining goods, etc., on false
writings.
An indictment under this section, which fails to charge
an intent to defraud, is fatally defective. Sims v. State,
37 Ga. App. 819, 142 S. E. 464.
Cited in dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Beavers, lo4
Ga. 702, 139 S. E. 344.
DIVISION 7A
Fictitious or Trade-Name in Business
§ 258(1). Unlawful use of fictitious or trade-
name; affidavit giving true-name, etc.—It shall
be unlawful for any person, persons, or partner-
ship to carry on, conduct, or transact any busi-
ness in this State under an assumed, fictitious, or
trade-name, or under any other designation,
name^or style, other than the real name or names
of the individual or individuals conducting or
transacting such business, unless said person,
persons, or partnership shall file, in the office of
the clerk of the superior court in each county in
which said person, persons, or partnership shall
maintain an office or place of business, an affi-
davit signed by said person or persons, setting
forth the full name or names and the address or
addresses of the true owner or owners of said
business. Acts 1929, ip. 233, § 1.
§ 258(2). Time for filing affidavit; affidavit on
change of ownership of business.—Any person,
persons, or partnership now conducting a busi-
ness under an assumed, fictitious, or trade-name
shall file such affidavit within thirty days after
this act shall take effect, and any person, persons,
or partnership acquiring or hereafter undertaking
to conduct a business under an assumed, ficti-
tious, or trade-name shall file said affidavit be-
fore doing any business under such assumed,
fictitious, or trade-name; and whenever there is
any change of ownership of a business conducted
under any assumed, fictitious, or trade-name, an
affidavit as herein provided for shall be filed,
showing the full name or names and address or
addresses of the new owner or owners of such
business. Acts 1929, p. 233, § 2.
§ 258(3). Alphabetical index of affidavits; fee
of clerk.—The clerk of the superior court in each
county shall keep an alphabetical index of all
such affidavits filed in his office, said mdex to be
kept under the assumed, fictitious, or trade-name,
and said clerk shall keep a permanent file of all
such affidavits filed in his office, both index and
file to be open to public inspection. The clerk
of the superior court shall receive a fee of fifty
cents for recording and indexing each such affi-
davit. Acts 1929, p. 234, § 3.
§ 258(4). Corporation legally doing business
under its corporate name, not affected.—Nothing
in this Act is to be construed to affect or apply
to any corporation duly organized under the laws
of this State or any foreign corporation legally
doing business in this State under its corporate
name. Acts 1929, p. 234, § 4.
§ 258(5). Violation of Act, a misdemeanor. —
Any violation of this Act shall be a misdemeanor
and upon conviction the offender shall be pun-
ished as for a misdemeanor. Acts 1929, p.
234, § 5.
EIGHTH DIVISION
Crimes against the Public Justice and Official
Duty
ARTICLE 5.
Obstructing Legal Process, and Sentence or
Order of Court
§ 311. (§ 306). Obstructing legal process.
See notes to C. C. § 4643.
Allegation as to Serving of Lawful Process.—An indict-
ment or accusation based upon this section, which does not
allege that the officer was attempting to serve or execute a
lawful process or order, is fatally defective. Prichard v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 181, 129 S. E- 12.
ARTICLE 6
Rescues and Escapes
§ 319. (§ 314.) Penalty for escapes in misde-
meanor cases.
See notes to § 1152.
This section refers only to persons convicted in State
courts and not to those convicted in the Federal courts
who may be imprisoned, under the authority of United
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§ 326 SOLICITING FOR PURPOSE OF PROSTITUTION § 384(1)
States officials, in State jails. This is true notwithstand
ing the provision of section 1152 of the Penal Code. Bran-
don v. State, 37 Ga. App. 495, 141 S. F. 63.
ARTICLE 8
Receiving, Harboring, or Concealing Guilty
Persons, and Compounding Crimes and
Penalties
(§ 321)=, Receiving, harboring, guilty§ 326,
person.
Concealing Body of Murdered Person.—Where A, knowing
that B is guilty of murder, assists B in concealing the crime
and the body of the murdered person, A is not thereby
guilty of "receiving, harboring, or concealing" the murderer,
within the meaning of this section. Heath v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 218, 128 S. E. 914.
ARTICLE 11
Appointment of Peace-Omcers and Detectives
§ 339(334). Other offenses against public jus-
tice.
Section Adopts Offenses Punishable at Common Law. —
This section and section 366 only adopts and make crimes
in this state offenses against public justice or against the
public peace which were punishable as such at common law.
Prichard v. State, 34 Ga. App. 181, 129 S. F. 12.
ARTICLE 12
Interfering with Board of Public Welfare
§ 339(a). Park's Code.
See § 339(1).
§ 339(1). Interference with inspection; refus-
ing access to records.
Obstructing Officer Arresting without Warrant. — Under
this section and section 366, a third person can not be pun-
ished for resisting or obstructing an officer in this state
who is attempting, without a warrant, to arrest another for
a violation of the prohibition law of this state. Prichard v
State, 34 Ga. App. 181, 129 S. E. 12.
NINTH DIVISION
Crimes against the Public Peace and Tranquility
ARTICLE 3
Carrying Concealed Weapons; Carrying Weapons
to Courts, Election Grounds, etc. Pointing
Weapon at Another, and Furnishing Weapons
to Minors
§ 348(a). Park's Code.
See § 348(1).
§ 348(1). Carrying pistols without license, pro-
hibited.
Applied in Fanning v. State, 39 Ga. App. 531, 147 S. F.
788.
§ 349. (§ 343^) Pointing weapon at another.
Evidence held to show that gun was pointed in viola-
tion of this section in Stapler v. State, 38 Ga. App. 33,
34, 142 S. E. 570.
ARTICLE 6
Unlawful Assemblies, Riots and Affrays
§ 360. (§ 354.) Riot.
All persons connected with and sharing in the common
purpose of the assembly were guilty of riot, whether
their conduct was violent and tumultuous or not. O'Quinn
v. State, 39 Ga. App. 829, 830, 148 S. E. 618.
'ARTICLE 8
Other Offenses against Public Peace
§ 366. (§ 375.) Other offenses against public
peace.
This section is sufficiently broad in its terms to au-
thorize the punishment of any offense which was an oi-
fense at the common law against the public peace, and
punishment of which is not provided for in the Penal
Code. Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga. 645 665, 144 S. F. 193.
See annotation to section 339.
TENTH DIVISION
Offenses against Public Morality and Decency,
Public Health, Public Safety and Convenience,
Public Trade, Public Policy, Suffrage, Public
Police
ARTICLE 5
Seduction
§ 378. (§ 387.) Seduction, and punishment.
Erroneous instruction on this subject in Joiner v.
State, 37 Ga. App. 487, 140 S. F. 799.
ARTICLE 6A
Soliciting for Purpose of Prostitution
§ 384(a). Park's Code.
See § 384(1).
§ 384(1). Soliciting and procuring unlawful;
penalty.
The indictment in this case, which charged the accused
with having transported a named woman in an automo-
[ 276 ]
§ 387 MANUFACTURE, ETC., OF PROHIBITED LIQUORS 448(c)
hile from, her home in Gordon county in this State to a
hotel and room, in a named place in the State of Tennes-
see, for the immoral purpose of having sexual intercourse
with her, was not subject to the demurrer. Hightower
v. State, 39 Ga. App. 674, 148 S. F. 300.
ARTICLE 7
Obscene Pictures, and Abusive and Vulgar
Language.
§ 387. (§ 396.) Using abusive or obscene lan-
guage.
Applied in Cumhie v. State, 37 Ga. App. 9, 138 S. F. 524.
ARTICLE 8
Gaming-Houses, Gaming-Tables, and Gambling.
§ 389 (§ 398). Gaming-houses.
Cited in Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed (2d), 674, 678.
does not apply in cases in which the disinterment is done by
and with the consent of relatives entitled to control the
burial and disposition of the bodies. Fairview Cemetery
Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 720, 138 S. F. 88.
§ 410. (§ 417). Disenterring by coroner with-
out good grounds.
When a claim is presented to the ordinary to audit un-
der this section, and he allows it and issues to the claim-
ant a warrant on the county treasurer for its pay-
ment, the claim becomes liquidated. It then becomes the
duty of the county treasurer on whom the warrant is
drawn to pay it. If the treasurer is in funds and re-
fuses to pay the warrant, he can be compelled by man-
damus to do so. Maddox v. Anchor Duck Mills, 167 Ga.
695, 698, 146 S. F. 551.
ARTICLE 9
Lotteries, Gift Enterprises, Dealing in Futures,
and Trading-stamps
§ 397. (§ 406). Lottery tickets.
Punchboard constituting gambling device under this sec-
tion. See Hobbs v. K. & S. Sales Co., 35 Ga. App. 226, 230,
132 S. F. 775.
§ 398. (§ 407). Carrying on a lottery.
See annotation to preceding section.
§ 403.—Repealed by Acts of 1929, p. 245, § 8.
See § 4264(8).
ARTICLE 11
Minors Not to Play Billiards, Pool, or Ten-Pins
Without Consent of Parents, etc., Regula-
tion of Billiard Rooms.
§ 406(2). Violation by licensee of regulations
governing billiard rooms.
Cited in Shaver v. Martin, 166 Ga. 424, 426, 143 S. F- 402.
ARTICLE 13
Disturbing Divine Service, or Societies, Violat-
ing the Sabbath, Intruding on Camp-grounds,
Disturbing Schools, Dance-Halls
§ 416. (§ 422). Violating the Sabbath Day.
In the light of modern-day methods of traveling by au-
tomobile, the motor-power of which is derived from the
use of gasoline, and in the light of the present-day use
to which automobiles are put, the sale of gasoline on the
Sabbath is a "work of necessity" within the contempla-
tion of this section. Williams v. State, 167 Ga. 160, 144
S. F. 745; 38 Ga. App. 694, 145 S. F. 483.
It is, in every prosecution based upon this section of
the code, incumbent on the State to allege and prove
that the acts done by the accused in the course of his
ordinary calling were not works of necessity or charity.
Frown v. State, 3& Ga. App. 209, 143 S. F. 439.
§ 419(1). Dancing in public places on Sunday.
Constitutionally.—The act which enacted this and the fol-
lowing section is not unconstitutional as violative of § 6437.
Durden v. State, 161 Ga. 537, 131 S. F. 496.
§ 425(a). Park's Code.
See §i§ 419(1), 419(2).
ARTICLE 12
Human Bodies, Embalming Illegally, Arbitrary
Burial Regulations, and Cemeteries
§ 40& (§ 415). Illegal removal from grave.
Disinterment with Consent of the Relatives.—This section
ARTICLE 14
Manufacture and Sale of Intoxicants, and Regu-
lations as to Liquors, and Substitutes for
Intoxicants
§ 442. Drunkenness in public places.
Acquittal as Bar.—Acquittal under this section was no bar
to a conviction on an indictment under section 528(21). Smitu
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 601, 130 S. F. 219.
Evidence held not authorizing conviction under this sec-
tion. Chandler v. State, 36 Ga. App. 121, 135 S. F- 494.
ARTICLE 14A
Manufacturing, Selling, Keeping, etc., of Prohib-
ited Liquors and Beverages
§§ 448(b), 448(c). Park's Code.
See §§ 448(2), 448(3).
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§ 448(2) ILLEGAL PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONS, ETC. § 464(4)
§ 448(2). Definition of prohibited liquors, what
embraced in.
This section is constitutional. Young v. State, 167 Ga.
165, 166, 144 S. E. 726.
In view of the provisions of the statute in question, which
includes, among other beverages the sale or possession of
which is prohibited, all malted or fermented liquors and
beverages in which maltose is a substantial ingredient,
whether alcoholic or not, or whether intoxicating or not,
ground 2 of the demurrer is without merit; the attack on
the indictment in that ground being that "the bill of in-
dictment, while professing to charge and accuse the defend-
ant with possessing certain liquors and beverages, does not
set out that the said liquors and beverages are intoxicating
or that they are alcoholic." Young v. State, 167 Ga. 165,
144 S. E- 726.
§ 448(3). Prohibited acts specified.
General Verdict Supported Only by One Court out of Two.
—It is error to refuse a new trial where an accusation con-
tained two counts, the first charging a sale of whisky, and
the second charging possession of whisky, both charges
growing out of the same transaction, where upon the trial
the evidence authorizes a conviction upon the second count
only and the verdict is a general verdict of guilty. Simmons
v. State, 162 Ga. 316, 134 S. E- 54.
ARTICLE 14D
Subsequent Prohibitions and Regulations of
Intoxicating Liquors
§ 448(vw). Park's Code.
See § 448(36).
§ 448 (36). Unlawful to carry, receive, or pos-
sess specified liquors.
Evidence Not Warranting Allegation.—Where a proceeding
is instituted under this act, to condemn an automobile al-
leged to have been used in conveying intoxicating liquors
over a designated public road, and the evidence does not
demand a finding that the vehicle was used in conveying
liquors "on the public roads named in the petition," the
direction of a verdict "for confiscation is reversible error."
Wells v. State, 33 Ga. App. 426, 126 S. E. 856; Citizens Auto
Co. v. State. 35 Ga. App. 166, 132 S. E. 258.
§ 448(oooo). Park's Code.
See § 448(54).
§ 448(54). Contraband articles; destruction,
sale and proceeds.
Verdict Directed Not Warranted by Evidence Reversible.
—Where a proceeding is instituted under this section, to
condemn an automobile alleged to have been used in con-
veying intoxicating liquors over a designated public road,
and the evidence does not demand a finding that the ve-
hicle was used in conveying liquors "on the public roads
named in the petition," the direction of a verdict "for con-
fiscation" is reversible error. Citizens Auto Co. v. State,
35 Ga. App. 166, 132 S. E. 258.
Burden of Proof upon the State.—In a proceeding under
this section, to condemn a vehicle or conveyance used in
transporting liquor, the sale or possession of which is prohi-
bited by law, the burden is upon the State, the condemner,
to show that the' vehicle or conveyance was used in con-
veying the prohibited liquors or beverages with the knowl-
edge of the owner or lessee. Seminole Securities Co. v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 723, 134 S. E- 625.
Owner Has No Right to Replevy.—This section does not
contain any provision authorizing the owner or lessee of
the vehicle or conveyance seized under the provisions of the
statute to replevy and take possession of the property by
giving a bond of any description to the sheriff after the
property has been seized. Commercial Credit Co. v. John-
son, 166 Ga. 316, 143 S. E. 377.
Injunction Against Sale Where Notice Not Given.—
Where an automobile is sought to be condemned and sold
for transporting whisky, under this section without notice
to any one except the person in possession of the automobile,
the real owner of the automobile, who has not been served
with notice of the condemnation proceedings, can have
such sale enjoined against the sheriff and solicitor of the
court seeking to sell the automobile; and the judge did not
err, under the pleadings and the evidence, in granting a
temporary injuneton. Betts v. Commercial Credit Co., 165
Ga. 119, 120, 139 S. E. 860.
ARTICLE 15
Vagrants
§ 449. Vagrancy defined.
Proof That Accused Was Able to Work.—A conviction of
vagrancy under this section is unauthorized where there is
no proof that the accused was able to work. Bryant v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 523, 130 S. E. 352.
Charge as to Age.—Failure to charge the jury that to con-
vict the defendants the evidence should show that they were
more than sixteen years of age, is not error, it not appearing
from the motion for a new trial, or from the evidence, that
either of the defendants was not of that age. Shank v.
State, 36 Ga. App. 301, 136 S. E- 332.
ARTICLE 17B
Sales of Securities
§ 461 (8). Unlawful sale, etc., of certain securi
ties.
The sale of bonds payable in one year from the date of
their issue is no offense, under the Georgia securities law.
Taylor v. State, 34 Ga. App. 4, 128 S. E- 228.
§ 461 (11). Selling Class "D" securities with-
out license; advertisements of illegal sales.
Constitutionality.—So much of this section as makes it a
felony for an issuer of securities falling within class D to
sell or offer to sell, etc., is unconstitutional as violative of
section 6437. Smiths v. State, 161 Ga. 103, 129 S. E. 766.
ARTICLE 18
Illegal Practice of Professions, Carrying on Busi-
ness, and Medical College Diplomas
§ 464(1). Cigarettes and
failure to pay tax.
Applied in McMath v. State,
899.
cigars ; penalty for
39 Ga. App. 541, 147 S. E-
§ 464(4). Failure to cancel stamps.—Whoever
rnakes use of any adhesive stamp to denote any
tax imposed by this Act, without cancelling or
obliterating such stamps as hereinafter provided,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon con-
viction shall be punished as hereinafter provided.
That whenever an adhesive stamp is used for de-
noting any tax imposed by § 993(308) et seq. of
the Civil Code Act, except as hereinafter pro-
vided, the person using or affixing the same shall
cancel same, so that the same may not again be
used, and stamps shall be affixed in such manner
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§ 464(5) VITAL STATISTICS § 503(11)
that their removal will require continued applica-
tion of steam or water. Acts 1929, p. 77, § 1.
§ 464(5). Alteration and other things made
penal.—Whoever wilfully removes or alters the
cancellation or defacing marks of said adhesive
stamp, with intent to use or cause the same to
be used after it has already been used, or know-
ingly or willfully buys, sells, offers for sale, or
gives away any such washed or restored stamp,
or knowingly uses the same, knowingly or wil-
fully prepares, buys, sells, offers for sale, or has
in his or its possession any counterfeit stamps,
is guilty of a misdemeanor, shall be punished as
hereinafter provided. Acts 19-29, p. 77, § 2.
§ 464(6). Defeating or hindering operation of
law, a misdemeanor.—Any person, firm, or cor-
poration subject to this tax, engaging in or per-
mitting such practices as are prohibited by law,
with intent to defeat provisions of § 993(308) et
seq. of the Civil Code, or if any person, firm, or
corporation, agent or officer thereof, who shall,
upon demand of any officer or agent of the De-
partment of Revenue of said State, refuse to al-
low full inspection of the premises or any part
thereof, or who shall hinder or delay or prevent
such inspection when demand is made therefor,
shall be deemed to be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall, upon conviction, be punished as here-
inafter provided. Acts 1929, p. 77, § 3.
§ 464(7). Penalty for engaging in business
without license. — Any person, firm, or corpora-
tion engaging in the business of buying, selling,
or distributing within this State cigars or ciga-
rettes, without having secured the required li-
cense from the Commissioner of Revenue, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be
punished, as hereinafter provided. Acts 1929, p.
79, § 6.
§ 464(8).—Used stamps; possession, use of,
etc., a misdemeanor.—Whoever wilfully removes
or otherwise prepares any adhesive stamp, with
intent to use, or cause the same to be used, after
it has already been used, or knowingly or wil-
fully buys, sells, offers for sale, or gives any such
washed or restored stamps to any person, or
knowingly uses the same, or has in his posses-
sion any washed, restored, or altered stamp which
has been removed from the articles to which it
has previously been affixed, or whoever, for the
purpose of indicating the payment of any tax
hereunder, reuses any stamp which has hereto-
fore been used, for the purpose of paying any
tax provided in §<§ 993(308) et seq. of the Civil
Code, or whoever, buys, sells, offers for sale, or
has in his or its possession any counterfeit
stamps, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction shall be punished as hereinafter pro-
vided. Acts 1929, p. 80, § 9.
| 464(9). Penalty for violation of Act.—Viola-
lation of any of the provisions of the preceding
sections, providing for punishment shall consti-
tute a misdemeanor and punishable as such, ex-
cept that the fine shall not be less than twenty-
[2
five ($25.00) dollars for each offense. Acts 1929,
p. 80, § 10.
§476(13). Motor fuel distributors; penalty.—
Any distributor who shall fail to register, or
make monthly returns, or give bond, or pay the
tax, as herein provided, or who shall fail to do
any other act in sections 993(293) to 993(300) of
the civil code required, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and shall be punished as provided in
section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia. Acts
1927, p. 108.
Editor's Note.—Section 476(12) of the code upon the saint
subject, simply provides a punishment for violation of 3§
993(164) -993(168) relative to occupation tax levied on motor-
fuel distributors.
§ 476(f). Park's Code.
See §§ 464(1), 464(2).
ARTICLE 23A
Vital Statistics
§§ 503(8) and 503(9). Superseded by the Acts
of 1927 pp. 353 et seq., herein codified as §
503 (10).
§ 503 (10). Violation of vital statistic law by
dny person.—Any person who, for himself or for
an officer, agent, or employee of any other per-
son or of any corporation or partnership, (a)
^liall inter, cremate, or otherwise finally dispose
of a dead body of a human being, or permit the
same to be done, or shall remove such body from
the primary registration district in which the
death occurred or the body was found, without
the authority of a burial or removal permit issued
by the local registrar of the district in which the
death occurred or in which the body was found,
or (b) shall refuse or fail to furnish correctly any
information in his possession, or shall furnish
false information affecting any certificate of rec-
ord, required by this Act, or (c) shall wil-
fully alter otherwise than is provided by
section 1681(43) or shall falsify any certificate of
birth or death, or any record established by §§
1681(27) to 1681(46) or, (d) being required by
§§ 1681(27) to 1681(46) to fill out a certificate of
oirth or death and file the same with the local
registrar, or deliver it upon request, to any person
charged with the duty of filing the same, shall
rail, neglect or refuse to perform such duty in the
manner required by §§ 1681(27) to 1681(46) or,
(e) being a local registrar or deputy registrar,
shall fail, neglect, or refuse to perform his duty
as required by §§ 1681(27) to 1681(46) shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon con-
viction thereof shall for the first offense be fined
not less than five dollars nor more than fifty dol-
lars, and for each subsequent offense not less
than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, or be
imprisoned in the county jail not more than sixty
days, or be both fined and imprisoned in the dis-
cretion of the court. Acts 1927, p. 369.
§ 503(11) Enforcement of vital statistic law.
—
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Each local registrar is hereby charged with strict
and thorough enforcement of the provisions §§
1681(27) to 1681(46) in his registration district,
under the supervision and direction of the State
Registrar, and he shall make an immediate report
to the State Registrar of any violation of this law
coming to his knowledge, by observation or upon
complaint of any person, or otherwise. The State
Registrar is hereby charged with the thorough and
efficient execution of the provisions of said sec-
tions in every part of the State, and is hereby
granted supervisory power over local registrars
and deputy local registrars, to the end that all its
requirements shall be uniformly complied with.
The State Registrar, either personally or by an
accredited representative, shall have authority to
investigate cases of irregularity or violation of
law, and all registrars shall aid him upon requesi
in such investigations. When he shall deem it
necessary, he shall report such cases of violations
of any of the provisions of sections above referred
to, to the prosecuting attorney of the county, wuh
the statement of the facts and circumstances; and
when any such case is reported to him by the
State registrar, the prosecuting attorney shall
forthwith initiate and promptly follow up the
necessary court proceedings against the person or
corporation responsible for the alleged violation
of law. And upon request of the State Registrar,
the Attorney-general shall assist in the enforce-
ment of the provisions of said sections. Acts 1927,
pp. 369, 370.
ARTICEE 24
The Public Safety
§ 517. (§ 515.) Trains must stop within fifty
feet of each railroad crossing.
Violation as Negligence at Highway Crossing.—The pur-
pose of this section is to prevent collisions of trains and can-
not be invoked by a private individual in a suit for injuries
sustained at a railway and highway crossing for the purpose
of showing negligence because the engine failed to stop be-
fore crossing the track of a nearby intersecting railroad.
Central, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin, 35 Ga. App. 161, 132 S. E.
255.
§ 518(a). Park's Code.
See § 518(1).
§ 518(1). Penalty for not erecting blow-posts.
See notes under sections 2677(1) et seq., citing L,ime-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103, 128
S. E- 226.
§ 519(a). Park's Code.
See § 519(1).
§ 519(1). Penalty for breach of duty by engi-
neer.
See notes under sections 2677(1) et seq., citing Eima-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103, 128
S. E- 226.
§ 526(1). Automatic fire-box door required.
Validity.—The case of Napier v. Atlantic Coast Eine R.
Co., 272 U. S. 605, affirmed 2 Fed. (2d) 891, as annotated
under this catchline in Ga. Code of 1926.
§ 528(c). Park's Code.
See § 528(2).
§ 528(2). Violating Civil Code §§ 1770(1)-
1770(20) regulating motor vehicles.
Effect of Acquittal for Drunkardness upon Prosecution.
—
Acquittal on an indictment under P. C. section 442 charging
the defendant with having appeared in an intoxicated condi-
tion on a public highway, which intoxication was made mani-
fest by boisterousness and indecent condition and acting,
and by vulgar, profane, and unbecoming language, was no
bar to a conviction on an indictment under this act, charg-
ing the defendant with having operated an automobile on
the public highway while in an intoxicated condition. Smith
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 601, 130 S. E. 219.
§ 528(3). Violating Civil Code §§ 1770(2)-
1770(48) regulating motor vehicles.
Constitutionality.—The title of the act is broad enough to
authorize the provision making penal the use of a number-
plate not furnished by the Secretary' of State. This provi-
sion was germane to the object of the act, directly tending
to make the provisions of the act effective. Eee v. State, 163
Ga. 239, 135 S. E- 912.
§ 528(4). Violating Civil Code §§ 1770(50)-
1770(60) regulating motor vehicles.
Constitutionality.—So much of the motor-vehicle act of
1921 as undertakes to make penal the failure of the operator
of a motor-vehicle, when meeting a vehicle approaching in
the opposite direction, to "turn his vehicle to the right so
as to give one half of the traveled roadway, if practicable.,
and a fair opportunity to the other to pass by without un-
necessary interference," is too uncertain and indefinite in its
terms to be capable of enforcement. Heath v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 206, 136 S. E. 284.
A defendant could not lawfully be convicted upon such
charges. Hale v. State, 21 Ga. App. 658, 94 S. E- 823; Heath
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 206, 136 S. E. 384; Shupe v. State, 36
Ga. App. 286, 287, 136 S. E- 331.
§ 528(e). Park's Code.
See § 528(7).
§ 528(7). Unlawful dealings in motor vehicles.
Applied in Goodwyne v. State, 38 Ga. App. 183, 143 S. E.
443.
§ 528 (j). Park's Code.
See § 528(4).
§ 528(1). Park's Code.
See § 526(1).
ARTICLE 34
Game
§ 594(d-l). Park's Code.
See § 594(1).
§ 594(1). Open season.—The following is es-
tablished as the lawful open season for hunting
birds and animals in Georgia, to-wit: Quail, Wild
Turkeys, and Plovers, from November 20th to
March 1st, inclusive; Doves, from October 16th
to January 31st, inclusive; Woodcock and Sum-
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mer or Wood Duck, from September 1st to Jan-
nary 1st; Snipe, from November 1st to January
31st; Marsh Hens, from September 1st to No-
vember 30th; Deer, from November 1st to De-
cember 31st, inclusive; Cat Squirrel, from No-
vember 20th to March 1st.
Any person who shall hunt, kill or destroy by
any means whatever, or who has in his posses-
sion any of the above named birds or animals,
except between the respective dates above speci-
fied shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Provided
however, that the open season for hunting cat
squirrel in such counties of the State of Geor-
gia as have a population of not less than 12,100
and not more than 12,123 as determined by the
census of the United States of 1920, shall be from
September 15th, to January 1st, inclusive. Acts
1925, pp. 302, 303; Acts 1929, p. 272, § 1.
§ 594(3a). Unlawful to kill deer in certain
counties.—It shall be unlawful for any person
to kill, shoot, or hunt deer in the counties of
Dade, Walker, Catoosa, Murray, Fannin, Rabun,
White, Chattooga, Whitfield, Gordon, Gilmer,
Towns, Dawson, Union, Habersham, Lumpkin,
Pickens, and Stephens, until five (5) years after
the passage of this Act.
Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction shall be punished as prescribed
in section 1065 of the Penal Code. Acts 1929, p.
271, § 1.
§ 594(3b). Dove hunting.—It shall be unlaw-
ful to hunt doves in the State of Georgia except
during the month of September and between
November 20th and January 31st, inclusive.
Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction shall be punished as prescribed
in section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia.
Acts 1929, p. 271,' § 1.
§ 594(7a). Open season for fur-bearing ani-
mals in counties of 231600 to 23,890 population;
proviso.—Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted by authority
of the same, that it shall 'be unlawful for any per-
son or persons, in counties of not less than 23,600
nor more than 23,890 according to the census of
ithe United States for the year 1920, to capture any
mink, otter, beaver, bear, wildcat, muskrat, skunk,
raccoon, opossum, and fox or any other fur-bear-
ing animals by means of traps, deadfalls, or other
similar devices, or to set or use any traps, dead-
falls or other similar devices for the purpose of
capturing any of said fur-bearing animals, be-
tween November 20th and the last day of Feb-
ruary, inclusive; provided, however, that it shall
not be unlawful to catch foxes and kill skunk,
wildcats, and other fur-bearing animals by means
not he'rein prohibited; that any person who shall
violate any of the above or foregoing laws or
provisions of this section shall be guilty of mis-
demeanor, and shall be punished as provided by
the Penal Code of Georgia in misdemeanor cases.
Acts 1929, p. 244, § 1.
§ 594(h-l). Park's Code.
See § 594(13). ,
§ 594(13). False statement in application for
trapper's license.—Any person making false
statements in an application for a trapper's li-
cense shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Acts
1929, p. 333, § 1.
See note to § 2158(3054), C. C.
§ 594(13a). Buying hides for resale.—Any per-
son, firm, or corporation who shall buy any hides
or pelts of fur-bearing animals for the purpose
of resale, without first procuring the license re-
quired by this Act, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and shall be punished as provided for in
section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia. Acts
1929, p. 334, § 2.
§ 594 (13b). Unlawful trapping.—It shall be
unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to
use a steel trap or other like device, in trapping
or catching any ibird, game, or animal in any of
the counties of this State, whether same be
caught or trapped for profit or otherwise. But
this Act shall not apply to the salt-water marshes
and the islands along the coast of Georgia; pro-
vided, however, that the Commissioner of Game
and Fish may issue special permits to game
wardens, deputies, or other responsible persons,
authorizing the taking, by means of steel traps,
of vermin and predatory animals in localities
where such vermin or predatory animals are a
menace to quail or other game birds, and each
steel trap used for this purpose must have se-
curely fastened thereto a tag issued by the De-
partment of Game and Fish, showing authority
for its use. Acts 1929, p. 335, § 1.
§ 594 (13c). Traps and devices to protect fowls,
not prohibited, when.—Any person, firm, or cor-
poration shall not be prohibited from using steel
traps or other like devices for the purpose of
protecting fowls, provided said steel traps or
other like devices shall not be set or placed at
a distance greater than one hundred feet from
said fowl-house; and provided further, that said
'fowl-house is located within the curtilage of the
dwelling-house of said person, firm, or corpora-
tion. Acts 1929, p. 335, § 2.
§ 594(13d). Misdemeanor; punishment. — Any
person, firm, or corporation found guilty of
the violation of the provisions of this Act shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall
be punished as provided in section 1065 of the
Penal Code of Georgia. Acts 1929, p. 336, § 3.
ARTICLE 35
Terrapins, Turtles, Fishing, and Oysters
§ 612. Closed period; seines, nets, gigs, spears.
Applied in Camp v. State, 34 Ga. App. 591, 130 S. E. 606.
§ 621 (bb). Park's Code.
See § 2158(24), C. C.
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§ 628(b). Park's Code.
See § 461(8).
§§ 628(d), 628 (h.) Park's Code.
See § 461(11).
ARTICLE 39
Emigrant Agents
§ 632. (§ 601.) Acting as emigrant agent with-
out license.—Any person wiho shall solicit or pro-
cure emigrants, or shall attempt to do so, without
first procuring a license as required by law, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor. An emigrant agent is
a person who shall solicit or attempt to procure
labor in this State to be employed beyond the
limits of the same. An emigrant is any person
who has been solicited, persuaded, enticed, or
employed to leave the State to the employed or
worked beyond the limits of the -same. Acts
1929, p. 176, § 632.
The word "emigrants," does not apply to persons who
have no intention of abandoning their residence in this
State or of acquiring a domicile outside the State, but who
leave the State merely for the purpose of temporarily en-
gaging in work in another State. Benson v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 87, 135 S. E- 514.
ARTICLE 43
Suffrage, Campaign Expenses, Campaign Funds,
and Political Mass Meetings
§ 658. (§ 623.) Superintendent to deliver list to
clerk, etc.
False Misstatement of Votes.—If the number of votes is
knowingly and falsely misstated by a superintendent of an
election, he has failed to discharge a duty imposed upon
him by law, and he is liable to be prosecuted, under this
section. Black v. State, 36 Ga. App. 286, 136 S. E- 334.
ARTICLE 51
Interest Illegally Taken
§ 70O. Interest at greater rate than 5 per cent
per month punished.
Section 3444 of the Civil Code and this section of the
Penal Code were not repealed by section 3438(1). Bennett
v. Lowry, 167 Ga. 347, 145 S. E- 505.
ELEVENTH DIVISION
Offenses Committed by Cheats and Swindlers
ARTICLE 1
Deceitful Means or Artful Practices
§ 702 (ff). Park's Code.
See § 406(2).
§ 703(1). Defrauding hotels and boarding
houses punishable.
Necessary for Fraudulent Intent. — The evidence in this
case did not authorize the jury to find that the defendant,
with intent to defraud, obtained food and lodging from the
boarding-house named in the accusation. Cowin v. State,
35 Ga. App. 499, 133 S. E- 880.
Copy Must Be Printed and Posted.—One can not legally
be convicted of violating this section unless the evidence
shows that a copy of that law, "printed in distinct type,"
was "posted in the lobby, public waiting room, or that
portion of the establishment most frequented by the guests
thereof," at the time the accused obtained the food, lodging,
or other accommodation. Phillips v. State, 39 Ga. App.
540, 148 S. E. 631.
713. (§ 668). False information as to liens.
Substitution for Section 719.—Where the judge based his
instructions to the jury on this section, which was inappli-
cable to the case on trial, and made no reference to sec.
719, which was applicable, this was error, as the crime' de-
fined by the last-named section contains elements which it
is necessary to allege and prove, different and distinct from
those necessary to be alleged and proved under this section.
Sims v. State, 34 Ga. App. 683, 685, 131 S. E. 101.
§ 715. Procuring money on contract for serv-
ices fraudulently.
To authorize a conviction under the "labor-contract act"
of 1903 (this section), the evidence must show a contract of
service distinct and definite as to all essential terms, such
as the time when the contract is to commence and termi-
nate, and the amount of wages to be paid. Bennett v.
State, 37 Ga. App. 20, 138 S. E. 671.
§ 716. Proof of intent to defraud.
Fraudulent Intent — Presumptive Evidence — Burden of
Proof.—The burden of proving that one accused of a viola-
tion of this section did not have good cause for quitting the
hirer rests upon the prosecution (Thorn v. State, 13 Ga.
App. 10, 78 S. E- 853) ; and this essential proof is not fur-
nished by the hirer's testimony that the accused "did not
have any reason for not returning the money or picking
the cotton." Miller v. State, 34 Ga. App. 140, 128 S. E. 588.
See also Cofer v. State, 34 Ga. App. 220, 129 S. E. 110.
A conviction is unauthorized where the evidence fails to
show that the laborer did not have a good and sufficient
cause for his failure to perform the contract. Such essen-
tials are not supplied by statements of the hirer that he
knew of no good reasons why the laborer did not work for
him. King v. State, 36 Ga. App. 272, 136 S. E. 466; Cofer
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 220, 129 S. E- 110.
§ 718(a). Park's Code.
See § 703(1).
TWELFTH DIVISION
Fraudulent or Malicious Mischief
ARTICLE 3
Injuries to Bridges and Dams
§ 750. (§ 700). Breaking bridges, dams, banks,
etc.
Although the offense charged was designated in the in-
dictment as a "misdemeanor," the acts charged therein are
a felony under this section, and on the trial the court did
not err in treating the offense as a felony. Pratt v. State,
38 Ga. App. 114, 142 S. E. 903.
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PROCEDURE
THE SUPERIOR COURT—ITS OFFICERS
AND JURIES
ARTICLE 1
Jurisdiction of the Court, and Authority of the
Judges
§ 792. (§ 792). Judges may grant writs of
certiorari, supersedeas, hear motions, etc.
A judge of the superior court has jurisdiction to entertain,
on habeas corpus, an application to lessen the amount of
bail previously fixed by a judge of a city court on request
of one accused of several violations of the State prohibitory
liquor law. Dickey v. Morris, 166 Ga. 140, 142 S. E. 557.
§ 792(a). Park's Code.
See § 792(1).
§ 792(1). Certiorari on ground that venue or
time not proved.
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 35 Ga. App. 126 132 S. I\.
414.
ARTICLE 2
Sessions and Adjournments
§ 796. (§ 796.) Special terms for either civil or
criminal business.
Applied in Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E. 448.
ARTICLE 4
Solicitors-General
§ 798, (§ 798). Special duties.
The act approved August 20, 1917 (Acts 1917, p. 283, § 3),
is sufficiently broad to comprehend fees and costs that
would be due a sheriff in criminal cases and to declare
such fees and costs as due to the sheriffs to be the prop-
erty of the county, and to confer on the clerk of the su-
perior court the authority to collect and distribute such
fees in lieu of the solicitors-general, whose duty it would
be to collect and distribute the fees under the general law
as embodied in this section of Penal Code. Harris County
v. Williams, 167 Ga. 45, 144 S. E. 756.
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 45 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. E.
414.
This act, abolishing fee system in Chattahoochee Cir-
cuit, held invalid as to sheriff's costs and fees collected
by solicitor- general and paid over under this section.
Harris County v. Williams, 167 Ga. 45, 144 S. E. 756.
In so far as the act of 1917, supra, purports to make
the costs and fees of the sheriff the property of the par-
ticular county, and to make it the duty of the clerk of
the superior court to collect and distribute such fees, it
is a special law relating to a matter covered by existing
general laws, and to that extent the act is violative of
Civil Code § 6391. Harris County v. Williams, 167 Ga.
45, 144 S. E. 756.
ARTICLE 5
Special Criminal Bailiffs
§ 808. (§ 808). Appointment and removal.—In
each county having more than twenty thousand
inhabitants, the solicitor-general of the superior,
city, and county courts shall each be entitled to
a special criminal bailiff, to be appointed by such
solicitor-general with the approval of the judge
of the court, and to be subject to removal by
such judge and solicitor-general for misconduct
in office, or other sufficient cause, to be judged
by them; provided, however, that in all counties
of this State having a population, according to
the United States Census of the year 1920, or by
any future census of the United States, of not
less than seventy thousand and not more than
ninety thousand inhabitants, the salary of the
special criminal bailiff for the solicitor-general
shall not be less than two hundred dollars per
month, and the salary of the said special criminal
bailiff for the solicitor of the city or county court
shall not be less than one hundred seventy-five
dollars per month, said salary to be paid monthly
out of the county treasury; and provided also,
that the solicitor-general of the superior court in
such counties and the solicitor of the city court
or county court therein be and they hereby are
authorized, if they see fit, to appoint the same
person to act as special criminal bailiff in both
courts, the appointment, however, to be subject
to approval of the judge of both courts. Acts
1929, p. 179, § 1; Acts 1929, p. 177, § 1.
ARTICLE 6
Stenographic Reporter
§ 810. (§ 810.) Reporters.
When Paid Out of Public Treasury.—The court could not
assess as costs against the public treasury in a civil case
between private parties the expense of requiring the notes
of the official stenographer to be written out for the benefit
of the judge. The case of Bugg v. State, 13 Ga. App. 672, 79
S. E. 748, is distinguished upon the ground that it was a
criminal proceeding. Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga. App.
672, 134 S. E. 621.
ARTICLE 7
The Grand Jury
§ 811. (§ 811). Qualification of grand jurors-
Illegal exercise of commissioners' power and discretion in
revision of jury lists as to exclusion of Jews. Bashlor v.
Bacon, 168 Ga. 370, 147 S. E. 762.
§ 819. (§ 818). Grand and traverse jurors, how
selected.
It was good cause of challenge to the array, in the trial of
a murder case, that the judge of the superior court, who
drew the regular jurors embraced in such array, did so by
taking from an alphabetical and numerical list of all jurors
in the traverse-jury box every tenth juror on said list,
commencing with number eight, and thus drawing until
the necessary number to make up the panel was drawn,
and by locating the corresponding numbers on the cards
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in said jury box and removing them therefrom. White
v. State, 166 Ga. 192, 142 S. E- 666.
§ 823. (§ 822). How drawn.
The language, "or otherwise disqualified by law," means
a disqualification which renders it improper to put the
name of a person in the grand-jury box and not a disquali-
fication propter affectum. Heaton v. State, 38 Ga. App.
695, 145 S. E. 534.
In drawing grand jurors according to this section, the
judge is not authorized, upon information based in part cm
what he knows and derived in part from others, to reject
jurors so drawn upon the ground that they would be in-
competent propter affectum to indict the person against
whom a charge is preferred and is to be passed on by the
grand jury. Heaton v. State, 167 Ga. 147, 144 S. E. 782.
§ 824. Ineligible at next succeeding term.
Section Modified by Acts of 1921.—The act of 1921 (p. 135),
being a general law providing that the grand jurors of one
term might be compelled to serve the following term, modi-
fied, so far as jurors serving in Walton superior court were
concerned, the provisions of this section. Eong v. State, 34
Ga. App. 125, 128 S. E- 784.
§ 827. (§ 824.) How summoned.
Section Directory.—The provision of this statute with re-
spect to the praecept is directory merely, and not mandatory,
and a failure of the clerk of the superior court to carry out
such provision affords no ground for a challenge to the ar-
ray of the jurors put upon a defendant in a criminal case.
Newham v. State, 35 Ga. App. 391, 133 S. E- 650, and cases
cited.
§ 833. (§ 829.) Duty of grand jurors.
Cited in Gibson v. State, 162 Ga. 504, 134 S. E- 326.
§ 838. (§ 834). Oath of witnesses before grand
jury.
Applied in Aldridge v. State, 39 Ga. App. 484, 147 S. E
414.
§ 851(a). Park's Code.
See § 851(1).
§ 851(1). Transfer of investigation to grand
jury of another county.
Necessity of Indictment Showing Change.—An indictment
was not void for the reason that the jurisdiction of the
grand jury of a county to which the investigation was trans-
ferred under this section to return the indictment did not
appear from the indictment, it not being stated therein
that the investigation of the crime had been transferred
from Eong County to Tattnall County. Sallette v. State,
162 Ga. 442, 134 S. E- 68. Sallette v. State, 35 Ga. App. 658,
134 S. E. 203.
While it might be better for the indictment to show that
the trial judge had ordered the transfer, yet the omission of
such facts from the indictment would not render the in-
dictment void. See Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14, 134 S. E-
59. Sallette v. State, 162 Ga. 442, 134 S. E. 68.
ARTICLE 9
The Petit Jury
§ 854. (§ 850.) Trial by jury.
Cited in Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166, 174, 129 S. E
772.
§ 857. (§ 853). Panels, how made.
Number of Strikes in Consolidated Case.—Where several
cases pending against an estate are consolidated in one pro-
ceeding against a receiver therefor, the parties so joined have
a right to only six strikes in selecting a jury. Ellis v. Geer,
36 Ga. App. 519, 520, 137 S. E- 290.
§ 858, (§ 854). Parties entitled to full panels.
To permit the members of the defendant corporation to
try the case of their corporation would be in effect to per-
mit the defendant to try its own case as a juror. To per-
mit a juror to serve in his own case violates the funda-
mental principle that jury trials must be fair and free from
suspicion of bias or prejudice, and is contrary to the prin-
ciple announced in this section. Bryan v. Moncrief Fur-
nace Co., 168 Ga. 825, 828, 149 S. E. 193.
§ 859. (§ 855). Challenge for favor.
A party may avail himself of challenge to jurors on ac-
count of their interest in the case, by a motion to put the
jurors on their voir dire. In such case the court may pro-
pond to each juror the questions indicated in this section,
or he may propound them to the entire panel, adopting such
plan as will assure a response to each question from each
juror. Bryan v. Moncrief Furnace Co., 168 Ga. 825, 828, 149
S. E. 193.
ARTICLE 10
Special Provisions as to Juries
§ 875. (§ 871.) Juries in special emergencies.
Applied in Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E. 448.
§ 876. (§ 872.) Compensation of jurors, and
court-bailiffs; subpoena clerks.—The first grand
jury impanelled at the fall term of the superior
courts of the several counties shall fix the com-
pensation of jurors and court bailiffs in the supe-
rior courts of such counties for the next succeed-
ing year, such compensation not to exceed $3.00
per diem; except in counties having a population
of 200,000 or more, according to the last United
States census, the compensation of court bailiffs
as fixed by the grand jury shall be $200.00 per
month, provided the Commissioners of Roads
and Revenues, or other authority having control
of county finances of such counties shall first ap-
prove the payment of such salaries and the num-
ber of deputies to be employed in each court; and
the same compensation shall be allowed to bailiffs
and jurors of the several city courts and special
courts in this State, as is allowed bailiffs and ju-
rors in the superior courts in which such city or
special court may be located. The pay of tales
jurors shall be the same as the regular drawn
traverse jurors, and there shall be no distinction
in the pay of tales and regular drawn jurors.
The commissioners of roads and revenues or
other authority having control of county finances
of such counties may designate one of said bail-
iffs as a subpoena clerk in the Superior Court,
may define his duty and fix his compensation at
not exceeding two hundred dollars per month, to
be paid monthly out of the county treasury. Acts
1890-1, p. 80; 1895, p. 74; 1919, p. 104; 1922, p.
50; 1925, p. 100; 1927, pp. 135, 193.
Editor's Note.—The compensation of court bailiffs in coun-
ties of 200,000 population or more was raised from $150 to
$200; and the last sentence was added, by the amendment of
1927.
§ 876(h). Park's Code.
See § 876(1).
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§ 876(1) COURTS OF INQUIRY § 947
§ 876(1). Compensation in counties of 200,-
000 or more.—In all counties having by the
United States census of 1920, or any future cen-
sus, a population of 200,000 inhabitants or more,
the salaries of court bailiffs appointed by the
judges of the Superior courts and by the judges
of the city courts shall be two hundred dollars
per month for each bailiff, to be paid monthly out
of the county treasury; provided, however, the
commissioners of roads and revenues, or other
county authority having charge of the fiscal af-
fairs of said county, may, in their discretion, re-
duce said salaries to any sum not less than one
hundred and fifty dollars per month for each
bailiff. Acts 1927, p. 194.
ARTICLE 11
Childrens County Established as Branches of the
Superior Court Their Jurisdiction, etc.,
—
Juvenile Courts.
§ 900(o). Park's Code.
See § 900(41).
§ 900(41). Appointment, etc., of Judges in Cer-
tain Counties.—In all counties having a popula-
tion of less than thirty-nine thousand eight hun-
dred and fifty (39,850) and more than thirty-nine
thousand eight hundred and forty (39,840), ac-
cording to the Federal Census of 1920, the Judge
of the Superior Court shall designate an existing
court of record to act and be known as the ju-
venile court of said county, and fix a reasonable
compensation for the judge thereof, not to ex-
ceed three hundred dollars per annum, in addi-
tion of any other compensation he may now re-
ceive, to be paid monthly out of the county treas-
ury upon the order of such Judge of the Supe-
rior Court, as other court expenses are now paid.
This shall involve no additional expense, except
as is herein provided, shall Create no new judge
or court, but shall merely clothe any existing
tribunal with additional powers. (a) Neverthe-
less, in all counties having a population between
thirty-five thousand and sixty thousand, upon the
concurrent recommendation of two successive
grand juries, the judge of the superior court shall
appoint a properly qualified person, of high moral
character and clean life, selected for his special
fitness for work with delinquent and neglected
children, to be the judge of the juvenile court,
whereupon it shall be considered that a special
juvenile court has been established in said county.
The term of the judge so appointed under this
section shall be for three (3) years, and the sal-
ary shall be fixed by the appointing judge with
the approval of the county commissioners. Pro-
vided, that where the esablishment of the juvenile
court has been recommended by a grand jury in
any county of this State at the term of the su-
perior court at which a grand jury was em-
paneled and 'sworn, next preceding August 14,
1915 (the date when the Supreme Court held the
juvenile court law then supposed to be of force
to be unconstitutional) a recommendation by the
grand jury of the same county at the next term
|
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of the superior court at which a grand jury is
empaneled and sworn, after the passage of the
amendments to the Acts of 1915 at the present
session of the General Assembly, shall authorize
the establishment of a juvenile court in all re-
spects as though said court were recommended
by two successive grand juries. Acts 1929, p.
279, § 3.
PROCEEDINGS TO COMMITMENTS, IN-
CLUSIVE
ARTICLE 1
Proceedings Prior to Arrest
§ 904. (§ 883). What affidavit and warrant
must state.
A substantial compliance with the provisions of this sec-
tion and section 906 with reference to affidavits and war-
rants for the arrest of offenders against the penal laws,
and the form of such warrants, is all that is required.
Kumpe v. Hall, 167 Ga. 284, 145 S. E. 509.
ARTICLE 2
Arrest
§ 917. (§ 896.) Arrest without warrant.
Charging Exact Language.—A charge in entire harmony
but not in exact language of this section and section 921 is
neither a misstatement of law nor misleading. Cobb v.
Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 133 S. E. 42.
Applicable to State and Municipal Officers.—This provi-
sion of law "is applicable alike to State and municipal ar-
resting officers." Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga. 645, 666, 144
S. E. 193.
§ 918u (§ 897.) Selection of judge to try the
*,ase.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E- 222.
§ 922. (§ 901.) Duty of person arresting.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E. 222.
§ 923. Arresting officer not to advise dismissal
of warrant.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E. 222.
§ 927. (§ 904). Authority to eject passengers,
etc.
Applied in Clinton v. State, 37 Ga. App. 79, 139 S. E-
82.
ARTICLE 3
Courts of Inquiry, and the Proceedings Therein
§ 947. (§ 922.) Bail.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E. 222.
§ 948 TRIAL OF JOINT OFFENDERS § 995
§ 948. (§ 923.) Waiving trial.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. F. 222.
§ 949- (§ 924.) Disposition of papers.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. F- 222.
INDICTMENT AND PRESENTMENT
ARTICLE l
Form of Indictment
§ 954. (§ 929.) Form of indictment.
See notes to P. C. § 211(28).
When Guilt Follows as Legal Conclusion.—If, taking the
facts alleged in the indictment as premises, the guilt of
the accused follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment
is good. Kidd v. State, 39 Ga. App. 30, 146 S. F- 35.
In proving the time of the commission of an offense the
State is not, as a general rule, restricted to proof of the
date alleged in the indictment, but is permitted to prove
its commission on any date within the statute of limitations.
Grayson v. State, 39 Ga. App. 673, 148 S. F. 309.
Sufficiency of Indictment for Car Breaking.—See Whitener
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 697, 131 S. F. 301, and note to § 181.
CHANGE OF VENUE
ARTICLE 2
When Two Returns of "No Bill" Are a Bar
§ 955. (§ 930.) Two returns of "no bill" are a
bar.
Change of Return after Entry on Minutes.—After a grand
iury has returned into court a true bill of indictment, ana
the same has been entered on the minutes of the superior
court by its clerk, the court obtains jurisdiction of the case,
and the grand jury is without authority, at the same term
of the court, to recall the true bill, erase the entry of "true
bill," and make an entry of "no bill" on the indictment.
Gibson v. State, 162 Ga. 504, 134 S. F. 326.
ARREST AND BAIL AFTER INDICTMENT
AND PROCESS AGAINST CORPORA-
TIONS
ARTICLE 2
Bail, Surrender of Principal, and Forfeiture
of Bond
§ 959. (§ 934). Bail but twice.
Applied in Knowles v. State, 166 Ga. 182, 142 S. F. 676.
§ 960. (§ 935). Bail surrendering principal.
Accused surrendered by his principal to sheriff, after over-
ruling of certiorari, has no right to discharge on habeas
corpus. Franco v. Fowry, 164 Ga. 419, 138 S. F. 897.
ARTICLE 1
When and How Venue May Be Changed
§ 964. (§ 939.) Venue, when and how changed.
Venue changed under section in Howell v. State, 162 Ga.
14, 134 S. F. 59.
Cited in Sallette v. State, 162 Ga. 442, 134 S. F. 68.
§ 965. (§ 940.) Clerk to transmit papers, etc.;
subpoenas for witnesses.
Cited in Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14, 134 S. F- 59.
FROM THE CALL OF THE DOCKET TO
SENTENCE
ARTICLE 4
Pleas of Insanity, and Misnomer
§ 979. (§ 954). Misnomer, plea of.
Applied in Rountree v. State, 34 Ga. App.
F. 919.
I, 670, 130 S.
ARTICLE 10
Continuances
§ 987. (§ 962). Continuance for absence of
witnesses.
Applied in Teems v. State, 34 Ga. App. 594, 130 S. F. 216.
§ 990. (§ 964). Continuance for absence or ill-
ness of counsel.
Applied in Evans v. State, 167 Ga. 261, 145 S. E. 512.
§ 992. (§ 966). Discretion of the court.
Cross-Examination of Defendant on Motion.—It is not a
reversible error to permit the defendant to be cross-examined
on his motion for a continuance. Bell v. State, 36 Ga. App.
Ill, 112, 135 S. E. 521.
ARTICLE 11
Trial of Joint Offenders
§ 995. (§ 969). Trial of joint offenders.
Number of Arguments. — Where two are tried together
without objection they have a right to only one argument.
Bloodworth v. State, 161 Ga. 332, 346, 131 S. F. 80.
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§ 997 EVIDENCE § 1013
ARTICLE 12
Impaneling the Jury
§ 997. (§ 971). Putting panel on prisoner.
Cited in Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E- 448.
§ 998. (§ 972). Challenge to the array.
Grounds for.—If there is objection to individual members
of the panel of jurors, the challenge should be to the poll,
and not to the array. Thompson v. Buice, 162 Ga. 556, 134 S-
E- 303.
Form.—A challenge to the array, for any cause going to
show that it was not fairly or improperly empaneled, must
be in writing. Thompson v. Buice, 162 Ga. 556, 134 S. E. 303.
§ 999. (§ 973). Challenges for cause.
Relation in Ninth Degree Illustrated.—A juror who is re-
lated to the deceased in that his great great grandmother
was a sister to the deceased's grandfather is sufficient to
disqualify him. Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 136 S. E- *2.
A person related by blood or marriage within the pro-
hibited degree (the ninth degree) to stockholders of a bank
is incompetent to serve as juror on the trial of an action
brought by the bank. Young v. Cochran Banking Co., 166
Ga. 877, 879, 144 S. E. 652.
§ 1001. (§ 975). Questions on voir dire.
Even though a juror had heard the evidence on a prev-
ious trial of the same case, this would not disqualify him
unless he had formed and expressed an opinion from hav-
ing heard the testimony delivered under oath. Ford v.
State, 164 Ga. 638, 641, 139 S. F. 355.
The right to have jurors put upon their voir dire may be
waived by a defendant; and where a jury is selected with-
out any request being made by defendant or his counsel to
have the jurors put upon their voir dire, this right is
thereby waived. The fact that the prisoner and his coun-
sel did not know that the jurors were not put upon their
voir dire until after verdict is no sufficient reason for grant-
ing a new trial, unless it appears that they could not have
discovered the existence of the fact by the exercise of or-
dinary diligence. Smith v. State, 168 Ga. 611, 615, 148 S.
F. 531.
§ 1004. (§ 978). No investigation before triors.
The fact that the juror in this case "was examined
touching his competency in the presence of his fellow ju-
rors" was not such error as requires the grant of a new
trial. Fvans v. State, 37 Ga. App. 156, 139 S. F. 156.
Although a juror has been found competent and has been
accepted, under the provisions of this section, the trial
court is authorized, before any evidence has been sub-
mitted on the main issue, to put the juror on trial again
as to his competency, if, subsequently to his acceptance,
there has been brought to the attention of the court any
evidence attacking his competency. Fvans v. State, 37 Ga.
App. 156, 139 S. F. 156.
ARTICLE 15
Evidence
§ 1008. (§ 982). Object of evidence.
Quoted in Groves v. State, 162 Ga. 161, 162, 132 S. F. 769.
§ 1009. (§ 983) « Sunday definitions.
It was held no error to fail to define circumstantial evi-
dence where the evidence was not wholly circumstantial in
Strickland v. State, 167 Ga. 452, 145 S. E. 879. See also
Phillips v. State, 39 Ga. App. 812, 148 S. F. 631.
§ 101 0. (§ 984). Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient.
Necessity of Charging Language of Section.—The failure
of the court to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in
the exact language of this section is not error. Sellers v.
State, 36 Ga. App. 653, 137 S. E- 912.
A charge of court using "should" instead of "must", in
quoting this section, does not require a new trial. Adams v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 144, 128 S. E. 924.
Charge Held a Sufficient Compliance.—The language of
the charge excepted to was not identical with the language
of the section, but it substantially stated the provisions of
that law. Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S. E. 896.
That the court, in charging on circumstantial evidence,
added to the language of this section after the words "rea-
sonable hypothesis," the words "or theory," was not cause
for a new trial. Daniel v. State, 39 Ga. App. 574, 148 S.
E. 601.
Circumstances not authorizing convict/ion: Of cattle steal-
ing. Hire v. State, 38 Ga. App. 116, 117. Of burglary. Wal-
lin v. State, 38 Ga. App. 194. Of larceny. Smith v. State,
38 Ga. App. 741, 145 S. E. 500.
Conviction of murder supported by circumstantial evi-
dence. Shirley v. State, 168 Ga. 344, 148 S. E- 91.
Applied in Burgess v. State, 164 Ga. 92, 137 S. E- 768:
North v. State, 39 Ga. App. 119, 146 S. E- 347; Heath v.
State, 38 Ga. App. 269, 143 S. E- 605.
Cited in Hall v. State, 36 Ga. App. 670, 137 S. E- 915;
dissenting opinion in Hill v. State, 164 Ga. 500, 506, 139 S.
F. 23.
§ 1012. (§ 986). Amount of mental conviction.
Cited in Waller v. State, 164 Ga. 128, 130, 138 S. E- 67.
§ 1013. (§ 987). When testimony warrants a
conviction.
Charge of Court.—A charge substantially in the language
of this section is not erroneous in that the court failed to
charge the jury that the testimony should be sufficient to
satisfy the minds and conscience of a fair and impartial
jury, etc. Smith v. State, 34 Ga. App. 779, 131 S. F. 923.
Erroneous Charge under This Section.—The following
charge under this section was held inaccurate: "Whether
dependent upon positive or circumstantial evidence, the true
question in all criminal cases is not that the conclusion to
which the evidence points may be false, but whether or not
the state has satisfied the minds and consciences of the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused."
King v. State, 163 Ga. 313, 136 S. E. 154.
Cited in Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 758, 759, 144 S.
F. 301. . .
§ 1015. (§ 989). Presumption arising from fail-
ure to produce evidence.
A charge on the presumption arising from a failure to
produce a witness is not applicable to a criminal case.
Waller v. State, 164 Ga. 128, 138 S. F. 67.
§ 1017. (§ 991). Number of witnesses neces-
sary.
Charging Part of Section When Inapplicable.—The court
did not err in giving in charge this section as to the num-
ber of witnesses necessary to convict of perjury and certain
other offenses, although a part of the section was not appli-
cable to the case where the inapplicable part was explained.
Pence v. State, 36 Ga. App. 270, 136 S. E. 820.
Perjury.—In this State there can be a legal verdict for
perjury only when it is supported by the evidence of two
witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances.
Proof that the defendant had made contradictory state-
ments is not alone sufficient. Roddenberry v. State, 37 Ga.
359, 360, 140 S. E. 386.
Uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be suffi-
cient to convict of a misdemeanor. The rule that the testi-
mony of an accomplice must be corroborated applies to fel-
onies only. Carson v. State, 37 Ga. App. 100, 138 S. F- 920.
The testimony of the principal witness, an accomplice in
the murder of which the accused was tried, was corrobo-
rated; and the conviction was authorized by the evidence.
George v. State, 167 Ga. 532, 146 S. E. 120.
§ 1018. (§ 992). Alibi, as a defense.
Section given in charge. Coggeshall v. State, 161 Ga. 269,
266, 131 S. E. 57.
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§ 1019 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES § 1037
Section held not applicable in Strickland v. State, 167 Ga.
452, 456, 145 S. E. 879.
ARTICLE 16
Rules Governing the Admission of Testimony
§ 1019. (§ 993). Character and conduct of par-
ties.
Applied in Cox v. State, 165 Ga. 145, 139 S. E- 861.
ARTICLE 17
Of Hearsay
§ 1023. (§ 997). Sometimes original evidence.
Declarations of person afterwards slain, explanatory of
his conduct, admissible on trial for murder. Shirley v. State,
168 Ga. 344, 148 S. E- 91.
Cited in Sloan v. State, 35 Ga. App. 347, 133 S. E- 269.
§ 1024. (§ 998.) Res gestae.
Cited in Cain v. State, 39 Ga. App. 128, 134, 146 S. E. 340.
§ 1025 (§ 999.) Declarations of conspirators.
Applied in Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 191, 136 S. E.
72; Eance v. State, 166 Ga. 15, 19, 142 S. E- 105; Farmers'
& Traders' Bank v. Davis, 39 Ga. App. 74, 146 S. E. 793.
§ 1026. (§ 1000). Dying declarations.
Preliminary proof sufficient to show that declarant was
conscious of his condition. Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga. 645,
661, 144 S. E- 193.
A prima facie case is all that is necessary to carry dy-
ing declarations to the jury. Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga.
645, 661, 144 S. E- 193.
Where it was manifestly impossible that the deceased
could have seen his assailant or known certainly who he
was
>_
* mere expression of opinion as to who he was is not
admissible as a dying declaration; but where want of
knowledge does not appear either from the statement itself
or from other evidence in the case, it must be presumed
that the declarant stated a fact within his knowledge. In
these circumstances it was a question for the jury whether
the declaration represented the primary knowledge of the
deceased or merely his opinion. Strickland v. State, 167
Ga. 452, 457, 145 S. E. 879.
§ 1027. (§ 1001). Testimony of witness on for-
mer trial.
Production of Articles Present at Former Trial.—Where
the testimony, of a deceased witness who had testified at
the former trial, contained references to certain physical ob-
jects, which at the former trial were in court, this fact did
not stop^ the operation of this section on the ground that
such articles were not produced in court at the trial now
under review nor offered in evidence, even though the state
did not account for their absence. Bloodworth v. State, 161
Ga. 332, 334, 131 S. E. 80.
Testimony of inaccessible witness, given at former trial,
held admissible. Sheppard v. State, 167 Ga. 326, 336, 145'
S. E. 654. See C. C. ,§ 5773, ante.
ARTICLE 18
Of Admissions and Confessions
§ 1029. (§ 1003). Acquiescence or silence as
admission.
Admissibility of Statements Made by Wife.—A former
statement made in front of her husband and a third person
[
may not be proved by the third person unless the statement
when made required an answer or denial. Bowen v. State,
36 Ga. App. 666, 137 S. E. 793.
§ 1031. (§ 1005). Weight of such evidence.
Omission to Charge as to Confessions.—In absence of a
timely request, the court did not err in omitting to charge
this section. Even where under the special facts of the
case, it is the duty of the court without a request to charge
upon the law of confessions, the omission to do so is not
cause for a new trial, it appearing that without such con
fession there was sufficient evidence to warrant the con-
viction. Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S. E. 36.
(§ 1006). Confession must be volun-§ 1032.
tary.
See annotation to preceding section.
Testimony of confession of wrecking passenger-train, in-
duced by hope of benefit or fear of injury, not admissible.
Eee v. State, 168 Ga. 560, 148 S. E- 400.
Applied in Mills v. State, 38 Ga. App. 125, 143 S. E. 575.
§ 1035. (§ 1009). Confession of conspirators.
Application of Phrase "After the Enterprise Is Ended."—
The phrase "after the enterprise is ended," necessanly
makes admissible any statements made by any of the con
spirators until the ultimate purpose of the conspiracy has
been accomplished. Hence where a killing is only an incident
in carrying out a purpose to accomplish some further ob-
ject, it would seem to follow from the very wording of the
section that where the enterprise had not ended, because the
real purpose of the conspiracy has not been achieved prior
to the completion of the enterprise, statements made even
after such a killing and until the purposes of the conspiracy
has been fully accomplished would be admissible on the trial
of any of those engaged in the conspiracy. Rawlings v.
State, 163 Ga. 406, 421, 136 S. E. 448.
ARTICLE 19
Prisoner's Statement
§ 1036. (§ 1010). Prisoner's statement.
Charge substantially in the language of the section up-
held. Coggeshall v. State, 161 Ga. 259, 265, 131 S. E- 57.
An instruction on the statement of the accused, comply-
ing with this section, is not subject to an exception for
omission, without appropriate request, to give in the same
connection an elaborative instruction. Bailey v. State, 167
Ga. 318, 145 S. E. 456.
ARTICLE 20
Competency of Witnesses
§ 1037. (§ 1011). Persons not competent or
compellable.
4. Husband and wife shall not be competent or
compellable to give evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding for or against each other, except that
either shall be competent, but not compellable,
to testify against the other upon the trial for any
criminal offense committed, or attempted to have
been committed, upon the person of either by the
other. The wife is also competent witness to
testify for or against her husband in case of
abandonment of his child, as provided for in sec-
tion 116 of this Code. Acts 1866, pp. 138, 139;
1880-1, p. 121; 1887, p. 30; 1927, p. 145.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927 the ex-
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§ 1038 VERDICT § 1059
ception contained in the fourth subdivision of this section
concerned only the wife. Nfow both the husband and wife
are competent for the purpose specified in the exception.
'Only that subdivision was affected by the amendment.
Proof of Statements Made by Wife. — Notwithstanding
the statutory inhibition against the giving of testimony by
a wife against her husband in a criminal case, yet where
a wife makes statements in the presence of her husband and
a third person which would implicate her husband in the
violation of a criminal statute, and the husband makes no
denial thereof, the third person may testify as to these
•statements. Bowen v. State, 36 Ga. App. 666, 137 S. E- 793.
§ 1038. (§ 1012). Persons who are incompetent
witnesses.
Children.—The test as to the competency of a child of tende:
years to be a witness is knowledge by the child of che
nature of an oath, and when an examination by the court
shows that the child has no such knowledge it is error to
permit the child to testify over proper objection. Horton v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S. E- 647.
Charge.—It was held not error to fail to charge this sec-
tion in the absence of a proper request in Lee v. State, 37
Ga. App. 632, 633, 141 S. E. 317.
ARTICLE 21
Examination of Witnesses
§ 1045. (§ 1019). Leading questions.
When Discretion Not Abused.—The discretion of the trial
judge was not abused, under the facts of the case
in allowing the solicitor-general to ask certain lead
ing questions of certain reluctant witnesses for the state.
Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 195, 136 S. E. 72.
§ 1046. (§ 1020). Memorandum in aid of wit-
ness's memory.
Cited in Adams v. State, 34 Ga. App. 144, 128 S. E- 924.
§ 1047. (§ 1021). Opinions of witness.
Applied in Tanner v. State, 163 Ga. 121, 122, 127, 135 S. E-
917.
ARTICLE 23
Argument of Counsel
§ 1055 (4). Extension of time.
Necessary Showing.—It is necessary that counsel make a
showing in the manner prescribed, as to the necessity of an
extension of time, in order to do justice to the case of their
client. Where the showing required by the statute is not
made it will not be held that there was any abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to extend
the time for argument as requested. Bloodworth v. State,
161 Ga. 332, 346, 131 S. E- 80.
ARTICLE 22
Impeachment of Witnesses
§ 1050 1
., (§ 1024.) Impeaching one's own wit-
ness.
The evidence did not show that the solicitor-general was
entrapped by a witness, within this section. King v.
State, 166 Ga. 10, 142 S. E- 160.
§ 1052. (§ 1026). By contradictory statements.
Determination of Credibility within Province of the Jury.—
This rule provides for impeachment of a witness and for
sustaining him when his credibility has been attacked in the
manner designated, but leaves it to the jury to determine
whether the witness has testified truthfully. If the witness
has been sustained by proof of general good character, that
would go to his credit, but in the absence of such proof the
truthfulness of his testimony would still be for determination
by the jury. The mere fact that the witness had made
statements out of court, contradictory to his testimony at
the trial, would not as matter of law necessarily deprive his
testimony of all probative value. King v. State, 163 Ga.
313, 322, 136 S. E. 154.
Necessity for Foundation.—In Stewart v. Avery, 38 Ga.
App. 431, 433, 144 S. E- 218, it is said: "No foundation was
laid for this testimony by proof of contradictory state-
ments, as required by this section." This is necessary for
the purpose of impeachment.
Ga.—19
ARTICLE 24
Charge of the Court
§ 1058. (§ 1032.) Judge not to express opinion
on the facts.
Statement as to Irrelevant Letter.—Statement that a
letter offered, which was entirely irrelevant, had no proba-
tive value, was held not to be a violation of this section.
Tanner v. State, 163 Ga. 121, 122, 129, 135 S. E. 917.
Reason for Ruling on Objection to Evidence No Expres-
sion of Opinion.—When an objection is made to evidence
offered, the judge has a right, if he deems proper, to
give the reasons for his decision on the objections; and such
reasons so given if pertinent to the objections made, do not
constitute an expression of opinion. Reed v. State, 163 Ga.
206, 213, 135 S. E. 748.
Stating an admitted fact does not constitute an expression
or intimation of opinion. Swain v. State, 162 Ga. 777, 789,
135 S. E. 187.
Same—Assumption That Crime Committed.—There beint,
nothing in the evidence or in the defendant's statement to
dispute the fact that the alleged crime was committed, and
his defense resting solely upon the contention that he did
not participate in the offense, the court did not violate this
section in assuming that a crime had been committed.
Pruitt v. State, 36 Ga. App. 736, 138 S. E- 251.
Statement That There Was No Dispute.—No expression
of opinion by statement that there was no dispute about
a fact in evidence. McCloud v. State, 166 Ga. 436, 437, 444,
143 S. E- 558.
Applied in Spivey v. State, 38 Ga. App. 213, 214, 143 S.
E. 450.
Section held not violated by charge in Bailey v. State,
167 Ga. 318, 320, 145 S. E- 456.
ARTICLE 25
The Verdict
§ 1059. (§ 1033). Jury judges of law and facts;
form and construction of verdicts.
Interchanging "Maximum" and "Minimum."—It is rea-
sonable to construe a verdict finding the accused guilty of
making intoxicating liquor and fixing a "maximum" pen-
alty of one year, and a "minimum" penalty of one and a
half years as meaning a minimum of one year and a
maximum of one and one-half years so as to uphold the
validity of it under this section. Jordan v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 648, 137 S. E- 798.
Where on joint trial of two persons for murder the jury
returned a verdict finding one of them guilty of murder,
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with recommendation to mercy, and finding the other
guilty of "manslaughter" and fixing a maximum and a
minimum sentence for him, it was error for the court to re-
fuse to receive the verdict so far as it related to the
latter finding, and to require the jury to reconsider the
case as to the latter accused under instruction that he
could net be convicted of voluntary manslaughter unless
his codefendant also was guilty of that offense. Allen v.
State, 164 Ga. 669, 139 S. E. 415.
§ 1060 (1). Jury to prescribe minimum and
maximum term of punishment, when; rules of
Prison Commission.
See notes to P. C. § 1068.
Emphasis of Power to Fix Minimum and Maximum
Sentence. — The power given to the jury to prescribe a
minimum and maximum term is emphasized by the further
provision that "in cases of pleas of guilty, then the judge
shall have the right to prescribe such minimum and maxi.
mum term as he may see fit." Mitchell v. State, 34 Ga. App.
505, 506, 130 S. E. 355.
Effect of Jury Failing to Fix Maximum and Minimum.-*
Where the jury failed to prescribe the maximum and mini-
mum in a burglary case but merely recommended him t~>
the mercy of the court, the verdict was not in proper form,
and it was error for the judge to receive it and fix the mini-
mum and maximum term of punishment. He should have
sent the jury back to their room with the instruction that
they fix the minimum and the maximum penalty. Mitchell v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 505, 130 S. E- 355.
Right to Poll Jury.—-Where the jury returned a maximum-
minimum sentence and the judge immediately turned to
the accused and stated that that would be his sentence, the
accused was not deprived of his right to poll the jury. He
had this privilege while the verdict was being reduced to
writing and retired as a judgment. Taylor v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 639, 642, 138 S. E. 83. Case distinguished from Mc-
Cullough v. State, 10 Ga. App. 403, 73 S. E. 546.
§ 1060(2). Punishment to be fixed by city-
court jury in county of 60,000 to 70,000 popula-
tion.
—
Juries in their verdicts upon the trial of all
cases upon the criminal side of the court, involv-
ing misdemeanors, in constitutional city courts
having jurisdiction over counties whose popula-
tion under the 1920 census of the United States
was not less than sixty thousand inhabitants and
not more than seventy thousand inhabitants, and
over counties whose population under any future
census of the United States shall be not less than
sixty thousand inhabitants and not in excess of
seventy thousand inhabitants, shall in their ver-
dicts prescribe the sentence or punishment to be
inflicted upon the defendant, in which verdict
may be imposed an alternative sentence or a sen-
tence imposing a fine, a term in jail, and a term
upon the chain-gang, all within the limits pre-
scribed by law for misdemeanors, either, any, or
all of said punishments; and the judge in impos-
ing the sentence upon the defendant shall follow
that fixed by the jury in its verdicts.
In all such courts in cases wherein pleas of
guiltv shall be entered, then the judge shall have
the right to prescribe the punishment within the
limits 3xed by law for misdemeanors. Acts 1927,
p. 317.
This section violates the constitution §§ 6391, 6527, and
6382. Cain v. State, 166 Ga. 539, 540, 144 S. E- 6.
§ 1061. (§ 1035.) Jury may find the attempt.
Attempting to Manufacture Liquor.—The evidence was
held not sufficient to support a verdict of attempting to
manufacture liquor. Hartline v. State, 34 Ga. App. 224, 129
S. E. 123.
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ARTICLE 26
The Sentence
Punishment ; recommenda-§ 1062. (§ 1036.)
tion of the jury.
See notes to P. C. § 1068.
Recommendation of Misdemeanor Punishment for May-
hem.—The failure of the court to instruct the jury that in
case they should convict the defendant of mayhem, they
would have the right to recommend that he be punished as
for a misdemeanor was not error. Cowart v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 517, 130 S. E. 358.
Minimum and Maximum Penalty.—When the jury ren-
dered a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation that the
defendant be punished as for a misdemeanor, it was not
error for the court to direct the jury to fix a minimum
and maximum penalty. Mitchell v. State, 34 Ga. App. 505,
650, 130 S. E. 355; Lee v. State, 35 Ga. App. 235, 133 S. E.
281; Young v. State, 36 Ga. App. 308, 136 S. E. 459; Jordan
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 648, 650, 137 S. E. 863, and cit.; Mc-
Kenzie v. State, 38 Ga. App. 200, 143 S. E. 442.
Effect of Recommendation].—Where a defendant is con-
victed of a felony and where, under this section, the jury
recommends that he be punished as for a misdemeanor, the
recommendation is advisory only, and the failure of the
judge to follow the recommendation is not cause for a new
trial. McKenize v. State, 38 Ga. App. 200, 143 S. E. 442.
§ 1065. (§ 1039.) Misdemeanors, how pun-
ished.
Judge's Discretion in Sentencing.—Where a female, undc
indictment for a misdemeanor, pleads guilty, the judge may
in his discretion sentence her to labor and confinement in
the woman's prison on the state farm. Conley v. Pope, 161
Ga. 462, 131 S. E. 168.
Dividing Sentence into Two Periods.—The fact that the
judge divided the sentence into two periods of six months
each, did not make the total sentence to the chain-gang
exceed the period fixed by the statute. Scott v. McClelland,
162 Ga. 443, 445, 133 S. E. 923.
Sentence to Hard Labor.—A sentence in a misdemeanor
case which provides that the person convicted shall be con-
fined at hard labor for the space of one year at the state
farm is not in conformity with this section as it
nrovides that the convict shall "work" or "labor," and this
does not necessarily mean "hard labor." Screen v. State,
107 Ga. 715, 33 S. E- 393; Potter v. State, 35 Ga. App. 248,
132 S. E- 783.
Power to Give Less than Maximum.—The court, having the
power to both pass upon the defendant a sentence of twelve
months and to impose a fine of not exceeding $1,000, could
do less than both, and could do so without giving the de-
fendant any election as to paying or refusing to pay the
fine. Dickson v. Officers of Court, 36 Ga. App. 341, 343, 136
S. E. 537.
Cited in King v. State, 37 Ga. App. 334, 140 S. E. 513;
Swanson v. State, 38 Ga. App. 386, 144 S. E. 49.
§ 1066. (§ 1040.) Attempts, how punished.
Cited in Hartline v. State, 34 Ga. App. 224, 129 S. E. 123.
§ 1067. (§ 1041.) Several imprisonments to be
successive.
Cited in Teasley v. Nelson, 164 Ga. 242, 246, 138 S. E. 72.
§ 1068. (§ 1042.) Conviction of second offense,
longest time.
See notes to P. C. § 183(1).
This section does not violate the double jeopardy clause
of the constitution. Tribble v. State, 168 Ga. 699, 148 S.
E. 593.
This section of the Penal Code does not violate para-
graph 5 of section 1 of article 1 of the constitution of this
State, which guarantees to one accused of crime an impartial
trial. Tribble v. State, 168 Ga. 699, 148 S. E- 593.
This section was not repealed by § 1062 nor by §
1060(1). Tribble v. State, 168 Ga. 699, 148 S. E- 593.
§ 1069(a). Park's Code.
See § 1069(1).
290 ]
§ ioe&(i) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON § 1091
§ 1069(1). Electrocution substituted for hang-
ing.
Constitutionality. — There is no merit in the alleged
grounds of attack upon the constitutionality of this and
the following section. There being no provision in the
constitution conferring upon sheriffs of counties the power
to execute sentences of the courts in capital cases, the
manner of execution of such sentences is for legislative
enactment, as is the matter of denning the crime of mur-
der and providing for its punishment. Dunaway v. Gore,
164 Ga. 219, 138 S. F. 213. Nor did the act contain matter
not expressed in its caption. Howell v. State, 164 Ga. 204,
138 S. E. 206.
The language, "within the walls of the State Penitentiary
at Milledgeville, Georgia," in this section means the State
Prison Farm located near Milledgeville; and the language,
"There shall be present at such execution the warden of
the penitentiary," in section 1069(4), means any warden of.
said prison, and embraces the superintendent of said pris-
on, who is the warden of the male camp of said peniten-
tiary. Those two sections of said act are not so vague
and indefinite as to render them null and void. Howell v.
State, 164 Ga. 204, 138 S. F. 206.
Construing the terms of §§ 1069(1) and 1069(4) as re-
ferring to the State Prison Farm located near Milledge-
ville, and as conferring the authority expressed in section
1069(4) on any warden of said prison, including the su-
perintendent thereof who is the warden of the male camp
of the penitentiary, the execution by that superintendent,
of the sentence for murder, would not deprive the con-
demned person of due process of law. Dunaway v. Gore,
164 Ga. 219, 138 S. F. 213.
Applied in Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S. F. 481.
§ 1069(d). Park's Code.
See § 1069(4).
§ 1069(4). Execution by warden and assistants;
witnesses.
See notes to § 1069(1).
Applied in Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S. F. 481.
(§ 1044). Sentence shall specify time§ 1070.
and place.
Fixing New Date for Unexecuted Sentence.—When the day
fixed by the trial court for the execution of a capital
sentence has passed, and the sentence for any reason what-
ever has not been executed, it is the duty of the judge of the
superior court in which the sentence of death was imposed,
either in term or in vacation by an order as prescribed by
law to name and fix a new date for the execution of said
capital sentence, which shall be not less than ten days nor
more than twenty days from the date of said order. Gore v.
Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S. F- 481.
§ 1081(a). Park's Code.
See § 1081(1).
§ 1081(1). Probation of offenders.
Constitutionality.—This act is not unconstitutional. Wil-
liams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S. F. 843; Rhodes v. State,
162 Ga. 627, 134 S. E. 448.
"The word®, 'on such conditions as it may see fit,' are
very broad, and the court will not say that the portion of
the sentence of which complaint is made is not authorized
by the terms of the act." Swanson v. State, 38 Ga. App.
386, 387, 144 S F. 49.
Oral Remarks to Sheriff as Constituting Probation.—The
oral remarks of the judge to the sheriff, in passing sentence
on the defendant, to watch after her, and if he had further
trouble with her to take her to the chain-gang, can not be
construed as placing the defendant upon probation, under
this act as such oral declarations of the judge constitute no
part of the sentence. Conley v. Pope, 161 Ga. 462, 131 S.
F. 168.
Power to Suspend Sentence.—Under this section the judge
has no power to pass a sentence and then suspend it, and
where he has attempted to do so this section has no applica-
tion. Kemp v. Meads, 162 Ga. 55, 132 S. F. 533.
The general rule is that a judge of the superior court of
this State has no authority to suspend execution of a
sentence imposed by him in a criminal case. Where he does
suspend such sentence, so much of the sentence as orders
a suspension may afterwards be revoked and the prisoner
be required to serve the sentence. Scott v. McClelland, 162
Ga. 443, 133 S. F. 923.
§ 1081(d). Park's Code.
See § 1081(4).
§ 1081(4). Delinquent probationers.
Limitation upon Power to Withdraw Parol.—A parole can
not lawfully be revoked as a mere matter of caprice. In
such hearing the judge is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses, but he is not permitted to withdraw a
parole unless there be sufficient evidence to authorize a
finding that one or more of the conditions upon which the
parole was granted has been violated. Williams v. State,
162 Ga. 327, 133 S. F. 843.
Where it can not be determined whether the criminal act
charged against the probationer as in violation of his paroie
was committed prior to the imposition of the sentence or
subsequent thereto, a finding revoking the parole would be
contrary to law and would not be authorized. Williams v.
State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S. E- 843.
Review on Bill of Exceptions.—Watts v. State, 36 Ga. App.
215, 136 S. F. 323, followed the cases cited under this catch-
line in Ga. Code 1926. See also Kennedy v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 602; 137 S. F. 573; Anderson v. State, 36 Ga. App. 602,
137 S. F. 572.
Cited in Taylor v. State, 36 Ga. App. 639, 642, 138 S. F. 83.
§§ 1081(e), 1081(f). Park's Code.
See §§ 1060(1), 1060(2).
NEW TRIALS, AND THE SUPREME
COURT
ARTICLE l
When New Trial Will, and Will Not Be
Granted
§ 1088. (§ 1061.) On account of new evidence.
See annotation under section 5480 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 2
The Motion and Proceedings Thereon
§ 1090(a). Park's Code.
See § 1090(1).
§ 1090(1). Objections before trial judge.
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. F-
414; Taunton v. Taylor, 37 Ga. App. 695, 141 S. F. 511.
§ 1091. (§ 1064.) Motion made after adjourn-
ment of court.
Notice Relates to the Time for Absolute Rule.—The notice
required by this section "relates to the time when the party
(having at term regularly moved his rule nisi) shall apply
for his rule absolute," and is complied with when the oppo
site party is served with the copy of the motion for new
trial and the rule nisi issuing thereon twenty days before
the time at which the hearing is to be had under the rule
nisi. Coggeshall v. Park, 162 Ga. 78, 80, 132 S. F. 632.
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§ 1096 DUTIES OF JAILER § 1152
ARTICLE 3
The Supreme Court
§ 1096. (§ 1068.) When a writ of error lies.
A ruling on a demurrer can not properly be made a
ground of a motion for a new trial. Quattlebaum v.
State, 32 Ga. App. 68, 122 S. £. 637; Cunningham v. State,
38 Ga. App. 236, 143 S. E. 602.
§ 1101(a). Park's Code.
See § 1101(1).
§ 1101(1). Proof of venue or time of commis-
sion of offense.
Applied in Brown v. State, 38 Ga. App. 196, 198, 143 S.
E. 457
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. E.
414.
COSTS, FINES, AND FINE AND FORFEI-
TURE FUND
ARTICLE 3
Fine and Forfeiture Fund
§ 1114. (§ 1087.) Insolvent costs, how paid.
Under this section "the officers bringing it into court"
are those who are in office when the money is actually paid
into court. Lane v. Duke, 37 Ga. App. 146, 139 S. E. 122.
SALARIES AND FEES OF OFFICERS,
WITNESSES, AND JURORS
§ 1138(4). Jury commissioners and clerks in
counties with population between 33,000 and 33,-
050.
—
Jury commissioners and their clerks dn all
counties of this State having a population,
according to the United States census of 1920,
of not less than 33,000 and not more than
33,050, shall be paid five ($5.00) dollars each for
every day's service in revising the jury-list. Said
compensation to be paid from the county treas-
ury. Acts 1927, p. 147.
§ 1138(5). Jury commissioners in certain other
counties.
—
Jury commissioners and their clerks,
in all counties having a population, according to
the United States Census of 1920, of not less
than 26,108 and not more than 26,110, shall be
paid five dollars ($5.00) each for every day's
service in revising the jury-list. Said compensa-
tion to be paid from the county treasury. Acts
1929, p. 182, § 1.
§ 1138(6). In counties of 18,355 to 18,365 popu-
lation.
—
Jury commissioners and their clerks, in
all counties of this State having a population ac-
cording to the United Sates Census of 1920 of
not less than 18,355 and not more than 18,365,
ishall be paid five dollars ($5.00) each for every
days' service in revising the jury-list; said com-
pensation to be paid from the county treasury.
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with the
provisions of this section, and especially the con-
flicting portions of section 1138 of the Penal
Code of Georgia, be and the same are hereby
repealed. Acts 1929, p. 277, § 1.
ARTICLE 13
Witnesses from Other Counties, and When
Venue Is Changed
§ 1143. (§ 1114.)
State's witness.
Subpoena for non-resident
ARTICLE 8
Jury Commissioners and Clerks
§ 1138(b). Park's Code.
See § 1138(3).
§ 1138(3). Jury Commissioners in Counties of
two hundred thousand or more.
—
Jury commis-
sioners and their clerks in all counties in the
State having a population, according to the
United States Census of 1920 or any future cen-
sus, of two hundred thousand or more shall be
paid ten dollars ($10.00) each for every day's
service in revising the jury list, said compensa-
tion to be paid from the county treasurer; pro-
vided, however, that any commissioner or clerk
who is already on the county payroll shall receive
no additional compensation for services under
this Act. Acts 1927, p. 222.
§ 1138(d). Park's Code.
See § 1138(4).
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Void if Not Signed by Clerk and Solicitor General.—Unless
at the time a subpoena for a non-resident witness for th;
state in a criminal case is issued it is signed both by the
clerk of the superior court and the solicitor-general of the
circuit, it is void. Cody v. Boykin, 163 Ga. 1, 135 S. E. 75.
COUNTY JAILS
ARTICLE 1
Duties of Jailer
§ 1152, (§ 1123.) United States prisoners.
See notes to P. C., § 319.
Section 1152 was codified from the act of the General
Assembly approved November 12, 1889 (Ga. h. 1889, p. 47),
and the last clause thereof refers solely to the duties and
responsibilities of the keeper of a county jail in safely
keeping and humanely treating such United States prison-
ers as may be received by him. Brandon v. State, 37 Ga.
App. 495, 141 S. E. 63.
2]
§ 1167 ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT § 1259(5)
MISDEMEANOR CONVICTS
ARTICLE 1
How Disposed of
§ 1167. (§ 113&.) Safe-keeping, support, and
employment.
Quoted in McConnell v. Floyd County, 164 Ga. 177, 137
S. F- 919.
ARTICLE 3
Time Shortened for Good Behavior
§ 1179. (§ 1150.) Good behavior of misde-
meanor convicts.
Applied in McConnell v. Floyd County, 164 Ga. 177, 137
S. E. 919.
THE PENITENTIARY
ARTICLE 1
Prison Commission, Control of Convicts,
Duties of Officers, Etc
§ 1203. Purchase of farm and control thereof.
Cited in reference to designation of penitentiary in elec-
trocution act of 1924. Howell v. State, 164 Ga. 204, 211, 13S
S. F. 206.
§ 1214, State farm and central penitentiary.
Cited in reference to designation of penitentiary in elec-
trocution act of 1924. Howell v. State, 164 Ga. 204, 211, 138
S. F. 206.
§ 1230.
capes.
ARTICLE 3
Miscellaneous Provisions
(§ 1174.) Expenses of trials for es-
Fund Out of Which to Be Paid.—No reference is made
here or elsewhere in the code as to the fund from which
the expense is to be paid, and it seems that the provision ij
the act of 1823, that it shall be paid out of the penitentiary
fund, remains unrepealed. Campbell v. Davison, 162 Ga. 221,
133 S. F. 468.
TAX TO SUPPORT PRISONERS IN CER-
TAIN COUNTIES
§ 1236(1). County tax to support prisoners. —
In those counties in the State of Georgia having
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a population, according to the United States
census of 1920, or any future census, of not less
than 44,195 nor more than 63,690 the commission-
ers of roads and revenues are hereby authorized,
in their discretion, to levy a tax annually upon
the taxable property in said counties, the pro-
ceeds of which are to be used by said commis-
sioners for the maintenance and support of pris-
oners, including the chain-gang operated by said
counties. Acts 1927, p. 339.
§ 1236(2). Use of chain-gang on municipal
streets,—Said commissioners may in their dis-
cretion, for the purpose of keeping said chain-
gang regularly engaged, employ said chain-gang
upon the streets or public works of municipali-
ties located in said counties, as well as upon the
rural roads and public works of said counties, so
long as the expense of maintaining and support-
ing said chain-gang does not exceed the amount
raised by said tax levy.
§ 1236(3). Separation of tax fund.—In those
counties coming within the terms of this Act, in
which the provisions of the alternative road law,
contained in the Code of Georgia of 1910, sec-
tions 694 to 704, inclusive, are in effect, the funds
derived from tax levies made for the maintenance
and support of prisoners and the funds derived
under the provisions of the alternative road law
shall be kept separate and apart, in order that no
portion of the tax funds derived under the alter-
native road law shall be applied to the expense of
maintaining and supporting the chain-gang while
engaged in work other than upon the rural roads.
GEORGIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR
GIRLS
ARTICLE l
Establishment and Management
§§ 1259 (d)- 125© (f). Park's Code.
See § 1259(5).
§ 1259(5). No compensation; Oath and bond;
expenses.—Said Board of Managers shall receive
no compensation for their services, and they
shall qualify on said board, taking and subscrib-
ing to an oath faithfully and impartially to dis-
charge their duties, and entering into bond in
such sums and in such securities as shall be pre-
scribed by the Governor, conditioned on the
faithful performance of all duties required of
them in this Act. The actual and necessary ex-
penses of this Board of Managers incurred in the
discharge of their official duties, together with
the expense of making said bonds herein provi-
ded, shall be paid out of the general appropria-
tion for said institution. Said Board of Mana-
gers shall organize by electing one of their mem-
bers as chairman and another as secretary of
said board; and when it may be deemed advisa-
ble, said board shall appoint a competent woman
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§ 1259(6) PENSIONS OF EX-CONFEDERATE SOLDIERS, ETC. § 1482(15)
as superintendent of said institution, at a salary
to be fixed by said Board of Managers, and shall
appoint such other employees as may be neces-
sary to carry on the work of said institution, pre-
scribing the duties of both the superintendent and
all other employees; provided, the salary of said
superintendent and said employees as well as the
expenses of the Board of Managers shall be paid
out of the maintenance fund, appropriated by
§ 1259(3). The superintendent and all other em-
ployees shall be subject to removal from office at
any time by said board. It shall be the duty of
said Board of Managers to meet once every three
months, for the purpose of attending to such
matters as may come before them in the man-
agement of said institution. Special meetings
may be called by the chairman. Absence from
any three meetings, unless excused by the
majority of the members present, shall be
treated by the Governor as a resignation from
office. Acts 1913, pp. 87, 89; 1919, p. 285; 1927,
p. 341.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 combined this sec-
tion with § 1259(6), and, in addition to other immaterial
omissions, omitted the word "other" preceding the woid
"members" in the last sentence of the combined section.
§ 1259(6). Included in the amendment to
§ 1259(5) by the Acts of 1927.
§ 1259 (i). Park's Code.
See § 1259(9).
§ 1259(9). Who may be committed and how;
fees for carrying persons to school.—The Judges
of the City and Superior Courts may in their dis-
cretion commit to the Georgia Training School
for Girls any girl under eighteen years of age
who has committed any offense against the laws
of this State, not punishable by death or life im-
prisonment, or who habitually associates with
vicious or immoral people, or who is incorrigible
to such an extent that she cannot be controlled
by parent or guardian, there to be held until such
girl reaches the age of twenty-one, unless sooner
discharged, bound out, or paroled under the rules
and regulations of said Board of Managers; pro-
vided, however, that no girl who is insane or an
idiot or who comes under the classification of
mental defectives as defined in section 3 of Act
approved August 19, 1919, establishing the Geor-
gia Training School for Mental Defectives, or
who is afflicted with an incurable disease, shall
be sentenced or committed to said institution.
The Judges of the City and Superior Courts may
hear and determine such cases, presiding in a
court or in chambers; provided, that any girl
brought before a court shall have a right to de-
mand trial by jury, and may appeal from the
judgment of said court as provided by law. The
fees that are now allowed by law for carrying
persons to the penitentiary shall be allowed to
the sheriffs of the various counties of the State,
for services in taking such girls as may be com-
mitted by the several courts to the Georgia
Training School for Girls. Acts 1913, pp. 87, 90;
1927, p. 343.
Editor's Note.—The exception, in the proviso, as to girls
who came under the classification of mental defective as de-
fined by the Act of 1919, is new with the amendment of
1927.
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§ 1259(j). Park's Code.
See § 1259(10).
§ 1259(10). Improper subjects returned; how
dealt with; parole. — The superintendent in
charge of such institution be and, with consent of
the chairman of Board of Managers, shall be
authorized and empowered to return whence she
came any girl who shall be found an improper
subject for admission, and who shall thereupon
be dealt with by the court or judge committing
her as would have been legal in the first instance
had not said girl been committed to the said
Georgia Training School for Girls; and provided,
that said Board of Managers shall be authorized
to discharge or release any inmate from said in-
stitution, or to liberate conditionally on parole
any inmate of said institution, under such rules
and regulations and upon such terms as said
Board of Managers may deem in the best inter-
ests of the inmate. Acts 1913, pp. 87, 90; 1927,
p. 349.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 the Board ox
Managers are authorized to discharge or release any inmate.
The amendment omitted a provision which authorized the
Board of Managers to bind out to some suitable person any
inmate, or return her to her parents or guardian.
SPECIAL QUASI CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
Habeas Corpus
ARTICLE l
Proceedings in Applications for Habeas Corpus
§ 1307. (§ 1226.) How wife or child may be
disposed of.
See annotation to § 2972 of the Civil Code.
§ 1313. (§ 1232.) Proceedings must be re-
corded.
Filing Papers after Hearing by the Judge.—Manifestly this
section contemplates filing the papers in the proceedings
with the clerk of the superior court after the hearing by the
Judge. Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 119, 132 S. 15.
757.
§ 1314. (§ 1233.) Notice of the hearing.
Waiver by failure to object, before hearing, to lack of
notice prescribed. Pridgen v. James, 168 Ga. 570, 149 S.
E. 48.
PENSIONS AND CONFEDERATE SOL-
DIERS' HOME
ARTICLE 1A
Pensions of Ex-Confederate Soldiers and
Widows
§ 1482(15). Pensions of Confederate soldiers
and widows, $360 per annum, payable $30 a
4]
§ 1519(44) PENSIONS FOR COUNTY EMPLOYEES § 1519(54)
month; additional clerk of Pension Commissioner.
—On and after January 1st, 1930, the annual pen-
sions paid to the Confederate soldiers and their
widows shall be $360.00 per annum to the Con-
federate soldiers and $360.00 per annum to their
widows, and these amounts are to be paid
monthly on the first day of each month; provided,
however, that the Confederate soldiers shall not
receive the amount named in this Act and the
amount that they are now receiving from the
State, but are to receive only $360.00 per annum
and to be paid this amount in installments of
$30.00 per month as provided in this Act; and
provided further, that if there are widows of
Confederate soldiers who are now drawing a
pension under any prior law, that they shall
come under this Act; and to provide further, that
if there are any widows of Confederate soldiers
who are now drawing a pension under any prior
law, that they shall not receive any other pension
except that provided for, in this Act, but may be
increased up to the amount herein named; pro-
vided further, that if any portion of this Act is
held invalid, then and in that event the portions
not so held shall remain in force; and provided
further that the amount to be paid the widows
shall be paid in installments of $30.00 per month
on the first day of each month as herein provided
for. Provided further that in order to carry out
the provisions of ithis Act the Pension Commis-
sioner is hereby authorized to employ an addi-
tional clerk at a salary not exceeding fifteen hun-
dred ($1,500.00) dollars per annum, the same to
be paid out of appropriations made to pay pen-
sions. Acts 192-9, p. 221, § 1.
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§ 1519(44). County employees in counties of
more than 200,000 people.—There may be raised
and established funds for the aid, relief, and pen-
sions of the employees of the county and their
dependents, in all counties having a population
of more than two hundred thousand by the
United States census of 1920, or any subsequent
census of the United States. Acts 1927, p. 262.
§ 1519(45). Right to retire after 25 years
service.—Every employee and future employees
who may participate in the pension fund may as
a matter of right retire from active service, pro-
vided he shall have been an employee of the
county for twenty-five years at the time of his
retirement.
§ 1519(46). Voluntary retirement of disabled
employees.—Any employee who is eligible to
participate and future employees who are eligi-
ble to participate, who shall be injured or whose
health shall become permanently impaired to
render them totally disabled, shall upon applica-
tion be retired. Should the board of trustees re-
fuse to grant an order of retirement, the appli-
cant shall select a physician, the board shall se-
lect a physician, and the two physicians so se-
lected shall select a third, and their decision shall
decide the question.
[2
§ 1519(47). Half-pay after retirement; pen-
sion for widow, etc.—When such employee shall
retire as a matter of right he shall be paid one-
half of his salary he was receiving at the time
of his retirement, for the rest of his life, to be
paid monthly. In case of death of a pensioner,
his widow and children or dependents shall draw
his pension as herein provided.
§ 1519(48). Half-pay for total disability.—
When such employees shall be retired for total
disability, he shall be paid one-half of the sal-
ary he was receiving at the time of his retire-
ment, for the rest of his life, to be paid monthly;
but this Act shall not affect any aid or relief or
pension received at the time of the passage of
this Act.
§ 1519(49). Board of trustees for fund; mem-
bers.—There is hereby established a board of
trustees whose duties it shall be to manage said
fiund. The board of trustees shall consist of the
chairman of the commissioners of roads and rev-
enues, the chief of the county police department,
and the superintendent of public works- of the
county; and if there be no chairman of the com-
missioners of roads and revenues, and if there
be no chief of county police, and if there be no
superintendent of public works, the county au-
thorities having charge of the affairs of the
county shall manage said pension funds. The
trustees shall formulate rules for taking care of
employees, and prescribe regulations and con-
ditions under which said aid, relief, and pensions
shall be paid. The board shall keep a strict ac-
count of disbursements and receipts of all funds,
which shall be open at all times to public inspec-
tion. The board of trustees shall have its first
meeting on Friday following the first Monday in
October after the passage of this Act, and or-
ganize by electing a chairman, a vice-chairman,
and a secretary. The chairman shall sign all
vouchers.
§ 1519(50). Deduction from salaries.—All
county employees who desire to participate in the
pension fund shall have two (2) per cent, of their
salaries deducted monthly.
§ 1519(51). Return of amount deducted from
salary.—In case an employee who has not served
twtenty-five years and whose employment has
been severed by the county, he shall receive the
amount deducted from his salary for the pension
fund.
§ 1519(52). Involuntary retirement.—In case
an employee has served twenty-five years does
not desire to retire, the board of trustees may in
their discretion retire him, after first obtaining
the consent of the county commissioners.
§ 1519(53). Former pensions not affected.—
This Act shall not repeal nor in any wise affect
any pensions or benefits or aids now being paid
to those who were receiving the same and who
shall receive the same after the passage of this
Act.
§ 1519(54). Widow and children, pension of,
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stops when.—When any employee has served
twenty-five years, and who has not taken a pen-
sion, dies, his widow and minor children shall re-
ceive his pension until such widow shall remarry,
or until such minor children or dependents shall
have reached the age of sixteen years.
§ 1519(55). Workmen's compensation law not
affected.—This Act shall not affect or be af-
fected by any workmens' compensation law or
other similar laws.
§ 1519(553/2). Pensions for widows of employ-
ees of cities of more than 150,000 population.—
The pensions set up and provided for in twelve
preceding sections shall, in case of the death of
the pensioner, if he leaves a widow be continued
to such widow during the remainder of her life,
except such widow's pension shall cease in case
of her remarriage, in case the officer or employee
could have secured a pension on account of serv-
ices but failed, to do so and continued in the serv-
ice and employment of the city, and dies without
having a pension set apart for him, his widow
may apply for such pension and have same set
apart to her during her life of widowhood. Acts
1929, p. 313, § 1.
§ 1519 (55a). Pensions of employees of counties
of 52,995 to 80,000 population.—There may be
raised and established funds for the aid, relief,
and pensions of employees of the county in all
counties in this State having therein a city with
a population of not less than fifty-two thousand,
nine hundred ninety-five and not more than
eighty thousand, according to the United States
census of 1920. 1929, p. 309, § 1.
§ 1519(55b). Half pay for employees serving 25
years continuously.—Whenever any employee of
any county to which this Act applies shall have
served for twenty-five years continuously and
without interruption in the employment of such
county, he shall be permitted to> retire from ac-
tive service upon his own application, on pay
equal to one-half the salary received on the date
of retirment; subject, however, to the following
terms or conditions:
(a) Any such employee desiring to retire shall
obtain from the county physician of such county,
if there be one, otherwise from some reputable
physician practicing in the said county, a certifi-
cate to the effect that such employee is no longer
fit and competent to perform the active duties of
his position, together with a statement of the
grounds of unfitness or incompetency. Upon
presentation of such certificate to the county
board of commissioners o'r other fiscal agent of
said county, such application shall be passed
upon, and, if the application is found to be meri-
torious, shall be approved and adopted, and the
employee shall then be retired on one-half pay,
as herein stated, which shall be paid to him un-
der the same rules and regulations as other em-
ployees of the county are paid. The action of
such board of county commissioners upon any
such application shall be final and conclusive up-
on the applicant; provided said county commis-
sioners or other fiscal agent may at any time
upon sufficient cause, to be judged by such board
or other fiscal agent, reconsider said application,
and, if it appears that same was improvidently
granted, rescind such action and order the em-
ployee back to work, and, upon his failure or
refusal within ten days to resume his duties, his
pension shall automatically cease and determine;
and provided further that if the condition of the
employee is changed so that in the opinion of said
board or other fiscal agent he is able to resume
his duties and can do so consistent with the best
interests of the county, he shall be ordered to re-
sume his duties, and, upon his failure or refusal
so to do within ten days, his pension shall auto-
matically cease.
(b) Such employee, as long as he is upon the
pension list, shall be relieved of all active duty
of his position and be free to engage in such other
occupation or business as he may desire.
(c) The pension granted under the provisions
of this Act shall continue to be paid to the em-
ployee so pensioned for and during the term of
his natural life, unless sooner terminated under
the provisions hereinbefore contained, or the re-
peal or modification of the law under which the
pension is granted.
(d) The pension or sums payable thereunder
shall not be subject in whole or in part to assign-
ment, sale, pledge, or other disposition, and shall
be payable only to the employee so pensioned.
(e) Said county board of commissioners o'r
other fiscal agent shall have the right, upon tak-
ing appropriate action therefor, to retire on half
pay any employee of such county who may have
served continuously and without interruption for
a period of twenty-five years next preceding such
retirement, whether or not such employee himself
desires to be retired. The action of such board
or other fiscal agent shall in every way be final
and conclusive upon such emplovee. Acts 1929,
p. 309, § 2.
§ 1519 (55c). Act applicable to teachers and
other employees of board of education.—In any
county to which this Act is applicable, where
there is a board of education controlling the
schools of the entire county, that the terms and
provisions of this Act shall apply to the teachers
or other employees of such board of education;
provided that as to such teachers such board of
education will determine, under rules applicable
to county employees, what teachers shall be
placed upon the pension list and entitled to half
pay, as hereinbefore provided. Acts 1929, p. 311,
§ 3.
§ 1519(55d). Two per cent of salaries deducted
monthly.—All county employees or teachers who
desire to participate in the pension fund shall
have 2 per cent of their salaries deducted
monthly. Acts 1929, p. 311, § 4.
§ 1519(55e). Funds from deductions from sal-
aries.—The funds arising from the deductions
from salaries as aforesaid shall be held under di-
rection of the county board of commissioners, so-
far as county employees are concerned, and un-
der the direction of any such board of education,
so far as teachers are concerned, provided that
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a complete and accurate 'record of such fund, any
investment thereof, and any disbursement there-
from, shall be kept and be open to public inspec-
tion during all reasonable hours. Acts 1929, p.
311, § 5.
§ 1519 (5 5f). Act not repeal benefits now being
paid.—This Act shall not repeal or in any wise
affect any pensions or benefits or aids now being
paid to those who may come under the operation
of this Act. Acts 1929, p. 311, § 7.
§ 1519(55g). Act not affect workmen's compen-
sation laws, etc.—/This Act shall not affect or be
affected by any workmen's compensation law or
similar laws. Acts 1929, p. 311, § 8.
§ 1519(55h). Pensions for certain infirm or
disabled officers or employees of counties of
more than 200,000 population.—In all counties of
this State having a population of over two hun-
dred thousand inhabitants according to the
United States census of 1920, or any future cen-
sus, the commissioners of roads and revenues,
or the ordinary, or other county authorities hav-
ing charge of the levying of taxes in such coun-
ties, shall have the right to provide and pay pen-
sions to infirm or disabled county employees and
officers, including county police, but not officers
elected by the people, or their deputies or assist-
ants; said pensions to be payable monthly in
such sums as said county authorities in their dis-
cretion may determine, provided however no
pension may exceed monthly fifty per cent.
(50%) of the average monthly earnings for the
preceding ten years paid by the county to said
employees or officer while in the employ of the
county; or if the said officer or employee shall
have been in the employ of the county for less
than ten years, then the monthly pension shall
not exceed fifty per cent, of the average monthly
earnings during the period of said employment.
S'aid county authorities shall have the right to
prescribe the rules, regulations, and conditions
under which said pension shall be paid. Acts
1929, p. 314, § 1.
§ 1519 (55i). Pensions for employees not infirm
or disabled, after 25 years' service.—A pension
may be granted to such an employee or officer
who is not infirm or disabled, if such officer or
employee has been in the county employment for
at least twenty-five years and because of age or
for other cause may wish, or said county authori-
ties may desire, to retire from the county em-
ployment. Acts 1929, p. 315, § 2.
§ 1519(55j). Taxes to pay pensions. — Said
county authorities shall have the right to levy
taxes, in addition to other taxes authorized by
law, for the purpose of carrying out the terms
and purposes of this Act. Acts 1929, p. 315, § 3.
§ 1519 (55k). When effective.—This Act shall
take effect immediately upon its passage and ap-
proval by the Governor or upon its becoming a
law without such approval; provided, however,,
that should this Act be held illegal or unconsti-
tutional, then this Act shall take effect when an
amendment to the Constitution of Georgia shall
be adopted and proclaimed by the Governor of
the State as 'a part of the Constitution, authoriz-
ing the legislature of the State to empower coun-
ties to levy taxes to pay pensions to county of-
ficers and employees. Acts 1929, p. 315, § 4.
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§ 1519(56). City employees in cities of above
150,000 people.—There shall be raised and estab-
lished funds for the pension of all officers and
employees now in active service and on the pay-
rolls, and future officers and employees in all
cities in Georgia having a population of more
than one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000)
by the United States census of 1920, or any sub-
sequent census of the United States. Acts 1927,
p. 265.
§ 1519(57). Right to retire after 25 years serv-
ice.—Every regular officer and employee of such
city, in active service at the time of the passage
of this Act, now on the pay-roll, and future offi-
cers and employees, may as a matter of right re-
tire from active service, provided he shall have
served twenty-five (25) years in active service
of such city at the time of his retirement.
§ 1519(58). Half-pay—When such officer or
employee shall retire as a matter of right, he shall
be paid one-half of the salary he was receiving at
the time of his retirement, for the rest of his life,
to 'be paid monthly.
§ 1519(59). Board of trustees for fund; mem-
bers.—There is hereby established a board of
trustees, to serve without pay, whose duty it shall
be to see that the provisions of this Act are car-
ried out by such cities; that the funds are kept
separate; each of such cities shall have a board
of trustees composed of the mayor, city comp-
troller, and city treasurer, or such officials who
discharge duties usually assigned said officers.
This board shall make rules describing forms for
applicants for said pensions, and all other mat-
ters connected with their duties under this Act.
When a pension is awarded by said board, the
award shall be transmitted to the governing au-
thorities of said city, who shall provide some
manner for verifying the facts of the petition, or
other legal requirements; when so verified, a
check shall ibe drawn on the fund provided for
the payment of the pension each month during
the life of the pension, signed by the mayor and
paid 'by the treasurer with the notation on each
check that the pension has been approved by the
governing authority of such city. Said board
shall designate times and place of meeting, method
of hearing and decisions, etc.
§ 1519(60). Deduction of 2 per cent, from sala-
ries.—The sum of two per centum shall be de-
ducted from the salaries or wages of all officers
and employees of such cities as and when paid.
This sum shall be retained by the city treasurer,
and is hereby set apart as a pension fund free
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from the control of such cities for any other pur-
pose of expenditure.
§ 1519(61). Appropriation to meet deficiency in
fund.—When pensions are properly allowed and
become a charge on such cities, and the fund
derived from the deductions from the salaries and
wages is not sufficient to meet such pensions, the
governing authorities of such cities shall provide,
by appropriation from the current funds thereof,
a sufficient sum to meet said pensions as they fall
due.
§ 1519(62). Objectors to deduction excluded.—
In case any emplo}^ee or officers objects to the
deduction of said salary or wages of said two per
cent, or otherwise objects to the payment of said
two per centum, such officer or employee shall
not be entitled to the pension provided by this
Act.
§ 1519(63). Supplementary ordinances,—The
governing authorities of such cities shall be au-
thor ized to pa sis ordinances supplementing the
provisions of this Act where its terms are found
not to be full enough to provide for the collection
and payment of such payment.
§ 1519(64). Funds not assignable or subject to
garnishment etc—None of the funds herein pro-
vided for shall be subject to attachment, garnish-
ment, or judgment, nor shall they be assigned,
but shall be paid to the pensioner only or on his
order.
§ 1519(65). Effect as to pensioner under pre-
vious law.—This Act does not repeal noi in any-
wise affect any benefit or pension now being
paid under some previous ordinance or Act, but
no pensioner shall receive two pensions. Those
already receiving pensions are not eligible to pen-
sions under this Act.
§ 1519(66). Workmen's compensation law not
affect d.—This Act shall not affect nor be affected
by any workmen's compensation law or similar
laws.
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§ 1519(67). City officers in cities of above
150,000 people.—All cities in Georgia having a
population of more than 150,000 inhabitants by
the United States census of 1920, or any subse-
quent census of the United States, shall provide
pensions for the following heads of departments
of their assistants or subordinates, to wit: city
clerk and chief deputy; city attorney and assist-
ant and investigator; comptroller, assistant and
auditor; purch'asing agent; treasurer and tax-
collector; tax-assessors, their tax investigator and
their chief clerk; marshal; building inspector; re-
corders; health officer; superintendent of Grady
and Battle Hill sanatorium's; chief of construction,
assistants in charge of sewers, streets, sidewalks,
repairs, plumbing, and bridges; chief sanitary in-
[
spector and assistant; street-improvement collec-
tor; superintendent of electrical affairs; warden;
superintendent of public schools; librarian; gen-
eral manager of parks and cemeteries; general
manager of waterworks, together' with superin-
tendent of construction and two chief engineers
in the waterworks 'department. If said cities have
no officials or employees having these particular
titles then the officials or employees discharging
the duties nearest to those indicated shall receive
the pension herein provided. Provided, the of-
ficers named are in active service in their several
offices and positions at the time of the passage of
this Act, and their names are on the pay-roll, and
likewise for their successors in office or in said
positions, provided they have served twenty-five
(25) years in the active service of said city at the
time of their retirement. In counting this period
of service, any official who was serving in a mu-
nicipality annexed to said city, shall have con-
puted the time of service rendered in the annexed
municipality in making up said twenty-five (25)
years. Acts 1927, p. 269.
§ 1519(68). Right to retire on half-pay.—Said
officers and employees shall be and they are here-
by authorized to retire as a matter of right, when
they shall have passed or attained the required
years of service, and in such event they shall be
paid one half of the salary they are receiving at
the time of such retirement, for the rest of their
lives, to be paid monthly.
§ 1519(69). Committee in charge of pensions,
—It shall be the duty of the governing authori-
ties of said cities to provide that some standing
committee shall have charge of these pensions.
Said committee shall formulate the rules under
which applications therefor shall be made, and
provide for the method by which said pen-
sions may be set up, ordered and established.
When so ordered and established, they shall re-
port to the governing authorities and to the comp-
troller, and same shall thereafter become a fixed
and binding obligation on the part of the city.
When so found and reported, the city, through
its governing authorities shall provide for the pay-
ment thereof from fund herein provided and its
current funds, and these payments shall be kept
up during the lives of said pensioners and funds
shall be annually provided sufficient to cover the
payment of said pensions, ana same shall be
promptly paid to said pensioners monthly, and
shall be one half of the sum received at the time
of their retirement.
§ 1519(70). Supplementary ordinances.—Such
cities shall by their governing bodies be author-
ized to pass ordinances carrying into effect the
purposes of this Act, but not in violation of the
terms thereof. This is done in order to provide
for rules and regulations, so that the provisions
of this Act may be carried out and become ef-
fective, although its terms may not be sufficiently
specific to secure the results desired.
§ 1519(71). Pensions only for those paying 2
per cent, of salary to fund.—The fund with which
to pay the pensions herein provided for shall be
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set up as follows: Each of said officials may pay
into a fund established and set apart by ordinance
the sum of (2) two per cent, of their salaries
monthly. Should said fund, at any time, be in-
sufficient to meet and pay said pensions, such
cities shall supplement, by appropriation from
current funds, 'sufficient amounts to make up the
difference. In case any of said officials fail to pay
said per centum, they shall thereupon become
ineligible to receive pensions. These matters shall
be regulated by ordinance.
§ 1519(72). Not affected by workmen's com-
pensation law.—This Act shall not affect nor be
affected by any workmen's compensation laws;
nor any similar laws; nor shall any pensioner be
paid more than one pension, if there are other
regulations by general law or charter amendment
under which the pensioner may be paid another
and different pension.
§ 1519(73). Meaning of "governing authori-
ties."—The words "governing authorities," here-
in used, mean either general council or council
or commission or other officials in charge of the
affairs of said city.
[ 299 ]
APPENDIX I
EXTRA SESSION OF 1926 AS AMENDED
NON-AMENDATORY ACTS.
§ 1. (a) State agricultural and normal college
established. — There shall be established, at
Americus, Georgia, on the tract of land occupied
by the Third District Agricultural and Mechani-
cal School, as a branch of the University of Geor-
gia, a Normal School for teachers to be known
as the State Agricultural and Normal College, to
which shall be admitted white students, citizens
of this State, both male and female, and with-
out charge for tuition therein. Acts 1926, p. 34.
(b) Control and use of property.—The plant,
equipment, and property, both real and personal,
of said Third District Agricultural and Mechani-
cal School, title to which is in the State of Geor-
gia, shall be for the use of said State Agricultural
and Normal College; and the Trustees of said
Third District Agricultural and Mechanical
Sc)hool, for their respective terms, unless re^
moved as hereinafter specified, shall have as full
and complete authority for the management and
control of said College as they now have over
said Third District Agricultural and Mechanical
School. Acts 1926, pp. 34, 35.
(c) Trustees: apportionment and terms; mem-
bership.—The local Board of Trustees of said
S'tate Agricultural and Normal College shall be
composed of nine members, three of whom shall
be appointed by the Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the University of Georgia. The other
members of said local Board of Trustees shall be
appointed by the Governor of this State. Three
shall be citizens of the County of Sumter, and three
shall be citizens of this State residing outside of
the County of Sumter. At the first appointment
of such trustees two shall be appointed by the
Governor for a term of two years, two for a term
of four years, and two for a term of six years;
but all subsequent appointments shall be for a
term of six years, except in case of a vacancy by
reason of death, resignation, or otherwise, when
the Governor shall fill such vacancy by appoint-
ment for the unexpired term. The miembers of
the Board of Trustees for the Third District Ag-
ricultural and Mechanical School, in office at the
time of the passage and approval of this Act,
shall also be members of the Board of Trustees
of the State Agricultural and Normal College
hereby created and established, until the expira-
tion of their respective terms of office. When
the terms of office of all of said District School
Trustees shall expire, the members of the Board
of Trustees of said College shall be nine in num-
ber as hereinbefore provided. But nothing in
the provisions of this Act shall deprive the Gov-
ernor of the right to appoint any memlber of the
Board of Trustees of said School a member of
the Board of Trustees of said State Agricultural
Act prior to the expiration of the term of office
of such person as a Trustee of the said Third
District Agricultural and Mechanical School.
Acts 1926, pp. 34, 35.
(d) Vacancies.—Whenever it is made to appear
to the Governor that any member of the Board of
Trustees of said College has failed to attend two
successive meetings of the said Board of trustees
without rendering an excuse in writing which is
satisfactory and accepted by the Board, it shall
be the duty of the Governor to declare his place
vacant, and to fill the same in the manner herein-
before provided for filling vacancies. Acts 1926,
pp. 34, 36.
(e) Expenses.—The members of the Board of
Trustees of said College shall serve without pay.
except that their actual expenses, while away
from their places of residence attending on the
meetings of the Board, shall be paid out of any
fund in the treasury of said College available for
such purpose. Acts 1926, pp. 34, 36.
(f) Course of study.—Said Trustees shall cause
to be maintained in said College courses of study
in general agriculture, home economics, and
other subjects in connection therewith, and in
addition shall require to be taught therein and
added thereto at least two years of normal train-
ing for teachers similar to that taught in other
colleges of like character; provided, however, said
Trustees shall have ample authority by proper
rules and regulations to provide for an election
of courses of study in said College. Acts 1926,
pp. 34, 36.
(g) Supervision by Chancellor.—The Chancel-
lor of the University of Georgia shall have super-
vision of the said State Agricultural and Normal
College, and its management and operation as a
Department of the University of Georgia. All
diplomas and certificates issued by said College
shall be countersigned by said Chancellor, who
shall cause a record of same to be kept in his of-
fice at Athens. Acts 1926, pp. 34, 37.
(h) Officers and teachers.—Said Trustees shall
have authority to create such officers of said col-
lege, and employ such teachers, and fix salaries
of same, as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of said College herein set forth. Acts
1926, pp. 34, 37.
(i) Diplomas and certificates.—Said College
shall have authority to give diplomas, certificates,
and such other evidence of work done as may
be authorized by law or conferred and given by
other College of like character and standing/.
Acts 1926, pp. 34, 37.
(j) Instruction; teachers training school. —
*
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as
reducing the authority of the Trustees of said
College to provide for full instructions in the
and Normal College under the provisions of this | branches of study hereto before and now pre-
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scribed for the students in said School, it being
the intention of this Act to enlarge the scope and
increase the usefulness of said School by main-
taining in connection therewith and as a part of
samje a teachers training school for the State of
Georgia. Acts 1926, pp. 34, 37.
(k) Appropriations to Third District A. & M.
School.—All appropriations made to the Third
District Agricultural and Mechanical School shall
be for the use of said State Agricultural and Nor-
mal College, as herein consolidated therewith.
Acts 1926, pp. 34, 37.
§ 2. (a) Authority to borrow of local boards of
trustees.—The boards of trustees of any local
school district levying a local school tax shall
have authority to borrow money in amounts not
to exceed the local tax collected on property
within the district during any current year, said
fund or funds borrowed to be used only for pur-
pose of paying teachers for the current year, and
not for a longer period than twelve months.
Acts 1926, p. 38.
(b) Resolution; contents; record.—In order for
any board of trustees of any local school district
to borrow mjoney for the purpose hereinbefore
stated, there shall be passed by said board of trus-
tees a resolution authorizing said money to be
borrowed, in which resolution shall be stated the
amount of money to be borrowed, the length of
time the same is to be used, the rate of interest
'to be paid, and for what purpose borrowed, and
from whom the same is to be borrowed; which
resolution shall be by the Secretary of said hoard
of trustees recorded in the minute-book of said
board of trustees, and a copy of said resolution
forwarded to the county superintendent of
schools. Acts 1926, p. 38.
(c) Period of time; repayment. — No money
shall be borrowed for a longer time than is nec-
essary, and the same shall he paid back out of any
funds coming into the hands of said board of
trustees from local district tax collected on prop-
erty within said district. Acts 1926, pp. 38, 39.
(d) Power to execute; notes for money.—After
the resolution aforesaid has been passed, the
chairman of said board of trustees together with
the secretary, shall have the right to execute the
note, or notes, in the name of said board of trus-
tees of said local school district for any money
that it is authorized to borrow under the resolu-
tion passed by said board. Acts 1926, pp. 38, 39.
§ 3. Equalization of common school fund; coun-
ties to which applicable.—In addition to the reg-
ular appropriation for the support of the public
schools, the General Assembly shall provide an
equalization fund, which shall be disbursed by the
State Board of Education for the purpose of
more nearly equalizing the educational opportu-
nities of the children of the several counties of
the State. The State Board of Education, in its
distribution of said equalization fund to County
Boards of Education for the purpose of equaliz-
ing educational opportunities as between the sev-
eral counties, shall take into consideration the
possible returns from taxable values for school
purposes, the extent to which local tax aid has
been utilized, the educational needs, and the lo-
cal inequalities existing in the several counties.
No county or independent system shall share in
the equalization fund for any year unless it levies
at Least five mills for a local tax for its public
school for that year. Acts 1926, p. 39.
§ 4. (a) Merger of independent school systems;
procedure.—Whenever the citizens of municipal-
ity of independent school districts authorized by
law to establish and maintain a system of schools
by local taxation, in whole or in part, and which
is operating a system of public schools independ-
ent of the county-school system, wish to annul
their special school law and become a part of the
county-school system, they shall present and file
with the Mayor or chief executive officer of the
city a petition signed by one fourth of the quali-
fied voters of their territory, and said Mayor or
chief executive officer shall then within not less
than twenty days and not more than sixty days
thereafter call an election. Notice of such an
election shall be published once a week for two
weeks in the paper in which the sheriff of the
county publishes his advertisements, and posted
at three public places within the territory con-
cerned, at least ten days prior to such election.
The election shall be held at the place and in the
manner of usual elections. Those favoring the
repeal of the independent local law shall have
written or printed on their ballots "For Repeal,"
and those against repealing their independent
local law shall have written or printed on their
ballots "Against Repeal." The returns of said
election shall be made to the Mayor or chief 'ex-
ecutive officer, who shall declare the result, and
a majority of those voting shall be necessary to
carry the election. Only qualified voters residing
within the municipality or district for six months
prior to the election shall vote. An election shall
not be held for the same purpose oftener than
every twelve months. Acts 1926, p. 40.
(b) School operations.—When the results of
said election are declared and published in favor
of repealing such independent or local school sys-
tem, making the territory included in said system
thereby to become a part of the county-school
system, said independent or local school system
shall continue to function under its local laws, or-
ganizations, and regulations until the county board
of education shall arrange for the operation by
them of such school or schools within said local
system as a part of their public-school system.
Acts 1926, pp. 40, 41.
§ 4(c). Merger;, tax rate; counties excluded.—
Where any local or independent system is re-
pealed by and in the manner provided in this act,
the territory formerly included in such independ-
ent system shall become and constitute a school
district of the county in which it is located, and
shall enjoy the same privileges and shall be gov-
erned by the same laws as other school districts
in said county, including the authority to levy lo-
cal taxes for school purposes; provided that the
rate for such taxation shall not exceed the rate
allowed iby law to other similar school districts.
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall ap-
ply to a municipal or independent local school
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system of a municipality having a population of
200,000 or more, according to the last or any
other United States Census. Acts 1926, pp. 40,
41; 1927, p. 160.
§ 5. School fiscal year.—"Beginning with July
1st, 1927, and continuing thereafter, the school
year shall be from July 1st to the next June 30th
inclusive of each year thereafter; and the State
School Superintendent shall, on or before the 1st
Tuesday in December of each year beginning in
1894, or as soon thereafter as practicable, make
an estimate of the entire common school fund for
the State for the next succeeding calendar year."
Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 42, 43.
§ 6 (a) Pension fees to ordinaries.—From and
after the passage of this Act, including the year
of 1926, each Ordinary of the State of Georgia
shall ibe allowed a fee of two dollars per pen-
sioner, per annum, for preparing all papers, proofs,
and pay rolls and for securing, receiving, and pay-
ing out the Confederate pensions to the various
pensioners in their respective Counties, which
shall be in full settlement for all the services to
be performed in connection with pension work
and pension disbursements of their Counties.
Acts 1926, p. 49.
(b) Payment, how made.—Said fee of two dol-
lars per pensioner, per annum, shall be paid by
the State of Georgia each year, out of the unex-
pended balance of the pension fund, by a warrant
of the Governor, granted upon the requisition of
the Commissioner of Pensions, to which requisi-
tion the Commissioner of Pensions shall attach
a certified statement showing the amount due to
the Ordinary of each county after all the Ordi-
naries of the State have made a full and complete
settlement of their pension rolls for the year,
'such warrants to be drawn against the unex-
pended balance of the pension fund remaining in
the Treasury after all the pensioners have been
paid for the current year. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess.,
pp. 49, 50.
(c) Warrants; appropriation not necessary. —
The Governor is hereby directed and empowered
and it shall be his duty, to draw such warrants
once each year on the unexpended balance of the
pension fund remaining in the Treasury after all
the pensions for the year have been paid, and
that no appropriation or other provision shall
ever be necessary to authorize the drawing of
such warrant each year and the paying of the
same. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 49, 50.
(d) Payments to counties.—The sums herein
provided for to be paid to the Ordinaries of the
respective Counties shall be paid to the proper
authorities handling the County funds in those
Counties in which the Ordinaries draw a fixed
salary. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 49, 50.
§ 7 (a) Discount by Governor. — The gov-
ernor of the State is hereby authorized, fully em-
powered, and directed to set apart, sell, and dis-
count not exceeding eight years of the rental
arising from the existing lease of the Western
and Atlantic Railroad, as a special fund to be
used exclusively for the purpose of paying war-
rants drawn against the same in accordance with
the provisions of this Act. Acts Extra Sess., pp.
51, 52; Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 52, 53.
§ 8 (b) In order to enable the State to meet
its obligations due to Confederate Soldiers and
their widows for pensions due and unpaid for the
years 1922, 1924, and 1925, the Governor of this
State is hereby authorized, fully emipowered, and
directed, to draw his warrant or warrants against
the special fund created by Section 1 of this Act,
so held as a special fund in the Treasury, for such
sum or sums as may be required to pay said pen-
sions for said years 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1925,
and the Governor is further authorized, empow-
ered, and directed, to discount said warrant or
warrants so drawn against said special fund and
to place the proceeds arising therefrom in the
Treasury to be disbursed for the purpose pro-
vided in this Act, in accordance with existing
laws for the payment of pensions. Said warrants
shall be duly countersigned by the Comptroller
General. The holders of said warrants shall fur-
ther have all of the rights and privileges which
the original obligees of said warrants have had
against the State. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., p. 51.
AMENDATORY OR REPEALING ACTS
§ 9. Repealing § 993(67)—Insurance agents.—
Upon each local insurance agent doing business
in this State, and upon each and every solicitor
or sub-agent for any resident or non-resident
company doing business in this State, $10.00 for
each county in which they shall transact or solicit
insurance business. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 18,
19.
§ 10. Repealing Sections 993(150) and 993
(153). — Each dealer shall pay said tax to the
Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Georgia,
who shall furnish to such dealer stamps of such
design and denominations as may be prescribed
by said Commissioner of Revenue; and it shall be
the duty of each dealer to affix to each package of
cigarettes and each box, package, or other con-
tainer of cigars a stamp, or stamps, furnished by
said commissioner of revenue, evidencing the
payment of the tax imposed by this Act, and to
cancel such stamps before said cigarettes or
cigars are offered for sale. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess.,
pp. 12, 14.
§ 11. Amending § 1041(1).—It shall be the duty
of the legal representative of the estate of any
person who may hereafter die a resident of this
State, and whose estate is subject to the pay-
ment of a Federal Estate tax, to file a duplicate
of the return which he is required to make to the
Federal authorities, for the purpose of having the
estate taxes determined, with the State Tax Com-
missioner. When such duplicate is filed with the
said official, he shall compute the amount that
would be due upon said return as Federal Estate
Taxes under the Act of Congress relating to the
levy and collection of Federal Estate Taxes upon
the property of said estate taxable in Georgia,
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and assess against said estate as State inherit-
ance taxes eighty per centum of the amount
found to be due for Federal Estate Taxes. Acts
1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 15, 16.
§ 12. Amending § 1041(4). — Whenever the
legal representative of any estate taxable under
this Act fails to pay the amount assessed against
said estate, within six months after notice from
proper authority as to the amount to foe paid, it
shall be the duty of the Tax Collector of the
County of the administration to issue execution
for the amount of such tax against said estate,
which execution shall be enforced by levy and
sale, and shall bear interest at the rate of one
per cent per month until paid. Acts 1926, pp.
15, 16.
§ 13. Amending § 1041(15).—There shall be
no other inheritance tax assessed or collected out
of estates of persons dying after the passage of
this Act, under the laws of this State. Acts 1926,
Ex. Sess., pp. 15, 17.
§ 14. Repealing § 1551(124).—Each and every
lot or parcel of land which has been or may
hereafter be obtained by any County Board of
Education, Independent School District, or Con-
solidated School District for the use of the Com-
mon Schools, or Common High Schools, together
with any buildings erected thereon for school
purposes, and all school furniture, shall be ex-
empt from levy and sale under any execution or
other writ or order in the nature of an execution;
provided, the lot of land so exempted shall not
exceed ten acres; and if there he any excess over
that number of acres, then that portion not to
exceed ten acres most convenient for school pur-
poses shall be exempt as aforesaid, the exempted
portion to be set off by order of County Board of
Education, or Boards of Trustees of Independent
School Systems, or Consolidated School Dis-
tricts. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 17, 18.
§ 15. Amending § 2158(102).—(a) A service
bureau is hereby created, to be known as the Vet-
erans Service Office, State of Georgia, to be com-
posed of one director, one assistant director, and
the necessary stenographic and clerical help. Acts
1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 53, 54.
(b). Amending § 2158(103). — Section 2158
(103) of this code was amended by adding there-
to the following words: Said director shall be
appointed t>y the Governor and be chosen from
ex-service [men] who were in the military or
naval service of the United States during the pe-
riod between April 17th, 1917, and November
11th, 1918, and honorably discharged therefrom.
Said assistant director shall be appointed by the
Governor on the recommendation of the director.
The term of office of said director shall be for the
first time after passage of- this Act until Decem-
ber 31, 1927, and two years thereafter. The term
of office of Assistant Director shall continue for
a period of two years only, at the end of which
time said office of Assistant Director is then abol-
ished, except the Assistant Director may 'be
sooner discharged by the Director if in his opin-
ion an assistant is no longer needed or the As-
[
sistant is incompetent, but in no event shall the
office of Assistant Director be continued for a
longer period than 2 years. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess.,
pp. 53, 54.
(c). Duties of Director.—The duties of said di-
rector shall be to disseminate information to vet-
erans of the War with Spain, the World War,
and to veterans of any war, military occupation,
or military expedition since 1897, their depend-
ents and beneficiaries, as to their rights and bene-
fits under Federal legislation or legislation of
this or any other State heretofore or hereafter
enacted; to assist said veterans, their dependents,
and beneficiaries in the preparation and prosecu-
tion of claims before the appropriate governmen-
tal departments; to report all evidences of fraud,
deceit, and unworthy claims coming or brought
to his attention to the department concerned; to
report all evidences of incompetency, dishonesty,
and neglect of duty of and by any employees of any
governmental department to the proper author-
ity; and generally to do and perform all things
possible for the interest and protection of the
worthy veteran; and to co-operate with the
Georgia Departments, The United Spanish War
Veterans, The American Legion, the Disabled
American Veterans of the World War, the
American Red Cross, and all other agencies to
these ends. Acts 1926, Ex. Sess., pp. 53, 55.
(d). Amending § 2158(105).—The salary of
said director shall be twenty-six hundred dollars
pen annum, effective August 21, 1925, and the sal-
ary of said Assistant director shall be twenty-
four hundred dollars per annum. Acts 1926, Ex.
Sess., pp. 53, 56.
§ 16. Amending § 2202(1).—Every corporation
having capital stock heretofore or hereafter in-
corporated under the laws of this State, whether
by the Secretary of State, by Act of the General
Assembly, or by the Superior Court (including
corporations with powers derived from two or
more of such sources), except an insurance,
banking, or trust company, may, upon its organi-
zation or thereafter in the manner hereinafter
provided, create shares of stock with or without
par value, and may create two or miore classes of
stock with such preferences, voting powers, re-
strictions and qualifications thereof as shall 'be
designated in its petition, declaration, or other
application for incorporation, or be subsequently
determined upon in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided: Provided, that before any corporation
shall avail itself of the provisions of this Act it
shall procure appropriate corporate authority
therefor, in the manner provided by law, and the
Secretary of State and the Superior courts are
hereby authorized to grant such powers to the
several classes of corporations of which they now
have jurisdiction to grant or amend charters:
Provided further, that there shal'l be (but one class
of common stock, each share of which shall stand
upon an equality with every other share; Pro-
vided further, that before any such corporation
can begin business as a corporation there must be
at least $1,000.00 paid in for such non-par value
common stock either in cash or in tangible as-
sets at their fairly appraised valuation. Acts
1926, Ex. Sess., p. 48.
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§ 17. Amending § 2207(1).—All foreign cor-
porations now doing business in the State of
Georgia, or which may hereafter do business in
the State of Georgia, and whose business is not
against <the public policy of this State, shall have
the power to become domesticated in the manner
hereinbefore pointed out; and upon becoming
domesticated such corporations and the stock-
holders thereof shall have the same powers, priv-
ileges, and immunities as similar corporations
created under the laws of the State of Georgia
and the stockholders thereof have, subject to the
same obligations, duties, liabilities, and disabili-
ties as if originally created under the laws of
Georgia, and shall no longer have that power of
(removing causes to the United States Courts
which inheres in foreign corporations. Acts 1926,
Ex. Sess., pp. 46, 47.
§ 18. Dissolution of domesticated corporations.
—All foreign corporations thus domesticated shall
be dissolved in the same manner and under same
proceedings as are now provided for dissolution
of domestic 'corporations. Acts 1926, pp. 44, 45.
§ 19. Amending § 3310(1). — Where advances
either of money or supplies or both are made for
the purpose of planting, cultivating, making, or
harvesting a crop or crops, the borrower or per-
son to whom such money or supplies shall be fur-
nished may secure the same by a bill of sale to
secure debt under § 3306 of the Civil Code of
1910, covering the crop or crops to be grown by
him within twelve months from the date of such
hill of sale, although such crop or crops may not
be planted or growing at the time of the execution
of such bill of sale: Provided, that the crop or crops
shall be described in said bill of sale with the
same particularity as the laws of Georgia requires
for a crop mortgage, and the amount of said ad-
vances in money or supplies be definitely stated
and fixed therein. Such bill of sale shall pass
title to the crop or crops covered thereby, and
shall not be held or construed to be a mortgage:
Provided, that the bill of sale herein authorized
shall not be construed to be superior to the lien
of a landlord for rent and supplies or to a laborer's
lien, but shall be superior to a judgment of older
date than such hill of sale, and to a mortgage or
bill of sale not given to secure the payment of a
debt created to aid in making and gathering the
particular crop or crops covered by such bill of
sale. Acts 1926, pp. 44, 45.
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
§ 6462(2). Be it enacted by the General As-
sembly of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby
enacted by authority of the same, that article 3,
section 7, of the Constitution of Georgia be
amended by adding thereto the following para-
graph, to wit:
"Paragraph 26. The General Assembly of the
State shall have authority to grant to the govern-
ing authorities of the Counties of Glynn and/or
Fulton and/or Chatham and/or Bibb and/or
Barrow and/or Colquitt authority to pass zoning
and planning laws whereby such counties may
be zoned or districted for various uses and other
and different uses prohibited therein, to regulate
|
the uses for which said zones or districts may
be set apart, and to regulate the plans for de-
velopment and improvement of real estate there-
in. The General Assembly is given general au-
thority to authorize such counties to pass zon-
ing and planning laws, and to levy and collect a
tax therefor; and acts of the General Assembly
heretofore passed, undertaking to grant such au-
thority to such counties, are hereby ratified and
confirmed." Acts 1929, p. 149, § 1.
§ 6521. Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted
by authority of the same, tihat article 7, section
6, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of Georgia be
amended by adding thereto the following words,
"To pay pensions to county officers and em-
ployees of Fulton County," so that said para-
graph as amended, in addition to the purposes
for which taxes may now be levied, shall author
provided for shall begin from the ratification of
this amendment, as provided in the second sec-
tion thereof, and shall apply to the incumbent in
office, as well as his successors."
(b) By adding in lieu thereof the following:
"and provided further that the Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Richmond, or
such other board or person as may from time to
time exercise the administrative powers of said
county, shall supplement from said county's
treasury the salary of the Judge of the Superior
Courts of the Augusta Circuit by such sums as
may be necessary, with salaries paid such Judge
from the State Treasury, to make a salary for
said Judge of ten thousand dollars per annum;
and such payments are declared to be a part of
the court expenses of said county, and such pay-
ment shall be made to the Judge now in office,
as well as his successors. The provisions of this
amendment shall take effect and the salaries
herein provided for shall begin from the ratifica-
tion of this amendment, as provided in the sec-
ond section thereof, and shall apply to the in-
cumbent in office, as well as his successors."
Acts 1929, p. 118, § 1.
§ 6*553. Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted
by authority of the same, that paragraph one (1),
section two (2), article seven (7) of the Consti-
tution of the State of Georgia be and the same
is hereby amended by adding at the end of said
paragraph the following language: "The General
Assembly shall also 'have authority to levy taxes
ize the General Assembly of the State of Geor- upon incomes for State purposes only, which tax
gia to delegate to Fulton County in this State
the right to levy a tax to pay pensions to county
officers and employees. Acts 1929, p. 134, § 1.
§ 6533. Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted
by authority of the same, that paragraph 1 of
section 13 of article 6 of the Constitution be
amended as follows:
(a) By striking from said paragraph the fol-
lowing: "and provided, further, that the Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Rich-
mond, or such other board or person as may
from time to time exercise the administrative
powers of said county, shall supplement from
said county's treasury "the salary of the Judge of
the Superior Court of the Circuit of which the
said County of Richmond is a part, by such sum
as may be necessary, with salaries paid such
Judge from the State Treasury, to make salary
for said Judge of $7,000.00 per annum; and such
payments are declared to be a part of the court
expenses of said county, and such payment shall
be made to the Judge now in office, as well as
to his successors. The provisions of this amend-
ment shall take effect and the salaries herein
may be graduated, the rate in no case to exceed
five per cent., and to provide further for such
exemptions as may appear to the General As-
sembly to be reasonable.
Sec. 1-A. The ad valorem tax for State pur-
poses on all classes of property shall not exceed
four mills for the first year an income tax is col-
lected, and shall not exceed three mills for the
second year an income tax is collected, and shall
not exceed two mills for any subsequent year
thereafter that an income tax is collected: except
that the State's right to levy ad valorem tax for
the purpose of paying the interest and principal
of the present outstanding, recognized, valid and
legal bonded indebtedness of the State shall not
be hereby abridged.
Sec. 1-B. The State's right to tax persons and
subjects of taxation in case of war, invasion, in-
surrection, and to defend the State in time of
war, shall remain unlimited. Acts 1929, § 143, § 1.
§ 6554(2). Be it enacted by the General As-
sembly of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted by
authority of the same, that article seven (7), sec-
tion two (2), paragraph two (2) and paragraph
two-A (2-A) of the Constitution of the State of
Ga.—20 [ 305 ]
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Georgia be and the same is hereby amended by
adding at the end of said paragraph two (2) an-
other paragraph to be known as paragraph
Iwo-B (2-B), to wit:
Paragraph 2-B. Any person, natural or arti-
ficial, who after or within two years prior to the
ratification of this amendment has built, or may
build on the Chattahoochee River, any dam for
storage or any power-dam for the manufacture,
generation, sale, or distribution of hydro-electric
current, embodying flood control and flood pro-
tection features for the City of West Point, Geor-
gia, may as to such project be exempt from all
county, school, and municipal taxes for the Coun-
ties of Troup and Heard for such period of time
as that the amount of taxes so exempted would
equal to and absorb such part of the cost of such
project as is attributable to such flood control or
flood protecting features, such cost attributable
to flood control and flood protection to be deter-
mined by the records of the Federal Power Com-
mission. Provided, that interest shall not be
computed on the sum to be absorbed by tax ex-
emption as herein provided. Acts 1929, p.
145, § 1.
§ 6563. Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted
by authority of the same, that article seven, sec-
tion seven, paragraph one, of the Constitution of
Georgia, which has heretofore been amended,
shall be further amended by adding at the end
thereof a new subparagraph in the following
words to wit: And except that Washington
County may, in addition to the debts hereinbe-
fore allowed, make temporary loans between
March 1st and Decemfber 1st in each year, to be
paid out of taxes received by the county in that
year; said loans to be evidenced by promissory
notes signed by the chairman and clerk of the
board having charge of the levying of taxes in
said county, and previously authorized by reso-
lution by a majority vote at a regular monthly
meeting of such board entered on the minutes;
the aggregate amount of said loans outstanding
at any one time not exceed thirty per cent., of
the total gross income of the county from taxes
and other sources in the preceding year, and no
new loans shall be made in one year until all
loans made in the previous year have been paid
in full. Acts 1929, p. 147, § 1.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted
by the authority of the same, that paragraph 1
of section 7 of article 7 of the Constitution of
this State, as now amended, is thereby amended
by adding at the end of said paragraph the fol-
lowing: Except that the City of Cornelia, from
time to time as necessary for the purpose of re-
pairing, purchasing or constructing a water-
works system, including all necessary pipe-line,
pumping-stations, reservoirs, or anything else
that may be necessary for the building, con-
structing, or operating a waterworks system for
the City of Cornelia, may incur a bonded indebt-
edness in addition to and separate from the
amount of debts hereinbefore in this paragraph
allowed to be incurred, to an amount in the ag-
gregate not exceeding the sum of two hundred
fifty thousand ($250,000.00) dollars, and such in-
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debtedness not to be incurred except with the as-
sent of two thirds of the qualified voters of said
city at an election or elections to be held as may
now or may hereafter be prescribed by law for
the incurring of new debts by said City of Cor-
nelia. The city authorities of the City of Cor-
nelia shall set aside and designate each year all
of the net revenue derived from the operation of
its waterworks system when constructed under
the provisions of this Act, for the purpose of
paying the interest and retiring its bonded in-
debtedness incurred under this Act; so that said
paragraph of the Constitution when amended
shall read as follows:
Paragraph 1. The debt hereinafter incurred by
any county, municipal corporation, or political
division of this State, except as in this Constitu-
tion provided for, shall not exceed seven per
centum of this assessed value of all the taxable
property therein, and no such county, municipal-
ity, or division shall incur any new debt, except
for temporary loan or loans to supply casual de-
ficiencies of revenue, not to exceed one fifth of
one per centum of the annual value of taxable
property therein, without the assent of two thirds
of the qualified voters thereof at an election for
that purpose, to be held as may be prescribed by
law; but any city, the debt of which does not ex-
ceed seven per centum of the assessed value of
the taxable property at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution, may be authorized by law
to increase, at any time, the amount of said debt
three per centum upon such assessed valuation;
except that the City of Augusta, from time to
time, as necessary for the purpose of protection
against flood, may incur a bonded indebtedness
upon its power-producing canal and municipal
waterworks, in addition to the debts hereinbefore
in this paragraph allowed to be incurred, to an
amount in the aggregate not exceeding fifty per
centum of the combined value of such properties
to be fixed as may be prescribed by law, but said
valuation not to exceed a figure five per cent, on
which shall represent the net revenue per annum
produced by the two such properties together at
the time of said valuation, and such indebtedness
not to be incurred except with the assent of two
thirds of the qualified voters of said city at an
election or elections for that purpose to be held
as may be now or may hereafter be prescribed
by law for the incurring of new debts by said
City Council of Augusta. Except that the City
of West Point, from time to time as may be
necessary for the purpose of protection against
floods, may incur a bonded indebtedness in addi-
tion to and separate from the amount of debts
hereinbefore in this paragraph allowed to be in-
curred, to an amount in the aggregate not ex-
ceeding the sum of seven hundred and fifty thou-
sand dollars, and such indebtedness not to be
incurred except with the assent of two thirds of
the qualified voters of such city at an election or
elections to be held as mlay now or hereafter be
prescribed by law for the incurring of new debts
by said City of West Point. Except that the City
of LaGrange, from time to time as necessary for
the purpose of repairing, purchasing, or construct-
ing waterworks system, including all necessary
pipe-line, pumping-stations, reservoirs, or any-
thing else that may be necessary for the building,
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or constructing or operating a waterworks sys-
tem for the City of LaGrange, may incur a
bonded indebtedness, in addition to and separate
from the amount of debts hereinbefore in this
paragraph allowed to be incurred, to an amount
in the aggregate not exceeding the sum of five
hundred thousand ($500,000.00) dollars, and such
indebtedness not to be incurred except with the
assent of two thirds of the qualified voters of
such city at an election or elections to be held
as may be now or may hereafter be prescribed
by law for the incurring of new debts by said
City of LaGrange. Except that the City of Cor-
nelia, from time to time as necessary for the pur-
pose of repairing, purchasing, or constructing a
waterworks system for the City of Cornelia, may
incur a bonded indebtedness, in addition to and
separate from the amount of debts hereinbefore
in this paragraph allowed to be incurred, to an
amount in the aggregate not exceeding the sum
of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,-
000.00), and such indebtedness not to be incurred
except with the assent of two thirds of the quali-
fied voters of said city at an election or elections
to be held as may now or hereafter be prescribed
by law for the incurring of new debts by said
City of Cornelia. The city authorities of the
City of Cornelia shall set aside and designate
each year all of the net revenue derived from the
operation of its waterworks system, when con-
structed under the provisions of this Act, for the
purpose of paying the interest and retiring its
bonded indebtedness incurred under this Act.
Acts 1929, p. 121, § 1.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
Georgia, and it is hereby enacted by au-
thority of same, that paragraph one, section
seven, article seven of the Constitution of this
State as now amended is hereby amended by
adding at the end of said paragraph the follow-
ing: Except that the City of Elberton, Georgia,
from time to time as may be necessary for the
purpose of condemning, purchasing, or construct-
ing and maintaining an electric system within or
without the city limits including dams, reservoirs,
electric lines, poles, steam plants, or anything
else that may be necessary for the building, con-
struction, or operating of an electric system by
the City of Elberton, may incur a bonded debt,
in addition to and separate from the amount of
debts hereinbefore in this paragraph allowed to
be incurred, to an amount in the aggregate not
to exceed the sum of two hundred thousand
($200,000.00) dollars, and such indebtedness not
to be incurred except with the assent of two
thirds of the qualified voters of said city at an
election or elections to be held as may now or
may hereafter be prescribed by law for the in-
curring of new debts by said City of Elberton;
so that said paragraph of the Constitution when
amended shall read as follows:
Paragraph 1. The debt hereafter incurred by
any county, municipal corporation, or political
division of this State, except as in this Constitu-
tion provided for, shall not exceed seven per
centum of the assessed value of all the taxable
property therein, and no such county, municipal-
ity, or local division shall incur any new debt,
except for temporary loan or loans to supply
casual deficiencies of revenue, not to exceed one
fifth of one per centum of the annual value of
taxable property therein, without the assent of
two thirds of the qualified voters thereof at an
election for that purpose to be held as may be
prescribed by law; but any city, the debt of which
does not exceed seven per centum of the assessed
value of the taxable property at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution, may be authorized
by law to increase, at any time, the amount of
said debt three per centum upon such assessed
valuation; except that the City of Augusta, trom
time to time, as necessary for the purpose of
protection against floods, may incur a bonded in-
debtedness upon its power-producing canal and
municipal waterworks, in addition to the debts
hereinbefore in this paragraph allowed to be in-
curred, to an amount in the aggregate not ex-
ceeding fifty per centum of the combined values
of such properties, the valuation of such proper-
ties to be fixed as may be prescribed by law, but
said valuation not to exceed a figure five per
cent, on which shall represent the net revenue
per annum produced by the two such properties
together at the time of said valuation, and such
indebtedness not to be incurred except with the
assent of two thirds of the qualified voters of
said city at an election or elections for that pur-
pose to be held as may be now or may hereafter
be prescribed by law for the incurring of new
debts by the said City Council of Augusta. Ex-
cept that the City of West Point, from time to
time as may be necessary for the purpose of pro-
tection against floods, may incur a bonded in-
debtedness, in addition to and separate from the
amount of debts hereinbefore in this paragraph
allowed to be incurred, to an amount in the ag-
gregate not exceeding the sum of seven hundred
and fifty thousand dollars, and such indebtedness
not to be incurred except with the assent of two
thirds of the qualified voters of such city at an
election or elections to be held as may now or
hereafter be prescribed by law for the incurring
of new debts by said City of West Point. Ex-
cept that the City of LaGrange, from time to
time as necessary for the purpose of repairing,
purchasing, or constructing water-works system
including all necessary pipe-lines, pumping-sta-
tions, reservoirs, or anything else that may be
necessary for the building or construction or
operating a waterworks system for the City of
LaGrange, may incur a bonded indebtedness, in
and in addition to and separate from the amount
of debts hereinbefore in this paragraph allowed
to be incurred, to an amount in the aggregate
not exceeding the sum of five hundred thousand
($500,000.00) dollars, and such indebtedness not
to be incurred except with the assent of two
thirds of the qualified voters of such city at an
election or elections to be held as may be now
or may hereafter be prescribed by law for the in-
curring of new debts of said City of LaGrange;
except that the City of Elberton, Georgia, from
time to time, may increase its bonded indebted-
ness, in addition to and separate from the
amount of debt heretofore allowed under said
paragraph, for the purpose of condemning, pur-
chasing, repairing, building, and maintaining an
electric system within or without the City of
Elberton, Georgia, including dams, reservoirs,
electric lines, poles, steam plants or anything
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else that may be necessary for an electric system,
may incur a bonded debt, in addition to and sepa-
rate from the amount of debts hereinbefore in
this paragraph allowed to be incurred, to an
amount in the aggregate not to exceed the sum
of two hundred thousand ($200,000.00) dollars,
and such indebtedness not to be incurred except
with the assent of two thirds of the qualified vot-
ers of said city at an election or elections to be
held as may now or may hereafter be prescribed
by law for the incurring of new debts by said
City of Elberton, Georgia. Acts 1929, p. 126, § 1.
That paragraph 1 of section 7 of article 7
of the Constitution of Georgia, as heretofore
amended, shall further be amended by changing
the period at the end thereof to a semicolon, and
by adding at the end of said paragraph the words,
"except that the County of Stephens, for the
purpose of owning, erecting, equipping, and op-
erating a hospital for medical and surgical treat-
ment, may incur a bonded indebtedness of sixty
thousand ($60,000.00) dollars, in addition to and
separate from the amount of debt hereinbefore in
this paragraph allowed to be incurred, and may
levy taxes to retire the principal and interest of
said bonds; said bonds to be issued under the
general law providing for county bond issues."
Acts 1929, p. 142, § 1.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted by
authority of the same, that article 7, section 7,
paragraph 1, of the Constitution of Georgia,
which has heretofore been amended, shall be
further amended by adding at the end thereof a
new subparagraph in the following words, to wit:
"And except that the City of Lakeland in Lanier
County, Georgia, from time to time as necessary
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, enjoying,
receiving, possessing, retaining, managing, main-
taining, operating, improving, extending, equip-
ping, and otherwise handling and negotiating the
Lakeland Railway and any extension or branch
thereof, together with any other transportation
property and all rolling-stock and terminal facili-
ties connected therewith, either within or without
the city of Lakeland, either within or without the
Count}- of Lanier, including all property and im-
provements of whatsoever nature both real and
personal, or anything else that may be necessary
for the maintaining, building, constructing, and
operating transportation lines and facilities of
any kind and character, whether rail, bus, or
otherwise, may incur an indebtedness, either in
the form of bonds, debentures, notes or other evi-
dence of indebtedness, in addition to and separate
from the amount of debts hereinbefore in this
paragraph allowed to be incurred, to an amount
the aggregate of which shall be determined by
the Mayor and Council of the City of Lakeland,
such indebtedness not to be incurred except with
the assent of a two-thirds majority of the Mayor
and Council of said City of Lakeland. Said City
of Lakeland by and through its Mayor and Coun-
cil shall have authority to issue said bonds, de-
bentures, notes, or other evidences of indebted-
ness as it may see proper, either limiting the
security therefor to the railroad or transportation
property or any part thereof, or/and providing
that the security therefor shall be the entire as-
sets of said city or any part thereof. Said City
of Lakeland is authorized by its Mayor and
Council to levy such tax as it may see proper for
the purpose of retiring the indebtedness and
carrying out the purposes provided for by this
amendment. Said City of Lakeland shall have
the authority to prescribe such rules and regula-
tions as it may see proper for the operation of
said Lakeland Railway and any other transporta-
tion propert}', and to enact such ordinances, rules,
and regulations as it may see proper for the pro-
tection of said railway and/or other transporta-
tion property or any extension or branches there-
of from paralleling or other competition either
within or without the limits of said City of Lake-
land or/and of the County of Lanier, for the
purpose of protecting and for preserving said
railroad and/or other transportation properties
against loss, depreciation, deterioration, or other
handicap. Said City of Lakeland shall have au-
thority to sell, lease, hypothecate, consolidate,
and otherwise, handle said Lakeland Railway
and/or any other transportation property owned
-by said city, or any part thereof, and to execute
such contracts, deeds, leases, or other instru-
ments of writings necessary or desirable for
carrying out any of the authorities and rights
delegated by this amendment. Said City of
Lakeland is specifically authorized to create such
railroad commission or committee as it may see
proper, through its Mayor and Council, for the
operating and otherwise handling of said Lake-
land Railway and/or other transportation prop-
erty owned by said city, and to prescribe such
rules and regulations by ordinance or otherwise,
and prescribe such qualifications as it may see
proper with reference thereto. Said City of
Lakeland is authorized to comply with such rules
and regulations as it may see proper and execute
such forms and other instruments as it may be-
come necessary as will enable it to co-operate
with the Georgia Public Service Commission or
any other department of the State or National
Government which it may determine desirable to
co-operate with in carrying out the provisions of
this amendment." Acts 1929, p. 130, § 1.
§ 6579. Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby enacted
by authority of the same, that article 8, section
4, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of Georgia, as
heretofore amended, shall be further amended by
adding at the end thereof a new subparagraph in
the following words, to wit: "Pierce County,
Georgia, shall be authorized to levy a tax, for
high-school purposes, of not to exceed twenty
cents on one hundred dollars of all the taxable
property in said county, in addition to all other
taxes which it is now authorized by law to levy,
upon approval of a majority of the qualified vot-
ers of said county voting at an election held for
the purpose of passing upon such a tax. If and
when this amendment shall be ratified, it shall
be the duty of the Commissioner of Roads and
Revenues of Pierce County to call a special elec-
tion to pass upon said tax, which election shall
be held in the same manner as other elections
held in said county. Notice of said election shall
be published by said commissioner, in the news-
paper in which sheriff's advertisements in said
county are published, once a week for four con-
[ 308 ]
§ 6598a APPENDIX II § 6598b
secutive weeks 'before said election is held. The
rate of taxation to be levied for high-school pur-
poses shall be that recommended by the Board
of Education of Pierce County, but not to exceed
the limit herein specified. The returns of said
election shall be made to the Ordinary of said
county, and the result declared by him. If the
first election held should be adverse to such a tax,
it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Roads
and Revenues of said county to again submit to
the voters of Pierce County the question of
whether such tax shall be levied when he is re-
quested so to do by the Board of Education of
Pierce County; provided, elections shall not be
held for this purpose within less than six months
of each other. When a tax for high-school pur-
poses is approved by the voters of Pierce County,
it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Roads
and Revenues to include in his next regular an-
nual levy of taxes such tax for high-school pur-
poses as may be approved by the voters of said
county, and annually thereafter when the regular
county levy is made. All monies arising from
said tax shall be turned over to the Board of Edu-
cation of Pierce County, Georgia, for expendi-
tures for high-school purposes only, and said
board shall have the right to make such arrange-
ments with the Blackshear High-School and
other high-schools in the county for high-school
work as it may deem advisable." Acts" 1929, p.
139, § 1.
§ 6598a. Be it enacted by the General Assem-
bly of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby en-
acted by authority of the same, that section one
(l) of article eleven (11) of the Constitution of
Georgia be amended by adding thereto the fol-
lowing paragraph, to wit:
Paragraph 6. The governing authorities of the
County of Glynn and of the County of Mcintosh
shall have authority to establish and administer
within the bounds of their respective counties
districts for special sanitation, fire prevention-
police protection, or building and improving
roads, and, to carry out the purposes of such es-
tablishment, they shall have authority to levy
taxes upon the taxable property in said respec-
tive districts, to issue bonds of such districts
upon a vote of the qualified voters of such dis-
tricts and under the rules of law governing the
issuance of county bonds, and to levy assessments
against and collect service charges from the
property abutting upon or served by the utilities
established or (provided pursuant hereto. Pro-
vided, that districts in Mcintosh County may
issue bonds not exceeding 14% of the value of
the taxable property therein. Acts 1929, p,
137, § 1.
§ 6598b. Be it enacted by the General Assem-
bly of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby en-
acted by authority of the same, that article 11,
section 1, of the Constitution of the State of
Georgia be amended by adding at the end of said
section a new paragraph, as follows: "The Com-
missioners of Roads and Revenues of Fulton
County shall have authority to establish and ad-
minister sewerage, water, and/or fire prevention
systems; to establish and maintain parks; and to
levy taxes cr assessments on property therefor."
Acts 1929, p. 136, § 1.
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ABANDONMENT OF CHILD.
Witnesses, Penal Code, § 1037.
ABUTTING OWNERS.
Street improvement in certain cities.
See "Special Assessments."
ACCIDENTS.
Automobiles.
Rules in cases of accident, § 1770(60n).
ACTIONS.
Automobiles.
Civil action not abridged, § 177O(-60aa).
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN.
Notice of adoption of children, § 3016.
ADVERTISING AGENTS.
Licenses, § 993(174).
AFFIDAVITS.
Affidavit of illegality.
County taxation of railroad, § 1041.
Fictitious names.
See "Trade Names or Fictitious Names."
Trade name.
See "Trade Names or Fictitious Names."
AGENTS.
Emigrant agents.
Acting as emigrant agent without license,
Penal Code, § 632.
AGRICULTURE.
Apples and peaches.
See "Marks and Brands."
Bonds.
Commissioner of agriculture, § 2067(1).
Commissioner of agriculture, §§ 2066(l)-2067(l).
Apples and peaches.
Commissioner of agriculture to establish
grades and marking rules, § 2119(9).
Bond of commissioner, § 2067(1).
Terms, § 2066(1).
Department of agriculture, §§ 2066(l)-2082(14).
Fruits.
See "Marks and Brands."
Peaches.
See "Marks and Brands."
AMENDMENTS.
Constitutional law.
Amendments proposed in 1929, Appx. II.
Proposed amendments to the Constitution,
Appx. II.
AMUSEMENTS.
Licenses.
See "Licenses."
AMUSEMENT PARKS.
Licenses, § 993(177).
ANALYSIS.
Fertilizers.
See "Fertilizers."
ANIMALS.
Instructions in animal, bird and fish life.
See "Education."
Licenses.
Live-stock dealers, § 993(234).
Notice.
Tuberculosis, § 2064(2).
Value of tuberculin animals, § 2064(3).
Stock law.
See "Fences."
Tuberculosis in domestic animals, §§ 2064(1)-
2064(6).
APPEAL AND ERROR.
Bill of exceptions.
Rules of court, § 6318(a).
ARCHITECTS.
Licenses, § 993(172).
ARGUMENTS AND CONDUCT OF COUN-
SEL.
Rules of courts, §§ 6261-6264.
ARMISTICE DAY.
Holiday, § 1770(81).
ARSON.
Firing woods, Penal Code, § 227.
ATHLETIC CLUBS.
Licenses, § 993(178).
ATTACHMENT.
Fertilizers, § 1799(11).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Infants.
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Insane, epileptic, feeble-minded and inebriate.
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Rules of courts.
See "Rules of Courts."
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Colored persons.
Duty of attorney-general, § 2177(20).
Marriage.
Duty of attorney-general, § 2177(20).
AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERS.
Jeweler's liens for repair, § 3364(3).
Licenses, § 993(179).
AUDITORS AND ACCOUNTANTS.
Auditors for certain counties, § 418(1).
Auditor to be clerk of county commissioners,
§ 418(5).
Duty of auditor, § 418(2).
Orders on treasurer not to be paid unless
approved by auditor, § 418(3).
Term of office, § 418(4).
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AUTOMOBILES.
Accidents.
Civil action not abridged, § 1770 (60aa).
Rules in case of accident, § 1770(60n).
Actions.
Civil action not abridged, § 1770 (60aa).
Acts of 1927, pp. 226 et seq., §§ 1770(60a)-
1770(60cc).
Age of driver, § 1770(60m).
Automobile dealers' monthly reports, §
1770(6odd).
Badges.
Chauffeur's badge, § 1770(60c).
Brakes, § 1770(60i).
Budget, § 1770(60t).
Busses.
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence ap-
plies to motor vehicle carriers, § 2713(1).
Carriers.
See "Motor Vehicle Carriers Act of 1929."
Chauffeur.
Age, § 1770(60m).
Application for chauffeur's license, § 1770(60c).
Badges, § 1770(60c).
Definition, § 1770(60b).
Commissioner of vehicles, § 1770 (60a).
Application for registration, § 1770(60c).
Salary, § 1770 (60v).
Secretary of state, § 1770(60a).
Crossings, § 1770(601).
Dealer.
Definition, § 1770(60b).
Registration, § 1770(60g).
Definitions, § 1770(60b).
Deputies from highway department, to enforce
law, § 1770(60y).
Expense.
Expense to carry out provisions of act, §
1770(60t).
Fees.
Disbursement of fees, § 1770 (60u).
Half-rate fees between Aug. 1 and Jan. 1,
§ 1770(60e).
Licenses, § 1770(60d).
Permits, § 1770 (60d).
Registration, licensing, or permit fees, §
1770(60d).
Glass, nails, tacks, etc., § 1770 (60w).
Inspector, § 1770(60x).
Lamps, § 1770(60i).
Law.
Deputies from highway department, to en-
force law, § 1770(60y).
Partial unconstitutionality, § 177O(60bb).
Penalty for violation of this Act, § 1770 (60z).
Sheriffs' and constables' attention to be
called to, § 1770(60x).
When effective, § 1770 (60cc).
Law of the road, § 1770(601).
Licenses.
See infra, "Registration."
Application for chauffeur's license, § 1770 (60c).
Automobile and truck dealers, § 993(180).
Automobile assembling plants, § 993(184).
Automobile financing, § 993(305).
Automobile garages, § 993(186).
Automobile parking-places, § 993(187).
Automobile tires or accessories; (Retail), §
993(183).
AUTOMOBILES—Cont'd
Licenses—Cont'd
Automobile tires or accessories; (Wholesale),
§ 993(182).
Automobile truck assembling plants, §
993(185).
Auto transportation companies, § 993(304).
Cars operated for hire, § 993(203).
Cars operated for hire over fixed routes, §
993(204).
Dealers in used cars, § 993(181).
"Drive-It-Yourself," § 993(205).
Fees, § 1770(60d).
Motor-busses, § 993(244).
Motorcycle dealers, § 993(246).
Motor-trucks and trailers, § 993(245).
Non-resident's license, § 1770(60j).
Lights, § 1770(60i).
List of vehicles registered, § 1770 (60x).
"Local authorities," § 1770 (60b).
Makers.
Registration, § 1770 (60g).
"Manufacturer," § 1770(60b).
"Metallic tires," § 1770 (60b).
"Motorcycle," § 1770(60b).
Motor fuel distributors.
See "Fuel Distributors."
"Motor-vehicle," § 1770(60b).
Motor vehicle carriers act of 1929.
See "Motor Vehicle Carriers Act of 1929."
Municipal corporations.
Municipal regulations of autos, § 1770(60s).
Non-resident's license, § 177O(60j).
Number-plates.
Description, § 1770(60h).
How attached, § 1770(60).
Operation, § 1770(601).
"Operator," § 1770 (60b).
"Owner," § 1770(60b).
Parking, § 1770(601).
Partial unconstitutionality, § 1770 (60bb).
Penalty for violation of this Act, § 1770 (60z).
Permit.
Fees, § 1770(d).
Permits for extra size or weight, § 1770 (60r).
Receipt for post-office order as permit, §
1770(60f).
"Pneumatic tires," § 1770(60b).
Post-office order.
Receipt for post-office order as permit, §
1770(60f).
Recording acts, § 1770(60c).
See infra, "Registration."
Registration, § 1770 (60c).
See infra, "Licenses."
Application for registration, § 1770 (60c).
Dealers, § 1770(60g).
Fees, § 1770(60d).
List of vehicles registered, § 1770(60x).
Makers, § 1770(60g).
Machines operated for hire, § 1770(60^a).
Restriction as to operators, § 1770(60m).
Restrictions as to traffic, § 1770(601).
Salary of commissioner of motor-vehicles, §
1770(60v).
Secretary of state.
Secretary of state, ex-officio commissioner
of vehicles, § 1770(60a).
Service-station, § 993(180).
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AUTOMOBKLES^Cont'd
Sheriffs and constables.
Attention to be called to provisions of law,
§ 1770(60x).
Sheriff's duties defined — inspector, §
1770 (60x).
Signals, § 1770(601).
Size.
Permits for extra size or weight, § 1770(60r).
Restriction as to, § 1770 (60o).
"Solid tires," § 1770(60b).
Speed.
Restrictions as to speed, § 1770(60k).
Statutes.
See infra, "Eaw."
Throwing things on highways, § 1770 (60w).
"Tractor," § 1770(60b).
Traffic, § 1770(601).
Traffic rules, § 1770(601).
"Trailer," § 1770 (60b).
"Trucks," § 1770(60b).
"Vehicle," § 1770(60b).
Weight.
Permits for extra size or weight, § 1770 (60r).
Restriction as to, § 1770(60p).
Wheels, restriction on, § 1770(60q).
BAILIFFS.
Compensation of bailiffs, Penal Code, § 876.
Criminal bailiffs, Penal Code, § 808.
Special criminal bailiffs, Penal Code, § 808.
Appointment, Penal Code, § 808.
Removal, Penal Code, § 808.
BAILMENTS.
Jeweler's liens for repair.
See "Liens."
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.
Banks.
See "Banks and Banking."
BANKS AND BANKING, §§ 2366(1)-
2366(196B).
Bankruptcy and insolvency.
See infra, "Taking Possession of Bank by
Superintendent."
Branch banks, § 2366(3).
In cities of 200,000 population, § 2366 (3b).
In cities of 80,000 to 125,000 population, §
2366 (3a).
Charter.
Application for charter, § 2366(80).
Checks.
See "Negotiable Instruments."
Criminal law.
Falsely advertising that deposits are insured,
Penal Code, § 211(15).
Death.
Payment of deposit of deceased depositor, §
2366(194).
Depositions, § 1249.
Deposits.
Falsely advertising that deposits are insured,
Penal Code, § 211(15).
Ordinaries.
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Payment of deposit of deceased depositor, §
2366(194).
Trust companies, §§ 2821 (19), 2821(22).
BANKS AND BANKING—Cont'd
Directors.
Qualification of directors, § 2366(148).
Semi-annual examinations by directors, §
2366(151).
Dissolution.
See infra, "Taking Possession of Bank by
Superintendent."
Examination.
Semi-annual examinations by directors, §
2366(151).
Executors and administrators.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
Guardian and ward.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
Incorporation of banks.
Application for charter, § 2366(80).
Insolvency.
See infra, "Taking Possession of Bank Su-
perintendent."
Investments.
Purchase of stocks and investment securities,
§ 2366(169).
Licenses, § 993(290).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(325).
Limit of loans by bank, § 2366(159).
Loans.
Limit of loans by bank, § 2366(159).
Purchase of stocks and investment securities, §
2366(169).
Regulation of business, §§ 2366(148)-2366(195B).
Short title, § 2366(196A).
State depositories, § 1249.
Stop-payment orders to be renewed, §
2366(195B).
Superintendent of banks.
See infra, "Taking Possession of Bank by
Superintendent."
Service of process, § 2366(196B).
Trust companies, § 2821(17).
Venue of suits, § 2366 (196B).
Taking possession of bank by superintendent,
§§ 2366(56)-2366(75).
Business resumed, how, § 2366(57).
Notice of taking possession, § 2366(56).
Objections to claims, § 2366(67).
Order of paying debts, § 2366(70).
Superintendent may reject claims or change
rank, § 2366(66).
Unclaimed deposits and dividends, § 2366(75).
Venue of suits, § 2366 (196B).
Taxation, § 993(290).
Trust companies.
See "Trust Companies."
Venue.
Suits against superintendent, § 2366 (196B).
BASEBALL.
Licenses.
Selling in baseball parks, § 993(253).
BILLS OF EXCEPTION.
Rules of court, § 6318(a).
BIRDS.
Instructions in animal, bird and fish life.
See "Education."
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BIRTH.
See "Vital Statistics."
Birth certificate, §§ 1681(39)-1681(41), 1681(46).
BOND COMMISSIONER.
Fees of commissioner, § 233.
State treasurer ex-officio bond commissioner,
§ 232.
BONDS.
Agriculture.
Commissioner of agriculture, § 2067(1).
County depositories, § 848(7).
Trust companies.
Dealing in stocks and bonds, § 2821(20).
BOWLING ALLEYS.
Licenses, § 993(216).
BRANCH BANKS, § 2366(3).
In cities of 200,000 population, § 2366 (3b).
In cities of 80,000 to 125,000 population, §
2366(3a).
BRANDS AND MARKS.
See "Marks and Brands."
BRIDGES.
Licenses.
Toll-bridge, § 993(272).
BROKERS.
Licenses.
Insurance brokers, § 993(227).
Stocks and bonds, § 993(198).
Real estate brokers, §§ 993(199), 1896(13).
See infra, "Real Estate Commission."
Amendments of act, § 1896(22).
Appeal from decision of real estate commis-
sion, § 1896(26).
Claims not enforceable by unlicensed broker,
§ 1896(24).
Cumulative act, § 1896(28).
Definition enlarged, § 1896(23).
Definition of "real-estate broker" enlarged, §
1896(23).
Dishonest dealers, § 1896(14).
Fees for licenses, § 1896(13).
Investigation, § 1896(14).
Licenses, §§ 993(199), 1896(13).
Failure to obtain license, § 1896(29).
Revocation, § 1896(14).
Penalties, § 1896(29).
Provisions, where inapplicable, § 1896(5).
"Real estate broker" and "real estate sales-
man" defined, § 1896(5).
Revocation of license, § 1896(14).
Rule, § 1896(25).
Real estate commission.
Appeal, § 1896(26).
Hearing before, § 1896(27).
Power to make rule, § 1896(25).
BUCKET SHOPS.
See "Gambling Contracts."
BUDGET.
Automobiles, § 1770 (60t).
'BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.
Licenses, § 993(291).
Taxation, § 993(291).
BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, §
1681(28).
BURIAL PERMIT, §§ 1681(31), 1681(35)-
1681(37).
CANALS.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
CARNIVALS.
Licenses, § 993(212).
CARRIERS.
Actions.
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence ap-
plies to motor vehicle carriers, § 2713(1).
Auto transportation companies.
Licenses, § 993(304).
Motor vehicle carriers.
See "Motor Vehicle Carriers Act of 1929."
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence, §
2713(1).
Railroad.
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence ap-
plies to motor vehicle carriers, § 27713(1).
CEMETERIES.
Licenses, § 993(207).
Removal permit, § 1681(31).
CHAIN GANG.
Municipal corporations, Penal Code, § 1236(2).
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
Setting aside judgment, § 5968(4).
CHECKS.
See "Negotiable Instruments."
CHIROPODIST.
Licenses, § 993(172).
CHIROPRACTIC.
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
CIGARETTES AND CIGARS.
See "Licenses."
CIRCUSES.
Licenses, §§ 993 (208) -993 (209).
CLERKS OF COURT.
Compensation when no fees allowed, § 6001.
Maps and plats.
Endorsement of plat for laying out street or
highway, § 4901(6).
Report of city planning commission, §
4901(6).
Streets and highways.
Endorsement of plat for laying out street or
highway, § 4901(6).
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COLLECTING AGENTS.
Licenses, § 993(175).
COLORED PERSON, §§ 2177-2177(19).
Application for marriage license. § 2177(8).
Application for marriage license 'by one not
born in this State, § 2177(11).
Filing application for marriage license, §
2177(9).
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
Non-residents, § 2177(11).
Report by state registrar of vital statistics
after examination as to registration of ap-
plicant, § 2177(10).
Unlawful for whites to marry oilier than
white; penalty, § 2177(114).
Attorney-general.
Duty of attorney-general, § 2177(20).
Definitions, §§ 2177-2177(12).
Forms, §§ 2177(1)-2177(3).
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
/Registration as to race, §§ 2177(l)-2177(3).
Marriage.
Application for marriage license.
See infra, "Application for Marriage Li-
cense."
Filing application for marriage license, §
2177(9).
Report by state registrar of vital statistics
after examination as to registration of ap-
plicant, § 2177(10).
Return of license after marriage, § 2177(12).
Miscegenation.
See "Miscegenation."
Motor vehicle carriers act of 1929, § 1770 (60nn).
Ordinary's noncompliance with law, § 2177(16).
Performing marriage ceremony in violation of
law, § 2177(17).
See infra, "Regulation."
Registration, § 2177(1).
False registration, felony, . punishment, ' §
2177(7).
Fee for registration 30 cents; how divided,
§ 2177(6).
Forms, §§ 2177(l)-2177(3).
Local registrar must cause each person in
district to execute form, etc., § 2177(3).
Penalty for refusal to execute registration
certificate, etc., § 2177(5).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(l)-2177(7).
Untrue statement, § 2177(4).
Report of violation of law, § 2177(18).
Solicitor-general.
Duty of solicitor-general, § 2177(20).
Supply of forms, § 2177(2).
Vital statistics.
Local registrar must cause each person in
district to execute form, etc., § 2177(3).
Registration as to race, § 2177(1).
(Supply of formis, § 2177(2).
Who are persons of color, § 2177.
COMMERCIAL AGENTS.
License, § 993(175).
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE.
See "Agriculture."
COMMITMENT AND PRELIMINARY EX-
AMINATION.
Georgia training school for girls, Penal Code,
§§ 1259(9), 1259(10).
COMPTROLLER-GENERAL.
Gasoline.
Appointment of state oil chemist, § 1814(12).
Duty to collect and test samples, § 1814(16).
Oils.
Appointment of state oil chemist, § 1814(12,).
Duty to collect and test samples, § 1814(16)".
Salary.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS.
See "Eminent Domain."
CONFEDERATE SOLDIERS AND WID-
OWS.
Pensions, Penal Code, § 1482(15).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Amendments proposed in 1929, Appx. II.
Judges.
Salaries, § 6533.
CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA.
Proposed amendment to the constitution,
Appx. II.
CONTESTED ELECTIONS.
See "Primary Elections."
CONTINUANCES.
Rules of courts, § 6280.
CONTRACTORS.
Licenses.
Plumbing, Heating, steam-fitting and tinning
contractors, § 993(278).
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIA-
TIONS.
Members to handle products only through as-
sociations, § 2928(17).
Powers, § 2928(16).
CORPORATIONS, §§ 2209-2928(50).
Banks and banking.
See "Banks and Banking."
Income taxes, § 1041(22).
Foreign corporations, § 1041(24).
Insurance companies.
/See "Insurance."
Licenses, §§ 993(213), 993(214).
Foreign, §§ 993(214)-993(214e).
Presidents and officers of corporations, §
993(173).
Return by resident agents, § 993(292).
Officers and agents.
Licenses, § 993(173).
Stock and stockholders.
Trust companies dealing in stock and bonds,
§ 2821(20).
Taxation.
See infra, "Licenses."
Return by resident agents, § 993(292).
Trade names.
See "Trade Names or Fictitious Names."
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CORPORATIONS—Cont'd
Trust companies.
See "Trust Companies."
COST.
Fertilizers, § 1799(11).
COTTON EXCHANGE.
See "Gambling Contracts."
COUNTIES.
Auditors for certain counties.
(See "Auditors."
Boards of education, § 1551(84^).
Bonds.
Residue of bond issue used for improve-
ments, § 431(4).
Use of balance of proceeds of bond issue, to
pay warrants in certain counties, § 431(4).
Boundaries.
Change of county lines.
Election in town of 400 to 500 population, §
471(1).
Commissioner of roads and revenues.
Salaries of commissioners in certain counties,
§ 626(2).
County depositories.
See "Depositories."
County officers.
Abolition of fee system in certain counties.
See "Fees."
Pensions.
See "Pensions."
Salaries.
Abolition of fee system in certain counties.
See "Fees."
County revenue.
See "Taxation."
Depositories.
See "Depositories."
Elections.
Change of county lines.
Election in town of 400 to 500 population,
§ 471(1).
Employees.
Pensions.
See "Pensions."
Expenses.
Office expenses of officers of certain coun-
ties, § 418(6).
Fees.
Abolition of fee system in certain counties.
See "Fees."
Fiscal year in certain counties.
Change to other than calendar year, § 526(6).
May change to calendar year, § 526(4).
Power to levy tax, § 526(5).
Inter-county improvements.
Residue of bond issue used for improve-
ments, § 431(4).
Use of balance of proceeds of bond issue,
to pay warrants in certain counties, §
431(4).
Officers.
County treasurer.
Salary in certain counties, § 590(2).
Office expenses of officers of certain counties.
§ 418(6).
Ordinaries.
See "Ordinaries."
COUNTIES—Cont'd
Pensions.
See "Pensions."
Pensions for county employees.
See "Pensions."
Surveys and surveyors.
Instruments to be bought for surveyors, §
3824(1).
Taxation.
Railroads.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041.
Voting machines in certain counties.
See "Elections."
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
Auditor to be clerk of county commissioners,
§ 418(5).
COUNTY COURTS.
Jurisdiction.
For amendmient of §§ 4775(24), 4775(25),
['§§ 4775 (x), 4775 (y), Park's Code] as to
Lamar County, see Acts 1929, pp 446, 447.
COUNTY MANAGER FORM OF GOVERN-
MENT.
Operation of statute, § 615(24).
Uniform county manager form of government
provided, § 615(24).
COUNTY OFFICERS.
Office expenses of officers of certain counties,
§ 418(6).
COURTS.
Bailiffs.
Compensation, Penal Code, §§ 876, 876(1).
Juvenile courts, Penal Code, § 900(41).
Ordinal ies.
See "Ordinaries."
CRIMINAL LAW.
Acting as emigrant agent without license,
Penal Code, § 632.
Bailiffs.
See "Bailiffs."
Banks and banking.
Falsely advertising that deposits are insured,
Penal Code, § 211(15).
Bill of exceptions in misdemeanor cases.
Rules of court, § 6318(a).
Convicts.
See "Prisons and Prisoners."
Firing woods, Penal Code, § 227.
Futures.
See "Gambling Contracts."
Game and game laws.
See "Game and Game Laws."
Gasoline.
Sale without test, § 1814<11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Income taxes.
Fraud by taxpayer, § 1041(37).
Motor fuel distributors, Penal Code, § 476(13).
Oils.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Prisons and prisoners.
See "Prisons and Prisoners."
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CRIMINAL LAW—Cont'd
Rules of court.
Bills of exceptions in misdemeanor cases, §
6318(a).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(337).
Special criminal bailiffs.
See "Bailiffs."
Vital statistics.
See "Vital Statistics."
Voting machines in certain counties, § 138(49).
Witnesses.
Husband and wife, Penal Code, § 1037.
CROPS, Appx. I, § 19.
CROSSINGS.
Automobiles, § 1770(601).
Grade crossings.
Adoption of layout, § 2677(18).
Agreements as to relocation, etc., § 2677(20).
Agreement to apportion work, § 2677(19).
Automatic signaling device required, §
2677(22).
Closing crossing, § 2677(30).
Cost where different railroads involved, §
2677(29).
Definitions, § 2677(17).
Division of cost, § 2677(21).
Elimination of grade crossings, § 2677(16).
Improvement of underpass or overpass, §
2677(23).
Judicial review of order, etc., of department
or board, § 2677(26).
Limit of annual expenditure of railroad, §
2677(31).
Maintenance of overpass, § 2677(24).
Notice to railroad company, § 2677(18).
Relocation, §§ 2677(27), 2677(30).
Selection of material, § 2677(25).
Space for additional track, § 2677(20).
Special agreements as to resolution, etc., §
§ 2677(27).
Status of crossings in case of relocation, §
§ 2677(30).
Underpass or overpass unsafe or inadequate,
§ 2677(23).
Use of right of way, § 2677(28).
DAIRIES.
Bottles and pipettes, § 2119<21).
Bond of manufacturer, § 2119(21).
How milked, § 2119(21).
Condensed or evaporated milk, § 2119(25).
Definition of terms, § 2119'(17).
Enforcement of act, § 2119(34).
Ice-cream.
Unlawful sale, § 2119(26).
When adulterated, § 2119(26).
License.
Annual fee, § 2119(28).
Cream testers' license, § 2119(28).
Licensing of cream testers, § 2119(19).
Milk and cream brokerage, § 2119(30).
Quarterly payments by butter manufacturer,
§ 2119(27).
Station license, § 2119(29).
Superintendent's license, § 2119(2-8).
Milk and cream brokerage, § 2119»(30).
Pasteurization, § 2119(23).
Penalties, § 2119(33).
DAIRIES—Cont'd
Reports.
Annual reports to state veterinarian as to
purchase of milk and cream, § 2119(31).
Milk and cream brokerage, § 2119(30).
Quarterly reports to state veterinarian, §
§ 2119(24).
Reports to state veterinarians, § 2119(24).
Sale of milk, cream, ice-cream, etc.
Unlawful act, § 2119(22).
Shipment from foreign state, § 2119'(35).
State veterinarian.
Annual reports, § 2119(31).
Duties as to dairy inspection, § 2119(16).
Duty as to weighing and testing, § 2119(20).
Money received by state veterinarian, §
2119(32).
Quarterly reports to state veterinarian, §
2119(24).
Test of milk, cream, etc., § 2119(18).
DEATH.
See "Vital Statistics."
Burial permit, §§ 1681(31), 1681(35)-168l(37).
Death certificate, §§ 1681(33), 1681(46).
Physicians and surgeons.
Death without medical attention, § 1681(34).
Registration of death.
See "Vital Statistics."
Removal of permit, § 1681(31).
DENTISTS.
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Nurses, § 1711(11).
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.
See "Agriculture."
DEPOSITORIES.
See "State Depositories."
County depositories.
Bonds, § 848(7).
County commissioners authorized to name
depositories in certain counties, § 848(7).
Term of depository, § 848(8).
DEPOSITS.
See "Banks and Banking."
DEPUTIES.
Tax collectors, §§ 1227(3), 1227(6), 1227(9),
1227(12), 1227(15).
DETECTIVE AGENTS.
Licenses, § 993(176).
DIRECTORS.
Banks and banking.
Qualification o<f directors, § 2366(148).
DIVORCE.
Rules of court.
Form of judgment, § 6296(a).
DOGS.
Licenses, § 993(282).
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DRUGS AND DRUGGISTS.
Compounding.
Drugs to be compounded only by or under
supervision of registered pharmacist, §
1731(11).
Who may compound or sell drugs, etc., §
1731(17).
Examinations.
See "State Board of Pharmacy."
Fees, § 1731(19).
Licenses.
License to one registered in another State, §
1731(14).
Refusal or revocation of license, § 1731(16).
Meaning of "drug-store," "pharmacy," "apoth-
cary," § 1731(20).
Registered pharmacist.
See "State Board of Pharmacy."
State board of pharmacy.
See "State Board of Pharmacy."
Unlawful use of title "drug-store," etc., §
1731(21).
EDUCATION.
See "State Agricultural and Normal Col-
lege."
Boards of education.
Compensation of memibers in certain coun-
ties, § 1551(84^).
Instruction in animal, bird and fish life, §§
15'51(184a)-15i51(l84c).
Period of instruction, § 1551(184>b).
Reports of teachers, § 1551(184c).
Training for conservation of useful wild life,
§ 155l(l84a).
Pensions.
Act applicable to teachers, Penal Code, §
1519(55c).
School property.
Exemption from levy and sale, Appx. I, § 14.
Taxation.
See "Taxation."
ELECTIONS.
Ballots.
See infra, "Voting Machines in Certain Coun-
ties."
Counties.
'Change of county lines.
Election in town of 400 to 500 population,
§ 471(1).
Fences.
See "Fences."
General Assembly.
In certain counties, § 80(b).
When and how held, § 80(b).
Municipal corporations.
Precincts located in city or town having
population of 1,000 or more, § 80(b).
Referendum on repeal or amendment of mu-
nicipal charters, § 913(19).
Municipalities.
Duty of authorities as to voting machines, §
138(33).
Officers.
Instruction to election officers under voting
machine act, § 138(34).
(Place.
General Assembly, § 80(b).
ELECTIONS—Cont'd
Polls.
See infra, "Voting Machines in Certain
Counties."
Precincts.
'Time polls kept open, § 80(b).
Primaries, § 178(7^).
See "Primary Elections."
Primary elections.
Contests in certain counties, § 126(1).
Candidate receiving highest vote is deemed
nominee, § 126(2).
Judgment of superior court final, § 126.(3).
Referendum.
Repeal or amendment of municipal charters,
^
§ 913(19).
Street improvements, § 913(24).
Stock laws.
See "Fences."
Time.
General Assembly, § 80(h).
Time polls kept open, § 80(b).
Voting machines in certain counties.
Adoption of voting machine, § 138(26).
Announcing the vote and locking the ma-
chine against voting, § 138(46).
Application of law, § 138(50).
'Ballots.
Furnishing instruction ballots, § 138(31).
Irregular ballots, § 138(41).
Lost or stolen ballots, § 138(38).
Mailing sample ballots, § 138(31).
Number of official 'ballots to be furnished,
§ 138(32).
Official ballots furnished, § 138(36).
Printing official ballots, § 138(30).
Returning irregular ballots, § 138(47).
Blind or physically disabled voters, § 138(45).
Definitions, § 138(24).
Disposition of keys, § 138(48).
Duty of authorities of municipalities, §
138(33).
Experimental use of voting machine, §
138-(27).
Furnishing ballots in lieu of ones lost, or
stolen, § 138(38).
Furnishing instruction ballots, § 138(31).
Instruction to election officers, § 138(34).
Instruction to voters before election, §
138(35).
Instruction to voters on election day, §
138(44).
Irregular ballots, § 138(41).
Keys.
'Disposition of keys, § 138i(48).
Location of voting machines, § 138(42).
Locking the machine and returning the ir-
regular ballots, § 138(47).
Mailing of sample ballots, § 138(31).
Numlber of official ballots to he furnished, §
138(32).
Number of voters in a district, § 138(37).
Official ballots furnished, § 138(36).
Opening of polls, § 138(40).
Payment for machines, § 138(29).
Penalties, § 138(49).
Present election laws not changed, § 138(52).
Printing official ballots, sec. 138(30).
Providing machines, § 138(28).
Purpose and object, § 138(51).
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ELECTIONS—-Cont'd
Voting machines in certain counties—Cont'd
Requirements of voting machines, § 138(25).
Time act takes effect, § 138.(53).
Time allowed a voter, § 138(43).
Voting machines out of order, § 138(39).
ELECTRICITY.
Condemnation of road or highway for power
plant generating electricity, § 5240(1).
EMBALMER.
Licenses, § 993(172).
EMIGRANT AGENTS.
Acting as emigrant agent without license, Pe-
nal Code, § 632.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Condemnation for gas pipe lines, §§ 5234(1),
5235.
Gas pipe lines, §§ 5234(1), 5235.
Light and power.
Condemnation of road or highway for power
(plant generating electricity, § 5240(1).
Proceedings to which applicable.
Condemnation for gas pipe lines, §§ 5234(1),
5235.
United States.
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1), 26(2).
ENGINEERS.
Licenses, § 993(172).
ESTATE TAX.
See "Inheritance Tax."
EVIDENCE.
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence ap-
plies to motor busses, § 2713(1).
EXECUTIONS.
Advertisements of judicial sales.
Selection of official organ, § 6065(1).
Two or more journals published in county,
§ 6065(2).
Cancellation of fi. fa. when judgment is va-
cated, § 5968(2).
General execution docket, § 3321.
No lien until entry, § 3321.
Time of entry on docket, § 3321.
Judgment set aside, § 5968(2).
'Release of property subject to execution, §
6048.
Satisfaction of executions.
Release of property subject to execution, §
6048.
Taxation.
Inheritance tax, 1041(4).
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Foreign administrators.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
Foreign executors.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX.
See "Inheritance Tax."
FEES.
Abolition of fee system in certain counties, §§
6017(6)-6017(11).
Comimissions for collection of corporation,
occupation and other special taxes return-
able to state, § 6017(6).
County officers to receive salaries instead of
fees; exception, § 6017(7).
Payment of salaries, how made, § 6017(11).
Salaries to be fixed annually 90 days before
January 1, § 6017(8).
Automobiles.
Disbursement of fees, § 1770(60u).
Half-rate fees between Aug. 1 and Jan. 1,
§ 1770(60e).
Licenses, § 177O(60d).
Permits, § 1770(60d).
Registration, licensing, and permit fees, §
1770(60d).
Bond commissioner, § 233.
(Compensation to officers when no fees allowed,
§ 6001.
Drugs and druggists, § 1731(19).
Nurses.
Deposit fee by applicant, § 1711(11).
Undergraduate nurse, § 1711(16).
State board of pharmacy, § 1731(19).
FENCES.
Election for no fences.
Exemption of mountain districts from no-
fence or stock law, § 2042(2).
Petition of freeholders, § 2042(3).
Exemption of mountain districts from no-fence
or stock law, § 2042(2).
Petition of freeholders, § 2042(3).
FERRIES.
Licenses, § 993(272).
FERTILIZERS.
Analysis, § 1799(2).
Attachment, § 1799(11).
Brands.
Registration of brands, § 1799(2).
Cancellation of registration, § 1799(12).
Cost, § 1799(11).
Fees, § 1799(2).
Covered into State Treasury, § 1799(15).
Filler, § 1799(4).
Inspection, § 1799(8).
Inspection 'before delivery to consumer, §
1799(9).
Laws not repealed, § 1799(14).
Licenses.
For sale, § 1799(3).
Penalties.
Attachment, § 1799(11).
Shortage in plant food or commercial value,
§ 1799(10).
Variation from percentage of soluble nitro-
gen, § 1799(7).
Violation of law misdemeanor, § 1799(13).
Percentage of water soluble nitrogen, § 1799(7).
Registration.
Cancellation of registration, § 1799(12).
Registration of brands, § 1799(2).
Samples, § 1799(8).
Shortage in plant food or commercial value, §
1799(10).
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FERTILIZERS—Cont'd i
•Supplemental act, § 1799(1).
Laws not repealed, § 1799(14).
Tag, § 1799(5).
Tankage, § 1799(6).
F TCTITIOUS NAMES.
See "Trade Naimes or Fictitious Names."
FILLING STATIONS.
Licenses, § 993(303).
FIERI FACIAS.
See "Executions."
FISCAL YEAR.
See "Time."
FISH AND FISHERIES.
Instruction in animal, bird and fish life.
See "Education."
State iboard of game and fish.
See "State Board of Game and Fish."
FOOD.
Milk and cheese dairy inspection.
See "Dairies."
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
Domestication, Appx. I, §§ 17, 18.
Income taxes, § 1041(24).
Licenses, § 993(214)-993(214e).
FORESTS.
Firing woods, Penal Code, § 227.
FORMS.
Colored persons, §§ 2177(1) -2177 (3).
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(l)-2177(3).
Divorce.
Form of decree of court in total divorce, §
6296(a).
Marriage.
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
FRATERNAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES.
Incorporations of fraternal 'benefit societies of
other states, § 2877(44).
Forms of certificates, § 2877(46).
Funds which may be used for expenses, §
2877(45).
Remedy in forum of society to be sought be-
fore suit, § 2877(47).
FUEL DISTRIBUTORS.
Licenses, §§ 9'93(295)-993(302).
Penalty, Penal Code, § 476(13).
Taxation, §§ 993 (295) -(302).
See "Taxation."
FUTURES.
See "Gamibling Contracts."
GAMBLING CONTRACTS.
Futures.
Boards of trade, § 4264(7).
Bona fide intent to deliver, § 4264(3).
Bucket shop defined, § 4264(4).
GAMBLING CONTRACTS—Cont'd
Futures—Cont'd
Constitutionality of act, § 4264(9).
"Contract of sale," § 4264(1).
Cotton exchanges, § 4264(7).
Definition.
See infra, "Meaning of Terms."
Delivery.
Necessity for delivery, § 4264(3).
Felony.
Party or agent in illegal contract guilty of
felony, § 4264(6).
Intent to deliver, § 4264(3).
Laws repealed, § 4264(8).
Meaning of terms, § 4264(1).
"Bucket shop," § 4264(4).
Contract of sale, § 4264(1).
"Person," § 4264(1).
Penalty, § 4264(6).
"Person," § 4264(1).
Sales.
Validity, § 4264(2).
Statement.
Written statement to principal in contract,
§ 4264(5).
Validity of sale, § 4264(2).
GAME AND GAME LAWS.
Deer.
Unlawful to kill deer in certain counties,
Penal Code, § 594 (3a).
Dove hunting, Penal Code, § 594 (3b).
Open season, Penal Code, § 594(1).
Fur bearing animals in certain counties,
Penal Code, § 594(7a).
State board of game and fish.
See "State Board of Game and Fish."
Trappers.
Buying hides for resale, Penal . Code, §
594(13a).
False statement in application for trappers'
license, Penal Code, § 594(13).
License, § 2158(30*4).
Misdemeanor, Penal Code, § 594(l3d).
Punishment, Penal Code, § 594 (13c).
Traps and devices to protect fowl, Penal
Code, § 594(13c).
Unlawful trapping, Penal Code, § 594 (13b).
Unlawful to kill deer in certain counties, Penal
Code, § 594 (3a).
GARAGES.
Title registration act.
Machines operated for hire, § 1770(60^a).
GAS AND GAS COMPANIES.
Condemnation for gas pipe lines, §§ 5234(1),
5235.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
GASOLINE.
Access for inspection, § 1814(19).
Analysis for buyer, § 1814(10).
Chemist.
See infra, "State Oil Chemist."
Comptroller-general.
Appointment of state oil chemist, § 1814(12).
Approval by state oil chemist and comp-
troller-general, § 1814(6).
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GASOLINE—Cont'd
Comptroller-general—Cont'd
Duty to collect and test samples, § 1814(16).
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Containers, § 1814(8).
Counties in which additional state-aid roads
are created.
Gas tax, § 828(19a).
Criminal law.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Definition, § 1814(4).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection.
See "Inspection."
Labels, § 1814(8).
Licenses.
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Definition of distributor, § 993 (296a).
Terms denned, § 993(295).
Trucks, § 993(273).
Notice as to shipments, § 1814(9).
Oil inspectors.
Appointment, § 1814(13).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Daily reports, § 1814(15).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Expense of equipment, supplies, clerical help,
etc.; allowance for; limits, § 1814(22).
Expenses, § 1814(13).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Inspectors' automobiles, § 1814(15).
Inspector's duty as to pumps, § 1814(18).
Number, § 1814(13).
Removal of chemist or inspector; charges in
writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, §§ 1814(13), 1814(23).
Terms, § 1814(13).
Unlawful interest in sale, etc., § 1814(14).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Registration of gasoline dealers, § 1814(17).
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Samples, § 1814(9).
State oil chemist, § 1814(6).
Appointment, § 1814(12).
Approval by state oil chemist and comp-
troller-general, § 1814(6).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Removal of chemist or inspector; charges in
writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, § 1814(23).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Taxation, §§ 993<(295)-993(302).
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Definition of distributor, § 993 (296a).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
Test, §§ 1814(10), 1814(11).
GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
Elections.
In certain counties, § 80(b).
When and how held, § 80(b).
Primary elections, § 138(7^).
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GEORGIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR
GIRLS, Penal Code, §§ 1259(5)-1259(10).
See "State Board of Pharmacy."
Board of managers, Penal Code, § 1259(5).
Commitment and preliminary examination,
Penal Code, §§ 1259(9), 1259(10).
Compensation of managers, Penal Code, §
1259(5).
Expenses of managers, Penal Code, § 1259(5).
Fees for carrying persons to school, Penal
Code, § 1259(9).
Improper subjects, Penal Code, § 1259(10).
Oath of managers, Penal Code, § 1259(5).
Parole, Penal Code, § 1259(10).
Who may be committed and how, Penal Code,
§§ 1259(9), 1259(10).
GRAND JURY RECOMMENDATIONS.
State board of game and fish, § 2158(4J^).
GUARANTY.
Trust companies, 2821(18),
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
Foreign guardian.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
Inmates of asylums.
Appointment without trial, § 3103.
Marriage.
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
Ordinary.
Custody and distribution when no legal
guardian, § 4804(1).
Persons entitled to payment from U. S. Veter-
ans' Bureau.
Act to be liberally construed, § 3103(15).
Annual accounting, § 3103(8).
Removal of guardian not accounting, §
3103(9).
Bond of guardian, § 3103(7).
Commitment to U. S. Veterans' Bureau
Hospital, § 3103(13).
Compensation of guardian, § 3103(10).
Defense, § 3103(14).
Definition of terms, § 3103(1).
Expenditures, § 3103(12).
Fitness of appointee, § 3103(7).
Investment of funds, § 3103(11).
Notice of petition, § 3103(6).
Petition for appointment, § 3103(4).
Notice of petition, § 3103(6).
Petition for discharge of guardian, § 3103(14).
Petition in case of minor, § 3103(5).
Removal of guardian not accounting, §
3103(9).
Unlawful to act as guardian of more than 5
wards not of the same family, § 3103(3).
When guardian must be appointed, § 3103(2).
Persons rated incompetent by U. S. Veterans'
Bureau, § 3103.
Stock and stockholders.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
HAWKERS AND PEDDLERS.
Licenses, § 993(255).
Fish and sea food peddlers; nonresident, §
993(281).
HOLIDAYS.
Armistice day, § 1770(81).
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HOSPITALS AND ASYLUMS.
Authority of Ware County to increase bonded
debt for hospital, § 6563.
Licenses.
Sanitariums, § 993(265).
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Witnesses, Penal Code, § 1037.
ICE CREAM.
See "Dairies."
ICE CREAM DEALERS.
Licenses, § 993(226).
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS.
Futures.
See "Gambling Contracts."
IMPROVEMENTS.
Street improvements in certain cities.
See "Special Assessments."
INCOME TAXES.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041(38).
Appeal, § 1041(29).
Blanks, § 1041(34).
Board of income tax review, § 1041(28).
Claim of exemption, § 1041(25).
Claims.
Does not relieve from immediate payment, §
1041(27).
Hearing claims, § 1041(28).
Special fund for reimbursements of claim-
ants, § 1041(32).
To be made with return, § 1041(25).
Computation of taxes, § 1041(23).
Corporations, § 1041(22).
Foreign corporations, § 1041(24).
Deductions, § 1041(25).
Sales act of 1929, § 993(341).
Default of taxpayer, § 1041(36).
Execution, § 1041(36).
Foreign corporations, § 1041(24).
Fraud by taxpayer, § 1041(37).
Interest.
Refund with interest, § 1041(31).
Notice to taxpayer before assessment, §
1041(36).
Payment in installments, § 1041(26).
Penalty, § 1041(36).
Fraud by taxpayer, § 1041(37).
Protest by taxpayer, § 1041(31).
Reduction of ad valorum tax rate because of
revenue from income tax, § 1041(39).
Reduction of amount paid under sales tax act
of 1929, § 993(341).
Refund, §§ 1041(27), 1041(31).
Return by public officer or employee, § 1041(24).
Returns.
Claim of exemption to be made with return,
§ 1041(25).
Time of return, § 1041(33).
Special fund for reimbursements of claimants,
§ 1041(32).
Summary hearing in superior court, §§ 1041(30),
1041(35).
Time of payment, § 1041(26).
Time of return, § 1041(33).
United States laws followed, § 1041(22).
INFANTS.
Attorney and client.
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Ordinaries.
Custody and distribution when no legal
guardian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
INHERITANCE TAX, §§ 1041(l)-104l(2l),
Appx. I, §§ 11, 12, 15.
Authority to prescribe rules and forms, §
1041(20).
Discount, § 1041(19).
Duties of county ordinaries, § 1041(2).
Executions, § 1041(4).
Exemption, § 1041(21).
Failure to pay, § 1041(4).
Federal estate tax return; duplicate to be filed
with State tax commissioner, § 1041(1).
Interest, § 1041(19).
Ordinaries, § 1041(2).
Payment, §§ 1041(4), 1041(19).
Transfer of property of non-resident, § 1041(17).
Valuation, § 1041(18).
INJUNCTIONS.
Limitation of actions.
Street improvements in certain cities, §
913(34).
Street improvements in certain cities, § 913(34).
INNS AND INNKEEPERS.
Licenses, § 993(224).
INSANE, EPILEPTIC, FEEBLE-MINDED
AND INEBRIATE.
See "Guardian and Ward."
Attorney and client.
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Ordinaries.
Custody and distribution when no legal
guardian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
INSPECTION.
Apples and peaches, §§ 2119(11), 2119(14).
Fertilizers.
See "Fertilizers."
Gasoline.
See infra, "Inspection of Oils."
Inspection of oils, §§ 1814(4)-1814(26).
Access for inspection, § 1814(19).
Allowances, § 1814(22).
Approval by state oil chemist and comp-
troller-general, § 1814(6).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Charges in writing, § 1814(21).
Clerical help, § 1814(22).
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Containers, § 1814(8).
Daily reports, § 1814(15).
Duty to collect and test samples, § 1814(16).
Entire time of chemist and inspectors to be
given to duties; bonds, § 1814(24).
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INSPECTION^Cont'd
Inspection of oils—Cont'd
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Expense of equipment, § 1814(22).
Fees, § 1814(25).
"Gasoline," "kerosene," denned, § 1814(4).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection of gasoline and kerosene, §
1814(5).
Inspectors' automobiles, § 1814(15).
Inspector's duty as to pumps, § 1814(18).
Labels, § 1814(8).
Notes as to shipments, § 1814(9).
Oil inspectors, § 1814(13).
Registration of gasoline dealers, § 1814(17).
Removal of chemist, § 1814(21).
Removal of inspector, § 1814(21).
Reports, § 1814(15).
Salaries and expense accounts; how paid, §
1814(23).
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Samples, § 1814(9).
State oil chemist, § 1814(12).
Supplies, § 1814(22).
Test or analysis for buyer, § 1814(10).
Unlawful interest in sale, § 1814(14).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Kerosene.
See infra, "Inspection of Oils."
Milk and food dairy inspection.
See "Dairies."
Oils.
See infra, "Inspection of Oils."
INSURANCE.
Agents.
Tax, Appx. I, § 9.
Authority to sell and buy, § 2409(6).
Commissioner.
Approval of investments, § 2409(3).
Fraternal benefit societies.
See "Fraternal Benefit Societies."
Insurance commissioner.
Approval of investments, § 2409(3).
Insurance companies.
See infra, "Investments."
Licenses.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(325).
Investments.
Approval by insurance commissioner, §
2409(3).
Authorized investments of insurance com-
panies, § 2409(2).
In more than 10% of securities of a single
company prohibited, § 2904(4).
Licenses, §§ 993(286), 2415.
Insurance agents, § 993(227).
Life insurance.
Medical examinations, § 2501(1).
Loans, § 2415.
Medical examinations, § 2501(1).
Required investments, § 2409(5).
Statements.
Before doing business, § 2415.
Taxation, § 993(286).
Workmen's compensation act.
See "Workmen's Compensation Act."
INTERROGATORIES.
Rules of court, § 6291.
JEWELER'S LIEN FOR REPAIR.
See "Liens."
JUDGES.
Constitutional law.
Salaries, § 6533.
Juvenile courts, Penal Code, § 900(41).
Ordinaries.
See "Ordinaries."
Primary elections, § 138(7^).
Salaries.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, § 6533.
JUDGMENT AND DECREES.
Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to set aside judgment on secured
debt, § 5968(1).
Recordation.
Method, § 4198(1).
Rules of court.
Form in total divorce cases, § 6296(a).
Setting aside judgment, §§ 5968(l)-5968(4).
Applicable to mortgage foreclosure, § 5968(4).
Cancellation of fi. fa., § 5968(2).
Jurisdiction to set aside judgment on secured
debt, § 5968(1).
Original status restored, § 5968(3).
Vacating.
See infra, "Setting Aside Judgment."
JUDICIAL SALES AND RENTINGS.
Advertisement of judicial sales.
Selection of official organ, § 6065(1).
Two or more journals published in county, §
6065(2).
Selection of official organ, § 6065(1).
JUNK DEALERS.
Licenses, § 993(228).
JURISDICTION.
County courts.
For amendment of sections 4775(24), 4775(25),
[§§ 4775 (x), 4775 (y), Park's Code] as to La-
niar County, see Acts 1929 (Local Laws),
pp. 446, 447.
Judgment and decrees.
Jurisdiction to set aside judgment on secured
debt, § 5968(1).
United States.
Land acquired by the United States, § 26(2).
JURY.
Compensation of jurors, Penal Code, § 876.
Jury commissioners.
Compensation.
Compensation in counties of 18,355 to
18,365, Penal Code, § 1138(6).
Compensation of jury commissioners in
counties of 26,108 and 26,110, Penal
Code, § 1138(5).
Compensation of jury commissioners and
clerks in counties with population be-
tween 33,000 and 33,050, Penal Code, §
1138(4).
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JURY—Cont'd
Jury commissioners—'Cont'd
Compensation—Cont'd
Compensation of jury commissioners in
counties of two hundred thousand or
more, Penal Code, § 1138(3).
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.
Abolition of justices' courts.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, § 6523.
JUVENILE COURTS.
Appointment, etc., of judges in certain coun-
ties, Penal Code, § 900(41).
KEROSENE.
See "Fuel Distributors;" "Inspection;" "Oils."
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Gasoline, § 1814(4).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection.
See "Inspection."
LAND REGISTRATION.
Method of recording instruments affecting land
title, § 4198(1).
LAUNDRIES.
Licenses, § 993(231).
LAW OF THE ROAD.
Automobiles, § 1770(601).
LICENSES.
Adding machines, § 993(238).
Ad valorem tax.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Advertising agents, § 993(174).
Amusement parks, § 993(177).
Animals.
Live-stock dealers, § 993(234).
Architects, § 993(172).
Athletic clubs, § 993(178).
Auctioneers, § 993(179).
Automatic sprinklers, § 993(268).
Automobile financing, § 993(305).
Automobiles.
See "Automobiles."
Automobile and truck dealers, § 993(180).
Title registration act.
Machines operated for hire, § 1770(60^a).
Auto transportation companies, § 993(304).
Awning and tent makers, § 993(188).
Bagatelle tables, § 993(189).
Banks and banking, § 993(290).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(325).
Barber-shops, § 993(191).
Barber supplies, § 993(192).
Baseball.
Selling in baseball parks, § 993(253).
Baseball parks, § 993(190).
Beauty parlors, § 993(193).
Bicycle dealers, § 993(194).
Bill distributors, § 993(195).
Billiard tables, § 993(189).
Book agents, § 993(196).
Bottlers (non-resident), § 993(197).
Bowling alleys, § 993(216).
LICENSES—Cont'd
Bridges.
Toll-bridges, § 993(272).
Brokers.
Insurance brokers, § 993(227).
Real estate, § 993(199).
Stocks and bonds, § 993(198).
Building and loan associations, § 993(291).
Burglar-alarms, § 993(200).
Business of selling.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Cafes, § 993(201).
Calculating machine, § 993(237).
Canals, § 993(288).
Cane racks, § 993(216).
Carbonic acid gas, § 993(202).
Carnivals, § 993(212).
Cash registers, § 993(236).
Cemeteries, § 993(207).
Chain of stores, § 993(280).
Chiropodist, § 993(172).
Chiropractic, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Cigarettes and cigars.
Alteration and other things made penal,
Penal Code, § 464(5).
Application for each place of business, §
§ 993(308).
Condemnation and sale of unstamped goods,
§ 993(312).
Constitutionality of act, § 993(315).
Defeating or hindering operation of law mis-
demeanor, Penal Code, § 464(6).
Leaf tobacco not included, § 993(308).
Penalties, Penal Code, § 464(4).
Penalty for engaging in business without li-
cense, Penal Code, § 464(7).
Penalty for violation of act, Penal Code, §
464(9).
Procedure in case of seizure, § 993(313).
Return of seized goods, § 993(314).
Revocation of license, § 993(309).
Stamps, § 993(310).
Commission of sellers of stamps, § 993(311).
Failure to cancel stamps, Penal Code, §
464(4).
Sellers of stamps, § 993(311).
Time of affixing, § 993(310).
Used stamps, Penal Code, § 464(8).
Circuses, §§ 993(208), 993(209).
Circus side-shows, § 993(209).
Coke and coal, § 993(206).
Collecting agents, § 993(175).
Collection of taxes, § 993(306).
Commercial agents, § 993(175).
Commercial reporting agencies, § 993(211).
Concerts, shows, and exhibitions, § 993(210).
Contractors.
Plumbing, heating, steam-fitting and tinning
contractors, § 993(278).
Corporations, §§ 993(213)-993(214e).
Domestic, § 993(213).
Domestic corporations.
Annual reports of domestic corporations,
§ 993(214c).
Failure to make reports, § 214e).
Payment does not relieve from other tax,
§ 993(214b).
Payment to comptroller-general, § 993 (14a).
GENERAL INDEX 325
LICENSES—Cont'd
Corporations—Cont'd
Domestic corporations—Cont'd
Returns, § 993(214b).
Section not applied to insurance and sew-
ing machine companies, § 993 (214b).
Foreign, § 993(214)-993(214e).
Presidents and officers of corporations, §
993(173).
Return by resident agents, § 993(292).
Cotton warehouses, § 993(275).
Dairies.
Annual fee, § 2119(28).
Cream testers' license, § 2119(28).
Licensing of cream testers, § 2119(19).
Milk and cream brokerage, § 2119(30).
Quarterly payments by butter manufacturer,
§ 2119(27).
Station license, § 2119(29).
Superintendent's license, § 2119(28).
Dance halls, § 993(215).
Default.
Penalty for default, § 993(307).
Definitions.
"In cities and towns" defined, § 993(294).
Dentists, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Detective agents, § 993(176).
Directories, § 993(217).
Dogs, § 993(282).
Dog show, § 993(266).
Drugs and druggists.
License to one registered in another State, §
1731(14).
Refusal or revocation of license, § 1731(16).
Dry-cleaning, § 993(218).
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., § 993(293).
Electrical contractors, § 993(219).
Embalmer, § 993(172).
Emigrant agents, § 993(220).
Acting as agent without license, Penal Code,
§ 632.
Employment agencies, § 993(221).
Engineers, § 993(172).
Equipment, § 993(241).
Ferries, § 993(272).
Fertilizers.
For sale, § 1799(3).
Filling stations, § 993(303).
Fire-engines and apparatus, § 993(222).
Fish.
Fish and sea food peddlers; non-resident, §
993(281).
Fish dealers, § 993(223).
Foreign corporations, §§ 993(214)-993(214e).
Fuel distributors, §§ 993(295)-993(302).
Amount of tax, § 993(296). *
Bond by distributor, § 993(302).
Definition of distributor, § 993 (296a).
Invoices and bills, § 993(299).
Kerosene distributors, § 993(297).
Monthly reports of fuel distributors, § 993-
(300).
Payment to comptroller-general, § 993(301).
Registration of fuel distributors, § 993(298).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
Gas and gas companies, § 993(288).
Gasoline.
See infra, "Fuel Distributors."
LICENSES—Cont'd
Gasoline—Cont'd
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Definition of distributors, § 993 (296a).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
Trucks, § 993(273).
Graphophones, § 993(249).
Gypsies, § 993(225).
Hawkers and peddlers, § 993(255).
Fish and sea food peddlers; non-resident, §
993(281).
Horse-traders, § 993(225).
Hospitals and asylums.
Sanitariums, § 993(264).
Ice cream dealers, § 993(226).
Income taxes.
See "Income Taxes."
Inns and innkeepers, § 993(224).
Insurance, § 2415.
Insurance agents, § 993(227).
Insurance companies, § 993(286).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(325).
Itinerant horse-traders, § 993(225).
Itinerant practitioners, § 993(261).
Jenny Lind, § 993(189).
Junk dealers, § 993(228).
Laundries, § 993(231).
Legerdemain, § 993(229).
Legislative agents, § 993(230).
Light and power, § 993(288).
Light companies.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
Lighting systems, § 993(232).
Lightning-rods, § 993(233).
Live-stock dealers, § 993(234).
Lobbyists, § 993(230).
Logs and logging.
Lumber dealers, § 993(235).
Lumber dealers, § 993(235).
Machinery, § 993(241).
Machines, §§ 993(236)-993(241).
Malt extracts and malt products, § 993(279).
Malt syrups, § 993(279).
Manufacturers.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Manufacturing companies, § 993(287).
Marriage.
See "Marriage."
Master and servant.
Salary and wage buyers, § 993(263).
Merry-go-round, § 993(242).
Monument dealers, § 993(243).
Motor-busses, § 993(244).
Motor vehicle carriers act of 1929.
See "Motor Vehicle Carriers Act of 1929."
Moving pictures, § 993(247).
Supply houses, § 993(248).
Municipal corporations.
"In cities and towns" defined, § 993(294).
Musical instruments, § 993(249).
Mutual benefit associations, § 993(325).
Navigation companies, § 993(288).
News dealers, § 993(250).
Nurses.
See "Nurses."
Occupation privilege.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Oils, §§ 993(295)-993(302).
Trucks, § 993(273).
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LICENSES—'Cont'd
Optician.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Optometrist.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Organs, § 993(249).
Osteopathy, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Packing-houses, § 993(251).
Patents.
Patent rights, § 993(252).
Pawnbrokers, § 993(254).
Payment.
How paid, § 993(285).
Peddlers, § 993(255).
Penalty for default, § 993(307).
Phonograph pianos, § 993(249).
Photographs, § 993(259).
Physicians and surgeons, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Pictures and picture-frames, § 993(256).
Pistols, § 993(257).
Playing-cards, § 993(258).
Plumbing, § 993(278).
Pony show, § 993(266).
Pool tables, § 993(189).
Power companies.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
Pressing-clubs, § 993(260).
Professional tax, § 993(172).
Public accountant, § 993(172).
Racing parks, § 993(190).
Radios, § 993(249).
Radio supplies, § 993(249).
Railroads, § 993(288).
Railroad returns and by whom made, §§
993 (288) -993 (289).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
Real estate brokers.
Claims not enforceable by unlicensed broker,
§ 1896(27).
Failure to obtain license, § 1896(29).
Fees for licenses, § 1896(13).
Revocation, § 1896(14).
Registration, § 993(306).
Reporting agencies, § 993(211).
Restaurants, § 993(201).
Returns.
How returned, § 993(284).
Rinks, § 993(262).
Safes, § 993(264).
Salary and wage buyers, § 993(263).
Sales tax act of 1929.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Sanitariums, § 993(265).
Sea food peddlers, § 993(281).
Second-hand dealers, § 993(228).
Sewing-machines, § 993(283).
Sheriffs.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., §
993(293).
Shooting galleries, § 993(216).
Sleeping car companies, § 993(288).
Sleight of hand, § 993(229).
Slot-machine, § 993(240).
Soda-fountains, § 993(269).
Soft drinks.
Soft-drink syrups, § 993(270).
Sprinklers, § 993(268).
LICENSES-Cont'd
Skating rinks, § 993(262).
Steam-fitting, § 993(278).
Street carnivals, § 993(212).
Street railroads, § 993(288).
Swimming-pools, § 993(271).
Taxation, §§ 993(295)-993(302).
Telegraphs and telephones, § 993(288).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
Ten-pin alleys, § 993(216).
Tent makers, § 993(188).
Theaters and shows, §§993(208)-993(210), 993-
(212).
Circus, §§ 993(208), 993(209).
Concerts, shows and exhibitions, § 993(210).
Dog and pony, § 993(266).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(321).
Vaudeville, § 993(267).
Tinning contractors, § 993(278).
Tivoli tables, § 993(189).
Toll-bridges, § 993(272).
Trappers' license, § 2158(30^4).
Trust companies.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(325).
Typewriters, § 993(239).
Undertakers, § 993(274).
Vaults, § 993(264).
Veterinary.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Victrolas, § 993(249).
Wage buyers, § 993(263).
Warehouses and warehousemen.
Cotton warehouses, § 993(275).
Merchandise, § 993(276).
Water companies and waterworks, § 993(288).
Weapons.
Pistols, § 993(257).
Weighing machine, § 993(237).
Wood dealers, § 993(277).
LIENS.
Jeweler's liens for repair, §§ 3364(l)-3364(5).
Application of proceeds, § 3364(4).
Creation of lien, § 3364(1).
Display of sign as to intention to sell, §
3364(5).
Notice before sale, § 3364(2).
Sale, § 3364(1).
Sale at public outcry before courthouse, §
3364(3).
Recording acts.
See "Recording Acts."
Registration.
See "Recording Acts."
Special assessments.
Street improvements in certain cities.
Date of lien, § 91,3(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913(38).
Street improvements in certain cities.
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913(38).
LIFE INSURANCE.
Medical examinations, § 2501(1).
LIGHT AND POWER.
Eminent domain.
Condemnation of road or highway for power
plant generating electricity, § 5240(1).
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LIGHT AND POWER—Cont'd
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
LIGHT COMPANIES.
Licenses.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
LIGHTNING-RODS.
Licenses, § 993(233).
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Injunction.
Street improvements in certain cities, § 913(34).
LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS.
Street improvements in certain cities.
See "Special Assessments."
LOGS AND LOGGING.
Licenses.
Lumber dealers, § 993(235).
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Licenses, § 993(287).
Taxation, § 993(287).
MAPS AND PLATS.
Clerks of Court.
Endorsement of plat for laying out street or
highway, § 4901(6).
MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS.
See "Co-operative Marketing Associations."
MARKETS.
Co-operative marketing associations.
See "Co-operative Marketing Associations."
MARKS AND BRANDS.
Apples and peaches, §§ 2119(9)-2119(15).
Appointment of inspectors, § 2119(11).
Commissioner of agriculture to establish
grades and making rules, § 2119(9).
Dealers protected by inspection, etc., § 2119-
(14).
Delivery prima facie evidence of offer to sell,
§ 2119(12).
Inspection, §§ 2119(11), 2119(14).
Package to be marked, § 2119(10).
Penalty, § 2119(13).
Stamps, § 2119(10).
Unfit fruit not to be shipped, § 2119(15).
MARRIAGE.
Application for marriage license, § 208(1).
Application for marriage license by one not
born in this state, § 2177(11).
False statement, § 2177(15).
Filing application for marriage license, §
2177(9).
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
Information as to impediments, § 2938(1).
Non-residents, § 2177(11).
Notice of application to be posted, § 2938.
Report by state registrar of vital statistics
after examination as to registration of ap-
plicant, § 2177(10).
Unlawful for whites to marry other than
whites; penalty, § 2177(14).
MARRIAGE—Cont'd
Attorney-general.
Duty of attorney-general, § 2177(20).
Colored persons.
See "Colored Persons"; "Miscegenation."
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
Forms.
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
Guardian and ward.
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
Impediments, information as to, § 2938(1).
License.
See infra, "Application for Marriage Li-
cense."
Application for license; information as to im-
pediments, etc., § 2938(1).
False statement in application; penalty, §
2177(15).
Filing application for marriage license, §
2177(9).
Form of application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
Notice of application to be posted, § 2938.
'Report by state registrar of vital statistics
after examination as to registration of ap-
plicant, § 2177(10<).
Return of license after marriage, § 2177(12).
Miscegenation.
See "Miscegenation."
Notice.
Notice of application for license to be posted,
§ 2938.
Ordinary's noncompliance with law, § 2177(16).
Parent and child.
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
Performing marriage ceremony in violation of
law, § 2177(17).
Return of license after marriage, § 2177(12).
Solicitor-general.
Duty of solicitor-general, § 2177(20).
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Licenses.
Salary and wage buyers, § 993(263).
Workmen's Compensation Act.
See "Workmen's Compensation Act."
MIDWIVES.
'Registration, § 1681(42).
MILK AND CHEESE DAIRY INSPEC-
TION.
See "Dairies."
MISCEGENATION.
See "Colored Persons."
Attorney-general's duties, § 2177(20).
False statement in application; penalty, § 2177-
(15).
Ordinary's noncompliance with law, § 2177(16).
Performing marriage ceremony in violation of
law, § 2177(17).
Report of violation of law, § 2177(18).
Return of license after marriage, § 2177(12).
(Solicitor-general's duties, § 2177(20).
Unlawful for whites to marry other than
white; penalty, § 2177(14).
"White person" defined, § 2177(13).
Who are persons of color, § 2177.
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MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST.
Foreclosure.
Jurisdiction to vacate or set aside judgment,
§ 5968(4).
Recordation.
Method, § 4198(1).
MOTOR BUSSES.
Licenses, § 993(244).
Cars operated for hire over fixed routes, §
993(204).
MOTOR VEHICLES CARRIERS ACT OF
1929.
Act cumulative of other laws, § 1770 (60zz).
Application for registration and license, § 1770-
(60uu).
Baggage, § 1770(60oo).
Bond reversed for protection of public, § 1770-
(60ii).
Certificate of public convenience and necessity,
§ 1770(G0hh).
Certificates, fees for issuance and transfer, §
1770 (60tt).
Chartered motor vehicles, § 1770(6011).
Commissioners power to regulate, § 1770-
.
(60g
.
g)
:
Commission to prescribe rates, § 177O(60jj).
County taxes, § 1770 (60ww).
Daily records, § 1770(60vv).
Definitions, § 1770(60ff).
Discontinuance of service, § 177O(60qq).
Exemptions for county and municipal taxes, §
1770(60ww).
Fees.
Application for registration, § 1770(60uu).
Issuance and transfer of certificate of con-
venience, § 1770(6011).
License.
Application for registration and license, §
1770(60uu).
Mail, parcels, packages, may be carried, §
1770(60mm).
Municipal taxes.
Exemptions, § 1770(60ww).
Penalties, § 1770(60xx).
Railroad.
Companies authorized to buy stock of motor
carrier, § 1770 (60rr).
Rates, § 1770 (60jj).
Rates discriminatory or reduced rates, § 1770-
(60kk).
Rebates and free transportation, § 1770 f60xx).
Records, § 1770(60vv).
Registration.
Application for registration and license, §
1770(60uu).
Review of orders of commission, § 1770 (60ss).
Salaries, § 177O(60yy).
Schedules, § 1770(60pp).
Time act takes effect, § 17 70(60aaa).
Title of act, § 1770(60ee).
White and colored passengers, § 1770 (60nn).
MOTOR VEHICLES.
See "Automobiles."
Motor vehicles carriers.
See "Motor Vehicle Carriers Act of 1929."
Title 'registration act, § 1770 (60^a).
Machines operated for hire, § 1770 (60^a).
MOVING PICTURES.
Licenses, § 993(247).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Amendment of charter.
Referendum, § 913(19).
Automobiles.
Municipal regulations of autos, § 1770(60s).
Chain gang, Penal Code, § 1236(2).
Charters.
Amendment, § 913(19).
Referendum, § 913(19).
(Repeal, § 913(19).
City planning 'commissions.
Report, § 4901(6).
Clerks of court.
Endorsement of plat for laying out street or
highways, § 4901(6).
Report of city planning commission, § 4901(6).
Councilman.
When councilman incompetent to hold other
office, § 886.
When incompetent to hold other municipal
office, § 886.
Elections.
Precincts located in city or town having pop-
ulation of 1,000 or more, § 80(b).
Referendum on appeal or amendment of
municipal charters, § 913(19).
Licenses.
See "Licenses."
"In cities and towns" defined, § 993(294).
Limitation on municipal debts, § 6563.
Authority of Ware County to increase bonded
debt for hospital, App. II, § 6563.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, § 653.
Officers.
See infra, "Pensions."
Councilman.
When councilman incompetent to hold
other office, § 886.
Pensions.
Appropriation to meet deficiency in fund,
Penal Code, § 1519(61).
Board of trustees for fund; members, Penal
Code, § 1519(59).
Cities of above 150,000 population, Penal
Code, § 1519(67).
City employees in cities of above 150,000 peo-
ple, Penal Code, § 1519(56).
Committee in charge of pensions, Penal
Code, § 1519(69).
Deduction of 2 per cent from salaries, Penal
Code, § 1519(60).
Effect as to pensioner under previous law,
Penal Code, § 1519(65).
Funds not assignable or subject to garnish-
ment, etc., Penal Code, § 1519(64).
In counties of more than 200,000 population,
Penal Code, § 1519 (55h).
Pensions for employees not infirm or dis-
abled after 25 years' service, Penal Code,
§ 1519 (5i5ii).
Tax to pay pensions, Penal Code, § 1519-
(55j).
When effective, Penal Code, § 1519 (55k).
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Penal Code, §§
cities of 150,000
§ 1519(55^).
act, P/emal Code,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—Cont'd
Pensions—Cont'd
In counties of population of between 52,995
and 80,000, Penal Code, § 1519 (55a).
Act not to affect workmen's compensation
law, Penal Code, § 1519 (55g).
Act not to repeal benefits now being paid,
Penal Code, § 1519 (55f).
Applicable to teachers and other employees
of board of education, Penal Code, §
1519(55e).
Funds from deductions from salaries, Penal
Code, § 1519 C55e).
Half-pay for employees serving 25 years
continuously, Penal Code, § 1519(55b).
Two per cent of salary deducted monthly,
Penal Code, § 1519 (5Sd).
Meaning of "governing authorities," Penal
Code, § 1519(73).
Objectors to deduction, excluded, Penal Code,
§ 1519(62).
Pensions only for those paying 2 per cent of
salary to fund, Penal Code, § 1519(71).
Retirement as a matter of right, Penal Code,
§ 1519058).
Right to retire after 25 years' service, Penal
Code, § 1519(57).
Right to retire on half-pay Penal Code, §
1519(68).
Supplementary ordinances,
1519(63), 1519(70).
Widows of employees in
population, Penal Code,
•Workmen's compensation
§§ 1519(66), 1519(72).
Power of municipality and its officers.
•Purchasers of realty by cities of certain popu-
lation, § 891(1).
When councilman incompetent to hold other
office, § 886.
Purchases of realty by cities of certain popula-
tion, § 891(1).
Referendum,.
Repeal or amendment of municipal charters,
§ 913(19).
Street improvements in certain cities, §
913(24).
Repeal of charter.
Referendum, § 913(19).
Securities.
See "Municipal Securities."
Sinking fund.
See "Municipal Securities."
Special assessments.
Street improvements in certain cities.
See "Special Assessments."
Street improvemients in certain cities.
See "Special Assessments."
Bonds, § 913(32).
Zoning.
Proposed amendment to
App. II, § 6452(1).
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
Attorney-general.
Validating bonds, § 445.
Counties.
Residue of bond issue
ments, § 431(4).
Use of balance of proceeds of bond issue, to
pay warrants in certain counties, § 431(4).
the Constitution,
used for improve-
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES—Cont'd
Prior issue.
Bonds for refunding or paying off prior issue,
§ 461.
Refunding.
Bonds for refunding or paying off prior is-
sue, § 461.
Taxation.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for retire-
ment of State Bonds, § 993(171).
Validating bond.
Bond for refunding or paying off prior issue,
§ 461.
Election, § 445.
Notice to attorney-general, § 445.
Notice to solicitor-general, § 445.
Sections applicaole to validation of street im-
provement bonds, § 462(1).
Street improvement bonds.
Sections applicable to validation of street
improvement bonds, § 462(1)
Street improvements, § 445.
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS.
Licenses, § 993(325).
NAMES.
Fictitious names.
See "Trade Names or Fictitious Names."
Trade names.
See "Trade Names of Fictitious Names."
NAVIGATION COMPANIES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Checks.
Stale checks, § 2366 (195A).
NEGROES.
See "Colored Persons."
NEWSPAPERS.
Judicial sales and rentings.
See "Judicial Sales and Rentings."
NORMAL COLLEGE.
See "State Agricultural and Normal College."
NOTICE.
Animals.
Tuberculosis, § 20-64(2).
Value of tuberculin animals, § 2064(3).
Jeweler's sale for repair, §§ 3364(2)-3364(5).
Marriage.
Notice of application for license to be posted,
§ 2938.
NURSES, §§ 1711(7)-1711(22).
Board of examiners of nurses.
Books to be property of new board, § 1711-
(21).
Continuation of members of existing board,
§ 1711(21).
Creation, § 1711(7).
Members, § 1711(7).
Certificates, § 1711(9).
Certificates of registration without examina-
tion, § 1711(20).
Nursing without certificate, § 1711(14).
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NURSES—Cont'd
Certificates—Cont'd
Revocation of certificate; notice to holder, §
1711(18).
Dental nurses, § 1711(11).
Deposit fee by applicant, § 1711(11).
Emergency nursing, § 1711(17).
Examinations., §§ *L711(10), 1711(13).
Certificates of registration without examina-
tion, § 1711(20).
Registration without, § 1711(13).
Fees.
Deposit fee by applicant, § 1711(11).
Undergraduate nurse, § 1711(16).
Licenses.
See infra, "Certificate."
Licenses to undergraduate nurses, § 1711(15).
/Notice of examinations, § 1711(10).
Notice of revocation, § 1711(18).
Nursing without certificate from 'board, §
1711(14).
Officers, § 1711(8).
Practical nurses, § 1711(22).
Profession regulated, §§ 1711(7)-1711(22).
Qualifications, § 1711(12).
Quorum, § 1711(9).
Records, § 1711(9).
Registration without examination, § 1711(13).
Salary of secretary, § 1711(19).
Seal, § 1711(9).
Statutes.
Nurses not affected by Act, § 1711(22).
OFFICERS.
County officers.
Office expenses of officers of certain counties,
§ 418(6).
OFFICERS OF COURT.
Compensation to officers, § 6001.
OFFICIAL BONDS.
Commissioner of agriculture, § 2067(1).
OILS.
Access for inspection, § 1814(19).
Analysis for buyer, § 1814(10).
Chemist.
See infra, "State Oil Chemist."
Comptroller-general.
Appointment of state oil chemist, § 1814(12).
IDuty to collect and lest samples, § 1814(16).
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Containers, § 1814(8).
Criminal law.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection.
See "Inspection."
Labels, § 1814(8).
Licenses, §§ 993(295)-993(302).
Trucks, § 993(273).
Notice as to shipments, § 1814(9).
Oil inspectors.
Appointment, § 1814(13).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Daily reports, § 1814(15).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
OILS—Cont'd
Oil inspectors—'Cont'd
Expense of equipment, supplies, clerical help;
etc., allowance for; limits, § 1814(22).
Expenses, § 1814(13).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Inspectors' automobiles, § 1814(15).
Inspectors' duty as to pumps, § 1814(18).
Numlbers, § 1814(13).
Removal of chemist or inspector; charges in
writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, §§ 1814(13), 1814(23).
Term, § 1814(13).
Unlawful interest in sale, etc., § 1814(14).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Samples, § 1814(9).
State oil chemist, § 1814(6).
Appointment, § 1814(12).
Approval by state oil chemist, § 1814(6).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Removal of 'chemist or inspector; charges in
writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, § 1814(23).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Taxation, §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
Test, §§ 1814(10), 1814(11).
OPTICIAN.
Licenses.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
OPTOMETRIST.
Licenses.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
ORDINANCES.
Street improvements in certain cities, §§ 913-
(25), 913(28).
ORDINARIES.
Authority of ordinaries, § 4804(l)-4804(7).
Compensation when no fees allowed, § 6001.
Guardian and ward.
Custody and distribution when no legal guard-
ian, § 4804(1).
Infants.
Custody and distribution when no legal guard-
ian, § 4804(1).
(Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
Inheritance tax, § 1041(2).
Insane, epileptic, feeble-minded and inebriates.
Custody and distribution when no legal guard-
ian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4802(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
Records.
Records open to inspection, § 4804(4).
OSTEOPATHY.
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
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PACKING-HOUSES.
Licenses, § 993(251).
PARDONS.
Parole.
Georgia Training School for Girls, Penal
Code, § 1259(10).
PARENT AND CHILD.
Abandonment.
Witnesses, Penal Code, § 1037.
Adoption of children, § 3016.
Marriage.
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
PARKS.
Purchases of realty by cities of certain popu-
lation, § 891(1).
PAROLE.
Georgia Training School for Girls, Penal Code,
§ 1259(10).
PARTNERSHIP.
Fictitious names.
See "Trade Names or Fictitious Names."
Trade names.
See "Trade Names or Fictitious Names."
PATENTS.
Licenses.
Patent rights, § 993(252).
PAWNBROKERS.
Licenses, § 993(254).
PAYMENT.
Payment of money into treasury.
See "Treasury."
PEACHES.
See "Marks and Brands."
PEDDLERS.
Licenses, § 993(255).
PENITENTIARY.
Tax to support prisoners in certain counties,
Penal Code, §§ 1236(1)-1236(3).
PENSIONS.
County employees, Penal Code, §§ 1519(44)-
1919(59).
Board of trustees for fund members, Penal
Code, § 1519(49).
Children, Penal Code, § 1519(54).
City employees in cities of above 150,000
people, Penal Code, §§ 1519(56)-1519(59),
1519(67).
County employees in counties of more than
200,000 people, Penal Code, § 1519(44).
Deduction from salaries, Penal Code, §
1519(50).
Former pensions not affected, Penal Code,
§ 1519(53).
Half-pay after retirement, Penal Code, §
1519(47).
Half-pay for total disability, Penal Code, §
1519(48).
Involuntary retirement, Penal Code, § 1519(52).
PENSIONS^Cont'd
County employees—Cont'd
Pension for widow, etc., Penal Code, §
1519(47).
Return of amount deducted from salary,
Penal Code, § 1519 051).
Right to retire after 25 years' service, Penal
Code, § 1519(45).
Voluntary retirement of disabled employees,
Penal Code, § 1519(46).
Widow, Penal Code, § 1519(54).
Workmen's compensation act, Penal Code,
§ 1519(55).
Ex-confederate soldiers and widows, Penal
Code, § 1482(15).
Municipal corporations.
Appropriation to meet deficiency in fund,
Penal Code, § 1519(61).
Board of trustees for fund members, Penal
Code, § 1519(59).
Cities of above 150,000 population, Penal
Code, § 1519(67).
City employees in cities of above 150,000
people, Penal Code, § 1519(56).
Committee in charge of pensions, Penal
Code, § 1519(69).
Deduction of 2 per cent from salaries, Penal
Code, § 1519(60).
Effect as to pensioner under previous law,
Penal Code, § 1519(65).
Funds not assignable or subject to garnish-
ment, etc., Penal Code, § 1519(64).
In counties of more than 200,000 population,
Penal Code, § 1519(55h).
Pension for employees not infirm or dis-
abled after 25 years' service, Penal Code,
§ 1519(55i).
Tax to pay pensions, Penal Code, § 1519-
(55j).
When effective, Penal Code, § 1519 (55k).
In counties of population of between 52,995
and 80,000, Penal Code, § 1519(55a).
Act not to affect workmen's compensation
law, Penal Code, § 1519(55g).
Act not to repeal benefits now being paid,
Penal Code, § 1519(55f).
Applicable to teachers and other employ-
ees of board of education, Penal Code, §
1519(55c).
Funds from deductions from salaries, Penal
Code, § 1519 (55e).
Half-pay for employees serving 25 years
continuously, Penal Code, § 1519 (55b).
Two per cent of salary deducted monthly,
Penal Code, § 1519(55d).
Meaning of "governing authorities," Penal
Code, § 1519(73).
Objectors to deduction excluded, Penal Code,
§ 1519(62).
Pensions only for those paying 2 per cent
of salary to fund, Penal Code, § 1519(71).
Retirement as a matter of right, Penal
Code, § 1519(58).
Right to retire after 25 years' service, Penal
Code, § 1519(57).
Right to retire on half-pay, Penal Code. §
1519(68).
Supplementary ordinances, Penal Code, §§
1519(63), 1519(70).
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PENSIONS—Cont'd
Municipal corporations—Cont'd
Widows of employees in cities of 150,000
population, Penal Code, § 1518(5554).
Workmen's compensation act, Penal Code,
§§ 1519(66), 1519(72).
Workmen's compensation law not affected,
Penal Code, § 1519(66).
Workmen's compensation act, Penal Code, §§
1519(55), 1519(66), 1519(72).
PHARMACY.
See "State Board of Pharmacy."
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
Death.
Death without medical attention, § 1681(34).
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
PLACEMENT AND ADOPTION OF CHIL-
DREN.
Notice of adoption, § 3016.
PLUMBING.
Licenses, § 993(278).
POLL TAXES.
Exemptions, § 993(170).
POWER COMPANIES.
See "Light and Power."
Licenses.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF
PROOF.
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence ap-
plies to motor busses, § 2713(1).
PRIMARY ELECTIONS.
Elections.
Contest in certain counties, § 126(1).
Candidate receiving highest vote is deemed
nominee, § 126(2).
Judgment of superior court final, § 126(3).
General assembly, §§ 138(75*4), 138(754a).
Judges, § 138(75^).
Municipal corporations.
Keeping polls open in precincts located in
city or town having population of 1,000
or more in certain counties, § 80(b).
Nomination for general assembly members, §§
138(750, 138(754a).
Nomination of Superior Court judges, §
138(754).
Plurality, §§ 138 (754a).
Specification of incumbent opposed, §§ 138-
(754), 138(7^a).
Time of keeping polls open in certain counties,
§ 80(b).
PRISONS AND PRISONERS.
Chain gang, Penal Code, § 1236(2).
Tax to support prisoners in certain counties,
Penal Code, §§ 1236(l)-1236(3).
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
See "Corporations."
PROCESSIONING.
Instruments to be bought for surveyors, §
3824(1).
Surveys and surveyors.
Instruments to be bought for surveyors, §
3824(1).
PROFESSIONAL NURSING.
See "Nursing."
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT.
Licenses, § 993(172).
PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
United States.
Exemption from taxation, § 26(2).
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1), 26(2).
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
Abolition of fee system in certain counties.
See "Fees."
Bonds.
Commissioner of agriculture, § 2067(1).
Officers of court.
Compensation, § 6001.
Pensions.
See "Pensions."
Salaries.
Abolition of fee system in certain counties.
See "Fees."
Secretary of State, comptroller-general and
treasurer.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
State veterinarian.
Salary, § 2081(3).
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.
Amendments to Special Acts of 1926, Appx. I.
Appropriation for consolidated schools, §
1551(97).
Consolidation.
Appropriation for, § 1551(97).
Merger of independent school system,
Appx. I.
Municipality having a population of
200,000 or more, Appx. I.
Taxes, Appx. I.
Territory becomes independent school dis-
trict, Appx. I.
County boards of education.
Compensation of members, § 1551(8454).
Merger.
See infra, "Consolidation."
Instructions in animal, bird and fish life.
See "Education."
Payment of teachers, §§ 1551(154a)-1551(154c).
Pupils, transportation of, § 1551(100).
Taxation.
Repeal of independent school system,
Appx. I.
Teachers.
Payment of teachers, §§ 1551 (154a)-
1551(154c).
Authority to use funds allocated for other
purposes, § 155l(154b).
Governor's authority to make debt to pay
teachers, § 1551(154a).
Limit of authority, § 1551 (154c).
Transportation of pupils, § 1551(100).
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RAILROADS.
Crossings.
See "Crossings."
Elimination of grade crossings.
See "Crossings."
Evidence.
Proof of injury as prima facie evidence ap-
plies to motor busses, § 2713(1).
Licenses, § 993(288).
Railroad returns and by whom made, §§
993(288), 993(289).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
Motor vehicle carriers act of 1929.
Companies authorized to buy stock of mo-
tor carrier, § 1770 (60rr).
Companies authorized to operate motor ve-
hicles, § 1770(60rr).
Special assessments.
Street improvements in certain cities, §
913(27).
Taxation, § 993(288).
County taxation of railroads.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041.
Railroad returns and by whom made, §§
993(288), 993(289).
REAL ESTATE BROKERS.
See "Brokers."
RECORDING ACTS.
See "Registration."
Dockets.
General execution docket, § 3321.
General executive docket, § 3321.
Liens, § 3321.
Method of recording instruments affecting land
title, § 4198(1).
RECORDS.
Ordinaries.
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
REGISTRATION.
Automobiles, § 1770(60c).
See "Automobiles."
Colored persons.
False registration, felony; punishment, §
2177(7).
Fee for registration 30 cents; how divided, §
2177(6).
Forms, §§ 2177(1)-2177(3).
Local registrar must cause each person in
district to execute form, etc., § 2177(3).
Penalty for refusal to execute registration
certificate, etc., § 2177(5).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(1)-2177(7).
Untrue statement, § 2177(4).
Fertilizers.
See "Fertilizers."
Method of recording instruments affecting land
title, § 4198(1).
REGISTRATION
DEATHS.
See "Vital Statistics."
OF BIRTHS AND
REPORTER.
See "Stenographers and Stenographic Re-
porters."
REPORTS.
City planning commission, § 4901(6).
RESTAURANTS.
Licenses, § 993(201).
REVENUE.
See "Taxation."
Payment of revenue into treasury.
See "Treasury."
RULES OF COURT.
Rules of superior courts.
Arguments of counsel, §§ 6261, 6264.
Attorneys, §§ 6261-6264.
Bill of exceptions, § 6318(a).
Continuances, § 6280.
Interrogatories.
Time allowed for return, § 6291.
Judgments and decrees.
Form of decree, § 6296(a).
Papers, § 6263.
SALARIES AND FEES.
Salaries of commissioners of roads and reve-
nues in certain counties, § 626(2).
SALES.
Conditional sales.
Setting aside judgment, § 5968(4).
Execution sales.
See "Execution Sales."
Fertilizers.
See "Fertilizers."
Judicial sales and rentings.
See "Judicial Sales and Rentings."
Tax act of 1929.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
SALES TAX ACT OF 1929.
Act to expire December 31, 1931, § 993(340).
Appeals, § 993(332).
Authority to examine records, § 993(329).
Corporation not to receive certificate of disso-
lution until tax paid, § 993(336).
Correction of error in computing tax, §
993(328).
Definition, § 993(316).
Exemption, § 993(323).
Banks, § 993(325).
Insurance companies, § 993(325).
Mutual benefit association, § 993(325).
Sale of gasoline, § 993(326).
Trust companies, § 993(325).
Expense of enforcing act, § 993(339).
Extension of time for return or payment, §
993(327).
Failure to make return, § 993(330).
Form of return, § 993(327).
Gross receipts of shows, § 993(321).
Licenses, § 993(324).
Lien of tax as affecting purchaser of business,
§ 993(331).
Manufacturers taxed on value of products as
shown by gross proceeds of sale, § 993(318).
Payment in quarterly installments, § 993(327).
Penalty, § 993(333).
Penalty for violation of Act, § 993(337).
Petition for correction of assessment, §
993(332).
334 GENERAL INDEX
SALES TAX OF 1929—Cont'd
Power companies, § 993(320).
Prosecuting attorney, § 993(338).
Railroads, § 993(320).
Reduction of tax amount paid as net income
tax, § 993(341).
Re-examination, § 993(327).
Remittances, § 993(335).
State tax board, § 993(332).
State tax commissioners' powers and duties, §
993(338).
Suit to collect tax, § 993(333).
Taxes prohibited by United States Constitu-
tion, § 993(322).
Tax imposed in addition to other taxes, §
993(335).
Tax on business of selling, § 993(319).
Tax year, § 933(334).
Telegraph and telephone companies, § 993(320).
Time of levy, § 993(317).
Time of tax-returns, § 993(327).
SECOND-HAND DEALERS.
Licenses, § 993(228).
SECRETARY OF STATE.
Automobiles.
Secretary of state, ex-officio commissioner
of vehicles, § 170 (60a).
Salary.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Banks and banking.
Superintendent of banks, § 2366(196B).
SERVICE STATION, § 993(180).
SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES.
Automobiles.
Attention to be called to provisions of law,
§ 1770(60x).
Sheriff's duties denned — inspector, §
1770(60x).
Compensation when no fees allowed, § 6001.
Licenses.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., §
993(293).
Taxation.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., §
993(293).
Sheriff ex-officio tax collector, §§ 1225-
1227(16).
Tax collectors, §§ 1225-1227(16).
SINKING FUND.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for retire-
ment of State Bonds, § 993(171).
SLEEPING CAR COMPANIES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
SLOT-MACHINE.
Licenses, § 993(240).
SOFT DRINKS.
Licenses.
Soft-drink syrups, § 993(270).
SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
Colored persons.
Duty of solicitor-general, § 2177(20).
Marriage.
Duty of solicitor-general, § 2177(20).
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS.
Injunctions.
Street improvements in certain cities, §
913(34).
Liens.
Street improvements in certain cities.
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913(38).
Railroads.
Street improvements in certain cities, §
913(27).
Street improvements in certain cities, §§
913(23)-913(38).
Affidavit of illegality, § 913(33).
Apportionment of cost to abutting owners,
§ 913(30).
Appraisers to apportion cost to abutting
land, § 913(30).
Assessment, § 913(25).
Affidavit of illegality, § 913(33).
Appraisers to apportion cost to abutting
land, § 913(30).
Assessment on basis of frontage, § 913(26).
Assessment where county is land owner,
§ 913(35).
Intersecting streets, § 913(26).
Lien of assessment, §§ 913(31), 913(38).
Resolution, § 913(25).
Sales to pay assessment, § 913(33).
Suit to enjoin assessment, § 913(34).
Treasurer's duty as to collection, § 913(33).
Bonds, § 913(32).
County land owner, § 913(35).
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Definitions, § 913(23).
Liens, §§ 913(25), 913(31).
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913(38).
Municipality paying part of cost, § 913(37).
Number of streets included in one resolu-
tion, § 913(25).
Ordinances, §§ 913(25), 913(28).
Payment of part by municipality, § 913(37).
Petition by majority of abutting owners, §
913(25).
Powers as to ordinances, § 913(28).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913(38).
Protest, § 913(25).
Publication of resolution, § 913(25).
Railroads, § 913(27).
Referendum as to adoption of this Act, §
913(24).
Repeal of special laws, § 913(36).
Resolution, § 913(25).
As to kind and extent of improvement;
contracts; bonds, etc., § 913(29).
Declaring improvement necessary, §
913(25).
Petition of majority of abutting owners, §
913(25).
Protest, § 913(25).
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SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS—Cont'd
Street improvements in certain cities—Cont'd
Resolution—Cont'd
Publication, § 913(25).
When not necessary, § 913(25).
Sales to pay assessment, § 913(33).
Special laws not repealed, § 913(36).
Suit to enjoin assessment, § 913(34).
Time limit of suit to enjoin assessment, §
913(34).
Treasurer's duty as to collection of assess-
ment, § 913(33).
Validation of lien, § 913(38).
STATE AGRICULTURAL AND NORMAL
COLLEGE, Appx. I, §§ 1-8.
STATE BOARD OF GAME AND FISH.
Grand jury recommendations, § 2158(4^).
Powers of board over fish during spawning
season, § 2158(4^).
Spawning season, § 2158(4^).
STATE BOARD OF HEALTH.
Registration of births and deaths.
See "Vital Statistics."
STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY, §§ 1731(1)-
1731(24).
Annual election of member for next vacancy,
§ 1731(4).
Annual registration, § 1731(22).
Creation, § 1731(1).
Drugs to be compounded only by or under su-
pervision of registered pharmacist, § 1731(11).
Election of representative to meeting of asso-
ciation of other States, § 1731(15).
Examination, § 1731(18).
Examination fee, § 1731(13).
Examinations by board, time of, § 1731(10).
Fees, § 1731(19).
Fees to go to fund in state treasury for pay
and expenses of board, § 1731(19).
Governor to commission members; term 5
years, § 1731(3).
Licenses.
License to one registered in another State,
§ 1731(14).
Refusal or revocation of license, § 1731(16).
Meaning of "drug-store," "pharmacy," "apothe-
cary," § 1731(20).
Members of existing board to be new board, §
1731(2).
New board, § 1731(2).
Oath of appointee, § 1731(6).
Organization of board, § 1731(8).
Pay of members, § 1731(7).
Power to make rules, § 1731(23).
Qualifications of applicants, § 1731(12).
Registration, § 1731(22).
Secretary's salary, § 1731(9).
Term, § 1731(3).
Unexpired term, § 1731(5).
Unlawful use of title "drug-store," etc., §
1731(21).
Violation of act a misdemeanor, § 1731(24).
Who may compound or sell drugs, etc., §
1731(17).
STATE DEBT.
Bond commissione'r, § 232.
STATE DEBT—Cont'd
Taxation.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for retire-
ment of State bonds, § 993(171).
STATE DEPOSITORIES, § 1249.
Buchanan, § 1249.
Dexter, § 1249.
Glennville, § 1249.
STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT.
Actions.
Defense to suits, § 828(19).
Additional main traffic rules, § 828(19).
Adjustment of claims, § 828(19).
Amount designated by governor presumed
correct, § 828 (30c).
Contracts of highway department, § 828 (19d).
Funds for highway board from taxes on dis-
tributors of fuel, § 828 (30a).
Gas tax, § 828(19a).
Highway department not liable for damages
or additional state-aid law, § 828 (19c).
Powers and duties of highway department.
Amount designated by governor presumed
correct, § 828(30c).
Appointment of board, § 828(19).
Contracts of highway department, § 828 (19d).
Fund for highway board from taxes on fuel
distributors, § 828 (30a).
Gas tax, § 828 (19a).
Highway department not liable for damages
on additional State-aid roads, § 828 (19c).
Limit of total mileage, § 828(19).
Relocation, § 828(19).
Roads to become part of State-Aid System, §
828(19b).
Warrants on special fund, § 828 (30b).
Roads to become part of state-aid system, §
828(19b).
Warrants on special fund, § 828(30b).
STATE OIL CHEMIST.
See "Oils."
STATE VETERINARIAN.
Dairies.
Annual reports, § 2119(31).
Duties as to dairy inspection, § 2119(16).
Duty as to weighing and testing, § 2119(20).
Money received by state veterinarian, §
2119(32).
Quarterly reports to state veterinarian, §
2119(24).
Notice to owner of tuberculin animal, § 2064(2).
Salary, § 2081(3).
Tuberculosis in domestic animals.
See "Tuberculosis."
STATISTICS.
See "Vital Statistics."
STENOGRAPHERS AND STENOGRAPHIC
REPORTERS.
In counties containing cities of more .than
175,000 inhabitants, § 5989(3).
Salaries in circuits with cities of 30,000 to
52,000 population, § 5989(7).
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STILLBORN CHILD.
Stillborn child to be
1681(32).
registered twice, §
STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS.
Executors and administrators.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
Guardian and ward.
Transfer of stock, § 4105.
Stock without par value, Appx. I, § 16.
STOCK LAWS.
See "Fences."
STREET RAILROADS.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.
Alternative road law.
General law amended to except certain
counties, § 704(2).
Road duty and commutation tax in certain
counties.
Exemption, § 723(1).
Tax in counties of certain population, §
695(3).
Automobiles.
See "Automobiles."
Clerks of court.
Endorsement of plat for laying out street
or highway, § 4901(6).
Commissioners of roads and revenues.
Salaries of commissioners in certain coun-
ties, § 626(2).
Taxation, § 1551 (6a).
Crossings.
See "Crossings."
Eminent domain.
Condemnation of road or highway for power
plant generating electricity, § 5240(1).
Municipal bonds.
See "Municipal Securities."
Road duty.
Exemption in certain counties, § 723(1).
Road duty in certain counties.
See infra, "Alternative Road Law."
Special assessments.
See "Special Assessments."
State highway department.
See "State Highway Department."
Street improvements in certain cities.
See "Special Assessments."
Throwing things on highways, § 1770 (60w).
SUBPOENA.
Compensation of subpoena clerks, Penal Code,
§ 876.
SUCCESSION TAX.
See "Inheritance Tax."
SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS.
Armistice day, § 1770(81).
SURVEYS AND SURVEYORS.
Processioning.
Instruments to be bought for surveyors, §
3824(1).
TAXATION.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Ad valorem tax.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Advertisements of sales, §§ 1227(2)-1227(5),
1227(8), 1227(11), 1227(14).
Alternative road law.
General road law amended to except certain
counties, § 704(2).
Tax in counties of certain population, §
695(3).
Automobile financing, § 993(305).
Auto transportation companies, § 993(304).
Banks and banking, § 993(290).
Building and loan associations, § 993(291).
Business taxes.
See "Licenses."
Canals, § 993(288).
Cigarettes and cigars.
See "Licenses."
Collection of taxes, § 993(306).
Corporations.
Return by resident agents, § 993(292).
County revenue.
County purposes generally, § 513.
Purposes for which tax may be assessed,
§ 513.
Default.
Penalty for default, § 993(307).
Deputies.
Tax collectors, §§ 1227(3), 1227(6), 1227(9),
1227(12), 1227(15).
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., § 993(293).
Education.
$20,000 a month from commissioners of
road and revenue payable in counties of
certain population, § 1551 (6a).
Estate tax.
See "Inheritance Tax."
Executions.
Inheritance tax, § 1041(4).
Exemption from taxation.
Inheritance lax, § 1041(21).
Land acquired by .the United Spates for pub-
lic buildings, § 26(2).
Poll tax, § 993(170).
United States, § 26(2).
Filling stations, § 993(303).
Fiscal year.
Fiscal year in certain counties, §§ 526(4)-
526(6).
Fuel distributors, §§ 993(295)-993(302).
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Bond by distributor, § 993(302).
Definition of distributor, § 993 (296a).
Invoices and bills, § 993(299).
Kerosene distributors, § 993(297).
Monthly reports of fuel distributors, §
993(300).
Payment of comptroller-general, § 993(301).
Registration of fuel distributors, § 993(298).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
Gas and gas companies, § 993(288).
Gasoline, §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
See infra, "Fuel Distributors."
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Definition of distributors, § 993 (296a).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
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TAXATION—Cont'd
Gasoline and motor fuels.
Counties in which state aid roads are created,
§ 828(19a).
Income taxes.
See "Income Taxes."
Inheritance tax.
See "Inheritance Tax."
Insurance companies, § 993 (286>).
Licenses, §§ 993(169), 993(295)-993(341).
See "Licenses."
Light and power, § 993(288).
Limitation on municipal debts.
Debt of counties and cities not to exceed
7%, §, 6563.
Manufacturing companies, § 993(287).
Motor vehicle carriers act of 1929.
See "Motor Vehicle Carriers Act of 1929."
Municipal securities.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for retire-
ment of State Bonds, § 993(171).
Navigation companies, § 993(288).
Objects of county tax, § 513.
Occupation privilege.
See "Sales Tax Act of 1929."
Occupation taxes.
See "Licenses."
Oils, §§ 993(295)-993(302).
Payment.
How paid, § 993(285).
Payment of revenue into treasury.
See "Treasury."
Penalty for default, § 993(307).
Prisons and prisoners.
Tax to support prisoners in certain counties,
Penal Code, §§ 1236(1)-1236(3).
Professional tax, § 993(172).
Railroads, § 993(288).
County taxation of railroads.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041.
Railroad returns and»by whom made, §§ 993-
(288), 9<9i3(289).
Registration, § 993(306).
Automobiles operated for hire, § 1770(60^a).
Returns.
How returned, § 993(284).
Road duty.
Exemption, § 723(1).
Sheriffs.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., § 993-
(293).
Sheriff ex officio tax collector, §§ 1225-
1227(16).
Sinking fund.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for retire-
ment of State Bonds, § 993(171).
Sleeping car companies, § 993(288).
Specific taxing, § 993(169).
State debt.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for retire-
ment of State Bonds, § 993(171).
Street railroads, § 993(288).
Succession taxes.
See "Inheritance Taxes."
Tax collectors.
Advertisements of sales, §§ 1227(2), 1227(5),
1227(8), 1227(11), 1227(14).
Counties with population of 6,458 to 6,462, §
1227(13).
Advertisement, § 1227(14).
Ga.—22
TAXATION—Cont'd
Tax collectors—Cont'd
Deputies, § 1227(15).
Counties with population of 7,320, § 1227(1).
Counties with population of 14,493 to 14,495
population, § 1227(16).
Counties with population of 15,160, § 1227(4).
Advertisement of sales, § 1227(5).
Deputies, § 1227(6).
Counties with population of 15,275 to 15,300,
§ 1227(7).
Advertisement, § 1227(8).
Deputies, § 1227(9).
Counties of 10,590 to 10,600 population, §
1227(10).
Advertisement, § 1227(11).
Deputies, § 1227(12).
Deputies, §§ 1227(3), 1227(6), 1227(9), 1227-
(12), 1227(15).
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc., § 993-
(293).
Sheriff, ex-officio in some counties, § 1225.
Sheriff ex-officio tax-collector, §§ 1225-1227-
(16).
Tax sale.
Advertisement of sales, §§ 1227(2), 2127(5).
Telegraphs and telephones, § 993(288).
Transfer of property of non-resident decedent,
§ 1041(17).
United States.
Exemption of land ceded United States, §
26(2).
Water companies and waterworks, § 993(288).
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(320).
Taxation, § 993(288).
TEN-PIN ALLEYS.
Licenses, § 993(216).
THEATERS AND SHOWS.
Licenses.
See "Licenses."
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(321).
TIME.
Fiscal year.
Fiscal year in certain counties, §§ 526(4)-526-
(6).
Year.
See infra, "Fiscal Year."
TRADE NAMES OR FICTITIOUS NAMES.
Affidavit giving true name, Penal Code, § 258(1).
Alphabetical index, Penal Code, § 258(3).
Change of ownership of business, Penal
Code, § 258(2).'
Time of filing, Penal Code, § 258(2).
Change of ownership of business, Penal Code,
§ 258(2).
Corporation legally doing business under its
corporate name not affected, Penal Code, §
258(4).
Fees of clerk, Penal Code, § 258(3).
Index of affidavits, Penal Code, § 258(3).
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TRADE NAMES OR FICTITIOUS NAMES—
Cont'd
Unlawful use of fictitious or trade name, Penal
Code, § 258(1).
Violation of act a misdemeanor, Penal Code, §
258(5).
TRAINED NURSES.
See "Nurses."
TRAPPERS.
See "Game and Game Laws."
License, § 2158(30^).
TREASURER.
Bond commissioner, ex-omcio, § 232.
County treasurer.
Salary in certain counties, § 590(2).
Salary.
Proposed amendment to the Constitution,
Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
State treasurer ex-officio 'bond commissioner,
§ 232.
Street improvements in certain cities.
Collection, § 913(33).
TREASURY.
Payment of revenue into treasury, § 1248(1)-
1248(7).
Appropriation or allocation of certain funds
not affected, § 124806).
Exception of funds collected to match Federal
aid funds, § 1248(4).
Exceptions, § 1248(3).
Expenses of maintenance to be paid from
treasury, § 1248(2).
Money collected by departments, etc., for
maintenance, to be paid into State treasury,
§ 1248(1).
Penalty for violation of Act, § 1248(7).
Time of payment to treasury, § 1248(5).
TRUST COMPANIES, §§ 2>821()15)-2821(25).
See "Banks and Banking."
Amendment to charters, § 2821(21).
Time in which amendment obtained, § 2821-
(23).
Bonds.
Dealing in stock and bonds, § 2821(20).
Corporations not affected by this Act, § 2821(25).
Criminal law, § 2821(24).
Dealing in stocks and bonds, § 2821(20).
Definitions, § 2821(15).
Deposits, § 2*821(19).
Surrender of authority to receive deposits,
etc., § 2821(22).
Guaranty, § 2821(18).
Licenses.
Sales tax act of 1929, § 993(325).
Penalties, § 2821(24).
Superintendent of banks, §< 2821(17).
Unauthorized use of the' word trust company,
§ 2821(16).
TUBERCULIN.
Restriction of use or sale, § 2064(4).
TUBERCULOSIS.
Animals, 2064(1)-2064(6).
Annual appropriation, § 2064(5).
Notice agreement on value, § 2064(3).
TUBERCULOSIS—Cont'd
Animals—Cont'd
Notice as to owner of animal, § 2064(2).
Penalty, § 2064(6).
Restriction of use or sale of tuberculin, §
2064(4).
State veterinarian's duty as to eradication of
tuberculosis in animals, § 20'64(1).
State veterinarian, §§ 2064(l)-2064(5).
See infra, "Animals."
Veterinarian.
See infra, "Animals."
VEHICLES.
See "Automobiles."
VENUE.
Banks and banking.
Suits against superintendent, § 2366(196B).
VERDICT.
Punishment to be fixed by city-court jury in
county of 60,000 to 70,000 population, Penal
Code, § 1060(2).
VETERANS.
Extraordinary session of 1926. Appx. I, § 15.
Guardian and ward.
See "Guardian and Ward."
VETERINARIAN.
State veterinarian.
Salary, § 2081(3).
VETERINARY.
Licenses.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Tuberculosis in domestic animals.
See "Tuberculosis."
VITAL STATISTICS, Penal Code, §§ 503(10),
503(11).
Birth certificates, §§ 1681(39)-1681(41), 1681(46).
Certified copies, § 1681(46).
Colored persons.
Local registrar must cause each person in dis-
trict to execute form, etc., § 2177(3).
Registration as to race, § 2177(1).
Supply of forms, § 2177(2).
Death certificate, §§ 1681(33), 1681(44), 1681-
^
(46).
Enforcement of vital statistic law, Penal Code,
§ 503(11).
Evidence.
Certified copies, § 1681(46).
Marriage license, §§ 2177(8)-2177(10).
Registration districts, § 1681(29).
Registration of births and deaths, §§ 1681(27)-
1681(46).
Appointment of State registrar, § 1681(28).
Banks supplied by State registrar, § 1681(43).
Birth certificate, §§ 1681(39), 1681(40), 1681-
(46).
Birth registration, § 1681(38).
Bureau of vital statistics, § 1681(28).
Burial permit, §§ 1681(31), l681(35)-168l(37).
Burial without permit prohibited, § 1681(37).
Certificate of birth to he filed, § 1681(39).
Certificate of death unsatisfactory, § 1681(44).
Certified copies, § 1681(46).
Contents of birth certificates, § 1681(40).
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VITAL STATISTICS—Cont'd
Registration of births and deaths—Cont'd
Contents of burial permit, § 1681(36).
Contents of death certificate, § 1681(33).
Death certificate, §§ 1681(33), 1681(46).
Death certificate unsatisfactory, § 1681(44).
Death without medical attention, § 1681(34).
Districts for registration, § 1'681(29).
Duties of local registrar, § 1681(44).
Fees, § 1681(45).
Indorsement and return of burial permit, §
1681(37).
Local registrars, §§ 1681(30), 1681(44).
Medical attention, § 1681(34).
Procedure in obtaining burial permit, § 1681-
(35).
Qualifications of State registrar, § 1681(28).
Registrar, §§ 1681(28), 1681(30), 1681(43).
Registration of midwives, § 1681 (42).
Removal permit, § 1681(31).
State board of health, § 1681(27).
State registrar, §§ 1681(28), 1681(43).
Stillborn child to be registered twice, § 1681-
(32).
Supplemental report, § 1681(41).
Stillborn child, § 1681(32).
Violation of vital statistic law by any person,
Penal Code, § 503(10).
VOTING MACHINES IN CERTAIN COUN-
TIES.
See "Elections."
WAREHOUSES AND WAREHOUSEMEN.
Licenses.
Merchandise, § 993(276).
WATER COMPANIES AND WATERWORKS.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
WEAPONS.
Licenses.
Pistols, § 993(257).
WHITE PERSONS.
Definition, § 2177(13).
WITNESSES.
Abandonment of child, Penal Code, § 1037.
Husband and wife, Penal Code, § 1037
Persons not competent or compellable, Penal
Code, § 1037.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
Audits, § 3154(75).
Determination of incapacity, § 3154(65).
Expenses.
Prorating of commission expenses, § 3154(75).
Incapacity.
Determination of incapacity, § 3154(65).
Injuries.
Records and reports of injuries, § 3154(65).
Insurance carriers.
Prorating of commission expenses, § 3154(75).
Pension act not affecting workmen's compen-
sation laws, Penal Code, § 1519 (55g).
Pensions, Penal Code, §§ 1519(55), 1519(66),
1519(72).
Prorating of commission expenses, § 3154(75).
Records and reports of injuries, § 3154(65).
Reports, § 3154(75).
WORLD WAR VETERANS.
See "Guardian and Ward."
UNDERTAKERS.
Licenses, § 993(274).
UNITED STATES.
Eminent domain.
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1), 26(2).
Jurisdiction.
Land acquired <by the United States, § 26(2).
Public 'buildings.
Exemption from taxation, § 26(2).
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1), 26(2).
Taxation.
Exemption of land ceded United States, §
26(2).

LOCAL LAW INDEX
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS 1926, 1927 AND 1929
ACWORTH.
Charter amendment, 1925, 64; 1926 63
Public utilities.
Referendum, 1929 796 |
Qualification of voters, 1927 756
Registration of voters, 1927 756
Sewerage, bonds, interest, terms, etc., 1927 754
ADEL.
Street improvements, charter amendment,
1919, 192; 1920, 156; 1926 65
ALAMO.
City Court abolished, 1927 379
Transfer of cases, 1927 379
ALBANY.
City Court, salary of judge, 1927 378
Lighting system, cost, etc., 1927 766
Limits of city, 1927 764
Police power, 1929 797
Zoning, 1929 797
ALMA.
City Court abolished, p 378
Elections, 1927 767
Independent school system, 1929 802
Paving, assessments, 1927 770
School tax, referedum, 1927 769
ALTO.
Contribution to sanitarium, 1927 .1750
AMERICUS.
Board of Police Commissioners abolished,
1927
Street paving assessments, 1913, 490; 1927
Supervision of police by mayor, 1927
APPLING COUNTY.
Commissioners, 1929
Tax levy for future bond issue, 1915, 142;
1922, 325; 1926
Tax rate, 1929
ARAB I.
Election of officers, 1927
Officers, salaries, 1927
773
775
773
524
59
525
778
779
ARLINGTON.
County site of Calhoun removed from Ar-
lington to Morgan, 1929
Morgan city court substituted, 1929
ATHENS.
Street improvements, 1929
550
467
809
ATKINSON COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues established by Acts of 1919 abol-
ished, 1927 476
ATKINSON COUNTY—Cont'd
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues estab-
lished, 1927 477
County tax-commissioner, referendum, 1929 535
Creation of commissioners, 1929 527
Repeal of act creating commissioner's of-
fice, 1929 256, 257
ATLANTA.
Air ports.
Authority to own, 1927 780
Regulation of, 1927 781
Taxation of, 1927 781
Authority to sell certain land, 1929 832
Board of Education.
Annual budget approval, 1927 784
Chairmlan ex officio member, 1927 783
Changes in corporate limits, 1299 830
Charter amendments, 1929 818
City clerk to be clerk of Atlanta, 1929 830
City Court.
Additional judges, 1927 381
Salary of judges, 1927 380
Criminal Court.
Additional judges, 1927 381
Salary of judges increased, 1927 382
East Lake, territorial limits extended to,
1927 793
Exchange of land for park, 1929 830
Georgia School of Technology, appropria-
tions to, 1927 786
Incorporation of municipality so designated,
1929 835
Cities included to be known as boroughs,
1929 835
Lease of land for city purposes, 1927 785
Municipal Court (see heading "Municipal
Court of City of Atlanta").
Park committee made charter committee,
1927 782
Parks, sale or lease of, 1927 783
Pensions for certain retired firemen, 1929.... 843
Planning Commission created, powers, du-
ties, etc., 1927 786
Property, exchange or sale of, 1927 783
Sanitary Department, chief of, term, 1927 786
Sidewalks, authority to lay, 1927 785
Tax assessors, terms of, 1927 780
Territorial limits extended, 1927 799
Territorial extension, 1929 844
Wards increased, 1929 847
Water service, charge for, 1927 782
Zoning regulations, 1927 790
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.
Solicitor-general, salary increased, 1927 .... 739
ATTAPULGUS.
Town limits extended, 1929 848
See "First Presbyterian Church in Au-
gusta."
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AUBURN.
Prisioners, punishment, etc., 1927
Repeal of charter, 1927
804
802
AUGUSTA.
Austell.
New charter, 1929 862
Aviation field, 1929 859
Bond election, 1929 857
Civil service commission, 1929 852
Councilmen, 1929 856
Fire department, 1929 851
Golf course, 1929 859
Lighting plant, 1929 857
Limits extended to aviation and golf course,
1929 859
Planning commission created, duties, 1927 808
Policemen and firemen.
Age limit, 1929 861
Registry of voters, 1927 806
Zoning regulations, 1927 809
AUGUSTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.
Solicitor-general, salary increased, 1929 782
AVONDALE ESTATES.
Town incorporated, 1927 813
BACON COUNTY.
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues
established, 1927 488
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues es-
tablished by Act of 1925 abolished, 1927 487
County court abolished, 1929 370
Superior Court, terms, 1927 177
Tax commissioner established, referendum,
1927 494
BACONTON.
Incorporation, new charter, 1926 72
Public School System established, 1926 74
Street improvements, 1926 73
BAINBRIDGE.
City Court, acquisitions, 1927 390
City manager form of government adopted,
1927 856
School tax, election for, 1927 874
Street improvements, 1927 875
Streets.
Authority to pave, 1926 77
Curbing, sewerage, etc., 1926 79
Paving, bond issue, 1926 85
Cost, execution for, 1926 86
Cost of, 1926 78, 81, 84
Objections, how raised, 1926 81, 87
Publication of ordinance, 1926 79
Treasurer and clerk, consolidated, 1927 855
Tree and park commission created, 1927 .... 855
BALDWIN.
Solicitor's term, 1929 370
BARNESVILLE.
City Court, abolished, 1927 391
Police authority extended to waterworks,
1929 886
Registration of voters, 1929 887
Street improvements, 1927 888
BARNESVILLE—Cont'd
Taxes to build grammar school, 1929
Tax limit increased, 1929
890
890
BARTOW.
Tax-commissioners.
Referendum, 1929 539
BAXLEY.
City Court.
Judge's qualifications, 1927 394
Judge's salary, 1927 393
Street improvements, assessments, bonds,
etc., 1927 902
Charter Amendment, 1927 88
Taxation, charter amendment, 1927 915
Territorial limits extended, 1927 916
BEN HILL COUNTY.
Schools, debts, how paid, 1927 497
BERRIEN COUNTY.
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues.
Election of, 1927 499
Statement of receipts and expenditures,
1927 499
BETHLEHEM.
Election of officers, 1927 917
Mayor, powers, duties, etc., 1927 920
Nuisances, abatement, 1927 919
Officials named, 1927 916
Streets, how opened, 1927 920
BLACKSHEAR.
City Court.
Bond of solicitor, 1929 372
Fines, 1929 375
Practice, 1927 394
Salary of judge, 1929 374
Salary of solicitor, 1929 372
Terms, 1927 394
Sewerage, 1927 928
Street improvements, assessments, bonds,
etc., 1927 921
BLAKELY.
City Court, foreclosures, 1927 396
Terms of court, 1929 377
BLECKLEY COUNTY.
Agricultural and mechanical school estab-
lished, 1927 162
BLUE RIDGE.
School funds from sale of light and water-
works system, 1929
BRADLEY COUNTY.
County Court abolished, 1927
893
397
BRANTLEY COUNTY.
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues es-
tablished, 1927 500
County court abolished, 1929 378
County court abolished, 1927 397
County depository, 1929 545
BROOKS COUNTY.
Reports furnished, 1927 1747
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BROWN MEMORIAL.
Erection of statute, time extended, 1927 1746
BRUNSWICK.
Airport, 1929 894
Aviation promotion, 1927 1750
City Court.
Clerk's salary, 1927 398
Judge's qualifications, 1927 398
Judge's salary, 1927 398
Sheriff's salary, 1927 398
Solicitor's salary, 1927 < 398
Conveyance of property to Board of Educa-
tion, 1927 936
Park and tree commissioner created, 1927.... 933
Pensions for policemen and firemen, 1929.... 895
Powers as to streets, parks, etc., 1929 895
Registration list, 1927 937
Zoning regulations, 1927 929
BRYAN COUNTY.
Depository, 1927 511
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues established, 1927 505
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues established by Acts of 1924 abol-
ished, 1927 . 504
County road duty; repeal, 1929 547
Peace officer, compensations allotted, 1927.... 510
Superior Court, terms, 1927 179
Treasurer, office established, 1927 513
BUFORD.
City court.
Clerk of Court.
Election and terms of office, 1929 381
Jurors pay, 1929 382
Salary of judge, 1929 380
Sheriff.
Election and terms of office, 1929 381
Fees, 1929 381
Street improvements, 1929 899
BURKE COUNTY.
Commissioners.
Bulletin, 1929 548
Election, 1929 548
Old Church, incorporated, 1927 1741
BUTTS COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues, qualifications, elections, duties, etc.,
1925, 565; 1927 514
Reports furnished, 1927 1748
Treasurer, salary, bond, etc., 1916, 376; 1927 518
CAIRO.
City court.
Salary of judge, 1929 383
Paving bonds, 1927 940
Power to dispose of public utilities limited,
1929 903
Territorial limits extended, 1927 939
CALHOUN.
See "Morgan."
Corporate limits, 1929 904
County site removed to Morgan, 1929 550
Franchises for use of streets, 1929 905
CALHOUN—Cont'd
Sale or release of waterworks and lighting
system, 1929 905
CAMDEN COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues, commissioners' districts, number
of, 1927 519
CAMPBELL.
Merger with Fulton.
Referendum, 1929 551
CANTON.
Electricity, water and gas, authority to sell,
1927 941
Franchises in streets, 1929 906
CARROLL COUNTY.
Commissioner's salary increased, 1927 520
Salaries of comlmissioner and clerk, 1929 .... 558
CARROLLTON.
City court.
Clerk's fee for filing suit, 1929 386
Jurisdiction, 1929 385
Clerk's duties, 1929 907
Contracts, 1929 907
Payment, 1929 907
Purchases, 1929 907
Recorder, 1929 , 907
School taxes, 1929 907
Tax collection, 1929 907
CARTERSVILLE.
Charter amendments.
Referendum, 1929 914
Elections, 1929 927
Franchises in streets, 1929 ; 912
Registration of voters, 1929 927
CEDARTOWN.
Corporate limits, 1929 939
Wards, 1929 939
CHAMBLEE.
Municipal fi. fas., 1929 943
CHARLTON COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues established, 1927 529
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues established, Acts 1920 abolished,
1927 529
Commissioners' meetings, 1929 559
CHATHAM COUNTY.
Commissioners.
Powers and duties, etc., 1927 522
Salaries, 1927 521
Educational funds.
Savannah and Chatham educational funds,
1929 1280
Teachers' pensions, 1929 1281
CHATTAHOOCHEE JUDICIAL CIR-
CUIT.
Solicitor-general, salary increased, 1927 741
CHAUNCEY.
Franchises, duration, 1927 942
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CHEATHAM COUNTY.
Bond issue, public road, 1926 22
CHEROKEE COUNTY.
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues, addi-
tional duties, 1927 540
CHEROKEE.
Commissioner's clerk's salary, 1929 561
County depositories, 1929 562
County tax-commissioner, 1929 564
Lease by commissioner, 1929 560
Treasurer, abolished, 1927 540
CHEROKEE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.
Solicitor-general.
Act of 1925 repealed, 1929 785
Salary, 1929 786
CHIPLEY.
Transfer of light fund to sewer fund, 1929.... 945
CHURCHES.
See "First Presbyterian Church in Au-
gusta."
CITY COURT OF ABLAY.
Salary of judge, 1927 378
CITY COURT OF ARLINGTON.
Morgan city court substituted, 1929 467
CITY COURT OF BAINBRIDGE.
Acquisitions, time of filing, 1927 391
CITY COURT OF BARNESVILLE.
Abolished, 1927 391
CITY COURT OF BAXLEY.
Judge, salary, 1927 393
CITY COURT OF BLACKSHEAR.
Bond of solicitor, 1929 372
Fines, 1929 375
Salary of judge, 1929 374
Salary of solicitor, 1929 372
Terms, 1911, 210; 1927 395
CITY COURT OF BLAKELY.
Foreclosures, 1927 396
Terms of court, 1929 377
CITY COURT OF BRUNSWICK.
Judge, salary, 1927 397
CITY COURT OF BUFORD.
Clerk of court.
Election and terms of office, 1929 381
Jurors pay, 1929 382
Salary of judge, 1929 380
Sheriff.
Election and terms of office, 1929 381
Fees, 1929 381
CITY COURT OF CAIRO.
Salary of judge, 1929 383
CITY COURT OF CARROLLTON.
Clerk's fee for filing suit, 1929 386
Jurisdiction, 1929 385
CITY COURT OF DARIEN.
Appeal and error, 1929 418
Appointment of judge, 1929 410
Attachment and garnishment, 1929 414
Bailiffs, 1929 417
Clerks, 1929 411
Contempt, 1929 416
Costs, 1929 412
Creation, 1929 409
Habeas corpus, 1929 413
Judgments and decrees, 1929 414, 415
Juries, 1929 416
Jurisdiction, 1929 410
Jury trial, 1929 413
New .trial, 1929 < 419
Practice of law by judge, 1929 411
Qualification of judge, 1929 410
Records, 1929 415
Scire facias, 1929 414
Solicitors, 1929 411, 419
Suits and processes, 1929 413
Terms of court, 1929 412
Testimony de bene esse, 1929 415
CITY COURT OF DECATUR.
Judge.
Election, 1927 399
Term of office, 1927 399
Solicitor, election, term, 1927 400
CITY COURT OF DOUGLAS.
Pending cases, 1929
... . 422
Salary of judge, 1929 421
Terms of court, 1929 421
CITY COURT OF FAIRBURN.
Attachment and garnishment, 1929 430
Clerks, 1929 427
Court created, 1929 424
Creative act of 1923 repealed, 1929 422
Judges, 1929 425
Pleading and practice, 1929 429
Sheriffs, 1929 427
Solicitors, 1929 426
Terms of court, 1929 429
CITY COURT OF FLOYD COUNTY.
Abolished, 1927 401
CITY COURT OF FORT GAINES.
Abolished, 1927 403
Jurisdiction, 1929 440
CITY COURT OF JESUP.
Deputy sheriff, appointment of, 1916, 252;
1927 405
Salary of judge, 1929 441
CITY COURT OF JONESBORO.
Abolished, 1927 406
Established, 1927 406
Salary of judge, 1929 442
Salary of solicitor, 1929 442
CITY COURT OF LEXINGTON.
Salary of judge, 1929 449
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CITY COURT OF LUDOWICI.
Judge, salary, 1927 422
CITY COURT OF MACON.
Judge, salary, 1927 422
Salaries, 1929 450
CITY COURT OF MILLER.
Indictment, 1929 466
Referendum as to amending act, 1929 ....462, 464
Salaries, 1929 466
CITY COURT OF MORGAN.
Sheriff's cost in prohibition cases, 1927 426
Substituted for city court of Arlington,
1929 467
CITY COURT OF NASHVILLE.
Fines and forfeitures, custody of, 1927 427
Sheriff's cost in prohibition cases, 1927 428
Terms, 1927 428
CITY COURT OF PEMBROKE.
Created, 1927 429
CITY COURT OF POLK COUNTY.
Judge, salary, 1927 446
CITY COURT OF REIDSVILLE.
Fees of clerk and sheriff, 1925, 495; 1927 .... 499
CITY COURT OF SANDERSVILLE.
Fees of clerk and sheriff, 1924, 248; 1927 .... 450
Judge, salary, 1924, 248; 1927 450
CITY COURT OF SAVANNAH.
Attachments, 1927 454
Attachment and garnishment, 1929 469
Clerk, salary, 1927 452
Costs in certain cases, 1927 454
Fees and costs, 1929 469
Fee system abolished, 1927 452
Sheriffs, and deputies, salary, 1927 453
CITY COURT OF SOPERTON.
Judge and solicitor, qualifications, term of
office, 1923, 184; 1927 464
Salary of judge, 1929 477
Salary solicitor, 1929 477
CITY COURT OF SUMMERVILLE.
Court abolished, 1929 480
CITY COURT OF SWAINSBORO.
Judge and solicitor, salary, 1927 467
CITY COURT OF SYLVANIA.
Amending act, 1929 481
Referendum, 1929 481
CITY COURT OF THOMASVILLE.
Fines and forfeitures, 1929 487
Fines and costs, 1929 489
Warrants, 1929 488
CITY COURT OF TIFTON.
Abolished, 1927 469
CITY COURT OF VALDOSTA.
Salary of judge, 1929 492
CITY COURT OF WASHINGTON.
Fees of clerk, 1929
y
496
Fees of sheriff, 1929 496
Judges, 1929 500
Jurisdiction, 1929 498, 499
Pleading and practice, 1929 494
CITY COURT OF WAYCROSS.
Salary of judge, 1929 518
Salary of solicitor, 1929 519
CITY COURT OF WRIGHTSVILLE.
Solicitor, term, 1927 471
Stenographers, 1929 521
Terms of court, 1929 520
Traverse jurors, number, 1927 473
CITY COURTS.
Stenographic 'reporters, 1929 477, 479
CLARKSTON.
Officials, salaries increased, 1914, 578; 1927.. 944
CLAXTON.
Officers, 1929 946
Registration of voters, 1929 946
Street improvements, 1929 946
CLIMAX.
Registration of voters, 1927 945
CLINCH COUNTY.
Boundary lines established, 1927 545
Clerk of court.
Selection by judge, 1929 386
County commissioners.
New board, 1929 568
Primary election, 1929 576
Salary of judge, 1929 386
COBB.
County treasurer's salary, 1929 579
COCHRAN.
Elections, 1927 947
Registration of voters, 1927 947
COFFEE.
Commissioners.
Road districts, 1929 580
961
963
950
COLBERT.
Franchises in streets, 1929
COLIGNY BEACH.
Charter repealed, 1929
Incorporation, charter, 1927
COLLEGE PARK.
Assessments, 1929 963
Corporate limits, 1929 963
Curbing, assessments, etc., 1927 957
Parks, 1929 , 963
Salaries, 1929 963
Sewers, 1929 963
Sewerage connections, 1927 957
COLLINS.
City limits, 1929 970
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COLQUITT.
Mayor's salary, 1927 963
COLQUITT COUNTY.
Appeals from mayor's court, 1929 972
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues.
Salary of chairman, 1927 547
City fencing, 1929 973
City officers' election, 1929 974
Commissioners.
Election, 1929 588
Terms, 1929 588
County treasurer's salary, 1929 590
Salary of clerk, 1927 547
COLUMBIA COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues established, 1927 549
Commissioners.
Road districts, 1929 591
COLUMBUS.
See "Municipal Court of Columbus."
City clerk and marshal, 1929 979
Common boards abolished, 1929 975
Power to furnish water outside of city,
1929 978
Street improvements, 1929 979
Streets.
Fourteenth Street closed, 1927 964
Fourteenth Street, sale or lease of por-
tion, 1927 964
Zoning and planning regulations, 1929 998
COMER.
Franchise on streets, 1929 1004
COMMERCE.
City Board of Registrars created, 1927 969
Reg'stration of voters, 1927 966
Street improvements, bonds, 1927 966
Voters, registration of, 1926 98
CORDELE.
Light and power plant, 1929 1005
Tax assessor, city manager as, 1927 980
CORNELIA.
Commission manager form of government
created, 1927 981
COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT IN CER-
TAIN COUNTIES.
Appeal, 1929 404
Authority of judge, 1929 398
Bond, 1929 400, 406
Certiorari, 1929 404
Clerk of superior court, ex-officio clerk of
criminal court, 1929 398
Contempts, 1929 ..., , 401
Costs in criminal cases, 1929 ...., 407
County to furnish stationery, 1929 399
Court of record, 1929 401
Disqualified cases, 1929 399
Election of judge and solicitor, 1929 396
Fees of clerk, 1929
, 398
Fees of judge, 1929 396
Fees of sheriff, 1929 396
COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT IN CER-
TAIN COUNTIES—Cont'd
Fees of solicitor, 1929 « 397
Fines, 1929
, 407
Indictments, 1929 402
Judgment, execution, levy and sale, 1929 .... 401
Juries, 1929 ...-, 401
Jurisdiction, 1929 394
New trial, 1929 404
Notice of candidacy, 1929 396
Oath of judge, 1929 395
Other laws applicable to court, 1929 400
Place of court, 1929 399
Process, 1929 400
Qualification of judge, 1929 395
Qualification of solicitor, 1929 395
Sheriff, ex-officio clerk of criminal court,
1929 938
Special bailiff, 1929 400
Strikes, 1929 402
Terms of court, 1929 399
Witnesses, 1929 403
COVINGTON.
Public utilities, disposal, 1927 1014
CRAWFORD COUNTY.
Depository, 1927 554
CRAWFORDVILLE.
Election of marshal and night watchman,
1929 • 1010
Treasurer, abolished, 1927 553
CUMMING.
Biennial elections of mayor, 1929 1011
DACULA.
Franchises in streets, 1929 1012
DAHLONEGA.
School tax, 1927 1015
DALLAS.
Franchise, duration, 1927 1016
Paving assessments, 1929 , 1013
Street improvements, assessments, etc., 1927 1018
DARIEN.
Abandonment of parts of streets, 1929 1015
City court.
Appeal and error, 1929 418
Appointment of judge, 1929 410
Attachment and garnishment, 1929 414
Bailiffs, 1929 417
Clerks, 1929 411
Contempt, 1929 416
Costs, 1929 412
Creation, 1929 409
Habeas corpus, 1929 413
Judgments and decrees, 1929 414, 415
Juries, 1929 416
Jurisdiction, 1929 410
Jury trial, 1929 413
New trial, 1929 419
Practice of law by judge, 1929 411
Qualification of judge, 1929 410
Records, 1929 415
Scire facias, 1929 414
Solicitors, 1929 414, 419
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DARIEN—Cont'd
City court—Cont'd
Suits and process, 1929 413
Terms of court, 1929 412
Testimony de bene esse, 1929 415
Elections for mayor and aldermen 1929 1016
Police court sentence, 1929 1018
DAWSON.
School laws amended, 1927 1020
Street improvements, 1918, 1068; 1923, 605;
1927 1025
DECATUR.
City Court.
Judges, how chosen, 1927 399
Officers, term of office and election, 1927.. 399
Solicitor, how chosen, 1927 399
Corporate limits extended, 1929 1019
Territorial limits extended, 1927 1044
DeKALB COUNTY.
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, sal-
aries, 1927 555
Tax commissioner, office established, 1927. ...558
Tax receiver, office abolished, 1927 558
Treasurer, repeal of act abolishing office,
1915, 210; 1927 561
DENTON.
New city charter.
Referendum, 1929 1023
DEXTER.
Franchises in streets, 1929 1038
DODGE.
Commissioner's salary, 1929 593
DONALSONVILLE.
Street improvements, 1927 1048
DOOLY.
Commissioners.
Amending act, 1929 594
DORAVILLE.
Commissioners' qualifications, 1929 1039
Corporate limits extended, 1929 1039
DOUGHERTY COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues, increase of salaries, 1927 563
City Court of Albany, judge's salary in-
creased, 1927 378
Superior Court, terms, 1927 180
DOUGLAS.
Ad valorem tax, 1929 1040
Agricultural and mechanical school estab-
lished, 1927 169
City court.
Pending cases, 1929 422
Salary of judge, 1929 >, 421
Terms of court, 1929 421
School tax, 1927 1075
Street improvements, 1927 1061
Tax exemption for industries, 1929 1040
Tax returns, 1929 1040
DUBLIN.
Bonds, payment, sinking fund, 1927 1076
Light and water commission abolished,
1927 1076
EARLY COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners.
Act of 1917 repealed, 1927 564
Number, 1927 564
Commissioners.
Board created, 1929 { 598
County tax-commissioner, 1929 599
County treasurer's salary, 1929 601
Tax commissioner, office established, sala-
ries, etc., 1927 566
Tax-commissioner's bond premium, 1929.... 602
Tax receiver, office abolished, 1927 566
EASTERN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.
Fee system abolished, 1927 743
Fees, statements of, 1927 745
Solictior-general.
Clerk to, 1927 746
Salary, 1927 744
EAST LAKE.
Charter repealed, 1927 1078
Incorporation, new charter, 1927 1079
EASTMAN.
Board of education, 1929 1050
Cleaning and draining of lots, 1927 1094
Paving assessments, etc., 1927 1091
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
1927 1095
EAST POINT.
Fire Department, regulation, 1927 1087
Pensions, 1929 1044
Salaries of mayor and councilmen, 1929 ....1044
EAST THOMASTON.
Corporate limits, 1929 c 1049
Territorial limits extended, 1927 1089
EATONTON.
School appropriations.
Referendum, 1929 1053
ECHOLS COUNTY.
Superior Court, terms, 1927 180
EDISON.
New charter, 1929 1055
EDMUND BLACK, JR.
Legitimization, 1929 1478
ELBERT COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners, election, term of
office, 1927, 570; 1927 571
Clerk's salary, 1929 602
Tax-commissioners.
Bond, 1929 602
ELBERTON.
City wards, repeal of act, 1921, 932; 1927.... 1106
Debts and sales requiring approval by
popular vote, 1929 1089
School fund, payment of, 1927 1107
School tax, 1929 1090
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ELLIJAY.
Elections, 1927 1110
Franchises, grants, 1927 1113
Street paving, assessments, etc., 1927 1114
Taxation, rate, 1927 1114
EMANUEL COUNTY.
Depository, referendum, 1927 574
Treasurer, office abolished, referendum, 1927 574
EMERSON.
Election of mayor and aldermen, 1927 1120
EVANS COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues.
Salaries, 1915, 122; 1927 577
Section 13, Acts 1915, repealed, 1915, 222;
1927 576
County depository changed, 1929 604
Road tax, when collected, 1927 578
FAIRBURN.
City court.
Attachment and garnishment, 1929 430
Clerks, 1929 427
Court created, 1929 424
Creative act of 1923 repealed, 1929 422
Judges, 1929 425
Pleading and practice 429
Sheriffs, 1929 427
Solicitors, 1929 426
Terms of court, 1929 429
Mayor's term of office, 1929 1091
Part of Smith street closed for school
ground, 1929 1092
FAIRFAX.
Charter, repeal of, 1927 1121
School system abolished, 1927 1123
FAIRMOUNT.
Incorporation, new charter, 1927 1125
FAYETTE.
County treasurer, 1929 606
FAYETTEVILLE.
Treasurer, bond, 1927 1157
FICKLEN.
Charter, repeal of, 1927 1158
FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF
AUGUSTA, 1929 1476
Indebtedness, 1927 1740
FITZGERALD.
Firemen and policemen, regulation of, 1927..1162
Official publication, rates, 1927 1164
School tax, repealed, 1927 1159
FLOYD COUNTY.
Bridge in Rome.
Referendum, 1929 607
City Court of, solicitors office abolished,
1927 401
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues, es-
tablished, referendum, 1927 580
FOREST PARK.
Term of mayor, 1929 1093
Time of election, 1929 1093
FORSYTH COUNTY.
County tax-commissioner, 1929 611
Superior Court, terms, 1927 181
FORT GAINES.
City Court, abolished, 1927 403
City court.
Jurisdiction, 1929 440
FORT VALLEY.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 .1165
FULTON COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues.
Clerk, salary, how paid, 1927 589
Public parks, authority to establish, 1927 590
Building regulation, 1929 614
Merger with Campbell.
Referendum, 1929 551
Water and sewerage system, 1929 621
Zoning, power as to, 1927 591
GAINESVILLE.
Authority to sell lighting equipment.
Referendum, 1929 1095
Industrial and publicity board created, 1926 101
GLASCOCK COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues, repealed, referendum, 1927 593
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues es-
tablished, 1927 595
GLENNVILLE.
Utilities, sale of, 1927 .1178
GLYNN COUNTY.
Airport, 1929 894
Building regulations, 1927 602
Eminent domain, power of, 1927 610
Marsh lands granted, 1927 609
GORDON.
Commissioner.
Amending act, 1929 628
Tax assessors, appointment of, 1927 1180
GORDON HOME.
Memorial, 1927 1748
GRADY COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues, number, election, term, 1927 610
GREENVILLE.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 1181
GRIFFIN.
Corporate limits, 1929 1098
Corporate limits extended, 1929 1097
Fire department salaries, 1929 1097
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GRIFFIN—Cont'd
Salaries of policemen, 1929 1098)
Water and electricity, authority to supply,
1927 1196
GWINNETT.
Tax-commissioner.
Referendum, 1929 630
HABERSHAM COUNTY.
Deer killing prohibited, 1927 613
HAHIRA.
Ad valorem tax rate, 1929 1101
HALL COUNTY.
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues.
Election of, 1911, 439; 1914, 293; 1927 614
Salaries, increase of, 1911, 439; 1914, 293;
1927 614
HAPEVILLE.
Aldermen, number, 1927 1197
Corporate limits reduced, 1929 1102
Officials, election, 1927 1197
Recorder, 1929 1102
Street-tax on women, 1929 1102
Taxation, females, 1927 1198
Territorial limit extended, 1927 1199
HARALSON.
Commissioner.
Referendum, 1929 633
HARTWELL.
Street improvements.
Charter amendments, 1926 104
HA.WKINSVILLE.
Boundary, change of, 1927 1200
City attorney, 1929 1108
Codification, 1929 1108
New form of government.
Referendum, 1929 1103
Nuisances, 1929 1108
Pay of officers, 1929 1108
Publication of minutes, 1929 1108
Recorder, 1929 1108
Repeal o>f commission government.
Referendum, 1929 1112
Sewerage, 1929 1108
HAZLEHURST.
Election and discharge of officers, 1929 1114
Mayor's duties, 1929 1114
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 1201
HEARD COUNTY.
County tax-comimissioner, 1929 638
School debt, authority to use tax money to
pay, 1927 159
HENRY.
Tax-commissioner.
Salary, 1929 642
HOLLY SPRINGS.
Taxation, rate, 1927 1214
HOMERVILLE.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 1215
Voters, registration of, 1926 114
INDIAN SPRINGS.
State park reservation, 1927 1749
IRWIN COUNTY.
Superior Court, terms, 1927 182
JACKSON.
Street improvements, charter amendment,
1926 116
JEFF DAVIS COUNTY.
Superior Court, terms, 1927 183
JEFFERSON COUNTY.
Ad valorem tax limit repealed, 1929 1115
Treasurer, office created, 1927 616
JENKINS COUNTY.
Superior Court, terms, 1927 184
JESUP.
City Court.
Deputy sheriffs, 1916, 252; 1927 404
Disqualification of judge, 1927 404
Salary of judge, 1929 441
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 1228
JONESBORO.
City Court.
Clerk of, 1927 409
Established, 1927 406
Executions, etc., 1927 412
Judge, qualifications, 1927 408
Judge, salary of, 1927 408
Judge's common appointment, 1927 407
Jurisdiction, 1927 406
Procedure, 1927 411
Salary of judge, 1929 442
Salary of solicitor, 1929 442
Sheriff, duties, etc., 1927 410
Solicitor, qualifications and salary, 1927.... 408
Terms, 1927 411
JUDGES.
Powers in other city courts, 1929 443
KINGSLAND.
Charter, repeal of, 1927 1240
Incorporation, new charter, 1927 1241
LaFAYETTE.
Recorder, mayor as, 1927 1276
Sewerage, 1927 1276
LAKELAND.
Ad valorem tax, 1929 1118
Operation of railroad, busses, 1929 1118
LAMAR COUNTY.
Advisory board created, 1927 617
City Court, abolished, 1927 391
County advisory board, 1929 644
County commissioners.
Referendum, 1929 646
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LAMAR COUNTY—Cont'd
Superior Court, terms, 1927 184
Tax Commissioner, compensation of, 1925,
668; 1926 60
LANIER.
Jurisdiction, 1929 444
LAURENS COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues, monthly reports, 1927 621
Board of Commissioners, term of office,
1919, 677; 1925, 687; 1927 622
LEARY.
New town charter, 1929 1121
LEE.
Commissioners increased, 1929 65b
Fur-bearing animals, 1929 656
LEESBURG.
Taxes, date due, 1927 1278
LEGITIMIZATION.
Legitimatizing Edmund Black, Jr., 1929 ....1478
LENOX.
Elections, time of, 1927 1279
Taxes, 1929 1156
Taxation, rate, 1927 1279
LEXINGTON.
City court.
Salary of judge, 1919 657
LIBERTY.
County live-stock dealers, 1929 657
LITHONIA.
Taxation, emergency, 1927 1281
LOUISVILLE.
Street improvements, charter amendment to
make, 1925, 1097; 1926 125
LOVEJOY.
Town marshal, 1929 1157
LOWNDES COUNTY.
Bond issue for college, 1926 25
Commissioners' meetings, 1929 663
LUDOWICI.
City Court, judge's salary increased, 1927 .... 422
LUMBER CITY.
Franchises, grant of, 1927 1283
LUMPKIN.
Election of mayor, aldermen and marshal,
1929 1159
LUTHERVILLE.
Texas 1929 1163
MACON.
Advertising medium, 1927 1355
MACON—Cont'd
Aldermen, qualifications, compensation, etc.,
1927 1307
Aldermen's pay, 1929 1165
Annexation of territory.
Referendum, 1929 1169'
Auditorium commission created, 1927 1353
Boundaries, 1927 1284
Bridges, 1927 1335
Railroad companies to erect, 1927 1330
Building inspector, duties, 1927 1310
Cemetery reserve, protection of, 1927 1356
City Attorney, duties, 1927 1320
City Court.
Judges salary, future increases same as
judges of Superior Court, 1927 422
Judge's salary increased, 1927 422
Salaries, 1929 450'
City reserves, power to lease or sell, 1927.... 1335
Civil Service rules, power to make, 1927 1322
Clerk, duties, 1927 1309
Elections.
Managers of, 1927 1299'
Material, mayor to furnish, 1927 1299
Oath, challenge of, 1927 1300
Preservation of order at polls, 1927 1299
Returns and contest, 1927 130O
Employees, charges, how preferred, 1927 1320'
Encroachments, power to grant, 1927 1334
Encroachment on street, 1929 1165
Fireman's and policemen's hours, 1929 1179*
Health, Board of, created, 1927 1351
Hospital, 1927 1347
Hospital commission to operate anti-tuber-
cular sanatarium, 1929 1180
Incorporation of greater Macon, 1929 1185
Insurance of employees, 1929 1165
Land, conveyance of, 1927 1357
Libraries, appropriations to, 1927 1355
License, 1927 1336
Marshal, duties, 1927 1309
Mayor.
Duties, 1927 1306
Qualifications, 1927 1306
Salary, 1927 1306
Term, 1929 1165
Mayor and aldermen.
Election of, 1927 1298
General powers, 1927 1301
Powers, 1927 1324
Vacancies, how filled, 1927 1299
Municipal court of Macon.
See "Municipal Court of Macon."
Night schools, appropriations to, 1927 1355
Officers, removal of, 1927 1311
Parks.
Commission established, 1927 1336
Incorporated limits outside of, 1927 1335
Paving.
Assessments, etc., 1927 1325
Bonds, 1927 1304
Pensions provided, how obtained, etc.,
1927 1322
Playground commission created, 1927 1354
Police and fire committees, powers of,
1927 1319
Police department, organization and pow-
ers, 1927 1315
Public works, construction of, 1927 1335
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MACON—Cont'd
Recorder.
Powers of, 1927 1312
Qualifications, 1927 1312
Recorder's court.
Certiorari from, 1927 1313
Clerk of, 1927 1314
Cost, 1927 1314
Jurisdiction, 1927 1312
Registrars, duties, 1927 1295
Registration of voters, 1929 1165
Service pipes lowered, 1927 1333
Sewers, bond issue, 1927 1304
Streets, how opened, 1927 1334
Voters.
Qualifications, 1927 1297
Registration of, 1927 1295
Voting.
Illegal, 1927 1298
Tax assessors, board created, 1927 1337
Tax fi. fas., collection of, 1927 1332
Taxation.
Concealing property, penalty, 1927 1339
General powers, 1927 1336
Returns, 1927 1339
Unreturned property, assessment of,
1927 1338
Taxes.
Collected, how, 1927 1340
When payable, 1927 1339
Territorial limits extended, election, 1927.... 1290
Treasurer, duties, 1927 1309
Wards, new, 1927 1294
Water Commissioners, Board of, 1927 1340
Water commissioners salary, 1929 1191
Water works, authority to operate, 1927 1340
Weights and measures, inspection of, 1927. ...1311
MACON JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.
Solicitor-general, payment of fees to treas-
urer, 1927 747
MADISON COUNTY.
County tax commissioner, office created,
1927 623
School district established, 1927 148
Tax receiver abolished, 1927 623
MANASSAS.
Mayor's court, 1929 1192
MANCHESTER.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
MARSHALLVILLE.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 1375
1927 ,1360
MANSFIELD.
Board of Education, vacancies, how filled,
1927 1373
Voters, registration, 1927 1374
MARIETTA.
Board of education.
Income, 1929 1194
Business license tax, maximum and mini-
mum, 1925, 1176; 1926 132
School tax, increase of, 1920, 1233; 1926 134
MARION.
Tax-comimissioner's bond premium, 1929 .... 664
MAYSVILLE.
Tax sales, 1927
MERIWETHER COUNTY.
Treasurer, salary increased, 1927
.1382
630
MIDWAY.
Commissioners, number, 1927 1400
Indebtedness, authority to make, 1927 1402
Marshall, jurisdiction, 1927 1402
MILLEDGEVILLE.
Street improvements, Charter Amendment,
1925, 1199; 1926 138
MILLEN.
Street improvements.
Cost of, 1906, 868; 1926 140
Paving, notice of, bonds, etc., 1906, 868;
1926 143
. Terms, assessments, etc., 1927 1404
MILLER COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues, created, 1927 631
City court.
Indictment, 1929 t 466
Referendum as to amending act, 1929 462, 464
Salaries, 1929 466
Commissioners.
Amending act, 1929 673
County commissioners.
Election, 1929 674
Referendum as to repeal of act, 1929 675
Referendum as to abolishing court, 1929 .... 459
MITCHELL COUNTY.
Board of County Commissioners.
Duties, 1927 635
Election, 1927 633
Term of office, 1927 635
Dog law repealed, 925; 718; 1927 636
MONROE COUNTY.
County school district tax, 1919 677
Permanent registration of voters, 1919 1196
Vital statistics, fees of local registrar, 1914,
157; 1919, 273; 1927 637
MONTEZUMA.
Charter, 1929 1199
MONTICELLO.
Sale of city property, 1929 1210
MONTROSE.
Town charter, 1929 1212
MORGAN.
City Court, sheriff's costs in liquor cases,
1927 426
City court substituted for city court of Ar-
lington, 1929 467
County site of Calhoun removed to Arling-
ton, 1929 550
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MOULTRIE.
Sanitary limits, 1927 1415
School commissioners, election, 1927 1416
Street improvements, Charter Amended,
1913, 1062; 1926 146
MOUNTAIN CITY.
Animals at large, 1929 1232
Boundaries, 1929 „ 1232
Council committees, 1929 1232
MOUNTAIN PARK.
Incorporated, charter, 1927 1418
MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY OF
ATLANTA.
DeKalb Division.
Appeal, 1929 368
Clerk, appointment and duties, 1927 387
Cost deposit, 1927 385
Court room, 1927 388
Default judgments, 1927 387
Disqualified case, 1929 369
Dockets, 1929 369
Hearing by consent, 1929 369
Judges, 1929 368
Qualifications, 1929 369
Jurisdiction, 1929 368
Jurisdiction enlarged, 1927 383
Jury, trial by judge without, 1927 386
New trial, 1929 368
Practice, rules of, 1927 387
Qualification of judges, 1927 383
Terms of court, 1929 368
Exceptions, time of filing, 1927 388
Jurors, number to be drawn, 1927 389
Pay of, 1927 389
MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY OF
COLUMBUS.
Additional officers, 1929 391
Amending act, 1929 387
Bonds, 1929 393
Costs, 1929 389
Default, 1929
,
392
Deputy clerks and marshals, 1929 391
Jurisdiction of municipal court, 1929 388
Criminal jurisdiction, 1929 389
Justice's courts abolished, 1929 388
Procedure, 1929 389
Salary of judge, 1929 393
Service of process, 1929 389
Terms of court, 1929 392
Transfer of cases, 1929 289
MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY OF MA-
CON.
Garnishment, 1929 458
Jurisdiction, 1929 452, 459
Jury, 1929 j 454
Justice's courts abolished, 1929 452
Procedure, 1929 453
Salaries.
Clerk, 1927 425
Clerks, 1929 457
Deputy clerks, 1927 425
Deputy sheriffs, 1927 426
Judge, 1927 424
Sheriffs, 1927 425
MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY OF MA-
CON—Cont'd
Sheriffs, 1929 456, 457
Subordinate officials, 1929 456
MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY OF SA-
VANNAH.
Clerks, additional clerks, 1927 462
Costs, 1929 471
Judgments, default, 1927 458
Jurisdiction increased, 1927 456
Pleading, practice, etc., 1927 457
Salaries.
Clerks, bailiffs, etc., 1927 463
Judges, 1927 462
MURRAY.
Commissioners of road and 'revenue repealed,
1929 678
County commissioners, 1929 678
MUSCOGEE COUNTY.
County tax commissioner, office created,
1927 638
Tax receiver and tax collector, office abol-
ished, 1927 638
McCAYSVILLE.
Bond issue, 1927 1395
School buildings, bonds, 1927 1393
Voters, registration, qualifications, etc.,
1927 1384
Water works and sewerage, 1927 1390
McDUFFIE COUNTY.
Superior Court, terms, 1927 175
McINTOSH COUNTY.
Bonded indebtedness increased, 1926 28
Catfish, manner and method of taking,
1927 626
County dog law.
Referendum, 1929 665
County live-stock dealers, 1929 667
Tax collector and tax receiver, abolished,
1927 627
Tax commissioner, office created, 1927 628
McRAE.
Public utilities.
Proceeds of sale, 1927 1398
Sale of, 1927 1397
Real estate, purchase of, 1918, 745;
1927 1396
Street improvements, Charter Amendment,
1918, 745; 1925, 1181; 1926 137
NASHVILLE.
City Court of, collection and disbursement
of fines, 1927 427
Mayor and aldermen, election, 1927 1426
Street improvements, charter amendment,
1910, 689; 1926 160
NEWBORN.
Streets, Academy Street closed, 1927 1429
NEWNAN.
Airplane landing field, 1929 1235
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NEWNAN—Cont'd
Condemnation of property, 1929 1237
Recorder's court, 1927 1430
Street improvements, 1927 1430
Terms, assessments, etc., 1927 1431
Zoning and planning laws, 1929 1239
NICHOLLS.
School building, bonds, 1927 1444
OAK PARK.
Town charter.
Referendum, 1929 1241
OCHLOCKNEE.
Animals running at large, 1929 1246
Voters, registration of, 1927 1446
OCILLA.
Mayor and aldermen, election, 1927 1460
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
etc., 1927 1448
Taxation, rate, 1927 1460
OCONEE.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Chairman's salary, 1929 682
OGLETHORPE COUNTY.
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues,
bond of, 1927 643
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues.
Clerk, appointment and salary, 1927 643
School district established, 1927 148
PALMETTO.
Elections, 1927 1464
Mayor and aldermen, election, terms,
1927 1462
Public utilities, sale of, 1927 1465
Road duty, age limit, 1927 1464
Water and sewerage, bonds, 1927 1464
PAULDING COUNTY.
Superior Court, terms, 1927 185
PAVO.
Officials, election, 1927 1465
PEACH COUNTY.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Referendum, 1929 683
Treasurer, salary, 1927 645
PELHAM.
School tax, 1927 1470
PEMBROKE.
City Court.
Established, 1927 429
Executions, etc., 1927 436
Judges, etc., qualifications, 1927 429
Jurisdiction, 1927 429
Procedure, 1927 435
Referendum, 1927 429
PERRY.
Street improvements, bonds for, 1926 173
Ga—23
PINEHURST.
Encroachments, 1927 1484
Nuisances, abatement, 1927 1484
Schools, bonds, 1927 1485
Street improvements, notice, bonds, asses-
ments, etc., 1927 : 1472
Taxation, 1927 1487
Voters, registration, 1927 1482
PINE PARK.
School law repealed, 1927 1472
POLK COUNTY.
City Court.
Judge's salary increased, 1927 446
Judge's term of office, 1927 446
PULASKI COUNTY.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Recall, 1929 696
Superior Court, terms, 1927 186
Treasurer's office abolished, 1927 646
Treasurer, ordinary as, 1927 646
QUITMAN.
City Court.
Judge's salary increased, 1927 448
. Judge's term of office, 1927 448
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Amending act, 1929 697
Street improvements, paving, notice of
bonds, etc., 1926 185
Taxes, additional, 1927 1492
Treasurer, salary increased, 1927 647
RABUN COUNTY.
Deer killing prohibited, 1927 613
Exempt from fence law, 1929 699
Squirrel hunting, 1929 700
Superior Court, terms, 1927 187
RANGER. •
Ad valorem tax, 1929 1248
Automobile speed, 1929 1248
Street-tax, 1929 1248
REIDSVILLE.
City Court, clerks, etc., fees of, 1927 449
RICEBORO.
Incorporation, charter, 1927 1493
RICHMOND COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues, jurisdiction, 1927 649
Commissioners and clerk.
Salaries, 1929 711
County Board of Education.
Bond issue, 1929 700
Elections, 1929 703
Powers, 1929 703
Qualification, 1929 i 703
School books, 1929 703
Secretary, term of office, 1927 648
Secretary, 1929 709
Terms, 1929 703
RINCON.
Incorporation, charter, 1927 1497
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ROCKLEDGE.
Town charter repealed, 1939
ROCKMART.
City limits, 1929
.1249
.1250
ROME.
Airport, 1929 , 1254
City manager's salary, 1929 1254
Corporate limits, 1929 1254
Floyd county bridge.
Referen.dumi, 1929 607
Improvements, 1929 1254
New ward, 1929 1254
School district, West Rome, 1927 1512
Streets, closing, 1927 1512
Tax rates, 1929 1254
Territorial limits extended, 1927 1503
Voters, registration, 1927 1505
ROSSVILLE.
Water and sewerage, 1927 1514
Zoning regulations, 1927 1514
ROSWELL.
Schools, taxation, 1927 1516
RUTLEDGE.
Franchises in streets, 1929 1277
SANDERSVILLE.
City Court, judge's salary increased, 1927 450
Elections, voters, 1927 1523
School-tax increase, 1929 1278
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
1927 1517
Territorial limits extended, 1927 1521
SASSER.
Water and lights, bonds, 1927 1525
SAVANNAH.
Air port, established, 1927 1531
Appraisers, 1929 1281
City court, fee system abolished, 1927 452
City court.
Attachment and garnishment, 1929 469
Engineer, duties, 1927
Fees and costs, 1929 469
Municipal Court.
See "Municipal Court City of Savan-
nah."
Paving, assessments, etc., 1927 1530
Sewerage connections, 1927 1531
Streets.
Closing 197
Sale of, 1927 1535
Territorial limits extended, 1927 1526
Viaduct, contract confirmed, 1927 1537
Zoning and planning regulations, 1927 ....1534
Educational funds.
Savannah and Chatham educational funds,
1^29 1280
Fees, 1929 1281
Fire extinguishing outside city, 1929 1281
Flying field, 1929 1281
Municipal court.
See "Municipal Court of Savannah."
Pay of commissioners, 1929 1281
Recorder's salary, 1929 1281
SAVANNAH—Cont'd
Teachers' pensions, 1929 1281
Water, 1929 1281
Zoning, 1929 1281
SAVANNAH BEACH, TYBEE ISLAND.
Corporate limits, 1929 ,...1380
Corporate name of Tybee changed, 1929 1380
SCREVEN COUNTY.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Road work, etc., 1929 716
Treasurer, salary increased, 1927 653
SILVERTOWN.
City charter, 1929 1287
SMYRNA.
Water works and sewerage bonds, etc.,
1929 1539
Water works and sewerage, bonds, etc.,
1927 1552
SOCIAL CIRCLE.
Street improvements, 1929 1299
SOPERTON.
City Court.
Judge's qualifications, term, 1927 464
Judge's salary increased, 1927 465
Salary of judge, 1929 477
Salary of solicitor, 1929 477
Solicitor's duties, terms, etc., 1927 467
SPALDING.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Salaries, 1929 718
SPARKS.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 .1565
SPARTA.
School tax, 1929 1308
STENOGRAPHIC REPORTERS.
City courts, 1929 477, 479
STATESBORO.
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 .1572
STEPHENS.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Amending act, 1929 719
School, election of trustees, 1927 173
STEWART COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues, old law abolished, 1927 653
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues
created, 1927 654
Depository, 1927 666
Treasurer's office abolished, 1927 666
STONE MOUNTAIN.
New charter, 1929 1309
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SUMMERVILLE.
City court.
Court abolished, 1929 480
SWAINSBORO.
City Court, judge's and solicitor's salary
increased, 1927 467
School district, act creating repealed, 1904,
323, 1926 198
School properties, sale of, 1926 199
School, Public System abolished, 1905, 526;
1912, 1421; 1926 198
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
etc., 1927 1585
SWORDS.
Charter repealed, 1927 1601
SYLVANIA.
City court.
Amending act, 1929 481
Referendum, 1929 481
SYLVESTER.
Cemetery, bonds, 1927 1602
Streets, condemnation, 1927 1604
TALBOTTON.
Tax rate.
Referendum, 1929 1348
TALIAFERRO COUNTY.
Commissioners.
Election of, 1927 672
Number, 1927 671
Salary, 1927 672
Term of office, 1927 671
Patrol act repealed, 1927 672
TALLAPOOSA.
Permanent registration of voters, 1929 1351
TARRYTOWN.
New charter, 1929 1352
TATTNALL COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues.
Created, 1927 674
Old law repealed, 1915, 365; 1919, 744;
1922, 418; 1927 674
Commutation of road tax, 1929 720
TELFAIR.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Chairman's salary, 1929 721, 722
TENNILLE.
Recorder's court, 1929 1357
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
etc., 1927 1606
Water commissioners.
Board created, 1929 1360
THOMASTON.
Condemnation of property, 1929 1365
Corporate limits extended, 1929 1367
THOMASVILLE.
City court.
Fines and costs, 1929 489
Fines and forfeitures, 1929 487
Warrants, 1929 488
City officers, 1929 1370
Commission form of government estab-
lished, 1927 1612
Land for airports, 1929 1368
Park and tree commission established, 1927.... 1626
Pensions for city employees.
Referendum, 1929 , 1372
Powers as to streets, nuisances, etc., 1929
1373, 1374
Voters, registration, 1927 1629
THOMSON.
Incorporation, new charter, 1927 1631
THUNDERBOLT.
Water connections, 1927 1673
TIFT COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and Rev-
enues.
Clerk, salary, 1927 684
Election of, 1927 685
Purchasing agents, authority repealed,
1927 682
Superior Court, terms, 1927 188
Tax collector and tax receiver, office abol-
ished, 1927 686
Tax commissioner, office created, 1927 686
TIFT.
Tax-commissioner's bond, 1929 723
TIFTON.
City Court, abolished, 1927 469
City manager, 1929 1376
Election, 1929 1376
TOOMBS COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues.
Act of 1912 repealed, 1929 724
Commissioners created, 1929 725
Commissioners district, 1927 692
Qualifications, 1927 691
County road act repealed, 1929 730
Superior Court, terms, 1927 175
TOOMESBORO.
Chain-gang, 1929 1377
Corporate limits, 1927 1673
Corporate limits, 1929 1377
TOWNS COUNTY.
Exempt from fence law, 1929 731
Fence and stock law, exempt from, 1927 .... 693
Treasurer.
Office established, 1927 694
Old law abolished, 1927 694
TROUP COUNTY.
Depository, 1927 700
Tax-commissioner's bond, 1929 732
Tax commissioner, office created, 1927 695
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TROUP COUNTY—Cont'd
Tax receiver and tax collector, office abol-
ished, 1927 695
Treasurer's office abolished, 1927 700
TURNER COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues, referendum for, 1927 702
Superior court, terms, 1927 188
TWIGGS COUNTY.
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues, ref-
erendum, 1927 7.13
Referendum, 1929 734
TYBEE.
Advertising, appropriations, 1927 1675
Corporate limits, 1929 1380
Corporate name changed to "Savannah
Beach," Tyeree Island, 1929 , 1380
Piers, authority to build, 1927 1676
Recorder, 1927 1674
Weeds, cutting, 1927 1675
UNADILLA.
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
etc., 1927 1677
Voters, registration, 1927 1677
UNION CITY.
Street improvements, cost, bonds, etc., 1926 206
UNION COUNTY.
Treasurer's salary increased, 1927 724
UPSON COUNTY.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Amending act, 1929 , 745
Depository, 1927 725
Treasurer's office abolished, 1927 725
VALDOSTA.
Bond issue for college, 1926 25
Building and zoning regulations, 1929 1381
City court.
Salary of judge, 1929 492
Sewerage, 1927 1686
Time for paying taxes, 1929 1389, 1390
Transfer of electric-plant fund to general
funds, 1929 1391
Water mains, 1927 1689
VIDALIA.
Corporate limits extended, 1929 1392
School tax, 1925, 1530; 1926 207
VIENNA.
Taxation, assessments, 1927 1693
WACO.
Number of councilman, 1929 1394
Terms of mayor and councilmen, 1929 1394
WADLEY.
Street improvements, notice, bonds, etc.,
1926 209
WALTON.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Act of 1917 repealed, 1929 746
Creation of board, 1929 747
WARE COUNTY.
Boundary lines established, 1927 545
Commissioners of road and 'revenue.
Amending act, 1929 755
WAYESBORO.
Charter repealed, 1929 1395
WARSAW.
Tax, ad valorem, 1921, 1122; 1926 220
WASHINGTON COUNTY.
Board of Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues, salary of, 1927 727
City court.
Fees of clerk, 1929 496
Fees of sheriff, 1929 496
Judges, 1929 500
Jurisdiction, 1929 498, 499
Pleading and practice, 1929 494
County attorney, old law repealed, 1927 728
New charter, 1929 1396
WATKINSVILLE.
Charter amendments, 1929 1422
WAYCROSS.
Board of Education, number, term, 1927. ...1701
City cou'rt.
Salary of judge, 1929 518
Salary of solicitor, 1929 519
Commission form of government abolished,
1929 1437
Commissioners, election, 1927 1699
Corporate limits changed, 1929 1450
Elections, 1929 1461
Marshal, 1929 1453
Officers, etc., 1929 1437
Officers of recorder and city attorney sep-
arated, 1929 1452
Permanent registration of voters, 1929 1461
Recorder and city attorney.
Salaries, 1929 1452
Salaries of recorder and city attorney, 1929 ..1452
Tax-assessors, 1929 1453
Teachers, pensions, 1927 1699
Wards, 1929 1437, 1461
WAYNE COUNTY.
See "Jesup."
Fishing regulated, 1927 729
WAYNESBORO.
Voters, registration, 1927 1703
WHEELER COUNTY.
Commissioner of Roads and Revenues,
clerk's salary, 1927 730
Tax collector.
Commissions, 1927 734
Duties, 1927 733
Office created, 1927 731
Tax commissioner, law repealed, 1927 737
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WHEELER COUNTY—^Cont'd
Tax receiver.
Duties, 1927 735
Office created, 1927 731
Salary, 1927 736
Treasurer.
Office created, 1927 733
Old law repealed, 1927 737
WHIGHAM.
Assessors, 1929 1471
Clerk and treasurer, 1929 1471
Registration, 1929 1471
Street improvements, assessments, etc.,
1927 1704
Taxes, 1929 1471
WHITE.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Creation of 'board, 1929 757
WHITFIELD.
Commissioners of road and revenue.
Referendum of repeal, 1929 764, 776
WILKES.
County tax-commissioner, 1929 777
WOODBINE.
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
etc., 1927 1716
WRENS.
Street improvements, bonds, assessments,
etc., 1927 1728
WRIGHTSVILLE.
City Court.
Jurors, how drawn, 1927 473
Solicitor, term of office, 1927 471
Stenographers, 1929 521
Terms of court, 1929 520
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